[Senate Hearing 114-779]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-779
REVIEW OF RESOURCES, PRIORITIES AND
PROGRAMS IN THE FISCAL YEAR 2017
STATE DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN
HEMISPHERE, TRANSNATIONAL
CRIME, CIVILIAN SECURITY,
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND GLOBAL WOMEN'S ISSUES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 26, 2016
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
30-219 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Rubio, Hon. Marco, U.S. Senator from Florida..................... 1
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California................ 2
Hogan, Elizabeth, Acting Assistant Administrator, Latin America
and Caribbean Bureau, USAID, Washington, DC.................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Palmieri, Francisco, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 10
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Malinowski, Hon. Tomasz, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 13
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to additional questions submitted by Senator David
Perdue to Elizabeth Hogan...................................... 36
Responses to additional questions submitted by Senator Marco
Rubio to Francisco Palmieri.................................... 42
Responses to additional questions submitted by Senator David
Perdue to Francisco Palmieri................................... 44
Responses to additional questions submitted by Senator Marco
Rubio to Tomasz Malinowski..................................... 51
Responses to additional questions submitted by Senator David
Perdue to Tomasz Malinowski.................................... 56
(iii)
REVIEW OF RESOURCES, PRIORITIES AND
PROGRAMS IN THE FISCAL YEAR 2017
STATE DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 26, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational
Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights,
and Global Women's Issues,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Marco Rubio,
chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Rubio [presiding], Gardner, Cardin,
Boxer, Kaine, and Markey.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Rubio. Good morning. This is a hearing of the
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime,
Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's
Issues.
The purpose of this hearing is to review the resources,
priorities, and programs in the fiscal year 2017 budget request
from the President and the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of
Western Hemisphere Affairs and the Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, as well as the USAID's Bureau for Latin
America and the Caribbean.
We will have an official panel with three witnesses: Mr.
Tom Malinowski, who is the Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Mr. Francisco Palmieri, who
is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Western Hemisphere Affairs; Ms. Elizabeth Hogan, who is the
Acting Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the
Caribbean at the U.S. Agency for International Development. And
I want to thank all of you for being with us today, and we
appreciate your time and commitment to furthering the important
work of this committee. And I also want to thank your staff for
working with the committee and members of my staff to making
this hearing possible.
Today is an opportunity to learn more about the
administration's priorities in the western hemisphere and in
promoting democracy and human rights around the world.
There are many challenges that we need to collaborate on in
order to make U.S. programs maximally effective. Building
strong democratic institutions and promoting human rights
around the world is in the moral and strategic interest of the
United States and should continue to be one of our top
priorities.
I believe it is important for U.S. programs to be aligned
with our strategic priorities and not just in the western
hemisphere but throughout the world.
It is also important that U.S. taxpayer dollars are not
wasted but instead are used to address significant challenges
related to our national security interests. I believe Congress
can continue to work in a constructive way to enhance the
Department's efforts.
I hope you address these issues today in your testimonies.
And with that, I turn it over to our ranking member,
Senator Boxer.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much.
This is an important hearing, and I want to extend my warm
welcome to our guests and witnesses. It is an opportunity to
examine in more detail the Department's budgetary priorities.
Our subcommittee is a very important one. It has
jurisdiction over a range of matters, including the countries
of the western hemisphere, as well as global responsibility for
democracy, human rights, and women's issues.
While we face numerous challenges in the western
hemisphere, ranging from narcotics trafficking to assisting
countries in the wake of natural disasters, the region is
making tremendous progress and it is rife with opportunity, due
in large part to the support of the United States.
I know my chairman and I--we are friends but we disagree
strongly on Cuba. So I will just say that President Obama's
decision to change a failed policy was welcome news for me, and
I hope it will turn out to be so for the Cuban people and the
human rights activists there. It is an unprecedented moment,
and I hope the Cuban people make the most of it and that the
government understands that they have got to change.
We have also witnessed progress in Colombia, due in large
part to the support of the U.S. negotiations between the
government and the FARC that continue to move forward.
And we can look at Argentina where the United States is
poised to build stronger ties. I visited Argentina a couple
years ago and was so depressed and disgusted, frankly, with
what I saw in that Kirchner government, and I really have hope
now. And I really believe, as we see the new government saying
yes, they are going to pay back the bonds and make investors at
least partially whole and maybe whole, it is an important
point.
In Mexico, we continue to build upon and reinforce our
relationship with our close neighbor. Our ties are very
important.
And I am very concerned about threats posed by the spread
of the Zika virus. And I think we are going to be heard more
and more on that on the floor of the United States Senate. This
is an emergency. We should not be quibbling about it. It is an
emergency, and our people are going to get sick, really sick.
And we already have I know in Florida, I have heard, 99 cases
of the Zika. And it is going to happen as sure as we are
sitting here and in short order.
So we need to lead on that, and we need to lead the world.
I know it is very difficult. There are no sure answers. We are
going to stumble and we are going to fall, but as they say,
what is important is how do you get back up. Have you learned
the lessons? Are you ready to make sure that we do not repeat
those mistakes? Because in any kind of human relations, let
alone foreign relations, we make mistakes.
So I support funding for programs that support human rights
defenders and civil society organizations, those that promote
religious freedom, strengthen accountability, and the rule of
law.
And I thank again my chairman.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
We will begin with the testimony from our panelists. As you
are aware, we will have a vote at 11:00. We have your
statements for the record, so if you could summarize them so we
can get into the question rounds, that would be great. Thank
you. Ms. Hogan?
STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH HOGAN, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN BUREAU, U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Ms. Hogan. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Boxer, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
invitation to testify today. I am pleased to present USAID's
plans for fiscal year 2017.
Our request of approximately $970 million will promote the
interests of the United States while also significantly
improving the quality of life for those we help.
We have identified five priorities to focus our assistance
where we can have the greatest impact: prosperity, good
governance, and security in Central America; promoting a
sustainable and equitable peace in Colombia; long-term
development in Haiti; advancing democracy and human rights
across the Americas; and addressing environmental threats to
livelihoods.
One of our highest priorities is Central America,
particularly in the countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras.
We see prosperity, improved governance, and security, the
objectives of our Central America strategy, as interdependent.
We know that opening doors for citizens, especially youth at
risk of gang recruitment, will bolster our efforts in security
and lead to freer, more prosperous societies. That is why our
prosperity programs include efforts to support small businesses
and entrepreneurs, encourage private investment, train youth in
job skills, and improve agricultural productivity. These
efforts to grow prosperity are only sustainable in an
environment where democratic values and institutions flourish,
human rights are respected, and civil society and the media can
play their rightful roles.
To that end, our governance programs are aimed at reforming
institutions to root our corruption, strengthening civil
society's ability to hold governments accountable, fostering a
culture of respect for human rights, especially for
historically marginalized groups, and improving fiscal
transparency. These are important programs, but ultimately it
will be difficult for our prosperity and governance efforts to
take root in societies that are plagued by insecurity.
Therefore, we are using tested approaches in the most
violent-prone communities to create safe community spaces,
provide job and life skills training, and build trust between
police and residents. With sustained commitment on the part of
the United States and host governments, we will help the
Northern Triangle develop into a safer, more prosperous region
for all those who live there.
Such sustained commitment yields results, as we have seen
with the notable strides made in Colombia. In 2017, USAID is
requesting $187 million to expand upon current programming to
help the Colombian Government establish a stronger presence in
former conflict zones, provide post-conflict reconciliation and
justice, promote inclusive rural economic growth, and
sustainably manage the country's vast natural resources. These
programs will build upon current successes especially for
marginalized populations.
Along with Central America and Colombia, Haiti remains a
high priority for USAID. Our fiscal year 2017 request will
continue our efforts to help Haiti grow into a stable and
economically viable country. We remain focused on promoting
economic growth, job creation and agricultural advances,
providing basic health care and education services, and
improving the transparency of government institutions and their
responsiveness to citizens. While much more remains to be done,
we are committed to supporting the Haitian people as they build
a more prosperous and secure future.
Throughout the region, our democracy and human rights
programs address fundamental issues, including anticorruption,
promotion of press freedoms and the rule of law, and support
for civil society. USAID works to ensure that government
institutions are open and accountable, they use public funds
responsibly and effectively, and deliver critical services to
citizens. We are also committed to supporting human rights
everywhere we work. Underpinning all of these efforts is
support and protection for a strong and vibrant civil society
that can hold governments accountable.
Another challenge facing the region is the negative impact
of extreme weather events. Our mitigation and adaptation
efforts help reduce devastation to life, property, and economic
activity. We are also speeding the development and deployment
of advanced clean energy technologies and helping to create
favorable legal and regulatory environments.
We have one goal in mind with everything that we do to
empower countries to assume responsibility for their own
development and grow beyond the need for international
assistance. We use science, technology, innovation, and private
sector partnerships to find new solutions and scale up what
works. For every dollar we spent in the region in 2014, we
mobilized five times that in private sector resources.
We take our responsibility to the United States taxpayer
seriously, and we are committed to accountability,
transparency, and oversight of our programs. We use a full
range of monitoring and evaluation tools to track our progress
and ensure that our programs are meeting goals and delivering
high impact results.
With sustained commitment from countries in the region to
advance their own development goals and our government's
support, we are well placed for success.
Thank you to the committee for your attention and I look
forward to your questions.
[Ms. Hogan's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Elizabeth Hogan, Acting Assistant
Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean, USAID
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify today. I am
grateful for the Committee's support for the United States Agency for
International Development's work in Latin America and the Caribbean,
and am pleased to have this opportunity to present our plans for Fiscal
Year (FY) 2017.
introduction
For more than fifty years, USAID has led our nation's efforts to
advance dignity and prosperity around the world, both as an expression
of core American values and to help build peaceful, open, and
flourishing partners for the United States. This is particularly
important in those countries closest to our shores: the nations of
Latin America and the Caribbean. Peaceful, stable, democratic societies
make for good trading partners and strong allies, helping us to be more
prosperous and secure here at home. Further, when we help countries in
our hemisphere reinforce basic rights and encourage civic
participation, foster conditions that improve prosperity and citizen
security, or protect precious natural resources, we are being good
neighbors.
development context
Many Latin American and Caribbean nations have experienced
monumental growth and change in the past several decades, and USAID has
partnered with these countries to make important progress. Despite the
global financial crisis, the region averaged a three percent annual
increase in economic growth between 2000 and 2012. Health indicators
have greatly improved in the region: infant mortality has declined from
43 to 16.2 deaths per 1,000 live births since 1990; maternal mortality
fell from 140 to 81 deaths per 100,000 live births in the same time
period; and the number of malaria cases decreased by 60 percent between
2000 and 2012.
Spurred by unprecedented engagement by ordinary citizens demanding
transparency and respect for basic freedoms and rights, governments
have begun significant reforms to improve the administration of
justice, enhance transparency, and promote better access to justice for
typically marginalized populations. And countries that once were only
on the receiving end of assistance, such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
and Mexico, are emerging as donors eager to share their expertise,
resources, and experience with developing nations around the world.
While these are impressive gains, the region still faces
significant challenges. Latin America and the Caribbean continue to
have some of the highest rates of income inequality in the world and
economies have slowed in the face of weaker commodity prices for key
exports, reduced domestic demand and investment, and worsening fiscal
balances. Severe, chronic drought threatens lives and livelihoods,
particularly in Haiti and parts of rural Guatemala and Honduras.
Regional progress in health masks inequalities between and within
countries, with the health status in select populations matching that
of countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Crime and violence have risen
dramatically in parts of the region over the past decade; according to
the United Nations' 2013 Global Study on Homicide, seven of the ten
countries with the highest murder rates in the world are in Latin
America and the Caribbean. And, despite democratic progress, some
countries are witnessing troubling backsliding, including constraints
on civil society, limits on media and freedom of the press, and
increasing executive overreach.
USAID's FY 2017 request for Latin America and the Caribbean
continues our long-term efforts to help the region overcome these
challenges. USAID's assistance of approximately $970 million in FY 2017
funds--a 15 percent increase over the FY 2015 enacted level of $846
million--promotes the interests of the United States while also
significantly improving the quality of life for those we help. We
actively seek out local partners who understand the context on the
ground, harness the expertise of the private sector and civil society
to set the stage for efforts to continue after we are gone, and develop
innovative and flexible approaches that bring new solutions to
longstanding challenges. With sustained commitment, we are confident
that the region will make strides that enable it to develop beyond the
need for United States government assistance.
central america
One of our greatest areas of focus is Central America, particularly
the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras. These countries are plagued by gang violence and
transnational crime, deep-seated social and economic inequity, lack of
economic opportunity, and high rates of unemployment. In addition, weak
government capacity and corruption continues to undermine efforts to
improve security and advance prosperity. We see the consequences of
this insecurity and lack of opportunity at our own border when children
and families complete the dangerous, irregular journey to the United
States.
We are acutely aware that this problem requires a strategic and
sustained endeavor to help Central American governments, private
sector, and civil society create an environment in which all of their
citizens thrive. We are grateful for Congress's support for the U.S.
Strategy for Engagement in Central America. The Strategy outlines
interdependent prosperity, governance, and security efforts designed to
address the root causes of migration. The State Department and USAID's
FY 2017 $750 million request is part of the Administration's $1 billion
interagency request in support of the Strategy. And we have seen
promising signs of the Northern Triangle governments' commitment to
this same effort, outlined in their Alliance for Prosperity. The
Alliance for Prosperity lays out the governments' shared pledge to grow
their economies, create employment, improve public safety and enhance
access to the legal system, and improve social services for their
citizens, particularly the poorest and most vulnerable. We are
encouraged that the governments passed budgets totaling $2.6 billion to
support the Alliance for Prosperity in 2016.
To spur greater prosperity in the Northern Triangle, USAID plans to
increase our support for successful broad-based economic growth
programs designed to expand business, employment, and educational
opportunities for the poor and those most likely to migrate. We plan to
continue successful efforts and invest in new initiatives to promote
good governance and transparency, including anti-corruption programs
that address chronically low tax revenue collection, improve fiscal
transparency, strengthen human rights protections for vulnerable
groups, empower civil society to hold governments accountable, and
expand justice sector reform throughout the region.
However, it will be difficult for our prosperity and governance
efforts to take root in societies plagued by insecurity. The heart of
our security work is youth-focused, as we invest in programs that reach
those most at risk for gang recruitment, crime, and violence. To
accomplish our goals to reduce and prevent crime and violence, USAID is
partnering with communities, civil society, governments and the private
sector to develop crime prevention plans, invest in municipal crime
observatories, create safe community spaces, expand after-school
activities, provide job and life skills training, and build trust
between police and residents. In some of the most violent areas and
neighborhoods of these countries, our efforts are amplified by close
coordination with the Department of State's Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) through our shared Place-
Based Strategy, which pairs community-based prevention work with
interventions to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement.
We are seeing results in these three areas of strategic focus. For
example, our agriculture-related prosperity programs in Honduras have
been successful in reducing extreme poverty: with USAID's help, the
incomes of small-scale farmers and families have increased by nearly 55
percent for more than 180,000 of the poorest individuals between 2011
and 2015. With USAID support, the Guatemalan judicial system, Office of
the Attorney General, High Impact Court, and National Forensics Lab
have made progress combatting impunity. And in El Salvador, analysis of
our crime prevention activities points to a drop in homicides of more
than 60 percent in the 76 communities where USAID targets its
programming.
With sustained commitment on the part of the United States and host
governments, we will build on and expand these successes into more
communities and municipalities and help the Northern Triangle develop
into a safer, more prosperous region for all those who live there, not
just the privileged few.
colombia
Sustained commitment on the part of the United States and host
governments can be successful, as we have seen with the notable strides
made under Plan Colombia. Begun in 2000, when Colombia was plagued by
an active civil conflict, corruption scandals, and widespread drug
cultivation, Plan Colombia was a strategy developed by the United
States and the Government of Colombia to help eradicate the drug trade
and bring peace and prosperity to that country. Thanks to the gains
made under this strategy, a result of years of strong bipartisan
support from the U.S. Congress, committed work and strategic patience,
the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) are expected to sign historic peace accords in 2016.
To provide post-accord support, in February 2016, President Obama
announced Paz Colombia (Peace Colombia), a collection of programs
already in progress or planned to begin when the peace accords are
signed. In FY 2017, USAID will manage $187 million--a 41 percent
increase over the FY 2015 enacted level of $133 million--to expand upon
current programming to help Colombian government institutions to
establish a stronger presence in former conflict zones, seek post-
conflict reconciliation and justice, promote inclusive rural economic
growth, and sustainably manage the country's vast natural resources.
These programs will build upon several successes achieved to date.
For example, thanks to USAID-funded work to implement rule of law and
human rights policies, there has been a 61 percent increase in the
number of cases decided by land restitution judges, and mobile justice
houses have been deployed to 95 remote communities in conflict zones.
To help improve prospects for traditionally marginalized groups, USAID
provided workforce training to more than 9,150 urban Afro-Colombian and
indigenous persons; more than 8,150 have now graduated and begun a six-
month formal employment phase. USAID programs are also improving
livelihoods while reducing deforestation, including by introducing more
sustainable approaches to cattle ranching, agroforestry systems, and
ecotourism; our efforts have helped to improve natural resource
management and protect nearly 37,000 hectares of important biodiversity
and ecosystems.
We are hopeful that our programs will reach a wider group when the
peace accords are signed and the Colombian people vote to approve the
accords. USAID is in negotiations with the Government of Colombia to
take advantage of this key opportunity and expand our presence into
twenty new municipalities.
haiti
Along with Central America and Colombia, Haiti remains a high
priority for USAID. The country, which is ranked 163 out of 188 on the
United Nations' 2015 Human Development Index, suffers from high
unemployment, political instability, and growing food insecurity due to
prolonged drought. In addition, more than half of Haitians live below
the World Bank's international extreme poverty line of $1.90 per day.
These challenges are severe, but we continue to be optimistic that if
we find sufficient political will in Haiti, we will be able to help the
country lift itself out of extreme poverty.
Funds requested for FY 2017 will continue our efforts to help Haiti
grow into a stable and economically viable country. Our assistance
strategy targets key development issues and specific areas of the
country where we can be the most successful. We remain focused on the
long-term reconstruction that has helped the country begin to turn the
corner after the 2010 earthquake by promoting economic growth, job
creation, and agricultural advances; providing basic health care and
education services; and improve the transparency of government
institutions and their responsiveness to their citizens.
We have seen encouraging signs that our assistance is improving
lives. To help build the economy from the ground up, USAID facilitates
access to finance, which is one of the major constraints to economic
development in Haiti. Thanks to USAID's work with local micro-, small-,
and medium-sized enterprises, we have helped to create close to 10,000
jobs due in large part to equity financing in the form of matching
grants or training in topics such as product quality control and
business development services. In addition, many of these companies and
others now have access to bank credit due to loan guarantees that we
have provided under our $57 million Development Credit Authority.
Moreover, we have recently awarded more than $11 million for capacity
development services and small grants to local Haitian organizations.
Our progress extends into other areas, as well. The 10-megawatt
power plant USAID helped build near the Caracol Industrial Park in the
North connects more than 8,000 households, businesses, and government
institutions to reliable power; this is the first time in history many
of those affected have ever had dependable electricity, and small
businesses are flourishing there. USAID is helping the Government of
Haiti make this electric utility financially sustainable, which will
lead to a public-private partnership for its ongoing operation and
maintenance. In agriculture, we worked with small-scale farmers and
helped to double the income of 60,000 farmers through an increase in
productivity, better yields, and the introduction of new technology.
And we are identifying where we can successfully work with Haitian
Government ministries so that they can better serve their citizens. For
example, we work closely with the Ministry of Health to help them
provide quality health care. One area of collaboration is the
rehabilitation of critical health infrastructure. As part of this
effort, USAID is helping to construct a new maternity and pediatrics
ward at Justinien Hospital in Cap Haitien and reconstruct the National
Campus of Health Sciences in Port au Prince.
Haiti's political environment continues to be challenging; for
progress to continue we need demonstrated political will, stability,
and good governance. We are eager to see the presidential elections
completed as soon as possible. We will maintain our engagement with
Haiti through various efforts, including by working with the Haitian
diaspora who bring unique skills and knowledge to projects and
technical sectors. The course of Haiti's future ultimately depends on
Haitians themselves. While much more remains to be done, we are
committed to supporting the Haitian people as they build the more
prosperous and secure future they deserve.
encouraging democracy and human rights
Our programs will only be sustainable under conditions where
democratic values and institutions flourish, citizens can depend on
basic social services, impunity is reduced, and civil society and the
media can play their rightful roles. Increasing violence and citizen
insecurity in Latin America and the Caribbean have eroded citizens'
confidence in democratic institutions and practices. Weak judicial
institutions, often plagued by corruption, have historically
contributed to impunity and public frustration. The region is host to
several ``closed spaces''--countries where governments generally are
duly elected and populist, but ultimately prove to be anti-democratic.
And illicit actors like transnational criminal organizations and gangs
also limit fundamental freedoms, primarily with threats and violence
against journalists, human rights defenders, and other civil society
actors.
USAID's democracy and human rights programs address issues that are
fundamental to democratic societies, including anti-corruption efforts,
promotion of press freedoms and the rule of law, and support for civil
society. To address corruption, USAID is working at national and local
levels to ensure that government institutions are open and accountable,
use public funds responsibly and effectively, and deliver critical
services to citizens. Our assistance includes security and justice
reforms, passage and enforcement of key anti-corruption and
transparency legislation, and financial management strengthening. For
example, in Paraguay, USAID assisted the National Procurement Agency to
develop an Open Data Portal, which allows citizens to view the status
of all competitive procurements, including how much ministries are
spending on contracts and vendor details, thus enabling citizens to
hold the government accountable. We are committed to supporting human
rights everywhere we work, including in Cuba and other closing spaces
where citizens are arbitrarily detained, threatened, harassed, and
beaten for peacefully exercising their fundamental rights. In a region
where journalists face violence and intimidation from government
authorities and criminal elements, USAID runs regional press freedom
programs and supports freedom of information activities across the
region. To shore up the rule of law, we work with police organizations
to improve effectiveness and professionalism, foster a culture of
respect for human rights, and instill a community-oriented approach.
Underpinning all of these efforts is support and protection for a
strong and vibrant civil society that can hold governments accountable.
Despite challenges, there are notable accomplishments attributable
to our work. Throughout the region, our programs have assisted
journalists' efforts to expose mismanagement of Latin American
government projects; nearly half of these investigative journalism
reports have resulted in a government policy response. For example, in
Ecuador in 2014, an investigative report on child trafficking led to a
National Assembly vote to fund an awareness campaign to ``Say No to
Risky Migration.'' Thanks to our efforts to improve effectiveness and
professionalism of the police in Jamaica, where USAID has worked with
the Jamaica Constabulary Force for more than 15 years, reports of
police soliciting bribes declined by almost 40 percent from 2006 to
2012. And to ensure that civil society remains able to operate freely,
we supported the Government of Mexico's National Protection Mechanism
for Human Rights Defenders and Journalists, providing assistance to
approximately 400 activists and journalists seeking protection from
threats of violence and harassment.
addressing environmental threats to livelihoods
In nations throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, USAID is
also working to mitigate the effects of changing climate patterns and
build the resiliency of the people with whom we work by helping them
implement risk-reducing practices and use climate information in their
decision making. The region is home to countries that are significant
greenhouse gas emitters, as well as nations with glaciers and coastal
regions that are at significant risk from extreme weather events and
natural disasters, and tropical forests, including the Amazon Basin,
that act as valuable natural resources.
USAID programs reduce the devastation to life, property, and
economic activity caused by environmental threats by helping vulnerable
groups withstand and cope with catastrophic weather events, droughts,
and other climate impacts. Prevention programs are also an efficient
use of development resources. Indeed, evidence suggests that every
dollar spent on disaster preparedness prevents an average of seven
dollars in economic losses due to disasters.
We work to reduce deforestation and greenhouse gas emissions by
investing in forest conservation, efforts to combat illegal logging,
and promotion of sustainable land use. This kind of programming can be
a helping hand that lifts people out of poverty. For example, USAID
assistance in Guatemala helped small- and medium-sized enterprises and
community-based organizations in the Maya Biosphere Reserve achieve
environmental certification on more than 270,000 hectares, and maintain
certification for nearly 500,000 hectares of forest products. At the
same time, we helped these organizations foster relationships with
United States and European businesses that put a premium on sustainably
sourced products. These efforts reduced deforestation and resulted in
nearly $26 million in total sales of certified forest products,
creating almost 4,000 jobs.
We are speeding the development and deployment of advanced clean
energy technologies and helping to create favorable legal and
regulatory environments. In this way, we help to attract private
investors from the United States and elsewhere to maximize the use of
renewable energy resources. By cutting down on imported fossil fuels,
these actions will lower greenhouse gas emissions and move the region
toward greater energy independence. Economic growth that is more energy
efficient will be cleaner, reduce dependency on scarce foreign
resources, and contribute to increased prosperity.
doing business differently
We have one goal in mind with everything that we do: to empower
countries to assume responsibility for their own development and grow
beyond the need for international assistance. To this end, we are using
science, technology, innovation, and private sector and trilateral
partnerships to find new solutions to longstanding problems and scale
up existing solutions in a more sustainable and efficient way. Our
partnerships with the private sector help us to marshal the resources,
innovation, technology, markets, and expertise of the business
community to accelerate development. In FY 2014 alone, USAID's
partnerships in Latin America and the Caribbean leveraged an estimated
$189 million in private sector resources for development; for every
dollar we spent in the region in 2014, we mobilized five times that
amount in private sector resources. These partnerships help to connect
small-scale farmers and businesses to valuable markets; provide
training, education, and employment to at-risk youth; and help to
increase incomes, move communities out of poverty, and improve food
security for the most vulnerable.
We are increasingly employing the latest science and technology to
improve health practices; introduce low-cost, high-impact seed
varieties and irrigation techniques; and improve public safety. For
example, in partnership with Microsoft, Cisco, Universal Service Fund,
and the Jamaican Ministry of Science, Technology, Energy and Mining, we
are experimenting with ``TV White Space,'' a new technology that taps
unused television broadcast frequencies. This will extend high-speed,
wireless internet access to remote parts of the country, improving
connectivity for public service provision and training in rural areas
of Jamaica.
Finally, we use innovative financing models to unlock private
capital for non-traditional partners, many of which drive the region's
economy. Through our Development Credit Authority (DCA), we help share
risks and incentivize lending from financial institutions to micro-,
small- and medium-sized enterprises in Colombia and Central America,
for example. During FY 2015 alone, seven new DCA guarantees mobilized
nearly $140 million in private capital to support these efforts in
Latin America and the Caribbean. As part of these efforts, guarantee
agreements with three Colombian banks will mobilize up to $120 million
in lending to borrowers in targeted rural regions of the country.
oversight
USAID takes its responsibility to the United States taxpayer
seriously, and we are committed to accountability, transparency, and
oversight of our programs. To do so, we use a full range of monitoring
and evaluation tools, including survey data, performance indicators,
analyses, studies, and external evaluations. Our Missions are guided by
five-year strategic plans and their individual Monitoring, Evaluation,
and Learning Plans. These tools enable us to establish baselines and
track the pace and status of implementation, ensure that programs are
meeting goals and delivering high-impact results, and provide the
flexibility needed to accommodate new needs and realities. Monitoring
and evaluation tools also feed valuable data on new and effective
approaches, which later inform new program designs. For example, our
post-earthquake strategy in Haiti calls for port services in the North
to help build viable economic centers outside of Port-au-Prince. Our
initial plan was to construct a new port, but after extensive due
diligence revealed economic and environmental challenges with this
approach, we shifted to our current effort to rehabilitating the
existing Cap Haitien port. The project is underway, with a projected
completion date of 2020.
We are also helping partner governments to develop monitoring
mechanisms and ensure the same oversight for assistance they receive
from us. For example, our Mission in Colombia developed, and turned
over to the Government of Colombia, a Consolidation Index--a
combination of 41 indicators that track institutional presence, good
governance and citizen participation, and regional integration--to
track whether USAID and the Government of Colombia are achieving goals
in increasing state presence and capacity to deliver services in
critical regions. This Index provides USAID with important information
related to its program performance and also provides similar relevant
information directly to the Government of Colombia.
conclusion
With sustained commitment from countries in the region to advance
their own development goals, and our government's support, we are well
placed for success. Political will, in combination with improved local
capacity, leveraged resources and new partnerships, will allow us to
help regional governments become more peaceful and prosperous. We would
like to thank this Committee for its interest in and support for our
work, and look forward to collaborating with you to address long-
standing challenges and new opportunities for reform.
Thank you for your time; I look forward to your questions.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Mr. Palmieri?
STATEMENT OF FRANCISCO PALMIERI, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Palmieri. Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, Senator
Kaine, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the fiscal
year 2017 foreign assistance request for the western
hemisphere. And thank you for your ongoing support of our
diplomatic and assistance efforts in the hemisphere.
The administration's approach to the region improves
security, strengthens the rule of law, promotes democracy and
human rights, advances partnerships, and promotes prosperity
and inclusive growth for all its citizens. U.S. assistance is a
critical tool that supports these goals.
In our requests for Central America and Mexico, we seek to
address the underlying conditions driving migration from
Central America through Mexico and to the United States. The
request also includes increases to support Colombia's
implementation of an expected peace agreement marking the end
of the hemisphere's longest running conflict. The request
maintains support for key partnerships with Peru, Haiti, and
the Caribbean.
The fiscal year 2017 foreign assistance request for our
strategy in Central America continues support for prosperity,
governance, and security, particularly for Central America's
Northern Triangle, in recognition of the acute challenges these
countries face. U.S. assistance through the strategy
complements the investments Northern Triangle governments are
making through their own development plan, the Alliance for
Prosperity. They plan to spend $2.6 billion this year on their
own plan.
Continued U.S. support will be vital to Colombia's success
as it seeks to implement a peace accord.
Our partnership with Mexico remains an important priority
for the United States and includes a range of issues that
benefit both countries, including trade and investment, energy,
and security. The Merida Initiative continues to provide the
framework for our bilateral security cooperation at both
Federal and State levels.
Our request also includes essential democracy assistance
for Cuba and Venezuela where the United States will continue to
provide assistance that advances universal human rights and
supports vibrant civil societies. Promotion of democratic
principles and human rights remains at the core of U.S.
interests in Cuba.
Our request for Haiti continues investments in
infrastructure, agriculture, economic growth, basic education
and health, expanded governance, democracy activities, and
security. A sustained U.S. commitment is essential to build on
the past gains of U.S. efforts in Haiti and to build its
capacity to respond to citizens' needs.
Improving security and development in the Caribbean
directly benefits U.S. interests. The Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative complements Caribbean efforts to reduce crime and
violence, strengthen the rule of law, and address the factors
that put youth and marginalized communities at risk of
insecurity.
U.S. counternarcotics assistance complements investments
made by the Government of Peru and maintains our strong
partnership in eradication and alternative development to coca
cultivation.
I urge the U.S. Congress to fully fund this request for the
western hemisphere as it advances our national security and
wisely invests our resources where they can have the most
significant impact.
I look forward to your questions.
And, Senator Kaine, I just wanted to point out there is a
great group of students from Richmond, Virginia here today at
the hearing.
[Mr. Palmieri's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Francisco L. Palmieri, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Fiscal
Year 2017 foreign assistance request for the Western Hemisphere.
The administration's approach to the region advances partnerships,
seeks to strengthen democracy and human rights, improves security and
strengthens the rule of law, and promotes prosperity and inclusive
growth for all citizens. U.S. assistance is a critical tool that
supports these goals.
In our requests for Central America and Mexico, we seek to address
the underlying conditions driving migration from Central America
through Mexico and toward the United States. The request includes
increases to support Colombia's implementation of an expected peace
agreement marking the end the hemisphere's longest running conflict.
The request maintains support for key U.S. partnerships with Peru,
Haiti, and the Caribbean. The request also supports essential democracy
and human rights efforts in Cuba and Venezuela.
The Fiscal Year 2017 request of $1.7 billion includes $750 million
for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America (the Strategy)
and $391 million for the Department and USAID for Colombia. Our request
targets challenges and opportunities that impact U.S. interests.
Flexibility in our assistance allows us to achieve the best return on
investment for the United States. We urge the U.S. Congress to fully
fund the request for the Western Hemisphere.
The Department and USAID's FY 2017 $750 million request is part of
the Administration's $1 billion interagency request in support of the
Strategy. Central America continues to have high levels of poverty,
weak institutions, and heightened levels of insecurity, all of which
have direct implications for the United States.
The FY 2017 foreign assistance request for the Strategy continues
support for prosperity, governance, and security, particularly for
Central America's Northern Triangle, in recognition of the acute
challenges those countries face. El Salvador faces a skyrocketing
homicide rate; Guatemala's new government is seeking to capitalize on
the anti-corruption momentum that led to reform after historic
elections; and Honduras is taking the first steps to implement its
anti-impunity mechanism--the OAS-sponsored Mission Against Corruption
and Impunity in Honduras. Addressing these challenges and achieving
lasting change will require sustained commitment from the United
States, the governments of Central America, and the international donor
community. U.S. assistance through the Strategy complements the
investments Northern Triangle governments are making through their own
development plan, the Alliance for Prosperity. They plan to spend $2.6
billion this year on the plan.
The Strategy request also includes $305.3 million for the Central
America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) to fund models proven to
improve security and prevent crime and violence. The balance of the
Strategy request includes support to expand programming to improve
economic prosperity and governance.
During the visit of President Santos, President Obama announced a
new framework for bilateral cooperation in the event of a peace accord:
Peace Colombia. Peace Colombia will focus U.S. assistance under three
pillars: consolidating and expanding progress on security and
counternarcotics while supporting disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration; expanding state presence and institutions to strengthen
the rule of law and rural economies, especially in former conflict
areas; and promoting justice and other essential services for conflict
victims. The $391.3 million bilateral request will support Colombia's
implementation of a peace agreement and counter-narcotics. While
negotiations continue, including on the mechanism for final approval of
a peace accord, Colombia has taken significant and important steps
toward a achieving a just and sustainable peace that ends its decades-
long conflict with the FARC. The Government of Colombia has built
capacity to provide security and services for its people, but continued
U.S. support will be vital to Colombia's success as it seeks to
implement a peace accord. In particular, rapid progress to extend
civilian security and prosperity into more municipalities during the
critical early post-accord phase will be key.
U.S. assistance to the government and people of Colombia will help
bring meaningful justice to victims; extend the rule of law and improve
government services; promote economic development in former conflict
areas; and maintain security gains. The request will continue expansion
of technical assistance to additional municipalities, further
strengthen justice and security institutions at the national level,
significantly expand demining efforts, including civilian-military
coordination and address the counternarcotics threat. Strengthening
respect for the human rights of all citizens in Colombia is a goal both
our countries share.
Our partnership with Mexico remains an important priority for the
United States and includes a range of issues that benefit both
countries, including trade and investment, energy and climate
cooperation, and security. The Merida Initiative continues to provide
the framework for our bilateral security cooperation at both federal
and state levels. The $117.1 million Merida request emphasizes
technical assistance, capacity building, and expands support to
additional Mexican states, consistent with Mexican government
priorities, including its transition to an adversarial justice system
and its southern border strategy. The United States and Mexico continue
to jointly identify projects of mutual interest that further our shared
security priorities.
The FY 2017 request also includes democracy assistance for Cuba and
Venezuela, where the United States will continue to provide assistance
to advance universal human rights and support vibrant civil society.
The request for Cuba continues direct support for civil society.
Promotion of democratic principles and human rights remains at the core
of U.S. assistance to Cuba. Assistance for Venezuela supports human
rights and a diverse civil society.
The $218 million request for Haiti continues investments in
infrastructure, agriculture, economic growth, basic education, health,
expanded governance and democracy activities, and security. Haiti is
suffering from a destabilized economy, rising food insecurity, drought,
and public health threats, among other issues. A sustained U.S.
commitment is essential to build on the past gains of U.S. efforts in
Haiti and to build the Government of Haiti's capacity to respond to
citizens' needs for services, promote economic opportunity, and advance
the rule of law and security.
Improving security and development in the Caribbean directly
benefits U.S. interests. The FY 2017 request includes $48.4 million for
the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) to complement Caribbean
efforts to reduce crime and violence, strengthen the rule of law, and
address the factors that put youth and marginalized communities at-risk
of insecurity. The request focuses on training and professionalization
within the police, security services, and rule of law institutions, and
builds on prior year investments. CBSI emphasizes regional cooperation
with our Caribbean partners, and seeks to increase the capacity of
Caribbean countries to more effectively work together to define and
meet current and emerging regional security challenges.
The $81.1 million bilateral request for Peru supports continued
counter-narcotics and alternative development cooperation in strong
partnership with the Peruvian government. Peru remains one of the
world's largest cocaine producers and the largest source of counterfeit
U.S. currency. U.S. counter-narcotics assistance complements
investments made by the government of Peru. The United States
anticipates continuing this cooperation with the next president of
Peru, whomever Peruvian voters choose.
We also continue to maintain and expand important cooperation with
other countries of the hemisphere, such as Paraguay, Argentina, Chile,
and Brazil. While bilateral assistance levels to these countries may be
small, our partnership with these nations is an important tool to
advancing our shared priorities in the hemisphere, of prosperity,
democracy and human rights, and security for all.
I look forward to your questions.
Senator Kaine. Can I ask are they Maggie Walker students?
Voices. Yes.
Senator Kaine. Hey, congratulations on ``We the People!''
You guys are fantastic. Two of my boys went to that high
school.
Senator Rubio. Secretary Malinowski?
STATEMENT OF HON. TOMASZ P. MALINOWSKI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Senator Rubio, Senator Boxer,
Senator Kaine. It is a pleasure to be here. I will say a few
words about our global programs to support people who are
struggling for advances in democracy and human rights around
the world.
And I will start by acknowledging that this is obviously
not an easy time to be doing this kind of work. It is a time,
as we can all see from the headlines, when authoritarian
governments beginning with big powers like Russia and China are
striking out with great ferocity against freedoms of
expression, association, and the press. There is the horrible
war in Syria and the terror of ISIL, the mass migrations of
refugees, and the fear that all of this insecurity creates even
in democratic countries with all of the impact on our politics
that we have seen.
Now, all of that should disturb us. I do not think it
should surprise us. After all, freedom has advanced in waves
over the last few decades. It has been followed by the advances
in the Internet and the global civil society, which have
allowed people in just about every closed society in the world
to know exactly what they are missing and to connect with each
other and with people around the world to build effective
movements for social change.
People often say to me that human rights is a soft issue. I
think it is the hardest hard power issue there is because its
advance is a threat to some of the most dangerous people in the
world. If you are trying to steal an election or to stay in
office for life or to profit from corruption, then of course
you are going to be threatened by NGOs and by journalists who
try to expose those abuses of power. Of course, you are going
to fight back and you are going to fight hard and you are going
to fight dirty. And that is what we are facing in many parts of
the world.
But as I look around the world, I find that the good guys
are still winning as many victories as they are losing,
particularly when we are there to help them. Just in the last
year, look at the historic elections that took place in Burma,
in Nigeria, in Sri Lanka, even in Venezuela where the people
have not won but they were able to manifest their enormous
desire for change through an election.
So the lesson I take from that is that if we have patience
and determination, if we stick with these efforts and with
these programs, we are going to win more victories than the
defeats that we face.
And that is where the funding that you provide my bureau,
DRL, through our human rights and democracy fund comes in. It
is not a lot of money. It is about $85 million this year. We
like to think of it as our venture capital fund for freedom. We
are using it to get news, knowledge, and even entertainment
into North Korea, an effort that we know is changing minds and
awakening expectations in the most closed society on earth.
We are using it to support the legal defense of activists
and dissidents in multiple countries where they are being
persecuted.
We are using it to support former political prisoners in
Burma so that they can contribute to building democracy there
and to fight the religious hatred that threatens their
democracy.
We are using it to develop and deploy cutting-edge
technologies that break through China's great firewall and to
protect activists in dozens of countries from cyber attacks and
cyber intrusions.
We are using it to help organizations defending freedom of
expression in Latin America. One of our programs recently
supported a campaign that saved Ecuador's number one press
freedom watchdog.
We are using it to keep civil society organizations alive
in Syria where groups we funded have negotiated ceasefires,
documented the crimes of the Assad regime, and organized
communities to stand up to ISIL and Al Nusra.
We are using it to prevent atrocities, for example, setting
up early warning systems in remote areas of the eastern Congo
so that people there can call for help when they are threatened
by armed groups and in Nigeria, to protect people from Boko
Haram.
We are using it to help women who have escaped ISIL
captivity in northern Iraq.
We are using it to support organizations that try to build
trust between Muslim communities and the police in eastern
Kenya so that they can unite against Al Shabaab.
We are using it to get help to people who need it faster
than I think any other agency in the U.S. Government. Our
emergency grant programs can get small but sometimes lifesaving
amounts of money to activists and NGO's under threat in as
little as 48 hours. We are using these programs right now to
provide protection and assistance to some of the bloggers and
others who have been threatened in Bangladesh, one of many
examples.
And to save the best for last, from a fiscal standpoint at
least, let me say that we also use it to support the work of
NGO's and journalists that expose corruption around the world.
This work has contributed to almost $3 billion in confiscations
and fines, including over $1 billion in Justice Department
seizures, which is a petty good investment for your DRL funds I
would say.
So I want to thank you for the very strong support that
this committee and the Congress has shown our programs over the
years. And I pledge to you that with continued support, we will
continue to do work that I think not only does our country
proud but that makes us safer, more secure, stronger in the
long run. Thank you very much.
[Mr. Malinowski's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tom Malinowski, Assistant Secretary,
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Bureau
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer and members of the committee,
thank you for this opportunity to describe how the Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor Bureau (DRL) works to promote human rights and
fundamental freedoms in closed societies. We are grateful for the
continued encouragement and support from this committee.
As you know, Secretary Kerry recently released the annual Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices, which provides an assessment of
human rights conditions in countries around the world. When releasing
the report, Secretary Kerry noted that we have seen important
democratic gains in such countries as Vietnam, Tunisia, Nigeria, Sri
Lanka, and Burma, though in each there are challenges that still need
to be overcome. He also pointed out, however, that in many countries in
the world, there are still major challenges. Seventy-two countries saw
increased persecution of civil society, crackdowns on freedom of
expression, and restrictions on the rule of law. Members of religious
minorities are persecuted for their faith. Human rights activists are
harassed, detained, abducted, and even killed for speaking out.
Physical threats by state and non-state actors against journalists and
editors reporting on corruption and other abuses are on the rise.
As daunting as these challenges are, countless human rights
defenders and civil society organizations are courageously working to
push back. We must continue to support them. DRL supports these efforts
in large part through the Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF) within
the Democracy Fund account. HRDF has grown from $8 million in FY 1998
to $88.5 million in FY 2016 thanks to the generous support of Congress,
including this committee. Our annual global HRDF budget request is not
broken down by region. That is deliberate. DRL reacts to target
democratic opportunities and challenges as they arise. By looking at
our funding historically, you can see that we do operate in closed or
restricted societies in all regions of the world. This past year we
managed nearly 350 grants totaling almost $500 million that benefit
civil society and activists around the world in their struggle for
freedom and dignity.
DRL has adjusted operating procedures and applied lessons-learned
to our approach in light of ongoing repression of civil society
worldwide. Doing so has enabled us to continue our work even in the
least hospitable environments. We employ methods aimed at protecting
the identity of our beneficiaries. Our programs are overt, are notified
to Congress, and we acknowledge them publicly. But what we try to avoid
is doing anything that would help an authoritarian government take
repressive actions against or punish our partners or beneficiaries.
Our key priorities in FY17 include work in authoritarian states
such as Russia and China, and in transitioning countries such as Burma
and Tunisia. We promote freedom of religion and conscience, fight
corruption and cronyism, work to break strangleholds on access to free
and credible information, combat threats against labor activists and
journalists, promote worker rights and inclusive economic growth,
respond to gender-based violence, promote citizen participation in
electoral processes, and address the shrinking space for civil society.
These initiatives are an important tool to promote long-term stability.
The majority of DRL programming is implemented in repressive,
authoritarian, or transitioning countries, including where the United
States has no diplomatic presence. The HRDF functions like a ``venture
capital fund for freedom.'' DRL administers programs that enable us to
be flexible, adaptable, and responsive to complex and changing
situations on the ground.
Thirty governments and private sector donors now help to fund our
human rights initiatives, including aiding embattled frontline NGOs,
countering cyber-attacks on activists, and assisting vulnerable
populations. These unique partnerships not only expand available
funding, but generate broader, coordinated diplomatic support for
activists. We also make sure that our programs are well coordinated
with USAID and NED. USAID participates in DRL's proposal review panels.
Some of our key programming efforts include:
Internet Freedom
One of our major HRDF programming areas is Internet freedom.
Governments in countries such as China, Cuba, and Russia devise new
ways of tracking and blocking online expression. In response, we
support programs to assist those seeking to exercise their rights
online with the tools and capacity to communicate securely and freely
with one another and the outside world.
Since 2008, DRL has programmed over $105 million in grants that
defend and promote a free and open Internet worldwide. These Internet
freedom programs have helped millions around the world. The battle for
Internet Freedom is now being waged on a global stage between those who
support an open Internet and those who see it as a tool of control. In
recent months, the cold war between these two sides has reached a
critical tipping point. Those who oppose a free and open Internet are
devoting extraordinary technical and financial resources to further
exert their control over cyberspace.
DRL has developed a high impact, low cost approach to increase the
free flow of information and to deny a government's ability to track,
censor, and disrupt communications. We support the development and
distribution of technology that provides uncensored access to content,
tools that increase the digital security of activists, advocacy
resources for human rights defenders, and research on where and how
Internet controls are being applied. This approach also helps to hold
accountable those who perpetrate and facilitate abusive activities.
Supporting Marginalized Populations
DRL has programs that provide direct assistance to members of
religious minorities, women, persons with disabilities, and the LGBTI
community.
In Nigeria, DRL supported the creation of a network of religious
leaders from among the Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim communities who
collaborate to encourage peaceful, interfaith coexistence and
reconciliation. Through media campaigns, trainings, performances, and
town hall events, the program has empowered thousands of community
members to become active leaders with knowledge of conflict de-
escalation strategies. As a result, former partisans with a history of
engaging in sectarian violence have become peer educators and advocates
for intercommunal tolerance. These young men and women have documented
cases in which their action has prevented the kind of violent
interactions that lead to loss of life, community instability, and
reprisal attacks.
We also support efforts to combat anti-Semitism. For example, our
funding supported coalition building and advocacy training with
Hungarian NGOs to create a consolidated voice in advocating against
anti-Semitism. This coalition was partof a broad, successful effort to
oppose the erection of a statue to honor Balint Homan (the notorious
anti-Semitic minister of religion and education, who co-sponsored
legislation that stripped Hungarian Jews of their citizenship rights
leading to mass deportation to Auschwitz). They continue the fight
against anti-Semitism and all forms of hate.
The Gender Based Violence Emergency Response and Protection
Initiative (GBVI) provides urgent assistance to survivors of egregious
forms of gender-based violence. It helps provide critical medical,
psychological, and social support as well as shelter and legal
assistance. The Initiative also supports integrated training for
governments, the judiciary, and key elements of civil society in
implementing laws that address GBV. In 2016, trainings will be
conducted in Thailand, the Philippines, South Africa, and Turkey.
In response to the kidnapping of 276 girls by Boko Haram, through
the GBVI we funded an Early Warning System in Northern Nigeria, which
uses communications technology to reduce response times to rebel
attacks on villages from several days or weeks to within hours of
threats and outbreaks. In Iraq, the GBVI provided emergency assistance,
including medical, psychosocial support, and livelihood assistance to
145 survivors, including Yezidi, that were formerly held captive by
Da'esh.
Our work through the Global Equality Fund is also supported by 20
like-minded governments and private sector partners to support civil
society organizations promoting the human rights of LGBTI persons
around the world. This support has helped over 120 LGBTI human rights
defenders who are under threat be able to continue their courageous
work. Nearly 500 activists received training to enhance their ability
to respond to the violence affecting LGBTI communities.
Rapid Response
DRL has the ability to respond to issues in a matter of days. We
have vastly expanded our capacity to assist threatened human rights
activists and organizations by providing them small infusions of
support--to allow them to continue their work in safety. Emergency
assistance to human rights activists attacked or under threat includes
paying the costs of temporary relocation, installation of surveillance
cameras, and medical, legal, psychosocial, and other support services.
Since 2007, DRL rapid response/emergency assistance programs have
assisted more than 3,300 people and organizations in more than 98
countries.
Five years ago we launched the Lifeline: Embattled Civil Society
Organizations Assistance Fund to offer emergency grants to civil
society organizations advancing human rights. Sixteen other governments
and two foundations have since provided support for the Lifeline Fund.
It has provided emergency assistance to more than 800 civil society
organizations in 88 countries and territories. For example, in Kunduz,
Afghanistan, the Taliban specifically targeted independent radio
stations. The fund provided emergency assistance to stations that had
been looted and destroyed, allowing almost ten stations to get back on
the air and continue their broadcasts.
Anti-Corruption
People around the globe demand greater governmental transparency
and accountability. In partnership with USAID, DRL supports the Open
Government Partnership, which is a global initiative that aims to
secure concrete commitments from governments to promote transparency,
empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to
strengthen governance. Since 2011, OGP has grown from eight countries
to 69, including Sri Lanka and Tunisia where new governments are
developing national action plans in partnership with civil society to
advance public sector integrity and key reforms.
DRL is also supporting transparency and anti-corruption watchdogs
and cross-border investigative reporting that exposes emblematic cases
of corruption. Our programs operate at both the national and the
regional levels, connecting activists and journalists to facilitate the
flow of best practices.
In Central America, a regional program trains journalists' to
investigate failures of government accountability and instances of
corruption. Journalists who participated in this program went on to
expose embezzlement and had their stories picked up by several media
organizations.
In Pakistan, we support the efforts of courageous journalists who
work in the tribal areas, where the most extreme militants are active.
Our program has trained journalists on how to conduct credible national
security investigations, while at the same time protecting their
personal security. In addition, we have been able to help local human
rights organizations expand their documentation of egregious human
rights abuses by security forces. As a result of our efforts, local
efforts to hold Pakistan security forces accountable for human rights
violations stand on firmer ground.
Transitional Justice & Atrocity Prevention
Around the world, legacies of atrocities cast a shadow on
transitions from repressive regimes to participatory and democratic
forms of governance. As part of the Department's commitment to
Presidential Study Directive 10 and the interagency efforts on Atrocity
Prevention, DRL has developed a number of tools to contribute to U.S.
efforts in this regard. To address impunity for past atrocities, DRL
created the Global Consortium for Justice, Truth, and Reconciliation
(the Consortium). The Consortium creates programs to address local
needs. For example, a $1.6 million project enables Iraqi civil society
to document human rights violations and abuses and violations of
international humanitarian law committed by all sides of the current
conflict with Da'esh. It establishes protocols and a repository that
collects, organizes, preserves, and analyzes evidence gathered to serve
a wide range of future transitional justice purposes. It also connects
local documentation efforts with the Iraqi judiciary and traditional
justice practices. To date, 29 representatives from Iraqi civil society
organizations participating in the project have collected over 600
narratives from victims and witnesses of atrocities committed in Iraq.
The Consortium can also respond rapidly to emerging needs in post-
conflict contexts. For example, partners have responded to requests for
rapid technical assistance to address issues of missing and disappeared
persons in Ukraine and now Colombia.
DRL's grantee focusing on mass graves excavation has designed a
refresher training course to strengthen the ability of partners from
the Iraqi Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs, the Medico-Legal
Institutes, criminal investigative and judicial agencies to recover and
process human remains in accordance with international standards. This
training package has been delivered in Erbil, allowing the relevant
Kurdistan Regional Government officials to deploy to Sinjar, where many
of Da'esh's atrocities took place, and begin work. DRL grantee staff
will mentor and support the process.
In the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a DRL-
supported Early Warning System received reports that helped foil rebel
attacks on villages that are home to approximately 150,000 people. The
early warning system demonstrates how communications technology can
reduce response times from several days or weeks to within hours of
threats. It can also ensure that respondersdeliver coordinated and
comprehensive assistance. The provincial government in this area of the
DRC is now funding and managing the system on its own.
China
In China, the Communist Party's monopoly on power remains absolute.
Growing numbers of people seek justice, an accountable and transparent
government, and the ability to express themselves freely and to
peacefully assemble and associate. The Chinese government has expanded
its crackdown on human rights lawyers and their associates, civil
society organizations and activists, friends and relatives of
activists, everyday people expressing themselves online or seeking to
practice their faith free of state control, and even foreigners and
foreign organizations working on human rights issues. In Tibetan and
Uighur areas, authorities have increased restrictions on fundamental
freedoms.
DRL funds targeted projects that bolster civil society
organizations seeking to improve respect for human rights in China. For
example, DRL programs build the capacity of public interest lawyers.
Other programs work to protect persons belonging to religious and
ethnic minorities and persons with disabilities, and those pressing for
government adherence to international human rights. Additionally, DRL
programs in China strengthen the advocacy skills of grassroots civil
society groups, and take advantage of technological developments to
enable greater freedom of expression.
Russia
The United States' commitment to engaging Russian civil society
remains firm despite the enactment of laws and practices in Russia that
restrict fundamental freedoms. Although the Russian government imposed
restrictions on civil society organizations receiving international
support, Russian organizations continue to express a desire to engage
with the United States. As a result, the Administration is developing
new ways to increase direct interactions between Russians and
Americans. These include establishing peer-to-peer and other regional
programs that support exchanges of best practices on civil society
development. We remain committed to supporting the people of Russia in
their pursuit of democracy, justice, and human rights, including
fighting corruption and creating a more pluralistic and participatory
society with viable, independent, and accountable institutions.
As part of our government's efforts to counter Russian intervention
in Eastern Europe, DRL programs assisted people in the southern and
eastern parts of Ukraine by facilitating their access to objective and
accurate information about Russia's occupation of Crimea, Russian
aggression in eastern Ukraine, attempts to destabilize the new
Ukrainian government, and the elections. Over 200 Ukrainian and foreign
journalists working on Crimea had better access to impartial and
accurate information about the situation in the peninsula. They also
had a safer workplace for preparing their materials and filing them to
their editors. In addition, 59 media outlets in the eastern and
southern regions received small grants and produced 857 media reports;
105 journalists received needs assessments and digital security
training to allow them to continue their work safely and securely.
Burma
The United States policy of principled engagement in Burma
encouraged leaders to undertake democratic reforms. Since May 2013, DRL
support has enabled the Assistance Association of Political Prisoners
to provide mental health counseling to more than 1,000 released
political prisoners, family members, and victims of torture in Burma.
Helping these courageous people reintegrate into Burmese society has
furthered their continued participation in Burma's political
transition. A strong civil society must serve as Burma's moral compass
as the country confronts challenges of bigotry and prejudice. These
lessons apply to other authoritarian environments. The dividends from
our assistance may not show immediately, but can deliver meaningful
long-term change.
Tunisia
During my trip to Tunisia last year, one of the key needs my
interlocutors identified was strengthening the parliament.
Parliamentarians, who have no staff, sought access to the resources and
expertise they need to draft and review legislation. We are in the
process of establishing a new program to provide members of parliament
non-partisan and credible resources to further democratic reforms,
including in the areas of human rights and rule of law. The program
will ensure that parliamentarians have access to a library of country-
specific materials, including fact sheets, briefing materials, research
papers, statistical profiles, and other forms of short, written
analyses, to enhance their ability to effectively engage on key
reforms.
The 2015 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the Tunisian National
Dialogue Quartet, comprised of the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT),
the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts, the
Tunisian Human Rights League, and the Tunisian Order of Lawyers. The
award cited its ``decisive contribution to the building of a
pluralistic democracy in Tunisia in the wake of the Jasmine Revolution
of 2011.'' The Quartet's work demonstrates the important role trade
unions can play in helping to build and maintain democratic
institutions. The labor movement in Tunisia, and UGTT in particular,
played a critical role moving Tunisia from dictatorship to democracy.
It effectively promoted and mediated peaceful dialogue between
citizens, political parties, and authorities. DRL supported the UGTT's
Women's Committee campaign and its efforts to increase women's
representation in decision making union structures. UGTT women
activists played a prominent role in get out the vote campaigns for the
national elections. A current DRL supported program in Tunisia aims to
formalize Tunisia's large informal sector so that workers might access
decent work and government-mandated protections.
Western Hemisphere
The Western Hemisphere presents new opportunities as well as
longstanding challenges. Throughout the region, despite restrictions on
freedom of expression and association, citizens have used the
democratic process to change the status quo. The people of Argentina
chose a new government committed to supporting human rights and
democracy in the hemisphere. We look forward to working with the new
government of Argentina on the most pressing issues in the region. The
Venezuelan people used their parliamentary elections to overwhelmingly
reject the course their ruling party had set. We urge the Maduro
administration to cease its efforts to restrict the powers of the
National Assembly and instead to enter into a dialogue with it. The
release of political prisoners would be a welcome preliminary step. The
people of Bolivia voted to reject removing term limits from the
constitution. We believe these democratic manifestations have been
possible in part due to the strong support the United States has shown
for those in each of these countries who have worked to counter efforts
to undermine democratic institutions. And that effort must continue,
including in Ecuador, where criminalizing dissent is a frequent
strategy for silencing opposition.
Across the hemisphere, people have also exercised their right to
peacefully assemble and demand an end to corruption and impunity. In
Guatemala, public outcry supported the efforts of the Public Ministry
and the Commission to Combat Impunity in Guatemala that led to criminal
corruption charges against the now former president and vice president.
Current corruption and impunity challenges in Guatemala are
intrinsically linked to past human rights violations and abuses. A DRL
program supported the identification of 97 victims of Guatemalan
atrocities. This information was used as principal evidence in the
unprecedented arrest of 14 military officers for crimes against
humanity, including those involving enforced disappearance, murder, and
torture.
DRL strengthens the capacity of local organizations to record and
report threats and violence against human rights activists, including
labor leaders. In Guatemala and Honduras, DRL programs have bolstered
national networks of labor unions, rural worker organizations, and non-
governmental organizations. This has generated coordinated mechanisms
for identifying violent incidents and demanding government responses. A
DRL-supported project in Guatemala is assisting a major coffee company
in mapping its supply chain. After conducting over 300 interviews of
internal migrant workers, the project implementer is providing the
company with increased visibility into the coffee supply chain, its
associated workforce, and recruitment abuses by tagging ``red flags''
that will be linked to specific labor brokers and suppliers.
We are also committed to supporting the people of Cuba as they seek
the basic freedoms that their government denies. During his visit to
Cuba in March, President Obama spoke openly to Cubans about the
importance of freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly. He called
for free and fair elections, and pledged U.S. support for these aims.
He also met with many brave activists who are struggling to promote
democracy and human rights on the island. He emphasized that Cuba's
future is for the Cuban people to design.
Consistent with this message, DRL programs in Cuba respond to the
needs and wishes of the Cuban people, by promoting human rights,
facilitating the flow of uncensored information, and strengthening
independent civil society. Cuban government restrictions on civil and
political rights increase the degree of difficulty of program
implementation. But despite these challenges, DRL has been able to
sustain consistent support to Cuban civil society for the past 10
years, and we will continue to do so with your support. As the
President has made clear our new approach to Cuba is not based on the
premise that the human rights situation there has improved; rather it
is based on the belief that we will be better able to support the
demands of the Cuban people if we keep the focus on the Cuban
government's policies rather than allowing the regime to blame American
policies for its problems.
Conclusion
When taking stock of the challenges at hand, some fear democracy is
in retreat. I would argue, however, that these challenges are a
reaction to the rising demands of people from every culture and region
for governments that answer to them.
Governments that protect human rights and fundamental freedoms are
more stable, successful, and secure than those that do not. American
workers are better off when their counterparts abroad can stand up for
their basic rights. The United States finds its strongest partners in
governments that act in the broad interests of their own people, rather
than the narrow interests of the few.
We must continue supporting civil society and pressing governments
to halt arbitrary detentions and uphold freedom of expression.
This is the work of decades, not days. But, we must also seize
opportunities to make an immediate difference for democracies under
threat or in countries in transition. As the 2015 National Security
Strategy affirms, ``America is uniquely situated--and routinely
expected--to support peaceful democratic change.'' Careful stewardship
of the resources allocated to DRL enables us to advance U.S. foreign
policy priorities in this regard, and we stand ready to do our part.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Secretary Malinowski, my first question is on the issue of
human rights and the President's visit last week to Saudi
Arabia. There are in particular two cases: Raif Badawi and
Waleed Abu Al-Khair. Do you know if either one of these cases
were raised in those meetings, and what are we doing to
pressure? There was a bipartisan letter--a group of Senators--
last week urging the President to make human rights a priority
during his meeting with the king. Were these cases raised
during that meeting, and if not, what else are we doing
regarding these two people that are jailed unjustly?
Mr. Malinowski. These cases have been raised, including at
the very highest levels, more than once with the Saudi
Government. And I know that the President in his meeting with
the king had an extensive conversation about human rights in
Saudi Arabia. I think you may have seen some stories about how
intensive that conversation was.
We will, I can pledge to you, continue to raise those cases
and others both privately with the Saudi Government and
publicly where appropriate until people who are unjustly
detained for peaceful expression, as these individuals are, are
released.
Senator Rubio. Recently the administration made its
countries of particular concern designations. Notably absent
from the list was Pakistan. A recent example of religious
intolerance was the horrific Easter attack in Lahore. What
would have to happen in your view for Pakistan to be designated
as a country of particular concern?
Mr. Malinowski. I think there are a lot of tough calls when
the Secretary makes these decisions. I think the test is not
simply whether there are significant abuses of religious
freedom in a particular country but whether we feel that there
is a commitment within the government to try to something about
it. And it is an evaluation that the Secretary makes on a case-
by-case basis. We added a country this year. We added
Tajikistan because after a lot of diplomatic efforts with the
government, we were simply not getting a sufficient or
acceptable response from that government to our requests for
action on certain issues. With respect to Pakistan, the
Secretary made the judgment that the government is committed to
trying to deal with this violence.
Senator Rubio. The Secretary recently made his genocide
designation. What steps has the Department taken to prioritize
especially vulnerable communities like the ancient Christian or
Yazidi communities which have found themselves in the
crosshairs of ISIS?
Mr. Malinowski. This has been a burning priority for many
of us since this conflict with ISIL began. I was in northern
Iraq about a month ago, Mr. Chairman. I visited the main Yazidi
religious shrine in Lalish just a few miles north of the front
line with ISIL. As I mentioned in my testimony, we have a lot
of programs that we are funding to provide direct support, not
just humanitarian assistance, but also psychosocial support for
people who have faced violence, escaped captivity on the part
of ISIL. As you know, the first shots that we fired in this war
to liberate territory in Iraq from ISIL were fired to protect
the Yazidi people on Mount Sinjar when they were surrounded by
the terrorists. And I think that this is something that we need
to think about with particular focus in the next stage of the
military campaign as it focuses more closely on Mosul and the
Ninawa plain.
I think many, many Members of Congress rightly urged us to
look at the genocide determination and to call what was
happening to the Christians, to the Yazidis, to other
minorities by its name, but using the terminology is the easy
part. The important thing is that we find a way to liberate
these historical home lands of these people in a way that not
only defeats ISIL, not only drives away the terrorists, but
that enables these communities to go home with dignity and with
security. And frankly, that is going to take resources, and I
think we are going to be working with you and reaching out to
you to talk about what it is going to take to do this in the
right way so those people can go home.
Senator Rubio. When you say it takes resources, what
additional budget resources are necessary to----
Mr. Malinowski. I am probably not the best person to ask
what the total cost of the----
Senator Rubio. What kind of programs?
Mr. Malinowski. It is going to require support for, in the
short term, IDPs. For example, as Mosul is squeezed, there will
almost certainly be hundreds of thousands of people fleeing
that city. There are 2 million people in Mosul, as you know.
Those people are going to need to be cared for somewhere by
somebody. It is going to require stabilization funds after the
liberation of that area for rebuilding, for restoring
institutions of justice. It is going to require training and
support for local security forces, including I would say some
of the local security forces that communities, including the
Christian communities, have been forming in that area. We are
already beginning to work with those folks. But I think if you
look at the various appeals, including the U.N. appeal just for
the humanitarian support, you will find that a lot more is
needed.
Senator Rubio. Secretary Palmieri, last year there were
over 8,600 documented political arrests in Cuba. Cuba remains
the only country in the Americas to be classified as not free
by Freedom House, and groups such as Human Rights Watch provide
details on the myriad of ways that basic rights and liberties
are still not respected in Cuba. In light of all of this, why
then would the administration request a reduction from the $20
million that is provided annually in recent years in funding to
democracy assistance for the Cuban people?
Mr. Palmieri. Thank you for the question, Senator.
The fiscal year 2017 request seeks to establish a
sustainable level of democracy support in Cuba. We believe the
human rights situation there merits continued attention, and
our assistance is designed to work with independent civil
society, promote democratic values, human rights, and advance
fundamental freedoms. The level of funding is one that we
believe we can execute on the ground there.
Senator Rubio. So you are saying that we do not think we
can spend $20 million. We cannot find programs to fund with the
$20 million. So that is why you are asking for less? It is very
unusual for a government agency to ask for less. That is why I
am bringing up this point. Why would we ask for less?
Mr. Palmieri. We believe that is the sustainable level of
programming that we can carry out inside Cuba.
Senator Rubio. But what does that mean ``sustainable''? The
amount you can get funded in the future or sustainable like
that is how much you can handle?
Mr. Palmieri. It is a combination of the amount of money
that we believe can be absorbed inside Cuba at this time.
Senator Rubio. That was not the feeling 2 years ago? Is
that a change in position? Because a couple years ago, the
funding was at $20 million. So what happened with the
additional money that was appropriated in those past years?
Mr. Palmieri. I will have to get back to you on what
happened to the previous funding, sir.
Senator Rubio. Well, my point is you are saying that you do
not believe the island can sustain $20 million of spending on
democracy programs, there is not enough precedent to fund or
that we can sustain $20 million. So that is why you are asking
for less. But in past years, there has been more money. Are you
saying that money was not spent? If you are spending less this
year than you were in the past, something that you funded in
the past is not getting funded now. Is that not correct?
Mr. Palmieri. I am sorry, sir.
Mr. Malinowski. Yes, we have spent slightly more than $15
million in the past.
I mean, I think what we face every time we make these
requests, to be honest, is overall, as you well know, a
diminishing pool of resources to do almost everything that we
want to do around the world. The way I look at this, Senator
Rubio, obviously, as the head of the Democracy and Human Rights
Bureau, I always welcome as much spending as we can do in any
country in the world that needs it. I have got, as I have
mentioned, about $85 million globally for every single country,
every single continent in the world to spend on democracy and
human rights programs. And I could probably spend more in every
single country where we are doing this kind of work. Cuba at
this point, I think next to Iraq, is the country that receives
the most human rights and democracy support of any country in
the world. And it merits it, given the challenges, given the
importance that this issue has to the United States.
But I sometimes look at it and say, gosh, I would love to
have more. Sometimes I look at it and say, you know, I would
rather have more than $200,000 for a country in Africa or a
country in Asia where that is all we have got to deal with
these issues. So those are some of the choices I think----
Senator Rubio. So this is basically a part of a
reallocation of resources to be spent somewhere else within a
limited budget.
Mr. Malinowski. I think we have a very limited budget, I
would say too far limited for democracy and governance around
the world. You know the challenges that we have had overall in
trying to maintain an adequate level of spending for democracy
and governance in a lot of places that we all care about
greatly. Cuba is one of them. So it is certainly not a
reallocation away from supporting democracy and human rights,
but we have hard choices to make within the limited amount of
money that we have for that. Obviously, I would love us to be
able to do more in a lot of places.
Senator Rubio. Senator Boxer?
Senator Boxer. Well, I would like you to be able to do
more. I watched you do it in the nonprofit sector, and I think
you could do it here as well.
I want to get back to the Zika virus because I think this
is an absolute threat to this country. So, Ms. Hogan, I am
going to direct this question to you. There is no doubt the
Zika virus is a public health emergency. It has infected
thousands people in the western hemisphere, including over 300
Americans. It causes severe birth defects in newborns,
including brain damage and blindness. In adults, it is linked
to Guillain-Barre syndrome which can cause paralysis.
In the last few months, the World Health Organization
described the Zika threat as, quote, one of alarming
proportions. And earlier this month, an official from the
Centers for Disease Control described the virus as, quote,
scarier than we originally thought. Unquote.
We also have learned that Zika is sexually transmitted.
Now, in our country, the most endangered Americans are
those who live in the Gulf States. It is clear that these types
of epidemics know no boundaries. So we have to respond quickly.
In February, the President requested a $1.9 billion
emergency supplemental for Zika. A portion of this request
would go to USAID to help fight the spread of the virus within
the western hemisphere. Unfortunately and sadly and
inexplicably, Congress has not provided the administration with
the funding it needs to respond to this outbreak. And those who
oppose it are going to be held accountable. It is as simple as
that.
Time makes a big difference in these kind of epidemics. The
longer we wait, the more people get infected, the more lives
are painfully altered forever. We have seen it. It is coming as
sure as I am looking at you.
So I am asking you with your limited funds what efforts is
USAID already undertaking to combat the spread of the Zika
virus in the western hemisphere.
I am told by some of my Republican friends, some of whom
support this, a lot of whom do not, take the money from Ebola.
Well, swell. That is a whole other problem, and that is not the
answer.
So I want to know what you are doing with your limited
funds and do you agree we have a great need for the funds the
President asked for.
Ms. Hogan. Thank you for that question and we share your
deep concern about the potential impact of Zika in the region,
including in the United States.
As you know, in addition to the $1.8 billion supplemental
that the President has requested, he has also sent forward a CN
to repurpose $295 million from our Ebola account to deal with
immediate needs. Thus far, USAID has conducted assessments
around the region, particularly in those countries where health
systems are weak, and we have developed a strategy which we are
ready to launch. Our strategy would include social behavior
change, communications, vector control, investing in new
diagnostic techniques, investing in research and development.
Senator Boxer. Excuse me for interrupting. Can we diagnose
it? Is it easy to find out if someone is carrying the virus?
Ms. Hogan. CDC is the expert in this area, but I know that
they can diagnose it. To do it more rapidly and more
inexpensively is what we are hoping to bring about through a
grant challenge that USAID just issued last week to the private
sector for $30 million to invest in innovative technologies and
innovative approaches to do the kinds of things that I just
mentioned in terms of diagnostics.
Senator Boxer. Okay. So to sum it up, you are doing
everything you can with limited resources, but it is a race
against time. You know, Mr. Chairman, from my understanding, we
have so much--and I know you are supporting taking action on
this. I am so grateful to you. We do not even know how long the
virus stays in your system, and since it is sexually
transmitted, you know, couples planning to have children--they
better know the situation, whether the man is infected and can
pass it on. It is very problematical.
I raise it here because it is one of those unusual
situations where there is a direct impact for Americans that is
going on in another part of the world. We have got to connect
the dots. This is not some foreign policy matter. This is a
health emergency. And I will be continuing to speak about it.
Mr. Malinowski, over the last 14 years, Afghan women have
made progress in education, health, and political
representation. I have been engaged every time I can in meeting
with the women. And while President Ghani is a strong partner
on women's issues, it is clear that women continue to face
grave barriers, especially in regard to their legal rights.
Last year, for instance, a mob brutally killed a woman
falsely accused of burning the Koran. This horrific murder
happened in central Kabul in broad daylight in the presence of
security officials. Disturbingly, the Afghan supreme court
recently vacated the death sentences of four men charged with
this murder and reduced the sentences of nine others. This is
but one example of ways in which Afghanistan's legal system
continues to fail Afghan women.
How will the U.S. continue to work with Afghanistan to
bolster the legal rights of Afghan women?
Mr. Malinowski. Well, thank you for that question. I am
sure I will not do justice to every aspect of it or everything
that we are doing.
With respect to the Afghan judiciary, one of the steps that
President Ghani intended to take was to appoint the first woman
or women to the Afghan supreme court. When I saw him last, I
urged him to do that. He said that he was committed to it. He
has been unsuccessful. His appointments there have been
blocked.
Senator Boxer. Well, wait a minute. Where are they learning
how to block appointments to the supreme court?
Mr. Malinowski. Their system I think----
Senator Boxer. I am only kidding.
Mr. Malinowski. Oh, sorry.
Senator Boxer. That was a bad joke.
Mr. Malinowski. I was heading toward the same joke.
Senator Boxer. Okay. Never mind.
Mr. Malinowski. I am resisting all kinds of ways of----
Senator Boxer. Resist.
Mr. Malinowski. At a lower level, but at a very important
level, we have done a lot of work with local justice
institutions in Afghanistan through training and other
assistance programs to help them implement the new violence
against women law, which has been one important advance in that
country.
We have a program out of my bureau which supports sending
talented young Afghan women to a university for women in
Bangladesh. We have established a really interesting and
important program there. And the women who graduate from that
program often then go back to Afghanistan and enter government,
enter the justice system. So at a grassroots level, just
encouraging more and more women to take up positions in the
justice system has been an important priority for our
programming.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Senator Rubio. Senator Gardner?
Senator Gardner. Thank you to all the witnesses for your
time and testimony today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.
Just a couple questions for you, Mr. Malinowski. I wanted
to start with North Korea, if I could. The legislation that the
Senate and House passed, signed by the President just a couple
months ago requires designation of human rights violators in
North Korea, an investigation of those human rights violators.
Our of curiosity, how are those investigations going, and
do you have any intention of naming people under the
legislation passed by Congress? And if so, who and when?
Mr. Malinowski. We are working very hard on identifying
people. I have often spoken publicly about this. I think one of
the most important things that we can do for human rights in
North Korea is to send a message inside the system there to the
mid-level people, to the camp commanders, to the people in the
public security ministries who are responsible for the worst
abuses that, guess what, we know who you are. We know your
names. And some day when there is change on the Korean
peninsula, you are going to be on a list that you do not want
to be on if you are associated with those abuses.
Figuring out who those people are is not always easy for
reasons that I am sure you will understand. We are working with
our partners, including with the South Koreans, to try to
figure this out. We have made some progress.
Yes, we do intend to use the sanctions authority. In fact,
as you know, the President's executive order before the
legislation passed created a human rights sanctions authority
for the same purpose. I cannot tell you who because we are not
there yet. The ``when,'' hopefully as soon as possible.
Senator Gardner. Will you be looking at the highest levels
of government, though, for these sanctions?
Mr. Malinowski. We will be. We can look at individuals. We
can also look at ministries. I will tell you my preference in
terms of effectiveness, because I do not want to just say Kim
Jong Un is a bad guy. We all know that. My preference would be
to try to identify some of the people who are less well known
in order to send that message that actually we do know who they
are and there may be some consequence in the future if they are
associated, for example, executions in the prison camp system
and the rest.
Senator Gardner. We did provide additional authorities
under the legislation in order to communicate with the North
Korean people to find ways to build cheap and efficient and
effective communication channels in order to get the message
out about the atrocities of the Kim Jong Un regime. And
hopefully those authorities--Senator Rubio, Chairman Rubio, was
a critical part of that--will be utilized and helpful in
getting the word out about the acts that these people are
carrying out.
Mr. Malinowski. Absolutely, and I am grateful for that. We
already have some very interesting and creative programming
from old-fashioned methodology like radio broadcasting to newer
ways of getting information to people in the North. There are
about 3 million cell phone contracts amazingly in North Korea
right now. So people are communicating with each other and also
with people outside the country in surprising ways. And there
are a lot of folks working on delivering content that will
raise awareness, that will bring information to people in North
Korea about simple things like what life is like outside of the
country. We fund some of that out of my bureau, and I think
there is room for a lot more.
Senator Gardner. China in the past has had a policy of
returning North Korea defectors to the regime. Are you in
conversation with China about changing that policy? Is China
still intending to change that policy? And how is that dialogue
taking place?
Mr. Malinowski. We have raised this many times with the
Chinese Government, as have some other countries in the region.
It has been a difficult conversation. I would note that there
are some cases recently in which China has allowed people to
move on who have sought asylum. I think there were some North
Korean workers in Beijing recently who managed to get
themselves to South Korea without objections from the Chinese
Government. So we will have to see. But it is an important
issue and one we continue to raise.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Malinowski.
And a couple more questions. According to news reports, the
week after President Obama visited--I will give you the quote
from the news reports. The week after U.S. President Barack
Obama's visit, things in Cuba have returned to normal. More
than 150 activists were arrested on Saturday in demonstrations
demanding the release of political prisoners. Is that an
accurate assessment? How many political prisoners are there
today in Cuba that we are aware of, and has there been an
increase or a decrease in the number of these arrests and
jailed since our policy change toward Cuba?
Mr. Malinowski. The big distinction here is between long-
term political prisoners, most of whom have been released, and
the short-term harassment, often violence that is inflicted on
people who try to hold meetings, organize rallies, discussions
to engage in the politics of the island. That has absolutely
not let up. I think there were a couple of thousand of those
short-term detentions in the first 3 months of this year. And I
think it reflects both the highly repressive tendencies of this
government which we know extremely well, but also I think their
nervousness about the changes that are taking place in our
relationship and the hemisphere.
I think it was very interesting to see the reaction of the
Cuban Government to President Obama's visit after the fact.
Fidel Castro basically left his bed to deliver a speech
denouncing President Obama. He said we do not need any gifts
from the empire. President Obama's syrupy words about
brotherhood and shared history were enough to give Cubans a
heart attack he said. Raul Castro made similar statements. You
know, it seems like the only argument these guys had for the
last few years is the myth of American hostility towards Cuba,
and we have completely destroyed that myth in the eyes of the
Cuban people. And they have got nothing else, and I think they
are extremely nervous and insecure as a result of that.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rubio. Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And if I could, I will just introduce you to these students
who are here. Maggie L. Walker High School in Richmond is a
school for governmental and international studies. It is in the
neighborhood where I live. It was a vacant and abandon building
when I got elected to the city council in 1994, and over the
course of about 7 years, we worked with governments in the
region to build it into this high school that is now commonly
ranked as one of the 25 best public high schools in the United
States. And these students are here as part of a constitutional
competition that they have been participating in, and I am
really happy to have them here. And with the school's focus on
governmental and international studies, this is a good hearing
to be at.
I had the opportunity last week to ask some questions of
both Ms. Hogan and Mr. Palmieri with respect to the Northern
Triangle. And I am going actually focus more of my questions to
Secretary Malinowski today on human rights issues.
Yesterday, I had a wonderful meeting with Senator Baldwin
and Senator Coons with an inspirational city council woman in
Istanbul, Sedef Cakmak, who is here. She founded the Istanbul
Pride Parade in 2003, and there were 30 marchers. By 2014,
there were over 80,000 marchers, and last year the Turkish
Government used water cannons to shut the march down and
disperse everyone after it had grown so large.
She was here visiting us to talk about ways in which the
United States could be helpful. And when Senator Coons asked
her, tell us how we can help human rights in Turkey, this was
her answer. And I wanted all of you to hear this because it is
about your colleagues. She said the help that we have had that
has enabled us to do what we have done has been the United
States. The support of the U.S. ambassador, the support of the
U.S. consul in Istanbul has enabled the LGBT community in
Turkey to not avoid persecution and hostility, as my story
about the Pride Parade being dispersed suggests, but they have
enabled us to finally at least come out of the shadows to some
degree and organize. And she really said that there had been no
greater friend.
So when we asked what we could do to help, she said the
main thing you can do to help is just thank our diplomats and
folks with the State Department who have been our allies.
Talk to me a little bit about the work that you are doing
in your bureau with respect to LGBT rights around the world
because whether it is in Turkey or Russia or Africa or other
countries, we see serious, serious challenges. Please tell a
little bit about how we factor that into our diplomacy.
Mr. Malinowski. Of course. Well, first of all, it is a very
heartening story that you just told and I will pass that on
personally to Ambassador Bass, who is one of our best
ambassadors on so many different scores. And I know that he has
been particularly principled in reaching out to the LGBT
community and to the broader activist community in Turkey,
which is facing a lot of challenges right now.
I would say, first of all, it begins with recognition of
the legitimacy and dignity of people around the world who are
working for the human rights of LGBT people and simply
asserting their own rights to live in safety and in dignity and
simply reaching out, meeting with these folks, as you
mentioned, in Turkey is an important part of it. I try to do it
on all my trips. Other senior U.S. officials do as well or are
seen doing it. That makes a difference.
We provide material support to people who are on the front
lines of the struggle. We have in our little DRL budget
something called the Global Equality Fund, which we have now
gotten other governments to contribute to as well. It is one of
those emergency funds that I mentioned in my opening statement
and that we can deliver $3,000 in 48 hours to someone who needs
help for security, for travel, for basic support for an NGO
that is doing good work, sometimes for legal support. There
have been successful legal challenges in various countries
around the world to highly restrictive, repressive anti-gay
laws that we have provided some support to.
And then just at a rhetorical level. And we are very, very
careful in our public statements not to suggest that this is
about carving out special rights for special kinds of people.
What we are talking about is simply basic human rights that
everybody in the world enjoys. Whether they are straight or
LGBT, no one should be discriminated against, no one should be
subject to violence, no one should be persecuted because of who
they are. And I think that message increasingly resonates in
countries even where there is nervousness about the advance of
this issue.
Senator Kaine. We met Sedef Cakmak--a number of us--in
Istanbul in early January. We were with her right in the heart
of the city near the Blue Mosque about two days before the
bombing there that occurred in early January. A very wonderful
advocate. And she definitely connects the feelings of
government persecution of the LGBT community to the worries
that other religious minorities or political opponents are
feeling in Turkey. This is not a hearing about Turkey. I would
like to delve into that further at another moment.
Let me switch to another area within your bailiwick and
that is press freedom. Again, around the world, we are seeing--
Turkey is a good example. Russia is a good example. Honduras,
sadly. I lived in Honduras, a journalist at Radio Progreso,
which is a Jesuan radio station in El Progreso, Honduras where
I worked with the Jesuit community there 35 years ago. Carlos
Mejia Orellana was killed 2 years ago and a number of other
journalists have been killed as well.
I think the chair alluded to some freedom of press
questions in his opening comments. This is so fundamental. And
again, if you see a government cracking down on a free press,
you can pretty much bet they are going to be cracking down on
political opponents. They are going to be trying to engage in
other authoritarian activity. As much as we in politics
sometimes rankle under a free press that is free and robust and
challenging, we sure would not trade it for anything else.
Tell us how the State Department through your bureau tries
to advance the notion of protecting freedom of the press around
the world.
Mr. Malinowski. First of all, when a government cracks down
on free press, we speak out about it and we talk to them about
it in our high level diplomatic engagements. We have done it
with Turkey. We have done it with Egypt where we have worked
really, really hard to get journalists out of prison. We have
done it in China. Sometimes we are successful. Sometimes we are
less so. But journalists are persecuted because they are doing
effective, hard-hitting work, and I think particularly at a
time when the issue of anti-corruption is coming to the fore in
many countries around the world, it is making a lot of
governments that are corrupt nervous about the work of a free
press that is uncovering their secrets. And oftentimes you will
find that we are supporting that kind of work not just
rhetorically because we have an interest in accountable, good
governance, and without a free press, we are not going to get
one.
More generally, we also have programs that are specifically
designed to help train journalists in difficult environments to
stay safe, programs in digital safety, physical safety that
obviously do not provide 100 percent protection, but I think
are very helpful to journalists who are facing very real danger
in the work that they do.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Rubio. Just a quick question. You asked about the
LGBT community in Istanbul. Is that criminalized under Turkish
law? You were talking about government persecution. Under what
form?
Mr. Malinowski. I will have to get back to you on that. I
do not know if it is one of the countries where it is
criminalized, but I will get back to you on that.
[The information referred to above was not received in time
to be included in this publication.]
Senator Rubio. Okay.
Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank all of our witnesses for their extraordinary
work that they do every day on behalf of human rights.
Mr. Malinowski, I want to ask you a couple questions, if I
might. First, the Russian media has been very actively engaged
to try to rewrite history as to what happened in Sergei
Magnitsky and his tragic arrest, torture, and death. The United
States--the administration has used its inherent authority to
grant certain types of sanctions against those who perpetrated
those crimes in Russia and has also used the authority under
the Magnitsky law that was passed.
Can you just comment as to the basis for imposing those
sanctions as it relates to the allegations that have been made
by the Russian press?
Mr. Malinowski. One thing I have learned about our
sanctions programs in this job is how high the bar is for our
lawyers, our investigators, the folks who determine whether a
particular individual meets the criteria that Congress has laid
out for application of a particular sanction. And I can tell
you in the Magnitsky case, we rely on multiple sources of
information in making these determinations. It is reviewed by
many people in the United States Government who have to be
confident that the information is credible before we put
somebody's name on that list. The Justice Department is
involved. The Treasury Department is involved, in addition to
the State Department. And we are very, very confident that the
people who are on that list deserve to be on that list based on
hard evidence.
Senator Cardin. I thank you for that. There have been
several people who have been sanctioned as a result of it, and
there has been congressional involvement working with the
administration on this issue. It is clear with the information
that we have received the type of conduct that they perpetrated
in Russia to a person who was trying to bring to the attention
of the authorities a corrupt situation and in fact became a
victim, arrested, tortured, and lost his life. I thank you for
clarifying that point.
I want to move on to a tragic situation in Azerbaijan. We
are seeing an increase in the number of political prisoners in
that country and their oppression against those who differ with
the government. One of those cases, Khadija Ismayilova, a
political prisoner and Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty
reporter, is currently serving a 7 and a half year sentence in
Azerbaijan on charges many human rights organizations regard as
politically motivated. She has been a tireless reporter on
corruption in the country and it is widely believed that she
was targeted for her work.
Could you just comment as to what diplomatic tools we have
available in order to raise this issue?
Mr. Malinowski. Well, I would say, first of all, that we
have called and will continue to call for the release of
Khadija Ismayilova. We are very well aware of her case.
In the last several weeks, we have engaged very intensively
with the Government of Azerbaijan on human rights issues. It
has, I think, contributed to actions by the Government of
Azerbaijan to release a number of people who we consider to be
political prisoners, including Intigam Aliyev, an
internationally recognized human rights lawyer, Rasul Jafarov,
and Anar Mammadli who is the chairman of their election
monitoring and democratic study center. We have seen some, I
think, very positive steps by the Government of Azerbaijan in
response to our engagement.
But we would certainly agree with you that the good news
that we have seen is not yet enough. There are still others in
detention who should not be, including Khadija Ismayilova, and
we very strongly believe that releasing the remaining political
prisoners and more broadly expanding freedom of expression and
freedom of the press in Azerbaijan would be good for that
country's future and good for our relationship with Azerbaijan.
Senator Cardin. And lastly, let me just raise the tragic
death that we saw in Bangladesh just a few days ago of a USAID
employee, Xulhaz Mannan, who founded the Bangladesh first LGBT
magazine. That murder is still being investigated from the
point of view of responsibility. We know that an ISIL-related
group claimed responsibility. But this is just outrageous, and
I would hope that the administration will keep a bright
spotlight on this tragic death and make sure that we have full
accountability as to who are responsible and that we hold the
government to doing everything possible not only to hold the
perpetrators responsible but to protect the civil society. The
civil society in Bangladesh is challenged, and clearly this
murder will have an impact on that country.
Mr. Malinowski. It is absolutely horrific. We are outraged
by it. It is the latest in a series of killings as you
mentioned. This one cuts particularly close. We will do
everything we can to encourage the Government of Bangladesh to
investigate this and bring the perpetrators to justice. We will
support them in doing so. And as I mentioned in my opening
remarks, we also can use and are using some of our emergency
assistance programs to provide support in getting people who
are still threatened in Bangladesh to safety if they want to
avail themselves of that kind of support.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. I thank all the panelists for
their commitment to these issues.
Senator Rubio. Senator Markey?
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Ms. Hogan we have a fentanyl epidemic in the United States.
Sources now say that it is very clear that China and Mexico are
the two principal means by which fentanyl is coming into the
United States. The number of opioid deaths in our country has
escalated dramatically with the single largest new addition to
that plague being fentanyl as a killer in our country.
What is our government saying to Mexico about the
importation of fentanyl? It comes up right from Mexico and it
winds up in Lawrence, Massachusetts where people die, but that
is the story for most of our country. What is it that we are
telling the Mexicans about this importation of fentanyl?
Ms. Hogan. Thank you for the question. Actually it is the
State Department that has the lead on that dialogue, so I would
ask my colleague from the State Department to respond.
Senator Markey. Mr. Palmieri?
Mr. Palmieri. Senator, thank you.
We are engaged in a broad-based effort with Mexico to
improve counternarcotics interdiction and to improve their
ability to eradicate poppy cultivation inside Mexico, as well
as strengthen our border and law enforcement cooperation to
prevent those kinds of drugs from leaving Mexico and entering--
--
Senator Markey. Are you talking specifically about
fentanyl? Fentanyl is the new addition. It is like a chemical
concoction that is put together. What are you saying about
fentanyl specifically to the Mexicans? It is a killer.
Mr. Palmieri. We have a broad-based conversation with
Mexico on counternarcotics. Our law enforcement agencies are
engaged with Mexico across the full range of drug trafficking
that emanates from Mexico into the United States.
Senator Markey. No. I am asking are you having specific
conversations about fentanyl with them. It is much more deadly
than heroin or anything that has ever been seen before. What
are you saying to them about this one specific, new addition to
the opioid death spiral that too many families in America have
now fallen?
Mr. Palmieri. We are pressing the Mexican Government to do
all it can to prevent illegal narcotics from entering the
United States and to work collaboratively with our law
enforcement agencies, and fentanyl is definitely one of those
substances that we are focused on, sir.
Senator Markey. Well, I would just urge you as strongly as
I can to elevate fentanyl to the top priority which you have.
It has the potential to kill tens of thousands--tens of
thousands--of Americans over the next several years. And the
route in is through Mexico. So this is something that I just
urge you to elevate to the level of intense dialogue between
our two countries so that they know that we mean business on
that issue. It is of critical concern not just in urban America
but in every city and town in our country. Fentanyl is the new
drug that is killing people, and we have got to stop it. And
the Mexicans must be our aggressive partner in this.
On human rights in Mexico, the security forces have been
implicated in repeated serious human rights violations,
including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances and
torture, and that the government has made little progress
investigating or prosecuting those responsible for abuses.
What is happening in Mexico defies belief. In September of
2014, 43 students disappeared in Mexico. That was nearly 2
years ago. At the time I wrote a letter urging the Secretary of
State to do everything possible to support the Mexican
Government by making additional investigative and forensic
resources available. My letter also urged assistance to the
Mexican Government in its efforts to bring all those
responsible to justice and to ensure positive postmortem
identifications that allow families to begin their grieving and
healing process. This the Mexican Government has not done.
In 2015, an interdisciplinary group of experts appointed by
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights went to Mexico to
investigate the case and worked for about a year to uncover the
truth. But then the Mexican Government refused to extend their
mandate prematurely ending their work.
This past weekend, they released their final report and
found serious abuses and inconsistencies in the Mexican
Government's investigation. The report throws the government's
version of events into serious question and suggests that the
government did not seek to discover the extent of official
culpability for these crimes.
Last Friday, the ``New York Times'' reported that the group
of experts has endured carefully orchestrated attacks in the
Mexican news media, a refusal by the government to turn over
documents or grant interviews with essential figures and even a
retaliatory criminal investigation into one of the officials
who appointed them.
What is our government doing to persuade the Mexican
Government to allow the group of experts to continue its
investigation, and what will we do now in response to their
report?
Mr. Palmieri. Senator, we did take note of the April 24th
report of the independent experts from the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. We commend the commission's work,
and we do urge Mexico to consider the report and respond to the
report's recommendations, specifically to provide assistance to
the families and the victims, to bring the perpetrators to
justice, and to evaluate the suggested actions to address the
forced disappearances associated with that incident.
Senator Markey. Well, what additional actions can we take
in order to impress upon the Mexican Government how serious we
are about this issue?
Mr. Palmieri. Well, we do have an ongoing human rights
dialogue with the Mexican Government. This is a topic that has
been raised at many different levels and will continue to be
raised directly with the government, sir.
Senator Markey. I think that we have got, obviously, a huge
problem here. 27,000 Mexicans have disappeared over the last 10
years, that the government has done little to investigate. And
I think that this is just an escalating problem inside of their
country, and I think it is up to the United States, since they
are our partner on so many other issues, to use every bit of
leverage we have to let them know that we are dead serious
about this issue and it just cannot be allowed to continue.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
I know there is a vote called, so we are going to wrap.
I just have one more question, Mr. Palmieri, I wanted ask
you. There has been a significant up-tick in the number of
Cuban migrants just, for example, from October of last year
through February. So just a 5-month period, 18,500 Cubans
arrived at the Texas Laredo field office. We are also getting
kind of similar reports from the Coast Guard. They say since
October of last year, 2,700 Cubans have attempted to enter the
U.S. by sea.
But what is more concerning is the number of people--we
talked about this briefly last week at another hearing--coming
in I think through Ecuador and Panama and Costa Rica. And if
you read the press reports, some of these governments--their
body language or attitude is we are going to put them on a
plane and fly them as close as possible to the U.S. border so
they can cross. In essence, we do not want this problem. This
is a major developing issue here, and much of this upsurge has
occurred since the deal.
What is driving this new migration? What is driving this
new migration? What is our position towards those countries
that are talking about moving these people? Their attitude is
our job is to kind of facilitate them, get them through, so
they can get to the U.S. which is where they want to go.
Second, are we confronting that attitude that they have? And
third, what is the best way to stop this?
Mr. Palmieri. Thank you for that question, Senator.
The engagement with the countries in the region focuses on
encouraging them to ensure safe, legal, and orderly migration.
Much of this migration is undocumented and irregular as it
passes through the Central America region. There is no question
that earlier this year Costa Rica and Panama worked with the
Government of Mexico and did airlift almost 8,000 Cuban
migrants from both countries to the northern part of Mexico
where they crossed into the United States.
Costa Rica took the step at that time of making clear that
after that backlog was addressed, that they were going to be
more aggressive in enforcing their immigration laws and
returning people to their last point of origin. We now see an
additional backlog of these migrants in Panama, and there is
now, at least as reported in the press, talk of another
possible airlift between Panama and Mexico.
We continue to urge the countries to enforce their
migration laws, to strengthen their border controls, and to
address undocumented and irregular migration by returning
people to their last point of origin. We think that is the best
way to----
Senator Rubio. Well, have we pronounced ourselves against
these airlifts? Have we pronounced ourselves against these
airlifts whether it is the one that Costa Rica did or the one
that Panama is now doing? Because the minute the word gets out
that if you can get into this country, they are going to put
you on a plane and fly you close to the U.S. border so you can
get it, you are encouraging more people to do this. So have we
said to them do not airlift people? We have significant
potential leverage over these countries.
Mr. Palmieri. We have worked with all three countries to
ensure that they are going to strengthen their border controls
and put in place better mechanisms to prevent this undocumented
and irregular----
Senator Rubio. That is future, but what about the current
backlog? Have we told them do not airlift these people?
Mr. Palmieri. We have encouraged the countries in the
region themselves to figure out the best solution to this surge
of migration. And we believe the best solution is stronger
enforcement of their own immigration laws----
Senator Rubio. But we have not told them not to do the
airlift.
Mr. Palmieri. We have not told them not to do the airlift,
sir.
Senator Rubio. What is driving this? I mean, Cuba has been
repressive for 60 years. What is the difference now? Is it the
fear that the Cuban Adjustment Act is going to go away that is
driving people to try to get in here before it goes away?
Mr. Palmieri. We have no plans to change the Cuban
Adjustment Act at this time, Senator. There continues to be a
large migration flow out of Cuba. It reflects the difficult
economic and human rights conditions in the country.
Senator Rubio. And I understand that the administration has
no plans to advocate for a change in the Cuban Adjustment Act,
which was an act of Congress. But my question is, is there
fear? What I hear is that people in Cuba think the Cuban
Adjustment Act might go away, and now that the situation has
been normalized, so they are trying to get into the U.S. before
that happens.
Mr. Palmieri. I do not know and cannot comment directly on
the individual motivations of these Cuban migrants. But I can
make clear that the administration is not entertaining any idea
of a change to the Cuban Adjustment Act, and so that should not
be a factor in their decision calculus.
Senator Rubio. All right. Well, I want to thank all of you
for being here today. I appreciate you participating in this,
and I think it was informative. And I am pleased as well that
we have so many members attend and ask great questions. Again,
we always thank you for the work that you all do on behalf of
our country.
And with that, I just wanted to end by noting that the
record will remain open until the close of business on
Thursday, April 28th.
And with that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:18 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator David Perdue
to Elizabeth Hogan, Acting Assistant Administrator for Latin America
and the Caribbean, USAID
Question 1a. Despite almost $4 billion in U.S. assistance to
Haiti, the nation suffers from high unemployment, political
instability, and growing food insecurity due to prolonged drought.
Haiti ranks 163 out of 188 on the U.N.s 2015 Human Development Index.
More than half of Haitians live below the international extreme poverty
line of $1.90 per day. For FY 2017, the President has requested $79.9
million in Economic Support Funds and about $129.2 million in funding
for global health programs for Haiti. The President's budget request
describes this funding as supporting long-term growth, but Haiti is
still struggling to bounce back from the devastating earthquake that
struck in 2010.
What portion of this $209.1 million will be dedicated to
reconstruction efforts specifically?
Answer. Although Haiti remains an extremely poor and fragile
country with substantial development needs, USAID has strategically
modified its areas of focus and assistance shifting from reconstruction
to more effectively address Haiti's needs and build the capacity of the
Haitian government and local Haitian institutions to tackle development
challenges. For example, with FY 2017 ESF, $3.1 million will be
allocated towards sustaining and expanding electricity generation in
the north of Haiti and $5.5 million will be used to continue to support
improved livelihood opportunities in areas where the U.S. government's
shelter related programs are operating. The remaining $200.5 million
will contribute to USAID's longer-term development programs focusing on
economic growth, agriculture, health, democracy and governance, and
basic education.
Question 1b. In what areas will these reconstruction funds be
concentrated?
Answer. In general, FY 2017 funds will support activities in Haiti
that advance democracy and human rights, nurture economic opportunity
in areas of private sector growth and sustained agricultural
development for food security, prevent the spread of infectious
diseases, improve basic health services especially for women and
children, and strengthen basic education. As referenced in part (a)
above, in FY 2017, $3.1 million will be allocated towards
infrastructure activities. With these funds, U.S. assistance will
support the Government of Haiti's efforts to engage the private sector
to take over the operation and maintenance of the mini-utility power
plant in northern Haiti. In addition, U.S. assistance will continue to
support improved livelihoods in geographic zones in which USAID has
previously invested in improved shelter and community development.
Question 1c. Can you speak about the FY 2017 request for improving
food security in Haiti?
Answer. The FY 2017 request of $9 million will allow USAID to
advance gains made through the Feed the Future Initiative. Agriculture
is central to the Haitian economy, employing approximately 60 percent
of the population and serving as the primary source of income in rural
areas. Under FTF, the U.S. government has introduced improved seeds,
fertilizer, and technology, as well as improved access to irrigation
and markets for almost 83,000 Haitian farmers. USAID has also linked
farmers directly with buyers, and improved farmer access to micro-
credit. Women have been involved in the entire value chain of
agricultural products and represent around 30 percent of direct
beneficiaries. USAID plans to continue to support these households and
to expand these efforts to another 30,000 farmers by 2018.
USAID's work to address environmental degradation in Haiti is
closely linked to efforts to improve the country's food insecurity.
More than half of all land in Haiti is steeply sloped, and
approximately 85 percent of the country's watersheds are degraded,
causing frequent flooding, erosion, reduced availability of groundwater
for irrigation in the fertile plains, and depletion of the basic soil
nutrients required for increased food production. As part of a larger
effort to stabilize watersheds, increase tree cover, and promote
sustainable agricultural practices in disaster prone regions of the
country, from 2009 to 2014, USAID supported reforestation efforts
through the planting of over 5 million seedlings with a survival rate
of about 70 percent throughout the country. USAID plans to fund
additional community-based reforestation and related policies.
Question 2. In their June 2015 report on Haiti reconstruction
progress, the GAO reported that 3 of 17 key non-infrastructure
activities were reduced, including providing access to basic
healthcare. In light of the outbreak of cholera that Haiti has dealt
with since the earthquake, what led USAID to decide to reduce basic
health initiatives?
Answer. USAID/Haiti takes its response to cholera very seriously,
and is responding in coordination with the Ministry of Health, U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and other donors. The
Agency has several projects addressing cholera, including the Quality
Health Services Project (SSQH), Sustaining Health Outcomes through the
Private Sector (SHOPS) Plus, and the Supply Chain Management System
(SCMS). These projects procure and distribute water treatment products,
and support education and community-based activities to raise awareness
around hygiene precautions to prevent and treat diarrheal diseases,
including cholera. Since the peak of the cholera outbreak, there has
been an 89 percent decrease in the number of cholera cases from 352,033
reported cases in FY 2011 to 36,644 cases in FY 2015. The case fatality
rate for hospitalized persons remained under 1 percent in 2015.
Our support for improving access to primary health care services
continues to be the core of our health sector strategy and programming.
In instances where projects ended early or were reduced in scope,
USAID's support for access to basic health care continued at the same
level through other projects. USAID's robust health portfolio, outlined
below, aims to both improve access to quality health services and
strengthen the health system nationwide, with a particular focus on
three key departments--the North, the West, and Artibonite.
Health services delivery: USAID support is increasing access to
essential primary health, nutrition, family planning, HIV/AIDS, and
tuberculosis services to underserved communities. Currently, USAID
supports 164 health facilities that provide access to primary health
care services for nearly half of the population.
Health systems strengthening: To ensure sustainability of these
investments, efforts are underway to build needed leadership,
managerial and administrative skills within the Ministry of Health.
These leadership and management skills will improve oversight and allow
the Government of Haiti to manage healthcare assets more transparently
and effectively.
Improving services and focused support for persons with
disabilities: USAID health activities increase access to quality
services for persons with disabilities by establishing systems and
programs within key Ministry of Health units and non-governmental
organizations to ensure that government and civil society have the
capacity to provide care, rehabilitation and support for their
reintegration into society.
Rebuilding public health infrastructure: Working alongside other
international donors, USAID is helping to rebuild Haiti's main public
tertiary and teaching hospital (the General University Hospital), to
construct a new maternity ward at St. Justinien Hospital in Cap-
Haitien, and to reconstruct the National Campus of Health Sciences.
Additionally, USAID is renovating 12 smaller health care centers and
schools, and improving infrastructure and accessibility for people with
disabilities.
Question 3. A GAO report was issued in June 2015 on the Haiti
Reconstruction effort (report no: GAO-15-17), which reported that USAID
extended the timeframe for its strategy to reconstruct Haiti from its
January 2010 earthquake by three years, to end in 2018. At the same
time, GAO had reported that USAID projects under the Haiti
reconstruction effort had achieved mixed results, with many projects
not fully meeting their intended results and some infrastructure
projects in particular years behind schedule. Almost a year has gone by
since this GAO report. And as a whole, we've invested almost $4 billion
in Haiti reconstruction and relief.
Have any improvements been made in the results projects are
achieving and in moving infrastructure projects forward?
What are the major achievements that USAID expects to have
completed by the end of the Haiti reconstruction strategy in
2018?
Answer. Haiti has historically been a challenging environment, with
chronic weaknesses of governance and recurring periods of political
uncertainty. Despite these challenges, USAID's pace of programming in
Haiti has seen improvements overall. For example, USAID's Cap-Haitien
Port Rehabilitation and Public-Private Partnership Project now has an
approved Master Plan in place. The project has begun breaking ground on
renovations and building new warehouses. The port rehabilitation work
and framework for a public private partnership for port operations are
also in process. The Government of Haiti (GOH), with USAID assistance,
conducted pre-solicitation meetings in Miami during the last week of
April 2016, and the transaction documents are scheduled to be released
by the GOH in July 2016. USAID released the draft request for proposals
and expects to award the contract for replacement of piers and dredging
of channels in spring 2017, with works expected to be completed by the
middle of 2020. USAID has also awarded contracts for customs and
regulatory reforms. Work on these items will continue for the next 24
months.
There has also been significant progress in health infrastructure
activities. During the 2010 earthquake, Haiti's largest teaching
hospital in the country, the Hospital of the State University of Haiti
(HUEH), suffered severe damages and collapsed buildings. At the request
of the GOH, USAID and the Agence Francaise de Development engaged in
supporting reconstruction activities as co-donors. While the full
reconstruction project is moving forward, USAID has already renovated
temporary facilities (emergency and maternity wards) of HUEH so the
hospital could continue to operate while under construction.
Reconstruction of the main hospital campus is progressing; all
foundations and structural steel have been erected and the main four-
story logistics building is nearing completion.
The construction of a modern medical teaching facility in Port-au-
Prince is also being funded by USAID. This facility will replace and
combine the former Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy, School of Nursing,
and Lab Technician School, which were all destroyed in the January 2010
earthquake. Reconstruction activities completed so far include
temporary space for the School of Nursing, which will be converted into
a permanent dormitory hall upon completion of the main project site.
Significant progress has been made on the main campus, and construction
is scheduled to be completed by July 2016.
USAID is also funding the reconstruction and expansion of St.
Justinien Hospital. The current facility is significantly overcrowded
and badly deteriorated with multiple roof leaks and cracks in walls and
floors. The new facility will consist of approximately 2,070 square
meters of new space including a neonatal ward, infant ward, children's
and adolescent wards, two isolation rooms, exam rooms, and a triage
area. The old ward has been demolished and the new foundation is
constructed. The structural steel is being erected now, and project
completion is expected in 2017.
While the Agency has been involved in renovation and construction
of larger health facilities, a series of small renovation projects have
been initiated to help rebuild smaller scale health care infrastructure
and improve accessibility for people with disabilities in schools. The
project involves 12 health care centers and schools in the North,
Northeast, West, and Artibonite Departments and will be completed in
2016. So far, six schools have been retrofitted; pre-construction and
construction activities are ongoing at additional sites.
As part of the original post-earthquake strategy, in the housing
sector, USAID has constructed over 900 permanent homes with running
water, modern sanitation, and electricity. The construction of another
574 units is currently in process. Of these 574, USAID is partnering
with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) on 426 units that will
be completed by the end of 2016 and 148 units with the Qatar Haiti Fund
that are scheduled to be completed by Spring 2017. For the 574 homes,
USAID's role is limited to site preparation, for example land leveling,
water and sewer systems, roads and walkways, and street lighting,
whereas the IDB and Qatar Haiti Fund will cover the costs of housing
construction. USAID is promoting sustainability of the new settlements
by supporting training for local residents to maintain their homes and
building the capacity of the GOH's social housing unit to manage
settlement areas, collect lease payments, and maintain the utilities
and common areas. USAID has since revised its strategy to focus on
housing finance and improvements in existing communities.
USAID continues to see progress in non-infrastructure sectors as
well. More than 80,000 rural households have benefited directly from
Feed the Future interventions and the Agency will continue to work with
these farmers into 2018. USAID is also committed to improving the
quality of, and access to, education for Haitians through the Ann ALE
education program, which aims to directly support 300 schools and
improve 100,000 students' reading and writing skills through
interactive teaching methods and community-based activities by 2019.
Question 4. Based on three GAO reports on Haiti reconstruction
(GAO-12-68, GAO-13-558, GAO-15-517) and the GAO's previous work on
disaster reconstruction, the GAO had found multiple cases of cost
overruns and delays for such reconstruction projects.
What lessons has USAID learned from its previous disaster work to
be able to make better projections for the funds it needs to
respond to future disasters and to better plan the uses for
that funding?
How are these lessons-learned incorporated into the FY 2017 budget
request for USAID programs in Haiti?
Answer. Generally, in the event of natural disasters, USAID's
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is responsible for leading
and coordinating the United States government's (USG) response to
disasters overseas. As part of standard procedures, OFDA began the
After Action Review (AAR) process for the 2010 Haiti earthquake while
the response was still ongoing. The AAR process included soliciting
information and recommendations from people involved in the response
through ``hotwashes'' (immediately after the response, group discussion
and evaluation of what worked, what did not and why), interviews, and
an online survey. To build upon the information gathered, USAID/OFDA
also held two AAR workshops involving USAID and USG interagency
partners.
USAID/OFDA identified several thematic areas for attention during
the AAR process, including defining USAID/OFDA's role within the USG
Interagency when USAID is named the lead federal agency, and optimizing
internal structure and staffing processes.
As a result, USAID/OFDA has focused on collaborating with and
operationalizing USG Interagency partners through the expansion of the
Humanitarian Policy and Global Engagement Division (HPGE) within USAID/
OFDA. The HPGE division leads the mapping of international response
capacity across USG agencies, has developed an Operational Response
Framework to guide USAID/OFDA doctrine and policy related to disaster
response, and is continuing to collaborate with interagency partners on
the development of an International Response Framework aimed at
aligning expectations in an international response context. USAID/OFDA
has also increased efforts to build relationships and awareness with
potential USG response partners through continuous engagement and
training programs.
USAID/OFDA has addressed recommendations related to response
staffing through the implementation of a strategic growth plan and of a
Multiple Response Staffing Strategy. To further support consistency and
preparedness, USAID/OFDA has developed a competency-based position
management system for response teams, as well as targeted response-
based training curricula to ensure staff readiness for response
assignments.
In Haiti, USAID activities were implemented in accordance with the
USG's larger strategy for reconstruction in Haiti. There have been some
lessons learned throughout the creation and implementation of this
strategy. For example, the USG's initial housing reconstruction
strategy included efforts to develop new settlements to replace housing
stock lost during the earthquake. In particular, the majority of USAID
shelter funds were dedicated to construction of permanent detached
single-family homes on land provided by the Government of Haiti in the
Cap-Haitien and Port-au-Prince development corridors.
After initial projects fell short of expectations, USAID recognized
that this approach is not cost-effective and that the need far exceeded
what all donor efforts could meet. To achieve greater cost efficiency
and sustainability, USAID shifted away from new construction and has
put a greater emphasis on providing low-income households with access
to housing finance and better infrastructure, working in existing
neighborhoods, and helping the private sector play a more prominent
role in housing construction.
USAID also shifted its approach on its port development efforts
when final feasibility studies indicated a new port was not
economically viable. The Agency redirected assistance from constructing
a new ``greenfield'' port to the rehabilitation of the existing port of
Cap-Haitien to meet the near-to medium-term demand for port services in
northern Haiti. An approved master plan is now in place. The port
rehabilitation work and public-private partnership for port operations
are also in process, with replacement of piers and dredging of channels
expected to be completed in 2020. USAID has also awarded contracts for
customs reform and regulatory strengthening that will result in a more
efficient and competitive port operation. This reform work is expected
to be completed by the end of 2017.
These lessons learned were incorporated into the Post-Earthquake
U.S. Government Haiti Three-Year Extension Strategy To Support
Reconstruction and Development: January 2015 to January 2018. The FY
2017 budget request reflects these lessons learned, as the budget
builds upon previous fiscal year budgets that take into account
strategic shifts.
Question 5. This year's request of economic support funds (ESF)
for Haiti is $79.9 million. This amount is almost half of the $134.25
million that was allocated for Haiti in FY2009, before the earthquake
occurred.
Can you explain the ESF budget trend for Haiti since FY2009, and
why this year's requested amount is less than the pre-quake
funding level?
Answer. The FY 2017 request levels are sufficient for this year,
given remaining unexpended funds that are available under the USG post-
earthquake strategy, and our commitment to achieving lasting results
and ensuring responsible investment of U.S. taxpayer dollars. However,
USAID has made tremendous progress in accelerating its pace of awards
in Haiti, having increased its staff and provided additional
procurement resources. As a result of these changes, last fiscal year,
for example, USAID/Haiti sub-obligated $400 million into grants and
contracts to contribute to meeting USAID's strategic objectives for
Haiti. These and other efforts have led to a 30 percent increase in
monthly expenditures. USAID/Haiti expects to reduce pipeline in line
with Agency best practices by the end of FY 2017.
Question 6a. A range of governments, NGOs, and international
organizations work to promote democracy around the world.
How does the State Department and USAID coordinate democracy
promotion efforts with these groups in the Western Hemisphere?
Answer. The Department of State and USAID coordinate to ensure
assistance efforts of Washington and overseas operating units involved
in democracy promotion abroad are complementary and non-duplicative. In
2006, the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources was established
to provide leadership and coordinate foreign assistance planning and
management across the Department and USAID. The relevant Chief of
Mission coordinates all assistance awards obligated overseas and
assistance awards obligated in Washington are coordinated by the
responsible operating unit with relevant stakeholders, including the
mission's staff. The U.S. government regularly engages with other
funders and entities involved in promoting democracy and human rights
in the Western Hemisphere and around the world in efforts to ensure
complementarity.
In partnership with governments, USAID promotes democracy by
addressing issues of systemic transparency and corruption in
governments.
In Paraguay, USAID works with public institutions including
the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of
Agriculture, Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Finance, and
the Supreme Court to install mechanisms for accountability and
anti-corruption that are necessary for a responsive democracy.
The project focuses on institutionalizing key reforms in the
areas of civil service, public financial management, and
internal controls in collaboration with the Civil Service
Secretariat, the Procurement Agency, the Executive Branch Audit
body, and the General Controller's Office of Paraguay.
In Peru, USAID provides specialized training to judges,
prosecutors and advocates to strengthen the administration of
courts and prosecutors' offices specialized in anticorruption.
USAID provides technical assistance to the Ministry of Justice
and Human Rights to design a model of institutional integrity
and a Code of Ethical Behavior for its officers and employees,
which are complemented by trainings. USAID has also helped
develop a manual for the Public Corruption Prosecutor to
calculate the compensation for damage caused by crimes of
corruption.
USAID also consults with NGOs and civil society organizations
(CSOs) to inform program design and implementation. For example,
through a procurement mechanism known as the Broad Agency Announcement,
USAID can co-create and co-design responses with CSOs to jointly-
identified challenges. In Guatemala, over 200 civil society
representatives participated in the design of a program with the goal
of fostering greater socioeconomic development through improved
governance and local ownership in the Western Highlands region of the
country. USAID also works directly with small CSOs to help them become
viable institutions to advocate for democratic practices. In Mexico,
USAID works with the Mexican government and civil society to address
human rights concerns through the government's National Protection
Mechanism for Human Rights Defenders and Journalists; in Fiscal Year
(FY) 2015, this program provided assistance to approximately 400
journalists and human rights defenders seeking protection from threats
of violence and harassment. Because of USAID's technical assistance and
training, provided through Freedom House, the National Protection
Mechanism has been able to process an increased number of requests for
assistance.
USAID programs in closed space countries in the Western
Hemisphere have demonstrably increased the effectiveness of
local civil society organizations that monitor and report human
rights abuses, perform vital roles in watchdogs when public
interest information is restricted, and defend remaining
democratic processes and spaces. Closed space programming is
closely coordinated within Embassies and with the Department of
State's Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs.
Finally, USAID works with various international organizations,
including other development agencies, United Nations organizations, and
the World Bank, to ensure that efforts are not duplicated and to
leverage comparative advantages in the region.
For example, in Honduras, USAID coordinates with the
Organization of American States to support the Mission to
Support the Fight Against Corruption and Impunity (MACCIH,
Spanish acronym).
Question 6b. How do DRL assistance programs to promote democracy
differ from those of USAID?
Answer. While there is commonality between USAID and the Department
of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor programming in
some areas of focus, differences in approach demonstrate the added
value of each entity. Centrally located in Washington, DC, State/DRL's
global emphasis enables it to provide grants to organizations all over
the world while maintaining a broad, worldwide overview and approach to
its programming. By contrast, with an on-the-ground presence of
approximately 400 democracy, human rights, and governance officers,
USAID's Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance
supports DRG offices worldwide to provide support for activities in
field Missions. USAID's local staff are on the ground full-time to
continually engage with local actors, monitor program implementation,
and make necessary adjustments as country conditions change and
programs generally support long-term development linked to larger
country and regional development strategies and objectives.
USAID and State/DRL programs are both suited to be implemented in
closed and closing spaces. USAID's DRG programs are increasingly based
on rigorous monitoring and evaluation components proven successful in
other development programs, incorporating best practices and evidence-
based research into the project design such as those from robust impact
evaluations and high-quality surveys. This is particularly important in
difficult political environments. State/DRL manages global initiatives
that can rapidly respond to deteriorating situations and emerging
opportunities, and provide emergency assistance to human rights
defenders, civil society organizations, and individuals under attack or
threat of attack.
Question 6c. Does USAID work with the National Endowment for
Democracy for democracy promotion? If so, how?
Answer. USAID, the Department of State, and the National Endowment
for Democracy staff interact to discuss and determine priorities in the
DRG sector, including ways to analyze, understand and respond to new
challenges. Most recently, USAID organized a trilateral meeting between
the three organizations to discuss a strategic approach to a number of
topics. USAID continues to look for ways to further enhance its
collaboration with these entities through regular briefings on regions,
countries or topics of interest, and on issues of mutual concern. This
includes discussions on institutionalizing the Stand with Civil Society
initiative, global governance initiatives, and the Open Government
Partnership. USAID also meets periodically with the NED to discuss and
coordinate programming, especially in countries with closed or closing
political spaces.
Question 6d. How does DRL work with the regional bureaus in the
Western Hemisphere regarding democracy monitoring and oversight? In
your view, how can these efforts be more effective?
Answer. DRL works closely with the regional bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs regarding democracy programmonitoring and oversight.
For example, regional offices participatein proposal review panels
which includes monitoring and evaluation criteria. In addition, DRL
coordinatessite visits with posts to do oversight of programs and
shares feedback on program progress with the offices. DRL's current
level of coordination is effective but is always looking for ways to
improve processes.
__________
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
to Francisco Palmieri, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs
Question 1. Please clarify the current number of U.S. Personnel
allowed at U.S. Embassy in Havana. If the answer is 76, then:
What are the current restrictions placed on putting more U.S.
personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Havana to get close to the 76
cap?
If more American personnel were placed at the Embassy, would there
be a reduction in the number of Cuban locally employed staff?
How much would it cost to replace the supervisor positions occupied
by Cubans with Americans?
Answer. As a result of negotiations to re-establish diplomatic
relations with Cuba, the number of accredited personnel allowed at U.S.
Embassy Havana is 76. We look forward to working with Congress to
secure the necessary funding and approvals in order to add additional
staff. Our ability to significantly increase staffing is restricted by
the limited expansion possibilities in the current Embassy building.
Adding American staff to our footprint at the Embassy would not
result in a reduction in the number of Cuban locally employed staff.
Cuban employees fill primarily support roles in the Embassy. The
additional needed American staff would fill positions requiring a
security clearance, which Cuban employees cannot obtain.
All supervisory positions at U.S. Embassy Havana are held by
cleared U.S. citizens, in accordance with longstanding personnel
practice and law, those positions with authority to supervise direct-
hire federal employees, including the authority to make final personnel
decisions such as hiring, firing, and issuing formal disciplinary
action with respect to the federal employees. While some Cuban staff
may be administratively organized so that certain more experienced
Cuban staff direct less experienced Cuban staff, even these experienced
Cuban staff do not exercise the supervisory authority and
responsibilities described above and typically associated with
supervisory positions; they do not hire, fire, or take formal
disciplinary actions, even with respect to other Cuban staff. Instead,
all Cuban staff are ultimately managed and supervised by a U.S. direct
hire employee.
It costs approximately $220,000 to establish a new overseas U.S.
direct hire position, with yearly costs amounting to approximately
$430,000. The average annual cost to employ a Cuban at the Embassy is
approximately $12,000.
Question 2. Since our last briefing, what has the State Department
and the Cuban government agreed to allow equipment and personnel into
the Embassy unmolested by the Cuban government?
Answer. We are in regular communication with our Cuban counterparts
on a number of issues that are important to the normalization of
diplomatic relations between our two countries. To date, we have no
concerns about the ability for equipment and personnel to enter the
Embassy unmolested.
Question 3. How would U.S. Assistance ?change if the Colombian
public chose not to approve what's in the final agreement?
Answer. We strongly support President Santos' efforts to reach a
just and lasting peace with the FARC. The negotiations are in the
endgame. We are hopeful the parties will reach a final accord soon,
leading to the FARC's disarmament by the end of this year.
The President's Peace Colombia strategy focuses U.S. assistance on
three broad pillars: (1) security, including counter-narcotics,
counter-transnational organized crime, demining, and demobilization of
former fighters; (2) expanding state presence and public institutions;
and (3) justice and other assistance for victims. The President's
strategy is flexible. A guiding principle is to focus our assistance on
special U.S. capabilities that can catalyze Colombia's efforts to end
the conflict, secure a just and durable peace, consolidate public
support for the peace process, and address the conflict's long-term
underlying drivers. Building on the success of prior year programs, the
FY2017 $391 million State/USAID request will fund programs critical to
strengthening Colombia's security and development, regardless of when
the parties reach a final peace accord. Adjustments to U.S. assistance,
if the Colombian public failed to approve the final accord, would take
into account the Colombian government's plans to consolidate their many
security and development gains in support of a lasting peace.
Question 4. A substantial increase in aid to Colombia is requested
under a new framework referred to as Peace Colombia. A recent report by
the Economist says that the FARC may have around $11.4 billion worth of
assets--yet its leadership is reportedly claiming that they will be
unable to contribute to material reparations for their victims due to
lack of funds. In the meantime, serious human rights violations in
areas controlled by the FARC, including severe restrictions on
religious freedom, continue. In the same vein, the ELN, which announced
its entry into new peace dialogues with the government, is not winding
down its violent operations but rather has been moving aggressively
into areas formerly controlled by the FARC and in some cases engaging
in violent conflict with illegal criminal groups in an effort to
consolidate its power. They continue to be responsible for serious
violations of human rights, including attacks on church leaders, as do
illegal groups like the Urabenos which have grown rapidly in terms of
geographic presence and power in the last few years.
Given these unpromising developments, will the administration
review its decision to transition to a Peace Colombia framework
in the absence of a peace agreement?
Answer. The negotiations are in the endgame. We are hopeful the
parties will reach a final accord soon, leading to the FARC's
disarmament by the end of this year. The President's Peace Colombia
strategy is flexible. If the negotiations continue or the parties fail
outright to reach a final accord, the Colombian government will
continue to combat illegal armed groups, drug-trafficking, and
transnational organized crime; remove landmines; strengthen public
institutions and foster licit economic opportunities in areas where the
state's presence has historically been weak; and provide assistance to
conflict victims. U.S. assistance for Colombia's efforts will continue
to be critical and advance U.S. interests in regional security,
counternarcotics, law enforcement, economic development, justice, and
human rights.
Question 5. If not, how does it expect to implement some of these
goals, such as ``expanding state presence and institutions to
strengthen the rule of law and rural economies, especially in former
conflict areas'' even as the conflict continues and in some parts of
the country has actually intensified due to the actions of the ELN and
illegal criminal groups?
Answer. Colombia's efforts and U.S. support for them will continue
to be flexible. Certain Colombian efforts, such as reintegrating
demobilized combatants, could be deferred or deemphasized if the peace
accord is delayed. Colombian military and law enforcement operations
might intensify in regions where illegal armed groups continued to pose
threats. Colombian efforts to strengthen the state's presence, build
public institutions, promote economic opportunity, and deliver victims
assistance would likely concentrate on more permissive areas.
Question 6. Please provide this committee with an update on the
current economic situation in Venezuela. ?I would respectfully ask that
you also include an update on the health care situation in the country.
Answer. Venezuela faces serious economic challenges, including
significant economic contraction, triple-digit inflation, widespread
shortages of food, water, electricity and medicine, and depleted
international currency reserves. Low global oil prices have exacerbated
the economic challenges facing the Maduro administration. Waning
domestic production, low oil prices, and government-imposed economic
distortions are principal drivers of the overall contraction. Any
turnaround will depend heavily on economic policy adjustments by the
Venezuelan government.
We continue to monitor the availability of food, medicines, and
other essentials. We are concerned by credible and independent reports
that upwards of 85 percent of medicines on the World Health
Organization's list of essential medicines are not available at
pharmacies and hospitals, while many other essential medicines are
scarce or hard to find, such as antibiotics, aspirin, anti-seizure
medicines, and chemotherapy drugs. There are also reported shortages of
surgical supplies and medical equipment in clinics and hospitals. The
Venezuelan people, including vulnerable populations such as children,
the disabled, and the elderly, are not able to access the basic
medicine and medical services they need.
The United States frequently provides humanitarian assistance to
countries around the word at the request of receiving countries.
Venezuela has made no such request. There are appropriate mechanisms
for international support to Venezuela. The international community and
the United States stand ready to assist but efforts should be carefully
coordinated.
We stand with the international community in expressing our concern
about the difficult conditions the Venezuelan people are facing. We
believe the solutions in Venezuela will be found through meaningful
dialogue among Venezuelans.
Question 7. The FY 2017 Economic Support Fund (ESF) of the budget
request for Venezuela is currently at $5.5 million.
With the current political and economic instability the country
faces, do you think $5.5 million is enough to help defend and
strengthen democratic practices, institutions and values that
support human rights and Venezuela civic engagement and
democratic governance?
How does that number compare to the assistance provided to other
countries in the hemisphere?
Answer. U.S. assistance to Venezuela seeks to defend and strengthen
democratic practices, institutions, and values that support respect for
human rights, access to information, and civic participation and
engagement. It supports diverse civil society actors who promote those
democratic checks and balances mandated by the Venezuelan constitution.
U.S. assistance, on a nonpartisan basis, inclusively promotes the basic
values of representative democracy and respect for human rights.
The FY 2017 bilateral assistance request will support the diverse
civil society actors who promote constitutionally-mandated democratic
checks and balances. The request provides the level of resources needed
to support civil society and human rights in Venezuela which expands
funding by $1.2 million, or 28 percent, from the FY 2015 level of $4.25
million to support activities that defend democratic processes and
human rights in Venezuela by: enhancing the public's access to
information; encouraging peaceful debate surrounding key issues;
providing support to democratic institutions; and promoting civic
participation. ESF funding is part of a broader approach towards
supporting democracy and human rights in Venezuela. There is robust
cooperation and coordination among U.S. recipients of assistance,
including the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, the National Endowment for Democracy, and USAID.
The urgent importance of the United States working to advance
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Venezuela,
including freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly must also be
balanced by the need to be prudent and careful in our engagement of
local Venezuelan partners.
Regionally, the bilateral request for Venezuela for this
programming is a significant level reflecting the human rights
challenges in Venezuela, as compared with other countries in the
hemisphere.
Question 8. The political crisis seems to be deepening in Brazil.
The economy is in its worst recession in more than three decades, and
Brazilians are protesting the high levels of corruption in the
government. What are the implications of this current political and
economic climate in Brazil for Brazil-U.S. Relations?
Answer. As the two largest democracies in the hemisphere, Brazil
and the United States are committed partners. The bilateral
relationship between our countries remains strong, and we engage with
the Brazilian government as part of our normal, routine diplomatic
work. For instance, we continue to coordinate with Brazil to ensure a
safe and successful 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro. We are also
advancing our robust collaboration with Brazil on combatting the Zika
virus, including by conducting joint research on vaccines and links to
associated disorders. Even as Brazil works through its political and
economic challenges, we expect to continue cooperating closely with
Brazil on these issues and other matters of mutual interest.
__________
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator David Perdue
to Francisco Palmieri, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs
Question 1a. Despite almost $4 billion in U.S. assistance to
Haiti, the nation suffers from high unemployment, political
instability, and growing food insecurity due to prolonged drought.
Haiti ranks 163 out of 188 on the U.N.s 2015 Human Development Index.
More than half of Haitian's live below the international extreme
poverty line of $1.90 per day. For FY 17, the President has requested
$79.9 million in Economic Support Funds and about $129.2 million in
funding for global health programs for Haiti. The President's budget
request describes this funding as supporting long-term growth, but
Haiti is still struggling to bounce back from the devastating
earthquake that struck in 2010.
What portion of this $209.1 million will be dedicated to
reconstruction efforts specifically?
Answer. Although Haiti remains an extremely poor and fragile
country with substantial development needs, USAID has strategically
modified its areas of focus and assistance shifting from reconstruction
to more effectively address Haiti's needs and build the capacity of the
Haitian government and local Haitian institutions to tackle development
challenges. For example, with FY 2017 Economic Support Funds (ESF),
$3.1 million will be allocated towards sustaining and expanding
electricity generation in the north of Haiti and $5.5 million will be
used to continue to support improved livelihood opportunities in areas
where the U.S. government's shelter related programs are operating.
The remaining $200.5 million will contribute to USAID's longer-term
development programs focusing on economic growth, agriculture, health,
democracy and governance, and basic education.
Question 1b. In what areas will these reconstruction funds be
concentrated?
Answer. Although Haiti remains an extremely poor and fragile
country with substantial development needs, USAID has strategically
modified its areas of focus and assistance shifting from reconstruction
to more effectively address Haiti's needs and build the capacity of the
Haitian government and local Haitian institutions to tackle development
challenges. For example, with FY 2017 ESF, $3.1 million will be
allocated towards sustaining and expanding electricity generation in
the north of Haiti and $5.5 million will be used to continue to support
improved livelihood opportunities in areas where the U.S. government's
shelter related programs are operating. The remaining $200.5 million
will contribute to USAID's longer-term development programs focusing on
economic growth, agriculture, health, democracy and governance, and
basic education.
Question 1c. Can you speak about the FY 2017 request for improving
food security in Haiti?
Answer. The FY 2017 request of $9 million will allow USAID to
advance gains made through the Feed the Future (FTF) Initiative.
Agriculture is central to the Haitian economy, employing approximately
60 percent of the population and serving as the primary source of
income in rural areas. Under FTF, the U.S. government has introduced
improved seeds, fertilizer, and technology, as well as improved access
to irrigation and markets for almost 83,000 Haitian farmers. USAID has
also linked farmers directly with buyers, and improved farmer access to
micro-credit. Women have been involved in the entire value chain of
agricultural products and represent around 30 percent of direct
beneficiaries. USAID plans to continue to support these households and
to expand these efforts to another 30,000 farmers by 2018.
USAID's work to address environmental degradation in Haiti is
closely linked to efforts to improve the country's food insecurity.
More than half of all land in Haiti is steeply sloped, and
approximately 85 percent of the country's watersheds are degraded,
causing frequent flooding, erosion, reduced availability of groundwater
for irrigation in the fertile plains, and depletion of the basic soil
nutrients required for increased food production. As part of a larger
effort to stabilize watersheds, increase tree cover, and promote
sustainable agricultural practices in disaster prone regions of the
country, from 2009 to 2014, USAID supported reforestation efforts
through the planting of over 5 million seedlings with a survival rate
of about 70 percent throughout the country. USAID plans to fund
additional community-based reforestation and related policies.Questions
for the Record Submitted toPrincipal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Francisco PalmieriSenator David Perdue (#2)Senate Foreign Relations
CommitteeApril 26, 2016Question:
Question 2. GAO report was issued in June 2015 on the Haiti
Reconstruction effort (report no: GAO-15-17), which reported that USAID
extended the timeframe for its strategy to reconstruct Haiti from its
January 2010 earthquake by three years, to end in 2018. At the same
time, GAO had reported that USAID projects under the Haiti
reconstruction effort had achieved mixed results, with many projects
not fully meeting their intended results and some infrastructure
projects in particular years behind schedule. Almost a year has gone by
since this GAO report. And as a whole, we've invested almost $4 billion
in Haiti reconstruction and relief.
Have any improvements been made in the results projects are
achieving and in moving infrastructure projects forward?
What are the major achievements that USAID expects to have
completed by the end of the Haiti reconstruction strategy in
2018?
Answer. Haiti has historically been a challenging environment, with
chronic weaknesses of governance and recurring periods of political
uncertainty. Despite these challenges, USAID's pace of programming in
Haiti has seen improvements overall. For example, USAID's Cap-Haitien
Port Rehabilitation and Public-Private Partnership Project now has an
approved Master Plan in place. The project has begun breaking ground on
renovations and building new warehouses.
The port rehabilitation work and framework for a public private
partnership for port operations are also in process. The Government of
Haiti, with USAID assistance, conducted pre-solicitation meetings in
Miami during the last week of April 2016, and the transaction documents
are scheduled to be released by Haiti in July 2016. USAID released the
draft request for proposals and expects to award the contract for
replacement of piers and dredging of channels in spring 2017, with
works expected to be completed by the middle of 2020. USAID has also
awarded contracts for customs and regulatory reforms. Work on these
items will continue for the next 24 months.
There has also been significant progress in health infrastructure
activities. During the 2010 earthquake, Haiti's largest teaching
hospital in the country, the Hospital of the State University of Haiti
(HUEH), suffered severe damages and collapsed buildings. At the request
of the Government of Haiti, USAID and the Agence Francaise de
Development engaged in supporting reconstruction activities as co-
donors. While the full reconstruction project is moving forward, USAID
has already renovated temporary facilities (emergency and maternity
wards) of HUEH so the hospital could continue to operate while under
construction. Reconstruction of the main hospital campus is
progressing; all foundations and structural steel have been erected and
the main four-story logistics building is nearing completion. ?
The construction of a modern medical teaching facility in Port-au-
Prince is also being funded by USAID. This facility will replace and
combine the former Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy, School of Nursing,
and Lab Technician School, which were all destroyed in the January 2010
earthquake. Reconstruction activities completed so far include
temporary space for the School of Nursing, which will be converted into
a permanent dormitory hall upon completion of the main project site.
Significant progress has been made on the main campus, and construction
is scheduled to be completed by July 2016.
USAID is also funding the reconstruction and expansion of St.
Justinien Hospital. The current facility is significantly overcrowded
and badly deteriorated with multiple roof leaks and cracks in walls and
floors. The new facility will consist of approximately 2,070 square
meters of new space including a neonatal ward, infant ward, children's
and adolescent wards, two isolation rooms, exam rooms, and a triage
area. The old ward has been demolished and the new foundation is
constructed. The structural steel is being erected now, and project
completion is expected in 2017.
While the Agency has been involved in renovation and construction
of larger health facilities, a series of small renovation projects have
been initiated to help rebuild smaller scale health care infrastructure
and improve accessibility for people with disabilities in schools. The
project involves 12 health care centers and schools in the North,
Northeast, West, and Artibonite Departments and will be completed in
2016. So far, six schools have been retrofitted; pre-construction and
construction activities are ongoing at additional sites.
As part of the original post-earthquake strategy, in the housing
sector, USAID has constructed over 900 permanent homes with running
water, modern sanitation, and electricity. The construction of another
574 units is currently in process. Of these 574, USAID is partnering
with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) on 426 units that will
be completed by the end of 2016 and 148 units with the Qatar Haiti Fund
that are scheduled to be completed by Spring 2017. For the 574 homes,
USAID's role is limited to site preparation, for example land leveling,
water and sewer systems, roads and walkways, and street lighting,
whereas the IDB and Qatar Haiti Fund will cover the costs of housing
construction.
USAID is promoting sustainability of the new settlements by
supporting training for local residents to maintain their homes and
building the capacity of the Government of Haiti's social housing unit
to manage settlement areas, collect lease payments, and maintain the
utilities and common areas. USAID has since revised its strategy to
focus on housing finance and improvements in existing communities.
USAID continues to see progress in non-infrastructure sectors as
well. More than 80,000 rural households have benefited directly from
Feed the Future interventions and the Agency will continue to work with
these farmers into 2018. USAID is also committed to improving the
quality of, and access to, education for Haitians through the Ann ALE
education program, which aims to directly support 300 schools and
improve 100,000 students' reading and writing skills through
interactive teaching methods and community-based activities by 2019.
Question 3. This year's request of economic support funds (ESF)
for Haiti is $79.9 million. This amount is almost half of the $134.25
million that was allocated for Haiti in FY 2009, before the earthquake
occurred.
Can you explain the ESF budget trend for Haiti since FY 2009, and
why this year's requested amount is less than the pre-quake
funding level?
Answer. The FY 2017 request levels are sufficient for this year,
given remaining unexpended funds that are available under the U.S.
government post-earthquake strategy, and our commitment to achieving
lasting results and ensuring responsible investment of U.S. taxpayer
dollars. However, USAID has made tremendous progress in accelerating
its pace of awards in Haiti, having increased its staff and provided
additional procurement resources. As a result of these changes, last
fiscal year, for example, USAID/Haiti sub-obligated $400 million into
grants and contracts to contribute to meeting USAID's strategic
objectives for Haiti. These and other efforts have led to a 30 percent
increase in monthly expenditures. USAID/Haiti expects to reduce
pipeline in line with Agency best practices by the end of FY 2017.
Question 4. The administration's FY 2017 budget request for State
and USAID includes more than $1.7 billion in foreign assistance to
Latin America and the Caribbean, a 10% increase over FY 15 levels. This
includes a 92% increase in development assistance (DA) funding,
primarily to support development efforts under the U.S. strategy for
Engagement in Central America. It also includes a 102% increase in
nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, de-mining and related programs (NADR)
to support efforts in Columbia. There's also a 46% increase in foreign
military financing funding (FMF), most of which would support military
partners in Colombia and throughout Central America.
Can you let me know which programs' funding levels decreased in
order to support these increases?
Answer. The FY 2017 Request for Department of State and USAID
totals $50.1 billion, an increase of $2.3 billion over the FY 2015
appropriation. While the FY 2017 request represents an increase over FY
2015, diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance needs are ever
rising, and certain tradeoffs had to be made as the administration
finalized the request. Of the $50.1 billion, $1.7 billion is requested
for foreign assistance programs in the Western Hemisphere. While the FY
2017 Request includes a $155 million (10 percent) increase above
funding allocated to the region in FY 2015, this funding is part of the
overall increase in funding requested by the President in FY 2017 for
the Department of State and USAID above the FY 2015 appropriation.
The President has made clear his commitment to providing strong
support for our partners and programs in the Western Hemisphere,
including those in Central America, Colombia, Mexico, and elsewhere.
The FY 2017 Request of $1.7 billion for the Western Hemisphere reflects
this commitment. The increases in this request will bolster efforts to
address the underlying factors of migration from Central America and
help support the peace process in Colombia.
Question 5. As you all know well, the world is facing
unprecedented humanitarian crises--conflict and disaster have displaced
millions of people. In June 2015, the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) reported that worldwide, nearly 60 million persons
were forcibly displaced--the highest number on record. Many people
forget that a large number of these refugees, asylum seekers, and
internally displaced persons (IDPs are fleeing violence in the Western
Hemisphere with almost 350,000 refugees and more than 6.5 million
internally displaced persons (IDPs) originating from Colombia alone
according to the U.N.CR as of this week. Despite these record highs,
the total U.S. humanitarian assistance request is $6.156 billion--
that's 20 percent less than FY 2016. Further, the amount in the
Migration and Refugee Assistance account in this year's request
decreased by $267 million.
What accounts for this significant decrease? Particularly when the
causes of this mass migration have yet to be solved, and so
many refugees and IDPs are in need of assistance?
Answer. The administration remains dedicated to providing strong
support for humanitarian programs worldwide. The President's FY 2017
request reflects the administration's ongoing commitment to these
programs. The FY 2017 request level includes $1.957 billion for the
International Disaster Assistance Account, $1.35 billion for Food for
Peace Title II, $2.799 billion for the Migration and Refugee Assistance
Account, and $50 million for the Emergency Refugee and Migration
Assistance Fund. The overall FY 2017 request for humanitarian
assistance is $511 million higher than the FY 2016 request. In concert
with FY 2016 resources, the request will enable the U.S. Government to
respond to the dire humanitarian situation resulting from displacement
from violence around the world, including Colombia and Central America,
as well as the humanitarian needs resulting from El Nino.
Thanks to generous support from the U.S. Congress, the U.S.
government is the largest humanitarian donor in the world. We plan to
continue our robust support in FY 2016 and FY 2017 while urging other
donors to contribute to these ongoing emergencies. We will continue to
ensure that we are using funds as efficiently as possible in order to
meet current and unforeseen needs.
Question 6a. For FY 17, the State Department is requesting $3.8
million for WHA to increase staff and update the aging facilities of
the U.S. Embassy in Havana, and notes in the request that ``adding
these new positions is vital to U.S. national security and to
supporting Cuban civil society.'' At the same time, the
administration's FY 2017 foreign aid budget request for Cuba democracy
and human rights funding is for $15 million in Economic Support Funds
(ESF), a 25% reduction from the $20 million provided annually in recent
years to nongovernmental democracy and human rights programs.
Please describe in what areas the nine additional staff that are
requested would work, and in particular, how they would help
support Cuban civil society.
Answer. The Embassy has not created any new positions since the
transition from an Interests Section to a full-fledged Embassy, despite
an enormous increase in workload. The fact that our Embassy in Havana
is severely understaffed makes it difficult to meet the U.S.
government's objectives. To put the staffing level of our Embassy in
Havana in context, Embassy Santo Domingo has approximately 150 U.S.
direct hire employees compared to 54 in Havana.
Of the nine additional staff requested, six would be assigned to
Embassy Havana and three would join the Office of the Coordinator for
Cuban Affairs in Washington, DC. The Havana positions would work in the
Political, Economic, and Management sections. A mixture of reporting
and support positons are required to deepen U.S. understanding of
Cuba's political, social, and economic environment, oversee maintenance
upgrades, conduct human rights monitoring and advocacy, and deepen law
enforcement cooperation on issues such as fugitives and
counternarcotics. Adding these positions is vital to U.S. national
security and to supporting Cuban civil society.
During re-establishment negotiations, we successfully negotiated
greater freedom for our diplomats to travel in Cuba to better monitor
developments within the country. The ability to travel outside Havana
and interact with Cubans outside the capital is vital to our security
and to our support of the Cuban people. We need additional staff in
Cuba to take advantage of this enhanced ability to travel. Questions
for the Record Submitted toPrincipal Deputy Assistance Secretary
Francisco PalmieriSenator David Perdue (#6b and #6c)Senate Foreign
Relations CommitteeApril 26, 2016Question:
Question 6b. What is the rationale for the 25% reduction in Cuba
democracy and human rights funding? Has there been any change in the
type of assistance provided in the aftermath of the reestablishment of
diplomatic relations?
Answer. The promotion of democratic principles and human rights
remains the core goal of U.S assistance to Cuba. We agree that support
to civil society in Cuba remains critical, and the re-establishment of
diplomatic relations has not changed that. We will continue to
implement democracy programs supported by Economic Support Funds. We
believe the FY 2017 request provides a sustainable level of democracy
support that will enable us to continue advancing our democracy and
human rights goals in Cuba.
In prior years, the scope of the tools available to us to interact
with civil society in Cuba was limited. As restrictions on travel by
Cubans and to Cuba have been eased on both sides, additional tools are
available that enable the United States to engage directly with the
Cuban people. For example, we are now able to conduct some forms of
training in the United States or third countries whereas previously,
these programs could only be carried out in Cuba.
Also, U.S. educational, religious, and humanitarian groups now
connect directly with the Cuban people. Other programs funded by the
Department of State offer enhanced opportunities for professional,
academic, and cultural exchanges with Cuba. Cuban activists are able to
travel regularly to the United States and elsewhere.
Under these circumstances, we also believe the FY 2017 request
takes into consideration that one of our goals in supporting civil
society ? worldwide ? is to provide the kind of training and capacity
building that allows them gradually to become more self-sustaining.
Regarding the status of prior year funding, the Department of State
obligated all of the Cuba ESF funding in Fiscal Years 2013 and 2014. We
are soliciting proposals for FY 2015 funds.
Question 6c. How would you assess the impact and effectiveness of
U.S. democracy and human rights assistance in Cuba?
Answer. When U.S. government-funded programs began, we supported
the few nascent civil society groups on the island who operated
primarily in urban environments. Since then and due in part to U.S.
government programming efforts, we support the professionalization of
the growing, diverse civil society groups throughout Cuba, and have
assisted in amplifying the voice of independent media through training
and information dissemination.
Growing activism within Cuba by independent groups, increased
information flow to, from and within the island, and increasing
disillusionment with failed government policies have emboldened a
greater number of Cubans and provided us the opportunity to engage with
a wider range of civil society actors, including a new generation of
activists and individuals who work to create new opportunities for an
open and prosperous Cuba.
U.S. government assistance in Cuba responds to the Cuban people's
demand for human rights and democratic governance. Our programs train
independent journalists to provide an alternative voice to state-run
media, and equip human rights defenders to better document human rights
abuses. Following Cuba's lifting of travel restrictions in early 2013,
more civil society members have been able to participate in training
opportunities outside of Cuba, increase their professional networks,
and present the situation regarding human rights through reports and
testimony to international fora. U.S. government assistance also
provides crucial humanitarian assistance to alleviate the hardships for
victims of political repression and their families, so they may
continue to speak out for their basic fundamental and human rights.
We support online platforms to promote the free flow of information
and disseminate reports of human rights violations, reaching more
Cubans than before as viewership of the platforms has dramatically
increased as internet access expands on the island, a trend we expect
to continue.
We will continue to assess the impact and effectiveness of our
programs and respond to changing conditions on the island as well as
new strategies and needs identified by civil society groups.
Question 7. The administration has requested more than $391
million in foreign assistance for Colombia in FY 2017 to support the
country's efforts to end its 52-year internal conflict and implement a
sustainable and inclusive peace.
In your view, what assistance does Colombia need to ensure a
successful post-conflict transition?
To what extent are you able to move ahead with programming while
peace negotiations are still underway?
How would U.S. assistance efforts change if the peace negotiations
fail or if the Colombian public chooses not to approve the
peace accords?
Answer. We strongly support President Santos' efforts to reach a
just and lasting peace with the FARC. The negotiations are in the
endgame. We are hopeful the parties will reach a final accord soon,
leading to the FARC's disarmament by the end of this year.
The President's Peace Colombia strategy focuses U.S. assistance on
three broad pillars: (1) security, including counternarcotics, counter-
transnational organized crime, demining, and demobilization of former
fighters; (2) expanding state presence and public institutions; and (3)
justice and other assistance for victims.
The President's strategy is flexible. A guiding principle is to
focus our assistance on special U.S. capabilities that can catalyze
Colombia's efforts to end the conflict, secure a just and durable
peace, consolidate public support for the peace process, and address
the conflict's long-term underlying drivers. Building on the success of
prior year programs, the FY 2017 $391 million State and USAID request
will fund critical programs to strengthen Colombia's efforts on
victims' assistance, reintegrating ex-combatants, and rural
development; counternarcotics and transnational organized crime;
military civil engineering; and demining.
As the negotiations progress, the Colombian government continues to
combat illegal armed groups, drug-trafficking, and transnational
organized crime; remove landmines; strengthen public institutions and
foster licit economic opportunities in areas where the state's presence
has historically been weak; and provide assistance to conflict victims.
U.S. assistance for Colombia's efforts continue to be critical and
advance U.S. interests in regional security, counternarcotics, law
enforcement, economic development, justice, and human rights.
Certain Colombian efforts, such as reintegrating demobilized
combatants, could be deferred or deemphasized if the peace accord is
delayed. Colombian military and law enforcement operations might
intensify in regions where illegal armed groups continued to pose
threats. Colombian efforts to strengthen the state's presence, build
public institutions, promote economic opportunity, and deliver victims
assistance would likely concentrate on more permissive areas.
Adjustments to U.S. assistance, if the Colombian public failed to
approve the final accord, would take into account the Colombian
government's plans to consolidate its development and security gains,
to ensure a lasting peace.
Question 8. A range of governments, NGOs, and international
organizations work to promote democracy around the world.
How does the State Department and the US government as a whole
coordinate democracy promotion efforts with these groups?
How does DRL, if at all, work with organizations such as USAID or
the National Endowment of Democracy?
How does DRL work with the regional bureaus regarding democracy
monitoring and oversight? In your view, how can these efforts
be more effective?
How do DRL assistance programs to promote democracy differ from
those of USAID?
What, if any, are the State Department's relative advantages or
unique strengths with regard to planning and implementing
democracy and governance activities?
Answer. With more than 100 operating units within the Department of
State and USAID in Washington and overseas that are involved in the
promotion of democracy abroad through foreign assistance, the
Department and USAID place a high value on coordination to help ensure
assistance efforts are complementary and non-duplicative. The U.S.
government regularly engages with other funders and entities involved
in promoting democracy and human rights around the world. In 2006, the
Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources was established to provide
leadership and coordinate foreign assistance planning and management
across the Department and USAID. The relevant Chief of Mission
coordinates all assistance awards obligated overseas and assistance
awards obligated in Washington are coordinated by the responsible
operating unit with relevant stakeholders.
For example, proposals for new assistance awards managed by the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) undergo interagency
review panels to ensure that potential programs are well coordinated,
complement, and do not duplicate existing programming efforts. DRL
invites representatives from the relevant regional bureaus (which
represent the views from U.S. embassies), other functional bureaus as
appropriate, and USAID (which draws its input from USAID field-
missions). With respect to democracy programs managed by other
operating units, DRL may be consulted on the drafting of comprehensive
strategies, solicitations, and Congressional notifications, and may
also participate in technical review panels. DRL regularly coordinates
and exchanges information with USAID and the NED on respective program
portfolios.
The promotion of human rights and democratic governance is an
integral part of the U.S. development agenda. USAID views human rights
and democratic governance as fundamental ends of development and as
critically important means to the reduction of poverty. USAID employs a
bottom-up approach to programming whereby field missions develop five-
year Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCS) that analyze and
prioritize key challenges in the DRG sector. The most effective
programmatic approaches are developed for the country context and
activities are implemented through a combination of mission and central
awards.
USAID's Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and
Governance (DRG Center) supports DRG programs in the field by operating
14 central funds or pre-competed implementation mechanisms (both grants
and contracts). These capabilities include support for programs in
elections and political party assistance, rule of law, anticorruption,
human rights, legislative strengthening, civil society, global labor
programs, media, and internet freedom.
DRL programs directly support national security and foreign policy
goals and objectives, and advance key priorities of the President and
Secretary of State. These include promoting Internet freedom, defending
international religious freedom, empowering women and girls and
preventing and responding to gender-based violence, preventing
atrocities and countering violent extremism, supporting transitional
justice, fighting corruption and cronyism, promoting media freedom,
protecting labor rights, advancing the human rights of members of
marginalized populations, and supporting pillars of President Obama's
Stand with Civil Society agenda.
DRL has developed best practices and specialized mechanisms to work
in closed societies and closing spaces that may have a limited or no
U.S. government presence. This ability to conduct sensitive programs in
a manner that meets federal requirements while keeping grantees safe is
the basis of all DRL programs, 90 percent of which operate in
restrictive or challenging environments. As a result, DRL has been able
to sustain support in environments when other donors were required to
halt.
DRL is able to administer programs in ways that allow the programs
to be flexible, adaptable, and responsive to complex and changing
situations on the ground, while mitigating risk to both our
implementing partners and local beneficiaries. DRL manages global
initiatives that can rapidly respond to deteriorating situations and
emerging opportunities, and provide emergency assistance to human
rights defenders, civil society organizations, and individuals under
attack or threat of attack. Since 2007, DRL emergency assistance
programs have assisted more than 3,300 people and organizations in more
than 98 countries and territories.
__________
Responses to Questions Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio to Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Tomaz
Malinowski
Question 1. The Budget includes $2.7 billion for programs that
support rule of law and human rights, good governance, political
competition and consensus-building and civil society capacity-building,
and supports key Administration initiatives, including the Open
Government Partnership and Stand with Civil Society initiative.
Can you provide details on the specific programs that support the
above-mentioned initiatives?
Answer. Within the $2.7 billion request for Democracy, Human
Rights, and Governance (DRG) programs, $652.1 million is requested for
civil society programming globally, which includes funds for bilateral
and regional civil society programs as well as the Lifeline: Embattled
Civil Society Organization (CSO) Assistance Fund, the Open Government
Partnership (OGP), the Civil Society Innovation Initiative (CSII), the
Legal Enabling Environment Program (LEEP), Civil Society Sustainability
Index (CSOSI), Information Safety and Capacity Project (ISC), and the
Emerging Global Leaders Initiative (EGLI).
The Lifeline: Embattled CSO Assistance Fund provides emergency
assistance to CSOs under threat or attack, subject to
politicallymotivated prosecution, or otherwise at risk due to
repression from state or non-state actors; provides support and short-
term concentrated capacity building to CSOs for advocacy initiatives
and preventive measures; and provides publicity for cases of
significant crackdowns on civil society. Lifeline is managed by the
Department of State's Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
(DRL), which created the initiative with $1 million in seed funding in
2011. It has since grown to include support from 17 other governments
and two foundations. Since its launch, Lifeline has assisted more than
900 CSOs in 97 countries. In one case, government officials raided the
office of a CSO, confiscated equipment and financial documents, and
brought the employees of the CSO in for questioning, where they
threatened criminal action based on false accusations of embezzlement.
Because of Lifeline assistance, the group was able to relocate, replace
their equipment, and continue their work.
The Open Government Partnership (OGP) was launched by President
Obama in 2011 with seven other heads of state and civil society
leaders. A global partnership between government and civil society
across 69 countries designed to facilitate a ``race to the top'' by
incentivizing best practices, OGP works to advance transparency and
accountability through national commitments for reform and an
independent review mechanism for tracking progress. The OGP Secretariat
is supported in part by U.S. government funding and OGP members have
collectively made more than 2,000 publicly-monitored commitments--
improving how governments serve more than 2 billion people worldwide.
As a direct result, citizens are petitioning their governments online,
citizens are participating directly in policy making, and governments
are partnering with civil society to find new ways to expose corruption
and improve good governance.
The Civil Society Innovation Initiative (CSII) was announced in
September 2014 to connect civil society through a network of
demanddriven innovation hubs that encourage cooperation,
innovation, research, learning, and peer-to-peer exchanges. USAID is
partnering with the Swedish International Development Cooperation
Agency (Sida) to create a process to ensure that civil society is an
active partner in the design process of the hubs. To date, CDII has
engaged over 500 CSO leaders to map existing networks and resources.
Two global co-creation workshops and six regional co-design workshops
brought together over 150 CSO leaders from 118 countries to design the
hubs and participate in a ``pitch'' session in Colombia. USAID
envisions that all six hubs will be launched in some capacity by the
end of 2016.
The Legal Enabling Environment Program (LEEP) was established in
2008 and is managed by USAID. It supports the International Center for
Not-for-Profit Law to promote a more enabling legal and regulatory
environment for CSOs and provides technical assistance to respond
swiftly to regulatory threats to CSOs. Over the past four years, LEEP
has supported and/or defended civil society in approximately 50
countries, including strengthening the capacity of local civil society
to defend itself.
USAID's Information Safety and Capacity (ISC) project was
established in 2011 and provides advanced, sustained information
security assistance to CSOs, independent media, and human rights
activists in countries where free expression, journalistic reporting,
online communications, and advocacy is potentially risky to personal
and digital safety. The ISC project connects democracy and human rights
activists to mentors who work with them to ensure they are using
technology securely and using the best tools tailored to their own risk
environment. To date, ISC has mentored and assisted more than 200
organizations and organized a dozen workshops that bring groups
together for coordination and joint planning.
The Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (CSOSI) began
in 1997 and reports on the strength and overall viability of the civil
society sector in over 70 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, the
Middle East and North Africa, and Europe and Eurasia based on seven key
dimensions: legal environment, financial viability, organizational
capacity, advocacy, service provision, infrastructure, and public
image. With support from USAID, this index and corresponding
information is available to the public. It is used by CSOs to engage in
policy dialogue with governments and private sector.
Since the announcement of the Emerging Global Leaders Initiative
(EGLI) in September 2014, 77 emerging civil society leaders have come
to the United States on a leadership development fellowship ranging
from six-18 months. As part of the program, fellows convene three times
in Washington, DC, for leadership training and are placed at civil
society organizations across the United States.
Question 2. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL)
plays a key role in executing the will of Congress on human rights,
democracy promotion, and religious freedom. It produces the annual
human rights report and the annual International Religious Freedom
Report, and vetting of security units pursuant to the Leahy human
rights amendment.
Does DRL feel that it has enough discretionary resources at its
disposal to carry out its mission?
Answer. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) has
sufficient resources to carry out its mission and appreciates the
support it receives from Congress each year. New opportunities do
arise, however, and the bureau's ability to address all priorities
sufficiently can be stretched. Recent examples of such opportunities
include protecting civil society, democracy, and security through the
Community of Democracies; promoting transparency and combatting
corruption through the Open Government Partnership; or strengthening
multilateral efforts to promote Internet freedom through the Freedom
Online Coalition.
Question 3. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL)
plays a key role in executing the will of Congress on human rights,
democracy promotion, and religious freedom. It produces the annual
human rights report and the annual International Religious Freedom
Report, and vetting of security units pursuant to the Leahy human
rights amendment.
What program areas have you identified that are neglected and
require additional funding that are not congressionally
mandated?
Answer. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL)
continues to focus its efforts on programs that advance its core
mission, including advancing civil society and promoting human rights.
As with many foreign assistance programs, given broader budget
constraints and other foreign policy and development priorities, needs
are greater than available resources. Beyond DRL's own budget
resources, DRL plays an important policy role informing U.S.
Democracy,H rights, and governance (DRG) programs carried out by other
agencies and bureaus. In the FY 2017, $2.7 billion is requested for
U.S. DRG assistance through State and USAID. This request is $411.8
million above the FY 2016 appropriation for such programs and would
support the Administration's strategic goal of promoting resilient,
open, and democratic societies.
There are areas in which DRL could do more, including protecting
civil society, democracy, and security through the Community of
Democracies; promoting transparency and combatting corruption through
the Open Government Partnership; strengthening multilateral efforts to
promote Internet freedom through the Freedom Online Coalition; and
strengthening efforts that assist businesses as they endeavor to
respect human rights such as the Voluntary Principles on Business and
Human Rights. The Bureau will work to extend its reach to these areas
as resources allow.
Question 4. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL)
plays a key role in executing the will of Congress on human rights,
democracy promotion, and religious freedom. It produces the annual
human rights report and the annual International Religious Freedom
Report, and vetting of security units pursuant to the Leahy human
rights amendment.
Are there any congressionally mandated programs that require
additional resources to be effectively carried out?
Answer. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor has
sufficient resources to carry out effectively congressionally mandated
programs. As DRL works to fully implement authorities to ensure human
rights violations and abuses are taken into account when reviewing visa
eligibility, DRL anticipates the bureau's resource needs may grow in
future years. Any additional future funding requirements would be
included in future Congressional Budget Justifications.
Question 5. Having come from the human rights community you know
for some time there have been conversations regarding the utility of
various human rights dialogues and concerns that these dialogues have
yielded little in terms of substantive outcomes and have had the
unintended consequence of ghettoizing human rights in U.S. foreign
policy.
Can you share any significant deliverables during the course of the
Obama administration that have emerged from these dialogues,
specifically the U.S.-China and U.S.-Vietnam human rights
dialogues?
Answer. Human rights dialogues with other governments are useful
when the other government is willing to openly and genuinely address
the issues discussed. Such dialogues also can be valuable opportunities
to discuss our human rights concerns in greater detail and depth. We
actively resist any effort by a government to use such dialogues as a
substitute for substantive progress or to avoid bilateral discussions
on human rights in other contexts.
The U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue (HRD) is just one forum among
many where we discuss human rights concerns with the Chinese
government. While Beijing seeks to confine human rights discussions to
the HRD, they have not succeeded. Secretary Kerry and other Department
principals raised human rights issue at every high-level engagement,
including the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the Legal Experts
Dialogue, and other bilateral meetings. However, the HRD is another
important channel for the United States to engage directly with the
Chinese government on human rights in an in-depth manner--focusing on
both systemic issues and specific political prisoner cases. This is not
a venue where we simply agree to disagree.
In some cases the dialogue has led to better conditions for
political prisoners whose cases we highlighted or their release. For
example, we repeatedly called for the release of journalist Gao Yu at
the most recent dialogue in August 2015, and in November, she was
released on medical parole. That said, we are greatly concerned about
the recent significant downturn in human rights in China and to signal
that the HRD is no substitute for progress on human rights, a dedicated
human rights dialogue has not been planned this year.
The annual U.S.-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue is likewise a
critical forum to engage in in-depth discussions. There have been some
successes, and we believe continuation of the Dialogue has prevented
greater backsliding on many democracy and human rights issues. On the
positive side, the number of prisoners of conscience continues to
decline due to the decreasing rate of new arrests. The broader trend
has been the overall number of prisoners of conscience decreasing from
160 in mid-2013 to fewer than 100 today. In February, Vietnam acceded
to the U.N. Convention Against Torture and the U.N. Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Vietnam also passed a new law to
provide greater protections to LGBTI persons, including the
decriminalization of gay marriage. In addition, Vietnam's commitments
to allow the formation of independent labor unions as part of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement would be significant if TPP
is ratified and implemented and if the commitments are realized.
Still, the overall human rights record in Vietnam remains poor.
Since January, Vietnamese courts have convicted nine individuals for
peaceful political expression. The National Assembly failed to ease or
eliminate vague national security provisions in the criminal code that
are used to prosecute peaceful dissent. Instead, it actually
strengthened and increased penalties for some of the relevant political
offenses. The Assembly will be considering key laws on association,
assembly and religion or belief this year, and we are urging the
government to ease restrictions on NGOs, religious groups, and
demonstrations. The most recent Human Rights Dialogue concluded in
April 2016 and we will assess its outcomes over the coming months.
Question 6. In a response to a Freedom House question this year
regarding the continued violence and discrimination faced by ethnic and
religious minorities in Burma, the State Department said that the $29.9
million requested would go towards supporting the ongoing democratic
transition and reforms as well as advance national reconciliation and
the political dialogue process. While this is laudable, these aims
outlined in this response are very broad and the response did not
address the specific plight of ethnic and religious minorities,
including the Rohingya, the Kachin and the Chin, who continue to suffer
violence and discrimination.
Can the State Department go into more detail into how the funding
will specifically target the situation of the ethnic
nationalities and religious minorities?
Answer. The U.S. remains deeply concerned about the humanitarian
and human rights situation in Burma, including the situation of ethnic
and religious minorities. Since FY 2015, the U.S. has provided over $77
million in humanitarian assistance for vulnerable Burmese, including
Rohingya, Kachin, and Chin, and populations along the Thailand-Burma
border. To assist Rohingya transitioning from internally displaced
persons camps and address the needs of surrounding vulnerable Rakhine
communities, USAID is providing $5 million to support livelihoods,
early recovery, trust-building, and income generation among both
groups.
The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) has
programmed $1.25 million to date in programs that promote religious
diversity and tolerance, document abuses and advocate against religious
discrimination, conduct interfaith dialogue, and support community
actors seeking to bridge religious divides in Burma. DRL is currently
designing programs to promote a diverse, multi-ethnic and multi-
religious society in Burma that respects the rights of all people, and
addresses inequalities faced by the Rohingya and other ethnic and
religious minorities. DRL will support projects that address social,
political, and economic factors that contribute to cycles of
intolerance, violence, and the internal displacement of minorities.
Question 7. How will this budget assist the Mexican government in
addressing ongoing violations of religious freedom as well as fight
impunity and strengthen the rule of law?
Answer. The FY 2017 budget will strengthen the rule of law and
reduce impunity by supporting Mexico's continued transition to an oral
adversarial criminal justice system.
The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
(INL) supports training and capacity building for investigators,
prosecutors, judges and other justice sector actors in their roles
under the new system, and provides support at both the federal and
state level to develop more professional, accountable police forces.
INL will continue to support accreditation to international standards
in Mexico's prisons to help reduce crime while maintaining safer, more
secure, and humane prisons. DRL plans to support projects in Mexico
that address social factors contributing to cycles of intolerance and
violence toward religious and ethnic minority populations. Our efforts
in Mexico address impunity and strengthen the rule of law by empowering
civil society organizations and journalists to promote human rights. A
strong civil society is the cornerstone of any democracy and is
essential to ensuring fundamental freedoms, including freedom of
religion, so we are also committed to working with Mexican civil
society to encourage reform.
In addition to activities financed by our foreign assistance
budget, the United States is committed to working with the Mexican
government and its citizens to strengthen the rule of law, promote
transparency, accountability, and anti-corruption efforts, and protect
human rights, including religious freedom, in Mexico.
The Department closely tracks reports of local political leaders
pressuring Protestants to convert to Catholicism through forced
displacement, arbitrary detention, and destruction of property in some
rural and indigenous communities. We are also concerned about reports
that priests and other religious leaders in some parts of the country
continued to be targeted last year with threats of extortion, death,
and intimidation, often from organized criminal groups.
Each year, the Assistant Secretaries of DRL and the Bureau of
Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) lead a Bilateral Human Rights Dialogue
between the United States and Mexican governments, during which the two
sides discuss cooperation on human rights issues. We hold discussions
with civil society members ahead of this dialogue and throughout the
year to ensure that we understand their concerns. The dialogue is an
opportunity to work together and share best practices on a wide range
of topics related to the rule of law, violence against women and
persons with disabilities, journalist security, and basic freedoms of
expression, association, and religion.
Question 8. Recent reports have stated that a panel of
international experts commissioned by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IACHR) has said that the Mexican government ``has
hampered the inquiries on the investigation of the disappearance of 43
Mexican students.''
Do you believe this reporting to be accurate?
Answer. As President Obama has said, this gruesome crime has no
place in a civilized society. We commend the Commission and the experts
for their work, which was requested by the Mexican government, and for
the assistance it has provided Mexico and the victims' families in
working to resolve this tragic case. The final detailed report includes
over 600 pages of analysis and recommendations and has been extensively
covered in the press, as have public statements by the experts. We
encourage the Government of Mexico to carefully consider the report's
recommendations, evaluate suggested actions to address the issue of
forced disappearances, provide support to the victims' families, and
continue their efforts to bring the perpetrators of these terrible
crimes to justice. The Government of Mexico took an important step by
recognizing the role that the international community could play, and
by requesting that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) appoint an independent group to support its investigation.
The experts are well-known and widely respected experts on the rule
of law, human rights, and public policy. Their report and public
statements reinforce the critical importance of bringing to justice the
perpetrators of these crimes to ensure accountability and bring closure
for the victims' families, who have suffered deeply. During the course
of the expert group's mandate, U.S. officials urged the Mexican
government to fully facilitate the experts' review of the
investigation. We now look forward to learning what the follow-up
mechanism will entail, with respect to the experts' recommendations and
work, as announced by the IACHR following its recent spring period of
sessions.
Beyond the case of the 43 students, the report reinforces the need
to continue efforts in Mexico to strengthen accountability and the rule
of law. The United States is supporting these efforts through
strengthening communities and institutions, supporting Mexican efforts
to establish and sustain the rule of law, advance transparency and
anti-corruption efforts, and working with Mexico to promote and protect
human rights.
Question 9. There are over 3 billion estimated internet users in
the world as of 2014. The Internet as we know it has transformed our
societies and economies, and it has thrived because it is open, free,
and encourages innovation and information sharing.
How effective has DRL been in promoting a free and open internet
with its current resources?
Answer. In 2014, DRL commissioned an external evaluation by the
Rand Corporation of its Internet freedom programming portfolio. The
evaluation concluded that, ``The DRL Internet Freedom portfolio
represents a resilient mix of both high-risk/high-gain and tried-and-
true approaches . . . balanced in investment allocation, geo-political
focus, distribution of performance, and project breadth.'' Since 2008,
DRL has invested over $145 million in those programs to promote
Internet freedom globally through support for anti-censorship and
secure communication technologies, digital safety, policy advocacy, and
research. DRL's portfolio is the most comprehensive support for
Internet freedom of any funder, private or public.
Over the last five years, DRL has supported the creation and
improvement of numerous anti-censorship and secure communications
tools. These tools are used by millions of individuals each year to
freely and safely access the global Internet. DRL's digital safety
programs have provided over 180,000 human rights defenders with digital
safety training, technical support, or emergency assistance. In
addition, DRL has supported policy advocacy efforts to promote Internet
freedom in nearly 40 key countries around the world. For example, in a
country in Eurasia, DRL supported local civil society efforts to
advocate against government plans to create an Internet ``blacklist''
and assisted with the development of a new multi-stakeholder Internet
regulatory body.
Question 10. What obstacles or foreign governments has DRL
identified that inhibit a free and open internet? How can these
obstacles be overcome?
Answer. More than half the world's population lives in a country
where the Internet is censored or restricted. Repressive regimes are
deploying new, sophisticated tactics to further limit Internet freedom.
Many governments have begun actively manipulating online content,
deploying malware to target human rights defenders, and launching
digital attacks to silence users. Last year, servers that experts claim
were associated with China's so-called ``Great Firewall'' launched a
cross-border cyber-attack against human rights websites being hosted in
the United States. The attack manipulated traffic intended for one of
China's biggest web service companies, turning it into malicious code
and re-directing it at American websites used by Chinese activists. The
attack was dubbed the ``Great Cannon.''
Many governments have also begun adopting restrictive policies to
further limit freedom of expression online, including implementing
national blacklists of banned websites, onerous online registration
polices, and overbroad cybercrime legislation. Governments are also
increasingly seeking to shift the burden of censorship to private
companies and individuals by pressing them to store, provide access to,
and remove online content.
To promote a free and open Internet, DRL has:
1. Invested over $145 million in Internet freedom programs to ensure
human rights defenders and ordinary citizens around the world
are able to safely access the global Internet. Our programs
provide individuals with the tools, information, and support
they need to circumvent censorship, defend against online
attacks, and communicate safely in closed environments. For
example, when the government of Burundi blocked access to
social media during election protests last summer, many human
rights defenders and journalists turned to anti-censorship
tools to continue reporting on the protests, documenting human
rights abuses and safely communicating with the outside world.
2. Led multilateral efforts to promote Internet freedom. The United
States is a founding member of the Freedom Online Coalition, a
group of likeminded nations committed to promoting and
protecting human rights online. Since its founding in 2011, we
have doubled membership in the Coalition to 30 countries.
3. Worked to build international consensus. The United States is part
of the core group that drafted and successfully negotiated a
series of pioneering resolutions on Internet Freedom at the
U.N. Human Rights Council. These resolutions, each of which has
passed by consensus, reaffirm that the same human rights that
people have offline must also be protected online.
__________
Responses to Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue to Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Tomaz
Malinowski
Question 1a. I was disappointed to see the announcement earlier
this month that the second round of Haiti's presidential elections was
postponed due to allegations of fraud and subsequent threats of violent
protests, leaving Haiti without a duly elected president or a complete
federal government in place. Despite having agreed on a plan to move
forward with an election by this week, the second round of elections
has been postponed, possibly until as late as October. The U.S. has a
tremendous stake in the future of Haiti's democracy. We have spent over
$30 million on elections in Haiti in the past year, and the
international community collectively has invested about $80 million.
Can you let me know what we've used the $30 million for in support
of the elections? Can you tell me about the FY 2017 budget
request for election support in Haiti?
Answer. We fully share your disappointment and agree it is
essential to get elections back on track. The United States has a huge
stake in Haiti's democracy. Through 2015, USAID had budgeted more than
$30 million for election-related activities. These activities aim to
strengthen Haiti's Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), and political
party and civil society groups' capacity to organize and monitor
regular and inclusive elections that meet international standards for
transparency and fairness.
To support the electoral process going forward, USAID has provided
an additional $4.9 million in elections funding to the UN Office for
Project Services (UNOPS) to provide transport and logistics support.
USAID has also budgeted additional funding for the Consortium for
Electoral and Political Processes Strengthening (NDI and IFES). This
assistance equips the partners to respond effectively to the
continually changing electoral and political process environment.
As a result of the delayed elections, increased funding will likely
be required. Until the CEP releases an electoral calendar, however, we
cannot accurately project the total elections cost, since that will be
significantly impacted by the CEP's decisions on the timing and
possible grouping of Presidential, Parliamentary, and sub-municipal
elections. Preliminary estimates prepared by UN Development Program and
the CEP have included an additional $13 million for the next round of
elections.
Going forward, the U.S. government's and Haiti's technical partners
stand by to assist efforts by civil society, the Haitian government,
and the CEP to meet demands for increased credibility and transparency
of the ongoing electoral process and to ensure a level playing field.
However, each step will require sustained commitment and political will
from the Government of Haiti and the CEP.
Question 1b. What is the State Department doing to help get
Haiti's election cycle back on track?
Answer. The Department of State is urging the Haitian government to
complete the 2015 electoral process promptly and seat a democratically
elected government, emphasizing that anti-democratic ``political
solutions'' are not an acceptable outcome. We are supporting Haitian
efforts aimed at finding consensual and constructive solutions that
will see the February 5 political accord implemented and a conclusion
to the electoral process as soon as possible. We are urging the
verification commission to complete expeditiously its evaluation and
the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) to implement the commission's
legal and constitutional recommendations. As interim President Privert
has promised, we expect the CEP to announce its electoral calendar by
June 6.
Question 1c. If elections get postponed again, does the State
department have a plan in place for a U.S. response?
Answer. Along with international partners, we are reviewing an
array of possible responses by the United States if the electoral
calendar is not issued on June 6, or if the deadlines announced in that
calendar are not met.
We have consulted closely with other donors to ensure a consistent
and coordinated response to possible continued electoral delays. To
date, the international donor community has generally spoken with one
voice, urging political actors to stick with the previously agreed
timetable. In some cases, international financial institutions'
programs may be affected if there is a prolonged absence of a
democratically elected government in Haiti.
Question 1d. If so, what is State prepared to do in order to
influence the interim government to complete elections?
Answer. We have indicated to the highest levels of the Haitian
government that it is important to set early deadlines not only for the
holding of elections, but also for the seating of those elected. The
administration is reviewing a range of unilateral and multilateral
actions we could take in the event that elections are not completed
quickly. Such responses include UN Security Council action,
Organization of American States (OAS) action, withdrawal of funding for
elections, and pressure on individual decision-makers. Questions for
the Record Submitted toAssistant Secretary of State Tomasz Malinowski
by Senator David Perdue (#2a and 2b)Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs
April 26, 2016
Question 2a. I recently wrote a letter to Secretary Kerry about
this issue--some U.S. officials on the ground in Haiti believe a small
group of candidates who were unsuccessful in the first election round
are responsible for inciting allegations of fraud in the elections and
sparking civil unrest in order to trigger a ``do over'' election, even
stooping to the level of paying citizens to take the to the streets.
How are State Department's resources being used to identify and
call out election disruptors?
Answer. Some actors have mobilized supporters and championed
allegations of fraud that to date are unsubstantiated; our Embassy
observers and other international electoral monitors determined there
was no massive fraud in the first round of presidential elections. The
United States, through multiple statements and a visit to Port au
Prince by Secretary Kerry, has made clear that electoral intimidation
and violence are unacceptable. We expect those who organize, finance,
or participate in electoral intimidation and violence to be held to
account in accordance with Haitian law.
In addition, through private meetings and public statements, the
U.S. government has made clear that all parties must take their claims
of fraud through the legal process, and not to the streets. Our efforts
are focused primarily on encouraging the interim Haitian government to
conclude the 2015 electoral process with the two candidates who won the
most votes in the October 25 elections. Once elections are scheduled,
we will expect Haitian security officials, with support from the UN
security mission (MINUSTAH) as needed, to respond strongly to the
threat or use of violence to disrupt the vote. We will also seek to
identify the perpetrators of violence aimed at disrupting the
elections, along with those who incited such acts, and take appropriate
action, such as restricting visas, to target those responsible for
inciting or committing violence.
Question 2b. Aside from public rhetoric and private talks, is
State willing to use other diplomatic tools of persuasion, including
travel restrictions and/or visa bans, for these disruptors and their
families, who view U.S. travel ability as a status symbol?
Answer. Yes, the Department of State is willing to use the
diplomatic tools at our disposal to respond to disruptors of the
electoral process. We are considering appropriate U.S. responses to
continued delays, including visa revocation on human rights or other
legal grounds, for those who deliberately disrupt the electoral process
to pursue their own interests. We are prepared to back public
statements and diplomatic pressure with concrete consequences, as
needed.
Question 3a. Can you speak a bit on democracy and human rights
efforts in Egypt, and how the FY 2017 budget request will work to
address those issues?
Answer. We are concerned by the deterioration of the human rights
situation in Egypt in recent months. The President, Secretary Kerry,
and other U.S. officials have repeatedly raised human rights concerns,
including those related to religious freedom issues in our bilateral
conversations with senior Egyptian officials and with civil society
leaders. We continue to have frank discussions with Egyptian officials
about the use of mass trials, the use of military courts to try
civilians, arbitrary arrests, and prolonged pre-trial detention. We
have also expressed concern about increased restrictions on the
exercise of freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly,
as well as harassment of NGOs.
The FY 2017 budget request complements these diplomatic efforts and
it includes funds to work with targeted government institutions and
non-governmental partners to enhance respect for human rights and rule
of law, including by supporting Egyptian efforts to modernize the
curriculum and instructional methods in initial entry training programs
for public prosecutors. Assistance will also help strengthen good
governance by providing expert advice on policy, regulatory, and
management reform initiatives for national and sub-national government
bodies, such as Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Finance and local
councils, to support required fiscal and budgetary reforms and improve
transparency, accountability, and service delivery. To complement these
activities, assistance will support organizations that raise awareness
of and advocate for improved public services and increased civic
participation on key rights. Funding will continue to support technical
assistance and training to government entities and the Egyptian people
to counter trafficking in persons, combat violence against women, and
promote a society that is more inclusive of marginalized populations.
Question 3b. What message do you think the consistent flow of
foreign assistance, despite leadership, has sent to Egypt? Do you see a
problem with how America provides continued security assistance to
Egypt, or how that is viewed by Egyptians concerned about the
government's human rights abuses?
Answer. Since the January 2011 revolution, we have made clear our
commitment both to safeguard our regional security interests and to
support meaningful Egyptian political reform including respect for
human rights. We are concerned by the deterioration of the human rights
situation in Egypt over the past year, and we continue to raise our
concerns both publicly and privately over increasing restrictions on
freedom of expression, association and civil society, including at the
highest levels of the Egyptian government.
As is the case around the world, we use a wide range of tools
including our assistance and diplomatic engagement to advance our
interests with Egypt while also strengthening a strategic partnership
with a country critical for regional stability. We understand the
concerns regarding the human rights situation in Egypt, and
continuously assess and refine our assistance to ensure we best support
a politically, economically, and socially stable Egypt. In 2015, after
a two-year review of our military and economic assistance, President
Obama restructured our military aid to focus on our shared strategic
objectives of improving Egypt's counterterrorism capability and border
security while also providing direct economic assistance. Our economic
assistance supports market reforms, inclusive growth, and job creation,
providing much needed employment for a rapidly growing number of young
people entering the workforce.
For example, programs aim to strengthen basic skills at the
elementary level, provide scholarships, and strengthen higher education
institutions. We and the Egyptians share the same objective of
deepening our strategic partnership. We remain concerned about
restrictions on space for civil society and continue to engage with our
Egyptian counterparts on this issue.
Question 3c. What do you think is the best policy option we have
at our disposal to influence President Sisi's--and his government's--to
halt their continued crackdown on human rights?
Answer. With Egypt, as we do around the world, we use a wide range
of tools to advance human rights and fundamental freedoms. Secretary
Kerry and other senior officials have repeatedly emphasized to the
Egyptian government that we continue to strongly support Egypt's
security and economic development, but that long-term peace and
stability are impossible without trust, accountability, and avenues for
peaceful dissent. They have also emphasized that NGOs and other civil
society organizations play a legitimate and necessary role in any
country and are critical to advancing freedoms, supporting universal
human rights, giving voice to citizens' views, and acting as
appropriate checks on the government.
Question 3d. Do you think a change to our assistance to Egypt is
enough leverage to be a catalyst for change?
Answer. The United States remains committed to supporting the
building of a stable, prosperous and democratic Egypt as an ally in an
increasingly troubled region. With Egypt, as we do around the world, we
use a wide range of tools including our assistance and both public and
private diplomatic engagement to advance human rights and fundamental
freedoms.
Question 4. The FY 2017 budget request seeks $35.6 million in
operational funding for the DRL bureau, an increase of $0.7 million
over last year's request, I understand that funds 171 positions,
roughly > of which are here in DC. DRL also requests funds to conduct
foreign assistance programs. However, this year's request is $75
million for DRL activities--a 4.6% decrease since FY15.
Can you help me understand why the funding request for the bureau
and roughly 128 staffers in DC has increased, but the
assistance funding request is down nearly 5%?
Answer. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) is
the foreign policy lead within the U.S. government on promoting
democracy and protecting human rights globally. DRL produces the annual
Human Rights Report and the annual International Religious Freedom
Report, and is responsible for vetting of security units pursuant to
the State Leahy Law. DRL works directly with designated human rights
officers and others at our 294 embassies, consulates, and diplomatic
missions around the world and centrally manages programs that focus
activities in countries where governments commit egregious human rights
violations, are undemocratic or in transition, and where democracy and
human rights advocates are under pressure.
The FY 2017 request for DRL's operational funding includes an
increase of $674,000, which includes additional funds for overseas
Leahy vetting as well as to cover current personnel, including cost
adjustments for domestic inflation and locality pay adjustments.
Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) programs are a
significant priority for this Administration and are critical
components of our ability to promote resilient, open, and democratic
societies. The FY 2017 request for DRG globally is $2.7 billion, which
is $786.2 million (41 percent) above the FY 2015 request levels. Within
the overall request for DRG assistance, the foreign assistance request
for DRL is $75 million. The FY 2017 request for foreign assistance
balances the Administration's highest foreign policy priorities,
including DRG programs, with other requirements--for example, the need
to respond to emerging crises.
Question 5. A range of governments, NGOs, and international
organizations work to promote democracy around the world.
How does the State Department and the US government as a whole
coordinate democracy promotion efforts with these groups?
How does DRL, if at all, work with organizations such as USAID or
the National Endowment of Democracy?
How does DRL work with the regional bureaus regarding democracy
monitoring and oversight? In your view, how can these efforts
be more effective?
How do DRL assistance programs to promote democracy differ from
those of USAID?
What, if any, are the State Department's relative advantages or
unique strengths with regard to planning and implementing
democracy and governance activities?
Answer. With more than 100 operating units within the Department of
State and USAID in Washington and overseas that are involved in the
promotion of democracy abroad through foreign assistance, the
Department and USAID place a high value on coordination to help ensure
assistance efforts are complementary and non-duplicative. The U.S.
government regularly engages with other funders and entities involved
in promoting democracy and human rights around the world. In 2006, the
Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources was established to provide
leadership and coordinate foreign assistance planning and management
across the Department and USAID. The relevant Chief of Mission
coordinates all assistance awards obligated overseas and assistance
awards obligated in Washington are coordinated by the responsible
operating unit with relevant stakeholders.
For example, proposals for new assistance awards managed by the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) undergo interagency
review panels to ensure that potential programs are well coordinated,
complement, and do not duplicate existing programming efforts. DRL
invites representatives from the relevant regional bureaus (which
represent the views from U.S. embassies), other functional bureaus as
appropriate, and USAID (which draws its input from USAID field-
missions). With respect to democracy programs managed by other
operating units, DRL may be consulted on the drafting of comprehensive
strategies, solicitations, and Congressional notifications, and may
also participate in technical review panels. DRL regularly coordinates
and exchanges information with USAID and the NED on respective program
portfolios.
The promotion of human rights and democratic governance is an
integral part of the U.S. development agenda. USAID views human rights
and democratic governance as fundamental ends of development and as
critically important means to the reduction of poverty. USAID employs a
bottom-up approach to programming whereby field missions develop five-
year Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCS) that analyze and
prioritize key challenges in the DRG sector. The most effective
programmatic approaches are developed for the country context and
activities are implemented through a combination of mission and central
awards.
USAID's Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and
Governance (DRG Center) supports DRG programs in the field by operating
14 central funds or pre-competed implementation mechanisms (both grants
and contracts). These capabilities include support for programs in
elections and political party assistance, rule of law, anticorruption,
human rights, legislative strengthening, civil society, global labor
programs, media, and internet freedom.
DRL programs directly support national security and foreign policy
goals and objectives, and advance key priorities of the President and
Secretary of State. These include promoting Internet freedom, defending
international religious freedom, empowering women and girls and
preventing and responding to gender-based violence, preventing
atrocities and countering violent extremism, supporting transitional
justice, fighting corruption and cronyism, promoting media freedom,
protecting labor rights, advancing the human rights of members of
marginalized populations, and supporting pillars of President Obama's
Stand with Civil Society agenda.
DRL has developed best practices and specialized mechanisms to work
in closed societies and closing spaces that may have a limited or no
U.S. government presence. This ability to conduct sensitive programs in
a manner that meets federal requirements while keeping grantees safe is
the basis of all DRL programs, 90 percent of which operate in
restrictive or challenging environments. As a result, DRL has been able
to sustain support in environments when other donors were required to
halt.
DRL is able to administer programs in ways that allow the programs
to be flexible, adaptable, and responsive to complex and changing
situations on the ground, while mitigating risk to both our
implementing partners and local beneficiaries. DRL manages global
initiatives that can rapidly respond to deteriorating situations and
emerging opportunities, and provide emergency assistance to human
rights defenders, civil society organizations, and individuals under
attack or threat of attack. Since 2007, DRL emergency assistance
programs have assisted more than 3,300 people and organizations in more
than 98 countries and territories.
Question 6. The Administration's FY 2017 budget request for State
and USAID includes more than $1.7 billion in foreign assistance to
Latin America and the Caribbean, a 10% increase over FY15 levels. This
includes a 92% increase in development assistance (DA) funding,
primarily to support development efforts under the U.S. strategy for
Engagement in Central America. It also includes a 102% increase in
nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, de-mining and related programs (NADR)
to support efforts in Columbia. There's also a 46% increase in foreign
military financing funding (FMF), most of which would support military
partners in Colombia and throughout Central America.
Can you let me know which programs' funding levels decreased in
order to support these increases?
Answer. The total FY 2017 Request for Department of State and USAID
totals $50.1 billion, an increase of $2.3 billion over the FY 2015
appropriation. While the FY 2017 request represents an increase over FY
2015, diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance needs are ever
rising, and certain tradeoffs had to be made as the Administration
finalized the request. Of the $50.1 billion, $1.7 billion is requested
for foreign assistance programs in the Western Hemisphere. While the FY
2017 Request includes a $155 million (10 percent) increase above
funding allocated to the region in FY 2015, this funding is part of the
overall increase in funding requested by the President in FY 2017 for
the Department of State and USAID above the FY 2015 appropriation.
The President has made clear his commitment to providing strong
support for our partners and programs in the Western Hemisphere,
including those in Central America, Colombia, Mexico, and elsewhere.
The FY 2017 Request of $1.7 billion for the Western Hemisphere reflects
this commitment. The increases in this request will bolster efforts to
address the underlying factors of migration from Central America and
help support the peace process in Colombia.
Question 7a. For FY 2017, the State Department is requesting $3.8
million for WHA to increase staff and update the aging facilities of
the U.S. Embassy in Havana, and notes in the request that ``adding
these new positions is vital to U.S. national security and to
supporting Cuban civil society.'' At the same time, the
Administration's FY 2017 foreign aid budget request for Cuba democracy
and human rights funding is for $15 million in Economic Support Funds
(ESF), a 25% reduction from the $20 million provided annually in recent
years to nongovernmental democracy and human rights programs.
Please describe in what areas the nine additional staff that are
requested would work, and in particular, how they would help
support Cuban civil society.
Answer. The Embassy has not created any new positions since the
transition from an Interests Section to a full-fledged Embassy, despite
an enormous increase in workload. The fact that our Embassy in Havana
is severely understaffed makes it difficult to meet the U.S.
government's objectives. To put the staffing level of our Embassy in
Havana in context, Embassy Santo Domingo has approximately 150 U.S.
direct hire employees compared to 54 in Havana.
Of the nine additional staff requested, six would be assigned to
Embassy Havana and three would join the Office of the Coordinator for
Cuban Affairs in Washington, DC. The Havana positions would work in the
Political, Economic, and Management sections. A mixture of reporting
and support positons are required to deepen U.S. understanding of
Cuba's political, social, and economic environment, oversee maintenance
upgrades, conduct human rights monitoring and advocacy, and deepen law
enforcement cooperation on issues such as fugitives and
counternarcotics. Adding these positions is vital to U.S. national
security and to supporting Cuban civil society.
During re-establishment negotiations, we successfully negotiated
greater freedom for our diplomats to travel in Cuba to better monitor
developments within the country. The ability to travel outside Havana
and interact with Cubans outside the capital is vital to our security
and to our support of the Cuban people. We need additional staff in
Cuba to take advantage of this enhanced ability to travel.
Question 7b. What is the rationale for the 25% reduction in Cuba
democracy and human rights funding? Has there been any change in the
type of assistance provided in the aftermath of the reestablishment of
diplomatic relations?
Answer. The promotion of democratic principles and human rights
remains the core goal of U.S assistance to Cuba. We agree that support
to civil society in Cuba remains critical, and the re-establishment of
diplomatic relations has not changed that. We will continue to
implement democracy programs supported by Economic Support Funds. We
believe the FY 2017 request provides a sustainable level of democracy
support that will enable us to continue advancing our democracy and
human rights goals in Cuba.
In prior years, the scope of the tools available to us to interact
with civil society in Cuba was limited. As restrictions on travel by
Cubans and to Cuba have been eased on both sides, additional tools are
available that enable the United States to engage directly with the
Cuban people. For example, we are now able to conduct some forms of
training in the United States or third countries whereas previously,
these programs could only be carried out in Cuba.
Also, U.S. educational, religious, and humanitarian groups now
connect directly with the Cuban people. Other programs funded by the
Department of State offer enhanced opportunities for professional,
academic, and cultural exchanges with Cuba. Cuban activists are able to
travel regularly to the United States and elsewhere.
Under these circumstances, we also believe the FY 2017 request
takes into consideration that one of our goals in supporting civil
society--worldwide--is to provide the kind of training and capacity
building that allows them gradually to become more self-sustaining.
Regarding the status of prior year funding, the Department of State
obligated all of the Cuba Economic Support Funds (ESF) funding in
Fiscal Years 2013 and 2014. We are soliciting proposals for FY 2015
funds.
Question 7c. How would you assess the impact and effectiveness of
U.S. democracy and human rights assistance in Cuba?
Answer. When U.S. government-funded programs began, we supported
the few nascent civil society groups on the island who operated
primarily in urban environments. Since then and due in part to U.S.
government programming efforts, we support the professionalization of
the growing, diverse civil society groups throughout Cuba, and have
assisted in amplifying the voice of independent media through training
and information dissemination.
Growing activism within Cuba by independent groups, increased
information flow to, from and within the island, and increasing
disillusionment with failed government policies have emboldened a
greater number of Cubans and provided us the opportunity to engage with
a wider range of civil society actors, including a new generation of
activists and individuals who work to create new opportunities for an
open and prosperous Cuba.
U.S. government assistance in Cuba responds to the Cuban people's
demand for human rights and democratic governance. Our programs train
independent journalists to provide an alternative voice to state-run
media, and equip human rights defenders to better document human rights
abuses. Following Cuba's lifting of travel restrictions in early 2013,
more civil society members have been able to participate in training
opportunities outside of Cuba, increase their professional networks,
and present the situation regarding human rights through reports and
testimony to international fora. U.S. government assistance also
provides crucial humanitarian assistance to alleviate the hardships for
victims of political repression and their families, so they may
continue to speak out for their basic fundamental and human rights.
We support online platforms to promote the free flow of information
and disseminate reports of human rights violations, reaching more
Cubans than before as viewership of the platforms has dramatically
increased as internet access expands on the island, a trend we expect
to continue.
We will continue to assess the impact and effectiveness of our
programs and respond to changing conditions on the island as well as
new strategies and needs identified by civil society groups.
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