[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-7]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR
GENERAL REPORT ``INVESTIGATION ON
ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO USCENTCOM INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS''
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 28, 2017
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
________
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri, Chairwoman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
MATT GAETZ, Florida TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
JIM BANKS, Indiana THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming (Vacancy)
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
Christopher Bright, Professional Staff Member
Barron YoungSmith, Counsel
Anna Waterfield, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hartzler, Hon. Vicky, a Representative from Missouri, Chairwoman,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations................... 1
Moulton, Hon. Seth, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations........... 2
WITNESSES
Fine, Hon. Glenn A., Acting Inspector General, Department of
Defense........................................................ 3
Grimes, Jacques T., Director, Defense Analysis, Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.................... 10
Marrs, Maj Gen James, USAF, Director for Intelligence, Joint
Staff.......................................................... 8
Quantock, MG Mark R., USA, Director of Intelligence, U.S. Central
Command........................................................ 9
Wiley, Neil R., Director, Defense Analysis, Defense Intelligence
Agency......................................................... 11
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Fine, Hon. Glenn A........................................... 25
Grimes, Jacques T., joint with Mr. Neil R. Wiley, Maj Gen
James Marrs, and MG Mark R. Quantock....................... 36
Hartzler, Hon. Vicky......................................... 21
Moulton, Hon. Seth........................................... 23
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ``INVESTIGATION ON
ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO USCENTCOM INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS''
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 28, 2017.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:32 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vicky Hartzler
(chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VICKY HARTZLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS
Mrs. Hartzler. Welcome. Good afternoon. I am delighted to
convene the first Oversight Investigation Subcommittee hearing
for the 115th Congress.
Before I turn to the topic of today's hearing and introduce
our witnesses, I want to welcome our new ranking member and the
others who are joining the subcommittee for the first time, who
will be coming shortly, we are sure.
In recent years, this subcommittee has been engaged in a
wide variety of important national security topics. I am eager
to work with all of you to ensure we continue to exercise our
constitutional responsibilities to help to oversee the
Department of Defense [DOD].
I am happy to have Mr. Moulton as the subcommittee's
ranking member, and I look forward to his important
contributions to our work.
I am also pleased that we are joined this year by Mr.
Gaetz, Mr. Banks, Ms. Cheney, Mr. O'Halleran, and Mr. Suozzi.
They are new to this committee. And our returning members are
Mr. Conaway and Mr. Scott. So I look forward to their keen
insights.
Now, for today's hearing, we are also joined by or probably
will be joined by one or more committee members who are not
members of the subcommittee. And for any members of the full
committee who are not permanent members of the subcommittee who
are or will be attending, I ask unanimous consent that they be
permitted to participate in this hearing with the understanding
that all sitting subcommittee members will be recognized for
questions prior to those not assigned to this subcommittee.
Without objection, so ordered.
Today's hearing topic is especially timely. Three weeks
ago, the Department of Defense Inspector General [IG] released
a report about allegations that leadership within U.S. Central
Command [CENTCOM] improperly manipulated intelligence products
that led to an inaccurate understanding of the U.S. campaign
against ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria].
As a consequence, 30 professionals in the Inspector
General's Office undertook an inquiry into this matter. They
conducted 152 interviews at CENTCOM and reviewed thousands of
pages of materials over the course of many months. Although the
report did not find systemic or intentional distortion of
intelligence or evidence of misconduct, the IG did conclude
that CENTCOM intelligence products could have and should have
been better.
The report also found a very challenging command climate at
CENTCOM and identified several process and procedural issues
which the IG believed impeded the intelligence analysis
process. The inspector general proffered 29 specific
recommendations for improvements and discussed the need to
implement corrective action.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and learning
about the changes that have been made in response to the report
and the progress we can expect. I look forward to discussing
these issues with the two panels today.
Before I introduce our first witness, I turn to the
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee ranking member for
any opening remarks that he would like to make.
[The prepared statement of Mrs. Hartzler can be found in
the Appendix on page 21.]
STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Chairwoman Hartzler. It is an honor
to be here, and I very much look forward to our work together.
So thank you so much for welcoming me.
And I would like to just take a quick moment to also
recognize a couple new Democratic members on the Oversight and
Investigations Subcommittee: Tom O'Halleran of Arizona and Tom
Suozzi of New York. So we are bringing you two Toms in addition
to myself.
I came to Washington promising to work across the aisle and
to make sure that we in Congress never flinch when it comes to
asking the difficult questions about what it takes to ensure
our national security. I believe we will do an excellent job
working together in that spirit and in the bipartisan tradition
of this committee.
In the United States, our policymakers and service members
rely on intelligence analysis to make critical strategic,
operational, and tactical decisions every day, some life or
death. So it is imperative that we have adequate safeguards in
place to ensure they receive objective, empirically based
reporting on which is ground truth.
For that reason, when allegations arose last year about
manipulation of intelligence at United States Central Command,
Congress encouraged the DOD Inspector General to conduct a
thorough investigation and report back with recommendations.
The inspector general conducted an exhaustive investigation
involving 152 interviews of 120 witnesses, reviews of millions
of emails, 425,000 documents, and 140 finished intelligence
products.
In its final report, they did not find evidence that
intelligence was falsified or intentionally distorted or that
intelligence processes resulted in false narrative or systemic
distortion; however, the IG did find evidence of issues that
are concerning to the committee, including some that the
chairwoman already mentioned.
These include a poor command climate, low morale, and
ineffective communication and guidance that produced a
perception among analysts that the integrity of the process was
questionable. These findings demonstrate how it is paramount
that we ensure the climate at CENTCOM is improved and that
better safeguards are in place.
I believe these are exactly the types of issues that
require serious scrutiny from the Oversight Committee, and I
would like to thank the chairwoman again for her leadership and
her interest in delving into this important topic today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Moulton can be found in the
Appendix on page 23.]
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Moulton. Appreciate your
comments.
So I am pleased to recognize the witness on our first
panel, the Honorable Glenn Fine, Acting Inspector General for
the Department of Defense. So thank you for being here today
and we welcome your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. GLENN A. FINE, ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Fine. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking
Member Moulton, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
inviting me to appear before you today to discuss the
investigation by the Department of Defense Office of Inspector
General into allegations that senior officials at CENTCOM
falsified, distorted, delayed, or suppressed intelligence
products related to its efforts to degrade and destroy ISIL
[Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant].
These were very serious and troubling allegations, and we
devoted significant resources to investigating them. We
assembled a multidisciplinary team of more than 30 DOD OIG
employees to handle the investigation. Our team did conduct
over 150 interviews of 120 witnesses, both inside and outside
of CENTCOM.
We examined in detail the specific intelligence products
that were raised by the complainants and witnesses. In
addition, we collected and reviewed a massive amount of draft
and final intelligence products and emails produced by CENTCOM.
We also interviewed intelligence officials in the DOD and the
intelligence community for their assessments of CENTCOM's
intelligence products.
We did not stop there. We conducted an analytical review of
a random sample of 140 CENTCOM intelligence products to
determine whether there were significant changes related to the
edits of these products and whether such changes indicated any
trend or pattern of distortion with regard to the portrayal of
ISIS and the Iraqi Security Forces as stronger or weaker. We
also interviewed witnesses about the command climate in
CENTCOM's intelligence directorate, and we reviewed command
climate surveys.
Finally, we examined in detail the management processes for
producing intelligence products in CENTCOM to determine if
there were deficiencies or weaknesses in need of improvement.
Our full findings and conclusions are contained in a 542-
page classified report of investigation, which we have provided
to this and other congressional committees. In addition, we
prepared a 190-page unclassified report of investigation, which
we publicly released.
In short, our investigation did not substantiate the most
serious allegation that intelligence was falsified. Similarly,
we did not find systematic or intentional distortion of
intelligence by CENTCOM's senior leaders or that the leaders
suppressed or delayed intelligence products.
However, we did find a troubling and widespread perception
among many intelligence analysts that their leaders were
attempting to distort the intelligence products. We also
identified specific weaknesses and flaws in the CENTCOM
management processes for creating intelligence products.
We believe these deficiencies, such as ineffective
communication and guidance, lack of adequate feedback,
uncertainty about various policies, and the ambiguous status of
DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] analysts assigned to CENTCOM
hindered the effectiveness and efficiency of CENTCOM
intelligence processes and it affected the morale of the
analytical workforce.
We concluded that these practices related to intelligence
products in CENTCOM could have and should have been better and
that further improvements can be made. We therefore made 29
recommendations that relate to the issues we investigated.
Some of the most important recommendations were that
CENTCOM should improve feedback, communication, and guidance
between its leaders and the intelligence workforce. CENTCOM
should update and maintain its standard operating procedures
related to intelligence production.
The relationship, reporting responsibilities, and
intelligence requirements that apply to DIA analysts should be
detailed and clarified in writing, and CENTCOM leaders should
require that intelligence products consider analysis of
alternatives.
We also recommended that senior leaders in the responsible
organizations review the report with regard to the overall
performance of the individuals described. We believe that all
29 recommendations are important and that they provide a useful
roadmap for improving intelligence processes, not only in
CENTCOM but throughout other combatant commands in the DOD.
We also note that many of our recommendations are
consistent with what the House of Representatives task force
recommended. We therefore urge the DOD, DIA, and CENTCOM to
take these recommendations seriously and to fully implement
corrective action in response to the recommendations or to
explain in detail why such corrective action is not necessary
or warranted.
We believe that such actions can further improve
intelligence processes and reduce the risk that allegations
such as the ones at issue in this report will arise in the
future.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our investigation
with the subcommittee. That concludes my statements, and I
would be glad to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fine can be found in the
Appendix on page 25.]
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you very much, Mr. Fine. I appreciate
your very good work.
This is the unclassified version, and then with another
500-page classified, you really have put a lot of effort into
this. And there is a lot of things in here that we can learn
from, and I guess that is my first question, because I have
seen in other instances of the excellent work that is done by
the DOD IG or the SIGAR [Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction] offices, but the story seems to
never continue after the report is issued.
So can you please tell me your responsibilities after you
released your report, and is there anyone that ensures your
recommendations are implemented?
Mr. Fine. Yes. We typically take follow-up action to
inquire from the responsible organizations what they intend to
do with regard to our recommendations. We want specific details
about whether they agree or disagree and whether they concur
with the recommendations or whether they intend to implement
other things to address the intent of the recommendations.
We then follow up with them. We ask them for documents and
verification that they have actually implemented those
recommendations, and in many cases, we often go back and test
to verify that they have actually done that. These are
important recommendations. We intend to do that. We intend to
follow up with them and we intend to ensure that they take
corrective action or explain why they don't intend to.
Mrs. Hartzler. So is the follow-up actions, is that made
public too?
Mr. Fine. Sometimes it is. It depends if we do a follow-up
report. We do make public our follow-up actions. Often we
provide in our semiannual reports the status of unimplemented
recommendations, so we do that as well. And sometimes--and we
are happy to provide the committee with information on the
status of those recommendations as time goes on as well.
Mrs. Hartzler. That sounds good. So this report you issued
was January 31, 2017. Is that right?
Mr. Fine. Yes.
Mrs. Hartzler. So when will you go back and check and see
that they are following up on the recommendations? About what
is the timeframe?
Mr. Fine. We normally give them a little time. I would say
they average about 60 days or so for them to determine what
they intend to do, and then we periodically follow up after
that as well, periodic time periods, depending on the
recommendation itself.
Mrs. Hartzler. So how has CENTCOM and other agencies
responded to the report recommendations, and do you assess that
they are willing or reluctant to pursue the changes that you
suggest?
Mr. Fine. Well, when we issued the report, they indicated
they thought it was a thorough report, and they thought that
particularly DIA, for example, said that this made useful
recommendations, thoughtful recommendations. They have not
responded specifically to each recommendations, and we want
that, and we intend to follow up with them.
But in general, the reaction has been generally positive,
but the proof is in the pudding. We want to see exactly what
they intend to do with regard to each specific recommendation.
Mrs. Hartzler. I think it is very important to pursue the
follow-up, and I look forward to your continued look at this
and what you find out.
So I turn to the ranking member for questions.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
First of all, Mr. Fine, I share Chairwoman Hartzler's views
of the quality of your report, the importance of it, and it
gives us a lot of confidence to know that such good work is
being done. I also share her concerns that the recommendations
actually be implemented, and so that is very important.
Sort of looking even further into the future, if there
were, here or elsewhere, an active attempt to manipulate
intelligence analysis sometime in the future, do we have
adequate protections in place to guard against that from ever
occurring?
Mr. Fine. I think we do. I think that there is the
opportunity to make those complaints known and that there are
entities within the Department of Defense that will look into
that, including us. As you saw, we took these allegations very
seriously and conducted an exhaustive investigation.
We do think that there can be additional actions that can
be taken, including clarifying the relationship of the analysts
at CENTCOM to DIA, improving the training, and guidance, and
oversight, increasing standardized operating procedures, and
also a recommendation to explain and identify the function of
the ombudsperson who can be an outlet for these kinds of
concerns, if analysts have them.
So I do think there is that opportunity, but there can be
improvements made to those processes.
Mr. Moulton. This issue with the ambiguity of the DIA
analysts' roles at CENTCOM seems to be one of the specific
examples you cite as a real issue here. Can you just give us an
example or a little bit more clarity into exactly how that
played out.
Mr. Fine. It played out by some of the analysts not knowing
what analytical standards applied to them, whether ICD
[Intelligence Community Directive] 203, 206, 208 applied to
them; not knowing who exactly they worked for; not knowing
various, you know, operating procedures and what their reports
were--and what the intent of their reports were. I think it
needs to be clarified exactly what kind of training they
receive, who they are working for, what kind of certifications
they need to have, and what their exact relationship is to the
combatant command, as well to DIA.
We found some ambiguity about that, not only among the
analysts but the senior leaders we talked to as well, not even
knowing for sure whether the intelligence community directives
applied to them. So that is concerning to us, and there needs
to be more clarity in writing and documented, including the
standard operating procedures that they have; that needs to be
clarified.
Mr. Moulton. So there clearly are some process improvements
that need to be made, but part of this is also just command
climate. And you addressed that in your report as well. Has the
IG received any similar complaints of command climate issue or
poor process issues at other COCOM [combatant command] J-2s
[intelligence directorates]?
Mr. Fine. I can't say whether we have never received any
other complaints, but we have never received anything like this
in terms of the intensity and the number and the concern that
we have had. So this was unusual. It was very unusual.
Mr. Moulton. And Mr. Fine, my final question is, do you
have any plans to share the recommendations of your findings
with other COCOM J-2s so that this kind of thing does not
happen elsewhere in the future?
Mr. Fine. Well, we have made the recommendations known,
publicly released them, gave them to the Department, gave them
to the DIA. I think the DIA, as well as the Department itself,
ought to make sure that others are aware of this, and they can
provide, as I say in my opening statement, a useful roadmap for
others as well.
I think that is one of the important things that needs to
be done, not solely for folks here on CENTCOM, but to have
others look at this as well to see whether there are process
improvements that they need to make in other combatant commands
as well, as well as throughout the DOD and the DIA.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you again for your work.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you very much.
We are voting right now, so we are getting ready to recess
here, but just based on the former conversation, I just want to
let everybody know there is a second panel. And we do have
representatives of the DIA and CENTCOM and the Office of Under
Secretary of the Defense, Intelligence, and the Joint Staff
that will be testifying next.
So I hope everyone will be able to come back, and we will
finish our questioning with Mr. Fine, but then we will get
their response as well. So I call a recess until after votes.
Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mrs. Hartzler. We will reconvene. We appreciate your
patience while we were voting, but thank you very much for
waiting. I know there may be some other members here, but I did
have another question for you before our second panel.
In your opening statement, you said that you did find that
they distorted the products, that they didn't falsify but you
used the word that they distorted, or did I misunderstand you?
Mr. Fine. Yeah, we found that they did not systematically
distort or intentionally distort the products or suppress or
delay. We did find a perception of that and we found processes
that needed improvement, but we did not find systematic or
intentional distortion.
Mrs. Hartzler. And when you were conducting this
investigation, where did the burden of proof lie? Did the
CENTCOM leadership need to show they didn't manipulate the
intelligence, or did the whistleblowers need to show the
CENTCOM leadership did manipulate it?
Mr. Fine. We didn't have a burden of proof. We didn't apply
that burden of proof. We just wanted to see what the facts
showed and what the evidence showed, and then we reached our
conclusions based upon that.
So if we would have found that there was distortion, we
would have said that, but we didn't find that. So we tried to
do a thorough and objective review and come to the conclusions
that we thought were warranted.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Very good.
Do you have any further questions, Mr. Moulton?
Mr. Moulton. No, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. I think there was some members that
had some questions, but they are not back yet, and we have had
our second panel waiting very long, so I think we will conclude
this first section.
But thank you very much, Mr. Fine, for your fine work--no
pun intended--and we look forward to following up with you and
seeing what you find in the future as far as how well the
departments follow your recommendations. So thank you very
much.
Mr. Fine. Thank you.
Mrs. Hartzler. We will welcome our second panel, and thank
you for your patience in waiting. We very much appreciate your
involvement in our hearing, and I look forward to hearing what
you have to share.
For our second panel, we have Major General James Marrs, he
is Director of Intelligence for the Joint Staff; Major General
Mark Quantock, Director of Intelligence for U.S. Central
Command; Mr. Jacques Grimes, Director of Defense Analysis for
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence;
and Mr. Neil Wiley, Director of Analysis for the Defense
Intelligence Agency.
So I understand the Department of Defense has submitted a
single written statement, but I will turn to each of you for
any opening remarks that you wish to make, so General Marrs.
[The joint prepared statement of General Marrs, General
Quantock, Mr. Grimes, and Mr. Wiley can be found in the
Appendix on page 36.]
STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN JAMES MARRS, USAF, DIRECTOR FOR
INTELLIGENCE, JOINT STAFF
General Marrs. Thank you Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking
Member Moulton, and members of the committee. I appreciate the
opportunity to offer testimony on the Department of Defense
Inspector General report ``Investigation on Allegations
Relating to USCENTCOM Intelligence Products.''
I am pleased to be here today with my other colleagues at
the table to share my perspective, both as a producer of
intelligence and as a representative of the combatant command
J-2s. Other than CENTCOM, of course, who is most ably
represented by Major General Mark Quantock to my left.
I echo my colleagues' sentiments, and you will hear more of
that shortly, regarding the important work done by the DOD IG
and the House Joint Task Force. Both reports remind us of the
vital and complex responsibilities entrusted to intelligence
professionals within our joint force. Continual improvements in
analytic standards and processes are necessary to ensure
intelligence products continue to be of the highest quality,
objectivity, and integrity.
Let me comment first on the Joint Staff J-2, a unique team
that is both part of the Joint Staff and the Defense
Intelligence Agency. Our J-2 mission is to provide the
chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and senior joint force
leadership with decision-quality intelligence that is relevant,
accurate, and unbiased.
Doing that work well depends on a high-quality team of
intelligence professionals, and within the context of today's
hearing, emphasis on two key ingredients: First is a workforce
steeped in the elements of good analytic tradecraft. The
programs and processes that will be outlined by Mr. Grimes and
Mr. Wiley serve as the foundation of that tradecraft. We build
upon that in the Joint Staff J-2 with our own local training
and collaborative relationships to ensure the best application
to our mission.
The second ingredient is the responsibility I, and my
leadership team, have every day to create an environment where
even in the most pressure-packed situations, dissent and candor
are encouraged as we shape our intelligence assessments.
While I, as the J-2, am ultimately responsible for the
quality of those assessments, this is a team sport of the
highest stakes for our national security and one that only
works at its best when communication and collaboration are
strong.
As for my J-2 colleagues across the combatant commands,
they and their teams face a very similar mission and set of
challenges as they support their four-star commanders and
combatant command joint force. They are very aware of today's
hearing and the important work done by the DOD IG and the House
Joint Task Force and are looking at this as a near-term
opportunity to focus on the aspects of our tradecraft and
operating environment that are vital to mission success.
I look forward to your questions.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
General Quantock.
STATEMENT OF MG MARK R. QUANTOCK, USA, DIRECTOR OF
INTELLIGENCE, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
General Quantock. Yes, ma'am. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking
Member Moulton, and members of the committee, thank you for the
invitation ----
Mrs. Hartzler. Is your microphone on?
General Quantock. Yes, it is. Okay. Now. I am sorry.
Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Moulton, and members of
the committee, thank you very much for the invitation to offer
testimony on the IG report.
First, I would like to acknowledge the breadth of the
investigation and appreciate the efforts of both the IG and the
Joint Task Force on CENTCOM Intelligence Analysis. The IG
report provided thoughtful recommendations on ways to make
improvements within the command, and we are taking those on as
well as those from the Joint Task Force [JTF].
Of the 29 DOD IG recommendations, and the 4 from the JTF
report, I view CENTCOM J-2--and that would be me--as the lead
for implementation, certainly for CENTCOM. We have developed an
aggressive action plan, which we are currently executing.
To be clear, some of these actions are new initiatives, but
many are actions that have already been implemented, indeed
were implemented many months ago. But as with any action that
involves leadership, communications, or training, the initial
implementation is the easy part. Sustainment over time is the
real challenge, a challenge that we readily accept at CENTCOM.
We look forward to working with USDI [Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence] and DIA in developing and
implementing tradecraft and production standards to ensure our
commanders and the Nation's policymakers receive the very best
intelligence support.
Thank you.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, General.
Mr. Grimes.
STATEMENT OF JACQUES T. GRIMES, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE ANALYSIS,
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Grimes. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking
Member Moulton, and members of the committee. Thank you for the
invitation to offer the testimony of the Department of Defense
on the inspector general report, ``Investigation on Allegations
Relating to USCENTCOM Products.''
I am Jacques Grimes, Director of Defense Analysis and
Partner Engagement, and I represent the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence. My role is to oversee defense
analysis and to set a policy foundation that empowers defense
analytic components to produce high-quality, relevant,
effective analysis.
The Department is indeed impressed with the inspector
general's investigation, and we appreciate the opportunity that
it gives us to discuss the steps we are taking to improve
intelligence analysis across the defense intelligence
enterprise.
We in the Department hold ourselves to the highest
standards, and we take great pride in the exceptional
intelligence professionals who support the full spectrum of DOD
intelligence customers from the President of the United States
to the soldier in the field. Every day, thousands of our
intelligence professionals across the globe tirelessly provide
insight and analysis without politicization.
Our commitment is and always will be to provide unvarnished
intelligence and key assessments into the myriad of challenges
facing our country every day. But we recognize that we can be
better, and we are getting better. We are studying the
inspector general's recommendations closely, and we are
identifying specific actions that we can take now to address
them.
We will use the recommendations in concert with our already
ongoing actions to build a strong foundation for high-quality
objective defense intelligence analysis. For example, in
November 2016, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
signed out a new policy titled ``Management and Oversight of
DOD All-Source Analysis,'' which assigns the role of the
functional manager for DOD all-source analysis to the Defense
Intelligence Agency and extends intelligence community analytic
standards to all DOD intelligence analytic organizations,
including the combatant commands.
I co-chair, along with my colleague from the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Analytic Tradecraft Council,
which serves as a forum for advancing analytic integrity and
tradecraft standards across the defense intelligence
enterprise.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence also
sponsored the first ever analytic objectivity symposium in
September 2016 that brought together expert speakers from
academia, finance, accounting, medical research, and law
enforcement to discuss measures for reducing bias and
politicization in analysis.
While these steps were initiated without specific reference
to the inspector general's investigation at CENTCOM, they align
with many of the IG's recommendations. The steps we are taking
have already established a firm foundation for DOD intelligence
analysis. We very much look forward to continuing along this
path to ensure that DOD analysis meets the highest standards of
quality, objectivity, and integrity.
Mrs. Hartzler. Very good. Thank you.
Mr. Wiley.
STATEMENT OF NEIL R. WILEY, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE ANALYSIS, DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Wiley. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Moulton, and
members of the committee, I would like to join my colleagues in
thanking you for the invitation to offer testimony on the DOD
IG report.
As the DIA director for analysis and the DOD functional
manager for all-source analysis, I am responsible for the
alignment, quality, and integrity of the analytic output at DIA
to service intelligence centers in the combatant commands. We
appreciate the DOD IG's thorough investigation and note that
the investigation found no lack of integrity or lack of probity
in the intelligence process.
We in the analytic profession hold ourselves to a high
standard, and when concerns are raised, it makes us all examine
what we could do better going forward. At DIA, across the
defense all-source analysis enterprise, and in partnership with
USDI, we have been aggressively investing in initiatives to
strengthen analytic tradecraft and analytic processes.
While many of these efforts were initiated independently
from and prior to the IG report, they align well with many of
the recommendations contained therein. We have established the
Defense Analytic Tradecraft Council to coordinate and implement
analytic tradecraft and process improvements across the
enterprise.
Most noteworthy thus far have been the implementation of an
enterprise-wide analytic ombudsman program and a common process
for analytic product evaluations. We have expanded professional
and analyst career education through the addition of a 10-day
course for DIA analysts, offered both in the National Capital
Region and at the combatant commands, stressing and exercising
Intelligence Community Directive 203 tradecraft standards in
analytic design.
We also believe that rigorous certification is an essential
component of a professional workforce and continue to implement
and enhance the certified defense all-source analysis program
to demonstrate attainment in analytic competence.
We have already made considerable strides in implementing
common analytic standards and practices across the enterprise,
but the business of intelligence analysis is one of constant
improvement. With our partners in USDI and across the
enterprise, we will continue to develop, codify, and share best
practices in intelligence tradecraft, process, and training.
Our ultimate mission is to provide our warfighters and
policymakers with defense all-source analysis of the highest
insight, quality, and integrity. They deserve no less.
Thank you.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you. I am encouraged by your
testimony. It sounds like already that you have made a lot of
changes, and it can be defense-wide, the lessons learned from
this incident. You talk about, Mr. Wiley, analytic ombudsman,
common analytic standards for intelligence all across the DOD,
career education.
Mr. Grimes, you talked about the development of a council,
standards, defense analytics, and a symposium that was held
where experts looked at ways to measure. So I am very
encouraged by this.
And, General Quantock, my question is that the inspector
general identified several issues having to do with poor work
environment and climate at CENTCOM during a crisis period. So
can you describe the specific actions that have been taken to
improve the common climate at CENTCOM.
General Quantock. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question.
We have endeavored over the past really 18 months to
continue to improve the climate in specifically in the CENTCOM
J-2. And I think, just in terms of the numbers, that has beared
out. So in the IG investigation, the way we have monitored this
is through the use of several surveys.
So the one that was called out in the IG report was the
analytic integrity and standard survey, which did have an
anomalous in the 15 percentage. It was much higher than other
COCOMs. Since that time, and we just received the calendar year
2016, where it went from a 41 percent, essentially
dissatisfaction, down to 22 percent. That is an enormous
increase.
And when you look at that, you contrast that, and so in
2015, it was 41 percent and then compared to a combatant
command average of 23 percent. This past year, it has gone down
to 22 percent as opposed to 25 percent for the COCOM average.
We are actually under the COCOM average, which is a pretty
marked increase.
And that is really through a lot of programs that we have
instituted, and this was really actually well before I got
there and General Votel got there. So when it was recognized by
the previous
J-2 command team that there--there were challenges. They did
start to institute things like, you know, townhalls and
interfacing with the analysts, and we have certainly continued
that.
So to be very specific, some of the things that are not new
that they instituted that got the ball moving in the right
direction were monthly townhalls. We have what is called a
daily IFC, or Intel Fusion Center closeout, where the J-2 or
the vice J-2 sits with all the analysts that are working the
problems. It is usually anywhere between 25 and 50 of them. And
we have a discussion of what has occurred that day in the
fight, in the fights that we have at CENTCOM.
Our vice J-2 has normal office hours where he will take--a
couple times a week he'll go down to an office and events,
which is the location where the bulk of our analysts are, and
he will spend an hour and a half there and just interfacing
with analysts or anyone in the J-2 that has an issue they want
to talk to or bend the
J-2's ear on.
We have had an open-door policy for some time. And the
command climate that we also work very hard on is--and General
Votel has been an enormous advocate for this, is he spends a
lot of time with our analysts. He receives intelligence first
thing in the morning through his read book.
And what I will send in with that read book is a young
analyst. And so it is a one-on-one between a four-star and a
young analyst, and they get to answer the questions. And they
do a magnificent job. I will tell you, I am very proud of the
workforce that we have. They are magnificent professionals.
And when he has a question, they will take that back to the
JIOC [joint intelligence operations center], to the JIC [joint
intelligence center], and they will work that question, and it
will be an email from that young analyst to the four-star. And,
you know, those of us on the chain of command also get cc'd so
we know what the boss knows, but that has been very, very
positive.
What is new in terms of--since the new team has rolled in,
is we do--it is normal leadership things where you have got
outreach to the full team, not just the analysts but the full
J-2 team, which is biweekly I will put out an update to the
team in terms of what is kind of happening within the command.
We have--the CENTCOM commander, General Votel, has daily
addresses over the PA [public address] system where he tells
about his travels and what is going on within the command.
Very, very well received by the command.
We have introduced walkabouts, where I will just frankly,
again, just do normal leadership stuff of getting out there and
mixing it up with our troops. I learn something every time I do
that, and as I mentioned, it is a world-class workforce.
Thank you.
Mrs. Hartzler. Very good. Thank you. Ranking Member
Moulton, do you have some questions?
Mr. Moulton. Yes, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you very much.
This is a question for General Quantock. One of the key
findings in the DOD IG's report was that the leadership did not
ensure operational reporting was necessarily from commanders on
the ground was appropriately separated from analytical
assessments. I am an operational guy myself. I think highly of
commanders' views on the ground, but obviously they have a
certain place in intelligence analysis. Can you talk about what
you are doing to correct that particular issue?
General Quantock. So I will tell you that in the
intelligence field we need to take all the information in,
always. We have to acknowledge that operational information,
like other information, has its own biases, and we have to
acknowledge that and incorporate that into our assessments.
But properly if we have got, for example, when Mosul fell
and before OIR [Operation Inherent Resolve] stood up, we had
intelligence analysts, the intel guys normally do red. They do
the threat. And so we were actually trying to report on
friendly forces, and the team was working that. When we started
to have friendly forces, U.S. forces come on the battlefield
and start to make assessments about what was going on the
battlefield, we have to take that in. That is right. It is
appropriate, it is in accordance with ICD 203. It is just the
right thing to do.
And so, we have encouraged the use of all forms of
information and intelligence, signals intelligence, human
intelligence, open source intelligence, anything we can get. We
just again have to weigh and acknowledge that there are biases
and be aware of those.
Mr. Moulton. And my understanding is that the issue was not
that you weren't incorporating these different sources of
intelligence, but that the biases weren't recognized. Is that
correct?
General Quantock. Well, I wasn't there in terms of the
specifics of what was, how it was characterized, but looking
forward, certainly that is one of the things that we are most
cognizant of.
Mr. Moulton. Great. Thank you very much.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you so much. We have Representative
Cheney.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. And
thank you very much all of you for your service and for being
here today.
I wanted to just see if we could get a little more details
about the mention sort of repeatedly about analytic standards
and the lack of understanding on the part of some of the
analysts about what standards were really applicable to them,
and how has that changed, and specifically, how do the
standards themselves, how are they implemented?
And then secondly, give a little bit of specifics about the
DIA engagement. I know one of the things that we have urged is
that DIA really accept its responsibility as sort of overseer
of the whole defense intelligence enterprise. And I would be
interested to know specifically how that is manifesting itself
on a day-to-day basis.
General Quantock. If I may take it first, and then I will
hand it over to my teammates. In terms of standards, because it
was brought up I know in the testimony from the IG in terms of
who do folks work for. I have made it very clear, and I know
that DIA is supporting me on this, and we have had actually a
session with other J-2s to make sure we are all in alignment
with this.
But analysts that are from DIA that work in combatant
commands, work for the combatant commander. They work for the
J-2. What J-2s need to be cognizant of is the requirements that
those analysts have for their professional development in terms
of training and in terms of their advancement. And they have to
make sure that that training and those experiences and
exposures that they need are taken into account.
And so in my townhalls with my folks, I have told them, I
said, listen, let's make sure you understand it, that we work
for the combatant command. It is no different, quite frankly,
in terms of these loyalties is to say, hey, do I work for the
Army or do I work for the combatant command? Well, the reality
is I work for both, but I take my instructions from the tower,
and the tower is at MacDill Air Force Base with General Votel.
But like every service, I have to be aware of the
requirements that the Army has of me, whether it is for firing
a weapon or doing PT [physical training] test or whatever the
standards I have to do. So it is really that both worlds. And
that is really, it talks to, you know, what folks have to have.
The saying I have with this whole thing is we did not have an
intelligence integrity issue. We had communications,
leadership, and training issues. That is exactly what the IG
found in their 29 recommendations, and that is exactly what we
are getting after.
And part of our action plan, I have gone through it in
depth, when you look at those 29 recommendations, you can put a
training, a leadership, or a communications issue by every one
of those recommendations. And so I acknowledge that, and we are
getting after that, ma'am.
Mr. Wiley. So if I may take the questions on DIA and
commonality and standards, so intelligence community directive
analytic standards do apply to combatant commands. That was
reinforced recently by Under Secretary of Defense instruction
in November that establishes that ICD standards do apply across
the defense all-source analytic enterprise, so it is very clear
that they do apply at the combatant commands.
In terms of DIA's role in all-source analysis in the
enterprise, I think I would characterize it in that we are
interested in consistency, integrity, and probity of the
analytic process, rather than interested in the actual analytic
outcome. So in other words, the analytic line taken by the
elements within the enterprise are the responsibility of the
elements within the enterprise, the combatant command, JIOC,
service intelligence centers, the applicants within DIA.
The process by which they arrive at that analysis needs to
have integrity, and we get that through common standards,
common practices, and common execution. So with USDI and the
rest of the enterprise, what we are focusing on now is
establishing that common understanding of what standards are,
what tradecraft practices are, and what the institutions and
mechanisms for doing that are.
So we mentioned earlier the Defense Analytic Tradecraft
Council, that is the principal vehicle to bring all 16 members
of the defense intelligence enterprise together to discussion
tradecraft standards, establish consistent tradecraft
standards, and then communicate those tradecraft standards. We
also use that as the vehicle for establishing the ombudsman of
the product review process.
Ms. Cheney. Let me just ask, so is that a process that has
just begun now as a result of what has happened and as a result
of these reports, and was it the case that there wasn't sort of
a consistent set of standards previously?
Mr. Wiley. Yes. The Defense Analytic Tradecraft Council was
revitalized. It was established some years back, but it had
essentially lain dormant, so it was revitalized as a result of
this situation, and we reestablished it to invigorate
commonality and standards. And, again, that is what we
recognized was necessary, was a vehicle to achieve greater
consistency across the enterprise.
Mr. Grimes. I just want to add that perhaps the chapeau, if
you will, of the USDI's role in all of this, we develop policy,
we conduct oversight, and we are advocates for defense analysis
programs to include playing an integrator function across the
defense intelligence enterprise. We have laid out four basic
actions that we have taken already.
First, the oversight and management of DOD all-source
analysis in a DOD instruction. That applies to the entire
defense intelligence enterprise and lays out the role of the
functional manager for analysis, calls for a board of
governors, a governance, if you will, structure for the defense
intelligence enterprise.
And we have three memos that the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence put out to the enterprise laying out six
functional areas that are critical to defense analysis.
And then finally, an all-source analysis certification
program for certified analysts and how they can become
certified across the enterprise.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Representative. And I am very
encouraged by the testimony that we received today.
You clearly have taken this report very seriously and taken
a lot of positive steps that will benefit not only CENTCOM, but
it sounds like across all the combatant commands.
And so this committee is dedicated to making sure that our
warfighter has the best intelligence possible and the most
positive environment possible for those who are committing
their lives to this very important mission.
So we look forward to working with the inspector general as
he continues to follow up with you in the months ahead, but
keep up the great work. We appreciate what you are doing, and
this hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 28, 2017
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 28, 2017
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