[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-24]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES HEARING
ON
HIGH CONSEQUENCES AND UNCERTAIN THREATS:
REVIEWING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS FOR
COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 23, 2017
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__________
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York, Chairwoman
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana JIM COOPER, Tennessee
LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming, Vice Chair JACKIE SPEIER, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
Katie Sutton, Professional Staff Member
Lindsay Kavanaugh, Professional Staff Member
Neve Schadler, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities................................................... 2
Stefanik, Hon. Elise M., a Representative from New York,
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.. 1
WITNESSES
Durand, Shari, Acting Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency,
U.S. Department of Defense..................................... 6
Hopkins, Dr. Arthur T., Acting Assistant Secretary for Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, U.S. Department of
Defense........................................................ 3
Verga, Peter, Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, U.S.
Department of Defense.......................................... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Durand, Shari................................................ 48
Hopkins, Dr. Arthur T........................................ 31
Stefanik, Hon. Elise M....................................... 29
Verga, Peter................................................. 38
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Ms. Gabbard.................................................. 70
Mr. Scott.................................................... 70
Ms. Stefanik................................................. 69
Mr. Wilson................................................... 69
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Franks................................................... 77
Mr. Langevin................................................. 75
Mr. Shuster.................................................. 76
Ms. Stefanik................................................. 75
HIGH CONSEQUENCES AND UNCERTAIN THREATS:
REVIEWING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY,
POLICY, AND PROGRAMS FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2018
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 23, 2017.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elise M.
Stefanik (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELISE M. STEFANIK, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM NEW YORK, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES
Ms. Stefanik. The Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee [HASC] will
come to order.
I would like to welcome everyone here today for this very
timely hearing on the Department of Defense [DOD] countering
weapons of mass destruction [CWMD] policy and programs for
fiscal year 2018.
The pursuit and potential use of weapons of mass
destruction remains a high-consequence threat to our national
security. To date, the Department of Defense efforts to
prevent, protect against, and respond to weapons of mass
destruction threats have kept the use of these weapons low.
Despite these efforts, recent media reports of chemical weapons
used in Iraq and Syria, continued nuclear weapons development
in North Korea, and the asymmetric use of nerve agent remind us
the threat is real, global in nature, and potentially growing.
A key challenge in countering this threat is that many
technologies that are used for peaceful civilian purposes can
also potentially be used for developing weapons of mass
destruction. Emerging examples of these dual-use technologies
are in the fields of synthetic biology and gene editing.
Rapidly developing biotechnologies that are easily obtained
present new threats to the warfighter that we have yet to fully
understand.
Today's hearing will allow our subcommittee to provide
critical oversight on ensuring that the Department's countering
weapons of mass destruction policies, plans, and programs
sufficiently address these emerging threats.
Let me now turn to Ranking Member Jim Langevin of Rhode
Island for any opening comments he would like to make.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Stefanik can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS
AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. Dr.
Hopkins and Mr. Verga, it is very nice to see you here. And Ms.
Durand, great to be with you for the first time, so thank you.
Before I give the rest of my opening statement, though, I
do want to take a minute to acknowledge Ms. Katie Sutton, a
Sandia National Laboratory fellow that has been on HASC for the
last 2 years. Katie returns to Sandia to work on cyber programs
next week.
During her tenure on HASC, Katie has been a tremendous
asset and has worked in a bipartisan fashion, particularly on
CWMD issues. She has many accomplishments to be proud of, such
as the biodefense strategy provision in the fiscal year 2017
NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], on which she was the
lead.
Katie, I just want to say thank you for your hard work on
behalf of the ETC Subcommittee, and wish you well.
Ms. Sutton. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Langevin. Thanks. Well, today, we meet to review the
efforts by the Department of Defense to address the threat of
weapons of mass destruction. This is an important topic for
oversight by the subcommittee, and I look forward to hearing
about the policies and programs at the Department of Defense to
counter this threat.
During this past year, we have continued to receive media
reports of the use of these weapons, including the use of
chemical weapons by ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] in
Iraq and Syria and the use of VX nerve agent by North Korea.
These reports illustrate the importance of robust efforts to
protect the services and the Nation from this continually
evolving threat.
Last fall, the agency formerly known as the Joint
Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency, or JIDA, was transitioned to
the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization, or JIDO,
within the Defense Threat Reduction Agency [DTRA]. This change
offers the opportunity to achieve savings through common
efficiencies and to leverage synergy in the organization's
missions. Efficiencies and synergy include streamlining the
command structure of JIDO to align with DTRA, consolidating
human resources and other overhead functions, and reducing
mission and program overlap in order to focus JIDO on its core
task and to avoid mission creep.
It is important that we continue to evaluate the
Department's programs and efforts to ensure they are
efficiently and effectively meeting the requirements of our
warfighters.
Over the last few years, we have been briefed by the
Department on Constellation, a prototype of a new CWMD
situational awareness technology. I certainly look forward to
hearing what efforts the Department has been taking to work
with Special Operations Command [SOCOM], which has recently
taken over the mission for global synchronization for
countering weapons of mass destruction, to understand the
requirements of the commander and leverage any existing systems
to meet these needs.
Finally, the confluence of the fiscal year 2017 end-of-year
appropriations, fiscal year 2017 supplemental requests, and
fiscal year 2018 budget outline have no doubt created
challenges in executing and planning programs. So I would like
to ask our witnesses to talk about the day-to-day challenges of
uncertainty and their priorities on all three of these funding
mechanisms.
With that, I thank you again to our witnesses for appearing
before us today, and, Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of
my time.
Ms. Stefanik. We have before us a panel of three
distinguished witnesses: Dr. Arthur Hopkins, Acting Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
Defense Programs; Mr. Peter Verga, performing the duties of
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global
Security; and Ms. Shari Durand, Acting Director of DTRA, the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
While detailed budget numbers for fiscal year 2018 are not
available at this time, we look forward to a robust discussion
on the policies and programs in place in the Department for
countering weapons of mass destruction in 2018.
Welcome to all of our witnesses. I would like to remind you
that your testimony will be included in the record, and we ask
that you summarize key points from that testimony in 5 minutes
or less.
And before we begin with Dr. Hopkins, I also would like to
take a moment to recognize Katie Sutton, who will be returning
to Sandia National Laboratories, having completed her 2-year
fellowship with our committee. Katie has been an integral part
of our team and helped us legislate and conduct oversight in
many important and complex areas, indeed many of the same
things we plan on discussing today.
Katie, thank you for your hard work over the past 2 years,
and we wish you continued success.
And, with that, Dr. Hopkins, we can begin with you. And we
look forward to your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF DR. ARTHUR T. HOPKINS, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dr. Hopkins. Thank you, Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member
Langevin, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I
appreciate this opportunity to testify on the Department's
efforts to counter threats posed by weapons of mass
destruction.
The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological [NCB] Defense Programs has roots that
go back to the establishment of the Department, when it was
focused primarily on nuclear deterrence. Since then, the
organization's responsibilities have expanded to include
nuclear, chemical, and biological defense programs, which are
carried out by four organizations within the NCB enterprise:
Our Nuclear Matters Office is the focal point for DOD
activities and initiatives for sustaining a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent.
Our Chemical and Biological Defense Program develops
capabilities that enable warfighters to deter, prevent,
protect, mitigate, respond to, and recover from traditional and
emerging threats.
Through our Threat Reduction and Arms Control Office, our
oversight of the Nation's chemical demilitarization program
focuses on the safe, complete, and treaty-compliant destruction
of the Nation's remaining chemical weapons stockpile. In
addition, we ensure DOD compliance with nuclear, chemical, and
biological treaties and agreements.
And our Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Systems
Program strengthens situational awareness of global WMD
activities.
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency addresses the full
spectrum of WMD-related threats, including cooperative threat
reduction programs and support to combatant commands, as well
as threats from improvised devices.
Today, I would like to highlight some of the enduring and
the emerging challenges and threats in each area, the ongoing
activities that we are conducting to address those challenges,
and our priorities moving forward.
To counter current and emerging threats like those enabled
by synthetic biology and nontraditional agents, the Chemical
and Biological Defense Program is developing new strategies to
anticipate, prepare, and more rapidly respond, especially in
the area of medical countermeasures, in addition to developing
protective equipment and detection systems.
In domestic chemical demilitarization, the Department
continues to make significant progress in meeting the Nation's
commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention by working
toward eliminating the last of our remaining chemical weapons
stockpiles in Colorado and Kentucky. In September 2016, the
Department started agent destruction operations at the Pueblo,
Colorado, site. At Blue Grass, Kentucky, facility construction
is complete, and destruction systems are being tested.
With the United States Special Operations Command's
[USSOCOM's] new leadership role in the countering weapons of
mass destruction mission, we have engaged closely with them to
understand their mission needs for global situational
awareness.
WMD threat reduction programs executed by the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency continue to reduce the threat of
weapons of mass destruction around the world by detecting and
preventing proliferation and consolidating, securing, and
eliminating dangerous pathogens and materials of concern. These
efforts are conducted in cooperation with partners throughout
the world as they enhance their own capacity to secure WMD
materials, detect and interdict proliferation, and respond to
WMD-related events.
WMD threats are real. The Department's activities to help
reduce these threats include the full spectrum of countering
weapons of mass destruction activities, from preventing
acquisition, to containing and reducing threats, to supporting
crisis response.
I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify and
also thank you for your enduring interest and support to these
important mission areas.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hopkins can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
Mr. Verga.
STATEMENT OF PETER VERGA, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Verga. Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin,
members of the committee, again, thank you for the opportunity
to testify today. I am honored to be here with Dr. Hopkins and
Ms. Durand to present the Department's approach to countering
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear [CBRN] threats.
Since the Department testified before the subcommittee on
this subject 1 year ago, two CBRN-related threats have
dominated the headlines: those posed by North Korea and the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS. Both highlight the
complex nature of the threat we face.
The North Korean regime has increased its dangerous and
provocative CBRN-related activities over the past year. It has
continued to test nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, in
clear violation of multiple United Nations Security Council
resolutions.
ISIS poses a different sort of CBRN threat as a non-state
actor not bound by longstanding norms and laws and with a
demonstrated willingness to use chemical weapons against
civilians and combatants alike. While ISIS' capabilities are
currently far less sophisticated than North Korea's, its
willingness to use and potentially proliferate CBRN-related
materials or knowledge to its affiliates elsewhere is of grave
concern.
The Department's strategic approach to countering these
threats focuses on three lines of effort: preventing
acquisition of WMD, containing and reducing threats, and
mitigating the consequences of potential use. Our efforts to
address these threats for North Korea and ISIS reflect this
approach.
To prevent the transfer of CBRN or dual-use materials to
and from North Korea, the Department works closely with
interagency partners, in part through outreach under the
Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI, to the 104 other PSI
endorsees committed to preventing WMD proliferation.
Relationships with committed allies and partners are
foundational to our success.
We also engage with partners through the DOD Cooperative
Threat Reduction [CTR] Program, which remains, in the words of
Secretary of Defense Mattis, ``the Department's most
comprehensive and effective tool for working cooperatively with
partners to mitigate CBRN-related threats.''
Through DTRA's capable implementation, CTR is engaged in
over 30 countries, helping them detect, secure, or eliminate
CBRN-related materials and pathogens of security concern. These
efforts are integrated with those of our interagency partners.
In Southeast Asia, CTR is building the capabilities of our
partners to detect and prevent maritime proliferation of CBRN-
related materials, such as those headed to or from North Korea.
Despite our best efforts at prevention, we must be prepared
to contain and reduce CBRN threats once they have developed.
For instance, to contain and reduce the CBRN threats from ISIS,
the U.S. and our coalition partners are also exploiting
opportunities on the ground to better understand and disrupt
their CW [chemical weapons] networks.
The DOD CTR program is also strengthening Jordan's and
Lebanon's capacity to prevent proliferation of CBRN materials
from Iraq and Syria into their territories and to ensure that
ISIS affiliates in Libya do not acquire or proliferate a CBRN
capability. We supported interagency efforts to remove chemical
precursors from Libya and initiated a proliferation prevention
program with the Government of Tunisia along its border with
Libya.
Elsewhere, DOD is working with our key regional allies, the
Republic of Korea and Japan, to ensure that our focus remains
postured to respond to CBRN contingencies on or emanating from
the Korean Peninsula, complementing those engagements in the
CBRN Preparedness Program, or CP2, which engages bilaterally
with our partner nations to respond to and mitigate effects of
a CBRN incident.
In addition to being prepared to respond to events
overseas, DOD must ensure we are prepared to support the
Federal response to a domestic CBRN incident at home. Working
closely with the Joint Staff, we continue to partner with a
wide array of interagency partners, including the Departments
of Homeland Security, Energy, and Justice, to ensure a
coordinated response to any event in the homeland.
In conclusion, the acquisition or use of CBRN weapons
against the United States, our forces, or our interests remains
among the most dangerous threats we face. With your support,
the Department will continue to strengthen our capabilities and
relationships to reduce these threats at home and abroad.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and
I look forward to any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Verga can be found in the
Appendix on page 38.]
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
Ms. Durand.
STATEMENT OF SHARI DURAND, ACTING DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT
REDUCTION AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. Durand. Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin,
and members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to be here
today to share with you the work of the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency.
DTRA makes the United States and our allies safer by
countering threats posed by the proliferation and use of
weapons of mass destruction. While not a direct focus of
today's hearing, DTRA also has a new mission area: countering
improvised explosive devices and other improvised threats. Last
October, the Department transitioned the Joint Improvised-
Threat Defeat Organization, JIDO, under the authority,
direction, and control of DTRA.
DTRA is a unique organization with a broad portfolio that
is accomplished by an incredibly capable and talented
workforce. We are very proud of some recent milestones,
including the accomplishments of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program, which celebrated its 25th anniversary
last December. And this coming April, we will celebrate the
70th anniversary of DTRA's Defense Nuclear Weapons School,
located in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Our expertise spans the full spectrum of WMD threats:
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and
high-yield explosives. We are a one-stop shop, open 24 hours a
day to support the Department's functional and geographic
combatant commands, the military services, and the interagency.
Over the past 3 years, DTRA moved to a regional vice
programmatic approach against WMD threats. This allows us to
support warfighters and allies with more comprehensive and
integrated methods that are better aligned with the combatant
commands. Likewise, our regional approach ensures a more
holistic prioritization of the science and technology [S&T]
that DTRA pursues and a better understanding of how we
transition those capabilities to the warfighter and military
services.
In Iraq and Syria, ISIS is using chemical weapons on the
battlefield. Thankfully, the authorities and funding that
Congress provides DTRA each year allows us to support Operation
Inherent Resolve and respond to these and other emerging, long-
term WMD challenges.
I am proud of what our team has accomplished this past year
and believe that we serve as good stewards of taxpayer dollars.
As we look toward fiscal year 2018, I am confident that we are
prepared to address future WMD and improvised threats around
the world.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Durand can be found in the
Appendix on page 48.]
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Ms. Durand.
My first question is, the FY [fiscal year] 2017 NDAA
authorized funding for many critical activities within the
Chemical and Biological Defense Program, the Chemical
Demilitarization Program, and at DTRA. What have been the
impacts of the continuing resolution, the CR, so far this
fiscal year? And can you describe the impacts to your programs
for a full-year CR for fiscal year 2017?
Dr. Hopkins.
Dr. Hopkins. Thank you, Chairwoman, for the question.
We are making it work because it is the reality of the
budget situation. But the continuing resolution really limits
our ability to do longer-term planning because of the way the
funds come in in increments.
And so I would say that the nature of the people who do the
work for us is such that they will make the programs work given
the constraints. However, it does limit our ability to plan and
adapt. Especially if things come up in the near term or medium
term that require different levels of funding; the continuing
resolution doesn't allow that. So it does tie our hands a bit.
Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Verga.
Mr. Verga. I would just go along with what Dr. Hopkins
said. It is obviously always better to have a full-year budget
appropriation because it does allow you to implement a program
that you have laid out in an orderly fashion, you know, given
what you expected to get in the appropriations that were asked
for in the budget. And a CR, it just trips you up when you get
started, and you can't really do what you need to do.
Ms. Stefanik. And Ms. Durand.
Ms. Durand. I will give you a couple specifics from an
agency perspective.
One, it more than doubles our workload. When you do
incremental funding as the CR funding comes in, we are having
to incrementally fund all of our contracts. So that means for
the contracting staff, who is already overworked, they are, in
essence, doubling their work throughout the year.
That also adds to our comptroller support office, who are
also having to do a lot of accounting and other budgetary
actions when the Department is working very hard towards our
financial improvement and audit readiness.
So part of that is just a workload capacity. As Dr. Hopkins
said, we will get it done, but at a time when we need everybody
more focused on direct mission support, that makes it
difficult.
For us specifically, another one that we encountered, when
JIDO came under us, one of the things we didn't expect was, in
the 2016 budget, was with the Army, because the Army was the
executive agent for JIDA. Because of the continuing resolution,
that funding was appropriated to the Army, and it did not come
directly to DTRA.
So, again, that means the accounting and the budgetary,
means it has to go on--if the money goes to the Army, we have
to get it from the Army. We have to do double budgeting and a
lot of budgetary transfers in our books. So it just makes it
very complicated.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you very much. It is important for us
to get on the record the negative impacts that a continued CR
would have on the DOD, so thank you for those thoughtful
answers.
My second question is for Dr. Hopkins.
Recent technological advances in the areas of synthetic
biology and gene editing have created a bio revolution that has
increased the capability and availability of biotechnology.
Last fall, the President's Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology released a report on this topic that concluded,
quote, ``Just as rapid advances in biotechnology have increased
the risk of misuse by bad actors, they have expanded the tools
available to protect the public.''
How is the DOD responding to the emerging threat faced by
these new technologies? And can the Department apply these new
technologies to counter the potential threat?
Dr. Hopkins. Thank you, Chairwoman, for the question.
You are absolutely right; the new technologies really are a
double-edged sword.
One of the challenges we have is, in looking at the
potential effects on national security, we want to make sure
that the things that we do to try to protect ourselves don't
interfere with the development of the application of the
technology for peaceful, useful purposes. And so that, combined
with the fact that it is an emerging area, really causes us to
step back and try to understand what will be or what could be
the potential national security impacts of synthetic biology.
We have asked the National Academy of Sciences to step in
and help us, in an interagency study, to look at the potential
impacts on security, about what timeframe would we expect
potential nefarious capabilities to be available to bad actors,
and what can we do about it.
And the things that we would do about it really fall into
at least three areas. The ability to know it is happening in
the first place, because if we are talking about a biological
threat, how do you know what it is? How do you know it has
appeared? And so we are working very hard on detection
technologies to understand when and if we may be subject to
those kinds of attacks.
Protection is the second area. As you know, the classic
chemical-biological protection is a mask, a suit, a glove,
individual protection, collective protection, that sort of
thing. We have to make sure that our science base is up to the
task and actually developing capabilities to protect the
warfighter. And so challenging the things that we have on hand
now that are classical in the face of those kind of threats is
very important.
The third area is mitigation, what are you going to do
about it. And since we are talking about the biological side of
things, medical countermeasure development is right at the
forefront. The same tools, synthetic biology, that we are
concerned about as being capable of being used against us we
are also using in the laboratories to help develop
countermeasures. And so our ability to come up with vaccines,
therapeutics, even laboratory equipment that will help identify
what the threat is--very important to us.
And so those three areas--detection/protection and medical
countermeasures and mitigation--are the places where we are
investing to try to counter that.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Dr. Hopkins. I now recognize Mr.
Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you to our witnesses again for being
here.
Ms. Durand, if I could start with you, JIDO was an
organization that continually evolved and had an uncertain
future. As I mentioned in my opening statement, the alignment
of JIDO onto DTRA should result in both synergy and
efficiencies as well as provide an opportunity to focus JIDO on
its core mission and define its future.
So I wanted to know, what synergies are there between DTRA
and JIDO? What efficiencies have been achieved as a result of
the realignment? And how is the Department using the alignment
as an opportunity to focus JIDO on its core mission and the
size and scope of the organization for that mission to achieve
maximum effectiveness. And, finally, has the term ``improvised
threat'' been defined?
So if you want me to repeat any of those--I threw a lot at
you--I would be glad to.
Ms. Durand. Thank you for those questions.
Two weeks ago, we briefed the staffers on highlighting all
the efficiencies that we have gained since JIDO came under us.
I would preface all my comments with: It really has only been
since October. So we spent, after the decision was made last
January up until October, when they officially came under us,
spending a lot of time getting everything ready to come under
us. That was an enormous challenge, just getting 235 JIDO
civilian employees transferred from the Army into DTRA.
One of the first things that we did is we have consolidated
eight of the offices that were previously in JIDO. Those are
the ones that you touched on: human resources, inspector
general, contracts, comptroller, general counsel, legislative
and public affairs, security, and counterintelligence. JIDA, at
the time, was standing up to be its own defense agency, so
those offices were standing up, so we just took those offices
and those individuals and merged them into ours. And so we are
moving forward with--they have entirely new systems that they
have to learn, so we are spending a lot of time getting them up
to speed.
You had mentioned in your opening comments about the senior
structure. So JIDO previously had four Senior Executive Service
members. One of those was a term appointment, so that ended. So
we are working on recognizing the need to shrink that senior
leadership level down, so we are pushing towards that.
The efficiency--so two key areas that we are looking at, in
information technology [IT] and our research and development
capacities. DTRA has a lot of testbed capacity in our research
and development, test and evaluation world, and JIDO will be
able to use those test ranges. So that will, in time, reduce
their costs associated with test range costs. So that is one
specific thing.
JIDO is very proficient and has a great deal of experience
in information technology, especially how it supports the
warfighter. So all their efforts that they have spent years
developing on situational awareness for improvised threats, on
attacking those networks, we are finding to be very helpful to
us in the CWMD community. So, in our IT worlds, they are
working very much together to figure out what synergies that
are there, what things can we combine, what things may need to
remain separate.
We have also, recognizing the committee's desire to show
savings, we are keeping track of those. I cannot sit here and
tell you that we have gained a tremendous amount of savings. It
takes quite a bit for this type of an integration. There are a
lot of upfront costs and time that go into it. But we fully
expect over a certain amount of time--and it may take a couple
years--that we would be able to come back to you and show you
specific metrics and dollar savings.
One quick one I would give you is, when JIDO was going to
stand up, they were going to have to buy their back-room human
resources services. So that is the processing a lot of actions.
They would have gained those services from the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA), which is a working capital entity, so
they would have been paying DLA for that support. So it was
about $1.5 million. That is a cost avoidance that they avoided
with that, and now they are just merged in with ours.
So we are seeing some savings, but I would expect them to
grow over time.
To your question on focusing on the mission, so we do think
that because they are now under DTRA and they are not having to
do all the things related to being a separate entity and a
separate agency, they will benefit from all the structure that
we have in place already, so they don't have to be bothered
with that.
To your specific question, is ``improvised threats''
defined well? No. You could use the term ``improvised threats''
and that could be everything that goes on within the
Department. So we are continuing to look at and to make sure
that we are following, I think, the guidance the committee has
been concerned about before of the mission creep.
I hope I addressed each one.
Mr. Langevin. You did. You hit them all. That is very good.
Thank you very much.
My time has expired. Hopefully we will get to a second
round, but if not, I yield back. Thank you.
Ms. Stefanik. Dr. Wenstrup.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it.
Thank you all for being here today on a very interesting and
concerning topic, as you well know.
Dr. Hopkins, I want to talk to you for a little bit. I
looked back at, like, DOD response to the Ebola virus and our
engagement there, and I think, actually, a lot to be proud of
with that mission and challenging situation.
I also look at trying--the balance of Department of Defense
or the military to serve in combat roles. And that is not a
combat role, but we could be in a combat environment where
there is an outbreak of some entity like that that we have to
be concerned with.
And then where does HHS [Department of Health and Human
Services] come into play, and how do you see those roles? Do
they cooperate? How are we engaging in that way? And what were
the lessons learned from that mission?
Dr. Hopkins. Congressman, thank you very much for the
question.
I think the success of the Defense Chemical-Biological
Defense Program is very, very much dependent on how well we
coordinate with the other government stakeholders in this area:
Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, CDC [Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention], National Institutes of Health,
Agriculture. I mean, there are a number of government agencies,
all of whom have a stake in this area.
Our focus is on biological threat agents, and so in order
to make sure that the warfighter has the therapeutics and the
diagnostics and the capabilities to know that they are under
attack and even protect them with vaccines. That is--I don't
want to call it a niche, but that is a very important part,
that is a lead part of what we do.
Having said that, the science associated with developing
those countermeasures, as well as the coordination on the basic
science for this, is something that we have to share. And I
think that happens very effectively through a group called
PHEMCE, the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures
Enterprise. It is all the agencies that I just mentioned all
coming together primarily for the purpose of making sure that
the Nation has a stockpile of therapeutics and vaccines in the
event of a natural outbreak, but we also leverage that
capability to make sure that the Department has what it needs.
As far as lessons learned from the Ebola outbreak, to me,
the single largest lesson is that the Department has a lot to
offer. While we may not have the lead in a natural outbreak,
the Department has quite a capability that we can leverage and
we can contribute to natural outbreaks like that.
Again, going back to my original point, the number one
lesson we learned is it is really, really important to be
talking to and collaborating with the other government agencies
who have a stake in the successful outcome of events like
those.
Dr. Wenstrup. In that particular situation, you know, you
don't know these outbreaks are coming; these are new viruses. I
am just curious how the military trains for that mission. I
guess it is more generic training and education as you roll
out, I would imagine. Would that be the case?
Dr. Hopkins. I think it is actually that, but it is also
the military laboratories--the Navy laboratories, the Army
laboratories--are always forward-looking, and they are always
coordinating with the civilian side to make sure that the
military has the situational awareness and knows what
capabilities are out there--our own and on the civilian side.
So, again, I think it comes down to the collaboration and
the situational awareness that is provided by the leading-edge
researchers and developers at the service laboratories.
Dr. Wenstrup. And the coordination has been good, in your
opinion?
Dr. Hopkins. Yes, it has been.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
Ms. Durand, if I could ask you real quickly, in the
intelligence community, how is the cooperation between
intelligence community and--with what is going on, we would
always hate to hear that there wasn't conversation back and
forth. Do you feel like there are any gaps there that we need
to address? Should Congress be helping in any way in that
regard?
Ms. Durand. I will tell you that DTRA enjoys an incredibly
strong partnership across the entire intelligence community.
I would also tell you that, in the very short time that
USSOCOM has had the synchronization mission, they are so
interwoven with the entire intelligence community. General
Thomas, in particular, is very actively going after this in
terms of what else does he need from the intelligence community
for the CWMD mission, and I have no doubt he will make great
strides in that regard.
We have also experienced in some recent exercises that some
of my folks have participated in--the feedback that I get from
them is that they have never seen a time when there was more
involvement and better partnership across the entire
interagency, with our allies, and with the intelligence
community.
So I can't tell you that I see any gap. I can give you the
assurance that if there is one, General Thomas will find it and
he will correct it.
Dr. Wenstrup. Okay. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Stefanik. Ms. Gabbard.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you very much.
Prior to the first Gulf War, it was disclosed that Iraq had
produced 19,000 liters of concentrated Botulinum-A toxin to be
used in weapons. Given that 1 aerosolized gram of this toxin
could potentially kill up to a million people, where would DTRA
rank this toxin in terms of threat level, where we are today?
Ms. Durand. So that one, I am not sure. So I would like to
take that one for the record and get back to you so I give you
the correct answer.
Ms. Gabbard. Sure. I appreciate it. As you go through that
follow-up, I would be interested to see if there are any
current programs or plans underway that recognize this threat
and countermeasures to deal with it.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 70.]
Ms. Gabbard. Given that the FDA [Food and Drug
Administration] approval process for medical countermeasures
can be lengthy and unpredictable, what kind of risk does that
present to the DOD in wait times for FDA approvals for any
countermeasures that we may need in a tighter timeline?
Generally, not specifically for this toxin, but generally.
Ms. Durand. DTRA is not specifically involved in that piece
of the process. I would defer to Dr. Hopkins on any of those
specifics.
Ms. Gabbard. Sure.
Dr. Hopkins. Thank you very much.
First of all, let me say that the FDA approval process is
critically important to the successful production of the
vaccines and therapeutics that we need.
And so, having said that, we are doing everything we can to
work with the FDA, starting early in the process. We have
learned over the years that it is best to engage with the Food
and Drug Administration very, very early so that we can
understand the process as well as work with them in speeding
things up.
We also, through the passing of the Cures Act, we in the
Department have authority now to offer priority review vouchers
and obtain orphan drug designations for some of our low-volume,
limited-distribution kind of products, and so that is very,
very helpful to us. In fact, most recently, the plague vaccine
has received FDA orphan drug status, and that was funded by the
Chem-Bio Defense Program.
So bottom line is we are using whatever means we can to
accelerate and work very closely and early with the Food and
Drug Administration because we know that their involvement is
important to the production of safe products.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Stefanik. Dr. Abraham.
Dr. Abraham. Thank you, Chairwoman. I thank the witnesses
for being here. This is a vital topic, in my opinion.
And, Mr. Verga, thank you for your service in Vietnam. We
appreciate that very much, sir.
I am going to pony a little bit off of Dr. Wenstrup and
Chairwoman Stefanik and go back to the synthetic biology. Of
all this nuclear, chemical, and biological things that do keep
me awake at night, I think the biological is the one that I
spend most of the time looking at the ceiling, because it is
cheap, it is available, and, as Dr. Wenstrup alluded to, you
could have a human vector to transmit the pathogen.
And to weaponize a virus or bacteria with what you
gentleman know, certainly you, Dr. Hopkins, with the CRISPR-
Cas9 [Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic
Repeats] technology, the genetic engineering, which can be done
now in any biochemical lab with a person of just normal
intelligence that has a master's or certainly a Ph.D. in that
type of instance, this can become a real threat very quickly.
My question, Dr. Hopkins, to you first. You said you were,
and I understand, talking to State governments and the people
in those agencies that we need to talk to, but we all know that
if a terrorist organization wants to do this, we are not
talking to them.
Are there any--and I understand it is difficult, but are
there any checks and balances today that at least can give us a
little hint of something that may be coming? Because, as Ms.
Gabbard said with botulism, mitigation is not an option here
because we are too far behind the power curve. So the question
is, what is out there to stop this? And what can we as Congress
do to help you accomplish that goal?
Dr. Hopkins. Thank you, Congressman, for the question. The
short answer is I am not aware of a specific action or a----
Dr. Abraham. And I am not either. That is why I asked the
question. I am not aware of any either.
Dr. Hopkins. But I think what that does is it really points
to the importance of the study that we have commissioned with
the National Academy of Sciences. Because, as you and I think
about this, we would both conjure up notions of some really bad
things that could happen in the hands of people who don't need
a lot of training or a lot of equipment----
Dr. Abraham. It sounds like science fiction, but it is not.
It is here.
Dr. Hopkins. It does.
What we have asked the Academy to do is kind of separate
the science fiction from the reality and recognize what reality
is today and help us to understand the national security
implications. What is the art of the possible in the near term,
in the mid term, and the long term, as well as to identify what
can we do about it.
We know that the first step is detection. We know that,
first of all, we have to know we are under attack. And so we
know that the laboratories are already thinking about ways that
we could detect a genetically modified version of some disease.
So that is the starting point, and we are already working on
that.
But I really think the key to framing this, framing the
whole potential threat is the National Academy, the national
experts thinking through this, with the assembly of the various
stakeholders, Health and Human Services and Homeland Security
and so forth, and Department of Defense, so that we can wrap
our arms around it.
Dr. Abraham. Ms. Durand, anything we can do in Congress to
help you guys out?
Ms. Durand. Not that I can think of right now. I would tell
you that in the chem-bio S&T world for science and technology,
one of our top priorities is finding an integrated early-
warning system and process to do just what Dr. Hopkins had
talked about, because just finding what is out there and
knowing it is coming is critical. So I would expect our work
would progress in that area.
Dr. Abraham. Anything to add, Mr. Verga?
Mr. Verga. Nothing other than just I think the recognition
of the problem is the first step, you know, towards dealing
with it. And I think it is important----
Dr. Abraham. I think we recognize that it is out there.
Mr. Verga. Yes, sir.
Dr. Abraham. Thank you, Ms. Chairwoman. I yield back.
Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Veasey.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I had a question I wanted to ask you. I know that on this
committee we have been closely monitoring military readiness
levels. And I would like to hear your assessment of our current
readiness levels dealing with chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear equipment, and personnel across the DOD
and other agencies.
And any of you can answer that.
Dr. Hopkins. Thank you, Congressman.
For the traditional agents and threats that we have been--
mustard, nerve, chemicals, the known biological systems--I
believe that the investments that the Department has been
making for decades in masks, suits, gloves, individual
protection, collective protection, and all of those areas have
provided a certain degree of readiness, an adequate degree of
readiness for encountering those classical agents.
In the area of emerging threats, emerging infectious
diseases, synthetic biological, engineered diseases, I don't
think we know how good we are or how bad we are. And that is an
area where we are focusing and we have to continue to focus.
Mr. Veasey. Also, I wanted to switch to the Middle East and
North Africa, and I wanted to ask if you could discuss how the
current events there are impacting DTRA's operations and
planning. And have you received any additional requests for
support from CENTCOM [Central Command] and AFRICOM [Africa
Command]? And what are some of your largest concerns there?
Ms. Durand. So, obviously, as the military campaign against
ISIS continues in Iraq and Syria, ISIS is regrouping,
specifically in those areas of the Middle East and North
Africa. DTRA works with partner countries in those regions to
help contain and reduce those threats from terrorists that are
obtaining WMD materials. That could certainly destabilize those
regions and lead to large refugee flows.
In countries where there is active, ongoing violence, such
as in Iraq, our CTR operations have been curtailed
significantly, and our engagements have been limited to VTC
[video teleconference] instead of being able to go there in
person.
In countries where violence is sporadic and the security
situation is delicate, such as in Lebanon and Jordan, our CTR
operations have continued to provide the security environment--
that that environment is stable enough for our operations. But
we encountered delays, but they have been short in duration.
So, in essence, our work there has been limited because we
are always focused on the safety of our people before we send
them over there. And so that limits us with what we can do.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you very much.
And I wanted to also ask one more question related to
Ebola. You know, we had one of the more high-profile cases in
Dallas County, which is an area that I represent. And I wanted
to know what lessons that you feel we have learned that have
been put into practice. And how would you assess the DOD's
ability to respond similarly in future cases?
Mr. Verga. I will comment on that.
The first thing, I think what DOD brings to a situation
like the Ebola outbreak is our organizational ability, our
planning ability, our logistics, and those sorts of things.
I think we learned from the Ebola outbreak the necessity of
having the capacity to transport folks. You know, we made an
investment in the patient transportable pods that could be put
into our military medical evacuation aircraft to do things like
that.
But I think the primary thing is early detection. I think
the earlier we can recognize that that is what the problem is
and the earlier we can get ahead of the curve on trying to deal
with the problem is probably where we are at. And so I think
our efforts in early detection and warning of outbreaks is
probably where our best investment can be made.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you. Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairwoman Stefanik. And thank each
of you for being here today and on these important issues.
And, indeed, our subcommittee has been very fortunate to
have a Sandia fellow, Katie Sutton, here. In fact, she brings
good news and bad news. Last year, she brought bad news, but it
needed to be addressed, and her professionalism has certainly
come through.
Last year, we had the mishandling of the live anthrax
samples that were sent from Dugway to 86 government and private
labs and other facilities in the United States and 7 other
countries: Australia, Britain, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan,
and South Korea.
Mr. Verga, what is the status of the report requested in
fiscal year 2017 NDAA regarding the mishandling of the anthrax
shipments? What is the status of any corrective actions that
have been put in place to make sure this type of incident is
prevented in the future? And what efforts are being taken
within the Department to reduce the amount of select agent
number of labs that handle select agents?
And this could be answered really by anyone, but if you
would begin.
Mr. Verga. I am afraid I would have to get back to you on
that because I don't know the details, but I will provide that
to you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 70.]
Mr. Wilson. Okay.
Ms. Durand.
Dr. Hopkins.
Dr. Hopkins. On the status of the report, I will have to
get that answer for you. If I could take that for the record,
we will get that status.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 69.]
Dr. Hopkins. As far as what the Department has done, we
recognized as a result of those inadvertent shipments that the
handling of those agents was being done in different chains of
command and there was not unity of effort or unity of oversight
over the years.
And so one of the things--I think the most significant
thing that the Deputy Secretary did is he designated the
Secretary of the Army as the executive agent for all work with
biological select agents. And that has had a unifying effect,
and it has introduced a certain amount of discipline into the
process. They are responsible for reviewing and inspecting all
of the laboratories that handle biological select agents and
toxins. And they have also looked outside themselves. They have
gone to establish an expert panel to review the procedures,
such as the ones that didn't work at Dugway.
And so I think we are in much better shape than we were 2
years ago on this, primarily because of that action. There have
been a number of actions below that in order to introduce more
discipline and care at the laboratory level, but I think the
most significant thing was establishing the Secretary of the
Army as the Department's executive agent for overseeing all
work with those select agents.
Ms. Durand. I have nothing further to add.
Mr. Wilson. And, again, Katie Sutton was just terrific,
bringing this to our attention, monitoring this. Her
professionalism always comes through. And we are going to miss
her as she departs for another great assignment.
Additionally, for Ms. Durand, Dr. Hopkins, the FY 2017
supplemental budget request included a supplemental increase of
$127 million for the Chemical Demilitarization Program due to
engineering challenges and increased contract costs.
Can you explain the justification for this additional
request? What is the impact if this funding is not received?
Will the program be able to complete all required destruction
by the 2023 deadline? What mitigation steps are being put in
place for this program to prevent further cost and schedule
overruns?
Dr. Hopkins. Thank you, Congressman, for that question.
Just for some context on this, the Chemical
Demilitarization Program in the United States is working on
eliminating the last 10 percent of what the United States
declared to the Chemical Weapons Convention. We declared 30,000
tons several years ago.
And this Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives [ACWA]
program is the program that has the two sites, one in Kentucky
and one in Colorado, and there has been major progress at both
of those sites. In Pueblo, they have started operations. In
Blue Grass, they are going through systemization.
There is a request in the supplemental for additional
resources, and that is primarily to recover some schedule in
order to make sure that we make the 2023. And, actually, in
large-scale processes like these, the more we can invest up
front, the higher the likelihood is that it is going to reduce
the lifecycle cost of this.
The need for the increase was really due to a number of
factors. Primarily, we did not anticipate the fact that the
first-of-a-kind technologies that are being used at both
locations would require so much rework. And I could go into
gory detail on some of the things, like redoing welds and so
forth, but, in both cases, in Pueblo and in Blue Grass, there
has been unexpected, unplanned need for some additional rework
in order to get the systems up and running.
And when I say we didn't anticipate it, I can be very
specific; we didn't anticipate last year. Because, last year,
in an attempt to reduce the amount of money that the program
carried over from one year to another, the ACWA program gave
money back, returned money, so that it could be rephased in the
out-years. And so, as a result, at the same time we are
returning the money so that it can be rephased in later years,
the need for this rework, the emerging challenges also
appeared, and that resulted in an actual need for the money in
2017.
So what we are essentially trying to do is put money back
into 2017 that we had reprogrammed into the out-years in order
to make sure that we make the 2023 schedule.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
Ms. Stefanik. Ms. Cheney.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you very
much to our witnesses for being here today.
I wanted to dig a little deeper in terms of what we are
doing to protect our warfighters and, in particular, the extent
to which we are facing increasing threats on the ground in Iraq
and Syria.
Mr. Verga, maybe we could start with you. Just in terms of
the assurances that you feel, the confidence that you feel that
we are in a position where we are providing our men and women
in uniform with the very best possible protection against the
growing threat that they may be facing on the battlefield from
these types of weapons.
Mr. Verga. Well, we have a great deal of confidence in the
equipment and the training that our forces have in order to
deal with these threats. I mean, it is one that we have
recognized over time, made significant investments in our
ability to counter those threats, and are now working with our
partners and allies in the area to, in fact, provide to the
allies, to the Iraqis and to the Kurds, equipment through
cooperative programs that DTRA and Dr. Hopkins can speak to a
little bit more in detail to be able to deal with those.
Again, I think the importance is recognizing the threat. I
mean, ISIS has, in fact, used both chemical weapons and toxic
industrial chemicals, you know, against our forces and against
our allied forces there.
I don't know if you had anything to add.
Dr. Hopkins. Thank you.
In addition, we are making sure that our laboratories, such
as Edgewood in Maryland, where they actually do challenge our
ability to protect the warfighter with masks and suits and
gloves, we are making sure that the things that we are giving
the warfighters are effective against what we believe to be the
actual materials that are being used in the field.
Ms. Durand. Just to add a little bit more, DTRA's specific
role in the science piece of that, our chemical and biological
folks get a lot of feedback from the Joint Program Office on
how the development that we did, how that is actually working.
Another great program that we have is the Scientists in the
Foxhole program, in which we take our scientists who are
working on the initial phases of developing that equipment that
will give the best protection to the warfighter, we send those
scientists out into the field with the warfighter so they can
get that immediate feedback. And that helps them tremendously
in understanding, as they are doing the research and the
scientific work, what works for the warfighter and what
doesn't. So that has proven to be very successful.
Ms. Cheney. And just to follow up, in terms of the
increasing capabilities that we are facing from our adversaries
in these areas, could you provide a little bit of information
about the extent to which our technology and ability to defend
against what we are seeing and the increasing availability of
some of these weapons, whether you feel that we are keeping up
sufficiently in terms of the progress that is being made by our
enemy?
Mr. Verga. My hesitation is I am trying to think if in an
unclassified format we can talk about where we are in that. I
think I would prefer to defer that, because we couldn't get
into any real specifics.
Ms. Cheney. All right. That is fine. Thank you.
And I just wanted to follow up on where we are on the
national biodefense implementation and strategy. I know you are
going to be coming back to us in September of this year, but if
you could talk a little bit about, sort of, the preliminary
work that has been done and, you know, how you think things are
going based on the requirement in the last NDAA.
Mr. Verga. Thank you.
Of course, the Department of Homeland Security is leading
that review. We and the Department of Defense are cooperating
with them, along with HHS and Department of Agriculture and
many other organizations.
We did provide a briefing to staff on where we are at on
it. And, as you said, the report is due in September, and we
think we will be able to deliver that on time.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ma'am and gentlemen,
thank you for your service to the country.
And my question gets back to our interaction with other
countries that we may not necessarily share values with, but we
share interests with. Obviously, the country of Russia comes to
mind. Russia and the United States were key to getting Syria to
destroy their chemical weapons.
How much dialogue do you have with counterparts in other
countries about what the most pressing threats are and the most
efficient ways to eliminate those threats?
Mr. Verga. I would describe the interaction we have with
our allies and friends as robust. We have a----
Mr. Scott. If I may, I am also talking about people that we
don't consider to be allies or friends, but that we may have a
shared interest with in this particular field.
Mr. Verga. Yeah, I would have to check on that one, sir. I
am sorry. I don't have that right offhand.
Mr. Scott. I would be interested in your answer if you
think that perhaps that is something that we should pursue.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 70.]
Mr. Scott. If you would, then, go ahead with our allies and
friends, if you would.
Mr. Verga. With our allies, we do have a robust cooperative
program with them, cooperative research and development
programs, working very closely with, you know, particularly our
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies and also
others to be able to be share information regarding the threats
and regarding the countermeasures.
I know Dr. Hopkins can talk a little bit more about some of
the specific programs.
Dr. Hopkins. Yes. In addition to the sharing information
about the potential threats, we have very active, detailed
engagements with our closest allies on mitigations and
identifying ways to protect us, and especially in the NATO
scenario, where we have a common standard for the performance
of various countermeasures. So closest allies, very strong and
very effective and helpful to us.
Mr. Scott. I would be interested in your comments, as well,
all of your comments, about whether or not this is something
that we should look into, whether we should or should not
potentially share information with countries where we have that
shared interest, if you will, even though we don't share
values.
I know that the issue with Syria, for example, is one where
it took an agreement with Russia to actually get those weapons
destroyed.
But, with that, Madam Chair, I will look forward to the
written response, and I thank you for your service to the
country, and I yield back the remainder of my time.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you. We will now go to the second round
of questions for members who are able to.
My question is a follow-up, Ms. Durand, to Mr. Veasey's
line of questioning. And in your testimony, you highlighted
DTRA's growing activities in the Middle East and Northern
Africa both in the context of support to Operation Inherent
Resolve and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
But can you discuss how DTRA prioritizes which nations
receive support? And how does DTRA leverage other government
agencies in these efforts?
Ms. Durand. I can. Thank you.
A lot of our priorities come from the two offices that Mr.
Verga and Dr. Hopkins represent. So the priorities flow from
the Department of Defense down through the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.
In our own internal planning for our priorities, we have a
lot of interaction with the combatant commands. So we get a lot
of our priority input from them. We have our own robust
strategic planning process within the agency on determining
what are the greatest threats, what are those priorities, and
then, as we build our budgets, we focus on those. But all those
are fed through other avenues throughout the Department.
Ms. Stefanik. And then how does DTRA leverage other
government agencies in these efforts?
Ms. Durand. So that part is critical to us. We have very
robust partnerships across the interagency. There are various
things that the Department of State does with us related to the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. We have mentioned before
Health and Human Services. They do a lot of work.
So we are constantly coordinating and synchronizing and
making sure that no one is duplicating efforts. And, in
essence, it ends up being a leveraging of capabilities across
the entire government so everyone knows where their lanes are
and they can focus on their specific areas of expertise.
Ms. Stefanik. It is clear that there are growing needs of
support. And what are your concerns about the growing need for
this support?
Ms. Durand. Support----
Ms. Stefanik. In the region.
Ms. Durand. Can I take that one for the record? I will have
to get back to you on that.
Ms. Stefanik. Absolutely.
Ms. Durand. Thank you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 69.]
Ms. Stefanik. I will recognize Mr. Langevin for his second
round of questions.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair. Again, thanks to our
witnesses.
Dr. Hopkins, as you know, for the last 2 years I have
followed the program Constellation. And the program is being
resourced by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
executed by DTRA to fulfill a STRATCOM [Strategic Command]
requirement, although, I must say, it is worth noting our
committee--I never heard directly from STRATCOM on this
particular need or program, which I find curious.
But now that the CWMD synchronization role has transferred
from STRATCOM to SOCOM, how is the Department clarifying
situational awareness requirements of that command?
Dr. Hopkins. Thank you for the question. It is especially
timely. As you probably could tell from the testimony, we have
discontinued the prototype that was called Constellation,
primarily due to the limitation of funds that was in the NDAA
draft and in the final language.
Having said that, though, the requirement for situational
awareness is as strong or stronger than it ever has been. The
commander of SOCOM has said more than once that he has a very
firm, strong need for common intelligence and common operating
pictures. And that is the essence of what situational awareness
is, and that is the essence of what the Constellation prototype
was intended to provide.
Two things are happening. One is your language in the NDAA
basically asked us to have an independent look at the system,
the requirements, and the plans, and we are doing that. We have
hired a federally funded research and development company to go
ahead and objectively look at requirements, including the ones
that you referenced might have come from STRATCOM at the time,
but the requirements for all the combatant commanders for
situational awareness of WMD-related things.
And our plan is to take the resources that we have and any
future resources and work with STRATCOM and work with DTRA and
adapt those parts where we did learn especially useful things
from Constellation and adapt them to the common intelligence
and the common operating picture that SOCOM needs in order to
perform their function as the synchronizer.
So we are in the process of doing that. We will get the
requirements and the plans, in other words work with the FFRDC
[federally funded research and development center], and then
also adapt what we have directly to the needs of the combatant
commander.
Mr. Langevin. So how underresourced were you for the
program that you had to cancel it?
Dr. Hopkins. Trusting my memory here, about $25 million.
Mr. Langevin. So are you saying that you are coming up with
a replacement program, Constellation Lite? Or is it----
Dr. Hopkins. I don't know what we would call it yet. We are
looking at the requirements, and we are going to work with
SOCOM and DTRA to understand what would be the most useful and
helpful ways to obtain and depict situational awareness of
people, places, and things in the various theaters having to do
with weapons of mass destruction, what would be most useful to
the warfighter in the field. And what form that takes, I am not
quite sure yet.
But we did learn a lot from doing the Constellation. So the
plan this year is to use the funds we have to do that and then
recovering next year and then investing more in those things
that are useful to SOCOM.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Well, we know that the requirement
hasn't gone away; it is the funding----
Dr. Hopkins. Correct.
Mr. Langevin [continuing]. That is the problem. Thank you.
Mr. Verga, what process is the Department using to ensure
the transition of necessary resources from STRATCOM to SOCOM
for the CWMD mission? Has the hiring freeze impacted the
ability of SOCOM or DTRA to bring people into key positions
during the transition?
And, Ms. Durand, how has the transition been for DTRA? What
have been the challenges and opportunities identified?
Mr. Verga.
Mr. Verga. To my knowledge, there have not been any issues
that have been identified by SOCOM as far as the transition
goes. I know they had their initial operational capability in
January to do that, and, as far as I know, they are moving
right along. The normal budgetary process in terms of the
transferring of resources is the one that we are using.
If I can take this opportunity, I may have misspoke when I
was talking about ISIS' use of chemical weapons. I believe I
may have said that they had used them against U.S. forces. That
is not true right now. Right now, it has only been Iraqi
civilians and Iraqi forces that they have used chemical weapons
against. And I would like to correct that, if I could.
Thank you.
Ms. Durand. So for the transition from STRATCOM to SOCOM, I
will address how it has impacted DTRA.
First, I will say our relationship with SOCOM is
tremendous. We have had a longstanding relationship with them,
and that has grown even stronger.
Last December, General Thomas gathered up the entire
interagency and DOD members and talked about, got their input
for his overall plan. So he learned from that. We had a Global
Synchronization Conference last month in bringing in all the
interagency. He laid out his initial thoughts on the global
campaign plan that he is developing, and he was gaining
everyone's input on that. So that has been going very well.
Specifically to the agency, under STRATCOM, the Director of
DTRA was dual-hatted as the Director of STRATCOM's Center for
Countering WMD. SOCOM is not following that organizational
model, which is just fine. We still have most of the same
people within the agency, so they are the SOCOM element with
us.
And that partnership is continuing, and, if anything, it
has grown even stronger with General Thomas' and his entire
staff's active participation in that. So I will tell you I
think it is going exceptionally well.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you.
I have other questions that I will submit for the record,
and if you could respond to those in writing, I would
appreciate it. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Langevin.
And thank you so much to all of our witnesses, Dr. Hopkins,
Mr. Verga, and Ms. Durand, for your expertise and testimony
today.
And no further questions from the committee members?
I adjourn this hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
March 23, 2017
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 23, 2017
=======================================================================
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 23, 2017
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK
Ms. Durand. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region
continues to be volatile, with many destabilizing state and non-state
actors posing threats across the chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear spectrum. In this region, we are observing the use not only
of traditional chemical warfare agents but also toxic industrial
materials (TIMs) such as chlorine as chemical weapons. We also see the
proliferation of radiological and nuclear materials and technologies
that must be considered ``high threat'' due to their potential to cause
WMD-like consequences. Most of these materials are in widespread use
for legitimate medical, industrial, or commercial power purposes for
domestic use and regional export. However, we have concerns when this
material is not properly secured and/or accounted for at production or
storage sites and in transit to end-use or disposition facilities. The
DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program will continue to work
together with interagency and international partners to ensure that
security gaps are identified and reduced, to share best practices, and
to coordinate efforts to prevent material from falling into the hands
of nefarious regional actors who could use it against the United
States, U.S. forces abroad, or U.S. allies. Another concern is that
malevolent non-state actors may try to proliferate WMD-associated
materials or knowledge from Iraq, Syria or other ungoverned territories
such as Libya to threaten our allies and partners in the region. To
this end, we are working with our partners in Jordan, Lebanon and
Tunisia to help them develop the capabilities to secure their borders
and be able to interdict WMD-related materials on the move. Resourcing
these urgent requirements has required us to reprioritize and
reallocate CTR Program funds and manpower away from other emerging
threats; however, we believe this is the correct decision. DTRA's
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Preparedness
Program (CP2), which supports Operation Inherent Resolve, must also
balance and prioritize training and equipping partner nations for
countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) operations within a
variety of constraints. DTRA's work with the Combatant Commands through
CP2 has successfully increased Turkey's interoperability with U.S.
Forces to respond to CBRN incidents on and around Turkey's southeastern
border and bolstered Iraq's ability to respond to chemical threats
posed by ISIS. It is only through constant vigilance with the Combatant
Commanders, Embassy Country Teams and partner nations that DTRA assists
a partner nation to develop their WMD preparedness and incident-
response capability for the next threat, rather than reacting to the
current WMD threat. Our concern in the long-term is ensuring that the
partner nation can sustain DTRA's CWMD security cooperation train and
equip efforts under the new authority provided in Section 333 of the
FY17 NDAA. [See page 21.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Dr. Hopkins. The Secretary of the Army, on behalf of the Secretary
of Defense, will soon submit the requested 2017 NDAA report to the
congressional committees on April 10, 2017. The report will address an
assessment conducted between August and December 2015 to determine the
optimal distribution of research, development, and production
activities at the laboratories supporting the Chemical and Biological
Defense Program (CBDP). The initial corrective action was to
consolidate the oversight responsibilities that had been spread amongst
numerous distinct chains of command. The Deputy Secretary of Defense
designated the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent for the
DOD-wide Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT) Biosafety Program
on July 23, 2015. The Secretary of the Army delegated authority to the
Surgeon General of the Army as the Executive Agent Responsible Official
(EARO) for the DOD BSAT Biosafety Program to consolidate oversight
across the Department. To optimize the utilization of subject matter
expertise, the Secretary of the Army approved further delegation of
authority to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Medical Research and
Materiel Command (USAMRMC). The Commanding General, USAMRMC, created
the BSAT Biosafety Program Office (BBPO) to advise on biosafety,
provide oversight of DOD BSAT laboratory operations, and serve as a
unified DOD interface with regulatory agencies. To consolidate the
Department's biosafety and biosecurity oversight responsibilities, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense also designated the Secretary of the Army
as the Executive Agent for the DOD BSAT Biosecurity Program on January
3, 2017. This facilitates the synchronization and unity of effort for
both biosafety and biosecurity issues. Another corrective action that
has already taken place is the realignment of oversight of the Dugway
Proving Ground (DPG) Life Sciences Division (the source of the
incompletely inactivated anthrax spore shipments) to the U.S. Army
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground,
Maryland. The EARO is responsible for tracking the remaining biosafety
recommendations and is available to provide more detailed information
in this area. The CBDP is also conducting an infrastructure assessment
that will support the analysis of options to reduce the number of labs
that handle select agents and/or reduce costs. [See page 16.]
Mr. Verga. The Secretary of the Army, on behalf of the Secretary of
Defense, submitted the requested National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 report to the congressional committees on
April 10, 2017. The report addresses an assessment conducted between
August and December 2015 to determine the optimal distribution of
research, development, and production activities at the laboratories
supporting the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP). The
initial corrective action was to consolidate the oversight
responsibilities that were previously spread among numerous distinct
chains of command. The Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the
Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent for the DOD-wide
Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT) Biosafety Program on July
23, 2015. The Secretary of the Army designated the Surgeon General of
the Army as the Executive Agent Responsible Official (EARO) for the DOD
BSAT Biosafety Program to consolidate oversight across DOD. To optimize
the utilization of subject matter expertise, the Secretary of the Army
approved further delegation of authority to the Commanding General,
U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC). The
Commanding General, USAMRMC, created the BSAT Biosafety Program Office
(BBPO) to advise on biosafety, provide oversight of DOD BSAT laboratory
operations, and serve as a unified DOD interface with regulatory
agencies. To consolidate DOD's biosafety and biosecurity oversight
responsibilities, the Deputy Secretary of Defense also designated the
Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent for the DOD BSAT
Biosecurity Program on January 3, 2017. This facilitates the
synchronization and unity of effort for both biosafety and biosecurity
issues. Another corrective action that has already taken place is the
realignment of the Life Sciences Division that was the source of the
incompletely inactivated anthrax spore shipments from Dugway Proving
Ground (DPG), Utah, to the U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical Biological
Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. The EARO is responsible
for tracking the remaining biosafety recommendations and is available
to provide more detailed information in this area. The CBDP is
conducting an infrastructure assessment that will support the analysis
of options to reduce the number of laboratories that handle select
agents and to reduce costs. [See page 16.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. GABBARD
Ms. Durand. Weaponization of botulinum neurotoxin (BoNT) requires a
high degree of sophistication, time, and expense. Work on a vaccine
against BoNT A/B is nearing completion and full Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) licensure of a DOD developed vaccine is planned
for FY23. The DOD is also utilizing its Advanced Manufacturing Facility
in Achalucha, Florida, to develop antibody drugs against BoNT A/B. The
first product being developed on this platform is against BoNT A/B.
[See page 13.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Verga. A decision on whether and how to engage with a country
that shares some of our interests, but not our values, would be made on
a case-by-case basis, and would take into consideration the national
security interests of the United States, the particular circumstances
of the information and country in question, and applicable laws and
regulations regarding information sharing with the particular foreign
government.
Regarding the Russian Federation, the Department will continue to
urge Russian adherence to its obligations (such as under the Minsk
Agreement and arms control treaties) and related global norms that
uphold international peace and security. However, both as a matter of
policy and pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017, bilateral military-to-military cooperation with the
Russian Federation Ministry of Defense remains prohibited. Interactions
with the Russian military are currently limited to those communications
needed to de-conflict operations and ensure the safety of our forces in
close proximity, as in Syria, to ensure compliance under international
agreements, and activities required to support our efforts in
Afghanistan. [See page 20.]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 23, 2017
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK
Ms. Stefanik. Near-peer adversaries such as North Korea and Iran
are building super-hard and deeply buried facilities to conceal weapons
development and other activities.
Could you describe the requirements that are currently articulated
for detecting, characterizing and neutralizing such sites?
Do you have any specific or unique requirements from any of the
combatant commands?
Would you consider the existing government-owned test sites at Fort
Hood, White Sands, and other locations sufficient to conduct the kinds
of research and development being planned to counter these
developments?
Are there any additional capability needs to test and demonstrate
new technologies and methods to locate, assess, and characterize super-
hard and deeply buried facilities that are not captured by any existing
requirements?
Ms. Durand. Thank you for that question Congresswoman Stefanik.
While warfighter and Combatant Commander requirements cannot be
described in this open forum, I will address your question the best I
can at an unclassified level. The Test Resource Management Center
(TRMC) FY 2016-2026 Strategic Plan for DOD T&E Resources describes
current and anticipated test facility requirements. DTRA research and
development test and evaluation (T&E) capability needs evolve as
intelligence assessments and combatant commander plans change. Existing
requirements documents capture the hardened and deeply buried target
T&E needs that we are aware of today. More details on the challenges
associated with hardened and deeply buried targets may be found in the
classified 2013-2014 Report to Congress on Weapons and Capabilities to
Defeat Hardened and Deeply Buried Targets dated April 2015 and
submitted jointly by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy,
and the Director of National Intelligence. This classified report was
transmitted to the Congressional Armed Services, Intelligence and
Appropriations Committees in letters dated 4 May 2015, and signed by
the then Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,
Frank Kendall.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. Among the provisions in the new administration's
budget framework are reforms to key public health, emergency
preparedness, and prevention programs. Changes would include the
creation of a Federal Emergency Respond Fund for rapid response to
health outbreaks, and a CDC block grant to address state-specific
challenges. How do the proposals in the budget framework fit into the
bio defense strategy mandated by the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA and being
developed by the interagency? In what ways will the proposed increase
of our nation's emergency response funds enhance agency collaboration?
Dr. Hopkins. As we've seen with H1N1, MERS CoV, Ebola, and now
Zika, swift and efficient response to biological threats is the best
way to mitigate the impact of the event. As DOD will always be in
support of civilian response to biological incidents when requested, we
defer to DHS and HHS on assessing how coordination might be enhanced by
the creation of Federal Emergency Respond Fund for rapid response to
health outbreaks. However, the creation of such a fund would likely
facilitate provision of DOD support during a response to a biological
incident.
Mr. Langevin. The 2014 Department of Defense CWMD Strategy
identifies a foundational activity and task as maintaining and
expanding technical expertise. What investments and programs is the
Department undertaking to maintain and expand technical expertise for a
robust workforce? Do efforts include investment in STEM programs for a
future workforce?
Mr. Verga. DOD recognizes that being on the cutting-edge of science
and technology in any discipline requires an adaptive technical
workforce that has access to the best equipment and facilities. DOD has
significant investments in these areas relevant to technology. DOD
routinely makes targeted investments in areas of emerging technology of
future relevance to Defense innovation. For example, DOD recently
committed $45 million in funding to build and strengthen its laboratory
workforce and equipment to perform Synthetic Biology for Military
Environments in a manner that builds a multi-service DOD community of
researchers that collaborate on meeting defense objectives.
Mr. Langevin. Among the provisions in the new administration's
budget framework are reforms to key public health, emergency
preparedness, and prevention programs. Changes would include the
creation of a Federal Emergency Respond Fund for rapid response to
health outbreaks, and a CDC block grant to address state-specific
challenges. How do the proposals in the budget framework fit into the
bio defense strategy mandated by the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA and being
developed by the interagency? In what ways will the proposed increase
of our nation's emergency response funds enhance agency collaboration?
Mr. Verga. As we've seen with H1N1, MERS CoV, Ebola, and now Zika,
a swift and efficient response to biological threats is the best way to
mitigate the impact of the event. As DOD will always be in support of
domestic response to biological incidents, we defer to the Department
of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human Services on
assessing how coordination might be enhanced by the creation of a
Federal Emergency Respond Fund for rapid response to health outbreaks.
However, the creation of such a fund would likely facilitate provision
of DOD Defense Support of Civil Authorities during a response to a
biological incident.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER
Mr. Shuster. What is the Defense Threat Reduction Agency doing to
leverage existing information management systems, such as the NGB's
Civil Support Team (CST) Information Management System (CIMS), to
ensure such prior investments are efficiently used by follow-on forces
like the NGB's Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High
explosive Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) and Homeland Defense
Response Force (HRF)?
Dr. Hopkins. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is
currently working with the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to field the
tools (Mobile Field Kit--CBRN and Tactical Assault Kit) that currently
comprise the Chemical Biological Radiological & Nuclear Information
Management System (CIMS 2018) to all 57 Civil Support Teams. We
recently began a new pilot program with NGB to explore how this
technology would be applicable to the CERFPs & HRFs. To date, this has
included providing initial training and conducting exercises with the
Massachusetts CBRN Task Force & Homeland Response Force. These
exercises have enabled DTRA to work with NGB to determine requirements
for, and begin developing, additional capability required of CIMS 2018
to be applicable to these forces. In addition to working with NGB, DTRA
is currently working with others to leverage existing capabilities to
ensure CIMS 2018 data can inform and receive data from other decision
makers as necessary. An example of this work recently occurred during
the 2017 Presidential Address to the Joint Session of Congress when
Mobile Field Kit--CBRN (MFK-CBRN) was used to pass information from the
33rd CST to the Situation Awareness Geospatial Enterprise (SAGE),
NORTHCOM's situational awareness platform and to the DTRA Joint
Operations Center.
Mr. Shuster. Do you have a timeline and investment plan for the
deployment of NGB's Civil Support Team (CST) Information Management
System (CIMS) to follow-on forces?
Dr. Hopkins. Congressman, I respectfully suggest this question
should be referred to the National Guard Bureau.
Mr. Shuster. What is the Defense Threat Reduction Agency doing to
leverage existing information management systems, such as the NGB's
Civil Support Team (CST) Information Management System (CIMS), to
ensure such prior investments are efficiently used by follow-on forces
like the NGB's Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High
explosive Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) and Homeland Defense
Response Force (HRF)?
Mr. Verga. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) continues to work with
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency on leveraging, to the maximum
extent possible, available capabilities of the current NGB Civil
Support Team (CST) Information Management System (CIMS) for the
National Guard (NG) CIMS. NG CIMS package fielding to weapons of mass
destruction (WMD)-CSTs, CERFPs, and HRFs is projected to begin in late
Fiscal Year (FY) 2018.
Mr. Shuster. Do you have a timeline and investment plan for the
deployment of NGB's Civil Support Team (CST) Information Management
System (CIMS) to follow-on forces?
Mr. Verga. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is currently conducting
implementation activities for the National Guard (NG) Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Response Enterprise (CRE)
Information Management System (NG CIMS) Phase I capabilities (initial
common operating picture and sensor integration capability). Phase I
pilot testing includes multiple weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-CSTs
and the Massachusetts Homeland Response Force and runs through the end
of FY 2017. The NGB is currently conducting planning activities for
Phase II (information management tools) and Phase III (enterprise and
interagency systems interoperability) capabilities. NG CIMS fielding to
WMD-CSTs, CERFPs, and HRFs is projected to begin in late FY 2018.
Adequate funding is programmed to support NG CIMS through Phase II,
Phase III, and unit fielding.
Mr. Shuster. What is the Defense Threat Reduction Agency doing to
leverage existing information management systems, such as the NGB's
Civil Support Team (CST) Information Management System (CIMS), to
ensure such prior investments are efficiently used by follow-on forces
like the NGB's Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High
explosive Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) and Homeland Defense
Response Force (HRF)?
Ms. Durand. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is currently
working with the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to field the tools (Mobile
Field Kit--CBRN and Tactical Assault Kit) that currently comprise the
Chemical Biological Radiological & Nuclear Information Management
System (CIMS 2018) to all 57 Civil Support Teams. We recently began a
new pilot program with NGB to explore how this technology would be
applicable to the CERFPs & HRFs. To date, this has included providing
initial training and conducting exercises with the Massachusetts CBRN
Task Force & Homeland Response Force. These exercises have enabled DTRA
to work with NGB to determine requirements for, and begin developing
additional capability required of, CIMS 2018 to be applicable to these
forces. In addition to working with NGB, DTRA is currently working with
others to leverage existing capabilities to ensure CIMS 2018 data can
inform and receive data from other decision makers as necessary. An
example of this work recently occurred during the 2017 Presidential
Address to the Joint Session of Congress when Mobile Field Kit--CBRN
(MFK-CBRN) was used to pass information from the 33rd CST to the
Situation Awareness Geospatial Enterprise (SAGE), NORTHCOM's
situational awareness platform and to the DTRA Joint Operations Center.
Mr. Shuster. Do you have a timeline and investment plan for the
deployment of NGB's Civil Support Team (CST) Information Management
System (CIMS) to follow-on forces?
Ms. Durand. Congressman, I respectfully suggest this question
should be referred to the National Guard Bureau.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Mr. Franks. How can the DOD defend against EMP detonations over
international waters (beyond 24 miles)?
How does DOD/DTRA and other DOD units propose to defend the Nation
from high-altitude EMP attacks initiated over international waters near
(e.g. within 500 miles) of U.S. coasts?
Dr. Hopkins. Congressman, this question should be directed to U.S.
Northern Command for defense against incoming missile or airborne
threats.
Mr. Franks. How would DOD/DTRA and other DOD units defend against a
slow-moving weather balloon containing a nuclear device launched 50
miles from the United States coast at night? How would it be detected
and destroyed without triggering an EMP detonation? Would the
detection/destruction method work if the device was launched
opportunistically inside the eye of a hurricane?
Dr. Hopkins. Congressman, this question should be directed to U.S.
Northern Command for defense against incoming missile or airborne
threats.
Mr. Franks. What is DOD policy on the extent to which all DOD
offensive, defensive, and logistic support equipment and facilities are
to be mitigated against EMP, and for facilities to have on-site EMP
mitigated reliable long-term power?
Dr. Hopkins. Per Department of Defense Instruction 3150.09, it is
DOD policy that the force will be equipped to survive and operate in
nuclear environments, including electromagnetic pulse (EMP), as a
deterrent to adversary use of weapons of mass destruction against the
United States, its allies, and its interests consistent with the DOD
Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. The ability of the
force to operate in these environments must be known and assessed on a
regular basis, and mission critical systems that must survive and
operate in nuclear environments will be specified. Mission critical
facilities with EMP-survivability requirements will be equipped to
survive and operate in EMP environments, including their necessary
power supplies.
Mr. Franks. How can the DOD defend against EMP detonations over
international waters (beyond 24 miles)?
How does DOD/DTRA and other DOD units propose to defend the Nation
from high-altitude EMP attacks initiated over international waters near
(e.g. within 500 miles) of U.S. coasts?
Mr. Verga. The United States is currently protected from high-
altitude electromagnetic pulse detonations by the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense system. Due to the classification levels associated
with this threat, the Department can make the appropriate personnel
available to provide a briefing on this specific threat scenario to
Congressman Franks should it be requested through Legislative Affairs.
Mr. Franks. How would DOD/DTRA and other DOD units defend against a
slow-moving weather balloon containing a nuclear device launched 50
miles from the United States coast at night? How would it be detected
and destroyed without triggering an EMP detonation? Would the
detection/destruction method work if the device was launched
opportunistically inside the eye of a hurricane?
Mr. Verga. Military forces and posture to defend the United States
from attack are employed under U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). Due to the classification levels
associated with this threat, the Department can make the appropriate
personnel available to provide a briefing on this specific threat
scenario to Congressman Franks should it be requested through
Legislative Affairs.
Mr. Franks. What is DOD policy on the extent to which all DOD
offensive, defensive, and logistic support equipment and facilities are
to be mitigated against EMP, and for facilities to have on-site EMP
mitigated reliable long-term power?
Mr. Verga. DOD remains fully committed to ensuring the ability of
defense critical assets to execute essential DOD missions in any
environment. The Department recognizes the unique challenges posed by
electromagnetic pulses (EMPs) and the impact that EMPs can have on
critical systems and capabilities. The Department addresses the
vulnerability of and mitigation for EMP through several mechanisms, and
works collaboratively across the Department and with other Federal
departments and agencies, such as the Department of Energy, so that
risk can be appropriately managed to ensure the Department's ability to
execute critical missions in all threat environments.
Mr. Franks. What are the major outcomes to date of the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) EMP mitigation project responsive to RFP
DTRA152-006?
What are the major outcomes and findings of the DTRA pilot projects
under contract responsive to the RFP DTRA152-006 to make Defense
Critical Infrastructure (DCI) mitigated against electromagnetic pulse
(EMP) threats, including extreme solar storms causing geomagnetic
disturbances (GMD)?
Ms. Durand. Work on High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)
research on the effects on DOD facilities and systems has been
performed for over 30 years. This research has resulted in the
publication of HEMP environmental and protection military standards and
handbooks for the ground facilities and systems, military aircraft,
military surface ships. We have a long history of both HEMP
phenomenology, testing and effects on systems as well as critical
facilities. This has led to research and development of technologies
that protect our most critical facilities and systems against HEMP.
Recently, attention has been focused on HEMP and its effects on Defense
Critical Infrastructure. This emerging research area is looking at the
effects of HEMP and the loss of power on critical defense installations
in the performance of their missions. The national power grid
survivability and performance is the responsibility of the Departments
of Energy and Homeland Security. DTRA has recognized the need to
perform R&D on the technologies and methodologies required for critical
military installations to seamlessly ``island'' off the power grid in
the event of a national disaster, including HEMP, in order to sustain
mission operational capabilities. Consequently, DTRA initiated three
SBIRs to explore the current state of related technologies and
methodologies. The R&D of the SBIR efforts will be focused on the new
technologies, renewable power sources and state-of-the-art switching
capabilities to island off the grid and seamlessly reconnect to the
grid. Cost efficiency in successful islanding concepts is a priority of
the research. We expect our vast experience in HEMP hardening of
complex military systems and facilities can be leveraged in this new
research area to be more cost-effective. The SBIR Phase II efforts will
focus on taking the concept from idea to prototype and working with
more realistic scenarios such as designing an optimization model for a
specific site based on their load requirements, available resources,
and incorporation of renewable energy. Phase II efforts may also
include designing and testing EMP hardened prototype components. As of
February 2017, one Phase II has been awarded and the others are being
evaluated. At this time there are no major outcomes or findings to
report. We expect to have the Final Reports finished by approximately
Dec 2019.
Mr. Franks. What was learned to date regarding the DTRA152-006
projects concerning costs for mitigating DCIs against: a. Direct EMP
damage? b. For on-site electrical power what are the costs and/or
energy savings regarding having energy generated on-site? c. Is it
worthwhile for NDAA legislation to require such EMP mitigation and on-
site power generation at other DCIs?
Ms. Durand. The DTRA152-0006 proposals are not yet awarded. The
process of evaluating contractor proposals is on-going. Contract awards
are expected by Oct 2017. We do not feel that it is necessary that the
NDAA require such EMP mitigation or on-site power generation at other
DCIs.
Mr. Franks. Will DTRA publish an unclassified DTRA152-006 report
with a classified appendix as appropriate? Is it worthwhile for the
NDAA 2018 to require this?
Will DTRA publish an unclassified report for the House Armed
Services Committee that describes in detail the outcomes and findings
to date of the DTRA 152-006 pilot projects--and include as a separate
appendix any classified material? [Such as within two months so the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can use the information while
preparing its strategy for protecting the Homeland from EMP/GMD (as
required by 6 U.S.C.) Such unclassified report will be helpful for
other projects with similar goals to protect other infrastructure.]
Ms. Durand. DTRA will publish an unclassified report containing the
detailed outcomes and findings upon conclusion of the Phase II SBIR
contract efforts in response to RFP DTRA152-006. If applicable, a
classified separate classified annex will be submitted. We do not feel
it necessary that the NDAA 2018 require this specifically. The Phase II
SBIRs are two-year R&D efforts. We expect to have the Final Report
finished approximately Dec 2019.
Mr. Franks. What are DTRA plans to support EMP mitigated DOD
telecommunications between DCIs and central NORTHCOM command? What are
DTRA plans to support EMP mitigated DOD telecommunications between DCIs
in event of nationwide EMP, including supporting signal regeneration/
repeater stations across the Nation (every 40 to 50 miles) that boost
decreasing signal strength using electric power that may likely be
disabled?
Ms. Durand. Congressman, this question should be directed to U.S.
Northern Command for defense against incoming missile or airborne
threats.
Mr. Franks. To enable logistic support to DCIs from civilian
infrastructures, what challenges must be overcome for civilian signal
regeneration stations every 40 to 50 miles nationwide to have on-site
EMP mitigated long-term/renewable power to enable these stations to
pass telecommunications signals to and from DCIs to such civilian
infrastructure?
How does DTRA intend to ensure DOD domestic communications between
DCIs can travel distances if the commercial regeneration/repeater
stations nationwide are disabled either due to: a. The direct effects
of an EMP destroying the electronic systems of such regeneration
stations? b. The loss of electric power from commercial sources?
Would NDAA 2018 legislation requiring certain rulemaking by the
Federal Communications Commission regarding civilian regeneration
stations be helpful regarding logistic support asked about in the
questions above?
Since DCIs receive logistic support in terms of food, fuel for
vehicles and air transport, equipment supplies from across the Nation,
how does DTRA envision this need being met as far as the suppliers of
these logistic needs having the electrical power and telecommunications
to facilitate meeting these needs?
Ms. Durand. Congressman, the Department of Homeland Security is the
most appropriate organization to address this question.
Mr. Franks. What civilian telecommunications support might the NDAA
2018 require to help ensure civilian infrastructure providing logistic
support to DCIs have needed telecommunications?
Ms. Durand. Congressman, the Department of Homeland Security is the
most appropriate organization to address this question.
Mr. Franks. Should NDAA 2018 require expanding the entities served
by the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet) to include as
deserving of priority access DCIs, other national security and homeland
security personnel and personnel providing critical logistic support to
DCIs, explicitly require FirstNet homeland security, national security,
and civilian sites providing logistic support to them to be adequately
mitigated against EMP--and require any FirstNet contracts not doing so
to be re-negotiated or cancelled and replaced by contracts providing
such support?
FirstNet has defied and ignored its Congressional mandate and
defied its requirement that it adequately ``address special
considerations for areas or regions with unique homeland security or
national security needs.address special considerations'' [47 U.S.C.
1426(b)(2)(D)]
In order to increase the likelihood that civilian logistic support
will be available to DTRA DCIs in the event of a nationwide EMP, should
NDAA 2018 require FirstNet's National Public Safety Broadband Network
(NPSBN) to meet its mandate, including mitigation against EMP?
In the NDAA for 2017, PL 114-328, Sec. 1913(a)(2) it established 6
U.S.C. 121(d)(26)(A)(i) which states, that DHS is to provide 6 months
after December 23, 2016, ``a recommended strategy to protect and
prepare the critical infrastructure of the homeland against threats of
EMP and GMD.''
Does this recent legislation justify the NDAA requiring FirstNet to
explicitly ensure the security and resiliency of the NPSBN against EMP?
Does DTRA see it within its scope to coordinate with FirstNet to
identify the feasibility, installation impacts, maintenance, training,
and associated costs to implement the issues above?
Ms. Durand. Congressman, the Department of Homeland Security is the
most appropriate organization to address this question.
Mr. Franks. Would it be helpful that federally owned electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution assets be required by NDAA
2018 legislation to make their assets EMP mitigated so that civilian
supporting infrastructure in such areas can better support DCIs?
Ms. Durand. Congressman, the Department of Homeland Security is the
most appropriate organization to address this question.
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