[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AFGHANISTAN'S TERRORIST RESURGENCE:
AL-QAEDA, ISIS, AND BEYOND
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 27, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-20
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina AMI BERA, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
TED S. YOHO, Florida DINA TITUS, Nevada
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois NORMA J. TORRES, California
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
Wisconsin TED LIEU, California
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania DINA TITUS, Nevada
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Bill Roggio, editor, Long War Journal, Foundation for Defense
of Democracies................................................. 4
Seth G. Jones, Ph.D., director, International Security and
Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation........................ 14
Vanda Felbab-Brown, Ph.D., senior fellow, Center for 21st Century
Security and Intelligence, Foreign Policy Program, The
Brookings Institution.......................................... 29
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Bill Roggio: Prepared statement.............................. 7
Seth G. Jones, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 16
Vanda Felbab-Brown, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.................... 31
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 56
Hearing minutes.................................................. 57
The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade: Statement by H.E. Mahmoud Saikal,
Ambassador, Permanent Respresentative of the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan to the United Nations........................... 58
AFGHANISTAN'S TERRORIST RESURGENCE:
AL-QAEDA, ISIS, AND BEYOND
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THURSDAY, APRIL 27, 2017
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Poe. The subcommittee will come to order. Without
objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements,
questions, and extraneous materials for the record subject to
the length limitation and the rules. At this time, I am going
to make my opening statement.
When our forces invaded Afghanistan in 2001, the goal was
simple: Remove the Taliban government that sheltered the
plotters of the 9/11 attacks and destroy al-Qaeda. It has been
16 years that the United States has been at war, and
Afghanistan is still a haven for terrorists who seek to attack
and kill Americans. Just today, two Americans were killed in
the eastern province of Afghanistan.
Our military quickly toppled the Taliban government in
2001, and the Taliban/al-Qaeda forces fled to Pakistan where
they regrouped and launched more attacks against our troops.
Since then, the Taliban has waged insurgency in Afghanistan,
destabilizing the country and creating perfect conditions for
terrorists to exploit.
The Taliban insurgency today is stronger than any other
point since 2001. The Special Inspector General for Afghan
Reconstruction said in January, 171 Afghan districts are
controlled, influenced, or contested by the Taliban. As long as
the Taliban is successful this means good news for al-Qaeda.
Al-Qaeda has a long history of loyalty to the Taliban, or Osama
bin Laden swore allegiance to the Taliban's leader, Mullah
Omar, even before 9/11. And when bin Laden was killed, Ayman
al-Zawahiri renewed his oath that cemented ties between al-
Qaeda and the Taliban. Wherever the Taliban has influenced, al-
Qaeda is not behind.
Since 2010, United States' officials have claimed that al-
Qaeda had a small presence in the country limited to only 50 to
100 fighters. That is absolutely incorrect. The United States
has killed and captured more Afghan, more terrorists, since
that time than was claimed to be in the entire country.
Alongside al-Qaeda and Afghanistan we have another
terrorist group, the Haqqani Network. This group is directly
linked to both al-Qaeda and the Taliban and is based, guess
where, Pakistan. The Haqqani Network is responsible for more
American deaths in the region than any other terrorist group.
The Haqqani Network attacks inside Afghanistan have been
directly traced back to Pakistan. In fact, in 2011, Admiral
Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
testified before the Senate, quote, deg. ``The Haqqani
Network acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence agency.''
It seems that Pakistan has ties to about every terrorist
group that is in Afghanistan. Pakistan openly supported the
Afghan Taliban both before and after the extremists took
control of Kabul in 1996. We know the Taliban is still based in
Pakistan, and it came to no surprise that when a U.S. drone
strike killed the leader of the Taliban in May 2016, he was in
southwestern Pakistan.
The laundry list of evidence of Pakistan support for
terrorists goes on and on. We remember that when the al-Qaeda
leader and America's most wanted terrorist, Osama bin Laden,
was killed he was found in Pakistan. Afghan's representative to
the U.N. recently told the Security Council that Pakistan
retains ties with more than 20 terrorist groups. And I ask
unanimous consent to introduce into the record the full
statement made by Afghan's representative to the U.N. and it is
admitted.
I believe Pakistan is playing us. They launched what they
called counterterrorism operations in the tribal areas
bordering Afghanistan, but it quickly became clear they were
only targeting the Pakistani Taliban and not the Afghan
Taliban.
ISIS announced the establishment of an Afghan affiliate in
January 2013 and has entrenched itself in the eastern part of
the country. ISIS presence in Afghan further complicates the
country's terrorist landscape. These fighters ended up becoming
the leaders of the ISIS affiliate in Afghanistan known as ISIS-
Khorasan Province.
It is no surprise that Afghanistan is a mess. In the war on
terror it is crystal clear to me that Pakistan is not on our
side. It is time that we consider, one, listing Pakistanas a
state sponsor of terrorism; two, stop sending them U.S. aid;
three, remove and revoke their status as a major non-NATO U.S.
ally. Our Pakistan policy should match Pakistan's behavior. And
I will yield to the ranking member for his comments.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Chairman Poe. Two U.S. service
members were killed in Afghanistan overnight. Reports indicate
that they were killed in operations against Islamic State
fighters in Nangarhar Province in eastern Afghanistan. Words
are truly inadequate to express our country's gratitude at the
extraordinary sacrifice of these individuals and heroes, and
our prayers are with their families.
As the continued threat of insurgent groups and instability
in the country poses a direct challenge to the United States,
this year marks 16 years of military presence in Afghanistan
following the September 11th attacks. Our own security is
linked to Afghanistan's security, putting the elimination of
terrorism there and putting them squarely within our interests,
as well, as a country.
If we are to be successful in eradicating this threat, we
must be sure that the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is
addressing the drivers of terrorism head on. Unfortunately, in
Afghanistan, there are multiple drivers, and our prolonged
military presence in the country underscores this complex
reality.
Internally, Afghanistan's National Unity Government is
still struggling to effectively address the many systemic
problems facing their country. Organized crime, illicit
economies, rampant corruption at all levels of the Afghan
society require a coordinated and a robust approach from the
government if Afghanistan is to achieve security from the
national level all the way down to the community level.
Taliban control in Afghan communities impedes the
government's ability to limit recruitment and the threat of
terrorism throughout the country. Strengthening the role of a
democratic Afghan Government at all levels is absolutely
necessary in order to eradicate terrorism in the long term.
Additionally, the Afghan military continues to encounter issues
of internal accountability and operational effectiveness in
combating terrorist groups.
I have witnessed U.S. military, along with our allied
forces, training and advising Afghan forces for years and the
significant progress they have made. However, there seem to be
ongoing institutional challenges within the Afghan military
that require further attention if their military is going to be
sufficiently prepared to take on the long term responsibility
of managing the terrorist threat in Afghanistan.
There is a role for the United States to play in ensuring
that Afghanistan can achieve their own security and
independently and internationally deal with the support
necessary to do so. However, we also need to be clear on what
form our role should take.
The security situation in Afghanistan, and by extension the
United States, is multidimensional and not solely comprised of
military objectives. The governance issues in Afghanistan that
are stymied and that have stymied the progress in the fight
against terrorism cannot be resolved solely through the use of
force and integration of military expertise.
The whole of the government approach is what is necessary.
That whole of the government approach that Afghanistan must
take to combat this threat of terrorism should be complemented
by the diverse expertise that the United States can offer in
order to make sure the Afghan Government is most efficiently
and effectively moving toward greater security within its own
borders. This means ensuring that our State Department and
other key government agencies have the capacity to engage
meaningfully with their counterparts and partners in
Afghanistan.
A whole of government approach here in the U.S. keeps our
troops and allies safer. It also promotes longer stability in
the country, a stability that will bring about a more rapid
resolution to this conflict.
I, therefore, join many of my Democratic and Republican
colleagues on and off the Foreign Affairs Committee who are
deeply concerned about the proposed budget cuts to the State
Department and the impact they would have on our objectives in
the long term. This is not only because of the complex
situation within Afghanistan, but because of the role that
other countries play in exacerbating the terrorist threat
inside the country.
We know that Iran and Russia have both provided assistance
to the Taliban in an effort to counter the threat of the
Islamic State groups in Afghanistan. Pakistan has had a long
and complicated history and have long and complicated efforts
to combat terrorism in Afghanistan through its acquiescence in
providing safe haven to terrorists, particularly the Haqqanis.
So, we need a balanced approach to tackling the terrorist
threat in Afghanistan that reflects the complex and dynamic
reality on the ground and in the region. Why should we tie one
hand behind our back when we have the experts ready and waiting
to make this difficult process of eliminating terrorist threat,
a process that should move forward more effectively and
quickly, if we take this approach?
Today I am eager to hear from our witnesses about the
lessons learned about what is working, what is not working, and
why. This is important as the White House reassesses the U.S.
strategy in Afghanistan and as Congress looks forward to an
appropriations process which gives us the opportunity to make
sure that the most effective strategies to bring peace and
stability for Afghanistan and the United States are
appropriately funded.
Thank you, Chairman Poe. I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. So, without objection, all
the witness' prepared statements will be made part of the
record. I ask that each of the witnesses please keep your
presentation to no more than 5 minutes, and when the red light
comes on you need to stop or I will encourage you to stop. I
will introduce each witness and then give them time for opening
statements.
Mr. Bill Roggio--is it Roggio--is a Foundation for Defense
of Democracies Senior Fellow and editor of the Long War
Journal. Mr. Roggio was embedded with the U.S. Marines, the
United States Army, and Iraqi forces in Iraq between 2005 and
2008, and with the Canadian Army in Afghanistan in 2006.
Dr. Seth Jones is director of the International Security
and Defense Policy Center at the RAND Corporation. He
previously served as the representative for the commander, U.S.
Special Operations Command, to the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations.
And Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown is a senior fellow in the Center
for the 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings
Institution. She is an expert on international and internal
conflicts and nontraditional security threats.
Mr. Roggio, we will start with you. You have 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. BILL ROGGIO, EDITOR, LONG WAR JOURNAL,
FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Roggio. Thank you, Chairman Poe and Ranking Member
Keating, and the rest of the distinguished members of this
committee. This is a timely discussion.
Last week the Taliban launched a major attack on an Afghan
army base. Ten fighters launched what I call a suicide assault
where the fighters penetrate security at the base, and they are
not coming back. They are going to fight to the death. They
killed at least 140 Afghan soldiers. This was an attack on an
army corps base in northern Afghanistan, not in the south where
everyone assumes the Taliban to be strong. I have seen reports
of upwards of 250 Afghan troops killed in this attack.
The Taliban is using tactics that have been honed and
perfected by al-Qaeda and now the Islamic State, which is the
child of al-Qaeda. We are losing in Afghanistan. The U.S.
military will tell you at best we are at a stalemate, but in a
stalemate, in that situation, the tie goes to the insurgent and
the Taliban controls or contests at least half of Afghanistan.
The Taliban issued a report in late March saying they
control or contest 211 of Afghanistan's more than 400
districts. That is very close to the SIGAR report that you had
mentioned where it was, I believe, 177. That assessment was
given by SIGAR in the fall of 2016. In addition to--and the
reason the Taliban matters is the Taliban and al-Qaeda, they
remain tied at the hip. The Taliban refused to surrender al-
Qaeda members and Osama bin Laden after the 9/11 attacks. They
continue to fight side by side.
Al-Qaeda serves as a force multiplier. Multiple
designations from the U.S. Treasury Department talk about how
al-Qaeda and the Taliban fundraise for each other in the Gulf
States. This includes the Haqqani Network by the way. And we
continue to see al-Qaeda fighters killed on the battlefield. As
a matter of fact, the U.S. military killed a senior al-Qaeda
leader just last month inside Afghanistan.
So a lot has been made in the U.S. intelligence circles
about the strength of al-Qaeda. Under the Obama administration,
we were told there were 50 to 100 al-Qaeda fighters inside the
country, and we were consistently given this estimate for more
than 6 years. This all came crashing down in October 2015 when
U.S. military raided two al-Qaeda camps; one of them described
by a U.S. commander as possibly the largest al-Qaeda facility
taken down since 9/11. This is in Afghanistan; not in Syria,
not in Iraq, not in Somalia or Yemen. More than 150 al-Qaeda
fighters were killed in this one raid alone. So, we basically
took 150 percent of al-Qaeda's estimated strength by the U.S.
military that was given in intelligence circles for more than 6
years.
We have an intelligence problem in Afghanistan. We have a
problem recognizing what the threat is. Until we determine
where al-Qaeda is inside Afghanistan and how they are working
closely with the Taliban, we will continue to have a problem,
and we will fail to properly deal with this threat. Today, a
lot of the threat in Afghanistan is looked at as being the
Islamic State's Khorasan Province. We dropped the mother of all
bombs there, and as you both had mentioned, we lost two
soldiers in Nangarhar Province last night.
The Islamic State is on the fringe. It is a small problem
in Afghanistan compared to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other
Pakistani jihadists groups that operate there. They operate
primarily in four districts in Nangarhar Province and have a
minimal presence in the north. It certainly is a problem. Our
efforts seem to be focused on the Islamic State at this point
in time while largely ignoring what the Taliban is doing
throughout the country, and that is directly challenging the
Afghan military. They are going toe to toe, they are raiding
their bases, they are taking control of territory, and the U.S.
military, frankly, has downplayed this problem with the
Taliban.
When the Taliban overran the Sangin District, hundreds of
U.S. Marines and British troops died trying to liberate it
during the surge between 2010 and 2012. When the Taliban
overran that district, the military put out--what I will say
is--a ridiculous press release stating, no, no, the district
wasn't overrun. We merely moved the district center, and the
Taliban took control of rubble. And if that is the attitude of
the U.S. military toward the Taliban inside Afghanistan, we
will continue to lose this war.
We need to reassess Afghanistan. We need to--our policy in
Afghanistan is a mess, frankly, and the Trump administration
needs to decide what to do and how to do it, quickly. Thank you
very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Roggio follows:]
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Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes Dr. Jones for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES, PH.D., DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating,
and other distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thanks for
holding this hearing. It is a reminder that Afghanistan is and
should be still important.
At over a decade and a half after the 9/11 attacks, many
Americans may not realize how deeply engaged the U.S. remains
in Afghanistan. Most of the media coverage, up until very
recently, has been on counterterrorism operations in Syria,
Iraq, North Korea, and a range of other locations, but
Afghanistan is a front line state. Many may also forget that
the number of U.S. military forces there, which is in the
neighborhood of 8,400, is larger than any other active combat
zone deployment. It is larger than what the U.S. has in Syria,
Iraq, or other combat zones. As Bill mentioned earlier, some
Americans finally began to realize and remember that we still
have forces there after the U.S. dropped its most powerful, or
one of its most powerful non-nuclear bombs.
My comments are going to focus on three questions. First,
what are U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan today?
That is one. Two, what is the terrorist and insurgent
landscape? And then three, what, at least briefly, steps can
the U.S. do to help mitigate the threat from Afghanistan and
more broadly in the region?
So, let me turn to U.S. interests. I mean, I think there is
no question that the U.S. has a range of interests overseas. I
mentioned earlier Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, but I
do think the U.S. has several interests that remain in
Afghanistan. One is that there are a number of extremist
groups, Islamic extremist groups, that continue to operate on
both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border. Bill mentioned them
earlier. They range from al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Haqqani Network
to the Islamic State, but also a range of other ones that have
operations in Central Asia.
Second, I think an expanding war, if the U.S. were to
leave, would also increase regional instability particularly
with countries like India, Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and even
China. A particular concern to me would be what it does to the
Pakistan-India competition. Those are both nuclear armed states
and have gone to war and are essentially fighting a proxy war
in Afghanistan right now.
Let me then move to the landscape, because I think this is
important to remember. It is part of U.S. interests. The
Taliban does continue to operate. It is the largest group that
operates in Afghanistan. It does have its sanctuary, its
command and control nodes, in Pakistan not in Afghanistan. Its
three major regional surahs are also on the Pakistan side of
the border. And I would just emphasize again the chairman's
remarks about the increase in Russian contacts and, at least,
limited support to the Taliban. It is not a positive step in
developments in the region.
But I would point out with the Taliban, the Taliban does
not control yet--I mean I would certainly argue that it has
increased its rural presence. It does not control yet a major
urban area, which makes it a little different from what we have
seen in 2014, 2015 in Iraq in cities like Mosul or other cities
within Anbar.
AQIS, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, my estimate is
probably larger and more expansive than it was 5 to 10 years
ago. It has a presence that is larger than just what some
Americans have talked about up in the northeast; but down in
the south in Kandahar as Bill mentioned, in Helmand, along the
Baramcha area, in Zabul, in Ghazni, in Paktika, those are
likely small cell structures.
In addition, the Islamic State-Khorasan Province does have
a presence. It looks to me like it has probably come down a
little bit from a year or 2 ago--down to between 1,000 and
2,000 fighters--but I would say that it has conducted a number
of attacks both in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as in
Bangladesh. So, in my view it has been pretty active in
conducting attacks. There are other groups, the Tehrik-i-
Taliban Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar that
also have a presence in the region, and I think--in that
sense--there are a milieu of groups.
Just briefly, I would note there are a range of things. I
would support the ranking member's comments about focusing on
governance and development. I would add electoral reform. I
would also add, I think there are opportunities at the moment
for reconciliation. I certainly would support at least opening
up discussions. I think they are probably unlikely in the near
term, but I think they are worth talking about.
The range of things, and we can certainly get into this
that--I would suggest pushing U.S. trainers down to the
tactical level. I would support probably slightly increasing
the U.S. presence in Afghanistan but more on the trade, advise,
and assist efforts. And I am happy to talk more later about the
steps toward Pakistan, but let me just briefly conclude by
noting that the Afghan Government and generally these people
want the U.S. to stay, so I think we should take that
seriously. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]
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----------
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
Dr. Felbab-Brown, 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF VANDA FELBAB-BROWN, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER
FOR 21ST CENTURY SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE, FOREIGN POLICY
PROGRAM, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Ms. Felbab-Brown. Thank you very much, Chairman Poe,
Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee. It is an honor for me to address you today.
I want to give away my punch line right at the beginning.
Improving governance, not merely beefing up military efforts or
attempting to counter external sponsor of terrorism in
Afghanistan, is critical for the success of U.S.
counterterrorism efforts. It is also critical for the broader
interests the United States has in Afghanistan and the region.
Yes, denying safe havens to anti-American global and regional
terrorist groups is crucial, and it is the number one primary
objective.
But, U.S. interests in Afghanistan go beyond that. As Seth
also mentioned, an unstable Afghanistan risks destabilizing
Pakistan. The relationship is not merely the reverse that a
problematic Pakistan destabilizes Afghanistan, but also that an
unstable Afghanistan destabilizes Pakistan and, as result,
Pakistan-India relationship and the entire region of Central
and South Asia.
Moreover, this integration of the Afghan State or an
outbreak of an outright civil war would be a great boost to
Salafi groups around the world. Once again, a great power will
have been seen as being defeated in Afghanistan. That is from a
strategic perspective, few places from a counterterrorism point
of view matter as much as Afghanistan does. Moreover, U.S.
reputation and self-regard are also at stake as a country that
can be relied upon to honor its commitments, including
commitments to the Afghan people.
The Taliban remains by far the most potent terrorist group
in Afghanistan. It has not targeted U.S. assets or people
outside of Afghanistan, but certainly makes it a good point to
target them in Afghanistan and defines as its primary objective
to drive U.S. forces out of the country. It is a major threat
to the Afghan State, the Afghan Government, and, frankly, the
very political dispensation that has been in the country since
9/11.
Afghanistan remains in a highly precarious position. As the
chairman said, the Taliban today is at its strongest point at
any point since 9/11. That does not mean that the Taliban does
not have problems, does not have shortcomings, or suffer from
deficiency and constraints; it does. But nonetheless, its
military energy is showing no signs of fizzling out yet.
More significantly, the Taliban is often seen as a less
pernicious form of governance than even some of the power
brokers associated with the Afghan Government and the post-9/11
dispensation in Afghanistan. And, this is indeed the
fundamental problem in the country and the reason why the
Taliban still today has so much capacity to regenerate and
weather the military pressure from the United States, allies,
and even the Afghan security forces. Unless major progress is
made in improving governance in Afghanistan and the
acceptability and perceptions of governance in Afghanistan,
even with beefed-up U.S. forces, we can be exactly in the same
predicament 5 or 10 years from now.
The government of National Unity has made some important
efforts to improve governance. It has taken on some corruption
and criminality but these efforts are hardly sufficient. Much
more needs to take place, and the United States must make it a
crucial point of its engagement with Afghanistan to insist,
facilitate, and help with improving governance.
The priority in improving anti-corruption and anti-crime
measures clearly are in the Afghan security and defense forces.
Indeed, one of the reasons they have been struggling so much on
the battlefield and are taking such large casualties is because
of the ethnic and patronage rifts, the corruption that plagues
the services that results in poor leadership, poor morale, and
a whole host of other enable problems. Clearly, the system of
corruption and the system of criminality are an enormous
challenge in Afghanistan, defining the very political
arrangements of the country.
It is not realistic to expect that everything can be
tackled, but even just taking on some steps, particularly
before the next Presidential election in Afghanistan, would be
very important, once again, starting with the most deleterious
forms of corruption and criminality such as rooting out
discrimination of entire ethnic groups.
One of the reasons why we saw the fall of Kunduz, the most
significant, tactical, and in fact strategic victory of the
Taliban so far, is number one along with that--and very much
correlated with focusing on the corruption and criminality in
the Afghan National Security Forces. There are other measures
beyond that that I am glad to answer or speak about during your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Felbab-Brown follows:]
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----------
Mr. Poe. I thank all three of the witnesses. The Chair will
reserve its time until the close of all the questions by the
other members, so therefore, I will recognize the ranking
member for his 5 minutes.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of things,
and based on your testimony, I would like to just give you the
opportunity to comment on more. Can you give us some of the
examples, Doctor, on the criminality and the corruption
activities more specifically within the National Security
Forces?
Ms. Felbab-Brown. The most fundamental problem--I would
say--is that positions of leadership at all levels, from unit
down to higher-up levels have for years been allotted on the
basis of ethnic patronage, very much with mind of rivalries
amongst specific commanders, and also related to tribal and
ethnic rivalries, but also have been sold out to those who can
pay most for the positions. And similar issues, such as getting
leave to go to family, has often been associated with those who
can pay at the level of individual soldiers. Related to that,
with perhaps most significant progress achieved so far, is
simply on getting pay down to soldiers as well as getting
equipment to soldiers.
Mr. Keating. Right. Now when I was there a few years ago,
they were implementing electronic payments directly, and that
was a way to try and ameliorate that. Has that been utilized,
first, and has it been successful?
Ms. Felbab-Brown. Yes. The process is underway, and it is
more linked to biometric systems, one of the primary of sort of
focus for the U.S. military and allied military as well as
President Ghani. So, progress has been achieved. It is hardly
complete; the process is not full. I want to very much
compliment the U.S. military in Afghanistan for insisting that
only soldiers that are part of the biometric system are paid,
because an immense problem has been ghost soldiers that have
been receiving payment.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Doctor. You gave me some more
specifics that I appreciate.
Dr. Jones, you wanted some more time to talk about Pakistan
and the regional instability, but also you mentioned
Bangladesh. If you could, really comment on Pakistan and
Bangladesh and what the effects regionally are there from your
vantage point?
Mr. Jones. Sure. My comments on Bangladesh were actually
twofold if I had had a little more time. One is that we have
seen an increase in Islamic State-Khorasan Province activity,
including strikes in and around Bangladesh. We have also seen a
growth of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent of Bangladesh as
well.
So we often focus a lot on Afghanistan. The terrorist
problem is a regional one, and we often focus also on Pakistan,
but Bangladesh has seen a major increase in jihadist activity
over the past several years. So, you know, part of the answer
here is a much better regional counterterrorism and governance
issue than just focusing on Afghanistan or----
Mr. Keating. Yeah. Would you say in Bangladesh too--with
some of the things I have witnessed there in terms of the way
their government is running right now--do you think that has
been an incubator for this kind of activity or do you think it
is just because of geography?
Mr. Jones. Well, I think it is a combination both of
geography and also strategy. When Ayman Al-Zawahiri announced
the creation of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, he
specifically asked for Bangladesh to be included in that. So,
it was a strategic decision. There is also--and you can see the
World Bank or Transparency International data--it is a weak
state. It has allowed groups like the ones I mentioned to
establish sanctuary there, so again very serious concerns, I
think, in Bangladesh.
Mr. Keating. And do any of the witnesses want to talk about
what we could do with the Iranian and Russian influence in that
area, any suggestions you might have?
Ms. Felbab-Brown. I think it is very important,
significant, and laudatory that General Nicholson highlighted
the pernicious role of Russia. It is not new. It has been in
the making for a number of years even during Russia's nominal
cooperation with the United States and Afghanistan. It has been
halting and sporadic, and it has clearly disintegrated as part
of the difficult U.S.-Russia relationship.
There are no easy fixes, but exposure is an important first
step, and there are other ways to engage diplomatically with
Russia. Hence, Ranking Member, I emphasize your crucial
statements in the beginning about the role of the State
Department and the fact that wars cannot simply be won on the
military battlefield. The diplomatic effort as well as the----
Mr. Keating. Briefly, on the issue of the Russians
supplying arms to the Taliban, is some of that just part of the
way they act criminally for their own revenues, criminal
syndicates, and things, or do you think it is strategic or
both?
Ms. Felbab-Brown. I do believe it is strategic. There is no
doubt that the Russian military has dealt with issues of
criminal involvement and criminal perpetration, including in
the narcotics trade. But I do believe that in the case of
supplying weapons to the Taliban it is a very controlled
strategic decision and likely indicates rogue members of the
Afghan military selling weapons and equipment to the Taliban as
well.
I do want to emphasize, however, that support for the
Taliban, such as from Iran, in my view, no more than the
support that Russia provides, is also very much a function of
the regional disbelief, at this point, that a stable,
successful government in Afghanistan, as envisioned after 9/11,
can be achieved. And it is the tremendous insecurity and
uncertainty about what will happen with the government,
including as a result of the lack of clarity of U.S. position
that encourages----
Mr. Keating. So, we get back to governance too. I know my
time is over so I want to yield that back, but we go back to
governance again. Thank you.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. The Chair recognizes the
gentleman from California, Colonel Cook, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Continuing the conversation, I wanted to ask how the
Chinese view the disturbing role of Russia there, particularly
being an ally of--well, China being an ally of Pakistan, and of
course, they border Afghanistan. Is that viewed as a major
threat any time the Russians do something along a border that
is close to China? And that is up to anyone to address that if
they could.
Mr. Roggio. Sure, I will address that. I can't speak to
what China has or hasn't done with respect to Russian arming of
the Taliban, but the Chinese certainly have an interest in
stability in Afghanistan. They have economic interests and,
obviously, security interests there as well. And there is a
group that is based--it is called the Turkistan Islamic Party.
It is made up of primarily ethnic Uyghurs from western China
and they conduct attacks. They primarily are based in
Afghanistan and are closely allied with al-Qaeda as well as the
Taliban. They fight inside Afghanistan alongside those groups.
And so you have that bleed-back problem where fighters that
come from China to fight inside of Afghanistan come back, and
that is a major security issue and security concern for the
Chinese Government.
Mr. Jones. If I could just add--I mean--I would say broadly
speaking the Chinese have several interests. One is,
historically, the economic interest--what I would call soft
power. They do have access to a range of mines although they
have been slow to develop them because of the security
situation. Two, they have been involved in peace negotiations,
so trying to bring the Taliban to the peace table, that have
not been particularly successful. And three, they have had
terrorism concerns. I suspect that anything that would
exacerbate their concerns about terrorist activity in the
region, including Russian support, would make China somewhat
nervous.
Mr. Cook. Doctor?
Ms. Felbab-Brown. I agree with those comments, perhaps only
to add there is rivalry between China and Russia. It is taking
place in Central Asia. The rivalry is, perhaps, not without
restraint, but nonetheless that is clearly taking place. So,
this is yet another element of the rivalry, the threats, and
the interests of China that serve, and Bill articulated also,
then implied, that China cannot be happy with Russia's
maneuvers toward the Taliban.
Mr. Cook. I want to address the poppy and the drugs that
finance the Taliban. And it almost seems counterproductive for
the Russians to be supporting the Taliban if you are worried
about some of these drugs that would go up through Uzbekistan
into Russia, which has had some concerns about growing drug
problems of its own. Could you address that drug situation,
because it is as I said--it doesn't seem logical.
Ms. Felbab-Brown. Sure. I will be very glad to do that. A
lot of my expertise is on the issues of drugs, including in
Afghanistan. So you are right, Representative Cook, about the
poppy being often emphasized as a key interest and problem of
Russia. Russia has long blamed the United States for poppy
cultivation in Afghanistan, accusing the U.S. of being at best
incompetent and often purposeful in allowing poppy cultivation
as a tool of poisoning the Russian nation. Obviously, those are
outrageous and incorrect claims. The larger issue, of course,
is that it is enormously difficult to suppress poppy
cultivation, as the Russian Government is well aware, and in
fact, any aggressive eradication measures will only feed the
Taliban insurgency. The Taliban derives a great deal of support
by being able to protect itself--offer itself as a protector of
the poppy farmers.
And in fact, one of the reasons why the Islamic State in
Nangarhar is so particularly challenged is because it has
prohibited poppy cultivation there and essentially mobilized
the populations in Achin, Shinwari, Khogyani against itself.
However, Russia's interest in countering the drug trade is
offset by its other interests, and I would say that Russia's
driving interest these days is to be as challenging to the
United States across the world as possible.
Mr. Cook. Thank you, I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. We are in the process of
votes. We do have time for one more series of questions from
Ms. Frankel from Florida. That is right.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you. Thank you very much to the panel
for being here. So, I guess probably myself, like most
Americans, are just very frustrated. My own son has served in
the military in Afghanistan as well as USAID, and so I have
heard a lot of war stories.
I want to ask you this. Compared to pre-9/11, which
obviously led to the catastrophe of the towers, how would you
compare Afghanistan and the dangers currently?
Mr. Roggio. Sure; I will tackle that. Well, prior to 9/11,
al-Qaeda was operating training camps with no threat of--
really, little threat other than maybe an occasional cruise
missile strike or something like that, and they were doing it
with the support of the Taliban. So, you had the state
sponsorship side; as such the Taliban was a state, and they
were operating unfettered.
Today, Afghanistan is a war zone. We have American forces
there, and they are engaging, targeting, and killing al-Qaeda
leaders and trying to prevent them from maintaining safe haven.
However, that camp that I mentioned in Shorabak and Kandahar
Province that was operating for some time before American--
Americans only found out about it when they conducted a raid in
Paktika Province several months prior and killed a senior al-
Qaeda leader there. Then, they discovered evidence of that
camp, and that is when they--and then they spent several months
planning the attack.
So, and also I would add that this continuous fighting
really serves as a recruiting machine for jihadist groups. That
doesn't mean we shouldn't be fighting them there, but the
longer we are there fighting the more they are going out and
selling their wares. They are getting jihadists to join their
cause, be it the Taliban, al-Qaeda, or the myriad of Pakistani
jihadist groups operating there. Thank you.
Mr. Jones. If I can add to that, I mean--I think pre-9/11,
with al-Qaeda's sanctuary and external plotting and with
assistance from the Taliban regime, the threat level to the
U.S. was obviously extremely high. Over the next couple of
years, it varied somewhat. I mean--I would point to the period
of 2009 and 2010 where we had several active plots that went
back to that area, Faisal Shahzad in New York City as well as
Najibullah Zazi, also New York City plots.
I think today the threat level is serious. I don't see the
same number today of external plotting by AQIS, al-Qaeda in the
Indian Subcontinent, or core al-Qaeda, but I would say that as
we look at future trends, particularly with the return of
foreign fighters from Iraq and Syria to the region, it is a
serious danger of becoming something like that in the future.
Ms. Frankel. So I guess that leads to my next question,
which is, does that call for keeping the troops there, more
troops? Obviously, I guess the--you have talked about, Doctor,
about USAID type efforts, and with the governance and the
corruption, I would be curious as to whether you have seen any
progress at all in terms of the governance and the corruption
issue? But if you could answer both those questions.
Ms. Felbab-Brown. I definitely see progress. Clearly,
President Ghani is motivated to take on corruption and
criminality. He has been constrained, and much more than has
been done needs to be done. Unfortunately, more broadly the
Afghan political elite continues to be constantly preoccupied
and distracted, as mentioned, with politicking and not
sufficiently focused on governance, and here is a crucial
element of where U.S. policy needs to engage.
If the United States decided to withdraw from Afghanistan,
we would be in a situation of full-blown civil war with the
Taliban controlling significant territories. No doubt the
situation would be dire in the country with serious
repercussions for the United States. I do believe that there is
good reason to have more troops in Afghanistan, simply because
the current force posture does not allow, really, for any
meaningful U.S. presence outside of Kabul or even in terms of
assistance and eyes on the ground, such as in economic efforts.
However, I also believe that the continuing U.S.
engagement--military engagement needs to be coupled with a very
explicit political strategy, and I don't mean by the
negotiations with the Taliban simply or predominantly, but
rather very explicit engagement with the Afghan Government
about improving governance. So yes; there is some progress but
hardly sufficient, and that needs to be the core of U.S.
engagement in the country.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you. I think my time, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Roggio, I just want to understand something that you said. You
said that fighting begets fighting, and yet I think you are all
advocating that we maintain our troops. So, is the theory to
try to maintain the troops without fighting or let just as
advisers and trainers?
Mr. Roggio. Yes. Afghanistan certainly is a catch-22
situation at this time given the length of time we have been
there, and I think we have lost the trust of a lot of Afghans.
However, I don't see any other option, and I agree with Dr.
Brown. If we pull our forces out of there--if we disengage from
Afghanistan, it will be largely run by the Taliban, large
Taliban pockets in the south, east, north. You will have al-
Qaeda back in strength.
So, we have to continue fighting them, and we have to work
hard at the governance side as well. We really need to find the
right--it is amazing to me that in almost 16 years, we haven't
found the right incentives to get the Afghans to do what they
need to do to take this fight to the Taliban--to defeat them.
I also agree--negotiations, we have been down this path
numerous times. We have been fooled by the Taliban. The Taliban
are motivated. Yes; they have their problems militarily and
politically, but there is no incentive for them at this point
in time. They believe they are winning. They are winning in
some areas, and we are not going to get them off the
battlefield by negotiating with them. They need to be defeated
militarily. We never have done that, and that is going to be
extremely difficult until we solve the Pakistan angle, which we
have all discussed multiple times here. Thank you.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentlewoman from Florida. The
subcommittee will be in recess until 10 minutes after the final
vote. There are three votes. Mr. Rohrabacher from California
will be the next questioner of the panel.
[Recess.]
Mr. Poe. The subcommittee will come to order. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from California, Surfin' Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will have to amend
your introduction. It is not the surfing Rohrabacher; it is the
suffering Rohrabacher now.
Well, listen, I have enjoyed your testimony today. I am
going to have some challenges about some of the positions that
you have been advocating. It doesn't mean I don't respect you.
I do, because you seem like you are smart and you have done
your homework, but I do disagree with you on some things. Also,
perhaps, there would be some alternatives that you need to
think about that maybe you haven't and, maybe, we haven't as a
country. But first let me ask some specific questions on
issues. How much heroin and opium is now being produced in
Afghanistan?
Ms. Felbab-Brown. I do not remember the exact number from
last year, but it is a very high number. It is believed to
supply at least 90 percent of the world's opiate production.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Talking about billions of dollars?
Ms. Felbab-Brown. Yes, and a significant portion of the
country's GDP. So the United Nations Drugs and Crime Office
estimates, or used to put out a number--they stopped putting
out a number--that only about 4 percent of Afghanistan's GDP is
linked to opium poppy. That is a very significant
underestimate. They only measured the farm-gate production. I
think it is a----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay, so we are talking about billions of
dollars that we know is floating around Afghanistan, and is it
fair to say that a significant amount of that money gets into
the hands of Islamic terrorists including the Taliban? Okay,
nobody disagrees with that?
Ms. Felbab-Brown. Certainly the Taliban. There has been no
evidence that the money has been going to other terrorist
groups. It is a significant number of that money that gets to
the hands of power brokers linked with the Afghan Government.
Mr. Jones. But the Taliban, which does have relationships
with other groups, the Taliban does get a fair amount of money
from----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay, so the Taliban gets a fair amount of
money and, of course, the Afghan Government, who we put into
place--corrupt officials in that group including the family of
Mr. Karzai maybe. We are talking about billions of dollars of
wealth. Well, with billions of dollars going like that--coming
out like that, I can imagine that would buy a lot of AK-47
bullets, and people wonder where people get the money now.
Do you think we would have the ability--I don't know; are
any of you aware that we now have the ability to drop--to spray
an area and that within a short period of time, in a way that
will not hurt other crops, would eliminate the poppy production
in Afghanistan and, basically, would not permit it to grow in
that area again for 10 years? Are you aware of that government
program?
Okay. Well, let me note for the record, Mr. Chairman, that
we have had that capability for at least 20 years and have not
touched it and not done it. We didn't do it after 9/11. We had
that capability, and we didn't do it. After 9/11, there were
storehouses of opium where the Taliban had stored billions of
dollars of opium and heroin in special locations in
Afghanistan. And I would just go on the record for the first
time on this. I notified our Government at the very highest
level exactly where those were and that they needed to be
bombed because the Taliban needed to be denied that money, and
our Government never did that. Our Government never did it. The
excuse was always, well, we think it might be too close to a
mosque.
All right. In terms of our alternatives now, okay, we ended
up bringing Karzai in. We have already heard an assessment of
the level of corruption associated with the Karzai regime and
the Karzai family. We created that. Those of us who were
engaged with this effort before that time wanted the king to
return the king. He was the one guy, Pashtun and the rest of
them, who everybody respected. Instead, we brought in Karzai,
who it appears as being said today oversaw massive corruption.
But now, back to how we now are in. So now, we are in a bad
spot. We didn't do what was right then, and now we are in a bad
spot. And let me just say for the record, Mr. Chairman, that
the alternative is not just putting more U.S. troops into
Afghanistan.
And let me ask the question of our panel, do you know how
many U.S. troops were in Afghanistan after 9/11 at the time
when the Taliban were driven out of Kabul? Do we know? Two
hundred. Two hundred. So, obviously, 200 Americans weren't the
ones who drove them out, it was the Northern Alliance. And
instead of having a government in which we respected these
individual leaders and a decentralist approach--have any of you
read the Afghan Constitution? Have you read the--okay.
Who in the Afghan Constitution, who appoints the local
police? Kabul. Who appoints the local educators? Kabul. We gave
them, Mr. Chairman, the most centralized government plan for
the people who are the most decentralized culture in the world,
and now they are upset, and they are willing to go along with
any number of groups.
And I am going to leave it with this one thought, because I
am sorry if I am taking too much time, Mr. Chairman. The Flying
Tigers came in, and really, they were private people, and they
were saving Chiang Kai-shek from this onslaught of the Japanese
before Pearl Harbor. They were actually on the way there. Their
first mission actually happened a couple days after Pearl
Harbor, but they were on their way over to create an air force.
We need air cover; do we not, sir? Do not our friends in
Afghanistan need the air cover? It is now being proposed by a
private sector of folks, who are not dissimilar from the Flying
Tigers, that they would go to Afghanistan and provide this
service. And I would hope that anybody reading this testimony
understands that we don't need to send massive troops in when
private sector people will get the job done or if people in
their own country would get it done. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. The Chair recognizes the
gentlelady from California, Ms. Torres.
Ms. Torres. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
panel for taking time to be here today.
Based on recent statements by General Nicholson and
Secretary Mattis, it appears increasingly clear that Russia has
been arming the Taliban. What is your assessment of Russian
intentions in Afghanistan? And I would like to hear an opinion
from maybe the three of you. How do you think the United States
should respond to Russia's intervention in Afghanistan?
Mr. Roggio. Sure. I believe Russia's intentions are
primarily focused on targeting the growing threat of the
Islamic State. What used to be al-Qaeda's branch in the
Caucasus has now become part of the Islamic State, and there is
a threat also that emanates from the region from the Islamic
State. They are concerned about that in the Central Asian
countries, which are in Russian sphere of influence as well as
attacks in their country.
So, I think part of that is an attempt. Because the Taliban
and the Islamic State are enemies, they do fight each other.
Although this was more common a year or 2 ago, they have sort
of, kind of come to some uneasy truce. I believe that they are
also--I think this is also a ploy by the Russians to gain
influence with the Taliban as well as, you know, as possibly a
little payback for United States efforts in Afghanistan in the
1980s.
As far as what the United States can do about this, I think
there is only really political pressure that can be applied. As
far as Russian support for the Taliban, it is pretty low on the
chain. When you look at it, you know, you have the primary
state sponsor for the Taliban and jihadist groups in Pakistan
is--or in Afghanistan is Pakistan, and I would even say Iran
poses a bigger threat with its support for the Taliban as well.
Russia; they are providing light arms as far as I could
tell at this point in time. We haven't had a lot of specifics
of what that Russian support is, but really the only solution
is diplomatic here. We are not going to go to war with the
Russians for providing a small amount of arms to the Taliban.
Ms. Torres. Thank you.
Mr. Jones. I would say, based on my look at this, there are
at least three potential motivations for Russia right now. One,
I think if we look broadly at Russian operations in Syria, even
Russian presence in Libya as well as in Afghanistan and other
locations, they are expanding and attempting to expand their
influence as part of a resurgence effort. Second, I think they
are concerned about the Islamic State and other groups
operating in Afghanistan, particularly ones that may come back
from Iraq and Syria into Central Asia, the Caucasus, and South
Asia. And third, they have had some concerns about the U.S.
withdrawal from the regions and what gets left on their
southern flank.
I mean, I think there are a few things that the U.S. can
do. One is--I mean--to continue to target, as the U.S. has, the
Islamic State in the region including in Afghanistan. I mean,
it is a threat so I think there is some reason for the Russians
to be concerned about ISIS there. I think the U.S. should stop
saying, as it has done at various points over the last couple
of years, that it is going to leave. I think that may be
helpful so the Russians realize we are not leaving for the
foreseeable future; it is a conditions based effort.
And I think, and Vanda said this earlier, that we should be
as transparent as possible on what they are doing so we have
evidence to show it publicly.
Ms. Torres. Thank you. Dr. Brown?
Ms. Felbab-Brown. I agree with the three stated
motivations. Russia's official justification for its engagement
and not denial of support for the Taliban has been that the
Islamic State is a bigger threat for them. I think that is the
calculation. I don't think that is the sole calculation,
however. I do believe that Russia, like other regional actors,
are uncertain about the outcome and are hedging and cultivating
proxies. It is not simply the Taliban that Russia is engaging,
but also other proxies that have been not violently, but in
political opposition to Kabul.
So, it is a wide range of actors that Russia is engaging
just as Iran is engaging, and clearly, they have now moved to
directly military cultivating the Taliban. And I do believe
that Russia defines its primary strategic objective as
challenging the United States across the world. They waited in
Afghanistan to challenge the United States, but they never
wholeheartedly supported U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, and now
they determined that this is yet another theater where they can
engage.
I do believe that the primary response is one of diplomatic
exposure and diplomatic engagement and, perhaps, diplomatic
isolation of Russia. However, there are other interdiction
options also not of Russian agents in the Taliban, but
certainly of some of the proxies that Russia is engaging with,
that does not necessarily mean military eliminating them; but
perhaps, blowing up the heroin stockpiles that the
representative mentioned that belong to proxies and favored
power brokers of Russia in Afghanistan as a tool, as a signal.
Ms. Torres. Thank you, and my time is up. I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentlelady. The Chair recognizes the
gentleman from Illinois Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Chairman Poe. Thank you to you
and the ranking member for calling this hearing, and I want to
thank the witnesses for sharing with us your perspectives. This
is obviously, as you have stated, a very complex issue. Before
I continue, I also want to join with my colleagues in extending
my personal and our condolences to the families of the fallen
fighters in Afghanistan. Our thoughts and prayers are with
them.
So Mr. Roggio, and I mentioned this to you on the break.
You mentioned something called the Long War and that could be
looking backward. We have been in Afghanistan now approaching
its 16th year, or it could be looking forward. From your
perspective what are we looking at going forward as far as the
time of our involvement here?
Mr. Roggio. Yes, this long war has expanded greatly since
9/11. If we look at just the threat of al-Qaeda, it was
operating in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban fighting the
Northern Alliance, running training camps, and then it had a
small presence in a couple of countries throughout the world
operating on a cellular level.
Since particularly with the Arab Spring, the jihadist
threat has expanded greatly. We now have active war zones in
Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Mali, Libya, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Southeast Asia. We could go on listing the
countries where we have active jihadist insurgencies. We have
had attacks here in the homeland, attacks in Europe. The
reality is we are fighting this enemy militarily, but we are
not tackling their ideology, which to me is the prime driver of
these Islamist militant groups.
Until we and our allies come up with a way to discredit
them, to discredit their ideology, we are just not killing them
fast enough. We have great success in killing terrorist
leaders, in killing fighters in drone strikes, and that has
been fine. But they have shown a remarkable capability to
replace their leadership and that is the way they have been
expanding their operations.
Mr. Schneider. And I am sorry just because of time--and
they are resilient. But if I can turn to Dr. Jones, I think it
was you that said this. If not, I apologize. I may have lost it
while we had stepped away. But you indicated that our policy
across administrations has been, I think the term you used was,
a mess. And my----
Mr. Jones. Bill may have used that.
Mr. Schneider. All right. That is just--I may have gotten
it right. But my question, this is for the whole panel, is as
we look at the policy as it is today with the challenges--and
Mr. Roggio you talked about how quickly, how resilient they are
and how quickly they have expanded and can pop up with new
members, new resources--as we try to put a policy into place
that has a sense of order, what does that order look like? What
specific goals would you apply? What would be the timelines we
should be considering as we look at policy here from our
position?
Mr. Jones. Sure, I have a couple of comments on that. I
mean, I think as I have looked at this and I have been involved
myself in this as a civilian and in the military in
Afghanistan, I think our objectives at this point should be
fairly limited. We are dealing with a government that has
challenges and is relatively weak, but I would set up several
objectives. One is to prevent the Taliban from overthrowing the
government and from holding urban terrain, you know, major
urban terrain, and I think that is potentially doable.
I think we should continue to target groups that are
plotting attacks against the U.S. both here and overseas, and I
think we should continue to support the government and local
actors as well on the ground. I don't know the timelines there.
I think those are in American interests. I think one can do
those with a limited presence on the ground with both
diplomatic, development, and military.
But I think that is a condition based approach rather than
a timeline, and I think as long as we are moving in those
directions and the government is relatively competent, I would
personally support that.
Mr. Schneider. Dr. Felbab-Brown, your perspective? You
bring experience beyond just this region; across the globe.
What do you see as some of the objectives, challenges, and
metrics that we can measure progress by?
Ms. Felbab-Brown. Beyond the unfortunate position of not
having a good alternative to persevering, we can decide to
liquidate the mission in Afghanistan, and indeed, to quote a
prominent U.S. strategist or paraphrase, the hallmark of a wise
power is to know when to liquidate unwise commitments.
I don't believe we have reached that stage in Afghanistan.
Our perseverance still keeps the country from outright civil
war and the Taliban from toppling the regime and holding
significant territories. Those are very important means to
achieving or to maintaining U.S. objectives.
I would think about the conditions under which the U.S.
support would no longer be maintaining those objectives such as
if the Afghan military turned on itself, if there were massive
defections, if in fact political infighting started in advance
of the Presidential 2019 elections. Those would be markers for
me to reconsider liquidating despite the terrible cost to U.S.
counterterrorism objectives.
Until then, I do believe that we need to persevere,
perhaps, with a boosted military presence as well. However, the
perseverance and the military presence cannot be decoupled from
strong focus and governance. We need to change the perceptions
of the Afghan people where the Taliban is really not so much
worse than the predatory rule of local power brokers or even
Afghan officials associated with the government.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you. My time is up. As with all
complex issues but especially here, the answers to a question
leads to so many more questions. I wish we had more time, but
thank you for being here.
Mr. Poe. And the gentleman can submit those questions for
the record and we will make sure that the witnesses invite
those, or answer those questions in a timely manner; not take
16 years to answer them for us. I will recognize myself, as I
mentioned, as last to ask questions. I want to read a statement
made by the Ambassador from Afghanistan to the United Nations--
only portions of it.
In recent months, dozens of terrorist attacks across
Afghanistan have claimed scores of innocent lives. The Taliban
has claimed responsibility for most of these attacks, but
regardless of whose names are being labeled on these attacks,
our own investigations have clearly established that they were
generally plotted beyond our frontiers on the other side of the
Durand line, mainly Pakistan. Mr. President, it is a
fundamental factor which needs to be addressed.
So I want to address that with the remaining time that we
have. Dr. Jones, I will ask you first. Explain, as you can
concisely, what Pakistan's mischief is regarding terrorist
groups that are related to Pakistan, hide in Pakistan, and they
go to Afghanistan. Explain that relationship if you can.
Mr. Jones. Sure. I think this in part comes down to what I
would call the great power of politics, meaning Afghanistan
sits--and Pakistan is a major border with Afghanistan.
Afghanistan's strongest regional ally is India. That is
unacceptable to Pakistan; India is an enemy. So while the
Afghan Government has an ally in the Indian Government,
Pakistan has resorted to proxy organizations to further its
foreign policy goals both in places like Jammu and Kashmir
against the Indians and in Afghanistan and that means support
to organizations like the Haqqani Network and the Taliban. So
it is a proxy war.
Mr. Poe. Either one of our other witnesses want to weigh in
on this?
Mr. Roggio. I would agree with Dr. Jones. The Pakistani
Government is, you know, continuing with its policy or its
strategy of strategic depth. It views everything through the
lens of fighting India. And unfortunately, some of these
jihadist groups that have spawned from the Pakistani efforts to
fight India to establish strategic depth in Afghanistan. It has
come back to bite them with groups like the movement of the
Taliban in Pakistan and other groups which have attacked the
Pakistani State. And unfortunately, Pakistan seems unwilling to
recognize this.
It is still--while it fights the movement of the Taliban in
Pakistan, it continues to support other groups like Lashkar-e-
Taiba and host of other groups, because they are willing to
serve as Pakistan's strategic depth. Until the Pakistani
Government, leaders and military intelligence--until they come
to grips with this, this problem is going to exist for decades.
Mr. Poe. Would you agree that with the statement of Admiral
Mullen in 2011 that the Haqqani Network acts as a veritable arm
of Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence agency?
Mr. Roggio. Yes, I absolutely would agree. And keep in mind
the operational leader of the Haqqani Network, Siraj Haqqani.
He is also one of two deputy emirs for the Taliban. The Haqqani
Network, they will tell you--their propaganda has said look, we
don't exist, there is no Haqqani Network. We are the Taliban.
That is both true and untrue. It is a subset of the Taliban.
Its leaders are integrated with the Taliban, so it is a major;
it is receiving major support from the Pakistani Government
and, you know, they are killing Americans. And we have to--we
really need to figure out a way to get Pakistan to stop
supporting the Taliban.
Mr. Poe. And in recent years, the United States has given
over $33 billion in some form of aid to Pakistan. Pakistan
directly or indirectly supports the Haqqani Network in theory.
That network, as we mentioned earlier, has killed more
Americans in the region than any other terrorist group. To me
that is something that we should not accept. We should not
accept sending money to a country that supports a terrorist
group that kills Americans. I think there is a real problem
with that.
Dr. Jones, do you want to weigh in on that?
Mr. Jones. No. I think it is a serious problem. I mean, I
have been on the receiving end of it myself. I have lost
friends and colleagues because of Haqqani Network attacks. I
think it is a very, very serious problem. I would support, as
the U.S. did last year, when it has a strike against a Taliban
leader as it did with Mullah Mansour to take that strike. I
mean, I think it is worth considering the costs and benefits,
but I would applaud the administration for targeting the
Taliban leader last year.
Mr. Poe. All right, I will yield back the remainder of my
time. I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here. I
certainly want to thank the members of the committee. This has
not been an encouraging hearing about the 16-year war that is
taking place, but I appreciate you being here. Maybe we can
figure out some solutions for what Congress' role should be and
advise the administration as well. This subcommittee is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Record
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Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Ted Poe, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and chairman,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
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