

**THE FUTURE OF COUNTERTERRORISM: ADDRESS-
ING THE EVOLVING THREAT TO DOMESTIC
SECURITY**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE**

OF THE

**COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

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CONTENTS

	Page
STATEMENTS	
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence:	
Oral Statement	1
Prepared Statement	2
The Honorable Kathleen M. Rice, a Representative in Congress From the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence:	
Oral Statement	3
Prepared Statement	4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security:	
Prepared Statement	5
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the State of Texas:	
Prepared Statement	5
WITNESSES	
Mr. Edward F. Davis, III, Chief Executive Officer, Edward Davis, LLC:	
Oral Statement	7
Prepared Statement	9
Mr. Thomas Joscelyn, Senior Fellow, The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies:	
Oral Statement	11
Prepared Statement	14
Mr. Robin Simcox, Margaret Thatcher Fellow, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, Heritage Foundation:	
Oral Statement	22
Prepared Statement	24
Mr. Peter Bergen, Vice President, Director, International Security and Fellows Programs, New America:	
Oral Statement	27
Prepared Statement	29
FOR THE RECORD	
The Honorable Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress From the State of Pennsylvania:	
Letter	50
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the State of Texas:	
Article, <i>New York Times</i>	60
Article, <i>Southern Poverty Law Center</i>	63
APPENDIX	
Questions From Honorable Mike Gallagher for Edward F. Davis, III	83
Questions From Honorable Mike Gallagher for Thomas Joscelyn	84

IV

	Page
Questions From Honorable Mike Gallagher for Robin Simcox	84
Questions From Honorable Mike Gallagher for Peter Bergen	86

THE FUTURE OF COUNTERTERRORISM: ADDRESSING THE EVOLVING THREAT TO DOMESTIC SECURITY

Tuesday, February 28, 2017

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Peter T. King (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives King, Perry, Hurd, Gallagher, Rice, Jackson Lee, and Keating.

Mr. KING. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism Intelligence will come to order.

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony from four counterterrorism and homeland security experts. I would like to welcome the Members of the subcommittee, particularly Ranking Member Kathleen Rice, and express my appreciation to witnesses who traveled to be here today.

Now I recognize myself for an opening statement.

In the weeks and months after the terror attacks of September 11, Congress and the administration worked together to fix the weaknesses which our enemies exploited to carry out their attacks. We created the Department of Homeland Security, restructured the intelligence community, and launched a war on terror to take the fight to our enemy, all to ensure that a similar attack would not happen again.

In the years that followed, however, much of the energy behind these reforms has been lost. Budgets were cut and important legislative initiatives were delayed. By 2013, leaders in National security warned that the country was paralyzed with, "terror fatigue."

At the same time, the al-Qaeda network evolved and metastasized and spread and ISIS began to take root, hundreds of Americans have been radicalized. A year ago, senior National security leaders testified that the United States is facing its highest threat level since 9/11.

Few could have predicted in 2001 how the world would change over the next 16 years. There has yet to be another spectacular attack claiming thousands of lives, due largely to the heroes in the ranks of our intelligence community, armed forces, first responders, and law enforcement and vigilant citizens.

As Commissioner Davis well knows, the increase in other attacks, though, across the United States carried out by adherents to the global jihadist ideology and the rapid revolution of terrorist tactics reveal that our enemy has changed with the times.

We must prepare for even more change: Increased pressure on terror cell safe havens and the caliphate in Syria may result in a new terrorist diaspora as thousands leave the conflict zone. Our adversaries, including a newly emboldened Iran, will continue to exploit any available chaos.

As the new administration settles in, there is no doubt that we are at a crossroads in U.S. counterterrorism strategy. We must have an aggressive, long-term strategy for addressing Islamic terrorist threat abroad and in the homeland.

For years, this committee has worked hard to identify and eliminate weaknesses in U.S. security defenses. Professionals and experts have warned repeatedly about failures to connect the dots and share information between agencies. After-action reviews of various terror attacks have identified individual and systemic failures that remain unaddressed.

We have an opportunity to carefully improve the homeland security of the United States. To whatever extent possible, this must include bipartisan cooperation and an eye on the vital issue of the safety and security for Americans. It is absolutely necessary to make progress as our adversaries will only continue to evolve.

This hearing today provides our first step. To build on the foundation of our work in previous Congresses, the witnesses here today will offer perspectives on both the current homeland threat picture and how Congress working with the administration can fight to once again fix the weaknesses our enemies now exploit. I look forward to hearing your suggestions to where improvements can be made across our counterterrorism programs and policies.

[The statement of Chairman King follows:]

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PETER T. KING

FEBRUARY 28, 2017

In the weeks and months after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress and the administration worked together to fix the weaknesses our enemies had exploited to carry out their attacks. We created the Department of Homeland Security, restructured the intelligence community, and launched a war on terror to take the fight to our enemy—all to ensure that a similar attack would not happen again.

In the years that followed, however, much of the energy behind these reforms has been lost. Budgets were cut and important legislative initiatives were delayed. By 2013, leaders in National security warned that the country was paralyzed with “terror fatigue.”

At the same time, the al-Qaeda network evolved and spread, ISIS began to take root, and hundreds of Americans have been radicalized. One year ago, senior National security leaders testified that the United States is facing its highest terror threat level since 9/11.

Few could have predicted in 2001 how the world would change over the next 16 years. There has yet to be another spectacular attack claiming thousands of lives—due largely to the heroes in the ranks of our intelligence community, armed forces, first responders and law enforcement, and vigilant citizens. Nonetheless, the increase of small-scale attacks across the United States carried out by adherents to the global jihadist ideology and the rapid evolution of terrorist tactics reveal that our enemy has changed with the times. We must prepare for even more change: Increased pressure on terror safe havens and the “caliphate” in Syria may result in a new terrorist diaspora as thousands leave the conflict zone. Our adversaries—including a newly emboldened Iran—will continue to exploit any available chaos.

As the new administration settles in, there is no doubt that we are at a crossroads in U.S. counterterrorism strategy. We must have an aggressive, long-term strategy for addressing the Islamist terror threat abroad and in the homeland.

For years, this committee has worked hard to identify and eliminate weaknesses in U.S. security defenses. Professionals and experts have warned repeatedly about failures to connect the dots and share information between agencies. After-action reviews of various terrorist attacks have identified individual and systemic failures that remain unaddressed.

We have an opportunity to carefully, but considerably, improve the homeland security of the United States. To whatever extent possible, this must include bipartisan cooperation and an eye on the vital issue of the safety and security of Americans. It is absolutely necessary to make progress, as our adversaries will only continue to evolve.

This hearing provides us our first step. To build on the foundation of our work in previous Congresses, the witnesses here today will offer perspectives on both the current homeland threat picture, and how Congress, working with this administration, can fight to once again fix the weaknesses our enemies now exploit. I look forward to hearing their suggestions for where improvements can be made across our counterterrorism programs and policies.

Mr. KING. Now I recognize the Ranking Member, Miss Rice.

Miss RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's hearing.

I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony today.

As we examine the future of counterterrorism, I think it is important to step back and consider just how much the threat of terrorism has evolved in the past 10 or 20 years. Terrorists today are not leaving our borders, undergoing training in another country and returning to the United States to commit attacks. Terrorists no longer need to seek financing from terrorist organizations, nor do these individuals need the plan or permission of a terrorist group or a particular leader.

More and more terrorists can be inspired by propaganda and rhetoric spewed over the internet. Lone actors, people who are self-radicalized and may not appear on a particular watch list to be flagged at the border, present an especially difficult task for our law enforcement officials. But the internet is not the only avenue to radicalization.

Charged public rhetoric can be a factor, including from our own President. We have heard reports that ISIS refers to President Trump's travel ban as the blessed ban. They point to the ban as proof that the United States is at war with Islam and the Muslim world.

I think it is important to recognize that words matter, particularly when we have a group like ISIS with such sophisticated communications operations. The words we use do matter; calling for a complete and total ban on Muslims entering the United States or going out of your way to call it radical Islamic terrorism, those words play right into our enemies' hands and do nothing to help our counterterrorism efforts.

Additionally, I am particularly concerned right now about the recent wave of bomb threats made Nation-wide to Jewish community centers, or JCCs. Last week, I joined several Members of Congress in urging the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the FBI to fully investigate these threats.

Over the last 2 decades, JCCs and Jewish institutions have several times been the target of domestic terrorist attacks. We must

do more to protect these and similar social, recreational, and cultural facilities.

To that end, I would ask Chairman King that this subcommittee commit to examining the work of DHS and FBI to help protect and harden JCCs and other religious institutions from terrorist threats. The threat landscape is ever-evolving and we have a responsibility to evolve with it and to confront the threat of terrorism in all its forms.

I look forward to hearing from our expert witnesses today, and I hope this will be a constructive conversation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The statement of Ranking Member Rice follows:]

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER KATHLEEN M. RICE

FEBRUARY 28, 2017

As we examine the future of counterterrorism, I think it is important to step back and consider just how much the threat of terrorism has evolved in the past 10 or 20 years. Terrorists today are not leaving our borders, undergoing training in another country, and returning to the United States to commit attacks. Terrorists no longer need to seek financing from terrorist organizations, nor do these individuals need the plan or permission of a terrorist group or a particular leader.

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But the internet is not the only avenue to radicalization. Charged public rhetoric can be a factor, including from our own President. We've heard reports that ISIS refers to President Trump's travel ban as "The Blessed Ban." They point to the ban as proof that the United States is at war with Islam and the Muslim world.

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To that end, I would ask Chairman King that this subcommittee commit to examining the work of DHS and FBI to help protect and harden JCCs and other religious institutions from terrorist threats.

The threat landscape is ever-evolving, and we have a responsibility to evolve with it, and to confront the threat of terrorism in all its forms.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Miss Rice. Obviously we would be, you know, delighted to work with you on this. I know over the years, especially the Jewish community in New York I can speak of personally, has received extensive homeland security funding and training and briefing on how to harden their targets and protect themselves. Obviously, if more has to be done, we will do it. It is really essential.

Again, coming from New York, we are probably even more particularly aware of, you know, the nature of those threats. So thank you, and I look forward to working with you that.

Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record.

[The statements of Ranking Member Thompson and Honorable Jackson Lee follow:]

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

FEBRUARY 28, 2017

Today, we will hear about what can be done to effectively counter ISIL, al-Qaeda, sovereign citizens, and other terrorist organizations. Through improved intelligence and effective allegiances, we have come a long way as a Nation since September 11.

However, just a little over a month into the Trump administration, the President, through his ill-conceived and hasty U.S. counterterrorism policies seeks to weaken counterterrorism defenses built over the 16 years since 9/11.

For example, on January 27, President Trump used unilateral Presidential power to circumvent Congress and defied our Constitution by issuing an Executive Order based on stereotyping, fear-mongering, and bigotry. This careless Executive Order and President Trump's inflammatory rhetoric used throughout his campaign and during his presidency provides propaganda for terrorist networks and alienates our allies within the United States and abroad.

While the Trump administration continues to advance policies that do nothing to make this country safer, and those in Congress defend these policies, questions still remain about one of the largest counterterrorism issues before our country.

We have no more answers regarding President Trump and this administration's continuous entanglement with the Vladimir Putin Regime. In fact, we have more questions now than then because we know that President Trump's former National security advisor lied about his communications with the Putin regime. I am disappointed that Republicans in Congress are unwilling to acknowledge that this significantly impacts our National security.

I have said it several times and I will continue, we need an independent commission to fully investigate Russia's interference with the election and any potential Trump campaign ties to Putin and his policies. Congress and the American public must be assured that our leaders have their best interests in mind when creating policy, especially and including our counterterrorism policies, not the best interests of foreign nations and their leaders.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE

FEBRUARY 28, 2017

Chairman Peter King and Ranking Member Kathleen Rice, the topic of today's subcommittee hearing is "The Future of Counterterrorism: Addressing the Evolving Threat to Domestic Security."

I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses:

- Edward Davis, former police commissioner of the city of Boston;
- Robin Simcox, Margaret Thatcher fellow, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, Heritage Foundation;
- Thomas Joscelyn, senior fellow, Foundation for Defense Democracies; and
- Peter Bergen, vice president and director, international security, future of war, and fellows programs, New America (Democratic witness).

As a senior Member of the House Committee on Homeland Security and Ranking Member of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security this topic has significance due to the number of violent acts committed in the United States since November 2016 number over 1,000.

According to the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), in the immediate aftermath of Election Day, a wave of hate crimes and lesser hate incidents swept the country—1,094 bias incidents in the first 34 days following November 8, 2016.

SPLC reports that anti-immigrant incidents (315) remain the most reported, followed by anti-black (221), anti-Muslim (112), and anti-LGBT (109). Anti-Trump incidents numbered 26 (6 of which were also anti-white in nature, with 2 non-Trump related anti-white incidents reported).

The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony from the witnesses about efforts to examine the continued evolution of the terrorist threat and review policy changes that will further the homeland security and counterterrorism programs and policies of the United States.

Unfortunately, ill-conceived U.S. counterterrorism policy under the Trump administration has and will likely continue to weaken the defenses built over the 16 years since 9/11.

In the month since taking office, carelessly-created Executive Orders such as the Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States Executive Order and inflammatory rhetoric has provided propaganda for terrorist networks and alienated our allies within the United States and abroad.

We can focus our efforts on a range of topics that impact homeland security, but we should not ignore how policies and public acts by individuals can contribute to the threat of home-grown terrorists or lone wolves as well as contribute to the recruitment efforts of ISIL, al-Qaeda, or other terrorist groups.

There seems to be an implied if not expressed belief that violent acts carried out against certain persons living within the United States can be carried out without fear of a Justice Department led by Jeff Sessions or a White House with senior staff known to hold bias views towards minorities, immigrants, and others.

Just last week, two Indian citizens who were enjoying a college basketball game with a friend were murdered.

I want to offer my condolences to the family of Srinivas Kuchibhotla and my prayers for a speedy recovery for Alok Madasani who were brutally shot in Kansas City Kansas, and senselessly gunned down by an angry racist.

RECENT TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES

On November 28, 2016, 11 individuals were injured in an incident at Ohio State University when Abdul Razaq Ali Artan drove a car into a crowd and also wounded individuals with a knife.

On July 17, 2016, an offender shot and killed six police officers in Baton Rouge, LA. Three of the officers died and three were hospitalized.

On July 7, 2016, an offender shot and killed five police officers and wounded 11 others (9 police officers and two civilians) in Dallas, TX. The offender was killed by police with a remotely-guided robot loaded with an explosive.

On June 12, 2016, an armed assailant shot and killed 49 people and non-fatally wounded over 50 others in an Orlando, FL nightclub. After a 3-hour stand-off with police, the assailant was killed by police.

On December 2, 2015, two offenders killed 14 people and wounded 21 others in San Bernardino, CA at a social services center. Both offenders were killed by police while resisting arrest.

On November 27, 2015, at a Planned Parenthood clinic, in Colorado Springs, CO, a lone offender shot and killed three people and wounded another nine people with a semiautomatic rifle before surrendering to the Police after a 5-hour stand-off.

On July 16, 2015, in Chattanooga, TN, a lone offender killed five people and wounded another person at a military recruitment office and naval reserve center, before he was killed by police.

On June 17, 2015, in Charleston, SC, a lone offender shot and killed nine parishioners and wounded another parishioner with 45 caliber pistol at the historic Emanuel American Methodist Episcopal Church.

The climate that the Nation is in at this moment poses the greatest threat to Homeland Security than at any other time since the days following September 11, 2001.

Words matter as well as actions—we need diplomacy and a strong homeland security plan bolstered by a military that can come to the fore if peaceful efforts to resolve disputes fail.

The United States cannot make more enemies than we are making friends—we cannot afford to turn our friends into enemies or absent allies when we need them to fight terrorist threats.

I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses.

Thank you.

Mr. KING. We are very pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses today on this important topic. All you have testified here before, and I want to thank Ed Davis, Tom Joscelyn, Robin Simcox, and Peter Bergen for once again returning.

Our first witness is Commissioner Davis. Ed Davis is the president and CEO of Edward Davis LLC, a business strategy and securities firm. He has a 35-year career in law enforcement, including serving for 7 years as the police commissioner of the city of Boston. Prior to that, he served as superintendent of the Lowell, Massachusetts police department where he spent nearly 30 years. Commissioner Davis has consistently been a strong advocate for inter-

agency collaboration and public safety. He has been a friend and trusted adviser to this committee for a number of years.

I believe you testified within 1 or 2 months of the attacks at the Boston Marathon. It was very moving and, more than that, very poignant testimony detailing deficiencies that were there and how you are working to correct them, particularly in your dealings with the FBI. You have been a great source of information to Members on both sides of the aisle, and you have come back time again. I want to thank you for that.

So with that, I recognized former Commissioner Ed Davis—always be commissioner—Commissioner Davis for his testimony.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD F. DAVIS, III, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, EDWARD DAVIS, LLC

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you for the opportunity to speak before you today.

As I stated in my 2013 testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, this topic is critically important and must remain a top priority for Congress.

Our administration, Congress, law enforcement, and private citizens must continue to work together in a coordinated manner. A focus on communication and consistency of funding for multi-jurisdictional training drills, communication tools, and intelligence gathering is essential to prevention and mitigation in the event of an organized or lone-wolf attack domestically.

Organized and lone-wolf attacks are not going away any time soon. These individuals are nimble and frequently change their methods. The goals, however, remain the same: Death, destruction, creation of fear and chaos. Just in 2016, we saw the brutal shooting and explosive attack on the Brussels national airport in Belgium that killed 32 civilians and three of the terrorists. A large truck plowing people down following the Bastille Day celebration in Nice, France that killed 86 people. Different methods, same goals.

More than ever before, relationships between law enforcement partners, stakeholders, and community members needs to be in place to prevent attacks. Law enforcement needs sufficient police resources and updated intelligence to collect relevant information prior to attacks and to truly begin to build trust within all of our communities.

Following the attacks on September 11, counterterrorism efforts in the United States shifted to the prevention of the next domestic terror attack.

JTTF, Joint Terrorism Task Forces, already in place at that time, established a working partnership with local, State, and Federal law enforcement authorities. At the time of the marathon bombing, there were information-sharing issues that were subsequently changed and improved. These JTTFs have proven to be a tremendous vehicle encouraging local, Federal, and State police to work together as full partners toward our Nation's critical mission of protecting the U.S. homeland.

I am happy to report that in Boston, under the direction of SAC, Hank Shaw, the JTTF has been working better than ever. The changes that were put in after testimony at the Homeland Security

Committee in 2013 remain in place today and are working very well in the city of Boston.

Testing of the JTTF systems is important for effectiveness and transparency, however. Every JTTF should be audited at appropriate intervals by the Department of Justice. The audit should include the content of every memorandum of understanding between agencies to ensure it is staying current with the ever-changing nature of the attacks, the type of investigations included in the databases and the actual sharing of information processes among JTTF members.

If you are to be successful in combating terrorism, law enforcement, cities and towns, and our Government must be communicating, sharing information, improving intelligence, and coordinating our prevention and response efforts. In 2013, following the bombings at the Boston marathon, Federal agents worked side-by-side with local law enforcement officers, collecting evidence at the finish line, interviewing witnesses and suspects, combing through petabytes of data from cellular service providers, and poring over the all-important collection of images from fixed surveillance and civilian cameras.

The decision to crowdsource, to go to the internet for help from citizens for potential evidence was made jointly by Federal, State, and local authorities. This collaboration, both in the field and behind the scenes, resulted in both suspects being arrested or killed within 102 hours.

Communities have a vital role in the prevention of attacks. I have investigated transnational organized crime throughout the majority of my career. I can tell you that after 35 years of policing, criminals or bad actors are always a small percentage of the population they live within.

It is impossible to work these cases without building strong, cooperative, and trusting relationships with the many good people within that same population. That is true whether you are doing narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, or terrorist investigations, those who are often most vulnerable to the threats of these depraved actors.

When I was commissioner of the Boston police department, we hosted and participated in the Bridges Group. It is a collaborative effort among various community representatives, Federal, State, and local government agencies and it is designed to enhance safety and security and provide an opportunity for candid conversation.

At that time, the Boston police department was experiencing an uptick in violence involving young Somali men. The Somali group representatives that participated in the Bridges meeting stepped in, they remediated the situation through community council, activities, and job creation in coordination with the Boston police department, and that problem went away.

The communities of every city and town across the United States have the ability to play a central role in the prevention of organized and lone-wolf attacks. Citizens can, if properly informed and trusting, provide early information to law enforcement agencies on radicalization in their midst.

One of the marathon bombers, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, had a concerning outburst indicative of potential radicalization at the Cam-

bridge mosque prior to the attacks. No information regarding the incident was provided to Federal, State, or local authorities. This was a missed opportunity to intervene. It would have led to greater scrutiny of the Tsarnaevs before the bombs exploded.

This requires, however, consistent effort to build trust and strong relationships. Intelligence sharing has been improved through the fusion centers located across the country, more effective JTTFs, and improved technology. One of the best practices in Boston is a comprehensive review of the JTTF cases. This is done several times a year and always prior to a major event. This process has provided more focused follow-up on individuals who pose the greatest threat to citizens.

I have more written testimony, but I don't want to go over my time here. So I just will sum up by saying that by working together, by training, preparing, and planning for these events and, most importantly, by developing the intelligence needed to intervene, like we saw in the attack on the police in Boston a year ago where a terrorist was being monitored and said he was going to go kill a police officer and behead a police officer, there was immediate intervention that occurred that stopped that attack from happening. That makes all the difference.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Davis follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD F. DAVIS, III

FEBRUARY 28, 2017

Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak before you today. This topic is critically important and must remain a top priority for Congress. Our administration, Congress, law enforcement, and private citizens must continue to work together in a coordinated manner. A focus on communication and consistency of funding for multi-jurisdictional training drills, communication tools, and intelligence gathering is essential to prevention and mitigation in the event of an organized or lone-wolf attack.

The nature of the work I do with my security consulting firm keeps me in touch with National and international front-line police and law enforcement agencies. Organized and lone-wolf attacks are not going away any time soon. These individuals are nimble and frequently change their methods. The goals, however, remain the same: Death, destruction, creation of fear and chaos. In 2016 we saw a brutal shooting and explosive attack on the Brussels National Airport in Belgium that killed 32 civilians and 3 of the perpetrators; a large truck plowing people down following a Bastille Day celebration in Nice, France that killed 86 people; different methods, same goals.

More than ever before, relationships between law enforcement partners, stakeholders, and community members need to be in place to prevent attacks. Law enforcement needs sufficient police resources and updated intelligence to collect relevant information prior to attacks, and to truly begin to build trust within all of our communities.

Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, counterterrorism efforts in the United States shifted to the prevention of the next domestic terror attack. Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), already in place at that time, established a working partnership with local, State, and Federal law enforcement authorities. At the time of the Marathon bombing there were information-sharing issues that were subsequently changed and improved. These JTTFs have proven to be tremendous vehicles, encouraging local, Federal, and State police to work together as full partners toward our Nation's critical mission of protecting the U.S. homeland.

Testing of the JTTF system is important for effectiveness and transparency. It is important to realize that any complex system charged with such responsibility must be monitored for compliance.

If we are to be successful in combating terrorism, law enforcement, cities and towns and our Government must be communicating, sharing information, improving

intelligence and coordinating our prevention and response efforts. In 2013, following the bombings at the Boston Marathon, Federal agents worked side-by-side with local law enforcement officers collecting evidence at the finish line, interviewing witnesses and suspects, combing through petabytes of data from cellular service providers and pouring over the all-important collection of images from fixed surveillance and civilian cameras. The decision to crowd-source for potential evidence was made jointly by Federal, State, and local authorities. This collaboration, both in-the-field and behind the scenes, resulted in both suspects being arrested or killed within 102 hours.

Communities have a vital role in prevention of attacks. I have investigated transnational organized crime throughout the majority of my career. I can tell you after 35 years of policing criminals, or “bad actors,” are always a small percentage of the population they live within. It is impossible to work these cases without building strong, cooperative, and trusting relationships with the many good people within that same population; those who are often most vulnerable to the threats of these deprived actors.

When I was police commissioner at the Boston Police Department, we hosted and participated as a partner in the BRIDGES group. It is a collaborative effort among various community representatives, Federal, State, and local government agencies. It is designed to enhance safety and security and provide an opportunity for candid conversation, relationship building, and problem solving between law enforcement and the community. At that time the Boston Police Department was experiencing an uptick in violence involving young, Somali men. The Somali group representatives that participated in BRIDGES stepped in and remedied the situation through community counsel, activities and job creation in coordination with the Boston Police Department and the city of Boston.

The communities of every city and town across the United States have the ability to play a central role in the prevention of organized and lone-wolf terror attacks. Citizens can, if properly informed and trusting, provide early information to law enforcement agencies on radicalization in their midst. One of the Boston Marathon bombers, Tamerlan Tsarnaev had a concerning outburst, indicative of potential radicalization, at a Cambridge mosque prior to the attacks when the Imam quoted Martin Luther King, Jr. No information regarding this incident was provided to Federal, State, or local authorities. This was a missed opportunity for information that could have led to greater scrutiny of Tsarnaev before the bombs exploded. This requires consistent effort to build trust and strong relationships between law enforcement and the community, so this type of information becomes available in a timely manner.

Intelligence sharing has been improved through fusion centers located across the country, more effective JTTFs and improved technology. One of the best practices in Boston is a comprehensive review of the JTTF cases. This is done several times every year and always prior to a major event. This process has provided more focused follow-up on individuals who pose the greatest threat to citizens and visitors in Boston.

It is important for Congress to remain vigilant on information sharing while at the same time safeguarding all citizens’ important Constitutional rights. The JTTFs rely on information from sources other than the Federal authorities. The New York Police Department intelligence operations provides the most effective and timeliest information sharing to JTTFs. The approval process for the Federal information sharing system is slower and is still largely bureaucratic. I encourage you to find ways to streamline and expedite this system so that information can be shared with appropriate partners in a timely manner.

Law enforcement training is essential for effective prevention, mitigation, and response to terrorist attacks. I encourage all of you to continue to push for important funding such as Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) through the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. In May, 2011, the Boston Police Department, city of Boston agencies, Federal, State, local, and transit law enforcement partners, emergency medical community, and other key stakeholders all trained together in a Mumbai scenario Urban Shield: Boston exercise. It revealed deficiencies that no doubt saved lives in April, 2013. It became clear that police and other first responders radios were not synced and that the medical and law enforcement community did not share common, necessary protocols in the event of an attack. When all cell phones failed during the Marathon attacks, radios were critical for communication. Each of the above deficiencies, and more, were corrected immediately and in place for the Marathon attacks.

Training also offers best practices for prevention, mitigation, and response such as how to secure perimeters. The use of large trucks, particularly heavy dump trucks, around the perimeter of large crowd events is one example of various meth-

ods used by law enforcement. This is done regularly during Boston championship events. In New Orleans last week, the drunk driver of a vehicle that plowed into a crowd, critically injuring approximately 28 people, eventually crashed into a dump truck that was situated along his travel route for cleaning purposes. This stop-gap definitely saved lives.

I recently spoke with the director of security for the Brussels National Airport in Zaventem, Belgium. At the time of the recent attack, law enforcement and security cell phones and radios were not functioning. They actually had to rely on a centuries-old model of using human runners with written messages to bring and receive information. This is an excellent example of why appropriate communication networks and equipment must be readily available so that law enforcement can do their jobs.

Public safety agencies must be able to effectively communicate at all times, particularly during a crisis. I encourage you to support interoperable networks that will facilitate interagency communication through funding and legislation.

In closing, the evolving and changing challenge of terrorism today in our country and throughout the world requires daily attention and consistent commitment from our leaders in both policy and funding. If we are to make measurable progress in this fight, it requires a common-sense approach: A true intelligence-sharing system that is periodically checked for effectiveness and authenticity, coordinated training for first responders and key stakeholders, critical equipment for first responders, long-term planning for communication networks, and relationship building with each of our communities. I ask that you continue to find legislative methods to enhance the great work that is already being done by our law enforcement community, and fund important programs that increase knowledge, training, and provide the right tools to effectively get the job done. Thank you.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Commissioner.

Our next witness is Tom Joscelyn, who also has appeared before this committee a number of times. Mr. Joscelyn is a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and is senior editor of its Long War Journal, a widely-read publication tracking counterterrorism operations and terror threats. Much of his research focuses on how al-Qaeda and ISIS operate around the globe. He served as a trainer for the FBI's Counterterrorism Division and is a very regular face in the halls of Congress having testified more than a dozen times.

Mr. Joscelyn, you are recognized for your testimony and thanks for being back.

**STATEMENT OF THOMAS JOSCELYN, SENIOR FELLOW, THE
FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES**

Mr. JOSCELYN. Thank you, Congressman, for the introduction and thank you all for being here today.

Unfortunately, I have had to testify more than a dozen times. As I say often to my wife, this has been somewhat of a growth industry over the years, I wish it wasn't. I would very much like to go back into economics and finance at any time, but I find myself here again.

The truth of the matter is, in my written testimony I sort-of look at different levels of threats to domestic security. One of the levels of threat is sort of what we call inspired attacks or something along those lines, often called lone wolves. I don't term them that way. I term them as individual terrorists or individual attackers because if they are responding to a global ideological movement and are taking up that call, then in fact they actually at least have an ideological bond to the people who are trying to attack us and to professional organizations.

But beyond that, if you look at my written testimony, I include somewhere between 8 and 10 or 11 examples of a different phe-

nomenon that ISIS has taken to another level inside Europe and the United States. It is this phenomenon called remote-controlled attacks. This is something they have had some success, these are small-scale operations. These are operations where a digital handler, a virtual handler for ISIS, sits in Raqqa, Syria, or somewhere outside of Mosul, Iraq, and via social media applications is able to communicate with would-be recruits in the West or elsewhere. They have done this around the globe.

Congressman King, I would like to point that one of the examples in my testimony actually involves a would-be jihadi in Queens who was in touch with an ISIS handler overseas in Syria and was getting instructions on how to carry out an attack in New York City.

This is a different level than just the sort-of, so-called, inspired attack. These are a whole new ballgame really in terms of counterterrorism, the level of it is anyway. In that regard, the FBI has, on a number of occasions, shut down such operations. If you go through the public record and courts of law, you will see that on numerous occasions they have confidential informants and those sorts of people sort-of well-placed to disrupt these plots.

In some cases the guys are on the other end of the remote-control attacks here in the United States, really are just sort-of doofuses, to be honest with you, who aren't really all that menacing I don't think. But in some cases they are. In some cases they are a problem. So this is a new sort of phenomenon that the FBI over the last couple years has been dealing with very carefully.

There is some controversy over some of the FBI's tactics. I think that is something that should be actually debated publicly in some of these cases.

Beyond that, you know, beyond looking at that sort-of the individual attackers or the lone attackers, the risk of a professional attack is still out there and when we are talking about well-trained terrorists who are dispatched.

Congressman, at the beginning of the hearing you said, rightly, that we haven't suffered another 9/11-scale-style attack in the United States and we can all be, of course, thankful for that. I think what is often lost in the discourse in the United States and elsewhere is that that is not by any accident. It is not because the threat has totally disappeared or is gone, but is instead the result of military intelligence and law enforcement work that is constantly trying to shut down these threats.

What we do at the Long War Journal is monitor this. Every day there is a story about somebody who is being targeted in counterterrorism operations overseas who may or may not be involved in plotting against the West. In that vein, we all recognize, to a certain extent, the threat that ISIS poses and what they want to do in the West, what they did in November 2015 in Paris, what they would like to do elsewhere.

But al-Qaeda is still very much in the game. There has been a lot of, I would say, erroneous, assessments of al-Qaeda's strength that have floated out there. I am just going to give you a couple data points on that very quickly.

In October 2015, the U.S. military, along with its Afghan allies, raided what is probably the largest al-Qaeda training camp in his-

tory in Afghanistan in the Shorabak district of Kandahar. It was approximately 30 square miles in size, it didn't have any propaganda coming out of there, they didn't want you to know they were there, but they were training a lot of recruits. This speaks to the fact that the al-Qaeda threat in Afghanistan and Pakistan remains there.

I will give you another data point on that. In December 2016, the U.S. military came out and said that they had killed or captured 250 al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan throughout the calendar year 2016. Doesn't sound like a lot, but it is actually two-and-a-half times the high-end estimate that the Obama administration had pushed since 2010 on the number of al-Qaeda operatives in all of Afghanistan. U.S. military also says that they are hunting al-Qaeda operatives in seven provinces in Afghanistan right now.

On top of that, General Nicholson, who runs about the NATO Operations Resolute Support and in charge of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, recently gave an interview in which he said there are plots against U.S. homeland in Afghanistan right now that we are trying to counter.

In October of last year, one of the chief al-Qaeda operatives responsible for that was killed, a guy named Faruq al Qahtani. He was a made man within al-Qaeda circles for many, many years. That was one of his jobs; in addition to fighting the insurgents in Afghanistan, supporting Taliban operations, was to try and plot attacks against the United States.

On top of that, on January 20 this year, Inauguration Day, the Defense Department came out and said they had killed 150 al-Qaeda terrorists since January 1, so just in the first 19 days of January, in Syria. In fact, they were forced to attack a large al-Qaeda training camp that had been in operation since 2013.

We track these operations in Syria and elsewhere to give you a sense of what is going on in the world. We are still killing guys who joined the jihad in 1979 or 1980 or 1981, who are still in the game and are still serving al-Qaeda's cause this many years later. If you don't think that they haven't thought about the replacements or have had plenty of time to groom the replacements, well, then I think we are missing part of the story. These guys have been operating for a long, long time.

Of course, I will leave you one last anecdote on this. Last summer, Brett McGurk, who leads the anti-ISIL coalition, you know, came out in his testimony before the Senate, and he said that in fact al-Qaeda had raised its largest affiliate in history in Syria; answering directly to Ayman al-Zawahiri. There is no doubt in my mind that al-Qaeda heard that. They heard other similar statements that started coming out of the Obama administration and decided to change their name and pretend that they weren't al-Qaeda anymore. This is their famous game. They do this all over the globe.

But that speaks to the fact this is something that we warned about in *Long War Journal* and in these hearings, Congressmen, and elsewhere. They were grooming this huge paramilitary force in Syria. It is very easy for them to redeploy or carve off some part of that to try and attack, plot in the West. They have many obstacles to executing a successful attack in the West, many, OK? There

is no guaranteed assurance that they can actually do this, but the threat is still there.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Joscelyn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS JOSCELYN

FEBRUARY 28, 2017

Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, and other Members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. The terrorist threat has evolved greatly since the September 11, 2001 hijackings. The United States arguably faces a more diverse set of threats today than ever. In my written and oral testimony, I intend to highlight both the scope of these threats, as well as some of what I think are the underappreciated risks.

My key points are as follows:

- The U.S. military and intelligence services have waged a prolific counterterrorism campaign to suppress threats to America. It is often argued that because no large-scale plot has been successful in the United States since 9/11 that the risk of such an attack is overblown. This argument ignores the fact that numerous plots, in various stages of development, have been thwarted since 2001. Meanwhile, Europe has been hit with larger-scale operations. In addition, the United States and its allies frequently target jihadists who are suspected of plotting against the West. America's counterterrorism strategy is mainly intended to disrupt potentially significant operations that are in the pipeline.
- Over the past several years, the U.S. military and intelligence agencies claim to have struck numerous Islamic State (or ISIS) and al-Qaeda "external operatives" in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere. These so-called "external operatives" are involved in anti-Western plotting. Had they not been targeted, it is likely that at least some of their plans would have come to fruition. Importantly, it is likely that many "external operatives" remain in the game, and are still laying the groundwork for attacks in the United States and the West.
- In addition, the Islamic State and al-Qaeda continue to adapt new messages in an attempt to inspire attacks abroad. U.S. law enforcement has been forced to spend significant resources to stop "inspired" plots. As we all know, some of them have not been thwarted. The Islamic State's caliphate declaration in 2014 heightened the threat of inspired attacks, as would-be jihadists were lured to the false promises of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's cause.
- The Islamic State also developed a system for "remote-controlling" attacks in the West and elsewhere. This system relies on digital operatives who connect with aspiring jihadis via social media applications. The Islamic State has had more success with these types of small-scale operations in Europe. But as I explain in my written testimony, the FBI has uncovered a string of plots inside the United States involving these same virtual planners.
- The refugee crisis is predominately a humanitarian concern. The Islamic State has used migrant and refugee flows to infiltrate terrorists into Europe. Both the Islamic State and al-Qaeda could seek to do the same with respect to the United States, however, they have other means for sneaking jihadists into the country as well. While some terrorists have slipped into the West alongside refugees, the United States should remain focused on identifying specific threats.
- More than 15 years after 9/11, al-Qaeda remains poorly understood. Most of al-Qaeda's resources are devoted to waging insurgencies in several countries. But as al-Qaeda's insurgency footprint has spread, so has the organization's capacity for plotting against the West. On 9/11, al-Qaeda's anti-Western plotting was primarily confined to Afghanistan, with logistical support networks in Pakistan, Iran, and other countries. Testifying before the Senate in February 2016, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper warned that the al-Qaeda threat to the West now emanates from multiple countries. Clapper testified that al-Qaeda "nodes in Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkey" are "dedicating resources to planning attacks." To this list we can add Yemen. And jihadists from Africa have been involved in anti-Western plotting as well. Incredibly, al-Qaeda is still plotting against the United States from Afghanistan.

Both the Islamic State and al-Qaeda continue to seek ways to inspire terrorism inside the United States and they are using both new and old messages in pursuit of this goal.

The jihadists have long sought to inspire individuals or small groups of people to commit acts of terrorism for their cause. Individual terrorists are often described as “lone wolves,” but that term is misleading. If a person is acting in the name of a global, ideological cause, then he or she cannot be considered a “lone wolf,” even if the individual in question has zero contact with others. In fact, single attackers often express their support for the jihadists’ cause in ways that show the clear influence of propaganda.

Indeed, al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) first began to aggressively market the idea of “individual” or “lone” operations years ago. AQAP’s *Inspire* magazine is intended to provide would-be jihadists with everything they could need to commit an attack without professional training or contact. Anwar al-Awlaki, an AQAP ideologue who was fluent in English, was an especially effective advocate for these types of plots. Despite the fact that Awlaki was killed in a U.S. airstrike in September 2011, his teachings remain widely available on the internet.

The Islamic State capitalized on the groundwork laid by Awlaki and AQAP. In fact, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s operation took these ideas and aggressively marketed them with an added incentive. Al-Qaeda has told its followers that it wants to eventually resurrect an Islamic caliphate. Beginning in mid-2014, the Islamic State began to tell its followers that it had already done so in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Baghdadi’s so-called caliphate has also instructed followers that it would be better for them to strike inside their home countries in the West, rather than migrate abroad for jihad. The Islamic State has consistently marketed this message.

In May 2016, for instance, Islamic State spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani told followers that if foreign governments “have shut the door of hijrah [migration] in your faces,” then they should “open the door of jihad in theirs,” meaning in the West. “Make your deed a source of their regret,” Adnani continued. “Truly, the smallest act you do in their lands is more beloved to us than the biggest act done here; it is more effective for us and more harmful to them.”¹

“If one of you wishes and strives to reach the lands of the Islamic State,” Adnani told his audience, “then each of us wishes to be in your place to make examples of the crusaders, day and night, scaring them and terrorizing them, until every neighbor fears his neighbor.” Adnani told jihadists that they should “not make light of throwing a stone at a crusader in his land,” nor should they “underestimate any deed, as its consequences are great for the mujahidin and its effect is noxious to the disbelievers.”²

The Islamic State continued to push this message after Adnani’s death in August 2016.

In at least several cases, we have seen individual jihadists who were first influenced by Awlaki and AQAP gravitate to the Islamic State’s cause. Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife were responsible for the December 2, 2015 San Bernardino massacre. They pledged allegiance to Baghdadi on social media, but Farook had drawn inspiration from Awlaki and AQAP’s *Inspire* years earlier.³

Omar Mateen swore allegiance to Baghdadi repeatedly on the night of his assault on a LGBT nightclub in Orlando, Florida. However, a Muslim who knew Mateen previously reported to the FBI that Mateen was going down the extremist path. He told the FBI in 2014 that Mateen was watching Awlaki’s videos.⁴ It was not until approximately 2 years later, in early June 2016, that Mateen killed 49 people and wounded dozens more in the name of the supposed caliphate.

Ahmad Khan Rahami, the man who allegedly planted bombs throughout New York and New Jersey in September 2016, left behind a notebook. In it, Rahami mentioned Osama bin Laden, “guidance” from Awlaki, an also referenced Islamic State spokesman Adnani. Federal prosecutors wrote in the complaint that Rahami

¹ Thomas Joscelyn, “References to the Islamic State omitted from Chelsea bombing complaint,” *FDD’s Long War Journal*, September 21, 2016. (<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/reference-to-islamic-state-omitted-from-chelsea-bombing-complaint.php>).

² *Ibid.*

³ U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, “California Man Charged with Conspiring to Provide Material Support to Terrorism and Being ‘Straw Purchaser’ of Assault Rifles Ultimately Used in San Bernardino, California, Attack,” December 17, 2015. (<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/california-man-charged-conspiring-provide-material-support-terrorism-and-being-straw>); See also: Thomas Joscelyn, “San Bernardino terrorists allegedly studied AQAP’s *Inspire* magazine, pledged allegiance to Baghdadi,” *FDD’s Long War Journal*, December 17, 2015. (<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/12/san-bernardino-terrorists-allegedly-studied-aqaps-inspire-magazine-pledged-allegiance-to-baghdadi.php>).

⁴ Mohammed A. Malik, “I reported Omar Mateen to the FBI. Trump is wrong that Muslims don’t do our part,” *The Washington Post*, June 20, 2016. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/06/20/i-reported-omar-mateen-to-the-fbi-trump-is-wrong-that-muslims-dont-do-our-part/?utm_term=.dec89331c2fb).

specifically wrote about “the instructions of terrorist leaders that, if travel is infeasible, to attack nonbelievers where they live.”⁵ This was Adnani’s key message, and remains a theme in Islamic State propaganda.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) has alleged that other individuals who sought to support the Islamic State were first exposed to Awlaki’s teachings as well.⁶

These cases demonstrate that the jihadis have developed a well of ideas from which individual adherents can draw, but it may take years for them to act on these beliefs, if they ever act on them at all. There is no question that the Islamic State has had greater success of late in influencing people to act in its name. But al-Qaeda continues to produce recruiting materials and to experiment with new concepts for individual attacks as well.

Al-Qaeda and its branches have recently called for revenge for Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, who died in a U.S. prison earlier this month. Rahman was convicted by a U.S. court for his involvement in plots against New York City landmarks in the mid-1990’s. Since then, al-Qaeda has used Rahman’s “will” to prophesize his death and to proactively blame the United States for it. Approximately 20 years after al-Qaeda first started pushing this theme, Rahman finally died. Al-Qaeda’s continued use of Rahman’s prediction, which is really just jihadist propaganda, demonstrates how these groups can use the same concepts for years, whether or not the facts are consistent with their messaging. Al-Qaeda also recently published a kidnapping guide based on old lectures by Saif al Adel, a senior figure in the group. Al Adel may or may not be currently in Syria. Al-Qaeda is using his lectures on kidnappings and hostage operations as a way to potentially teach others how to carry them out. The guide was published in both Arabic and English, meaning that al-Qaeda seeks an audience in the West for al Adel’s designs.

Both the Islamic State and AQAP also continue to produce English-language magazines for on-line audiences. The 15th issue of *Inspire*, which was released last year, provided instructions for carrying out “professional assassinations.” AQAP has been creating lists of high-profile targets in the United States and elsewhere that they hope supporters will use in selecting potential victims. AQAP’s idea is to maximize the impact of “lone” attacks by focusing on wealthy businessmen or other well-known individuals. AQAP has advocated for, and praised, indiscriminate attacks as well. But the group has critiqued some attacks (such as the Orlando massacre at a LGBT nightclub) for supposedly muddying the jihadists’ message. AQAP is trying to lay the groundwork for more targeted operations. For example, the January 2015 assault on Charlie Hebdo’s offices in Paris was set in motion by al-Qaeda and AQAP. *Inspire* even specifically identified the intended victims beforehand. Al-Qaeda would like individual actors, with no foreign ties, to emulate such precise hits.

Meanwhile, the Islamic State has lowered the bar for what is considered a successful attack, pushing people to use cars, knives, or whatever weapons they can get in their hands. The Islamic State claimed that both the September 2016 mall stabbings in Minnesota and the vehicular assault at Ohio State University in November 2016 were the work of its “soldiers.”⁷ It may be the case that there were no digital ties between these attackers and the Islamic State. However, there is often more to the story of how the Islamic State guides such small-scale operations.

The Islamic State has sought to carry out attacks inside the United States via “remote-controlled” terrorists.

A series of attacks in Europe and elsewhere around the globe have been carried out by jihadists who were in contact, via social media applications, with Islamic State handlers in Syria and Iraq.⁸ The so-called caliphate’s members have been able

⁵ Thomas Joscelyn, “References to the Islamic State omitted from Chelsea bombing complaint,” *FDD’s Long War Journal*, September 21, 2016. (<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/reference-to-islamic-state-omitted-from-chelsea-bombing-complaint.php>).

⁶ The DOJ made this allegation in the cases involving Emanuel Lutchman and Mohamed Bailor Jalloh, as well as others. The Lutchman and Jalloh cases are discussed briefly below.

⁷ See: Thomas Joscelyn, “Islamic State claims its ‘soldier’ was responsible for stabbings in Minnesota,” *FDD’s Long War Journal*, September 18, 2016. (<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/islamic-state-claims-soldier-responsible-stabbings-in-minnesota.php>); Thomas Joscelyn, “Islamic State claims its ‘soldier’ carried out Ohio State attack,” *FDD’s Long War Journal*, November 29, 2016. (<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/11/islamic-state-claims-its-soldier-carried-out-ohio-state-attack.php>).

⁸ For more on the Islamic State’s “remote-controlled” attacks, see: Rukmini Callimachi, “Not Lone Wolves’ After All: How ISIS Guides World’s Terror Plots From Afar,” *The New York Times*, February 4, 2017. (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/world/asia/isis-messaging-app-terror-plot.html?_r=0); Thomas Joscelyn, “Terror plots in Germany, France were ‘remote-controlled’ by Islamic State operatives,” *FDD’s Long War Journal*, September 24, 2016. (<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/terror-plots-in-germany-france-were-remote-controlled-by-islamic-state-operatives.php>); Bridget Moreng, “ISIS’ Virtual Puppeteers,” *Foreign Af-*

to remotely guide willing recruits through small-scale plots that did not require much sophistication. These plots targeted victims in France, Germany, Russia, and other countries. In some cases, terrorists have received virtual support right up until the moment of their attack. The Islamic State has had more success orchestrating “remote-controlled” plots in Europe, but the jihadist group has also tried to carry out similar plots inside the United States.⁹

Since 2015, if not earlier, the U.S.-led coalition has launched airstrikes against the Islamic State operatives responsible for these operations. Jihadists such as Rachid Kassim, Junaid Hussain, and Abu Issa al Amriki have all been targeted. Both Hussain and al Amriki sought to “remotely-control” attacks inside the United States. They have reached into other countries as well. For example, British Prime Minister David Cameron connected Hussain to plots in the United Kingdom.¹⁰ And Hussain’s wife, Sally Jones, has also reportedly used the web to connect with female recruits.

Kassim was tracked to a location near Mosul, Iraq earlier this month.¹¹ Hussain was killed in an American airstrike in Raqqa, Syria on August 24, 2015. Along with his wife, al Amriki perished in an airstrike near Al Bab, Syria on April 22, 2016.¹² But law enforcement officials are still dealing with their legacy and it is possible that others will continue with their methods.

In this section, I will briefly outline several cases in which Hussain and al Amriki were in contact with convicted or suspected terror recruits inside the United States. In a number of cases, the FBI has used confidential informants or other methods in sting operations to stop these recruits. It should be noted that it is not always clear how much of a threat a suspect really posed and the press has questioned the FBI’s methods in some of these cases.¹³ I have included the examples below to demonstrate how the Islamic State’s digital operatives have contacted potential jihadists across the United States.

For example, Hussain was likely in contact with the two gunmen who opened fire at an event dedicated to drawing pictures of the Prophet Mohammed in Garland, Texas on May 3, 2015. As first reported by the SITE Intelligence Group, Hussain (tweeting under one of his aliases) quickly claimed the gunmen were acting on behalf of the caliphate. Then, in June 2015, Hussain claimed on Twitter that he had encouraged Usaamah Rahim, an Islamic State supporter, to carry a knife in case anyone attempted to arrest him. Rahim was shot and killed by police in Boston after allegedly wielding the blade. The DOJ subsequently confirmed that Rahim was “was communicating with [Islamic State] members overseas, including Junaid Hussain.”¹⁴

faairs, September 21, 2016. (<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-09-21/isis-virtual-puppeteers>); Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, “Bloody Ramadan: How the Islamic State Coordinated a Global Terrorist Campaign,” *War on the Rocks*, July 20, 2016. (<https://warontherocks.com/2016/07/bloody-ramadan-how-the-islamic-state-coordinated-a-global-terrorist-campaign/>).

⁹ In this section, I briefly summarize a number of Islamic State attempts to remote-control terrorists in the United States. Seamus Hughes and Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens have a forthcoming piece on the same topic in the CTC Sentinel (March 2017) entitled, “Understanding the role of Virtual Entrepreneurs in Islamic State-Inspired Terrorism in the United States: The Evidence from Criminal Cases.” According to one of the authors, their study will document the Islamic State’s “systematic approach” to “enable homeland attacks through continuous communications with would-be American jihadis.”

¹⁰ Thomas Joscelyn, “Prime Minister says 2 British nationals killed in airstrikes were plotting attacks,” *FDD’s Long War Journal*, September 7, 2015. (<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/09/prime-minister-says-2-british-nationals-killed-in-airstrikes-were-plotting-attacks.php>).

¹¹ Thomas Joscelyn, “U.S.-led coalition targeted key online operative for Islamic State near Mosul,” *FDD’s Long War Journal*, February 11, 2017. (<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/02/us-led-coalition-targeted-key-online-operative-for-islamic-state-near-mosul.php>).

¹² U.S. Department of Defense, Press Release, “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” May 5, 2016. (<https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/752789/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-pentagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-in>).

¹³ For example, *The New York Times* cited the Lutchman and Sullivan cases discussed in this section as examples of the FBI’s “aggressive methods.” *The Times* described Lutchman as a “mentally ill panhandler” with “no money.” See: Eric Lichtblau, “F.B.I. Steps Up Use of Stings in ISIS Cases,” *The New York Times*, June 7, 2016. (<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/us/fbi-isis-terrorism-stings.html>).

¹⁴ U.S. Attorney’s Office District of Massachusetts, Press Release, “Everett Man Alleged to Support ISIL Charged with Additional Charge of Obstructing Justice,” February 15, 2017.

On July 7, 2016, Munir Abdulkader, of West Chester, Ohio, pleaded guilty to various terrorism-related charges. According to the DOJ, Abdulkader communicated with Hussain, who “directed and encouraged Abdulkader to plan and execute a violent attack within the United States.” In conversations with both Hussain and a “confidential human source,” Abdulkader discussed a plot “to kill an identified military employee on account of his position with the U.S. Government.” Abdulkader planned to abduct “the employee at the employee’s home” and then film this person’s execution. After murdering the military employee, Abdulkader “planned to perpetrate a violent attack on a police station in the Southern District of Ohio using firearms and Molotov cocktails.”¹⁵ Hussain repeatedly encouraged Islamic State followers to attack U.S. military personnel, just as Abdulkader planned.

On August 11, 2016, Emanuel Lutchman of Rochester, New York pleaded guilty to conspiring to provide material support to the Islamic State as part of a planned New Year’s Eve attack.¹⁶ Lutchman admittedly conspired with Abu Issa al Amriki after he “initiated on-line contact” with the Islamic State planner on Christmas day 2015. “In a series of subsequent communications,” DOJ noted, al Amriki “told Lutchman to plan an attack on New Year’s Eve and kill a number of kuffar [non-believers].” Al Amriki wanted Lutchman “to write something before the attack and give it to” an Islamic State member, “so that after the attack the [Islamic State] member could post it on-line to announce Lutchman’s allegiance” to the so-called caliphate. Lutchman wanted to join the Islamic State overseas, but al Amriki encouraged him to strike inside the United States, as it would better serve the jihadists’ cause. “New years [sic] is here soon,” al Amriki typed to Lutchman. “Do operations and kill some kuffar.”¹⁷ Al Amriki also promised Lutchman some assistance in traveling to Syria or Libya, if the conditions were right. Lutchman divulged his contacts with al Amriki to individuals who, “unbeknownst to Lutchman,” were “cooperating with the FBI.”

On November 7, 2016, Aaron Travis Daniels, also known as Harun Muhammad and Abu Yusef, was arrested at an airport in Columbus, Ohio. He was reportedly en route to Trinidad, but he allegedly intended to travel to Libya for jihad. According to DOJ, Daniels was in contact with Abu Issa al Amriki, who acted as a “recruiter and external attack planner.” Daniels said at one point that it was al Amriki who “suggested” he go to Libya “to support jihad” and he allegedly “wired money to an intermediary” for al Amriki.¹⁸ The DOJ did not allege that Daniels planned to commit an attack in Ohio or elsewhere inside the United States. Still, the allegations are significant because Daniels was allegedly in contact with al Amriki.

On November 29, 2016, Justin Nojan Sullivan, of Morganton, North Carolina, pleaded guilty to terrorism-related charges.¹⁹ “Sullivan was in contact and plotted with now-deceased Syria-based terrorist Junaid Hussain to execute acts of mass violence in the United States in the name of the” Islamic State, Acting Assistant Attor-

(<https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/everett-man-alleged-support-isil-charged-additional-charge-obstructing-justice>).

¹⁵ U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, “Cincinnati-Area Man Pleads Guilty to Plot to Attack U.S. Government Officers,” July 7, 2016. (<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/cincinnati-area-man-pleads-guilty-plot-attack-us-government-officers>); see also: Thomas Joscelyn, “Ohio man conspired with Islamic State recruiter, Justice Department says,” *FDD’s Long War Journal*, July 7, 2016. (<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/07/ohio-man-conspired-with-islamic-state-recruiter-justice-department-says.php>).

¹⁶ U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, “New York Man Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to ISIL in Connection with Planned New Year’s Eve Attack,” August 11, 2016. (<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/new-york-man-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-provide-material-support-isil-connection-planned-new>).

¹⁷ U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, “New York Man Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to ISIL in Connection with Planned New Year’s Eve Attack,” August 11, 2016. (<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/new-york-man-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-provide-material-support-isil-connection-planned-new>).

¹⁸ U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, “Ohio Man Arrested for Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIL,” November 7, 2016. (<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ohio-man-arrested-attempting-provide-material-support-isil>); See also: Thomas Joscelyn, “Ohio man allegedly communicated with an Islamic State ‘external attack planner,’” *FDD’s Long War Journal*, November 8, 2016. (<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/11/ohio-man-allegedly-communicated-with-an-islamic-state-external-attack-planner.php>).

¹⁹ U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, “North Carolina Man Pleads Guilty to Attempting to Commit An Act of Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries,” November 29, 2016. (<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/north-carolina-man-pleads-guilty-attempting-commit-act-terrorism-transcending-national>); See also: Thomas Joscelyn, “North Carolina man pleads guilty to conspiring with Islamic State recruiter,” *FDD’s Long War Journal*, November 29, 2016. (<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/11/north-carolina-man-pleads-guilty-to-conspiring-with-islamic-state-recruiter.php>).

ney General for National Security Mary B. McCord said in a statement.²⁰ Sullivan and Hussain “conspired” to “plan mass shooting attacks in North Carolina and Virginia,” with Sullivan intending “to kill hundreds of innocent people.”

On February 10, 2017, the DOJ announced that two New York City residents, Munther Omar Saleh and Fareed Mumuni, pleaded guilty to terror-related charges.²¹ “Working with [Islamic State] fighters located overseas, Saleh and Mumuni also coordinated their plot to conduct a terrorist attack in New York City,” the DOJ explained. Saleh, from Queens, sought and received instructions from an [Islamic State] attack facilitator to create a pressure-cooker bomb and discussed with the same [Islamic State] attack facilitator potential targets for a terrorist attack in New York City.” Saleh “also sought and received religious authorization from an [Islamic State] fighter permitting Mumuni to conduct a suicide ‘martyrdom’ attack by using a pressure-cooker bomb against law enforcement officers who were following the co-conspirators and thus preventing them from traveling to join” the Islamic State.²² Federal prosecutors revealed that the “attack facilitator” Saleh was talking to was, in fact, Junaid Hussain.²³

Also on February 10, 2017, Mohamed Bailor Jalloh, a Virginia man and former member of the Army National Guard, was sentenced to 11 years in prison and 5 years supervised release for attempting to provide material support to the Islamic State.²⁴ According to the DOJ, Jalloh was in contact with Islamic State members both in person and on-line. He met Islamic State members in Nigeria during a “6-month trip to Africa” and also “began communicating on-line with” an Islamic State member located overseas during this time. The Islamic State member “brokered” Jalloh’s “introduction” to the FBI’s confidential human source. This means the U.S. Government’s intelligence was so good in this case that the digital handler was actually fooled into leading Jalloh into a dead-end. Still, Jalloh considered “conducting an attack similar to the terrorist attack at Ft. Hood, Texas,” which left 13 people dead and dozens more wounded.

More than 15 years after the 9/11 hijackings, al-Qaeda is still plotting against the United States

Al-Qaeda has not been able to replicate its most devastating attack in history, the September 11, 2001 hijackings. But this does not mean the al-Qaeda threat has disappeared. Instead, al-Qaeda has evolved. There are multiple explanations for why the United States has not been struck with another 9/11-style, mass casualty operation.²⁵ These reasons include: The inherent difficulty in planning large-scale attacks, America’s improved defenses, and a prolific counterterrorism campaign overseas.

In addition, contrary to a widely-held assumption in counterterrorism circles, al-Qaeda has not made striking the United States its sole priority. In fact, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has even ordered his men in Syria to stand down at times, as they prioritized the war against Bashar al Assad’s regime over bombings, hijackings, or other assaults in the West. However, Zawahiri could change his calculation at any time, and it would then be up to America’s intelligence and law enforcement officials to detect and thwart specific plots launched from Syria. One additional caveat here is warranted. Despite the fact that Zawahiri has not given the final green light for an anti-Western operation launched from Syrian soil, al-Qaeda has been laying the groundwork for such attacks in Syria and elsewhere. There is a risk that al-Qaeda could seek to launch Mumbai-style attacks in American or Eu-

²⁰ U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, “North Carolina Man Pleads Guilty to Attempting to Commit An Act of Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries,” November 29, 2016. (<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/north-carolina-man-pleads-guilty-attempting-commit-act-terrorism-transcending-national>).

²¹ U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, “Two New York City Residents Pleaded Guilty to All Charges in Terrorism Case,” February 10, 2017. (<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-new-york-city-residents-pleaded-guilty-all-charges-terrorism-case>).

²² U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, “Two New York City Residents Pleaded Guilty to All Charges in Terrorism Case,” February 10, 2017. (<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-new-york-city-residents-pleaded-guilty-all-charges-terrorism-case>).

²³ “New York man Munther Omar Saleh admits plotting to help ISIS,” *CBS News*, February 10, 2017. (<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/new-york-man-munther-omar-saleh-admits-isis/>).

²⁴ U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, “Former Army National Guardsman Sentenced to 11 Years for Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIL,” February 10, 2017. (<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-army-national-guardsman-sentenced-11-years-attempting-provide-material-support-isil>).

²⁵ The discussion here is specifically focused on larger-scale plots, recognizing that both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have inspired or influenced multiple, smaller-scale operations in the United States since 9/11.

ropean cities, bomb trains or other mass transit locations, plant sophisticated explosives on Western airliners, or dream up some other horrible attack.

In September 2014, the Obama administration announced that it launched airstrikes against al-Qaeda's so-called "Khorasan Group" in Syria. There was some confusion surrounding this group. The Khorasan Shura is an elite body within al-Qaeda and part of this group is dedicated to launching "external operations," that is, attacks in the West. Several significant leaders in the Khorasan Group were previously based in Iran, where al-Qaeda maintains a core facilitation hub. In fact, at least two Khorasan figures previously headed al-Qaeda's Iran-based network, which shuttles operatives throughout the Middle East and sometimes into the West. As I have previously testified before this committee, some foiled al-Qaeda plots against the West were facilitated by operatives based in Iran.²⁶

Al-Qaeda began relocating senior operatives to Syria in 2011. And the United States has targeted known or obscure al-Qaeda veterans in Syria in the years since, often citing their presumed threat to the United States and the West. I will not list all of these operatives here, but we regularly track the al-Qaeda figures targeted in drone strikes at *FDD's Long War Journal*.

During the final months of the Obama administration, American military and intelligence officials highlighted al-Qaeda's continued plotting against the United States on multiple occasions. And there was also a shift in America's air campaign, from targeted strikes on individual al-Qaeda operatives in Syria to bombings intended to destroy whole training camps or other facilities. In addition, the U.S. Treasury and State Departments began to designate terrorist leaders within al-Qaeda's branch in Syria who may not play any direct role in international operations. This change in tactics reflects the realization that al-Qaeda has built its largest paramilitary force in history in Syria. And while only part of this force may have an eye on the West, there is often no easy way to delineate between jihadists involved in al-Qaeda's insurgency operations and those who are participating in plots against America or European nations.²⁷

In October 2016, the Defense Department announced that the United States had carried out "transregional" airstrikes against al-Qaeda's "external" operatives in Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda "doesn't recognize borders when they conspire to commit terrorist attacks against the West, and we will continue to work with our partners and allies to find and destroy their leaders, their fighters and their cells that are planning attacks externally," Pentagon spokesman Navy Capt. Jeff Davis said shortly after the bombings. Davis added that some of al-Qaeda's "external" plotters enjoyed a "friendly, hospitable environment" within al-Nusrah Front, which was the name used by al-Qaeda's guerrilla army in Syria until mid-2016. Davis added that the jihadists targeted "are people who are from outside Syria in many cases and who are focused on external operations."²⁸

The Pentagon provided short descriptions for each of the al-Qaeda operatives targeted in October 2016. On October 17, Haydar Kirkan was killed in Idlib, Syria. He was "a long-serving and experienced facilitator and courier for al-Qaeda in Syria," who "had ties to al-Qaeda senior leaders, including Osama bin Laden." Davis added that Kirkan "was al-Qaeda's senior external terror attack planner in Syria, Turkey, and Europe."²⁹ Kirkan oversaw a significant network inside Turkey.³⁰ The United States has killed a number of individuals with backgrounds similar to Kirkan since 2014.

On October 21, an AQAP leader known as Abu Hadi al-Bayhani and four others were killed in a U.S. airstrike in Yemen's Marib Governorate. The Pentagon tied al-Bayhani to AQAP's "external" plotting, noting that the al-Qaeda arm relies on

²⁶ See my testimony during the May 22, 2013 subcommittee hearing: Thomas Joscelyn, "Assessing the Threat to the Homeland from al Qaeda Operations in Iran and Syria," Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, May 22, 2013. (<http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20130522/100901/HHRG-113-HM05-WState-JoscelynT-920130522.pdf>).

²⁷ Most of al-Qaeda's paramilitary fighters in Syria will remain focused on the war against Bashar al Assad's regime and Assad's allies. However, some of the key al-Qaeda operatives killed in U.S. drone strikes have played multiple roles within the organization, meaning they can walk (fight on the ground in Syria) and chew gum (plot against the West) at the same time. And training facilities can be used for these dual purposes.

²⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, Press Release, "Transregional Strikes Hit al-Qaida Leaders in Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan," November 2, 2016. (<https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/994180/transregional-strikes-hit-al-qaida-leaders-in-syria-yemen-afghanistan>).

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Thomas Joscelyn, "Pentagon: Al Qaeda veteran in Syria was planning attacks against the West," *FDD's Long War Journal*, November 2, 2016. (<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/11/al-qaeda-veteran-in-syria-was-planning-attacks-against-the-west.php>).

“leaders like Bayhani to build and maintain safe havens” from which it “plans external operations.”³¹

Then, on October 23, two senior al-Qaeda leaders, Farouq al-Qahtani and Bilal al-Utabi, were killed in airstrikes in Afghanistan. Qahtani was one of al-Qaeda’s most prominent figures in the Afghan insurgency, as he was the group’s emir for eastern Afghanistan and coordinated operations with the Taliban. Osama bin Laden’s files indicate that Qahtani was responsible for re-establishing al-Qaeda’s safe havens in Afghanistan in 2010, if not earlier.³² But Qahtani was also tasked with plotting attacks in the West.

General John W. Nicholson, the Commander of NATO’s Resolute Support and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, described the threat posed by Qahtani in a recent interview with the CTC Sentinel, a publication produced by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.³³ Gen. Nicholson described Qahtani as al-Qaeda’s “external operations director,” saying that he was “actively involved in the last year in plotting attacks against the United States.” Nicholson added this warning: “There’s active plotting against our homeland going on in Afghanistan. If we relieve pressure on this system, then they’re going to be able to advance their work more quickly than they would otherwise.”³⁴

Kirkan, Bayhani, and Qahtani are just some of the men involved in anti-Western plotting who have been killed in recent bombings. And these targeted airstrikes are just part of the picture.

In October 2015, the United States and its Afghan allies destroyed what was probably the largest al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan’s history in the Shorabak district of Kandahar.³⁵ The facility was an estimated 30 square miles in size, making it bigger than any of al-Qaeda’s pre-9/11 camps.

The U.S. military says that approximately 250 al-Qaeda operatives were killed or captured in Afghanistan in 2016.³⁶ This is far more than the U.S. Government’s long-standing estimate for al-Qaeda’s entire force structure in all of Afghanistan. For years, U.S. officials claimed there was just 50 to 100 al-Qaeda jihadists throughout the entire country.

On January 20, the Defense Department announced that “more than 150 al-Qaeda terrorists” had been killed in Syria since the beginning of 2017.³⁷ In addition to individual terrorists involved in plotting against the West, the United States struck the Shaykh Sulayman training camp, which had been “operational since at least 2013.”

The reality is that al-Qaeda now operates large training camps in more countries today than on 9/11. The next 9/11-style plotters could be in those camps, or fighting in jihadist insurgencies, right now. If so, it will be up to America’s offensive counterterrorism campaign and its defenses to stop them.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Joscelyn.

Our next witness is Robin Simcox. Mr. Simcox specializes in terrorism and National security analysis as the Margaret Thatcher fellow at the Heritage Foundation. Prior to joining Heritage last year, he was a research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, a for-

³¹ U.S. Department of Defense, Press Release, “Transregional Strikes Hit al-Qaida Leaders in Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan,” November 2, 2016. (<https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/994180/transregional-strikes-hit-al-qaida-leaders-in-syria-yemen-afghanistan>).

³² Thomas Joscelyn, “Treasury designates head of al-Qaeda’s eastern zone in Afghanistan,” *FDD’s Long War Journal*, February 10, 2016. (<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/02/treasury-designates-head-of-al-qaedas-eastern-zone-in-afghanistan.php>).

³³ Brian Dodwell and Don Rassler, “A view from the CT foxhole: General John W. Nicholson, Commander, Resolute Support and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan,” *CTC Sentinel*, February 22, 2017. (<https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-view-from-the-ct-foxhole-general-john-w-nicholson-commander-resolute-support-and-u-s-forces-afghanistan>).

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, “U.S. military strikes large al-Qaeda training camps in southern Afghanistan,” *FDD’s Long War Journal*, October 13, 2015. (<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/10/us-military-strikes-large-al-qaeda-training-camps-in-southern-afghanistan.php>).

³⁶ Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, “U.S. military: 250 al-Qaeda operatives killed or captured in Afghanistan this year,” *FDD’s Long War Journal*, December 14, 2016. (<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/12/us-military-250-al-qaeda-operatives-killed-or-captured-in-afghanistan-this-year.php>).

³⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, Press Release, “U.S. Airstrike Kills More Than 100 al-Qaida Fighters in Syria,” January 20, 2017. (<https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1055727/us-airstrike-kills-more-than-100-al-qaida-fighters-in-syria>).

eign policy think tank in London. He also has testified several times before this committee on terror threats and radicalization.

His work has been published in multiple newspapers and magazines, including *The Washington Post*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *the Atlantic*, West Point's *Counterterrorism Center Sentinel*, and *The Weekly Standard*. Mr. Simcox received a masters of science degree in U.S. foreign policy from the Institute for the Study of Americas, University of London, and a bachelor of arts degree in international history from the University of Leeds. He is originally from England, he currently resides in Washington, DC.

It is good to have you back and you are recognized for your testimony.

STATEMENT OF ROBIN SIMCOX, MARGARET THATCHER FELLOW, MARGARET THATCHER CENTER FOR FREEDOM, DAVIS INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY, HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Mr. SIMCOX. Thank you, Chairman King, distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today.

My goal is to highlight just some of the issues which have hindered U.S. counterterrorism efforts in recent years. Allow me to suggest three specific areas to which the United States could devote more attention.

The first area lies in defining the enemy. The United States dedicates a huge amount of resources to counterterrorism, yet U.S. policy makers and, arguably, us as a society, seem to be no closer to a consensus on where the source of this terrorist threat emerges from and who exactly our real adversaries are. President Trump refers to the enemy as radical Islamic terrorism. If this is the lexicon to be used, then serious thought needs to be given to what constitutes a radical Islamic terrorist.

I am sure we can all agree that it includes al-Qaeda and ISIS, yet al-Qaeda and ISIS are manifestations of a broader Islamist movement. The ideology that propels these groups transcends the tens of thousands of their fighters that the United States is most fixated upon in the short term. So are we just focused on those willing to use violence to achieve their goals or should our ambitions be grander?

For example, there is currently a discussion over whether to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. Yet whether the United States does so or not cannot deflect from the broader questions that must be answered, such as, are we aiming to defeat or discredit all forms of political Islam? If so, how do we reconcile this aim with broader diplomatic goals? After all, not so long ago, the Brotherhood came to power in Tunisia and Egypt. So do we need different strategies to deal with Islamism at home and abroad?

What about those Salafists whose ideology we may find harmful and socially divisive, but who say they are non-political? I don't think a lot of serious thought has gone into some of these questions over recent years, and I think it might be worthwhile beginning to do so.

The second area lies with the Countering Violent Extremism, CVE, initiative. Accordance of Department for Homeland Security, CVE aims to address the root causes of violent extremism by providing resources to communities to build and sustain local prevention efforts and promote the use of counter narratives to confront violent extremist messaging on-line. CVE should not be dismissed out of hand, but it should also be limited in scope and the United States must develop robust ways of measuring the success of its initiatives. Otherwise, there is a possibility that the United States makes the same mistakes some of its allies have made with such programs.

Let me provide an example of this from the United Kingdom. So clearly, it is only Muslims who have the knowledge and credibility within their communities to tackle Islamist extremism most effectively, yet CVE partners should also be supportive of some very basic principles, such as a belief in democracy, religious freedom, equality, and freedom of speech. In the United Kingdom, this was not the case. Too much trust was placed in certain groups claiming to be representative of British Muslim opinion, yet organizationally and ideologically tied to Islamist groups in South Asia and North Africa.

Such groups did not adhere to basic British values, yet they gained the ear of the government and worked to shut down conversation about any ideological and theological roots of terrorism and instead pushed an agenda that placed acts of terrorism solely at the door of U.S. and U.K. foreign policy. The legacy of this continues to hamper U.K. policy in this area today, and I fear a similar thing could happen in the United States.

The third area lies with encouraging reform from key international partners. ISIS would clearly like to carry out a terrorist attack in the United States. So far, however, there are no known cases of ISIS operatives being able to infiltrate the United States from abroad and then commit such an attack. This is not the case in Europe, however, where ISIS has had far more success. This has a clear relevance to the United States.

Approximately over 1½ million American citizens live in Europe and that is not even counting all those who live on military bases. Americans have already been killed in terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, Brussels in March 2016, and Nice in July 2016. Unfortunately, European countries that are threatened by ISIS usually do not have sufficiently robust counterterrorism defenses in place.

Therefore, the United States must do what it can to protect its citizens by encouraging certain European partners to spend more money on counterterrorism efforts, reform their complex intelligence apparatuses, and to take a more robust approach to law and order and border security.

These are just some of the challenges U.S. security policy must address. Yet by working with its allies abroad, a multi-pronged and nuanced approach to the threat at home and a clearer understanding of the ideology that threatens the United States, some headway can be made.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today, and I look forward to your questions and comments.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Simcox follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBIN SIMCOX

FEBRUARY 24, 2017

Chairman King and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify here today.

My name is Robin Simcox. I am the Margaret Thatcher fellow at the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom at The Heritage Foundation. My responsibilities at The Heritage Foundation consist of research on terrorism and security policy, issues I have published and written widely on for almost 10 years, both here in the United States and in Europe. The views I express in this testimony are my own and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation.

My goal in this testimony is to highlight just some issues which have hindered either U.S. homeland security counterterrorism efforts or presented a threat to American lives in recent years. Allow me to suggest three specific areas which the United States could devote more attention and ultimately decrease the threat posed to American citizens.

DEFINE THE ENEMY

The United States dedicates a huge amount of resources to counterterrorism. This issue is now part of the National conversation. It was discussed endlessly on the campaign trail and virtually every day in National newspapers. Yet the U.S. Government, and arguably us as a society, seem to be no closer to identifying who exactly it is we are fighting. We talk about needing to win the war of ideas—yet against precisely which ideas?

President Trump refers to the enemy as “radical Islamic terrorism.” He has received criticism from some for speaking so bluntly, but at least there is an attempt to define who or what the United States is trying to defeat in terms that most of the country understands. However, if this is the lexicon to be used, then serious thought needs to be given to what constitutes a radical Islamic terrorist.

I am sure we can all agree that al-Qaeda and ISIS constitute the enemy. They are the most pressing security threats and need to be treated with the utmost seriousness. Yet the unpleasant reality is that the ideology that propels these groups transcends the tens of thousands of their fighters that the United States is most fixated upon in the short term.

In this context, we need to give greater thought to movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood. There is currently discussion over whether to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.¹ The Brotherhood share almost identical goals to terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS but with key differences regarding the use of violence in achieving these goals.

Yet whether the United States bans the Brotherhood or not cannot deflect from the broader questions that must be answered. Are we just focused on those willing to use violence to achieve their goals? What forms of Salafism constitute a threat? Are we aiming to defeat all forms of political Islam? If so, how do we reconcile this aim with broader diplomatic goals, such as when the Muslim Brotherhood came to power in Tunisia? What about other Islamist parties that could feasibly end up governing countries?

These are key questions to consider. As one Heritage Foundation report argues, “Countering the illiberal agendas of Islamist parties is vital to protecting American core national security interests. Islamists often pursue policies that undermine individual freedoms and lead to discrimination, repression, and violence against religious minority groups and women. Their lenient policies toward terrorist groups also undercut U.S. counterterrorism measures and encourage a permissive environment for extremists to plot, plan, and train for international terrorist attacks.”²

¹ For example, see Peter Baker, “White House Weighs Terrorist Designation for Muslim Brotherhood,” *The New York Times*, February 7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/world/middleeast/muslim-brotherhood-terrorism-trump.html?_r=0 (accessed February 23, 2017); Eric Trager, “The U.S. Should Be Wary About Overplaying Its Hand,” *The Cipher Brief*, February 9, 2017, <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/middle-east/us-should-be-wary-about-overplaying-its-hand-1089> (accessed February 23, 2017); and Lorenzo Vidino, “Why the United States Should Be as Circumspect as the British About the Muslim Brotherhood Ban,” *Lawfare*, February 12, 2017, <https://lawfareblog.com/why-united-states-should-be-circumspect-british-about-muslim-brotherhood> (accessed February 23, 2017).

² Lisa Curtis, Charlotte Florance, Walter Lohman, and James Phillips, “Pursuing a Freedom Agenda Amidst Rising Global Islamism,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 159, Novem-

The previous administration took a minimalist approach focused very narrowly on the violent Islamists of ISIS, al-Qaeda, and their belief system. My preference would be for a much broader approach. ISIS, al-Qaeda, and their supporters are manifestations of a broader Islamist movement. It is vital, therefore, that the appeal of the ideology of Islamism itself is undermined.

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM (CVE)

According to the Department for Homeland Security website, “CVE aims to address the root causes of violent extremism by providing resources to communities to build and sustain local prevention efforts and promote the use of counter-narratives to confront violent extremist messaging on-line.”³

This is a worthy cause and one that is not always well-understood. Establishing lines of dialog between local Muslim communities, local government, and the police, or providing alternative pathways for potential radicals—particularly the young—should be one option among many in reducing the threat posed by Islamism. Indeed, this kind of work is being pursued in various forms by governments across the West.

Yet such programs should be an occasional complement to law enforcement efforts and not a replacement. Furthermore, the United States must avoid mistakes some of its allies have made with such programs.

For example, there will be a temptation to allow the CVE agenda to metastasize. This runs the risk of wasting a lot of money and empowering some of the wrong people. Clearly it is only Muslims who have the knowledge and credibility within their communities to head up this fight. Yet by placing too much trust in certain groups or individuals claiming to be representative of Muslim opinion, the United States may end up empowering those who practice a highly intolerant form of Islam. This is precisely what happened in the United Kingdom.

Another lesson from the United Kingdom was that well-organized Islamist groups gained the ear of the government and subsequently worked to shut down any conversation about the ideological and theological roots of terrorism and relentlessly pushed an agenda of grievances, usually related to foreign policy. These groups falsely portray themselves as gatekeepers to the entire, diverse Muslim population of a country. Some Muslim Brotherhood front groups even ended up being funded by the British government.⁴ I see a similar situation potentially arising in the United States.

So CVE should be limited in scope and the United States must develop robust ways of measuring the success of its initiatives. Its CVE partners should be carefully vetted and be supportive of basic American principles: Such as a belief in democracy, religious freedom, equality, tolerance, freedom of speech, and the rule of law.

There is one additional comment on CVE I would like to make.

It was recently reported by Reuters that CVE is to be renamed either “Countering Islamic Extremism” or “Countering Radical Islamic Extremism.”⁵ These may not be my precise preference as a choice of words—I believe a focus on the political ideology of Islamism is preferable—but I think this is a step forwards.

Changing the language is not a panacea in and of itself, but greater honesty about the area of primary concern is a positive development. It conveys a clearer idea to the American people that the White House is aware of the threat of Islamism specifically and is tailoring policy accordingly. I find the generic “violent extremist” does the opposite.

The United States should not be hampered by an approach which implies that all extremists pose the same gravity of threat to the homeland. This is not the case. Eco-terrorists do not pose the same threat as ISIS-inspired terrorists.

ber 17, 2014, <http://www.heritage.org/terrorism/report/pursuing-freedom-agenda-amidst-rising-global-islamism> (accessed February 23, 2017).

³ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Countering Violent Extremism*, January 19, 2017, <https://www.dhs.gov/countering-violent-extremism> (accessed February 23, 2017).

⁴ Shiraz Maher and Martyn Frampton, *Choosing Our Friends Wisely: Criteria for Engagement with Muslim Groups* (Policy Exchange, 2009), <https://policyexchange.org.uk/publication/choosing-our-friends-wisely-criteria-for-engagement-with-muslim-groups/> (accessed February 23, 2017).

⁵ Julia Edwards Ainsley, Dustin Volz, and Kristina Cooke, “Exclusive: Trump to Focus Counter-extremism Program Solely on Islam—Sources,” Reuters, February 2, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-extremists-program-exclusive-idUSKBN15G5VO?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=Social (accessed February 23, 2017).

All terrorist threats must be vigorously addressed but there is not a one-size-fits-all approach to every ideology. The greatest threat to American lives comes from Islamist terrorists and our counter-radicalization efforts should surely reflect that.⁶

Encourage Reform from International Partners to Reduce the Threats to American Citizens

ISIS would clearly like to carry out a terrorist attack in the United States. So far, however, there are no known cases of ISIS operatives being able to infiltrate the United States from abroad and then carry out an attack.

This is not the case in Europe, for example, where ISIS has had far more success.⁷ I have just returned from a research trip meeting security and counterterrorism officials and I believe that the situation is grave.

Europe faces a severe and on-going threat from terrorism. This has a clear impact on the United States. The threat to American lives is not simply restricted to those living in America. According to the Association of American Residents Overseas, approximately over 1.5 million American citizens live in Europe.⁸ This does not include all those Americans on military bases housed throughout Europe, which are also an appealing target for Islamist terrorists. Already, an American was killed in the Paris attacks of November 2015. Four Americans were killed in Brussels in March 2016. Another three were killed in an attack in Nice in July 2016. More casualties are likely.

Unfortunately, European countries that are threatened by ISIS usually do not have the robust counterterrorism defenses in place that the United States does. Therefore, the United States must do what it can to protect its citizens by:

- Maintaining a strong intelligence-sharing alliance with relevant European partners.
- Encouraging our European partners to spend more money on counterterrorism efforts.
- Encouraging our European partners to take a tougher approach to law and order (for example, jail those convicted of terrorism-related activity for longer periods).
- Helping certain European countries to reform their unwieldy and complex intelligence and security apparatus.
- Imploring Europe to get tougher on border security. The borderless travel that exists in much of continental Europe has proven to be easily exploitable for a transnational terror network like ISIS.

Anyone who has any experience in dealing with European approaches to counterterrorism is aware of what a challenging task this is. However, it is important for the United States to focus even more attention on such issues.

Mr. KING. Thank you Mr. Simcox.

Our final witness is Peter Bergen who has also appeared before this committee and certainly both this committee and the Intelligence Committee, where I also serve, we have seen him a number of times. He is a vice president and director of the fellows program and the international security program at New America in the District of Columbia, a professor of practice at the School of Politics and Global Studies at Arizona State University, where he is the co-director of the Center on the Future of War. He is a CNN National security analyst and a fellow at Fordham University's Center on National Security.

He is a prolific author, authoring five books on terrorism and homeland security. We probably agree more often than not, but even when we don't agree, I have the greatest respect for your integrity and your intellect.

⁶ David Inserra and Robin Simcox, "How to Turn Countering Violent Extremism into Combating Islamist Terrorism," *The Daily Signal*, July 8, 2016, <http://dailysignal.com/2016/07/08/how-to-turn-countering-violent-extremism-into-combating-islamist-terrorism/>.

⁷ Robin Simcox, "The Threat of Islamist Terrorism in Europe and How the U.S. Should Respond," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 3142, August 1, 2016, <http://www.heritage.org/terrorism/report/the-threat-islamist-terrorism-europe-and-how-the-us-should-respond>.

⁸ The Association of American Residents Overseas, *About AARO*, <https://www.aaro.org/about-aaro/6m-americans-abroad> (accessed February 23, 2017).

So, Mr. Bergen, with that, it is great to have you back before the committee.

**STATEMENT OF PETER BERGEN, VICE PRESIDENT, DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND FELLOWS PROGRAMS, NEW
AMERICA**

Mr. BERGEN. Thank you, Chairman King. Thank you, Ranking Member Rice and the other distinguished Members of the committee.

I don't want to sort-of repeat what has already been said, so focusing perhaps more on what we can do or what we shouldn't do.

So two things we shouldn't do. The visa ban—the visa ban is a temporary ban from the seven Muslim majority countries is totally ineffective if you look at what has actually happened since 9/11. As it is presently constructed, it would be a bit like saying we have a problem with gangs from Central America that have roots in Salvador, and therefore, we should stop people from Argentina or Chile and Canada coming into the United States.

It doesn't make any sense, because of the 94 Americans that have been killed by terrorists since 9/11, according to research conducted by New America and my team is here with me, none of these attacks were conducted by the seven Muslim-majority country nationals and none of their families came from these countries.

So there seems to be a campaign promise that hasn't really been thought through very carefully and let us see what happens tomorrow as they move the goal posts on this.

But the real issue is Americans radicalizing here in this country and they are radicalizing because of what they are reading on-line. Of the 117 Americans who have traveled to Syria to join ISIS or other groups, 88 of them were heavy users of the internet, not just sending e-mails, but posting jihadist material, sometimes, as other people testifying here have said, communicating directly with ISIS.

Now, the internet is not subject to a visa ban, so the issue is really a question of how to deal with that problem, the Americans radicalizing here.

A second bad idea, which Mr. Simcox has sort-of gestured at, is the idea of banning or designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. This would be very stupid. This would be akin to saying because everybody in this country who attacks an abortion clinic is a Christian fundamentalist, we should designate Christian fundamentalists as terrorists. This makes no sense.

The Muslim Brotherhood is a movement of tens of millions of people, a tiny minority of whom have then gone on to join al-Qaeda. The Muslim Brotherhood was important members of close American allies in the government in Jordan, in Kuwait, in Tunisia, in Iraq, people that we need to work with us.

OK, so an idea that would work is an idea actually proposed by Chairman King, which is the no-fly, no-buy idea. Now, it is astonishing that Major Nidal Hasan who killed 13 people at Fort Hood, Omar Mateen who killed 49 people in Orlando, and Carlos Bledsoe who killed an American soldier in Little Rock, Arkansas in 2009 legally purchased semiautomatic weapons, despite the fact that they were the subjects of FBI scrutiny.

The NRA has put up a huge smoke screen about this issues saying, well, some people on the no-fly list shouldn't be there. Well, that is ridiculous because there are 81,000 people on the no-fly list, 800 of whom or only 800 of whom are Americans. Maybe one of them shouldn't be on the list. But the idea that there is sort-of a problem with it is just crazy.

Another idea is we should stay in Afghanistan. I think one of the more counterproductive things the Obama administration did was say we are constantly withdrawing. We are not going to withdraw from Afghanistan, you know, in my lifetime, I think, and it is right for the United States security, it is right for security for other countries around the world and for Afghans, they want us to stay. So I hope that the administration has a robust policy in Afghanistan.

It is not about the number of troops, it is about the political messaging around it. Afghans don't care if it is 8,400 troops as we have now or 12,000. From a purely military point of view there is a difference, but it is the political messaging. We have a strategic partnership with Afghanistan until 2024, let us stay there, let us say we are going to stay there until we can really eliminate some of the threats that Mr. Joscelyn talked about.

Something that is working is micro-targeting. Now, if I look for shoes on-line, for the rest of my life I am going to get advertisements about shoes on-line. I think the GEC at State has actually moved to a much better policy which is, we are going to micro-target people looking for ISIS propaganda, we are going to have counter-messages in local languages. Google is doing some of this, too. This is actually something that at least does no harm, and may actually work.

I think it was very useful that we talked about the attacks on Jewish targets, because of the 94 Americans that have been killed by jihadi terrorists since 9/11, 50 have been killed by extreme right-wing militants, including a number at, for instance, in Kansas City in 2014 by a neo-Nazi. Also, we had the incident at the Holocaust Museum here in Washington. Also, we also have a black separatist militant who has killed five people.

In an era of increasing polarization, we shouldn't be completely fixated on jihadi terrorism. Look just here in this city. On December 5 we, I think, missed, you know, something could have been very serious, at Comet Pizza where a man armed with a semiautomatic weapon came into the pizza restaurant and was planning to do violence. Luckily he was disabled before he could do anything.

Finally, picking up on what some of what Commissioner Davis said, enlisting the Muslim community is the right approach because the FBI has done a very interesting study of 80 terrorism cases since 2009, and the study may be larger by now, but what they found was, the people who know the most about a potential attack are peers and the people who know the second-most are family members, then next authority figures like clerics or teachers. Finally, strangers know the least.

The people most likely to drop a dime are strangers, but they have the least useful information. So we see in the San Bernardino case, Enrique Marquez actually knew a lot about what was going

to happen. Unfortunately, he didn't say anything. So we really want to get those people to come forward.

Just two other quick points. I am very concerned about the insider threat from airports, which is something this committee I am sure is concerned about, too. Sinai shows that this is the one way they can get their holy grail. There are 103 countries that have direct flights to the United States.

Now, if you are taking a direct flight from Heathrow, that is probably less of a problem than, let's say, from, you know, some other countries. But I think this is a real area.

The final issue that I would like to focus on is the question of armed drones. You know, Hezbollah and ISIS have all used armed drones in combat. There is a vast proliferation. American embassies overseas are well-protected against truck bombs. Are they well-protected against armed drones?

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bergen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER BERGEN

FEBRUARY 28, 2017

This testimony is organized into 8 sections:

1. What is the terrorism threat to the United States?
2. What is the terrorism threat posed by citizens of proposed travel-ban countries?
3. An examination of attacks in the United States that are inspired or enabled by ISIS.
4. An assessment of who ISIS' American recruits are and why they sign up;
5. An assessment of how ISIS is doing;
6. An examination of what the big drivers of jihadist terrorism are;
7. A discussion of some future trends in terrorism;
6. Finally, what can be done to reduce the threat from jihadist terrorists?

1. WHAT IS THE TERRORISM THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES?

The ISIS attacks in Brussels last year and in Paris in 2015 underlined the threat posed by returning Western "foreign fighters" from the conflicts in Syria and Iraq who have been trained by ISIS or other jihadist groups there. Six of the attackers in Paris were European nationals who had trained with ISIS in Syria. Yet in the United States, the threat from returning foreign fighters is quite limited. According to FBI Director James Comey, 250 Americans have gone or attempted to go to Syria. This figure is far fewer than the estimated 6,900 who have traveled to Syria from Western nations as a whole—the vast majority from Europe. As many as 1,900 of those militants have returned, according to an estimate by the House Committee on Homeland Security.

At home, the United States has not faced any threats from ISIS-trained militants, but it does face a threat from extremists inspired by ISIS, or that are in some cases in direct communication with ISIS through encrypted communications. The home-grown terror threat poses a knotty, multi-layered problem for United States law enforcement. It's hard for the United States intelligence community to track lone wolves who are not communicating with foreign terrorist organizations via email or phone. Nor do lone wolves have meetings with co-conspirators of the type that can be monitored by the FBI, while domestic extremists who are in touch with ISIS using encrypted communications are using the type of encryption that cannot be easily decrypted.

The FBI said in 2016 that it was conducting some 1,000 investigations of suspected Islamist militants; many of these will be dismissed, rightly, as not causes for true alarm, but the attack by Omar Mateen in Orlando that killed 49 reminds us that despite all these FBI investigations, sometimes America's home-grown terrorists will still slip through the net. This will be ISIS' legacy in the United States: The crowdsourcing of jihad, so that men like Omar Mateen can quickly convert their personal grievances into what they believe is a righteous holy war.

From court records and news reports New America identified 117 American militants who have traveled to Syria to join militant groups, attempted to travel to Syria to do so, or provided support for those who did. Of those, 74 were arrested

before reaching Syria. For example, Shannon Conley, a 19-year-old woman from Colorado, pleaded guilty in 2014 to conspiring to provide material support to ISIS. She never set foot in Syria, as she was arrested at the Denver International Airport.

Forty-three did manage to reach Syria and join a militant group. Of those, 17 are dead. Douglas McAuthur McCain, for instance, a Muslim convert from California, was killed in 2014 fighting for ISIS in a battle against the Free Syrian Army. Recently unsealed court documents suggest that Adnan Fazeli, a 38-year-old man who settled in Maine after coming to the United States as a refugee from Iran, died fighting for ISIS in 2015 in a battle against the Lebanese army.

Only 8 American militants returning from Syria have been arrested and only one is alleged to have plotted an attack in the United States.

Court documents allege that Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud, a 23-year-old from Ohio, left to fight in Syria in April 2014 before returning to the United States 2 months later. After his return to the United States, he was monitored by an informant, leading to his arrest. Mohamud has pleaded not guilty to plotting an attack on a United States military base.

The United States is now a hard target for foreign terrorist organizations.

The United States today is a hard target for foreign terrorist organizations that have not carried out a successful attack in the States since 9/11. That is in part because of the defensive measures the States has taken. On 9/11, there were 16 people on the United States “no fly” list. By 2016 there were 81,000. In 2001, there were 35 Joint Terrorism Task Force “fusion centers,” where multiple law enforcement agencies worked together to chase down leads and build terrorism cases. A decade-and-a-half later there were more than 100. Before 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security, National Counterterrorism Center, and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) all did not exist. Annoying as it is for many Americans to go through a TSA checkpoint at an airport, it is a strong deterrent for terrorists inclined to smuggle any kind of weapon on board a plane. While it’s impossible to decisively measure the impact of programs designed to make attacks not happen, the relatively few successful jihadist terrorist attacks in the States in the years since 9/11 do seem indicative that, broadly speaking, American defensive measures are working.

Another important change: At the dawn of the 21st Century, the American public didn’t comprehend the threat posed by jihadist terrorists. That changed dramatically after 9/11. In December 2001, the passengers on an American Airlines jet disabled the “shoe bomber,” Richard Reid, as the plane flew between Paris and Miami. Similarly, 8 years later it was his fellow passengers who tackled the “underwear bomber” Umar Abdulmutallab on Northwest Flight 253 as it flew over Detroit. And the following year it was a street vendor who spotted a suspicious SUV parked in Times Square that contained the bomb planted there by Pakistani Taliban recruit, Faisal Shahzad. The public’s awareness of terrorism as a domestic threat is a significant force multiplier to the other measures put in place to defend the “homeland” after 9/11.

Aiding those defensive measures is the United States’ offense overseas. In 2013, the United States allocated \$72 billion to intelligence collection and other covert activities. Before 9/11, the budget was around a third of that figure: \$26 billion. CIA drones may be controversial, but they also did significant damage to al-Qaeda in Pakistan and in Yemen killing dozens of the group’s leaders. While it’s impossible to decisively measure the impact of programs designed to make attacks not happen, neither branch of al-Qaeda was able to launch a successful attack on the States after 9/11 in part because of the pressure that the drone program put them under.

The threat from al-Qaeda, ISIS, and similar groups has receded significantly from its high point on 9/11. The threat inside the States is lone-wolf attacks such as the attack in Orlando in June 2016. As described above, in the past decade-and-a-half 94 Americans have been killed in the United States by jihadist terrorists. Shocking and tragic as these attacks have been, they still pale in comparison to al-Qaeda’s murder of almost 3,000 people on the morning of 9/11.

Other Forms of Political Violence.

Political violence has long been a feature of American life. In the 1970’s leftist groups such as the Weather Underground and the Black Panthers conducted a number of terrorist attacks. In 1995 two men animated by extreme right-wing beliefs conducted what was then the most lethal terrorist attack on America soil in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people. Since 9/11, according to New America’s research, in addition to the 94 people killed by jihadist terrorists, terrorists motivated by extreme right-wing beliefs killed 50 people, while 5 were killed by a militant black separatist.

Since this hearing is about threats to domestic security focusing only on jihadist terrorism would miss other threats, particularly in an era of increased polarization.

In November, for instance a story circulated on several websites that Hillary Clinton and her campaign manager John Podesta were running a child sex ring out the basement of the Comet Ping Pong pizza joint in northwest Washington, DC. This patently absurd story prompted 28-year-old Edgar Welch of Salisbury, North Carolina to travel to Washington to “self-investigate.” On December 5 Welch walked into the popular pizza restaurant carrying an assault rifle and started firing shots. He pointed the firearm in the direction of a restaurant employee who fled and notified police who arrested Welch. Welch told investigators that he had come armed to help rescue the children and he also told a reporter with masterful understatement “the intel on this wasn’t 100 percent.”

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorists in the States

Despite all the hysterical commentary about the issue, in the decade-and-a-half since 9/11 jihadist terrorists in the States have not developed, acquired, or deployed chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons. This is a striking finding that is worth underlining: Of the 399 cases of jihadist terrorism in the States examined by New America, not one involved CBRN. Chemical and biological weapons and their precursors, however, were either developed or deployed over the past decade-and-a-half in the States by 13 far-right militants, one leftist militant and two with idiosyncratic motives, such as Bruce Ivins who launched the anthrax attacks in Washington and New York in the months after 9/11.

2. DO CITIZENS OF COUNTRIES TARGETED BY THE PROPOSED TEMPORARY TRAVEL BAN POSE A THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES?

On January 27 President Donald Trump signed an Executive Order instituting a temporary travel ban on foreign nationals traveling from seven majority-Muslim countries—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. New America has collected data on 399 individuals accused of jihadist terrorism-related crimes since 9/11. That research shows that of the 94 people killed by jihadist terrorists inside the United States since 9/11, not a single death would have been prevented by the travel ban. Far from being foreign infiltrators, the large majority of jihadist terrorists in the United States are American citizens or legal residents. Almost half were born American citizens. No deadly attacker since 9/11 emigrated from one of the countries listed under the travel ban. Nor did any of the 9/11 hijackers come from one of the travel ban countries. Nor did any of the deadly post-9/11 terrorists come from a family that had emigrated from one of the travel ban countries.

The proposed travel ban is akin to saying that because the United States has a significant problem with gangs that have their roots in Central America, therefore it should ban travel from Argentina and Chile.

Of the 12 lethal jihadist terrorists in the United States since 9/11:

- Three, Carlos Bledsoe, Alton Nolen, and Ali Muhammad Brown are African-Americans born in the United States, and Bledsoe can trace his family’s United States military service back to the Civil War.
- Three, Syed Rizwan Farook, Tashfeen Malik, and Naveed Haq are from families that hailed originally from Pakistan. Farook and Haq were born in the United States while Malik entered on a K-1 Spouse Visa and later becoming a legal permanent resident.
- One, Nidal Hasan, is from a family that came from the Palestinian Territories and was born in the United States. His parents had immigrated to the United States during the 1960’s.
- Two, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, came from Russia as children. Dzhokhar became a naturalized citizen while Tamerlan was a permanent resident.
- One, Hesham Hadayet, emigrated from Egypt and conducted his attack a decade after coming to the United States. Hadayet was a permanent resident.
- One, Mohammed Abdulazeez, was born in Kuwait to Palestinian-Jordanian parents and became a naturalized citizen.
- One, Omar Mateen, is from an Afghan family and was born in the United States.

Of 15 individuals who have conducted non-lethal terrorist attacks inside the United States since 9/11, only three came from countries covered by the travel ban. However, in two of those cases, the individual entered the United States as a child.

- On March 3, 2006 Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar, a naturalized citizen from Iran, drove a car into a group of students at the University of North Carolina, injuring nine people. However, Taheri-Azar, though born in Iran, came to the

United States at the age of two. As a result his radicalization was home-grown inside the United States.

- On September 17, 2016 Dahir Adan, a 20-year-old naturalized citizen from Somalia, injured ten people while wielding a knife at a mall in Minnesota. However, like Taheri-Azar, Adan had come to the United States as a young child.
- On November 28, 2016 Abdul Razak Ali, an 18-year-old legal permanent resident who came to the United States as a refugee from Somalia in 2014—having left Somalia for Pakistan in 2007—injured 11 people when he rammed a car into a group of his fellow students on the campus of Ohio State University and then attacked them with a knife. However, it is not clear that the attack provides support for Trump’s travel ban. Artan left Somalia as a pre-teen, and if he was radicalized abroad, it most likely occurred while in Pakistan, which is not included on the travel ban. Furthermore, it is far from clear that Artan radicalized abroad rather than inside the United States. In a Facebook posting prior to his attack, he cited Anwar al-Awlaki, the Yemeni-American cleric born in the United States, whose work has helped radicalize a wide range of extremists in the United States including those born in the United States.

Syrian refugees settling in the States are not terrorists

On January 27 President Trump also signed the Executive Order that aimed to suspend the entry of Syrian refugees into the United States indefinitely. As he signed the order, President Trump said that this was “to keep radical Islamic terrorists out of the United States.” This order will achieve absolutely nothing because there is no evidence of terrorists among the Syrian refugees who are settling in the United States. That shouldn’t be too surprising, because the United States has accepted only a minuscule number of Syrian refugees, even though the Syrian civil war is one of the worst humanitarian crises since World War II and has generated a vast outflow of nearly 5 million refugees from Syria. The United States has taken only around 15,000 Syrian refugees, amounting to a tiny 0.2 percent of the total number of refugees, the large majority of whom are women and children.

Not only are these Syrian refugees not terrorists, but they are fleeing the brutal state terrorism of the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and the brutal non-state terrorism of ISIS. The Syrian refugees entering the states are the victims of terrorism, not the perpetrators of terrorism.

Also, any ISIS terrorist with an ounce of common sense is quite unlikely to try to infiltrate the United States as a Syrian refugee. Anne Richard, a senior U.S. State Department official, testified at a Senate Homeland Security Committee hearing in November 2015 that any Syrian refugee trying to get into the United States is scrutinized by officials from the National Counterterrorism Center, FBI, Department of Homeland Security, State Department and Pentagon. They must also give up their biometric data—scans of their retinas, for instance—submit their detailed biographic histories and submit to lengthy interviews. These refugees are also queried against a number of government data bases to see if they might pose a threat—and the whole process takes 2 years, sometimes more. Leon Rodriguez, the director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, who also testified at the November 2015 hearing, said that of all the tens of millions of people who are trying to get into the United States every year, “Refugees get the most scrutiny and Syrian refugees get the most scrutiny of all.”

By contrast, Syrian refugees fleeing to Europe do not go through anything like the rigorous process experienced by those who are coming to the States, and the volume of Syrians fleeing to Europe is orders of magnitude larger than it is to the United States.

The Trump administration’s own data on anti-Western terror attacks undermines the case for the travel ban.

Earlier this month with great fanfare the White House released a list of 78 terrorist attacks around the world since September 2014. A White House official described them as “major terrorist attacks targeting the West.” The list was released after President Trump’s claim that the media is not paying enough attention to terrorist attacks, a contention that is false. In fact, with a search of the Nexis media database I found more than 80,000 stories about the purportedly under-covered 78 terrorist attacks, an average of 1,000 stories per attack.

The White House’s own terrorism list underlines the arbitrary nature of the proposed travel ban because, by the White House’s own account, the countries that are generating the most significant number of terrorists threatening the West are from the West. The list also underlines the fact that it is American citizens who largely foment terrorism in the United States. This is also the case in countries such as

France and Belgium, where it is French and Belgian citizens who are most often the ones conducting significant acts of terrorism.

Conspicuous by their absence on the White House list of terrorists carrying out major attacks against Western targets were Iraqis, Somalis, Sudanese, and Yemenis, who are from four of the seven Muslim countries that the Trump administration is seeking to suspend travel from.

Of the total of 90 terrorists on the White House list, at most 9 are from travel ban countries. Indeed, 50 of the terrorists—more than half—are from Christian-majority countries in the West. On the list, which includes the identities of attackers where they are known, France leads the way with 16 French terrorists, followed by the United States with 13 American terrorists, 11 of whom are U.S. citizens and two of whom are legal permanent residents.

Of these 29 American and French terrorists, only two even have family origins in travel ban countries and they are both from Somalia. Belgium comes in third place with seven terrorists.

In descending order after that are:

- Tunisians (6),
- Libyans and Bangladeshis are tied with 5,
- Saudis (4),
- Syrians, Algerians, and Indonesians are tied with 3 each;
- Afghans, Australians, Bosnians, Canadians, Danes, Germans, Russians, and Turks are tied with two each, and
- One each from Chad, Egypt, the Emirates, Iran, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, Pakistan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

3. ISIS-INSPIRED AND ISIS-ENABLED ATTACKS IN THE STATES

Attacks Inspired by ISIS

In the past 2½ years, there have been eight ISIS-inspired attacks in the United States. The most lethal was in Orlando in June 2016 when Omar Mateen killed 49 people at a nightclub catering to the gay community; it was the deadliest terrorist attack in the States since 9/11. In December 2015 a married couple in San Bernardino, California attacked an office holiday party and killed 14.

There have been other ISIS-inspired attacks that were not lethal. In the fall of 2014, 32-year-old Zale Thompson attacked police officers with a hatchet in New York. Described as an unemployed recluse, Thompson is believed to have been inspired by ISIS. In May 2015, gunmen inspired by ISIS opened fire at a cartoon contest of the Prophet Mohammed held in Garland, Texas. The gunmen, Elton Simpson and Nadir Soofi, were killed by police before they could kill anyone. In January 2016, Edward Archer shot Philadelphia police officer Jesse Hartnett. Archer told police, “I pledge my allegiance to the Islamic State, and that’s why I did what I did.”

As mentioned above, on September 17, 2016 Dahir Adan, a 20-year-old naturalized citizen from Somalia, injured 10 people while wielding a knife at a mall in Minnesota and 2 months later Abdul Razak Ali Artan, an 18-year-old legal permanent resident of Somali origin injured 11 people in an attack at Ohio State. Both attackers were inspired by ISIS.

Unstable Individuals Adopted by ISIS

Unstable individuals will sometimes carry out attacks with only the thinnest veneer of jihadist justification and the attack will be quickly adopted by ISIS, even though ISIS had no connection to the plot at all. In late August 2016, 20-year-old Wasil Farooqui of Roanoke County, Virginia—who had reportedly traveled to Turkey in an apparent effort to then cross the border and possibly join ISIS in Syria—allegedly repeatedly stabbed a randomly selected man and woman in Roanoke with a knife, yelling “Allahu Akbar!” as he did so, severely injuring them. The case is complicated by the fact that Farooqui told a detective he was hearing voices telling him that he was stupid and to attack someone, which raises the issue of the extent to which some “ISIS” attacks are even really “terrorism” in any meaningful sense.

This certainly seems to be the case of 31-year-old Tunisian Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel who so frightened his own family with his violent personality that he was prescribed antipsychotic drugs when he was a teenager. Bouhlel never attended his neighborhood mosque, smoked pot, drank heavily, ate pork, chased women, and had had a number of run-ins with the law for violence. He also beat his wife who then divorced him. Bouhlel was so incensed by his wife leaving him that he defecated in their apartment. Bouhlel, in short, was a violent loser who may have been on the edge of psychosis.

During Bastille Day celebrations on July 14, 2016, Bouhlel killed 84 in Nice, France using a large truck as a weapon. ISIS’ overseer of operations in the West,

Abu Mohammed al-Adnani had called for attacks using vehicles as weapons 2 years earlier. After Bouhlel's massacre, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls astutely observed that ISIS "gives unstable individuals an ideological kit that allows them to make sense of their acts." This echoed the conclusions of leading American forensic psychologist Reid Meloy, who together with his British colleague Jessica Yakeley published a 2014 study of terrorists with no connections to formal terrorist organizations.

Meloy, who works as a consultant with the FBI's behavioral analysts, framed the initial stage leading to violence as "grievance," and his explanation of what that meant is worth quoting at length, as it nicely summarizes Bouhlel's rancor. According to Meloy, the pathway begins with "an event or series of events that involve loss and often humiliation of the subject, his or her continual rumination about the loss, and the blaming of others. Most people with grievances eventually grieve their loss, but for those unwilling or unable to do so, often the most narcissistically sensitive individuals, it is much easier to convert their shame into rage toward the object which they believe is the cause of all their suffering. Such intense grievances require that individuals take no personal responsibility for their failures in life . . . they are 'injustice collectors.'"

What follows this stage, Meloy explains, is "moral outrage": "He embeds his personal grievance in an historical, religious, or political cause or event. The suffering of others, which may be misperceived or actual, provides emotional fuel for his personal grievance." Personal grievance and moral outrage are then "framed by an ideology." The nature of the ideology is secondary; its function is to allow the perpetrator some justification for the violent act he is planning. Meloy explained, "Upon closer examination, these conscious belief systems are quite superficial; subjects will cherry pick phrases from the relevant authoritative text to justify their desire to kill others . . . This framing is absolutist and simplistic, providing a clarity that both rationalizes behavior and masks other, more personal grievances."

A Case Study: The Orlando Terrorist

This is also a good description of how the Orlando terrorist, Omar Mateen, took his personal grievances and framed them around the ideology of ISIS so that he was no longer the disappointed wannabe cop in a dead-end job that he actually was, but by pledging himself to ISIS as he carried out his massacre he was now a heroic holy warrior.

The attack in Orlando fit a grim pattern: Every lethal jihadist terrorist attack in the United States in the past decade-and-a-half has been carried out by American citizens or legal permanent residents, operating either as lone wolves or in pairs, who have no formal connections or training from terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda or ISIS. Because 19 Arab, foreign-born terrorists carried out 9/11 many Americans may think that terrorist attacks in the United States are carried out by foreigners, rather than by United States citizens, but Omar Mateen was an American citizen who was born in New York to parents who immigrated to the United States from Afghanistan.

Mateen is similar to other jihadist terrorists in the States since 9/11. According to research by New America, there have been more than 350 jihadist terrorism cases in the United States since the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. The militants are overwhelmingly American citizens or legal residents; around 84 percent. The perpetrators are not the young hotheads of popular imagination. The individuals in these cases have an average age of 29, a third are married and a third have children. In many ways, they are ordinary Americans. Mateen was 29 when he carried out the attack, had been married twice and had a 3-year-old son. He was steadily employed as a security guard at a local golf resort. He had no criminal convictions, and there is no evidence he suffered from mental illness.

In his case, as in so many others of the 399 Americans charged since 9/11 with some act of jihadist terrorism—ranging from material support of a terrorist group to murder—the easy explanations—that jihadists in the United States are "mad" or "bad"—are not supported by the evidence. According to research by New America, the rate of mental illness for those Americans who have been charged or convicted for some kind of jihadist crime—about 11 percent—is below the rate of the general population, while their incarceration rate is similar to the incarceration rate of the general population of adult males; around 10 percent of American males spend time in prison.

Even in the cases of the dozen perpetrators who carried out the ten lethal jihadist terrorist attacks in the United States since 9/11 only three of the terrorists had a history of mental illness; Naveed Azfal Haq who killed a woman at the Jewish Federation building in Seattle in 2006 and Muhammad Youssef Abdulazeez who killed four Marines and a sailor at two military installations in Chattanooga, Tennessee

in 2015. In August 2016, a judge ruled that Alton Nolen, who beheaded a coworker in Oklahoma in September 2014, was not competent to plead guilty after hearing testimony from mental health experts.

Of course, killing strangers in the service of jihadist ideology isn't "normal," but the large majority of the 12 jihadist terrorists in the States since 9/11 who have carried out lethal attacks were not suffering from a mental illness when they carried out their assaults. The National Institute of Mental Health says that around one in five Americans have some kind of mental illness in any given year. The sample size of 12 lethal jihadist terrorists in the States since 9/11 is a very small one, but their rate of mental illness—one in five—is that of the general population. (By contrast, a 2013 study of 119 individuals who carried out or planned to carry out acts of lone-actor terrorism either in the United States or in Europe since 1990—motivated by a wide range of political beliefs including jihadism, neo-Nazism, anti-government extremism and those with idiosyncratic ideologies—found that a third had a history of mental illness or personality disorders.)

For the book *United States of Jihad: Investigating America's Homegrown Terrorists*, I reviewed court records in hundreds of terrorism cases and spoke to family members and friends of terrorists, as well as to some of the militants themselves. I found that American jihadists are generally motivated by a mix of factors, including dislike of United States foreign policy in the Muslim world; a "cognitive opening" to militant Islam, often precipitated by a personal disappointment or loss; and the desire to attach themselves to an ideology or organization that could give them a sense of purpose. For many, embracing the ideology of Osama bin Laden or ISIS allowed them to become the heroes of their own story as well as actors in a cosmic crusade.

For each individual terrorist the proportion of these motivations varied. For instance, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the older of the two brothers who carried out the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013, was a non-practicing Muslim who became an Islamist militant once his dreams of becoming an Olympic boxer faded. At the time of the attack, he was unemployed. For him, bombing the marathon seemed to allow him to become the heroic figure that he believed himself to be. On the other hand, his younger brother, Dzhokhar, never seemed to embrace militant Islam. He smoked marijuana, drank and chased girls—hardly the actions of a Muslim fundamentalist. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev's motivations for the bombings were instead largely molded by his older brother, whom he admired and feared, and by his own half-baked opposition to American foreign policy.

Nidal Hasan, the Army major, who killed 13 people at Fort Hood, Tex., in 2009, seemed to be more of an ideologue. He was a highly observant Muslim who objected to American foreign policy. But according to Nader Hasan, a first cousin who had grown up with him, the massacre at Fort Hood was also motivated by Nidal Hasan's personal problems. He was unmarried, his parents were dead, he had no real friends and a dreaded deployment to Afghanistan loomed. "He went postal," Nader Hasan explained, "and he called it Islam."

These stories underline how hard it is to satisfactorily answer the question of why terrorists commit heinous crimes. Human motivations are complex. As the philosopher Immanuel Kant observed, "From the crooked timber of humanity not a straight thing was ever made." It's a useful reminder that human beings, including terrorists, often defy neat categorization.

Omar Mateen's motivations, too, seem to have been multi-layered, and will probably never be fully explicable. Mateen himself offered one inspiration: ISIS. In a 9-1-1 call he made from the nightclub as he was carrying out his massacre, Mateen pledged himself to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Yet a more complex stew of personal traits, resentments, and obsessions also propelled him toward violence. As a child Mateen was angry and disruptive in class, and at age 14 he was expelled from high school for fighting. On the morning of the 9/11 attacks, Mateen told classmates that Osama bin Laden was his uncle.

As an adult, relatives say Mateen expressed homophobic views, while coworkers remember that he claimed to have connections to both al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, groups that are at war with each other. His first wife says he was abusive and couldn't control his temper, while there are suggestions that he might have been confused about his sexual identity. Mateen's reported use of gay dating apps and visits to the Pulse nightclub in the months before the attack make this a tempting central narrative—self-loathing for his own homosexuality turned violent—but these behaviors are also consistent with the careful planning of predatory murderers. In the weeks after the massacre FBI investigators concluded that there was no evidence Mateen had had a gay relationship.

Mateen was certainly, however, a man whose dreams had faded. He desperately wanted to be a cop and took selfies wearing New York Police Department shirts,

but he was dismissed from a Florida police-training academy in 2007 because he threatened to bring a gun to campus and was falling asleep in class. Eight years later, in 2015, Mateen tried once again to become a police officer, applying to the police academy at Indian River State College in Fort Pierce. He was turned down because he admitted to using marijuana in the past and also because of what the college termed “discrepancies” in his application form.

Mateen’s grievances festered. Three weeks before his attack, one of the leaders of ISIS publicly urged that sympathizers of the group should carry out attacks in the West during the coming holy month of Ramadan. By following this directive, carrying out an attack as a self-styled “Islamic fighter” pledging allegiance to ISIS, Mateen was finally the heroic holy warrior that he believed himself to be. A day after the massacre ISIS’s official radio station, Al-Bayan, claimed him as one of the “soldiers of the caliphate in America.” But Mateen’s connection to ISIS was only aspirational; he wasn’t trained, directed, or financed by the group. Instead he was, like every other jihadist in the States since 9/11 that has carried out a lethal attack, operating as a self-radicalized “lone wolf.”

Attacks Enabled by ISIS

Militants inspired by ISIS can reach out directly to members of ISIS in Syria over encrypted social media platforms seeking some kind of specific directions for an attack. This creates a “blended” plot that is both inspired and directed by ISIS. In FBI terminology this is an “enabled” ISIS attack. We already saw a harbinger of this in May 2015 when one of the two ISIS-inspired American militants who attacked the Prophet Mohammed cartoon contest in Garland, Texas, sent more than 100 encrypted messages to a terrorist overseas, according to the FBI.

4. WHO ARE ISIS’ AMERICAN RECRUITS?

There are 117 individuals in the United States that New America has identified in public records or news accounts that have tried to join militant groups in Syria such as ISIS or the al-Qaeda affiliated Nusra Front, or have succeeded in joining such groups, or have helped others to join such groups.

They hail from across the United States and from a wide range of ethnic groups, which underscores the difficulty that law enforcement has in tracking them. They are relatively young; some are even teenagers. Given the fact that groups like ISIS have scant roles for women outside the home, women are surprisingly well-represented. These militants are also quite active on social media. This is something of a boon for law enforcement, as many of these militants are prolific posters on publicly available social media, which it is perfectly legal for the FBI and police departments to monitor.

The 117 are residents of 23 States: Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. There is no single ethnic profile for these militants: They are white, African-American, Somali-American, Vietnamese-American, Bosnian-American and Arab-American, among other ethnicities and nationalities.

An unprecedented number of American women are involved in the Syrian jihad compared to other such jihads in the past. One in nine of the 117 Americans involved in Syria-related militant activity are women. Women were rarely present, if at all, among jihadists in previous “holy wars”—in Afghanistan against the Soviets in the 1980’s, in Bosnia against the Serbs in the 1990’s, and the initial insurgency in Iraq against the United States-led occupation more than a decade ago.

They’re relatively young. Almost a fifth are teenagers—including six teenage girls, the youngest of whom is 15. New America found that the average age of the militants is 25.

The only profile that ties together American militants drawn to the Syrian conflict is that they are active in on-line jihadist circles. Eighty-eight of the 117 individuals showed a pattern of often downloading and sharing jihadist propaganda on-line and, in a smaller number of cases, carrying on on-line conversations with militants abroad. Militants in the United States today become radicalized after reading and interacting with propaganda on-line and many have little or no physical interaction with other extremists.

Social media has dramatically accelerated this trend. Of the 117 individual cases that New America examined, there were no clear cases of physical recruitment by a militant operative, radical cleric, or returning fighter from Syria. Instead, people self-recruited on-line or were sometimes in touch via Twitter with members of ISIS they had never met in person.

A representative case is that of 19-year-old Mohammed Hamzah Khan of suburban Chicago. In the late summer of 2014, he purchased three airline tickets for flights from Chicago to Istanbul for himself and his 17-year-old sister and 16-year-old brother (who have not been named publicly because they were minors). Khan had met someone on-line who had provided him with the number of a contact to call once he had landed in Istanbul who would help to get him and his siblings to the Turkish-Syrian border, and from there on to a region occupied by ISIS. Khan planned to serve in the group's police force. Before leaving, Khan wrote a 3-page letter to his parents explaining why he was leaving Chicago to join ISIS. He told them that ISIS had established the perfect Islamic State and that he felt obligated to "migrate" there.

According to prosecutors, the three teenagers planned to meet up in Turkey with a shadowy ISIS recruiter they had met on-line, known as Abu Qa'qa, and travel with him, most likely to ISIS headquarters in Raqqa, Syria. They didn't make it. FBI agents arrested Khan and his two siblings at O'Hare Airport in October 2014.

There is no evidence that Khan planned to commit any act of terrorism in the United States or elsewhere, and he failed in his goal of reaching ISIS, but he faced up to 15 years in prison for attempting to provide "material support" to ISIS in the form of his own potential "services." He has pled guilty and Federal prosecutors have argued for a 5-year sentence in which he must continue to cooperate with them.

How Does ISIS Crowd Source Jihad in the States?

As FBI director James Comey noted when referring to the 2013 arrest of Terry Loewen, who was accused of plotting an attack on the Wichita airport in Kansas, "We have made it so hard for people to get into this country, bad guys, but they can enter as a photon and radicalize somebody in Wichita, Kansas." The "photon" Comey was talking about was, of course, the internet. The only profile that tied together American militants drawn to the Syrian conflict is that they were active in on-line jihadist circles. More than three-quarters were posters of jihadist material on Twitter or Facebook, or were in direct contact with ISIS recruiters over social media.

This raises the question of how we should conceptualize lone wolves in the age of social media. A militant radicalizing in front of his or her computer by himself at home is now not really alone. He/she is swimming in a virtual sea of jihadist recruiters, cheerleaders, and fellow travelers who are available for interaction with him or her 24/7. Contrast this with a classic lone-wolf American terrorist of the past such as the Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski, who mailed his targets more than a dozen bombs between the late 1970's and the mid-1990's that killed three people and injured some two dozen others, all in service of his obscure, Luddite beliefs. Kaczynski did this entirely by himself while living like a hermit in a remote cabin in Montana with—forget the internet—no electricity.

Today's lone wolf is instead plugged into a vast self-referential and interactive ecosystem where he or she can virtually, instantly find thousands of other people around the world who share his or her beliefs. Take the case of Alex, a 23-year-old sometime Sunday school teacher living in a remote part of Washington State who converted to Islam. In 2015 multiple members and fans of ISIS spent thousands of hours on-line with her, promising that they would find her a suitable husband and even sending her gifts of chocolate and books about Islam. The three teenage Khan siblings from Chicago were in regular contact with virtual recruiters in Turkey and Syria and militants in the United Kingdom before attempting their emigration to the caliphate in 2014. In the useful formulation of the Israeli counterterrorism expert Gabriel Weimann, the lone wolf is now part of a virtual pack.

No amount of fiddling with visa regimes will alter the central fact that today's jihadist terrorists in the United States are largely radicalized on-line while they are living in the States. A travel ban is not going to stop the internet.

The Continuing Influence of Anwar al-Awlaki

Lost in the intense coverage of the ISIS-inspired threat in the States is the continuing influence of the American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki whose sermons and writings about the importance of jihad have appeared in 98 jihadist terrorism cases since 9/11, according to New America's research. Awlaki was killed in a drone strike in Yemen in 2011, but killing the man turned out to be easier than killing his ideas; Since his death Awlaki's writings and videos have turned up in 58 terrorism cases in the United States.

5. ISIS IN RETREAT

ISIS has lost just under half the territory it once controlled in Iraq and around a fifth of what it had controlled in Syria. In the past year ISIS has lost the key Iraqi cities of Baiji, Fallujah, Ramadi and Tikrit, as well as Palmyra in Syria. In August 2016 ISIS lost the city of Manbij, in northern Syria, a significant victory because it controls key routes to ISIS' de facto Syrian capital, Raqqa. ISIS fighters disobeyed orders to fight to the death to hold Manbij and fled. The same month the Turkish army crossed the border and seized the Syrian city of Jarablus.

In August 2016 Lt. Gen. Sean MacFarland, who was leading the anti-ISIS campaign at the time, said 45,000 ISIS fighters had been killed so far by the U.S.-led coalition. "We estimate that over the past 11 months, we've killed about 25,000 enemy fighters. When you add that to the 20,000 estimated killed (previously), that's 45,000 enemy (fighters) taken off the battlefield."

That's an astonishing amount of attrition for a force MacFarland estimates had a remaining strength of 15,000 to 30,000 fighters.

United States intelligence estimates the U.S.-led coalition has also killed at least 135 of ISIS leaders and significant officials, including in late August Mohammad al-Adnani, who oversaw the group's terrorist operations in the West. The United States military has also stepped up the air campaign against ISIS' wealth, for instance, bombing a bank in Iraq in January 2016 in which ISIS had stored millions in cash. United States bombers have also repeatedly struck trucks carrying oil that ISIS has extracted from oil fields in the shrinking area it now controls. These attacks on ISIS' cash supply and revenue streams have had real effects on ISIS' bottom line. ISIS has had to halve the salaries of its foot soldiers, according to documents that leaked from the terrorist army in 2016.

These massive losses of territory and income have had a very damaging effect on ISIS' central claims; that it has created a real caliphate that controls large amounts of territory and that it functions like a normal state. As the caliphate withers so too does its appeal to "foreign fighters" from around the Muslim world. This is a key to undermining ISIS as the foreign fighters are often the most ideological of the organization's cadre and, as the coalition continues to kill on average 2,000 ISIS fighters a month, the terrorist army is finding it harder and harder to replenish its ranks, an indicator of which is that it is increasingly resorting to using children as suicide attackers. In April 2016 the Pentagon said that the flow of foreign fighters joining ISIS had dropped from roughly 1,500 a month down to 200 within the past year.

Meanwhile, the flow of Americans going to join ISIS or attempting to do so has slowed to a trickle from an average of six to one a month, according to U.S. intelligence estimates. Balanced against all this, of course, is the fact that the terrorist group has launched attacks or inspired them in places as disparate as Baghdad, Brussels, Istanbul, Kabul, Nice, Orlando, and Paris in the past year-and-a-half. The terrorism research group, IntelCenter, also counts 43 ISIS affiliates of various kinds around the world. Some have declared their "support" for ISIS, while others have declared their "allegiance." Some of these affiliates may have simply slapped on the ISIS patch, but others clearly have some real connection with the ISIS core, such as the ISIS affiliate in Libya, which is the affiliate that is most tightly bound to the ISIS core.

That said, ISIS core continues to suffer reverse after reverse on the battlefield, while ISIS in Libya has suffered similar battlefield reverses to that of ISIS' core, losing control of the key coastal city of Sirte in Libya in August 2016, which had served as the group's key hub in Libya.

The Continued Resilience of al-Qaeda

A decade-and-a-half after 9/11 al-Qaeda has shown surprising resiliency despite the heavy losses it has sustained, including of its founder Osama bin Laden as well as dozens of other al-Qaeda leaders killed in CIA drones strikes in Pakistan and Yemen. While al-Qaeda has shown scant ability to attack in the West—the last successful terrorist attack it directed in the West was the suicide bombings on London's transportation system in 2005 that killed more than 50 commuters—its regional affiliates remain quite capable of sustained attacks in their respective regions. Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb all retain capacity for sustained local attacks. Meanwhile the Nusra Front, al-Qaeda's capable Syrian affiliate, claimed in July 2016 that it was separating from al-Qaeda. Then-Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, said that Nusra likely announced its divorce from al-Qaeda's core for tactical reasons and the split was only cosmetic in nature.

Al-Qaeda is grooming one of bin Laden's sons, Hamza, to be a next generation leader of the group. Hamza, in his mid-20's, has long been an al-Qaeda true believer. He has appeared in a number of videos and audio messages that were released by al-Qaeda in the past year or so.

Omar Abdel-Rahman, the Egyptian cleric who inspired terrorist plots in New York during the early 1990's and who died in an American prison last week, was also the spiritual guide of key 9/11 plotters. Rahman's death in an American jail will almost certainly spark calls from al-Qaeda's current leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, for further anti-American attacks.

6. THE DRIVERS OF GLOBAL JIHADISM

At the macro level, ISIS is not itself the problem—though it certainly amplifies existing problems—but rather is the symptom of five major problems that are driving jihadist terrorism around the globe and will continue to do so even when ISIS is largely defeated.

1. *The regional civil war in the Middle East between the Sunni and the Shia that engulfed first Iraq, then Syria, and now Yemen.*—That regional civil war is being driven by a variety of factors including the failure of the largely Shia Iraqi government to give Sunnis a real place at the table and the brutal civil war that the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad is waging on his largely Sunni population. Also in the mix is the role that Iran and the Gulf States have played in fighting each other in Syria through proxy forces such as the Sunni militant groups that are supported by the Gulf States and the Shia militias that are supported by Iran.

This regional sectarian war was amplified by Saudi Arabia's invasion of Yemen in the spring of 2015 to fight what they believe to be Iranian-backed Houthis who had recently seized control of the Yemeni capital.

The civil war across the Middle East between the Shia and the Sunni empowers groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda who claim to be the defenders of Sunni rights against Shia attack. Until there is real political accommodation between the Sunnis and the Shia in countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen and some kind of rapprochement between the mortal enemies of Iran and Saudi Arabia, these sectarian wars will grind on. Don't, however, expect such an accommodation in the short- or medium-term. The Syrian civil war is already in its sixth year and the principal players in the conflict both inside Syria and outside of the country show no sign of setting up a real peace process.

2. *The collapse of Arab governance around the region.*—Think of ISIS as a pathogen that preys on weak hosts in the Muslim world. In fact, there is something of a political law: The weaker a Muslim state, the stronger will be the presence of ISIS or like-minded groups. So, in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen—countries that are completely failed states or are largely failing states—the presence of these groups is strong. In Muslim countries with somewhat competent governments such as Indonesia, the presence of these groups is relatively small.

3. *Unprecedented waves of immigration to Europe from the Muslim world.*—Germany alone has taken more than a million refugees and asylum seekers. European countries simply do not have the ideological framework the United States has in the shape of the "American Dream" that has helped to absorb successfully wave after wave of immigration to the States, including Muslim Americans who are well integrated into American society. There is no analogous French dream or German dream.

4. *The rise of European ultranationalist and protofascist parties, a problem amplified by the massive immigration from Muslim countries into Europe.*—These parties define themselves as deeply opposed to immigrants and are ultranationalist in flavor. They once played a very marginal role in European politics, but now these parties are now doing well in Austria, France, Hungary, Poland, and Switzerland. The rise of these parties is reflective of the rising anti-immigrant sentiment in many European societies that in turn amplifies the feelings of alienation that many Muslims feel in Europe.

5. *The marginalization of Muslims in Europe who often live separate and unequal lives.*—An indication of how marginalized European Muslims are is provided by the following bleak statistics: The proportion of the French prison population that is Muslim is estimated to be around 60 percent, yet Muslims only account for about 8 percent of France's total population. In Belgian prisons there is a similar story: 30 percent of the prison population is Muslim, yet Muslims only make up 6 percent of the overall population. It's therefore not surprising that French and Belgian prisons have proven to be universities of jihad.

The members of the ISIS cell responsible for the attacks in Paris in November that killed 130 and the attacks in March 2016 in Brussels, Belgium, at the airport and on the subway system that killed 32, bonded through criminal activities or in prison. Abdelhamid Abaaoud and Salah Abdeslam, the cell's masterminds, were childhood friends who grew up in the Brussels neighborhood of Molenbeek. In 2010, the men were arrested and spent time in the same prison. Ibrahim Abdeslam, Salah's brother, also spent time in prison with Abaaoud. He would go on to be one of the terrorists in the November Paris attacks. Khalid and Ibrahim El Bakraoui, both suicide bombers in the Brussels attacks, had served lengthy prison sentences for armed robbery and assault on police.

Muslim citizens in France are 2½ times less likely to be called for a job interview than a similar Christian candidate, according to researchers at Stanford University. Many French Muslims live in grim banlieues, the suburbs of large French cities (similar to housing projects in the United States), where they find themselves largely divorced from mainstream French society. According to the Renseignements Généraux, a police agency that monitors militants in France, half the neighborhoods with a high Muslim population are isolated from French social and political life. The French term for these neighborhoods is equivalent to "sensitive urban zones," where youth unemployment can be as high as 45 percent.

None of these five problems is easily solvable and they feed into ISIS' narrative that Muslims are under attack by the West and also by the Shia as well as by any Muslim who doesn't share their extremist ideology. If these problems cannot be ameliorated—and in the short term many of them will not be ameliorated—the West will be confronted by a son of ISIS and, down the line, a grandson of ISIS.

7. EMERGING TRENDS IN TERRORISM

1. Terrorists Merging with Media

In 1985, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher spoke about terrorism at the annual convention of the American Bar Association. Following a recent high-profile hijacking of a TWA passenger plane forced to land in Beirut that had received lavish media coverage, Thatcher urged that news organizations "must try to find ways to starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend."

It's a dilemma that news organizations have grappled with for many decades since. Terrorist attacks are, of course, news, but terrorists also depend on "the oxygen of publicity" provided by the media to spread accounts of their violence. But what happens when today's terrorists are the media? In the past, terrorists had to rely on the media to get their messages out, but now they can completely control their own message, from making their own content to ensuring its widespread distribution.

In a new twist of the past 3 years, ISIS and other jihadist militants are also now reporting on their own bloody work in real time. Consider that ISIS produces lavish TV productions, filmed professionally in high definition—of everything from its murder of civilians, to profiles of its heroic fighters, to the supposedly idyllic life that can be lived under its purportedly utopian rule. The group also has its own de facto news agency, *Amaq*, that credibly reports on ISIS' own atrocities. ISIS also publishes multiple webzines in English, French, Russian, and Turkish. Most strikingly, terrorist organizations and their supporters maintain many tens of thousands of accounts on social media platforms, including Twitter and Facebook, which they use to further propagate the ISIS message. More and more, those accounts are documenting and broadcasting terrorist violence, as it plays out live.

When ISIS militants took hostages at the upscale cafe in Dhaka, Bangladesh in June 2016 and killed 20 mostly non-Muslim foreigners, at the same time they also sent images of their victims lying in pools of blood to the ISIS new agency, *Amaq*, which posted them for the world to see. Similarly, the same month Larossi Abballa, an ISIS-inspired militant, killed a police official and his partner outside of Paris. Immediately after the murders, Abballa videotaped himself live on Facebook declaring his allegiance to ISIS. While Abballa was taping this statement, near him was the couple's terrified 3-year-old son.

Meanwhile, pledging allegiance to ISIS on Facebook after a murderous attack has now become almost routine for terrorists in the West. Omar Mateen, the terrorist in Orlando who killed 49 at a gay nightclub, pledged his allegiance to ISIS on Facebook as he carried out his attack. So, too, did the terrorists in San Bernardino in December who killed 14 attending an office holiday party.

One of the big ideas of modern terrorism, from the Munich Olympics of 1972 during which Palestinian terrorists kidnapped Israeli athletes to 9/11, has been to use wide-spread TV coverage of violent acts to propagate and advance the political ideas

of the militants. Today, terrorists bypass traditional media entirely and they now act simultaneously as the protagonists, producers, and propagators of their acts of nihilistic violence.

2. *Terrorist Groups with Armed Drones*

Hezbollah, the militant Shiite group that is headquartered in Lebanon, armed drones, combined with fire from Hezbollah ground troops, killed 23 Nusra militants and wounded some 10 others, according to a report by an Iranian news agency.

Iran is the key sponsor for Hezbollah and has plausibly claimed for the past several years to manufacture armed drones. Hezbollah's use of drones marks a milestone for terrorist groups world-wide: It would be the first time a group other than a nation-state used armed drones successfully to carry out an attack, marking an important step toward closing the gap between the drone capabilities of countries such as the United States and militant groups such as Hezbollah. After all, it was only in the months immediately after 9/11 that the United States mastered the technology of arming drones and began to use them in combat. In August 2016 Hezbollah also released video on-line showing what appears to be a commercial drone dropping small bombs on rebel positions in Aleppo, Syria.

Previously, drones were used by militant groups only for surveillance purposes. In August 2014 ISIS uploaded a video to YouTube that showed aerial views of Syrian Army Military Base 93 in Raqqa province in northern Syria that had been shot by a drone. In the past year ISIS has used small armed drones for combat missions.

ISIS use of armed drones shows how warfare is changing: The monopoly of states on the use of military force is eroding, and new technology is leveling the playing field between states and militant groups. So what can the United States and other nations do to protect themselves from this dawning threat? Most armed drones are relatively easy to shoot down if you have sophisticated air defenses or a fleet of jet fighter aircraft. Western countries generally have these, but one can imagine a dystopian future where terrorist groups are able to deploy armed drones against less well-defended targets.

This may be particularly a problem for U.S. embassies, which are well-defended against vehicle-borne bombs, but not against armed drones.

3. *The Insider Threat at Airports*

The bomb smuggled aboard the Metrojet flight that killed 224 by an ISIS-recruited insider at Sharm el-Sheikh airport in Sinai in October 2015 raised the question: Could such an insider attack happen in the West? Short answer: It isn't out of the question.

Five American citizens involved in serious terrorist crimes since 9/11 have worked at major United States airports in a variety of capacities. They were recruited by variously ISIS; al-Shabaab; a virulent "home-grown" jihadist cell based in California; and another such group in New York City.

In the years after 9/11, Kevin Lamar James was jailed in California's Folsom prison where he formed a group that he conceived of as "al-Qaeda in America." James recruited others to help him with his plans. One of them was 21-year-old Gregory Vernon Patterson who had recently worked at a duty-free shop at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). James thought that Patterson's inside knowledge of LAX would be helpful for his plans and when he made a list of potential targets in California, James listed LAX. James' crew planned to attack around the fourth anniversary of 9/11. They financed their activities by sticking up gas stations and their plans only came to light during the course of a routine investigation of a gas station robbery by police in Torrance, California, who found documents that laid out the group's plans for jihadist mayhem. Members of the California cell are now serving long prison terms.

On October 29, 2008, Shirwa Ahmed became one of the first Americans ever to conduct a suicide attack anywhere in the world when he was recruited by al-Shabaab to drive a truck loaded with explosives into a government building in Somalia, blowing himself up and killing 20 other people. Ahmed graduated from high school in Minneapolis in 2003 and then worked at the Minneapolis airport pushing passengers in wheelchairs; it was during this period that he became increasingly religious and was recruited by al-Shabaab. Abdisalan Hussein Ali became a suicide bomber for al-Shabaab in Somalia in 2011 and had also worked at the Minneapolis airport, in a Caribou coffee shop. Similarly, Abdirahmaan Muhumed, who was killed in 2014 while fighting for ISIS in Syria, had worked at the Minneapolis airport, where he had a security clearance that gave him access to the tarmac and to planes.

The problem of militants working at airports and airlines is not peculiar only to the States. In the past decade, British citizens working at Heathrow and at British Airways have conspired with members of al-Qaeda. In the United Kingdom, British

Airways IT expert Rajib Karim, 31, conspired with al-Qaeda's affiliate in Yemen to place a bomb on a United States-bound plane. In 2010, one of the leaders of al-Qaeda's Yemeni affiliate, Anwar al-Awlaki, wrote an email to Karim asking "Is it possible to get a package or a person with a package on-board a flight heading to the US?" Karim replied: "I do not know much about US I can work with the bros to find out the possibilities of shipping a package to a US-bound plane." Karim had applied for cabin-crew training before he was arrested and was sentenced to 30 years in 2011. In 2006, an employee at a shop in Heathrow working on the "airside" post-security section of the airport provided advice about the security conditions to self-proclaimed al-Qaeda terrorist Sohail Qureshi, who was convicted of multiple terrorism charges.

Then-Department of Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson announced in June 2015 that he was implementing new measures to "address the potential insider threat" by mandating biannual background checks for workers at United States airports, while also requiring airports to reduce the number of access points to secured areas and to increase randomized screening of airport employees.

These are welcome developments, but the real vulnerabilities exist in some of the 103 countries that send direct flights to the United States.

4. *Bleed out of ISIS "Foreign Fighters" from Syria*

The likely defeat of ISIS on the battlefield raises the question: What to do about ISIS foreign fighters who survive? Thousands of foreign fighters may melt from the battlefield. Since we know from other jihads that these foreign fighters are the likely terrorists of tomorrow, Western governments as well as Arab and North African governments must think through what they plan to do to track these fighters and prevent them from carrying out attacks.

8. WHAT CAN BE DONE?

There seems to be some conceptual confusion in the U.S. Government about what "Countering Violent Extremism" programs are attempting to do: Is it counter-radicalization? Or is it counter-recruitment? Counter-radicalization—turning many millions of Muslims around the world away from radical ideas—seems both a nebulous mission and one that may not be achievable. A far more specific task is trying to stop the relatively small number of Muslims who are trying to join ISIS or sign up for its ideology from doing so. From an American National security perspective that is, after all, what we all want to prevent.

Here are 16 things that can be done, and one measure that should not be taken.

1. *Enlist rather than alienate the Muslim community*

The terrorist attacks in San Bernardino and Orlando touched off a furious political debate about how best to safeguard Americans, featuring such solutions as shutting off Muslim immigration, but that would not do much to deal with the threat because lethal attacks by jihadist terrorists in the States since 9/11 have been conducted largely by American citizens.

In fact, the real lessons learned should come from the law enforcement agencies that have studied jihadist terrorists in depth. A very telling indicator of future violence by a terrorist, FBI behavioral analysts have found, is what they term "leakage." Leakage was first identified by the FBI in 1999 in the context of school shootings, emerging from the observation that a student who was going to do something violent had often intentionally or unintentionally revealed something significant about the impending act, anything from confiding in a friend to making ominous "they'll be sorry" remarks. Leakage is, in short, when a violent perpetrator signals to people in his circle that he is planning an act of violence.

What was true of school shootings turned out to be true for terrorist crimes as well. In an on-going study of some 80 terrorism cases in the States since 2009, the FBI found that "leakage" happened more than 80 percent of the time. Those to whom information was leaked, termed "bystanders," were broken down by the FBI into peers, family members, authority figures, and strangers. FBI analysts found an average of three bystanders per case, and in one case as many as 14. Some "bystanders" saw radicalization behavior.

Others saw actual plotting and planning, such as the accumulation of weapons, self-educating about how to make explosives, or preparations to travel overseas for terrorist training.

FBI analysts were dismayed by how common it was for bystanders to know that a radicalized individual was up to something yet failed to tip off the authorities. Analysts graphed out the bystanders who were most likely to come forward with information versus those least likely to do so. Peers were aware of the most concerning information, but they were the least likely to volunteer it. Family members were

often aware of both radicalization and planning, but they came forward less often than authority figures such as college professors, supervisors, military commanders, or clerics. These figures were reasonably likely to offer information but were more aware of a suspect's radical sympathies than of any actual plotting.

Strangers were the most likely to come forward, which could be helpful. A tip from a clerk at a New Jersey Circuit City—who in 2005 was asked to make copies of a videotape on which he saw men shooting off weapons and shouting “Allahu Akbar!”—developed into the case in which a group of six men were convicted for plotting an attack to kill soldiers at the Fort Dix, New Jersey, army base. However, strangers made up only 5 percent of the bystanders with useful information about a suspect.

The importance of the information that a peer can have was underlined by the terrorist attack in San Bernardino in which 14 people were killed by the married couple, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik. Farook's friend, Enrique Marquez provided the two semiautomatic rifles that Farook and his wife used in the massacre. Marquez also knew that Farook was planning to carry out some kind of terrorist attack as early as 2011. Marquez pled guilty earlier this month to a variety of Federal crimes.

The lesson of the FBI study of terrorism cases is that the most useful information comes from peers and family members. That's why community outreach to Muslim communities to enlist their help in detecting those who may be becoming militant is the most fruitful approach to dealing with the scourge of terrorism. This is the opposite approach from painting all Muslim immigrants as potential terrorists.

2. Either through electronic warfare or other means, take out ISIS' propaganda production facilities in the Middle East

ISIS announced its involvement in the attack in June at the café in Dhaka, Bangladesh, that killed 20 through *Amaq*, which is effectively ISIS' news agency. Why does *Amaq* continue to exist? Also, ISIS continues to pump out on-line videos, audios, and webzines. These require crude production facilities of some kind. These, too, should be eliminated. (Of course, some will argue that there is some intelligence value derived from having ISIS propaganda facilities continuing to function, but surely that is outweighed by the value of the larger enterprise of eliminating ISIS' appeal.)

3. Intensify the military campaign against ISIS

The less the ISIS “caliphate” exists as a physical entity, the less the group can claim it is the “Islamic State” that it purports to be. That should involve more United States Special Forces on the ground embedded with the Iraqi military as well as other coalition forces in Syria and more United States forward air controllers calling in close air support strikes for those forces.

4. Institute a no-fly zone in northern Syria, but be aware of how complex that has now become

President Trump has often called for safe zones in Syria. This is an excellent idea in theory, because this will reduce the battlefield success of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, who is the principal driver of the Syrian war and will also reduce the flow of refugees into Europe, but, based on multiple discussions with U.S. military officials based in the Middle East, implementing such safe zones would be quite complex because it would entail a no-fly zone if it had a chance to succeed.

First, appropriate authorities would have to be given to American fighter jet pilots to shoot down planes defying the no-fly zone, including possibly Russian planes that are also conducting air strikes in Syria. Second, complicating matters, some of the planes that the Syrian air force flies are the same model as some of the older Russian planes that are flying over Syria. Third, Syria has excellent air defenses that would have to be taken out. The Russians have deployed the SA-23 surface-to-air missile system to Syria, which, according to U.S. military officials, is one of the most sophisticated air defense systems in the world. Fourth, as a matter of international law a no-fly zone in Syria would require some kind of U.N. resolution authorizing it and Russia would veto such a measure. In 1999, NATO did impose a no-fly zone in Kosovo without seeking a U.N. resolution, in order to carry out air strikes on Serbian forces. Trump could do something similar, for instance, unilaterally ordering American warplanes to bomb Syrian airfields so Assad's warplanes could no longer use them. Of course, this would be a significant escalation of America's role in the conflict and would also skirt international law.

5. *Build a database of all the “foreign fighters” who have gone to Syria to fight for ISIS and the al-Qaeda affiliate there*

This is one of the recommendations of the House Homeland Security Committee’s 2015 report on foreign fighters in Syria and it is a very good one. How can you prevent an attack by returning foreign fighters if you are not cognizant of their names and links to ISIS? Right now, Interpol has a list of some 8,000 foreign fighters, but the estimated 40,000 foreign fighters who have gone to fight in Syria dwarf that.

6. *Enlist defectors from ISIS to tell their stories publicly*

Nothing is more powerful than hearing from former members of the group that ISIS is not creating an Islamist utopia in the areas it controls, but a hell on earth. Reducing the flow of foreign fighters to ISIS is a key to reducing ISIS’ manpower. Muhammad Jamal Khweis, 26, of Alexandria, Virginia, was held by Kurdish fighters after allegedly deserting from ISIS in early 2015. Khweis gave an interview to a Kurdish TV station in which he said: “My message to the American people is: the life in Mosul [the Iraqi capital of ISIS] it’s really, really bad. The people [that] were controlling Mosul don’t represent the religion. Daesh, ISIS, ISIL, they don’t represent the religion, I don’t see them as good Muslims.”

United States prosecutors could throw the book at Khweis for joining ISIS, and he could get 20 years or more, but, alternatively, they could try something more creative—a deal in which he tells prosecutors what he knows about ISIS in return for a reduced prison sentence. And one more thing: He would also have to appear before the American public, explaining that ISIS is creating hell in the areas it controls.

7. *Amplify voices such as that of the ISIS opposition group Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently*

The group routinely posts photos on-line of bread lines in Raqqa, the de facto capital of ISIS in northern Syria, and writes about electricity shortages in the city. This helps to undercut ISIS propaganda that it is a truly functioning state.

8. *Support the work of clerics such as Imam Mohamed Magid of northern Virginia*

Magid has personally convinced a number of American Muslims seduced into support for jihad by ISIS that what the group is doing is contrary to the teachings of Islam.

9. *Keep up pressure on social media companies such as Twitter to enforce their own terms of use to take down any ISIS material that encourages violence*

Since 2015, Twitter has taken down some 360,000 accounts—including 235,000 accounts in the last 6 months—used by ISIS supporters, but the group continues to use Twitter and other social media platforms to propagate its message.

10. *Amplify support to Turkey to help it to tamp down the foreign fighter flow through their country to ISIS in neighboring Syria*

Turkey, which had long been criticized by Western countries for allowing foreign fighters to move through its territory on their way to Syria, has clamped down on that traffic into Syria. Those efforts by the Turks are paying off, according to ISIS itself. In 2015, ISIS posted advice in one of its English-language on-line publications to would-be foreign fighters, saying, “It is important to know that the Turkish intelligence agencies are in no way friends of the Islamic State [ISIS].”

11. *Relentlessly hammer home the message that while ISIS positions itself as the defender of Muslims, its victims are overwhelmingly fellow Muslims.*

12. *No-Fly, No-Buy. Prevent suspected terrorists from buying military-style assault rifles*

Astonishingly, over the past decade or so more than 2,000 people known or suspected to be terrorists have bought guns and assault rifles. Even while suspected jihadist terrorists are under some form of FBI investigation, they can easily buy military-style assault weapons. Omar Mateen, Nidal Hasan, and Carlos Bledsoe—three of the most prominent domestic terrorists since 9/11—were all FBI subjects of interest, yet all legally purchased semi-automatic weapons shortly before their attacks. If you have been the subject of an FBI terrorism inquiry it’s obviously absurd that you should be able to legally purchase semi-automatic weapons. Congress should pass a law preventing this from happening in the future.

13. *Stay in Afghanistan*

Afghanistan is going down the tubes and it is in worse shape than it has been since 9/11. The Taliban control or contest a third of the population. That’s 10 million people; more than ISIS controlled at the height of its power in the summer of 2014 when it might have controlled 8 million people at most.

The Obama administration had a counterproductive policy of announcing withdrawals from Afghanistan even as it surged troops into the country. Exhibit A: the December 1, 2009 speech at West Point where Obama announced the surge of troops into Afghanistan and also announced their withdrawal date. Of course, that withdrawal date came and went, as did a number of others. Constantly announcing proposed withdrawal dates for United States forces has enabled the Taliban to believe they can simply wait out the clock. It also has contributed to a lack of confidence among the Afghan population, 8 out of 10 of whom say that the Afghan army and police need support from countries such as the United States if they are to do their jobs properly, according to polling last year by the Asia Foundation.

It is in American and Afghan interests for the United States to stay in Afghanistan so it doesn't turn into Iraq circa 2014 with the Taliban controlling much of the country while also hosting a strong presence of ISIS and al-Qaeda as well as every other jihadist group of note.

What to do? Publicly state that the United States already has a Strategic Partnership with Afghanistan until 2024 that was negotiated by the Obama administration and we promise to be there for the long term in an advise-and-assist capacity along the usual lines of providing intelligence, Special Forces trainers, close air support and the like. Afghans don't care if we have 8,400 troops, or 12,000 troops or 20,000 troops. Clearly there is a difference from a purely military point of view but from a political point of view the message Afghans want to hear is that we are not abandoning them and plan to stay the course. Such a public announcement of a long-term commitment to Afghanistan will help NATO and other allies also commit for the long term; it will also undermine the Taliban and change the calculus of the hedging strategies of neighbors such as Pakistan.

14. Free American hostages in the Afghan/Pakistan border regions

There are five Americans being held by the Taliban-affiliated Haqqanis. The Trump administration could put a win on the board by securing their release. The Haqqanis want Anas Haqqani—one of their family members—to be released in a prisoner exchange for the American hostages. Anas is a relatively bit player in the Haqqani Network who is now on death row in Afghanistan for raising money for terrorism. This prisoner exchange would be somewhat politically costly for the government of Ashraf Ghani, but it would secure five American lives, some of whom have been in captivity for 5 years. The United States can help broker this deal.

15. Develop “micro targeting” counter messages for those who are looking at ISIS propaganda

Advertisers on the internet routinely do this for consumers looking at, say, shoes and there is really no technical reason that this could not be done effectively for those who are looking at ISIS propaganda. Indeed, companies such as Google are already doing this and the United States State Department is also quietly supporting similar efforts around the Muslim world using local voices in local languages that counter the message of ISIS.

16. Increase funding and research for “photo DNA” technologies of the kind that have largely banished child pornography images from social media platforms.

17. Some in the Trump administration want to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. This is a bad idea that will surely backfire, as it would effectively criminalize and label as terrorists the tens of millions of Muslims around the world who are part of the Muslim Brotherhood.

While it is certainly the case that a small number of Muslim Brothers have radicalized and engaged in terrorism, that does not make the Brotherhood a terrorist organization. There are tens of millions of Christian fundamentalists in the United States, a tiny number of whom have conducted violence against abortion clinics and doctors, yet that would not be an argument for criminalizing Christian fundamentalists.

Also members of the Muslim Brotherhood play significant roles in the governments and/or parliaments of Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia, and Turkey. Designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization would label as criminals political leaders of four countries in the Middle East, some of which are close American allies and all of which happen to be relatively open societies compared to the Gulf State autocracies. In Egypt the Sisi government has criminalized the Muslim Brotherhood, an extraordinary decision since it effectively has criminalized the largest opposition organization in the country as well as the previous Morsi government. The United States should not be aligning itself with the policies of the Egyptian dictatorship.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Bergen.

Commissioner Davis, if I could start, I discussed this with Director Comey. We had the cases in Orlando, the case in California where the FBI had been carrying out investigations and then they closed the investigation when nothing was found. I am not being critical of the FBI for not finding it. Just by the nature of the people who they are investigating, you may not find it in 4 months or 6 months, whatever the time limit happens to be.

Do you have any suggestions as to how, you know, the FBI can continue the investigation or somehow ensure that the local police are fully briefed and they carry out, you know, continue at least some surveillance and some investigation and then report back to the FBI or work with the FBI?

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Chairman. Two points on that issue. The first would be to follow the lead of what the Boston police department is doing right now, which is a multi-time, each year there are multiple scrubs of all of the information in the Guardian database.

Whenever there is an event coming up, in preparation for that event there is a team sent in to work with the JTTF to go through the database to see who is out there and who might pose a threat. Then there is a joint meeting on what we could do to stop that from happening. That is a best practice that should happen Nation-wide.

The other thing is, and this is more an organizational issue, I have worked in big police departments, I have run big organizations; since I have stepped down, I have worked with some of the biggest corporations in the United States, 50,000 employees, 100,000 employees all across the globe. Those companies can't get things done unless they are continually reviewing their policies to make sure their policies are being carried out.

So as I said in my testimony, a review of those agreements and a real check to make sure that the organization hasn't snapped back to old practices. When you have an organization and you are going to change that organization, that rubber band can stretch so far, but then it snaps back sometimes.

It is usually in the middle of the organization, the mid-level managers that are responsible for that. The well-intentioned leaders of the organization want to see the right thing happen. If you are not continually reviewing that process, you can have that snap-back effect, and I think that is what we have to guard against here in the United States.

Mr. KING. Thank you.

Also, Ed, you mentioned about working with the local Muslim communities. I know of several instances, for instance, in Suffolk County in New York where the police have very close relationships, including monthly meetings at the mosque with the imam. Yet in several of those mosques, you had members of the mosque who were arrested overseas or arrested here in the United States for being involved in terrorist plots. In several of those I am aware of, the police said, well, why didn't you tell us then?

In fact, Venus is one. He was arrested in Afghanistan and he was planning attack on the Long Island Railroad. The imam probably said, well, he came to our mosque and we told him we don't do jihad here. But you never told the police when they were coming into warn them about Venus. There were two others, also from

the South Shore, with similar-type instances. What has your experience been as far as getting cooperation?

Also, you mentioned the Somalis. I know this goes back several years, but we had testimony before our committee that when a young man was killed in Somalia, a man from Minneapolis was killed in Somalia, basically the local leaders told the people not to cooperate with the FBI. Now, that was going back several years. Do you know if those situations have improved?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, there is no question, Chairman, that there are going to be problems. This is not a perfect solution to the issue, it is just one of many things that has to continue to play out.

In the example I used where we had the Bridges Group, the main deficiency with the Bridges Group was only bringing people in that were very friendly to us. So we had the same people coming in from 9/11 up until 2013 and we got to know them very well and they were friends. We never expanded beyond that group into the more radical mosques, doing outreach to places where we knew were problematic. That is really, I think, the key to this is to establish trust.

But even if you do establish trust, there are still going to be very sophisticated actors in these groups that don't divulge their plans. That is when you have to pay attention to the surveillance part of it to work these cases as if they are sophisticated and, you know, bad-intentioned criminals and actors from foreign places that are attempting to hurt us. So a combination of surveillance and outreach, I think, is the answer to it.

Mr. KING. Also, I think it was mentioned that we have only had, in fact I mentioned it in my opening statement, there has not been a large-scale attack, but there has been good police and good FBI work that stopped them. For instance, the 2009 attempted subway attack in New York. If that had succeeded, at least hundreds, maybe thousands of people could have been killed. That was one, so in many ways these numbers aren't always apples and oranges or they are apples and oranges because there could be many more thousands killed it had not been for the extensive surveillance that was being carried out.

Mr. DAVIS. There is no question. The success has been across the board. Local, State, and Federal agencies have stopped these events from happening.

One of the problems that my contacts in the world of antiterrorism work mentioned is the large number of people with psychological problems that are bubbling up and end up being reported to JTTFs and the lack of sort of a way to deal with somebody who has just got a psych problem and mentions terrorism as opposed to someone who actually is intent on hurting the United States.

Mr. Joscelyn mentioned it in his testimony, some sort of middle-of-the-line way to deal with people who are presenting with serious psych problems and could do something bad, but most likely need some type of supervision or treatment, that is a huge problem for JTTFs across the country.

Mr. KING. Thank you.

We will go now to the Ranking Member for questions.

Miss RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BERGEN. I would like to go to you because I think that some of the things that you were touching on feed or are addressing the issue that we are facing in this country.

I am sure it happens in every change of administration. I am not specifically saying that this has anything to do with the fact that it is Donald Trump as our President now. But rhetoric and what you say matters. Trying to make a transition from a very heated campaign season to actually governing in the space of National security. I would just like to ask you if you could talk more about the Muslim Brotherhood and how you think this administration should deal with that group.

I would like you talk more about the no-fly, no-buy. I give Chairman King a lot of credit for being a patriot before being a politician and introducing that bill in the last Congress. Hopefully it will be reintroduced without any political fanfare, just recognizing the great value of it, and I commend him for that.

But if you could just talk more about how, you know, the terminology of radical Islamic terrorism, what is that doing to help, hurt the relationships we have to have with all the other Muslim countries that have been our partner in this fight against terrorism? What can we do to help that situation as Members of Congress?

Mr. BERGEN. Thank you. You know, I think the discussion of terminology can be less important than sometimes it is seen in this town. So, I mean, that is just my personal view. You know, we don't want to confuse, I mean, you know, if the reporting about H.R. McMaster is true, he told the NSC on Thursday, you know, that he was not in favor of using this term.

Clearly, you know, whether it is in Iraq or Afghanistan, our key allies are Muslims. So we don't want to confuse them with the idea that somehow we were at war with Islam. That is just a fact.

But our actions are much more important than what we say. You know, we have inflicted a huge amount of damage on ISIS already, I think the latest figure about 60,000 ISIS fighters have been killed. So whether we call radical Islamic terrorism or, you know, violent extremists, whatever we call them, actually ISIS is in, you know, grave danger right now of losing its most important city, Mosul. So actions are the key.

So going to your questions, Representative Rice, I mean, the no-fly, no-buy, think about Major Nidal Hasan, he is an Army major. He is not a common criminal. He had to buy four semiautomatic weapons to kill 13 people at Fort Hood. He couldn't go on the street and, you know, very unlikely to buy one, you know, from a criminal. He didn't know any criminals.

So, of course, it is not a perfect solution that if you are on the no-fly list you can't buy a semiautomatic weapon, but it is better than many of the other things that have been proposed. It would actually make a difference.

Similarly with the Muslim Brotherhood, I mean, the largest Arab country is Egypt with 80 million people, until very recently their government was the Muslim Brotherhood. They were democratically elected, unlike so many of the other regimes around the region. So this idea of designating them as a terrorist organization is simply ridiculous.

Miss RICE. Commissioner Davis, just to talk more, because I actually think that what you did after the bombing in terms of reaching out to the community is incredibly valuable as opposed to bringing people in instead of shunning them.

Can you just talk more about how much of your time is spent? You know, because I know that there is some resistance on the part of law enforcement, people want to be more aggressive in certain communities and shut them out and focus on them in a different way than a community policing model would allow for.

So if you could just talk more about the value of bringing people in, you know, and going into these communities and trying to get information from them and let them know that we are trying to work together. Whatever or however your philosophy, whatever that was.

Mr. DAVIS. Right. Thank you, Ranking Member. I policed urban areas and there are enclaves of people who live in urban areas, depending on where were you go in the city and many times these individuals need our help more than anybody else. So it is important for us as a police organization to establish trust across the city so that when someone is in trouble and they need assistance they are not afraid to call us.

We spent a lot of time doing that when I was the commissioner in Boston. It continues today and it has been going on for 30 years. That outreach is critical and that trusting relationship is critical for us to be able to work in these communities and protect the good people who are there.

If we don't do that, then the people who live in these communities will not trust the police, they will not call us, and the bad guys will be able to run roughshod over their own fellow either citizens or whatever region they are from, in these small neighborhoods.

It is crucial that we, that we maintain close relationships. That is, as Mr. Bergen said, it is much more likely for a peer to report this bad activity than it is for someone just, you know, at the mosque. It is going to be someone who they know and they work with.

This is true. I have worked narcotics cases for much of my career. If we weren't talking to people from the countries, the source countries, of narcotics, we would never be able to put a case together against the criminals who are actually transporting the narcotics into the country. The same applies to terrorism.

Miss RICE. Thank you very much.

Mr. KING. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry.

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In 2008, the Holy Land Foundation and several of its senior leaders were convicted of funneling more than \$12 million to Hamas with the jury finding the defendants guilty on all counts of the indictment. While the Holy Land Foundation was brought to justice, the Obama administration refused to investigate the list of 246 unindicted co-conspirators presented as evidence by the prosecution.

On February 17 of this year, my colleagues and I authored a letter asking Attorney General Sessions to reopen the investigation into the unindicted co-conspirators listed in the largest terrorist financing trial in our Nation's history, which is the United States

versus the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, et al.

At this time I ask unanimous consent that this be submitted for the record.

Mr. KING. Without objection.
[The information follows:]

LETTER SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY HONORABLE SCOTT PERRY

FEBRUARY 17, 2017.

The Honorable JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS,
United States Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20530.

DEAR ATTORNEY GENERAL SESSIONS: We respectfully request that the Department of Justice reopens the investigation into the unindicted co-conspirators listed in the largest terror financing trial in our Nation's history, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al.*

In December 2001, The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), the largest Islamic charity in the America, was designated as a Specially Designated Terrorist (SDT) organization by the U.S. Government. After freezing its assets, the FBI concluded that HLF's primary goal was the subsidization of HAMAS, and a criminal case ensued in July 2004. In 2008, HLF and several of its senior leaders were convicted of funneling more than \$12 million to HAMAS, with the jury finding defendants guilty on all counts of the indictment. Evidence presented by the prosecutors included a list of 246 unindicted co-conspirators (attached) and its designation was broken into categories based on the extent of their participation and/or association with the HLF, HAMAS, and the Muslim Brotherhood.

While HLF was brought to justice, the Obama Administration refused to investigate these unindicted co-conspirators, and in the decade since the trial, the threat of radical Islamist terrorism has developed substantially. If the individuals and groups on this list are funneling money through the U.S. to fight our enemies, the American people have the right to know. While appalling that President Obama refused even to acknowledge the threat of radical Islamist terrorism, the mistakes of the past must be corrected and those who finance terror be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.

We truly hope that under your authority, the Department of Justice will reopen the investigation into these unindicted co-conspirators. We look forward to your reply, and wish you the best in your new position.

Very Respectfully,

SCOTT PERRY,
Member of Congress.

LOU BARLETTA,
Member of Congress.

DAVE BRAT,
Member of Congress.

BRIAN BABIN,
Member of Congress.

LOUIE GOHMERT,
Member of Congress.

GLENN GROTHMAN,
Member of Congress.

TED S. YOHO,
Member of Congress.

JEFF DUNCAN,
Member of Congress.

ATTACHMENT.—IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION

*UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS. HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF
AND DEVELOPMENT*, also known as the “HLF” (01) SHUKRI ABU BAKER,
(02) MOHAMMED ELMEZAIN, (03) GHASSAN ELASHI, (04) HAITHAM
MAGHA WRI, (05) AKRAM MISHAL, (06) MUFID ABDULQADER, (07) and
ABDULRAHMAN ODEH (08) CR NO. 3:04–CR–240–G

LIST OF UNINDICTED CO-CONSPIRATORS AND/OR JOINT VENTURERS*

*(It should be noted that certain individuals and/or entities appear in more than one
category).*

I. The following are individuals/entities who are and/or were part of the HAMAS’
social infrastructure in Israel and the Palestinian territories:

1. Abdel Al Jeneidi
2. Abdel Khalek Al Natsheh
3. Abdel Rahim Hanbali
4. Abdul Rahman Baroud
5. Adali Yaish
6. Ahmad Abdullah
7. Ahmed Al Kurd
8. Ahmed Baher
9. Akram Kharoubi
10. Alaa Anwar Aqel
11. Al Anwar Al Ibrahimi Library
12. Al Salah Society
13. Al Razi Hospital
14. Amal Alafraji
15. Amin Shweiki
16. Anees Shaheen
17. Aqel Rabi
18. Asaad Abu Sharkh
19. Bethlehem Orphans Society
20. Bilal Yousif Asfira
21. Ekram Taweel
22. Fallah Herzallah
23. Fatimeh Odeh
24. Fawaz Hamad, aka Abul Abed
25. Foud Abu Zeid
26. Ghassan Harmas
27. Hafeth Natsheh
28. Halhul Zakat
29. Hamad Hassanat
30. HAMAS
31. Hamed Al Bitawi
32. Hanadi Natsheh
33. Hashem Sadeq El Natsheh
34. Hatem Qafisha
35. Hoda Abdeen
36. Hosni Khawaji
37. Husni Abu Awad
38. Hussein Abu Kweik
39. Hussein Al Khatib
40. Ibrahim Abdel Rahim Dawoud, aka Bilal Hanoun
41. Ibrabim Mosleh
42. Ibrahim Al Yazuri
43. Islamic University of Gaza
44. Islamic Center of Gaza, aka Islamic Complex, aka Al Mojamma Al Islami
45. Islamic Relief Committee
46. Islamic Society of Gaza
47. Islamic Charitable Society of Hebron
48. Islamic Science and Culture Committee
49. Islamic Heritage Committee

*The names listed herein are spelled in the manner most commonly seen, or phonetically,
however it should be remembered that such names are subject to multiple spelling variations.

50. Jamal Al Khodary
51. Jamal Al Tawil
52. Jamil Hammami, aka Abu Hamza
53. Jenin Zakat
54. Kamal Al Tamimi, aka Abu Islam
55. Khaled Abdelqader
56. Khalid Al Masri
57. Khalil Shaheen
58. Mahmoud Yasin Ahmed El Sheikh Yasin
59. Mahmud Rumahi
60. Mahtahdi Musleh
61. Mervit Al Masri
62. Mohamed Fouad Abu Zeid
63. Mohamed Saker
64. Mohamed Eid Misk
65. Mohamed Siam, aka Abu Mahmud
66. Mufid Mukhalalati
67. Muhamad Salman Baroud
68. Muhammad Taha
69. Muhammad Muharam
70. Muslim Womens' Society
71. Nabil Mansour
72. Nablus Zakat
73. Najeh Bakarar
74. Nasser Hidmi
75. Omar Hamdan
76. Patients Friends Society
77. Qalqilya Zakat
78. Ramallah Zakat
79. Riyad Walwil
80. Salem Salamah
81. Seham Al Quatros
82. Siham Al Masri
83. Sulieman Ighbariya
84. Taher Shreitah
85. Talal Sader
86. Tawfik ATrash
87. Tolkarem Zakat
88. Walid Jarrar
89. Young Mens' Muslim Society
90. Zaid Zakarneh
91. Ziyad Mishal
92. Zuhair Elbarasse

II. The following are individuals who participated in fund-raising activities on behalf of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development:

1. Abdallah Azzam
2. Abdel Jabar Hamdan
3. Abdel Aziz Jaber
4. Abdul Muni Abu Zunt
5. Ahmed Al Kofahi
6. Ahmed Nofel
7. Ahmed Al Qattan
8. Ahmed Kafaween
9. Aziz Dweik
10. Bassam Jarrar
11. Deeb Anees
12. Faisal Malawi
13. Falhi Yakan
14. Ghazi Honeina
15. Hamed Al Bitawi
16. Hammam Saeed
17. Hamza Mansour
18. Hatem Qafisha
19. Hatem Jarrar
20. Jamal Badawi
21. Jamil Hammami, aka Abu Hamza
22. Kamal Hilbawi

23. Khalil Al Quqa
24. Mahfuz Nahnah
25. Mahmud Zahar, aka Abu Khaled
26. Majdi Aqel
27. Mohamed Siam, aka Abu Mahmud
28. Mohamed Anati
29. Mohamed Shbeir
30. Mohammed Faraj Al Ghul
31. Muharram Al Arifi
32. Mustafa Mahsur
33. Omar Sobeihi
34. Omar Al Ashqar
35. Qadi Hassan
36. Raed Saleh
37. Rashed Ghanoushi
38. Yussef Al Qaradawi

III. The following are individuals/entities who are and/or were members of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood's Palestine Committee and/or its organizations:

1. Abdel Haleem Ashqar, aka Abdel Hassan
2. Ahmed Agha
3. Akram Kharoubi
4. Al Aqsa Educational Fund
5. American Middle Eastern League, aka AMEL
6. Ayman Ismail
7. Ayman Sharawi
8. Ayman Siraj Eddin
9. Basman Elashi
10. Bayan Elashi
11. Council on American Islamic Relations, aka CAIR
12. Dalell Mohamed
13. Fawaz Mushtaha, aka Abu Mosab
14. Fayez Idlebi
15. Ghassan Dahduli
16. Hamoud Salem
17. Hassan Sabri
18. Hazim Elashi
19. IAP Information Office
20. Ibrahim Al Samneh
21. INFOCOM
22. International Computers and Communications, aka ICC
23. Islam Siam
24. Islamic Association for Palestine in North America, aka IAP
25. Islamic Association for Palestine, aka IAP
26. Ismail Elbarasse, aka Abdul Hassan, aka Abd el Hassan
27. Ismail Jaber
28. Issam El Siraj
29. Izzat Mansour
30. Jamal Said
31. Kifah Mustapha
32. Mohamed Abbas
33. Mohamed Abu Amaria
34. Mohamed El Shorbagi
35. Mohamed Akram Adlouni
36. Mohamed Al Hanooti
37. Mohamed Jaghlit
38. Mohamed Qassam Sawallha, aka Abu Obeida
39. Mohamed Salah
40. Munzer Taleb
41. Muin Shabib
42. Nader Jawad
43. Omar Ahmad, aka Omar Yehia
44. Omar El Sobani
45. Palestine Committee
46. Rashid Qurman
47. Rasmi Almallah
48. United Association for Studies and Research, aka UASR
49. Walid Abu Sharkh

50. Walid Ranu
51. Yasser Saleh Bushnaq
52. Yousef Saleh, aka Ahmed Yousef
53. Zaher Salman, aka Osama Abdullah

IV. The following are individuals/entities who are and/or were members of the Palestine Section of the International Muslim Brotherhood:

1. Abdallah Azzam
2. Abdel Rahman Abu Diyeh
3. Ahmed Nofel
4. Ali Mishal
5. Hammam Saeed
6. Hani El Jasser
7. Imad Abu Diyeh
8. Islamic Action Front
9. Issa Mohamed Ahmad
10. Jawad Al Hamad
11. Kandil Shaker
12. Khairy Al Ahga, aka Abu Obeida
13. Khalid Taqi Al Din
14. Mohamed Abu Fares
15. Mohamed Eweida
16. Munir Elashi
17. Muslim Brother, aka Ikwan Al Muslimi
18. Mustafa Mahsur
19. Rageh El Kurdi
20. Ziad Abu Ghanimeh

V. The following are individuals who are and/or were leaders of HAMAS inside the Palestinian territories:

1. Abdel Aziz Rantisi
2. Ahmed Yassin
3. Ibrahim Al Yazuri
4. Imad Aqel
5. Ismail Abu Shanab
6. Ismail Haniya
7. Mahmud Al Rumahi
8. Mahmud Zahar, aka Abu Khaled
9. Muhammad Taha
10. Salah Shehadah

VI. The following are individuals who are and/or were leaders of the HAMAS Political Bureau and/or HAMAS leaders and/or representatives in various Middle Eastern/African countries:

1. Ibrahim Ghoshe
2. Imad Alami
3. Khalid Mishal, aka Abu Walid
4. Mousa Abu Marzook, aka Abu Omar
5. Jamal Issa, aka Jamal Abu Baker
6. Mohamed Siyam

VII. The following are individuals/entities who are and/or were members of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood:

1. Abdel Rahman Alamoudi
2. Gaddor Ibrahim Saidi
3. Islamic Society of North America, aka ISNA
4. Muslim Arab Youth Association, aka MAYA
5. Nizar Minshar
6. North American Islamic Trust, aka NAIT
7. Raed Awad
8. Tareq Suwaidan

VIII. The following are individuals/entities that are and/or were part of the Global HAMAS financing mechanism:

1. Al Aqsa Society
2. Abdel Rahim Nasrallah
3. Association de Secours Palestiniens
4. Commitee De Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens, aka CBSP

5. Interpal
6. Jersualem Fund, aka IRFAN
7. K & A Overseas Trading
8. Khairy Al Ahga, aka Abu Obeida
9. Palestine Relief and Development Fund
10. Palestine and Lebanon Relief Fund
11. Palestinian Association of Austria
12. Sanabil Foundation for Relief and Development
13. Soboul Al Khair

IX. The following are other individuals/entities that Marzook utilized as a financial conduit on behalf and/or for the benefit of HAMAS:

1. Bashir Elashi
2. Gaddor Ibrahim Saidi
3. INFOCOM
4. International Computers and Communications, aka ICC
5. K & A Overseas Trading
6. Kbairy Al Ahga, aka Abu Obeida
7. Mohamed Salah
8. Munir Elashi
9. Nadia Elashi
10. Omar Salah Badahdah

X. The following are individuals who were HLF employees, directors, officers and/or representatives:

1. Abdel Jabar Hamdan
2. Ahmed Agha
3. Akram Kbaroubi
4. Amal Alafranji
5. Amin Shweiki
6. Anees Shaheen
7. Asaad Abu Sharkh
8. Ayman Ismail
9. Basman Elashi
10. Dalell Mohamed
11. Ekram Taweel
12. Fatimeh Odeh
13. Fawaz Hamad, aka Abul Abed
14. Ghassan Harmas
15. Hanadi Natsheh
16. Hazim Elashi
17. Hoda Abdeen
18. Hussein Al Khatib
19. Islam Siam
20. Jamal Al Khodary
21. Kamal Al Tamimi, aka Abu Islam
22. Khalid Al Masri
23. Mervit Al Masri
24. Mohamed Dahroug
25. Mohamed Eid Misk
26. Mufid Mukhalalati
27. Muhammad Muharram
28. Kifah Mustapha
29. Mohamed Anati
30. Mohamed El Shorbagi
31. Omar Kurdi
32. Raed Awad
33. Ramzi Abu Baker
34. Rasmi Almallah
35. Seham Al Quatros
36. Sharif Battiki
37. Siham Al Masri
38. Taqi Al Din
39. Zuhair Elbarasse

XI. The following are HAMAS members whose families received support from the HLF through the HAMAS social infrastructure:

1. Adel Awadallah

2. Abdel Rahman Arouri
3. Abdel Aziz Rantisi
4. Ahmed Yassin
5. Ismail Abu Shanab
6. Ismail Haniya
7. Jamil Al Baz
8. Kamal Naeem
9. Khalil Al Quqa
10. Khamis Zaki Akel
11. Naser Ghazi Edweidar
12. Salah Eldin Nijmi
13. Salah Othman
14. Salah Shehadah
15. Yasser Hassanat
16. Yasser Namruti
17. Yehia Ayyash

Mr. PERRY. So I think my first question would go to Mr. Joscelyn. Wahhabi ideology is essentially the wellspring of the doctrine and world views of radical Islamic terrorist organizations or Islamism or fundamentalism or whatever you folks feel comfortable with calling it, in general, and of ISIS in particular.

I know you are often focused on al-Qaeda, but I know that you are well-versed in ISIS as well and the general theme. Many of ISIS' official publications are classic works of the Wahhabi canon and ISIS ideologues and supporters who regularly liken the so-called caliphate to the first Saudi Wahhabi state.

Since 1979, Saudi Arabia has engaged in a persistent and consistent campaign of exporting Wahhabi ideology throughout the Muslim world, spending about \$4 billion annually on mosques, madrasas, preachers, students, and textbooks. Wahhabi ideology has become so prominent in the Muslim world that by 2013, 75 percent of North American Islamic centers relied on Wahhabi preachers who promote anti-Western ideas in person and on-line through their sermons and through the Saudi-produced literature.

So the question is, what role does the export of Wahhabism by Saudi Arabia play in the radicalization of Muslims, whether it be in regard to ISIS, al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, or otherwise, both at home and abroad and in grooming them for recruitment by terrorist organizations?

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, Wahhabi extremism is an issue in a lot of ways. I mean, in areas where the funding goes to fund those mosques or madrasas, it oftentimes runs roughshod over local Islamic traditions, basically replaced by this extremist version of Islam.

But in terms of ISIS and al-Qaeda, we also have to be careful a little bit where ISIS, in particular, basically draws on ideas outside of the Wahhabi realm quite often and has actually turned its rhetorical guns and is trying to turn its literal guns on the Saudi Kingdom on a regular basis.

Same thing with al-Qaeda. I mean, you know, part of why the Saudis have intervened in Yemen, for example, is they were worried both about the Houthi rebellion there and also on the al-Qaeda side. So there is a story to be told on Saudi funding of extremism for sure. I think it is a problem.

It is not the version of Islam I think most Muslims around the world are used to or know, it is not part of the regular customs. I have seen complaints everywhere from Nigeria through North Af-

rica through East Africa all the way into South Asia of where when the Saudi's turn on the spigot basically a very different version of sort-of Islam shows up. I think we should be careful about tracking that and understanding that.

To your point about the terrorism finance, Congressman, I would second the idea that any specific violations of terrorist finance laws need to be investigated and prosecuted here in the United States.

I am aware, I think I am aware, that there has been a slow roll on that issue. The way I think about the world is in terms of very specific threats and very specific ties to terrorists, and if there are organizations here in the United States, which are engaging in that sort of fundraising activity once again, they should be investigated and prosecuted.

Mr. PERRY. So just kind-of following up on your discussion about most Muslims, and I would agree with you that most Muslims eschew or reject the Wahhabi or the strict structural fundamental form of Wahhabiism that is put upon them.

But I still am concerned about oftentimes the high percentage of Muslims world-wide and these peaceful Muslims, let us just be clear here, they are the ones that are put upon by the this ideology and most of the reign of terror, if you will, by the Wahhabists or Islamist.

Mr. JOSCELYN. Correct.

Mr. PERRY. But many of the world's Muslim population, including the United States, sees sharia, which is oftentimes as well associated with Wahhabiism, as perfectly OK and appropriate to live under.

So in a circumstance where many of the occupants might not like the kind of the outcome of living under those circumstances, they don't really disagree with it fundamentally when questioned. What do you make of that?

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, as a secular humanist, I am certainly no fan of sharia law, but I will say this. Sharia means different things within the Muslim community. There isn't one interpretation or meaning of that. That is not a cop-out or an apology for it, it is just really sharia can mean a number of different things.

What I think you are concerned about or I would be concerned about are organizations that basically say that sharia law should supplant sort-of American customs or American ideas and principles. I think that is something that needs to be contested in the court of public opinion and exposed and sort-of debated is basically the way I would handle that more often than not.

I don't think, you know, just because an individual Muslim necessarily adheres to sharia, it may not mean the version of sharia that is sort-of totalitarian or sort-of wants to supplant American customs. It may mean something much more local and personal.

I certainly know, you know, Muslims in the New York, New Jersey area who will tell you that they are sharia compliant, and yet they don't believe in Muslim Brotherhood ideology or, you know, al-Qaeda's ideology or ISIS or anything like that. So what I would look at is basically organizations that sort-of advocate a version of that that is sort-of totalitarian in nature and contest it in the court of public opinion.

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chair, I yield.

Mr. KING. Mr. Keating.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just quickly, you can just say yes if you agree with this. But is the No. 1 threat to the citizens of this country still home-grown violent extremist people here? Is that, would you say, the major threat that we have?

Mr. DAVIS. I believe it is right now.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Joscelyn.

Mr. JOSCELYN. I think it is a major threat with one caveat, which you will see in my testimony, which is if eventually they are successful in infiltrating a team onto U.S. soil, but it is the predominant threat on a day-to-day basis.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Simcox.

Mr. SIMCOX. Yes, I think the most numerous amount of home-grown, although what we have seen in Europe is that the highest body count often come from when external planners are involved.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Bergen.

Mr. BERGEN. Yes.

Mr. KEATING. OK.

I was really pleased, Commissioner Davis, to hear your views on the progress that we have made, and thanks for your work with this committee, on dealing in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing, the lessons learned, and the fact that we are sharing information and the legislation that requires the codification of that so it doesn't get lost as people come and go through different agencies.

I just wanted to touch base on one aspect that all of you might feel, particularly Commissioner Davis since he has been there. I think the area where there is a great deal of stress on our officials trying to counter terrorism in this country is at that guardian and at the assessment stage, because I think the volume is so high on the FBI as they go through that. Their resources are strained, it is very difficult, and there is a time line they have to work with.

Afterwards, you know, there is what we used to call, you know, the closing the book on everything, so that information is not shared. I believe that the same progress we have made sharing information could be greater utilized at that assessment stage working with people. I looked at the New Jersey and New York bombings and, you know, from what was public in that information, I thought at that stage greater participation at the local level could have been better, and I think that is a case elsewhere.

How can we accomplish that to a better degree?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I think that the rules and regulations that the FBI operate under are extremely difficult to follow. I have looked at them and I know in my sort-of experience of investing cases, they are overly bureaucratic and I think maybe review of that would be in order. So I think that is sort-of the first step.

But I will agree with you that group think on these situations results in a much better outcome and also eliminates the potential for criticism and review afterwards.

Mr. KEATING. I think it helps deal with the problem you referenced that I think is a very major problem. People with psychological difficulties, trying to screen out where there is a real problem. I think people at the local level have more insight into that.

So beyond the rules and regulations, is it a force multiplier? You know, I know you don't want to comment on if we need more resources for the FBI. I happen to think they could use more in that regard, but that is a critical area that I think we could improve things.

Mr. DAVIS. I think so, too. I think the coming together on these cases, deciding how to vet the real threats from these psychological—

Mr. KEATING. Yes, taking it beyond information sharing into more joint reviews of that. Thank you.

Quick question, Mr. Bergen. You mentioned the Executive Order didn't help things, basically it didn't achieve anything. You didn't get into the fact, can it hinder our efforts? I didn't think you did.

Mr. BERGEN. You know, I just don't know.

Mr. KEATING. Yes. Anyone have any thoughts on that?

There were reports that the CVE funding that was there were turned down by certain groups after the Executive Order. That is what made me think, is that a problem there?

Mr. BERGEN. Actually, let me revise. You know, the Iraqi government is really angry about this ban and clearly, you know, who is dying in Mosul, it is overwhelmingly Iraqis. So, you know, we managed to really anger one of our key allies with this ban.

Mr. KEATING. OK. Any other questions about how we can improve some of the activities through the CVE? How is that working? Are there more funds necessary? Are they effective? I know in Boston and New York they have used those funds a great deal.

Mr. DAVIS. Right, we have. As I said in my comments earlier, outreach is extremely important; identifying what is happening. But also, you know, saying what this really is and identifying precisely what the threat is, who is responsible for it, and making sure that we have a clear idea, as Robin said in his testimony, is as important as the outreach. This has to be a balanced approach.

Mr. KEATING. OK. I will have more follow-up questions in writing, since my time is expired, on airport issues and airline issues, which I think that we have made great progress, but still remain as threats. So I will save that for my written portion since my time is out.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KING. Thank you.

Ms. Jackson Lee.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, thank you very much. I am delighted to join you this morning.

Thank you to all the witnesses.

Chief Davis, you have got Mr. Davis in front of Davis. We have got mister, but I can't help but again to acknowledge your great leadership, your very fine congressperson was such a champion for Boston, but you were certainly the gleaming example of what we hoped, tragically, would come out of homeland security when there was a tragedy. We hoped you wouldn't have to encounter, but the collaboration, the local leadership, the insisting on the sharing of intelligence, you did it all and we are grateful for you.

I think that is the way that we put forward the best domestic front in protecting the people in protecting the homeland, so I thank you for that.

To all of the witnesses as well, we appreciate you being here.
 Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record two articles. One, "Hate crime is feared as two Indian engineers are shot in Kansas." I ask unanimous consent to introduce it into the record.

Mr. KING. Without objection.
 [The information referred to follows:]

HATE CRIME IS FEARED AS 2 INDIAN ENGINEERS ARE SHOT IN KANSAS

FEBRUARY 27, 2017

By John Eligon, Alan Blinder and Nida Najar

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/world/asia/kansas-attack-possible-hate-crime-srinivas-kuchibhotla.html?_r=0



Tributes to three gunshot victims were outside Austins Bar and Grill in Olathe, Kan., the scene of the attack, on Friday. Credit Amy Stroth for *The New York Times*

OLATHE, Kan.—“The Jameson guys,” as some on the staff at Austins Bar and Grill knew the pair, were on the patio on Wednesday evening. It was hardly unusual: Srinivas Kuchibhotla and Alok Madasani, two immigrants from India, often enjoyed an after-work whiskey at the bar they had adopted as a hangout.

Adam W. Purinton was also there, tossing ethnic slurs at the two men and suggesting they did not belong in the United States, other customers said. Patrons complained, and Mr. Purinton was thrown out.

But a short time later, he came back in a rage and fired on the two men, the authorities said. Mr. Kuchibhotla was killed, and Mr. Madasani was wounded, along with a 24-year-old man who had tried to apprehend the gunman, who fled.

Mr. Purinton, 51, was extradited to Kansas from Missouri on Friday, and he is charged with premeditated first-degree murder and two counts of attempted premeditated first-degree murder.

The attack, which the Federal and local authorities are investigating as a possible hate crime, reverberated far beyond both states.

It raised new alarms about a climate of hostility toward foreigners in the United States, where President Trump has made clamping down on immigration a central plank of his “America first” agenda.

The White House strongly rejected the notion that there might be any connection between the shooting and the new administration’s sharp language about immigration.

“People are devastated,” said Somil Chandwani, a friend of the two victims who lives in Overland Park, Kan. “I wouldn’t say they are angry. They have a sense of insecurity at the moment. People are trying to find answers.”

A charging document released on Friday gave no details about the motive for the shooting. Law enforcement officials in Kansas, citing the continuing investigation and judicial ethics standards, said little about the episode.

Still, the F.B.I.’s role in the inquiry suggested that officials had found some evidence that could eventually lead to civil rights charges in connection with the shooting, which occurred around 7:15 p.m. Wednesday.

“He snapped, and this is not his typical self,” the suspect’s mother, Marsha Purinton, said before declining further comment.



Srinivas Kuchibhotla, right, with his wife, Sunayana Dumala, in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, in an undated photo. Mr. Kuchibhotla was shot dead outside a bar in Kansas on Wednesday. Credit Courtesy of Kranti Shalia, via Associated Press

In a brief phone interview on Friday night, Mr. Madasani described the remarks made Wednesday by the man sitting near him and Mr. Kuchibhotla at the restaurant. “He asked us what visa are we currently on and whether we are staying here illegally,” Mr. Madasani said. (Both men were educated in the United States and were working here legally.)

“We didn’t react,” Mr. Madasani said. “People do stupid things all the time. This guy took it to the next level.”

Mr. Madasani said he went in to get a manager, and by the time he returned to the patio, the man was being escorted out.

After Mr. Purinton was thrown out, Jeremy Luby, 41, a software developer, said he offered to pick up the tab for the two men, who thanked him during a brief conversation about work and cultural differences.

“It was wrong what happened to them,” Mr. Luby said. “I thought it was a nice gesture to say, ‘I’m sorry someone was being rude to you like that.’”

After the shooting began, another patron, Ian Grillot, 24, said he tried to count the shots while he hid under a table. Thinking the gunman had run out of ammunition, Mr. Grillot said, he confronted him, only to be shot in the hand and the chest.

“It wasn’t right, and I didn’t want the gentleman to potentially go after somebody else,” Mr. Grillot said in a video released by the hospital where he received treatment. “He did it once. What would stop him from doing it again?”

The shots echoed around the area, and Chris Lacross soon emerged from a store a few doors down to an unimaginable scene: an emergency medical technician performing CPR on a man lying in the doorway of the bar’s front patio, where tables

and chairs had been flipped over, and someone was shouting that they needed towels.

Another man took off his shirt and applied pressure to the wound of another victim, who was writhing in pain, said Mr. Lacross, who allowed some people to use a store restroom to wash away spattered blood.

Within minutes, an emergency dispatcher, in a transmission archived by the Broadcastify website, told officers, "We're being advised the suspect's name is Adam, and he's a white male wearing a white shirt with military medals."



Adam W. Purinton was charged on Thursday with one count of premeditated first-degree murder and two counts of attempted premeditated first-degree murder. Credit Henry County Sheriff's Office, via Associated Press

Capt. Sonny Lynch, the deputy chief of police in Clinton, Mo., where Mr. Purinton was arrested at an Applebee's restaurant, said a bartender there called the police after a customer confessed to his involvement in a shooting hours earlier.

"He was talking to her—I'm on the run; I'm hiding out from the law—so she stuck around," Captain Lynch said of the bartender. "She just hung out there talking to the guy until he said, 'I shot those guys, and that's why I'm hiding out from the police.'"

Mr. Purinton was arrested without incident, Captain Lynch said, and invoked his constitutional rights. It was not clear whether he had a lawyer.

Mr. Purinton spent time in the Navy and, according to a website where veterans can list their military records, was deployed aboard the Long Beach, a missile cruiser, from 1988 to 1990. He later worked for the Federal Aviation Administration but left the agency in 2000, a spokeswoman said.

In Johnson County, Kan., at least, he has had few run-ins with law enforcement. Court records showed a limited history: a speeding ticket in 2008, as well as a 1999 drunken-driving charge that was dismissed.

A neighbor, Lisa Puckett, said that Mr. Purinton was frequently intoxicated but that news of a shooting was stunning.

"We always wondered if he might hurt himself, but we didn't think he would hurt someone else," she said.

The dead man, Mr. Kuchibhotla, worked for Garmin, a GPS navigation and communications device company. One of the wounded men, Mr. Madasani, like Mr. Kuchibhotla in his early 30's, also worked for Garmin, according to the Indian government. On Friday, counselors were at the company's campus in Olathe, a hub of South Asian immigrants where 84 languages are spoken in the local school district.

Speaking to reporters on Friday at the Garmin headquarters, Mr. Kuchibhotla's widow, Sunayana Dumala, said she had long been worried by shootings she read about in the newspaper.

"I, especially, I was always concerned, are we doing the right thing of staying in the United States of America?" she said. "But he always assured me that only good things happen to good people."

Now, Ms. Dumala said, she needed "an answer from the government" about what "they're going to do to stop this hate crime."

Mr. Madasani's father, Jagan Mohan Reddy, a government engineer in Hyderabad, India, said his family was in shock. He said he did not know whether he would ask Mr. Madasani, who received a graduate degree from the University of Missouri-Kansas City, and another son living in the United States to leave the country.

"We have to think it over," he said. "My sons are not new to America. They have been staying there for the last 10 to 12 years. This is a new situation, and they are the best judges."

Mr. Madasani, who has been released from the hospital, said he was recovering physically and mentally. "I'm definitely doing much better, but it's not over yet," he said.

On Friday, Mr. Kuchibhotla's killing and the wounding of Mr. Madasani led to a chorus of fury in India, where the attack dominated the news media to such an extent that the top American diplomat in the country was compelled to issue a statement condemning what she described as a "tragic and senseless act."

In Washington, the White House press secretary, Sean Spicer, rejected any link between Mr. Trump's policy agenda and the shooting, which many Indians believed might have been inspired by the president's harsh tone on immigration.

The Justice Department is under pressure to bring Federal charges in the case.

Moussa Elbayoumy, the board chairman for the Kansas chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, said the government should "consider filing hate crime charges in order to send a strong message that violence targeting religious or ethnic minorities will not be tolerated."

On Friday night, a diverse crowd of more than 400 gathered to grieve at First Baptist Church down the street from the bar. They offered their prayers to the Kuchibhotlas and the Madasanis, characterized the shooting as an anomaly in an otherwise peaceful, tolerant suburb and vowed they would not let that change.

"As a community, we are still shocked, devastated, and angry," Mayor Michael Copeland said. "But this is not how this ends. This is not our Olathe."

He added, "One evil act does not divide a united community."

Mr. Purinton was scheduled to appear in court on Monday. Austins, meanwhile, planned to reopen on Saturday

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Second is, "1,094 bias-related incidents in the month following the election." I ask unanimous consent.

Mr. KING. Without objection.

[The information follows:]

UPDATE: 1,094 BIAS-RELATED INCIDENTS IN THE MONTH FOLLOWING THE ELECTION


DECEMBER 16, 2016

<https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/12/16/update-1094-bias-related-incidents-month-following-election>

Hatewatch Staff

This is the fourth update in the Southern Poverty Law Center's effort to collect reports of bias-related harassment and intimidation around the country following the election. This update spans the period from November 9 to December 12.

The SPLC collected reports from news articles, social media, and direct submissions via our #ReportHate intake page. The SPLC made every effort to verify each report, but many included in the count remain anecdotal. Here's the breakdown nationwide:



While the total number has surpassed the 1,000 mark, reports have slowed down significantly compared to the days immediately following the election. The reports are nonetheless as heartbreaking and infuriating as before. In Massachusetts:


Just now, our 14-year-old son walked into our house and informed me that he just experienced his first hate crime. It's dark out so he was riding his bike on the sidewalk down the street from our house. He sees a man walking in the middle of the

sidewalk, so our son says, “Excuse me”. The man steps to the side and then yells, “Hey nigger, next time get off of the bike”. This is a quick walk from our new home and I am enraged and saddened that someone near us would do that.

In Florida:

I witnessed an apparently inebriated older white man in the park make an obscene gesture at two women in hijabs in a public park. The women scurried away and the man turned to me perhaps under the assumption that I shared his enmity. He made remarks about Ohio and, to the effect, that Muslims are subhuman and that “President Trump got his work cut out for him.” We exchanged words but I avoided an altercation and left the scene.

Hate Incident Daily Count




Overall, anti-immigrant incidents (315) remain the most reported, followed by anti-black (221), anti-Muslim (112), and anti-LGBT (109). Anti-Trump incidents numbered 26 (6 of which were also anti-white in nature, with 2 non-Trump-related anti-white incidents reported).

We’ve also been tracking false reports (13 total), as a handful of high-profile incidents have been recently uncovered, including two (I, II) that we had previously counted and have removed for this update.

While it is almost certain that more false reports will be uncovered, and the SPLC will be quick to update our database, the right-wing narrative that this wave of incidents are all hoaxes simply doesn’t stand up to the numbers. Counting all 13 false reports (listed at the bottom of this post), of which only two were counted in our previous reporting, amounts to just over 1 percent of the total number of incidents collected in this update.

Let’s get to the numbers.

Hate Incident Motivation



As we've previously reported, many incidents cross multiple "types." This voicemail, left at a church known for its immigrant community outreach in Grand Rapids, Michigan, on Nov. 21, we categorized as one incident. Its main type was anti-immigrant while its subtypes were anti-LGBT, anti-Latino, and Trump.

Here's the transcription:


"I think this is the gay church, that help gays that get kicked out of the country along with all the fricken Mexicans that are illegal that you guys are hiding illegally. I hope Trump gets ya. Trump Trump Trump. Trump Trump Trump. Trump's gonna get your asses out of here and throw you over the wall. You dirty rotten scumbags. Hillary is a scumbag bitch. Too bad waaa waaa. Hillary lost. Hillary lost. Trump's gonna getcha and throw you over the wall."

Like the incident above, around 37 percent of all incidents directly referenced either President-elect Donald Trump, his campaign slogans, or his infamous remarks about sexual assault.

Within these Trump-related incidents, we can see which incident types most frequently included a reference to Trump (excluding anti-and pro-Trump only incidents which would both be 100 percent).


By far, anti-woman incidents saw the greatest share:


Share of Trump-Related Incidents by Type



Trump-related incidents (including anti-Trump (26) incidents) appear to follow the same trend over time, dropping off since their peak during the period immediately following Election Day:


Trump-Related Hate Incident Daily Count





The most frequently reported incident type, anti-immigrant (315) incidents, were around 29 percent of all of those reported to us. We saw a number of different targets, as well as a more generalized sentiment against perceived foreigners that was vague in terms of targeting race or country of origin.

Those subtypes break down as follows, with anti-Muslim incidents included (anti-Muslim incidents, separate from our anti-immigrant count but related in quality, also encapsulate incidents that could also be defined as anti-Arab):



Of particular note in this updated time period is a string of hateful anti-Muslim letters sent to mosques and Islamic centers around the country. Between Nov. 23 and Dec. 2, the following centers all received an identical letter that described Muslims as “Children of Satan” and a “vile and filthy people.”


California:

- Islamic Center of Claremont
- Islamic Center of Northridge
- Evergreen Islamic Center
- Islamic Center of Southern California, Los Angeles (Koreatown)
- Islamic Center of Davis
- Islamic Cultural Center of Fresno
- Long Beach Islamic Center

Elsewhere:

- Masjid Miami Gardens
- Islamic Center of Savannah
- Masjid Al-Fajr Islamic Center of Greater Indianapolis
- Islamic Center of Boston
- Islamic Center of Ann Arbor
- Islamic Center of East Lansing
- Islamic Center of Cleveland
- reports of an Islamic center in Denver, Colo.

We've also been tracking the reported distribution of white nationalist (47), KKK (7), and anti-Semitic (3) posters and fliers. In total, we captured 57 separate incidents with a spike coming on the first Monday following the election:



With white nationalist “alt-right” figureheads like Richard Spencer and Milo Yiannopolous touring college campuses, the increased confidence that these groups are feeling following Trump’s victory, and the unprecedented press attention they are receiving, it isn’t surprising to see that nearly 74 percent of these incidents occurred on campuses, where the ‘movement’ hopes to build its numbers.


The white nationalist alt-right youth groups behind these incidents were American Vanguard, Identity Evropa, TheRightStuff. We collected reports from the following colleges and universities:

- University of Arkansas, Fort Smith
- Arizona State University
- University California, San Diego
- University California, Davis
- UCLA
- University of California, Santa Cruz
- University of California, Santa Barbara
- University of Colorado, Colorado Springs
- University of Augusta
- Iowa State University
- Michigan State University
- Grand Valley State University
- William Jewell College
- Rutgers
- University of Cincinnati
- Miami University
- Ohio State University
- University of Oklahoma
- Southern Methodist University
- University of Texas, Dallas
- Virginia Commonwealth University
- University of Washington
- Beloit College
- Diablo Valley College
- University of Florida

- Florida Gulf Coast University
- University of Central Florida
- The University of Chicago
- Indiana University-Purdue University
- Purdue University
- Amherst College
- University of Maryland
- Lebanon Valley College
- Emerson College

The breakdown of location types has stayed steady throughout our reporting, with the majority of incidents occurring at K–12 schools (226), businesses like Starbucks, Walmart, and restaurants (203), and colleges and universities (172).

Hate Incident Locations




In the days to come, if you or someone you know has experienced or witnessed a hate incident, please consider submitting the incident to the SPLC after first reporting to the proper authorities.

Likely False Reports:

- 11/9/2016 Lafayette, LA: A student at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette fabricated a story about having her hijab pulled off:
- 11/9/2016 Santa Monica, CA: A filmmaker claimed he was beaten by Trump supporters and posted a photo on Twitter. The Santa Monica police never received a report about the alleged incident, and no such patient was admitted to area hospitals.
- 11/9/2016 Mebane, NC: A picture was circulated on social media that appeared to show Klan members marching across a bridge. It was a conservative group and not Klan members.

- 11/9/2016: Minnesota, MN: No verification: woman says she was attacked, told to “go back to Asia,” deletes her account and Facebook post.
- 11/9/2016 Smyrna, DE: Woman threatened, called a “black bitch.” Posts on Facebook. Says she has reported, that charges have been filed. Police in Smyrna have no evidence of her report or the incident.
- 11/10/2016: A picture of two college students who appeared to be posing in black face in front of a confederate flag was circulated on social media. The flag was actually torn to show opposition, and the students were wearing cosmetic face masks.
- 11/15/2016 Calvert County, MD: A student claimed he was assaulted by three men, two of whom were black. The report was later deemed fake.
- 11/16/2016 Dallas, TX: A racist and anti-LGBT flyer allegedly found on the windshield of a car appears to be a hoax.
- 11/16/2016 Philadelphia, PA: A fake article circulated alleging that Trump protestors beat a homeless man to death.
- 11/17/2016 Bowling Green, KY: BG police say student lied about politically driven attack.
- 11/18/2016: Malden, MA: Man admits to faking hate crime in Malden.
- 11/22/2016 Chicago, IL: Hateful ‘Trump’ Notes Allegedly Aimed at Student Were Fabricated, University Says.
- 12/1/2016 New York City, NY: Muslim college student made up Trump supporter subway attack story to avoid punishment for missing curfew.

1,094 Post-Election Hate Incidents



Ms. JACKSON LEE. I also would like to pose a question, Mr. Chairman, I will put it in writing, but I would ask that this committee, being the front-line committee on intelligence, be part of the investigation that would determine what questions were posed to the Department of Homeland Security and DOJ, but our jurisdiction is homeland security, in asking, let me just say I don't know whether the word was "demanding," a memorandum that would support the administration's decision on the banning of Muslim countries, seven Muslim countries.

It is a reported in the media that the Department of Homeland Security was asked to produce the memo to support the actions

that were already taken. I think that is important information for us to have as Members of the Homeland Security Committee and as well for us to do our unfettered work, unfettered investigatory work and also meeting with the standards of this hearing, the future of counterterrorism, addressing the evolving threat in domestic security.

We have to ensure that independence in our agencies.

Let me pursue this with Mr. Bergen. Thank you for your work. I wouldn't say that I am, I won't use the term "fascinated," I was about to say it, but I am in awe at the initial writing of the Executive Order and all of its nuances.

One of the ones that really struck me was the 120-day ban on refugees. That combines with—I am from the city of Houston. We have a large number refugees. For decades, we had a huge number of Iraqi refugees that came in after the war and on-going. We have a huge number of Afghan refugees.

You just made a very valid point. I have watched. I have been in Mosul and I have watched the retaking. I was there in the bloody, let me not characterize, but as a Member in the after-effect of all the bloodiness that went on in those earlier times. But we know that Mosul has been a site. Here we have Iraqi military forces with certainly the technical help of our very fine military, moving forward and moving in these ISIS strongholds. This is miraculous and bloody.

So, who knows what refugees may come out of that? We know that there are people who are interpreters and otherwise. But would you please answer the question of the far-reaching impact of an Executive Order impacting refugees, 120 days, possibly in fear of their life? Then just the general statement that the Executive Order makes, in terms of the United States' history of friendship with the Muslim world.

Mr. BERGEN. Thank you, Representative Lee. You know, I would point to the indefinite ban of Syrian refugees—

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes.

Mr. BERGEN [continuing]. Coming into this country. You know, this is a bad idea. We have accepted 15,000 Syrian refugees, there are 5 million of them. So we have taken 0.2 percent. The last way you would want to get into this country as a terrorist is a Syrian refugee. It is the hardest way to get in. It takes 2 years; you give up all your biometric data, it is quite a process. There is no evidence of any Syrian refugee engaging in any form of terroristic activity.

So this was a counterproductive idea and these people are victims of terrorism. They are the victims of State-sponsored terrorism by Assad and victims of ISIS. They are, overwhelmingly, women and children.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. I am glad you mentioned Syrian and the Iraqi and refugees overall are impacted negatively by this, I don't want to put words in your mouth, but this Executive Order.

Mr. BERGEN. Agreed.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you.

I yield back. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to the Ranking Member.

Mr. King, I have some follow-up questions I will ask the entire panel. It looks as if we are achieving great success in Mosul. Assuming that success continues in Iraq and Syria, how much of threat do you think we face in this country from terrorists who were driven out of Iraq and Syria, and I would say the threat to Europe and to the United States, since you will have well-trained terrorists there? Is there going to be a problem with them coming? Putting aside the refugee issue and all, I am talking about people coming into the country.

Mr. BERGEN. So far we see no ISIS-trained militants coming into the United States and we have only seen eight people, Americans, returning from Syria. They have trained mostly with other groups. So the problem is going to be in Europe. And, yes, there will be a problem.

But, you know, ISIS is not the problem, it is a symptom of big problems that aren't going to be fixed very, anytime soon. We are going to see a son of ISIS and a grandson of ISIS if there is no political accommodation in Iraq and Syria, that produced ISIS in the first place.

So, you know, we are going to be unfortunately testifying on this subject in the future if we can't solve the Syrian civil war and the Iraqi civil war, none of which is easy to do.

Mr. KING. I guess my concern was the immediate one as far as law enforcement and—

Mr. BERGEN. Yes.

Mr. KING [continuing]. Counterterrorism in this country. How alert do we have to be to an increase, a possible increase or upsurge in terrorists coming either into Europe or the United States?

Mr. BERGEN. I think it is particularly Europe. I mean, most of the Americans who have gone—there are very few Americans that succeeded in getting to Syria. A lot of them have been killed over there. You know, the volume of Europeans is, you know, 6,900, I think, in total. The number of Americans who have even gotten to Syria is maybe 50, half of whom are probably dead by now.

So it is really the European problem and, of course, the problem in the Middle East, where, you know, probably, you know, more than 30,000 foreign fighters, not all of whom will get killed.

Mr. KING. Right.

Mr. BERGEN. So there will be this bleed-out problem.

Mr. KING. Mr. Simcox.

Mr. SIMCOX. Yes, I think the European foreign fighter issue is a very serious one for the United States. These foreign fighters, of course, some of them are going to be killed in trying to defend Raqqa and Mosul and other ISIS strongholds, but many will return to their countries of origin. This obviously presents a severe threat for Europeans and, of course, Americans living in Europe, of which there are over 1½ million.

But you also have to think of the fact that European agencies, European security agencies around some of the countries especially impacted, Germany, Belgium, France, for example, are overwhelmed with the scale of the problem at the moment and they clearly would say themselves don't know who exactly has left the country and who exactly is going to be coming back in.

Obviously, it is a lot easier for returnees, if they are not on the security radar, to travel to the United States from Brussels or Paris than it will be to go from Syria and Iraq. So I think you have to also think there is a potential threat to the United States from European returnees, not just in Americans abroad, but also in the U.S. homeland itself.

Mr. KING. Mr. Joscelyn.

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, this is why I always come back to al-Qaeda. Of course, I am well versed in ISIS threat, but part of the discussion here is that the military intelligence and law enforcement of the United States has been dealing with potential al-Qaeda threats emanating from Syria for some time now.

There has been an uptick in airstrikes that have been deliberately targeting individuals who, according to the Defense Department, who, according to intelligence sources who talk to the press and make official statements, are involved in plotting against the West and specifically against the United States.

Now, yes, it is difficult to get from Syria into the United States. It is much easier to get into Europe. They have all sorts of logistical problems in pulling off a major sort-of attack from there. But that doesn't mean they are not trying, it doesn't mean they are not probing, it doesn't mean that they don't want to eventually.

Another factor here is that they have been very, very patient, and this is what makes me worried, in that they actually had a stand-down order for al-Qaeda in Syria for a couple years now where they were laying the groundwork for plots against the West, but they weren't given the green light for it.

Basically, it was they were focusing on the war against the Assad regime and building popular support for al-Qaeda's cause in Syria, very dangerous in the long run. You want to talk about having hearings for the coming future? That is the type of thing we will have hearings in the coming future.

But the point is that as in Syria, as in elsewhere, a small part of their resources are devoted to anti-Western plotting. So far, I think the United States has disrupted quite a bit of that, but it doesn't mean it doesn't exist, it is there.

Mr. KING. Commissioner.

Mr. DAVIS. I believe that the more successful the military is in depriving these actors of their foreign lands, the more underground that they will go and they will attack us on two fronts. One through the internet, which I think we need to pay close attention to. The radicalization of our own people through the internet is an extreme problem that needs more robust defenses.

Then the other thing is we can't forget that 9/11 was a very sophisticated plot. Terrorists will follow the path of least resistance in launching their threats. So Europe has a bigger problem than we have, but we cannot discount it here. They will, if they go underground, they will launch attacks against us from foreign lands that we need to be vigilant about.

So at the same time that I believe trusting relationships with the people who live here are extremely important, it is also very important to have a good defense at our borders to keep out anybody who is intent on hurting our people.

Mr. KING. Thank you. I know I am over my time, but, Mr. Bergen, if I could just engage you on the question of the seven countries. We can debate the ban separately, but as far as those seven countries, agreed, there has not been serious attacks in the past from those seven countries.

But again, when legislation was first passed, I guess, in 2015 to 2016 about taking away the visa waiver status of Europeans and we attempted to determine which countries had the most potential for danger in the future, we agreed on four countries, and that was agreed on with the President and the Congress and that was voted on. The administration itself added three countries to come to the seven.

Now, the Obama administration had the opportunity to add other countries, too, but it was the four that was agreed on with Congress and the administration. Then the administration added on the three as the countries which had the most potential danger.

Certainly, as far as, you know, the visa waiver is concerned and if we mention countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, we do have much better relationships now with their intelligence agencies than we had on 9/11.

On these other countries, you have Iran who is an enemy, and you have certainly Iraq could be a separate issue, I agree. But the other countries, basically there is no intelligence agency, there is no intelligence structure. In many ways, they are broken governments. I think in only three of those countries, we even have embassies. So, to me, that was the logic that went into those seven.

Again, we can discuss the ban itself, or the temporary ban, separately. But I think there is a logic to those seven countries. But I would appreciate your thoughts, as I always do.

Mr. BERGEN. Thank you, Chairman King. You know, I think it was Jeff Flake and Senator Dianne Feinstein, who, you know, there is something that makes sense, which is if you are the citizen of a visa waiver country, which is almost invariably a Western country, and you have recently visited Syria and Iraq, yes, you should be the subject of scrutiny, and a number of these other countries. That makes sense.

But just saying anybody who comes from these countries is a potential threat, that doesn't make, I mean, to me, that makes less sense. These countries are given a lot of scrutiny already if you are a citizen of these countries coming in to the United States.

So what was sensible was to say if you are a European who has in the past 5 years visited Syria or Iraq, well, you could be on a humanitarian mission, but you could also be joining ISIS. Giving those people extra scrutiny, I think, made a lot of sense. But just saying anybody from these countries is a potential terrorist, I think, is overdoing it.

Mr. KING. We could debate that. But again, to me, that was the logic. They didn't include Saudi Arabia or Pakistan or Egypt or other countries, which maybe they could have.

Mr. JOSCELYN.

Mr. JOSCELYN. Yes, just to interject real quick. You know, I agree with what Peter said about dealing with specific threats as opposed to just everybody. This isn't a defense of the travel ban. It has to be dealing with specific threats, as I said in my written testimony.

Most of the refugee crisis is a humanitarian concern, not a counterterrorism concern, but there are counterterrorism concerns there.

Just when you go back to sort-of the history, you know, until 9/11, we didn't have an Egyptian, Lebanese, Saudis hijacked planes and fly them into buildings before 9/11, you know?

So the threat was emanating from countries and these were foreign nationals who went and got trained in Afghanistan and then made their way through the West to come here. This is a very complex sort-of situation. It is not something that goes down to just sort-of a crude nationality.

In the terms of the seven, Congressmen, to sort-of just buttress your point a little bit, there is no doubt in my mind that some of preeminent threats to the U.S. security are emanating from Syria and Iraq today, also Yemen. We know AQAP has tried a number of times to launch attacks against us. Somalia, which is on the ban list, again, I am not defending the ban list, I think it is crude, but Somalia, there is a threat emanating there.

Al-Qaeda has been experimenting with a very small explosive that they can slip onto planes. You heard Peter mention that possibility in one of the airports abroad, that they come into the United States, they have been experimenting with that type of explosive and they tried that in Somalia with a flight that came through Europe or was going to go through Europe.

So I think the countries, and Libya as well, I think there are clear, defined threats from most of these countries. Iran, of course, is the principal gateway for al-Qaeda to this day. This is another issue that is not really discussed very much, but the Obama administration between July 2011 and July 2016, on numerous occasions said that the core pipeline for al-Qaeda's operations around the globe, including sending operatives to the West, goes through Iran. That is, of course, on the list.

So the ban, to me, is clumsy, there are many problems with it. But in terms of understanding where the threats are coming from, at least a number of the countries on this list are rightfully under scrutiny. I think there are other countries, as well. But again, you know, most of the people coming from these countries are not terrorists, of course.

Mr. KING. Ranking Member for as much time as she wants.

Miss RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BERGEN. it was recently reported that the President is looking in his budget, he is going to be looking to increase military spending and part of that was going to be paid for by cutting foreign aid. Can you talk about what that would do and how that would affect National security?

Mr. BERGEN. The \$54 billion that the Trump administration is seeking for the Department of Defense, I mean, probably some of that is justified. But if it is just simply going to buy, you know, things like the F-35 or other pieces of hardware that are highly expensive and not that relevant to the actual wars we are fighting on, I think the Pentagon itself is going to push back on some of this.

Because after all, it was Secretary Mattis who said, you know, that in 2013 that the State Department was essential. After all, we

don't want to go to war, we want to stop wars before they happen. That is the job of the State Department. It is called diplomacy.

So zeroing out foreign aid and basically, you know, kind-of gutting the State Department, I think, in the long term, is a terrible idea. I am not even certain that the Pentagon necessarily—of course, they want money for veterans and other things like that, but I don't think there is a huge demand signal.

This seems to be more of a campaign promise that just sort-of willy-nilly has been fulfilled without doing a lot of careful consideration about what are we trying to achieve and how to do we best try and achieve it rather than just saying we are just going to increase 10 percent to the Department of Defense.

Miss RICE. Well, I actually think that it was Secretary Mattis before he became Secretary who said how critical foreign aid is in terms of maintaining calm and peace throughout the countries in areas that are, you know, that are in volatile areas.

While having a robust military is obviously very important, from a diplomatic standpoint, from a non-interventionist standpoint, military interventionist standpoint, that that foreign aid to all of our allies across the globe is critically essential to maintaining that kind of world order.

Would you agree that, Mr. Bergen?

Mr. BERGEN. I mean, we spend 1 percent of our budget is on foreign aid. So as a percentage of the budget, it is very, very small. Of course, sometimes it is misspent; I mean, we can't pretend otherwise. But the idea that it should be zeroed out, it doesn't make sense because sometimes it is misspent.

Miss RICE. Thank you.

Mr. KING. The gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Bergen, in your written testimony you claimed that New America, which is the organization that you are employed with, right, has collected data on 399 individuals accused of jihadist terrorism-related crime since 9/11 and the research shows that of the 94 people killed by jihadist terrorists inside the United States since that time, not a single death would have been prevented by the travel ban.

Now, to me, this obviously ignores a number of attempted, failed, or less-than-lethal terror attacks that have been perpetrated by persons from these seven countries. I am just going to name a few here. A Somali refugee Abdul Razak Ali Artan went on a jihadi stabbing rampage at Ohio State. An Iraqi refugee Omar Faraj Saeed Al Hardan was accused of planning to bomb a local mall in Texas. A Somali refugee named Dahir Adan went on a stabbing spree in a mall in St. Cloud, Minnesota. A Somali refugee was arrested for planning to blow up a Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Oregon in 2010. An Iraqi refugee bombed a Social Security office in Arizona.

So the question is, would the Executive Order protecting the Nation currently, well, as proposed, from foreign terrorist entry into the United States, had it been in place prior to these individuals coming, would it have prevented those instances?

Mr. BERGEN. Also in my testimony, sir, as you may have noticed, I mentioned some of these cases. In the case of the Ohio State at-

tack, he actually came from Pakistan. He was a Somali refugee who went to Pakistan when he was a child. So did his radicalization take place in Pakistan, which is not on the ban? Did his radicalization take here in the United States?

I mean, it raises the broader issue of, when children come to this country as refugees, are we going to ban them because 10 years from now they might become terrorists?

For instance, in the 1920's and 1930's, would it have been our policy to say, well, if you are from Sicily, which millions of people came to this country from, you know, because there was a possibility you might become a member of the mafia 10 years down the road, we are not going to let you in. This is the logic of this ban, it doesn't make sense.

Mr. PERRY. Well, I don't necessarily agree with you on that, and I don't necessarily see it as a ban either, as more of a resetting to understand and make sure that the vetting process is correct and appropriate. It seems, in a way, that you are advocating for unless there is broad and wide-scale mayhem and destruction that we need to be reactive as opposed to proactive.

Mr. BERGEN. Of course I am not advocating that. What I am saying is the problem is an American domestic problem. I mean, every lethal terrorist attack in this country has been carried out by an American citizen or a legal permanent resident. I mean the issue is radicalization here, not—

Mr. PERRY. But it seems to fly in the face. I mean, if the police are searching for a serial killer, but something requires them to look at the whole panoply of everybody that was killed in the city, doesn't it kind of fly in the face that you need to focus your efforts on the things that make sense that connect and are common to the acts that are committed. The things that are common, you have to focus your efforts there because that tells the story of maybe why, who, how, these things are happening?

If we just say, well, these things are happening everywhere and there is no commonality of origin or ideology, I think we are going to miss the mark.

Mr. BERGEN. Are you suggesting that we should ban travel from France?

Mr. PERRY. No, I am not suggesting that. But I am suggesting that some countries, some geography have a higher incidence and just like, as the Chairman said, the administration prior to this one recognized the exact same thing. As it is stated, as you call it, a ban, to me, it is just a timeout to make sure that we are doing everything we can, appropriately, regarding the countries that we find most at risk.

It is essentially just renewing your insurance policy and looking at the risks that you have; as opposed to being reactive, we are being proactive.

Let me just move on a little bit regarding the Muslim Brotherhood and designating them. I am sure you are familiar with the Holy Land Foundation investigation and civilization jihad, right?

Mr. BERGEN. Yes.

Mr. PERRY. So because we have relations and relationships with countries that recognize the Muslim Brotherhood, most recently, I

am sure you are aware that Egypt, although democratically elected, rejected the Muslim Brotherhood and listed them themselves.

But, you know we have had conversations with the likes of Saddam Hussein, the Castro regime, the North Koreans; meanwhile, we designate them in some effect as hostile actors. Can we not have our cake and eat it, too? Can we not recognize that these individuals and these organizations have a design to overturn our Government, our way of life in some cases and in many cases, even though that they are on the world stage and are world actors and we must have a relationship and some kind of dialog with them, but to understand what their clear intentions are take action regarding their intentions?

Mr. BERGEN. I think conflating the North Korean government with the Muslim Brotherhood is to make a category error.

Mr. PERRY. OK. Go ahead.

Mr. BERGEN. After all, I mean, Muslim Brotherhood is the government or part of the government in many of our closest allies. I mean, are you going to criminalize the leaders of the Iraqi government who are helping us in Mosul?

Are you going to criminalize the Jordanian members of Parliament who are members of the Muslim Brotherhood? Or the Kuwaiti members of Parliament who are members of the Muslim Brotherhood?

Are we going to behave like the Egyptian dictatorship, el-Sisi, who criminalized the largest opposition party in his own country? Are you endorsing that?

Mr. PERRY. What I am endorsing is is that the United States needs to be vigilant regarding individuals and organizations that seek our destruction and our downfall and acting like as they wander among us in town that they don't have that intent when they have shown that very express intent, is suicidal, is suicidal for a nation.

While it might not be the best vehicle, I think it raises the bar and puts those organizations on notice that we understand what their intentions are. Though we might have to deal with them, and we should deal with them for the good of mankind, we understand and recognize and disagree with their intentions.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield.

Mr. KING. Mr. Keating.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As a district attorney before I was here, I was very concerned on gender violence issues, particularly sexual assault, domestic violence. The National Task Force on Ending Sexual and Domestic Violence recently stated that the Executive Order would endanger the safety of victims of sexual assault, domestic violence, and human trafficking, their families and communities at large, further isolate victims and erect barriers to establish legal protections for those victims.

Mr. Bergen, can you comment on that?

Mr. BERGEN. I don't actually know, sir.

Mr. KEATING. Any of our panelists can comment on that?

All right, I just wanted to also—we are making great success shrinking the footprint militarily with ISIL. One of the things that

we are also making great success with that is probably less publicized is the way we are shrinking their financing as well.

We are doing it with our elimination of their oil refineries and resources. They are doing it as we shrink the land because they can't tax the way that they could before. The other two issues are really the use of hostages and ransom and the trading illegally in antiquities and cultural artifacts.

How are we doing on those other points? I know we are doing well, you know, on shrinking the footprint, which again deals with the taxing issue. But if you could just comment on how we are doing on those fronts.

Mr. BERGEN. Very well, ISIS has halved its salaries. You know, we dropped a big bomb, the United States, on one of their banks where they had a lot of their money in. The *New York Post* had one of the best headlines of all time, "United States Makes Big Deposit." So we have really kind-of, you know, they are running a 30,000-man, 20,000-man army, it costs money. We have really put a hurt on that.

They are running and one of the reasons we are seeing child soldiers, by the way, now is they are running out of manpower. We are seeing more and more child soldiers. So I think the approach is working, they are slowly being strangled.

Mr. KEATING. OK, yes?

Mr. SIMCOX. I think one of the key things on the kidnap-for-ransom issue is making sure that everybody is on the same page because are some countries which take this very seriously in terms of not paying kidnap money to ISIS.

The United States takes it very seriously, the United Kingdom takes it very seriously. Some of the United States' European allies have been harder to persuade and actually are paying kidnap ransom money. ISIS and al-Qaeda are the groups who are able to sustain themselves because of it.

Also, when you look, I think I agree entirely with Peter on some of the progress that is being made in the Middle East. But remember, some of the ISIS cells in Europe, for example, are kind-of, I mean, some of these are lower-level criminals who have got other ways of fundraising, you know, something closer aligned with criminal gangs and gangsters. So there are multiple problems that we need to be aware of.

Mr. JOSCELYN. You know, there were some designations by the U.S. Government last year dealing in the aftermath of counterterrorism raids against ISIS in Deir ez-Zor and the leadership there where what the documentation that was recovered showed extensive trading in antiquities from Palmyra and elsewhere in Syria and Iraq on the black market.

It is very difficult to get a sense of what the total income is from this activity because it is illicit, because it is in the black market, and there were many trades that were discovered during those raids that were unknown. You know, there were the artifacts that were basically being put up on the block that were previously unknown to be in their possession.

So it is very difficult in that aspect, which is only one of many of their revenues they are bringing in, to get a good sense of just

how prolific they have been and perhaps could be in the future. I do think overall their finances have absolutely been hurt.

On the kidnapping for ransom, again, you know, I know I am the al-Qaeda guy, I will keep coming back to it, but this is one of those areas where they been a little more sophisticated than ISIS in terms of getting kidnapping for ransoms because they have been able to maintain friendly relations with certain Gulf countries that have basically brokered very lucrative deals for them at times for U.N. people who were kidnapped near the Golan Heights, U.N. workers, and employees for high-profile Americans and others where they have been able to trade for millions and millions of dollars and earn ransoms.

This is part of their strategy all the way from West Africa, all the way to South Asia and through the heart of the Middle East. So it is something to keep an eye on. As Robin said, some countries are good on it, others, a lot of them in fact, are not. So that is part of the problem.

Mr. KEATING. So that is something we should work with our friends then. I have another question.

Oh, yes, did you want to talk about that, Mr. Davis? Sorry.

Mr. DAVIS. I just wanted to mention that beyond kinetic weapons, the financial investigations and also shutting down of these websites or targeting people who are responsible for them, who are activating people in our country has been very effective.

Mr. KEATING. Good point.

Mr. DAVIS. I don't understand why we can't shut down their magazines, why pursuing that on the internet and immediately shutting down the publications of these magazines that extol this radicalism and attacks against us couldn't be done more frequently.

Mr. KEATING. Yes. It wasn't long ago that I was in Tunisia, and here is the concern I have. Tunisia, as I think most of you know, has the highest per-capita number of foreign terrorist fighters, and they are coming back. Some of them going back to Libya, but some, you know, many are coming right back to Tunisia which is a pretty fragile country right now and they are not alone, but I will use them as an example.

When we are cutting, as a country, our ability to help countries like that that are in crisis at this point, how dangerous is that, to do that? Because you have got a fragile country, you have got a high amount now of returning foreign terrorist fighters that they don't know how to deal with, according to reports.

This is a great example how the United States, I believe, intervention there to help that country, you know, through the State side could be so critical and keep us safer. Would you like to comment on the need of doing that and why maybe making sure we have funding to help at these critical times is important?

Mr. SIMCOX. Yes. Tunisia is obviously a very clear country of concern. Actually, I was speaking to the German government recently who, one of their main concerns at the moment is, they have lots of Tunisians in Germany that they regard as a threat, who shouldn't be there, trying to deport back to Tunisia, and Tunisia is saying we just don't want them back. Right?

I mean, they already feel as if they are a threat. They are already under severe, you know, terrorist alert as it is. So I think

that is an area where the United States has got to take the lead in helping coordinate that kind of thing.

Mr. KEATING. Well, thank you very much.

Are you done, Mr. Joscelyn?

Mr. JOSCELYN. Can I just add here on Tunisia? I mean, that basically this is one of the few countries to come out of the Arab uprisings that has a chance actually for a better future at this point. You know, I think that America should scale up its efforts to support the Tunisian forces there instead of the opposite.

You know, the Tunisian case as a country, I am sorry, is inextricably linked to Libya and the flow of fighters back and forth, which basically if you start looking at the whole situation, if we are not bolstering Tunisia, then we start to allow them to have greater operating access across North Africa, you know.

So Tunisia is one of those key countries right now. Any strategist looking at the jihadi threat has to look at Tunisia as sort-of a key roadblock possibly to what the jihadis are doing.

Mr. KEATING. Great. Thank you very much.

Mr. KING. OK. First of all, let me thank the witnesses for their testimony. I think this was a very worthwhile hearing, testimony was very illuminating, and I think the dialog between the Members and the witnesses was very constructive. So I want to thank you really for your testimony.

Thank you for all the work you have done with the committee in the past, and hopefully we can see you again the future. Any advice you have for us along the way, any input, we certainly welcome it, including yours, Mr. Bergen, really.

[Laughter.]

Mr. KING. No.

Thank you all very much. With that the hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE MIKE GALLAGHER FOR EDWARD F. DAVIS, III

Question 1. Significant American aid dollars, mostly in the form of U.S. SF and intelligence assets, has assisted Nigeria in scoring several battlefield victories against Boko Haram in recent years. However, given not just the frequency of mass kidnappings, but the inability to locate these Nigerian victims and secure their release, what further support does Nigeria need both from a military and civil society standpoint, to ensure they can secure their own borders and the safety of their people without significant and indefinite U.S. aid?

Answer. My current work as a National and international security consultant includes the field of domestic terrorism. Boko Haram is an example of world-wide terror organization that needs to be defeated. Beyond that I have no insight on what type of support is needed to insure Nigeria can secure their own borders and the safety of their people without significant and indefinite U.S. aid.

Question 2a. Last month, Pakistan's military approved a 10-year, 121 billion-rupee (\$1.77 billion) development package for formal integration of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas into the Khyber province. The plan needs approval from Pakistan's Federal Cabinet, but, given the military's support of the plan, this approval is seen as a formality.

Taking into account the FATA's history of local governance, tribal politics, and active militants, how does Islamabad's decision potentially impact Pakistani militant groups?

Question 2b. Could we see an uptick in attacks from the Pakistani Taliban and LeT within Pakistan or/and would we see the groups pushed out of Pakistan back into Afghanistan and become an even greater threat to Afghan and American forces?

Answer. I do not have insight on 2(a) or 2(b).

Question 3a. Are we now looking at social media for visa and refugee applicants to understand better any potential threats or dangers?

What are the impediments and do you see a coordinated effort between the intelligence community, law enforcement, and State Department on a common approach?

Question 3b. What are the data and privacy concerns attached to any of this?

Answer. Social media is a critical component of effective background screening. Open-source reviews are an important part of a comprehensive background screening. A coordinated effort between the intelligence community, law enforcement and the State Department makes abundant sense in this process.

There are data and privacy concerns attached to data sourced via internet. These concerns are well-founded. However, open-source data is and should be accessible to all. It would be negligent in today's world not to search open-source information as part of background screenings and intelligence gathering. All searches should adhere to Federal and State law.

Question 4. Given your experience as Commissioner of a large urban police department that would frequently work with the FBI, how can local law enforcement, in conjunction with the FBI's Minneapolis Field Office and other relevant Federal agencies, work to prevent both self-radicalization and formal jihadi recruitment of members of the Somali diaspora, particularly in the large cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul?

Answer. Federal, State, and local law enforcement should work together using a community policing approach to conduct outreach to the Somali diaspora. They can schedule cross-jurisdictional meetings within communities where radicalization is most prevalent, to discuss issues, concerns, and establish relationships. Building relationships with all community groups is critical to finding solutions and receiving meaningful intelligence to thwart radicalization and attacks. The attendees of these meetings should include community members who bring different perspectives to the table. The meetings should go beyond community members who regularly attend

community meetings. This is very important to encourage a vigorous discussion of the issues and work to establish trust with the entire community.

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE MIKE GALLAGHER FOR THOMAS JOSCELYN

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Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

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Taking into account the FATA's history of local governance, tribal politics, and active militants, how does Islamabad's decision potentially impact Pakistani militant groups?

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What are the impediments and do you see a coordinated effort between the intelligence community, law enforcement, and State Department on a common approach?

Question 3b. What are the data and privacy concerns attached to any of this?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE MIKE GALLAGHER FOR ROBIN SIMCOX

Question 1. Significant American aid dollars, mostly in the form of U.S. SF and intelligence assets, has assisted Nigeria in scoring several battlefield victories against Boko Haram in recent years. However, given not just the frequency of mass kidnappings, but the inability to locate these Nigerian victims and secure their release, what further support does Nigeria need both from a military and civil society standpoint, to ensure they can secure their own borders and the safety of their people without significant and indefinite U.S. aid?

Answer. The Nigerian army and the rest of the multinational coalition fighting Boko Haram have made significant tactical gains against the group. However, sustainable progress requires that the Nigerian government implement a strategy that discredits the ideology that motivates Boko Haram's leadership and some of its recruits, and ameliorates the environment that facilitates Boko Haram recruitment.

The U.S. Government can help Nigeria by increasing—in keeping with relevant American law—its tactical support to the Nigerian military, including ISR, training, and appropriate equipment. The United States should also insist on the importance of, and help the Nigerians build, strong and transparent security institutions critical to creating and sustaining the accountable, competent, and law-abiding force necessary for long-term success against Boko Haram and similar groups.

The United States should, in tandem, provide direct support to competent Nigerian civil society organizations, especially those in Boko Haram-affected areas, working on counter-radicalization, rule of law, and economic-development initiatives.

Question 2a. Last month, Pakistan's military approved a 10-year, 121 billion-rupee (\$1.77 billion) development package for formal integration of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas into the Khyber province. The plan needs approval from Pakistan's Federal Cabinet, but, given the military's support of the plan, this approval is seen as a formality.

Taking into account the FATA's history of local governance, tribal politics, and active militants, how does Islamabad's decision potentially impact Pakistani militant groups?

Answer. The plan to integrate Pakistan's Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province is a welcome and long overdue step. The plan to scrap the outdated Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) and replace it with a code of law based on personal, rather than collective, responsibility

will help protect individual rights. Furthermore, extending the jurisdiction of the Pakistani High Court and Supreme Court to the FATA and allowing the people of the region to participate in national elections will ensure they enjoy full and equal rights under the Pakistani Constitution. These political changes, along with the economic development package for the region, is critical to ensuring FATA does not remain a hotbed for terrorism. It also signals a change in mindset of the Pakistani military, which had long resisted incorporating the FATA into Pakistan proper, most likely to protect certain militant groups that operated there. Following through on the political and economic changes for FATA will help the military and civilian leadership consolidate the gains against the Tehrik-e-Taliban-Pakistan (TTP) made during Operation Zarb-e-Azb.

The outlook regarding the future of the anti-India Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) militant group is less certain. This group retains links to Pakistan's security establishment and is still perceived to be a useful tool against India among most Pakistani military and intelligence officials. While Pakistan recently took a positive first step against LeT by putting under house arrest the group's founder, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, there have been no other tangible signs that Islamabad is reining in the group's operations. The major LeT compound at Muridke, outside Lahore, remains unaffected and there has been no information about LeT training camps or funding sources being shut down. Only time will tell if Pakistan is serious about also reining in the LeT.

Question 2b. Could we see an uptick in attacks from the Pakistani Taliban and LeT within Pakistan or/and would we see the groups pushed out of Pakistan back into Afghanistan and become an even greater threat to Afghan and American forces?

Answer. Large numbers of TTP militants have already moved across the border into Afghanistan as a result of the Zarb-e-Azb military operation. Some of these militants have rebranded themselves as members of the Islamic State (ISIS). The Afghan forces, with support from U.S. forces, have targeted these bases, mostly found in the eastern Afghan province of Nangahar.

There is some concern following the string of attacks in Pakistan last month (including a major attack on a Sufi shrine that killed nearly 80) that TTP elements have been able to regroup inside Pakistan. A renewed push by the Pakistan military to crack down on terrorism, including sending 2,000 Pakistan Army Rangers into the Punjab province, is aimed at stamping out the residual terrorist networks.

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What are the impediments and do you see a coordinated effort between the intelligence community, law enforcement, and State Department on a common approach?

Question 3b. What are the data and privacy concerns attached to any of this?

Answer. The United States is looking at social media in a select manner for visa applicants and travelers to the United States. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has ordered consular officials responsible for conducting visa interviews to undertake "mandatory social media check[s] for applicants present in a territory at the time it was controlled by ISIS." In applying through the electronic system for travel authorization (ESTA) to come to the United States through the Visa Waiver Program, travelers now have the option to provide some of their social media information. DHS has also tested multiple social media screening pilot programs but was criticized by the DHS inspector general for poor objective setting.

(a) Resources are certainly a potential impediment. There are two primary ways to engage in social media vetting: Self-reporting and open-source intelligence gathering from the internet. Self-reporting may allow a targeted search of an individual's accounts but ultimately relies on the truthfulness of the applicant. Have they provided all their accounts to authorities? Have they provided false accounts? Solving such problems may ultimately require that officials resort to the second option of searching the internet. Unfortunately, finding each social media account belonging to every applicant's social media accounts seems to be a resource-intensive process. It also is no guarantee that searches of social media accounts on the internet will be able to find the ones belonging to the applicant in question. This is not to say that social media should never be used—but that mass collection of social media may be more trouble than it is worth.

(b) If passwords are collected to access social media accounts then there are certainly concerns regarding how that data will be secured from hackers or insiders. It would be a gold mine to keep all those passwords in one place and would be targeted for malicious purposes. Another concern to consider is that U.S. citizens could be subject to reciprocal or retaliatory measures when entering other nations that could pose a threat to the privacy and security of American travelers' data.

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE MIKE GALLAGHER FOR PETER BERGEN

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Taking into account the FATA’s history of local governance, tribal politics, and active militants, how does Islamabad’s decision potentially impact Pakistani militant groups?

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What are the impediments and do you see a coordinated effort between the intelligence community, law enforcement, and State Department on a common approach?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 3b. What are the data and privacy concerns attached to any of this?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 4a. In your written testimony you mention CVE programs and the difference between counter-radicalization and counter-recruitment. Should we create community-led off-ramps for those individuals who are being radicalized—as has been recommended by think tanks like CSIS (Panetta/Blair Commission) and considered by the FBI in certain cases?

What should that look like—and does DHS have a leading role to play?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 4b. What are the best ways to, as you put it, “enlist rather than alienate the Muslim community” to prevent ISIS’s and other radical groups’ propaganda from spreading across American communities?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

