[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
IMPLICATIONS OF A U.S.-SAUDI ARABIA NUCLEAR
COOPERATION AGREEMENT FOR THE
MIDDLE EAST
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 21, 2018
__________
Serial No. 115-122
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
TED S. YOHO, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois DINA TITUS, Nevada
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
Wisconsin ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
ANN WAGNER, Missouri TED LIEU, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
DARRELL E. ISSA, California GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
RON DeSANTIS, Florida DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
ANN WAGNER, Missouri THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida TED LIEU, California
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Henry Sokolski, executive director, The Nonproliferation
Policy Education Center........................................ 8
Mr. William Tobey, senior fellow, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, The John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University................................. 18
Ms. Sharon Squassoni, research professor of the practice of
international affairs, Institute for International Science and
Technology, Elliott School of International Affairs, George
Washington University.......................................... 23
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Henry Sokolski: Prepared statement........................... 10
Mr. William Tobey: Prepared statement............................ 19
Ms. Sharon Squassoni: Prepared statement......................... 25
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 52
Hearing minutes.................................................. 53
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 54
Material submitted for the record by Mr. Henry Sokolski:
``A New Light on the Proposed U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Agreement,''
by Victor Gilinsky and Henry Sokolski........................ 55
``Economic Consideration of Nuclear Power Deployment in Saudi
Arabia,'' by Ali Ahmad....................................... 58
``Nuclear Cooperation with Gulf Arabs,'' by Mark Fitzpatrick... 66
``Saudi Arabia Energy Needs and Nuclear Power''................ 68
IMPLICATIONS OF A U.S.-SAUDI ARABIA
NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT FOR
THE MIDDLE EAST
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 2018
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
Thank you so much to our panelists, thank you to the
audience and, most especially, thank you to our--to the members
of our subcommittee and some visitors that we might--we might
have join our subcommittee today.
And after recognizing myself and my good friend, the
ranking member, Mr. Deutch, for 5 minutes each for our opening
statements, I will then recognize other members seeking
recognition for 1 minute.
We will then hear from our witnesses and without objection,
ladies and gentlemen, your written statements will be made a
part of the record and members have 5 days to insert statements
and questions for the record, subject to the length limitation
in the rules.
The chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
Just last week in an interview aired on CBS News, the crown
prince of Saudi Arabia stated, ``But without a doubt, if Iran
developed a nuclear bomb, we would follow suit as soon as
possible.''
This interview aired just days after Energy Secretary Rick
Perry flew to London to discuss a 123, or nuclear cooperation
agreement, with senior Saudi officials.
Saudi Arabia is planning to build two nuclear reactors
along the Persian Gulf in the near future with plans to expand
to at least 16 reactors across the country.
But what should alarm us all is Saudi Arabia's insistence
that it be allowed to have enrichment and reprocessing
capabilities and statements about acquiring a nuclear weapon.
The crown prince's interview just last week is reason
enough to have the administration pump the brakes on the
negotiations and insist that there will be no 123 Agreement
that includes enriching and reprocessing.
Unfortunately, from the little we do know from the
administration, it is looking at this deal in terms of
economics and in terms of commerce, and national security
implications only register as a minor issue, if at all.
I am not completely opposed to the Saudi--to Saudi Arabia
having a peaceful nuclear program. But the idea of Saudi Arabia
having a nuclear program with the ability to enrich is a major
national security concern.
There are security risks to consider. As we all know, the
Middle East is a region that's constantly ensnared in conflict
and instability or on the verge of conflict and instability.
We don't need to look further than on Saudi Arabia's own
borders where the kingdom is leading a coalition against the
Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen.
The Houthis already targeted Riyadh's airport in a missile
attack. Hezbollah is amassing its presence in Yemen and you can
be sure that any nuclear infrastructure that goes up will be a
target as well.
There are also proliferation risks to consider and the
precedent that we may set if we allow Saudi Arabia to enrich,
as other countries in the region will want similar
capabilities.
When we negotiated the UAE 123 Agreement, our partners in
the UAE voluntarily agreed to renounce enrichment and
reprocessing capabilities and technologies.
This was a watershed agreement and has become what we now
know as the gold standard. The previous administration
abandoned the pursuit of the gold standard for all nuclear
cooperation agreements after the UAE deal and it appears that
the current administration, sadly, is following suit.
And that is why yesterday I joined our colleague from
California, Mr. Sherman, in sending a letter to the
administration urging it to pursue nothing short of the gold
standard in its negotiations with the Saudis.
Without those assurances, we feel it would be necessary to
oppose the agreement. There are too many concerns. There is no
justification for our friends in Saudi Arabia to have
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.
Unfortunately, the way that the current system is set up,
as you know, it is rigged in favor of the administration--any
administration--getting its 123 agreements approved no matter
what.
When the administration submits its agreement to Congress
for our review period, we have hearings and we debate the
merits of the agreement.
But then the only way that Congress can block the proposals
is by passing a joint resolution of disapproval. Not only would
Congress need a majority of votes for the disapproval, we would
need a large enough majority in order to override the
President's veto.
And that is not how it should work. These are agreements
that have great national security implications, we should all
have robust debate.
All of these deals should be thoroughly vetted and then, if
there is no gold standard, Congress should have to vote to
approve the proposal and say in the affirmative we agree with
the President--yes, this is a good deal.
And that is why Brad and I, along with Judge Poe and
Ranking Member Keating of our Nonproliferation Subcommittee
introduced a bill today that would amend this process.
It's called the Nuclear Cooperation Reform Act. We want to
amend the Atomic Energy Act. That's the underlying law that
governs these 123 Agreements and the approval procedures so
that Congress reasserts our proper oversight role.
Our bill would force a vote of approval on any 123
Agreement that falls short of the gold standard, and that's the
way it should be. We should not allow these agreements to come
into force passively and we should not cede our authority to
oversee and approve these agreements to the executive branch.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on this plan,
and with that, I very much look forward to the statement--
opening statements from our ranking member, Mr. Deutch of
Florida.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Thanks for calling today's hearing. Thanks for our
witnesses. For many members, today is an opportunity to explore
both the positives and negatives of a nuclear cooperation
agreement with Saudi Arabia.
We look forward to a productive discussion about this
important subject. We, in the United States Congress, are
strongly committed to ensuring only responsible and peaceful
use of nuclear technology around the world and preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons technology.
We also understand the role energy security plays in the
prospects for long-term stability in the Middle East. As such,
the United States has demonstrated high standards for nuclear
agreements in past negotiations.
The U.S. agreement that paved the way for the United Arab
Emirates to begin its nuclear energy program has been praised
as upholding the gold standard of 123 Agreements for its
prohibition on enrichment and reprocessing.
As more Middle East nations seek to diversify their energy
portfolios and limit their reliance on fossil fuels, we now
must ask ourselves if the gold standard is the bar that the
United States must always uphold.
I believe in working to boost the U.S. economy but not at
the expense of our commitment to good decision making on
sharing our nuclear technology.
Saudi Arabia is a strong ally in the Middle East and has
consistently shared U.S. priorities to counter terrorism and
limit the spread of dangerous Iranian-backed groups and
militant ideology.
The kingdom, however, continues to lag on several fronts
including human rights, governmental and business transparency,
and military deficiencies.
Its government, military, and private sector see large
influx--a large influx of funding but still suffers from
mismanagement and inefficiencies stemming from the reliance on
patronage, corruption, and nepotism.
Promotions based off lineage rather than expertise,
corruption and other bad practices will continue, I am afraid,
to limit Saudi Arabia from thriving and growing.
Reform is happening, albeit slowly, and we should be
supportive of the steps the government has taken to address
some of these shortcomings. Shakeups or trying to remove
corruption and make industries and ministries more efficient.
The reforms have touched high levels of Saudi Arabia's
government, military, and private sector including concentrated
efforts to root out corruption and graft at Aramco before a
highly-anticipated public offering that aims to build investor
confidence and address criticism of widespread corruption and a
lack of transparency at the company.
Only time and transparency will tell if these reforms will
see Saudi Arabia make honest efforts to turn its back on bad
practices. But we continue to be hopeful and we continue to
watch the rapid pace of reforms, especially as the changes may
have important implications on the country's stability and
ability to safely manage something as important as nuclear
technology.
This comes at a time when nuclear technology is an
increasingly important factor in Middle East relations and the
battle for influence between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Past discussions with the kingdom fell short when Riyadh
dismissed core aspects of the gold standard agreement with the
UAE, mainly centering on its priority to retain the right to
enrich uranium.
Concessions to Saudi Arabia could threaten the UAE deal and
set the bar for future nuclear technology negotiations.
Conversely, the United States maintaining a hard line on
this matter could conceivably push Riyadh to sign a nuclear
deal with one of the other countries it gets in discussions
with, the most concerning being Russia or China, both of which
have lax standards, quality, and restrictions.
Russia or China being the signatory on a nuclear deal would
also increase those nations' sway in this key region with our
key ally, potentially limiting American influence.
The future of Saudi Arabia's nuclear program also has
important implications on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action with Iran, which limits uranium enrichment but only for
a set period of time.
The U.S. attempting to restrict Saudi enrichment may be
viewed as unfair in light of Iran potentially having the
ability to restart this technology if it continues to adhere to
the tenets of the plan.
Now, I have long raised serious concerns about the sunsets
in the JCPOA. But we have to draw some distinctions. The key
difference is that Iran was already enriching uranium and the
goal was to prevent Iran's enrichment program from building up
its stockpile of highly enriched uranium that is necessary for
a nuclear weapon.
Saudi Arabia will be building this ability anew. Obviously,
uranium enrichment is no small factor and its implications for
a nuclear weapons program are extremely concerning.
And while Riyadh assures the world that it only wants
peaceful nuclear technology to boost and diversify its energy
sector, the country also is on record saying if it believes
Iran is building a nuclear weapon it will quickly follow suit.
Last week, the Crown Prince stated, as the chair already
pointed out, Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire a nuclear
bomb but without a doubt if Iran developed a nuclear bomb we
will follow suit as soon as possible.
The fact that there are ample enriched uranium reserves on
a global market that would be a higher quality and cheaper for
Saudi Arabia to import rather than try to initiate its own
enrichment capability leads me to think the catalyst for
wanting this technology is to maintain parity with Iran rather
than for energy uses.
The potential boosts for the U.S. economy and renewal of
the U.S. nuclear industry are indeed desirable. But it hasn't
been made clear what we can feasibly expect.
It's worth discussion today about how much funding it would
take to revive the industry, given the amount of government
funds most other countries that produce nuclear technology put
into their industries.
The risks are high and will absolutely set a precedent that
will follow us for decades to come. We don't take this decision
lightly and I am very grateful to our panel. I hope for a
productive discussion that may illuminate some of these key
gaps.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Excellent points. Thank you so much, Mr.
Deutch.
And now I am going to recognize the members. Mr. Chabot of
Ohio.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this
important hearing today and I'll be very brief so that we can
get to the witnesses.
Whenever we discuss the transfer of nuclear technologies
there is always cause for concern and, unfortunately, the
conversation we are having today would be completely different
without a resurgent Iran.
The Saudis have to deal with an Iran bent on dominance for
the foreseeable future. President Obama's Iran deal provided
Tehran with the cash to expand its influence throughout the
Middle East and since the JCPOA was agreed to, we have seen the
mullahs develop ballistic missiles and fight proxy wars
throughout the region, and on and on.
Worse, the JCPOA makes it a virtual certainty that Iran
will develop a nuclear weapon. Iran's nuclear ambitions raise
the specter that other nations will be forced to follow suit,
Saudi Arabia in particular.
So, Madam Chair, thank you for calling this distinguished
panel here today at this very critical time, and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. You are so right.
Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot.
And Ms. Frankel of Florida.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you to the
ranking member. Thank you both for your very articulate
thoughtful comments.
I just want to start by saying that we need to do
everything possible to prevent nuclear proliferation. Even a
country that we think are our friends, you just never know
whose hands these weapons will fall into at a later date.
What worries me is that we have a President who wrote this
book, ``The Art of the Deal,'' who believes that success is
based upon how much money you make and I think there is some
thinking in the administration's part that our participation in
this agreement could reap billions of dollars for the U.S.
economy.
I know everyone here thinks there is much more at stake
than that. Mr. Deutch raised, I thought, an interesting
dilemma, which is, you know, damned if you do, damned if you
don't, because if it was just up to us and we said no, we are
not going to get into this agreement with you and that was the
end of it, I think that would be easy.
My concern is and what I'd like to hear from you is what
happens if we don't have an agreement and we just leave it for
the Saudis to go and make one with Russia or China. I think
that's the big dilemma here.
Anyway, thank you for being here and I look forward to your
testimony.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Good points, Lois. Thank you so much.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for
convening this important hearing.
I applaud the Trump administration for their aggressive
advocacy on behalf of the U.S. nuclear technology in Saudi
Arabia.
The energy landscape in Saudi Arabia and the entire Gulf
Cooperation Council region is shifting dramatically with a
strong interest in renewable energy and particularly nuclear
power.
The facts are clear. Saudi Arabia will construct civilian
nuclear reactors. The only remaining question is who will build
them.
I believe the commercial interests and national security
interests are intertwined, with suppliers of this technology
gaining decades of influence over regional energy security and
nonproliferation standards.
Sadly, the American nuclear industry has experienced
setbacks at home with only two reactors under construction at
Plant Vogtle, adjacent to the district I represent in Georgia.
The United States should be doing everything in its power to
find new and emerging markets for its nuclear technology.
Later today I am grateful to introduce a resolution with
Congressman Don Norcross of New Jersey aimed at promoting a
comprehensive U.S. strategy to engage in the developing energy
market across the entire Gulf Cooperation Council region,
especially with regard to nuclear power.
This will include aggressive negotiation of peaceful
nuclear cooperation agreements with the remaining GCC countries
just as the administration is now doing with Saudi Arabia.
I yield back. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Sherman of California.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you for holding these hearings and
allowing me to participate.
We already have a gold standard template for 123 Agreements
or nuclear cooperation agreements. We have one with the United
Arab Emirates, signed in 2009, which prevents reprocessing and
enrichment.
Saudi Arabia also wants a nuclear cooperation agreement
with us, yet they balked at the idea of such restrictions. We
need a gold standard agreement.
Yesterday, I joined with the chair of this committee in
writing a letter to the secretary of energy on this issue,
urging that we press for a prohibition of enrichment and
reprocessing in the nuclear cooperation agreement. Today I join
with the chairwoman, Congressman Ted Poe, and Congressman Bill
Keating, the respective chairman and ranking member of the
subcommittee on nonproliferation in introducing the Nuclear
Cooperation Reform Act of 2018, to provide stronger
congressional influence in the process of agreeing to nuclear
cooperation agreements and requiring an affirmative vote of
Congress before we enter an agreement that does not meet the
gold standard.
Two points I want to make about Saudi Arabia. First, just
because they are anti-Iran does not mean they are a
Jeffersonian democracy. And second, even if you find MBS, who's
here in Washington, to be utterly charming or pro-American,
remember that the Shah seemed utterly charming and pro-American
or at least pro-American back in 1978 and 1979, and all the
weapons under his control are now in the control of the Islamic
Republic.
So we need to be careful and not allow Saudi Arabia to
develop a nuclear weapon just because we are worried about the
nuclear program in Iran, and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
And seeing no other requests for time, I am proud to
introduce our witnesses.
First, we are delighted to welcome back a good friend,
Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation
Policy Education Center.
Prior to this, Mr. Sokolski served as Deputy for
Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and before that he worked in the Secretary of
Defense's Office of Net Assessment on strategic weapons
proliferation issues.
Thank you for being here with us again, Henry, and we look
forward to your testimony.
Next, we are delighted to also welcome back a good friend,
Mr. William Tobey, senior fellow to the Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs and director of the U.S.-
Russia initiative to prevent nuclear terrorism.
Previously, Mr. Tobey served as Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear
Security Administration.
Mr. Tobey also served on the National Security Council
staff under three Presidents and we look forward to your
testimony as well, Mr. Tobey.
And finally, we are delighted to welcome Ms. Sharon
Squassoni, research professor of practice and international
affairs at the Institute for International Science and
Technology Policy at the George Washington University.
Prior to this position, Ms. Squassoni directed the
Proliferation Prevention Program at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies in Washington, DC.
She has also served at the State Department and in the
Congressional Research Service. Great to have you here, Ms.
Squassoni.
We thank all of our witnesses for braving the weather and
agreeing to see this hearing through despite the snow. So we
greatly appreciate your commitment to this important matter.
And as I had said, your written statements will be made a
part of the record. Please feel free to summarize, and we will
begin with Mr. Sokolski.
Probably move that microphone a little closer. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MR. HENRY SOKOLSKI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE
NONPROLIFERATION POLICY EDUCATION CENTER
Mr. Sokolski. Thank you very much for holding this hearing
and showing your true grit in sticking to your flight plan,
getting us all here despite our whining and complaints.
This, I understand from my staff, is the thirteenth time I
have appeared before you to testify on nuclear policy issues.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. You have got to make it interesting, like
Elizabeth Taylor said to her fifteenth husband.
Mr. Sokolski. Well, I'd like to. [Laughter.]
Yes. Well, I do rhyme a lot. I apologize for that.
I think it's a providential number at this time. I am
counting on it. This is even not the first time I've testified
about the legislation that you have pushed.
In this regard, I want to say that it's been a privilege to
work with you and your staff on so many of these issues since
1995. Your willingness to take these issues on actually keeps
my faith in this institution.
Actually, it helps me to get up in the morning and not be
discouraged, and I say that about your example. I hope I
haven't overdone it. But you can tell I actually think this.
So I want to ask permission to put four items into the
record.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Without objection.
Mr. Sokolski. Okay. I am not going to go over detailed,
footnoted, rather detailed testimony but to emphasize three
points.
First, I would plead with all the members here not to buy
the prevailing narrative regarding the proposed nuclear deal
with the Saudis. The U.S. has leverage. It should use it.
Second, after the Crown Prince's performance on ``60
Minutes,'' the key concern about the deal ought not to be to
what extent it does or does not promote American nuclear
exports, but whether it green lights Riyadh's desire to get a
bomb.
Third, H.R. 5357, the Nuclear Cooperation Reform Act, which
demands a congressional vote of approval for nuclear
cooperative agreements that fail to have the gold standard with
regard to WPT nonweapon states is long, long overdue.
I'll focus the balance of my time, if I may, on that
narrative, which, roughly, is the Saudis must have nuclear
power because they are running out of fossil fuels. We are all
going to get rich selling them as many as 16 reactors--American
reactors--but that if we insist on the gold standard and don't
rush to get congressional approval of an agreement that would
be more permissive of enriching and reprocessing, our best
friend in the Gulf will bolt, buy from the Russians and
Chinese, and we will lose influence.
The truth is the Saudis don't need nuclear power to meet
their energy and environmental goals, much less to enrich
uranium or reprocess spent fuel. Their neighbor, the UAE,
announced that it will not be building any more nuclear power
plants but instead will invest in cheaper, quicker, nonnuclear
energy sources.
Ms. Frankel, I can just say to you the odds of Riyadh
buying Russian are about as likely as them buying it from the
Iranians because, effectively, they are that close and I don't
think we have to worry about that. Nor do I think the Chinese
or French products for a variety of reasons, offer any
attraction. I think it's going to be South Korean if it's going
to be anything.
As for getting rich, few now believe the Saudis will be
buying 16 reactors. The Nuclear Energy Institute's own recent
analysis now allows that by 2040, at most, the Saudis might
build eight and perhaps as few as four, while others supporting
a non-gold standard Saudi deal have even allowed that we'd be
lucky if they build even one.
The last point is something to focus on. If, as the Crown
Prince made clear in the ``60 Minutes'' performance that Saudi
Arabia is intent on getting a bomb as soon as possible, he
could do so by using one or both of the two 100-megawatt
electrical South Korean research reactors that he has already
bought and does not require a 123 on. This system would afford,
roughly, six times the plutonium production capacity of Israel
or India or North Korea when they started off.
It would be a sufficient bomb starter kit either for the
production of plutonium or to serve as a cover to procure what
would be needed to enrich or reprocess.
The takeaway here is that we need to get the Saudis to
accept the gold standard, even if they don't buy American.
Otherwise, we risk leaving the door open for them to get the
bomb.
One last comment--some argue that one bomb will neutralize
another bomb--that a Saudi bomb will neutralize an Iranian
bomb--that one plus one equals zero.
That's fuzzy math. Where I come from, one plus one equals
two and in the Middle East it quickly turns into a much higher
number.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sokolski follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. We appreciate it.
Mr. Tobey.
STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM TOBEY, SENIOR FELLOW, BELFER CENTER
FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE JOHN F. KENNEDY
SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Mr. Tobey. Madam Chair, Ranking Member Deutch, members of
the committee, thank you for holding this hearing, on an
important but often overlooked subject.
I will distill my testimony to just six points but would be
happy to elaborate upon your questions.
First, the proliferation risks associated with light water
power reactors are modest and manageable.
Second, the proliferation risks associated with enrichment
and reprocessing technology, however, are deep and dangerous.
Third, Saudi Arabia is justifiably concerned about Iran's
nuclear program. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has
serious flaws. The durations of its key provisions are too
short and it fails to require of Iran a complete and correct
declaration of all of its relevant nuclear activities.
Even if the deal endures--and I hope it does, despite its
flaws, even though I was a critic of it before it was brought
into force--our forty-sixth President will likely face an Iran
technically capable of producing enough fissile material for a
nuclear weapon in weeks or months.
Fourth, the further spread of enrichment technology would
only compound these dangers and should be resisted vigorously
by U.S. policy.
Fifth, the arguments that the United States lacks leverage
in this situation are overstated. The United States is the
kingdom's most important security partner and one of its
largest trading partners, particularly in the realm of arms
sales. If we join a race to the bottom, we forfeit this
leverage.
Sixth and finally, the United States has never before
contemplated, let alone concluded, a nuclear cooperation
agreement with a state that is threatening even provisionally
to leave the nonproliferation treaty.
We should have no truck with nations threatening to bolt
from the NPT, especially not nuclear truck.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tobey follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Tobey.
Ms. Squassoni.
Thank you. You can push that little button there to
activate your microphone. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MS. SHARON SQUASSONI, RESEARCH PROFESSOR OF THE
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Ms. Squassoni. Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member
Deutch, and members of the committee, thanks for the
opportunity to share some views on the implications of nuclear
cooperation with Saudi Arabia for the Middle East.
I too have six points, Will, but we didn't collaborate.
[Laughter.]
Before my six points, I want to just give a little bit of
introductory remarks. In the Middle East, countries have been
slow to deploy nuclear power for a few reasons--abundant oil in
some countries, fear after Chernobyl, cost issues, and
sensitivity about nuclear weapons proliferation, whether it's
Israel, Iraq, or Iran.
The first country to deploy a commercial nuclear power
reactor, Iran, underscored the risks of proliferation. Perhaps
because of that, the next country deploying nuclear power, the
United Arab Emirates, took a bold step in renouncing sensitive
fuel cycle capabilities.
Separately and in its nuclear cooperation agreement with
the U.S., the UAE rejected pursuit of domestic uranium
enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing.
As the members have noted, that's been called the gold
standard. Why did the UAE do that?
Well, it was confident that the international market would
supply its fuel while being sensitive to the need to instill
confidence in the international community about its peaceful
nuclear intentions.
Besides, as the U.S. has proven, it's possible to run 100
reactors while relying on foreign sources of uranium and/or
enrichment and without having reprocessing at all.
Saudi Arabia is taking a different approach. The U.S. has
been trying for 10 years to persuade Saudi Arabia to commit to
relying on the international market. But Saudi officials are
wary.
Technology and economics are less important here than
politics. Saudi officials have stated consistently since 2011
that they would match Iranian nuclear capabilities whether just
in uranium enrichment or nuclear weapons.
For Saudi Arabia, obviously, the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action with Iran is a problem because it did not completely
eliminate Iran's uranium enrichment program.
This creates a dilemma for all nuclear suppliers, not just
the United States. It seems risky to engage in nuclear
cooperation with a country that has avowed its intention to
pursue nuclear weapons under specific conditions.
How confident are Members of Congress that Iran will not
acquire a nuclear weapon? How confident are Members of Congress
about Saudi Arabia's intelligence capabilities regarding Iran's
nuclear program?
Here are the six points.
One, critics can debate whether a universal gold standard
for nuclear cooperation agreements is feasible or desirable.
But the U.S. has quietly implemented this approach in the
Middle East since 1981 precisely because of the proliferation
risks.
There's no reason to create an exception to that policy for
Saudi Arabia.
Two, concerns about the JCPOA make it even more important
to limit the spread of enrichment in the region. The best hope
for reining in Iranian capabilities is to bring Iran into line
with norms in the region.
The JCPOA limits are the start, not the finish.
Three, there's no substitute for U.S. leadership in nuclear
nonproliferation, nuclear safety, and security. The point is
not to lower our standards but to raise others.
And four, if Saudi Arabia desires flexibility for future
options, it should sign a shorter agreement with the U.S.--an
agreement with 10 to 15 years' duration would match phases in
the JCPOA if that's a concern.
Fifth, Nuclear Suppliers Group members will discourage
Saudi enrichment but might support a multilateral approach that
could possibly benefit the whole Middle East.
Finally, part of the challenge in collaborating with Saudi
Arabia will likely be a lack of transparency. Congress can help
in the following ways. I do applaud the new bill. I think it
does a lot of important things.
Saudi Arabia needs to rescind its Small Quantities Protocol
or adopt the amended version recommended by the IAEA. An
Additional Protocol is essential to its safeguards agreement
but would also be a useful educational exercise for Saudi
Arabia's new regulatory authority.
And finally, you should levy a requirement for the Director
of National Intelligence to provide annual unclassified and
classified reports to Congress on WMD-related acquisitions and
transfers to and from Saudi Arabia.
You used to get those reports across the board and for some
unknown reason they were ended.
Thank you very much and I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Squassoni follows:]
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----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Really excellent
testimony. I will begin with the question and answer period.
The administration and the nuclear industry are both
touting the economic and commercial benefits of a 123 Agreement
with Saudi Arabia. Exactly how much the U.S. economy would
benefit is highly uncertain, as all of the models and all of
the projections make heavy assumptions that are far from
guaranteed.
But this economic and commerce argument raises another
question about the lack of congressional oversight. Trade
agreements are subject to strong congressional debate. We have
an up and down vote on approval.
But 123 Agreements, which also impact our national
security, are passively approved under current law. If the
administration and the industry are touting this agreement as,
essentially, a trade or commerce deal--however flawed that
logic may be--based on its economic impact, then should it not
at a minimum be getting the same treatment with an up and down
vote? And so you can answer that when I finish my round of
questions here.
And on Monday, the Saudi foreign minister called the
Iranian nuclear deal a flawed agreement and the
administration's next steps on the JCPOA are reported to be a
major part of the discussions between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia
officials this very week.
And with the Crown Prince stating earlier that Saudis will
get a nuclear bomb as soon as Iran gets one, it is clear that
the JCPOA and the administration's current 123 negotiations are
linked.
So I would ask the panelists what impact do you think the
JCPOA had on Saudi Arabia's nuclear plans and how did the JCPOA
impact our leverage in 123 negotiations?
And related to that, considering the JCPOA's enrichment
restrictions--they start to sunset in just 10 years--what
options do we have with the Saudis and how can we meet our
nonproliferation goals in the region?
And we will start with you, Henry. Thank you.
Put the microphone on and hold it closer.
Mr. Sokolski. Sorry.
I think we need to think a bit bolder than even Mr. Trump,
and that's saying a lot because he's a pretty bold guy.
I think you can't just extend the duration of the kinds of
controls on enrichment that are in Iran. The reason your
legislation and this hearing is important is it ought to be a
wake-up call that maybe we have to think big and that would
mean getting the gold standard not just for Saudi Arabia but
that should be part of the President's agenda.
In this regard, the quickest smartest way to help that
happen is to take the advice that the UAE actually is giving by
not going any more nuclear to provide assistance to folks in
the region for lots of things that make more economic sense.
I have entered into the record two recent studies by
leading energy economists that show what the kinds of things
are that you would do that--where you'd make money and you
don't have to worry about bombs or being bombed because these
facilities, when they're large, get targeted.
So that, I guess, is my brief answer.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Tobey.
Mr. Tobey. So, Madam Chair, if I understood your questions
correctly, it was what impact did the JCPOA have on Saudi
thinking and how did that affect our leverage in this
situation.
So it's very clear that the weaknesses in the JCPOA drive
valid Saudi concerns. I just happen to think that the correct
way to address those weaknesses is not by a Saudi nuclear
weapons program, but by other means, which are quite possible,
that would bring to bear American influence--political,
military, diplomatic--on the situation.
With respect to what impact it had on our leverage, those
that say that we have no leverage on this situation because
others will sell the reactor ignore broader aspects of the
problem.
It's true that within the narrow focus of just nuclear
matters there are other suppliers that would be willing to take
the field.
But Saudi Arabia would be foolish to take on Iran without
American support.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Ms. Squassoni.
Ms. Squassoni. Thank you.
On the question of what economic benefits we might have, I
think it's important to remember that a 123 Agreement is not a
contract and, honestly, Westinghouse is not in a good position
to be selling reactors.
I agree with Henry that it's likely going to be a South
Korean contract. Now, does that mean that we should lower our
standards to enable South Korea to get business with Saudi
Arabia? That is not clear to me.
On the JCPOA, I would say little impact because, really,
it's kind of a red herring. Without the JCPOA, Iran would be
enriching.
Let's not forget that countries can legally acquire
enrichment and reprocessing and they can stockpile as much
material as they would like, right.
If they have a big stockpile of bomb-grade plutonium or
highly enriched uranium, they have a lot of inspections--it's
true.
But whether or not the JCPOA has linkage to this, the fact
of the matter is the U.S. does not support the spread of this
technology. The JCPOA, even though it has sunset provisions, is
giving us an opportunity to bring Iran around and we need to
take every opportunity we can so that when those provisions
sunset they wake up and realize pursuing those kinds of
capabilities is not in their national security interest.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much to all of you again
for being here.
And now I am very pleased to turn to my friend, Mr. Deutch
of Florida.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
We've had lots of discussion about the decision on a
nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia and having ripple effects
throughout the region.
I guess my question is this. We are at this moment where
the President--where the President is now talking openly of
pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal at the same time that
there's conversation about entering into a nuclear agreement
with the Saudis, which may permit enrichment if--and I would
like to just--you have touched on--each of you have touched on
this a bit but if you could just explore what it means if both
of these things were to happen if we--if the President pulls us
out of the Iran deal and what that will mean in terms of
Iranian enrichment, then look at what impact that would have on
a deal like this with Saudi Arabia, particularly in light of
the comments that I referred to earlier.
Mr. Sokolski.
Mr. Sokolski. I am reminded of the Tom Lehrer lyric,
``We'll all go together when we go.'' Let's think this through.
First of all, please don't rush. If you're going to do
something wrong, don't be in a rush for it. I always tell my
staff if you're going to do something stupid, take your time.
Okay.
Second, if it's going to be really foolish, let's put it to
a vote. I will tell you why you want to do all that because
your question goes directly to our future.
The Saudis, clearly, are going to try to bootstrap up. If
the Iranians break out of that deal or that deal is terminated,
you will see them ramp up their enrichment almost certainly is
quite likely or, you know, in time.
The Saudis will then work with what they have whether they
buy it from us or not. They have those two Korean reactors.
They can use that. It has everything they need to do what they
want to. They don't even have to buy American or Russian or any
of that.
What then will happen is the UAE, if we strike this deal
with the Saudis, will say hey, what about us--we have a clause
that says we should at least be given an opportunity to amend
ours.
So too does Egypt and its deal comes up, I believe, in
2021. Then Turkey, our favorite ally--you folks must have a
hearing or two on that--in 2023, Morocco in 2021, and let's not
forget why Mr. Sherman showed up. South Korea, they also want
to enrich. At a minimum, even their current President wants
nuclear submarines and previously the President before that
wanted to do recycling. Well, you have a deal with Saudi
Arabia--what about us, and then, of course, you have what Japan
will do.
You get the picture. I mean, it's a mess. You are throwing
kerosene on the embers of the current proliferation problem in
expectation that with enough of it, you will snuff the fire
out.
Mr. Deutch. Mr. Tobey, Ms. Squassoni, what would tell--what
would you tell the Emiratis when they come to us after a deal
is struck with Saudi Arabia that permits enrichment and assume
that happens.
Assume also that the President pulls us out of the Iran
deal. The Emiratis come and say, wait a second--in light of
everything that's going on in the region, you're our ally--we
assume you're going to be willing to renegotiate our deal--that
gold standard just doesn't work anymore.
What's our response?
Mr. Tobey. The UAE deal provides for the ability to
renegotiate it if the UAE faces terms that are less favorable
than others that are negotiated subsequently.
So they have the right to pursue that and there's not much
we can do. I actually think the UAE is unlikely to do so
because I regard them as a genuinely responsible
proliferation--nonproliferation player.
Your earlier question about what the combined impact of a
withdrawal from the JCPOA and a green light to Saudi enrichment
would be, the short answer is it would be a proliferation
disaster.
I've been a critic of the JCPOA. But if the duration is one
of your criticisms, taking its duration to zero makes no sense
whatsoever, especially since the bulk of the benefits to Iran
have already accrued to Tehran, whereas the benefits to us
accrue over time.
Mr. Deutch. Just if I may, Madam Chairman, just one last
question.
Ms. Squassoni, so let me ask what would America's
response--what should America's response be then to the Saudis
if the question is okay, well, we would very much like to enter
into this deal with you.
But if you're prepared to do it then we are just going to
go elsewhere? I know Mr. Sokolski says unlikely the Russians. I
understand why. But Russians, South Koreans, anywhere else,
what's our response then?
Ms. Squassoni. Well, there's a thing called the Nuclear
Suppliers Group where we harmonize our export controls and
Russia and China are members of that.
Let me just make something crystal clear. We don't give
enrichment or reprocessing technology to anybody. We don't do
it.
So what we are actually talking about and what Saudi Arabia
wants is our consent for them to do that with our material in
the future. So they've got to get it from somewhere else.
We still, even though we stirred the pot 10 years ago with
the India deal, we still have a lot of leverage within the
Nuclear Suppliers Group.
If the JCPOA goes away and there's nothing to replace it,
and we have an agreement with Saudi Arabia or we don't, Saudi
Arabia has to go to someone to ask them for enrichment and
reprocessing.
If no one in the Nuclear Suppliers Group will give it to
them, they could go to North Korea or they could go to
Pakistan. Either way, that is creating a whole other dynamic in
the region.
It would be even worse than Henry's, you know, pouring oil
on the fire. That would be a disaster. I am not saying it's
going to come to pass but they do have limited options.
In terms of what we tell Saudi Arabia, it is you are a
nuclear newcomer state--you do not need enrichment and
reprocessing.
We have a standard in the Middle East, which we are
committed to upholding, and if you're concerned in the future
let's talk about it in 10 years' time.
Mr. Deutch. Great. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Mr. Donovan of New York.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Are the international inspections--we enter this
agreement--are international inspectors able to--I mean, are
they overworked by the JCPOA?
Are they going to be able to make inspections that are
going to make us feel comfortable about Saudi Arabia following
whatever protocols are in place?
Mr. Sokolski. In a word, no, and the reason why is they are
very clear in Vienna and they've been very honest, if we would
bother to listen, that they cannot absolutely guarantee that
they know where things might be if someone wants to hide them
from them. That's what happened in Iraq. That's what happened
in Iran. That's what happened in North Korea, and the Agency,
to its credit, was candid about that.
We won't take no for an answer, though. We need to. There
are limits. Not only that, but there are ways of operating
overt facilities such that you can break out so quickly that
the ability of us to convene a hearing, much less to do
anything, might not be very quick.
It's called timely warning. We don't have it. You can have
inspections of light water reactors if you know there's not any
desire to enrich or reprocess. You can keep track. You can do
that.
But if there's any reason to believe someone is covertly or
overtly enriching or reprocessing, you're in trouble and I
think--you know, I share the criticisms that Will Tobey has
about the Iran deal on that basis. I think we are kind of
kidding ourselves as to how well that can be verified.
Mr. Donovan. Do you all agree with that as well?
Mr. Tobey. Yes, and I would just add that it's important to
understand that the scale of enrichment capacity necessary to
fuel reactors is far larger than the scale that's necessary to
have a viable weapons program.
So it's easy to hide a weapons program within this larger
system, which makes the breakout potential even more dangerous
and the breakout period even shorter.
Ms. Squassoni. I have a slightly different perspective. I
would say that under the JCPOA we have higher confidence than
we do under just regular comprehensive safeguards. That was the
whole purpose, right?
You get more information, more access to more sites. You
have a lot of information about the procurement chain. So the
measures under the JCPOA are better than what we have under the
Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty's comprehensive safeguards
agreement.
But your question did not specify whether Saudi Arabia had
enrichment capability or not. I would say we have more
confidence if it has a simple program with light water
reactors.
When you introduce sensitive nuclear fuel cycle
technologies into the equation, the confidence goes down.
And let me just say one thing. Most countries with a
complete fuel cycle are former nuclear weapon states or nuclear
weapon states. There are few exceptions. Japan--who else?
Germany.
Mr. Sokolski. Brazil.
Ms. Squassoni. Well, yes. Brazil and Argentina. Brazil has
a small enrichment program. But that came from its weapons
program.
Mr. Donovan. Aren't we dependent, though, on the country
being forthcoming, permitting access, whereas, my
understanding, in part of the Iran deal is Iran is selecting
where the inspectors go, what soil to test.
They're removing the soil and giving what soil they want
tested rather than having the inspectors themselves choose the
sites.
Mr. Sokolski. Two comments. I don't know how many lawyers
are up here. Too many. Well, but I've always been told--and I
worked in the Justice Department briefly--that laws are meant
to be broken but people don't understand what that means. What
it means is you have got to catch people breaking the laws and
if you do, that's okay. That's part of the reason why even
outrageous countries like North Korea are very concerned about
the law and what they're being asked to sign up for. It's not
for nothing that the Iranians negotiated as long as they did.
It's not for nothing that the North Koreans took so long to
negotiate the things that they negotiated with us and it's not
for nothing that the Saudis are also very concerned about the
letter of the law.
You have got something here. Use it.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you.
Madam Chairman, my time has expired. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Donovan.
Ms. Frankel of Florida.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you very much.
So I want to go back to the statement that my chair and
ranking member mentioned at the beginning.
When Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman met--let's see, he
had an interview with CBS and said Saudi Arabia does not want
to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt, if Iran
developed a nuclear bomb we will follow suit as soon as
possible.
So here's my question. What are the steps that Saudi Arabia
has to start to take to get to that position and what is the
leverage that we have to prevent that from happening?
Mr. Sokolski. I will take a shot at that.
Let's put on our bomb-making hats. Okay. First thing you
want to do is have a program that causes so much noise for
anyone monitoring what you're doing that it's very hard for
them to see the signal of you procuring the bits and pieces to
do enrichment.
You don't have to buy it from the Russians, the Americans,
or the French. You buy it by going to perhaps Pakistan, your
good buddy, and you say, how do you go about procuring the
little bits and pieces and who do you contact, and you put that
together while you continue to train up and build some large
reactor.
And as I noted, even these research reactors are way big.
Well, you have two routes then. One would be you could divert
plutonium made in the research reactors and there are ways to
get around IAEA safeguards.
I can go into detail later if you'd like. Or you bide your
time and put together an enrichment program. A lot of people--I
am married to someone who's Australian and because she worked
for the government, I got to know a lot of Australians
including people who worked on their bomb project. And it did
not take more than a few years, as in maybe three, for them to
put together a really good enrichment system.
We are assuming that the Saudis somehow are inferior or
they don't know how to do long division or they can't buy
assistance. I think all of that's wrong. It's been wrong every
time. We said that of the Indians, the Pakistanis.
Ms. Frankel. What are their options on getting the reactor?
Mr. Sokolski. Well, they already have it.
Ms. Frankel. Okay. So they need to get the material----
Mr. Sokolski. In other words, they are buying two of them.
They will be built.
Ms. Frankel. And what is our leverage? What is our
strength?
Mr. Sokolski. Your leverage is what the chairwoman is
suggesting you all sign up to, again. You reported it out of
committee in 2011. Do it again. Repetition is the soul of wit
in politics, I am told.
If you do it, it'll mean that the gold standard will be
something the negotiators, who are not done with our deal, will
be thinking a lot more about. If you get that, then it won't
matter that they have the reactors.
Ms. Frankel. Well, what is--what is our leverage to get
them to sign that?
Mr. Sokolski. I think----
Ms. Frankel. If they can----
Mr. Sokolski [continuing]. President Trump did a pretty
good job on TV yesterday laying out all the things that the
Saudis are buying. They are not just buying pieces of hardware.
They're trying to integrate themselves into the American
security system. That, I would submit, is an enormous lever
that, for some reason, no one's thinking about.
Ms. Frankel. Got it.
Anybody else want to add something?
Mr. Tobey. I would say it perhaps in a more succinct
fashion.
We should tell them that U.S. support for Saudi Arabia is
contingent upon Saudi Arabia's commitment to the NPT and a
Saudi nuclear weapons program will end the American security
commitment to Riyadh.
Mr. Sokolski. That's it.
Ms. Frankel. Got it. Thank you.
Ms. Squassoni. I agree with my esteemed colleagues.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you very much. I yield back, Madam
Chair.
Mr. Donovan [presiding]. The gentlewoman yields.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our
panel.
I've got to say, Mr. Sokolski, I very much enjoy your
repartee and your answers. It's nice to have color in our
hearings now and then.
No, but I mean that as a compliment. You indicated, look,
the odds of Riyadh--because we keep on hearing, well, if we
press them too hard they're going to go to Russia and China,
and you said the odds of Riyadh buying Russian are about as
likely as them buying Iranian because they're about that close.
Similarly, China is not an attractive option either. Could
you expand on that? Because I think we hear that as if it's a
real threat. I've never been persuaded of it but I thought
you'd expand on your statement.
Mr. Sokolski. This was an insight I got from someone from
Congressional Research Service, who I don't think thought
through what he meant, and we both worked this up in our heads.
Let's say you're interested in a bomb option. You're a
Saudi. Putting aside the quality of the product which, I got to
tell you, is not great--the last time their export version was
put up on the grid for a safety test it immediately had to be
taken off the grid. Putting aside that when you allow the
Russians into your financial dealings you lose money or, in the
case of the South Africans, you get thrown out for corruption.
Put all that aside.
Mr. Connolly. Or you could even get compromised
politically, but that's a different----
Mr. Sokolski. Yes. Right.
Put all that aside. There's a bigger problem. Your game has
to be to keep the world from knowing what you're doing. Why
would you let Russian technicians who are thick as thieves with
the Iranians into your house? I am not worried about the
Russians. If somebody wants to use that narrative to buffalo
you, grab your wallet. Walk out. It's not right, in my head.
The Chinese have a different problem. They and the French
have the same kinds of problems and, arguably, we do, and
Westinghouse does. We don't have an operating version of many
of these reactors that we are trying to pitch them. The ones in
China that might be exporting have not been reviewed or
licensed anywhere in the West. They will be, but not for a few
years. So, you know, there's a reason why, when the original
bid went out from Saudi Arabia it was almost rigged so only the
South Koreans could win it. They read the newspapers. They know
what's in their interest. Now, we opened that up but I don't
think we should assume that somehow it's immediately going to
go to someone other than the Koreans.
Mr. Connolly. Yes. Well, thank you, and of course, the
other thing is if we fall below the so-called gold standard we
invite the UAE to insist on renegotiating and we have--we have
basically dumbed down the standard for others in the region and
other parts of the----
Mr. Sokolski. Well, I mean, essentially if you buy the
Russian argument you might as well just not pay any attention
to this issue.
Mr. Connolly. Right.
Mr. Sokolski. You give them all the leverage and you say,
well, whatever you want.
Mr. Connolly. That's right.
Mr. Sokolski. I don't think that makes sense at all.
Mr. Connolly. I agree. I thank you.
Ms. Squassoni, in the time I have left, so if we renounce
or abrogate the JCPOA--the Iran nuclear agreement--doesn't that
incentivize countries like the Saudis to now have their own
nuclear development program because, clearly, the Iranians will
develop a nuclear--will return to their nuclear threshold
status and beyond if we renounce our own agreement roll it back
or freeze it?
Ms. Squassoni. I think you have to ask the question what
happens if the U.S. renounces this agreement. It's not entirely
clear to me that everyone else will take their toys and go
home.
Iran has certain benefits from continuing to adhere to the
agreement.
Mr. Connolly. I agree with your point, but forgive me--I've
got 35 seconds.
Ms. Squassoni. Sure.
Mr. Connolly. But my point is should Iran say okay, fine,
then we are going to return to our nuclear development program
that we had rolled back and frozen at your insistence under
this agreement.
Doesn't that mean that the Saudis--this topic we are
talking about here--have more of an incentive to develop their
own nuclear program because they're now worried that the
Iranians are proceeding?
What we have on ice is suddenly no longer on ice, and Mr.
Tobey, you look like you might want to comment as well. Real
quickly, because--I thank the chair.
Ms. Squassoni. I will be quick. Yes an incentive.
Mr. Connolly. Yes, go ahead, Ms. Squassoni. I am sorry.
Ms. Squassoni. Yes. That will provide them greater
incentives. There were other things that the United States can
do in terms of security assurances, nuclear deterrence, other
things like that.
But if the Saudis are intent on matching then there's not
much we can do about it except put something else in place
before you torpedo something that is currently freezing Iranian
capabilities.
Mr. Connolly. Excuse me. Well, it is a novel approach to
diplomacy to renounce and abrogate your own treaty. But that's
a different subject.
Mr. Tobey.
Mr. Tobey. I agree with you, sir, and with Ms. Squassoni.
Mr. Connolly. And Mr. Sokolski, do you agree?
Mr. Sokolski. Yes, you're on to something at least to this
extent, for sure. You don't get the Saudi agreement in such a
fashion signed out that it permits enrichment and reprocessing
before you find out what's going on with Iran.
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
Mr. Sokolski. And I would urge you all to slow the train
down. Getting that darn bill out finally again, will be the
loudest signal to the negotiators you can possibly deliver. The
last time you guys had an opinion, you know what you produced?
The gold standard. Get on it again, will you?
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Well, we have a checkered past but some of our opinions
actually have efficacious value, and I appreciate your saying
that.
I do think it's important though what we just heard from
this panel, and then I will shut up, Madam Chairman.
But is that renouncing Iran agreement--the JCPOA--has
consequences far beyond Iran and, frankly, would have the
unintended consequence potentially of actually proliferating,
especially in countries such as the one we are talking about
today--Saudi Arabia.
So I would hope the President and the White House will take
that into account before they make any kind of decision.
Thank you, Madam Chairman, for your indulgence.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.
Thank you very much.
And if I might just have two follow-up questions and then
anybody would--if you wanted to you could have one. Thank you.
But just to emphasize the need for the bill that I've been
pushing, has there ever been an instance where Congress has
ever passed a resolution of disapproval and then in fact
successfully blocked a 123 Agreement?
The answer is no, but go ahead. Yes, has there been one?
Ms. Squassoni. No, but in the case of the China agreement,
Congress conditioned its approval----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. True.
Ms. Squassoni [continuing]. And there were no nuclear
exports for 13 years, and so there are various ways that
Congress can put in conditions, can put in certifications, et
cetera.
May I just take a moment and respond to you?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Yes, please.
Ms. Squassoni. You know, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act
of 1978 made a tradeoff. It strengthened the nonproliferation
requirements but it also gave this kind of quasi fast track
approval, a passive approval.
The one thing that it envisioned was consultations with
Congress and those have not happened. So when the U.S.-India
nuclear deal came before you, it was already written.
And so thank you for holding this hearing because I think
you have to start the debate before the ink is dry.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. We need to have a voice instead of a fake
process. Yes, Henry?
Mr. Sokolski. Actually, the fast track was locked in when
we were in a propaganda war pushing out small research reactors
in 1954. We went along in 1978 with that again.
Seems to me, though, that every--you had 1946, 1954, 1978--
that's 40 years. You're due to do an estimate of what the
margin of safety requires. Surely you have learned something in
the last 40 years about the adequacy of IAEA safeguards, the
willingness of people to cheat, our ability to keep track of
covert facilities, and just how many things have been bombed.
Take that into account. I think your bill is long overdue.
It is something that has been--you know, the correction on what
is an exempt agreement. It has been visited routinely. You're
due. It's time for an oil change.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
And as you mentioned, we have some 123 Agreements with
Egypt, with Morocco, Turkey. They're up soon. So let's see what
the administration is going to take these agreements one at a
time or what it will do.
Ms. Frankel, I know that you had a follow-up question.
Ms. Frankel. I guess I would just----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Yes.
Ms. Frankel. I am just trying to get something clarified
here. So in listening to you, I guess we can assume that Saudi
Arabia, hypothetically, could get a research facility and the
materials they need without going through the United States or
without the United States' participation. Is that right? Yes?
You think so? Okay. Okay.
So yes, that's what--because that was going to get my next
step to that. They are now a party to the nonproliferation
treaty. Is that correct?
Mr. Sokolski. Yes.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Microphone on?
Mr. Sokolski. Yes, they are.
Ms. Frankel. Yes. Okay. So I guess what I am trying to
understand is, and I know I heard you say we have a lot of
leverage, which sounds correct, over Saudi Arabia in a lot of
different areas.
But my question is, they've signed on to the
nonproliferation treaty. What more can we do, let's say, or
should we do?
Mr. Sokolski. I think what Will Tobey said succinctly and I
didn't say succinctly, and I give him credit, is basically the
Pope and the U.N. don't have as many divisions as we do, and if
you are willing to tell your good friend and ally that we are
there for them but the prerequisite is they actually have to
follow the NPT and not threaten to leave it and live up to the
gold standard and get behind us leaning on the Iranians to get
them to behave, it'll work.
That's the reason, again, I think the legislation is
reasonable and urgently needed.
Mr. Tobey. By the way, as someone who has negotiated some
of these agreements on behalf of the executive branch, I can
say that it really helps to have Congress in the right place on
these issues.
If we can point to the fact that we can't get it past our
Congress if it doesn't have certain provisions, that's a
powerful tool and speaks all the more about the importance of
cooperation between the two branches.
Mr. Connolly. Well, we are here to help, Mr. Tobey.
That's----
Ms. Frankel. Did you want to add something?
Ms. Squassoni. I did want to add something. I mentioned
this is in my testimony. Saudi Arabia is a member of the NPT
but it hasn't crossed all the T's and dotted all the I's.
Because it has very little material in the country it has
what is called the Small Quantities Protocol.
Back after we discovered Iran's clandestine program, the
International Atomic Energy Agency said, hey, all you countries
with Small Quantities Protocol this is a huge problem because
you won't let our inspectors in.
So you either have to modify that or rescind it. They asked
Saudi Arabia in 2005. We are still waiting. Half the countries
who had those protocols have changed them. So that's one thing.
And the other thing is the Additional Protocol, which is in
H.R. 5357. We should certainly ask Saudi Arabia to sign that
Additional Protocol because it gives inspectors more access and
more information.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Thank you for that follow-up
question.
Thank you to our witnesses. Thank you for everyone to--for
being here. We look forward to continuing this discussion. This
is not going away.
And with that, our hearing is adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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