[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FROM BOSTON TO AUSTIN: LESSONS LEARNED ON HOMELAND THREAT INFORMATION
SHARING
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 18, 2018
__________
Serial No. 115-60
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
John Katko, New York Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Will Hurd, Texas Filemon Vela, Texas
Martha McSally, Arizona Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Ratcliffe, Texas Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York J. Luis Correa, California
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Val Butler Demings, Florida
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Ron Estes, Kansas
Don Bacon, Nebraska
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Steven S. Giaier, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Lou Barletta, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania:
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
The Honorable William R. Keating, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Massachusetts:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey:
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
WITNESSES
Panel I
Chief Brian Manley, Chief, Austin Police Department, Austin,
Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Mr. William B. Evans, Commissioner, Boston Police Department,
Boston, Massachusetts:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Mr. Peter Newsham, Chief of Police, Washington Metropolitan
Police Department, Testifying on Behalf of the Major Cities
Chiefs Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 24
Panel II
Mr. Kerry L. Sleeper, Assistant Director, Partnership and
Engagement, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of
Justice:
Oral Statement................................................. 53
Prepared Statement............................................. 56
Mr. James E. McDermond, Assistant Director, Office of Strategic
Intelligence and Information Bureau, Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, U.S. Department of Justice:
Oral Statement................................................. 59
Prepared Statement............................................. 61
FOR THE RECORD
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Letter......................................................... 42
APPENDIX
Questions From Honorable Lou Barletta for Brian Manley........... 71
Questions From Honorable Daniel M. Donovan for Brian Manley...... 71
Questions From Honorable Lou Barletta for William B. Evans....... 71
Questions From Honorable Daniel M. Donovan for William B. Evans.. 72
Questions From Honorable Lou Barletta for Peter Newsham.......... 73
Questions From Honorable Daniel M. Donovan for Peter Newsham..... 73
FROM BOSTON TO AUSTIN: LESSONS LEARNED ON HOMELAND THREAT INFORMATION
SHARING
----------
Wednesday, April 18, 2018
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:11 a.m., in
room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Michael T. McCaul
(Chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives McCaul, King, Barletta, Perry,
Katko, Hurd, Ratcliffe, Donovan, Higgins, Rutherford,
Fitzpatrick, Estes, Jackson Lee, Watson Coleman, Rice, Correa,
Demings, and Barragan.
Chairman McCaul. The Committee on Homeland Security will
come to order. I would like to first express my condolences to
the Bush family in remembrance of First Lady Barbara Bush, who
served this country so well, really the matriarch of a dynasty
family that we all admire. I will never forget President Bush
and Barbara actually endorsing me in my first primary, and it
was quite an endorsement to have.
She had a great strength about her and a great sense of
humor, I think, all the way until the end. I will be in Houston
on Friday at the ceremony in remembrance. If we could just take
a moment of silence?
So the committee is meeting today to examine information
sharing and cooperation between Federal, State, and local
partners, their responses to the Boston Marathon bombings, and
the recent series of bombings in my home town of Austin, Texas.
So I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Five years ago, as thousands of people were running toward
the finish line in Boston, two bombs exploded. In a matter of
seconds, a time of celebration became a time of terror. In the
midst of the chaos on this Patriot's Day afternoon, ordinary
citizens, first responders, and members of the National Guard
worked frenetically to save lives.
Our Nation was stunned. This hateful attack killed 3
innocent people at the scene, including an 8-year-old boy. Of
the 260 people who were injured, 16 of them lost their limbs.
An MIT police officer later was shot and killed as the bombers
tried to avoid capture. Many people's lives were changed
forever.
After a strong response from the FBI, the Massachusetts
State Police, ATF, and local police, both of the bombers were
brought to justice. One was killed in a shootout and the other
sits on death row. When it became clear that one of the bombers
had been on our radar screen before the attacks, this committee
took action.
After an extensive investigation, we learned there were
opportunities where additional steps could have been taken.
Even though we will never know if things might have turned out
differently, this committee's report made several key
recommendations to bolster information sharing and strengthen
partnerships among Federal, State, and local law enforcement.
More than anything else, the committee's investigation led
to a stronger homeland security bond between Federal, State,
and local. We are always working to formalize and improve
information sharing between agencies. Though much more work
needs to be done, at least five of the committee's seven
recommendations have been addressed. Here are some examples.
First, the FBI revised its memorandum of understanding with
agencies partnering on its Joint Terrorism Task Forces to more
clearly encourage information sharing. Second, the FBI
normalized communication between JTTFs and partner agencies.
Third, DHS improved their travel recordkeeping. Finally, broad
investments have been made to inform the public on the threat
we face from terrorism and enlist their help in combatting it.
These changes were necessary. They have made a real impact
over time and have remained at the heart of this committee's
initiatives. After 5 years, our counter-terrorism partnerships
are improved and the coordination among Federal, State, and
local law enforcement, I believe, is stronger. We witnessed
this just last month when my home town of Austin was terrorized
by a bomber.
In response, Austin Chief Brian Manley, who is here today,
commanded local and State law enforcement personnel with over
500 Federal agents deployed to assist in the operations. This
represented the largest mobilization of law enforcement since
the bombings in Boston. Working together, they were able to
track down the bomber and stop him in his tracks and stop these
attacks.
Unfortunately, the bomber had already murdered two people
and injured six others. I have spoken to several of the victims
and their family members. It was very painful to hear their
voices and stories, but inspiring to learn of their strength.
Chief Manley, I was very impressed by the way you led our
home town through such a difficult time. You were determined in
bringing the bomber to his final justice. On behalf of the
Austin community and as a resident of Austin, Texas, we are
grateful you brought this nightmare to an end. Now is the time
to heal.
I know that the FBI officials in the area worked hard to
support your investigation, including the special agent in
charge at the San Antonio field office, Chris Combs, who I was
in very constant contact with, and the resident agent in
Austin, John Scata. The tragedies in Boston and Austin are very
different, but they reflect the continued progress we, as a
country, are making toward homeland security.
At the heart of each are basic questions of coordination,
sharing, and mutual support. We must continue to learn from
these tragedies so we can prevent the next one. As a former
Federal prosecutor, I understand this requires flawless
coordination at all levels. This committee has achieved a lot.
We are always looking to do more.
That is why this hearing today is so important to me, and I
want to thank all the witnesses for being here today. Each of
you provide an important voice on this issue. But you also
represent many brave men and women who spring to action and
spring to valor during a time of emergency.
You and they work hard to protect American families every
day, and we thank you for that. This entire committee is
thankful for your service.
[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:]
Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
April 18, 2018
Five years ago, as thousands of people were running toward the
finish line in the Boston Marathon, two bombs exploded. In a matter of
seconds, a time of celebration became a time of terror.
In the midst of the chaos on this Patriot's Day afternoon, ordinary
citizens, first responders, and members of the National Guard worked
frantically to save lives.
Our Nation was stunned.
This hateful attack killed three innocent people at the scene,
including an 8-year-old boy.
Of the 260 people who were injured, 16 of them lost legs.
A MIT police officer was later shot and killed as the bombers tried
to avoid capture.
Many people's lives were changed forever.
After a strong response from the FBI, the Massachusetts State
Police, the ATF, and local police, both of the bombers were brought to
justice.
One was killed in a shootout and the other sits on death row.
When it became clear that one of the bombers had been ``on our
radar'' before the attacks, this committee took action.
After an extensive investigation, we learned there were
opportunities where additional steps could have been taken.
Even though we will never know if things might have turned out
differently, this committee's report made several key recommendations
to bolster information sharing and strengthen partnerships among
Federal, State, and local agencies.
More than anything else, the committee's investigation led to a
stronger homeland security bond between local, State, and National law
enforcement.
We are always working to formalize and improve information sharing
between agencies.
Though much more work needs done, at least five of the committee's
seven recommendations have been addressed.
Here are some examples:
The FBI revised its memoranda of understanding (MOU) with
agencies partnering on its Joint Terrorism Task Forces to more
clearly encourage information sharing,
The FBI normalized communication between JTTFs and partner
agencies,
DHS improved their travel recordkeeping, and,
Broad investments have been made to inform the public on the
threat we face from terrorism, and enlist their help in
combatting it.
These changes were necessary.
They have made a real impact and have remained at the heart of this
committee's initiatives.
After 5 years, our counterterrorism partnerships are improved and
the coordination among Federal, State, and local law enforcement is
stronger.
We witnessed this just last month when my home town of Austin was
terrorized by a bomber.
In response, Austin Police Chief Brian Manley, who is here today,
commanded local and State law enforcement personnel, with 500 Federal
agents deployed to assist in the operations.
This represented the largest mobilization of law enforcement since
the bombings in Boston.
Working together, they were able to track down the bomber and stop
these attacks.
Unfortunately, the bomber had already murdered two people and
injured six others.
I've spoken to several of the victims and their family members.
It was very painful to hear their stories, but inspiring to learn
of their strength.
Chief Manley, I was very impressed by the way you led our home town
through such a difficult time.
You were determined in bringing the bomber to his final justice.
On behalf of the Austin community, we are grateful you brought this
nightmare to an end.
Now it is time for us to heal.
I know that FBI officials in the area worked hard to support your
investigation, including the Special Agent in Charge at the San Antonio
Field Office, Chris Coombs, and the Resident Agent in Austin, John
Scata.
The tragedies in Boston and Austin are very different.
But they reflect the continued progress we as a country are making
toward homeland security.
At the heart of each are basic questions of coordination, sharing,
and mutual support.
We must continue to learn from these tragedies so we can prevent
the next one.
As a former Federal prosecutor, I understand this requires flawless
coordination at all levels.
This committee has achieved a lot, but we are always looking to do
more. That is why this hearing today is so important.
I want thank all of today's witnesses for being here.
Each one of you provides an important voice on this issue.
You also represent many brave men and women who spring to action
during an emergency.
They work hard to protect American families every day.
This entire committee is thankful for their service.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady
from New Jersey, the acting Ranking Member, Mrs. Watson
Coleman, for her statement.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. McCaul, and I want to
associate myself with the condolences that you extended to the
Bush family. You couldn't help but notice that this is a strong
family values woman. Her grandchildren loved being around her.
Her sons, who were in politics, never were remiss in not
mentioning her and the importance that she had in their lives.
Of course her husband, former President Bush, spoke of her
dearly.
So we are better that she lived among us and cared about
those who needed someone to reach out to them, including HIV
babies and young people. We pray God's blessings upon her
family and upon her soul.
On behalf of Ranking Member Thompson, I thank Chairman
McCaul for holding today's hearing on homeland threat
information sharing in the wake of the Austin bombings and just
after the fifth anniversary of the Boston Marathon bombing. I
join my colleagues in remembering those who lost their lives in
these tragic attacks and in keeping their families, friends,
and loved ones in our prayers.
Ranking Member Thompson wrote to Chairman McCaul last month
requesting a hearing on the events in Austin. He did so because
it is imperative that we examine attacks on the homeland
closely, no matter the ideology or the motivation driving them,
to better identify and to disrupt future attacks.
Information-sharing failures that contributed to 9/11
terrorist attacks are well-documented. Since that time, the
Federal Government has made enormous strides in addressing
these failures, not only by improving information sharing among
its own departments and agencies, but also with State and local
partners. These State and local law enforcement agencies are,
in many ways, our ears, our eyes and our boots on the ground in
our communities.
As such, they are an essential part of our homeland
security information-sharing apparatus, participating in fusion
centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the country, as
well as in more informal information-sharing mechanisms with
law enforcement counterparts on an everyday basis.
That said, we know there is always room for continued
improvement. Shortly after the Boston bombing, it is my
understanding that a directive was sent from FBI headquarters
to the field intended to ensure better information sharing with
Federal, State, and local law enforcement.
I am therefore interested in understanding the effects of
that directive and whether the police chiefs in Boston, Austin,
and Washington, DC believe it is being implemented still today.
I hope they will also share their thoughts on how we can take
the lessons learned, not just from 9/11 or Boston, but also the
recent events in Austin, Parkland, and Sutherland Springs and
use them to redouble our information-sharing efforts to better
secure the homeland.
For the Federal witnesses, I hope they will speak to their
commitment to information sharing not just in generalities, but
with concrete examples about how the FBI and the ATF can
improve information sharing and better assess the effectiveness
of our existing initiatives.
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not point out the
importance of homeland security grants, like the UASI, to local
communities the ability to prevent and respond to the kinds of
attacks we saw in Boston and in Austin. Without these dollars,
many cities and towns lack the resources to provide the
equipment and the training necessary to respond effectively.
I have been greatly disappointed by President Trump's
proposed cuts to those vital programs, but remain committed to
supporting much-needed homeland security grants to communities
across the country. Whether terrorism, continued incidents of
gun violence in our school or other attacks on our homeland, we
need to do our part to provide the resources necessary to keep
Americans safe and secure.
I thank our witnesses for being here today.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the committee holding today's
hearing. I look forward to continued oversight of efforts on
the important issue. I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. I thank the Ranking Member.
Other Members are reminded that opening statements may be
submitted for the record. First, I ask unanimous consent to
insert into the record a statement from Mr. Keating. He is
unable to be here today. He is attending the funeral of
Yarmouth Officer Sean Gannon who was killed in the line of duty
last week.
Mr. Keating and I perhaps worked more closely than ever in
the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing, which hit his
home town, including producing a joint investigative report. I
know he cares deeply about these issues before us today. So
without objection, so ordered.
[The statements of Mr. Keating, Ranking Member Thompson,
Mr. Barletta, and Ms. Jackson Lee follow:]
Statement of Honorable Bill Keating
Due to the funeral of fallen Police Officer Sean Gannon, I am
regrettably unable to attend today's full committee hearing entitled
``From Boston to Austin: Lessons Learned on Homeland Threat Information
Sharing.''
This week marked the 5th anniversary of the Boston Marathon Bombing
and I submit this statement for the record to reflect on the progress
made since that dreadful day in April 2013, and to underscore the need
for continued resolve to ensure critical threat information is shared
among our Nation's Federal, State, and local enforcement agencies.
Shortly following the attack, I joined Chairman McCaul in authoring
a comprehensive, bipartisan report recommending expanded cooperation
between Federal and local law enforcement, refining policies
surrounding the use of travel records of international travelers, and
increasing information sharing with regard to Federal watch lists.
Together, we produced recommendations in our joint report that laid
the groundwork for several pieces of legislation passed by this
committee aimed at improving cooperation between Federal and State
authorities, as well as disseminating greater amounts of information
from the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force. Additionally, this committee
supported increasing funding for the Regional Information Sharing
Systems Program, which serves over 9,000 law enforcement agencies in
all 50 States, and supports Federal information initiatives such as the
National Data Exchange and the Homeland Security Information Network.
This committee plays a vital role in making sure stakeholders at
every level have the tools and information they need to protect our
Nation from domestic and international terrorist groups. There is
always more we can do to help empower those on the front lines,
including improving efforts to combat violent extremism and
radicalization. I applaud Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson
for holding this hearing, and I look forward to addressing all areas
highlighted by the witnesses today where we can make further
improvements to improve our National security and ensure tragedies like
the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing do not happen again.
______
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
April 18, 2018
I thank Chairman McCaul for holding today's hearing on homeland
threat information sharing in the wake of the Austin bombings and just
after the fifth anniversary of the Boston Marathon bombing. I join my
colleagues in remembering those who lost their lives in these tragic
attacks and in keeping their families, friends, and loved ones in our
prayers.
I wrote to Chairman McCaul last month requesting a hearing on the
events in Austin. I did so because it is imperative that we examine
attacks on the homeland closely, no matter the ideology or motivation
driving them, to better identify and disrupt future attacks.
Information-sharing failures that contributed to the 9/11 terrorist
attacks are well-documented.
Since that time, the Federal Government has made enormous strides
in addressing those failures not only by improving information sharing
among its own departments and agencies, but also with State and local
partners. These State and local law enforcement agencies are, in many
ways, our eyes, ears, and boots on the ground in our communities.
As such, they are an essential part of our homeland security
information-sharing apparatus, participating in fusion centers and
Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the country, as well as in more
informal information-sharing mechanisms with law enforcement
counterparts on an everyday basis.
That said, we know there is always room for continued improvement.
Shortly after the Boston bombing, it is my understanding that a
directive was sent from FBI headquarters to the field intended to
ensure better information sharing with Federal, State, and local law
enforcement.
I am interested in understanding the effects of that directive, and
whether the police chiefs in Boston, Austin, and Washington, DC believe
it is being implemented still today. I hope they will also share their
thoughts on how we can take the lessons learned not just from 9/11 or
Boston, but also the recent events in Austin, and use them to redouble
our information-sharing efforts to better secure the homeland.
For the Federal witnesses, I hope they will speak to their
commitment to information sharing not just in generalities, but with
concrete examples about how the FBI and ATF can improve information
sharing and better assess the effectiveness of our existing
initiatives.
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not point out the importance of
homeland security grants, like UASI, to local communities' ability to
prevent and respond to the kinds of attacks we saw in Boston and
Austin.
Without these dollars, many cities and towns lack the resources to
provide the equipment and training necessary to respond effectively. I
have been greatly disappointed by President Trump's proposed cuts to
these vital programs, but remain committed to supporting much-needed
homeland security grants to communities across this country.
Whether terrorism, continued incidents of gun violence in our
schools, or other attacks on the homeland, we need to do our part to
provide the resources necessary to keep Americans safe and secure.
______
Statement of Honorable Lou Barletta
Good morning, thank you all for appearing before this committee
today, and for your service to our country.
I was the Mayor of Hazleton, Pennsylvania for 10 years, so I have
tremendous respect and appreciation for State and local law
enforcement. They protect our schools and neighborhoods, keeping our
families safe, while risking their own lives every day.
The importance of information sharing across the Government cannot
be overstated. Our local law enforcement officers are the first line of
defense against terrorism, and we need to make sure they are receiving
necessary information in a timely manner so they can do their jobs.
It will be the officer on the streets of Hazleton, Harrisburg, or
Shippensburg, not an analyst in Washington who will recognize a member
of our community has been radicalized or been recruited by a gang or
terrorist sect.
That is why I worked with this committee to introduce the
Department of Homeland Security Classified Facility Inventory Act. My
bill strengthens information sharing between local, State, and Federal
law enforcement by requiring DHS to maintain an inventory of facilities
certified to store information classified above the Secret level.
More and more State and local officials are now getting the
security clearances they need to get important National security
information. However, gaps remain, and to be honest, it is frustrating
that this legislation is even needed.
Congress and DHS share the same goal of keeping our communities
safe. We must make it clear that information needs to be shared to
allow for proper oversight, both now and in the future.
______
Statement of Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee
April 18, 2018
Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson, thank you for
convening today's hearing of the Homeland Security Committee on the
topic of information sharing ``From Boston to Austin: Lessons Learned
on Homeland Threat Information Sharing.''
This hearing will allow Members of the Committee to:
1. receive testimony from law enforcement officials regarding the
evolving threats their communities face;
2. assess improvements to the amount and quality of information
shared among Federal, State, and local law enforcement, and
3. discuss the need for future improvements in information sharing,
including what next steps should be prioritized.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses:
Mr. Brian Manley, Chief, Austin Police Department, Austin,
Texas;
Mr. William B. Evans, Commissioner, Boston Police
Department, Boston, Massachusetts; and
Mr. Peter Newsham, Chief of Police, Washington Metropolitan
Police Department, testifying on behalf of the Major Cities
Chiefs Association.
Mr. Kerry Sleeper, Assistant Director, Partnership and
Engagement, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S.
Department of Justice; and
Mr. James E. McDermond, Assistant Director, Office of
Strategic Intelligence and Information Bureau, Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), U.S.
Department of Justice.
On March 2, 2018, the first of seven bombs were detonated in what
became a terrorizing series of attacks that killed Anthony Stephan
House, 39, and Draylen Mason, 17.
My thoughts and prayers are with the families and loved ones of the
two who were killed.
We also need to thank the residents of the city of Austin for their
efforts to support law enforcement authorities in the investigation of
the bombings.
I also thank our first responders for their work to protect
communities and search for and ultimately stop the killer.
On April 15, 2013, two home-made bombs detonated near the finish
line of the annual Boston Marathon, killing three people and injuring
several hundred others, including 16 who lost limbs.
It has been 5 years since that terrible day, but we still remember
the people of Boston, who said they would not be made to fear the
terror that hides its face, to attack the innocent.
An essential component of the success that local, State, and
Federal law enforcement had during the investigation of the Boston
Bombing was the full engagement of the public who shared valuable
information with authorities, which provided important clues that led
to the identification and ultimate capture of the terrorists.
Today's hearing is important because it allows Members of the
Homeland Security Committee to assess the effectiveness of efforts to
increase the value and ease of information sharing among local, State,
and Federal law enforcement agencies over the five years since the
Boston Marathon Bombings and the recent bombing attacks in Austin
Texas.
Prior to September 11, 2001, the Federal Government had a wide
range of law enforcement, National security, and benefits management
agencies that collected information, but jealously guarded this
information from other agencies.
The 9/11 Commission Report allowed an in-depth assessment of the
failures that led to the horrific terrorist attacks against the United
States that cost the lives of nearly 3,000 people.
The House Committee on Homeland Security was created to implement
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report and ensure that
resources were provided to support the mission of homeland security.
The most significant task of the Committee was guiding the
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, and making sure
that it had all that it would need to carry out its mission.
I, along with other Members who have served on this Committee since
its inception, made a commitment that a terrorist attack of the
magnitude that occurred on September 11, 2001 would never happen again.
An essential component of our ability to keep this commitment was
the establishment and sustainment of information sharing among Federal
agencies and extending the network of data collection, retention, and
sharing with local and State law enforcement partners.
This Committee has worked to erase information sharing barriers
among local, State, and Federal law enforcement for the sole purpose of
eradicating, interdicting, disrupting, and apprehending those who seek
to carryout terrorist plots within the United States.
Through Fusion Centers as well as local, State, and Federal law
enforcement anti-terrorism partnerships and Joint Task Forces, we have
closed the information sharing gap among Federal, local, and State law.
A great deal had been accomplished over the years, but when the
Boston Marathon bombing occurred we learned that more needed to be
done.
One of the valuable lessons learned during the Boston incident was
the value and importance of having the trust and engagement of the
public to help solve the crime.
We needed that collaboration and cooperation with the public to
succeed in identifying and ultimately stopping the attackers; for this
reason, I believe that more can and must be done to get and maintain
public trust and support.
There are still important unanswered questions in the Austin Bomb
attacks--some of the answers may only be accessed in a Classified
briefing for Members of Congress who should be well-versed in the
means, motives, and methods used by the attacker.
For this reason it is imperative that the 28-minute video left by
the bomber be part of a comprehensive briefing on the Austin attacks.
Within weeks after the bombing attacks in Boston the relevant law
enforcement authorities had briefed this committee on the investigation
into that attack that led to 3 deaths and over a 100 injuries.
Community involvement and support for the investigation and
prevention of violent acts should be uppermost in the minds of law
enforcement and policy makers.
A delay in having a similar briefing on the Austin Bombing only
causes further complications because it will contribute to a public
perception that the lives lost did not matter.
The nature of the attacks and the skill of the bomb maker make this
briefing on the Austin bombings of vital importance to the work of this
committee.
This, coupled with the issuance of a Black Identity Extremism
report by the Federal Bureau of Investigations' Domestic Terrorism
Analysis Unit, leaves the African American community once again
questioning the motivations of the Nation's premier Federal law
enforcement agency.
As the fight against terrorism succeeds a search for new targets
for the resources dedicated to that effort should not be the goal of
agencies.
That report did not help in the investigation of the Austin Bombing
and it is not going to help in the investigation of future threats.
Conintelpro, the targeting and surveillance of African Americans
engaged in Constitutionally-protected civil rights work occurred
decades ago, but its damage is still being felt today.
The killing of unarmed black men has been met by communities across
the Nation joined by people from all walks of life and ethnicities who
have adhered to non-violent protects in the tradition of the civil
rights movement to pursue changes in law enforcement practices.
This is not and should not be viewed as a crime and especially not
terrorism.
Given the history of the Civil Rights Movement, which witnessed
repeated bombings as tools used by white supremacists to terrorize and
murder innocent people--it is not inconceivable that this could have
been the motivation of the Austin Bomber given that his initial victims
were African American and Hispanic.
When the police focused their efforts on the community attacked and
the type of bombs used it is not inconceivable that the bomber changed
the design of his bombs and the neighborhoods where the first devices
where left.
Finally, given the many questions regarding the Austin bombing
attacks and the benefit that the briefings concerning the Boston
Bombing it would be very beneficial to have that same level of
transparency on the recent attacks provided to the Members of this
committee.
I look forward today's hearing.
Thank you, I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. We are pleased to have two distinguished
panels of witnesses before us on this important topic. The
first panel includes my home town chief of police, Chief Brian
Manley of Austin, Texas; Mr. Bill Evans, a commissioner of the
Police Department for the city of Boston, Massachusetts; and
Mr. Peter Newsham, the chief of police for the Metropolitan
Police Department of Washington, DC and on behalf of the Major
Cities Chiefs Association.
I can't think of three better witnesses to testify on this
topic. Your full written statements will appear in the record.
The Chair now recognizes Chief Manley for an opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN MANLEY, CHIEF, AUSTIN POLICE DEPARTMENT,
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Chief Manley. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Ms. Watson
Coleman on behalf of Mr. Thompson and honorable Members of the
committee, thank you for allowing me to address you today
regarding the bombing incidents that took place in Austin last
month, a string of attacks that took two lives from our
community: Mr. Anthony House, a husband and father; and a 17-
year-old amazing young man, musician, and performer, Mr.
Draylen Mason.
I currently serve as the interim police chief of the Austin
Police Department and I am here speaking in that capacity, but
also on behalf of my mayor, Steve Adler, our city council and
our city manager, Spencer Cronk.
The coordination that took place between this attack on our
community between our Federal, State, and local officials,
along with our elected and appointed leaders in our city, were
also a large reason on why we were as successful as we were in
bringing this to as quick a resolution as we did, albeit not
without significant loss of life and other lives that were
changed forever based on the injuries that they sustained.
I have submitted a brief that outlines the attacks that
took place. For purposes of my testimony today I will just
briefly cover them for the intent of being brief. The first
attack that took place in our community was on March 2.
Mr. Anthony House came out front of his home and found a
package that had been delivered to his front doorstep. Upon
picking up that package, the device exploded and he was
significantly injured, injuries that he later succumbed to at
an area hospital.
Move forward 10 days and we had early morning hours, 17-
year-old Draylen Mason goes out front of his residence. He
finds a package on the doorstep. He picks it up and brings it
inside. As he and his mother are opening this package in their
kitchen, the device explodes. The injuries took Draylen's life
on the scene, and his mother was seriously injured and
transported for treatment.
As we were on the scene of that event, hours later we
receive a call that there had been another explosion. This one
in South Austin, and this one when 75-year-old Esperanza
Herrera came outside of her residence and located a package
that had been left there. She picked that package up. It too
exploded causing significant injuries from which she is still
trying to recover.
On March 18, was notified in the evening hours after 8 p.m.
that we had an explosion that took place south again. This one
was different. This was a bomb that had been placed in a
neighborhood on a side street with a tripwire that was strung
across the sidewalk, and we had two males that were walking
down the street and activated that tripwire. That device
exploded causing serious injuries to these two individuals, 22
and 23 years of age.
On March 19, we were notified that there was an explosion
in a FedEx warehouse in Schertz, Texas, a city just north of
San Antonio. On-scene investigation revealed that we believed
this device was linked to all of the Austin devices based on
similarities.
With the ability to look into that we found out the store
in Austin where that package had been mailed from, and we were
able to determine that that suspect not only mailed one
package, but two. So we were able to backtrack that second
package and we found that it was sitting in a warehouse in
Austin waiting to be delivered to an address in Austin.
So members of the Austin Police Department's bomb squad,
along with support from Houston, San Antonio, and ATF, were
able to render that device safe within that warehouse and
collect a lot of valuable information from that one as well.
The final bomb that exploded in this incident occurred on
March 21 when the bomber self-detonated a device as members of
the Austin Police Department's SWAT team moved in on him.
I often say I have the benefit of working with heroes every
day and nowhere has that been on display as it was on both
March 20 and 21 as members of law enforcement bomb squad
rendered a device safe that was meant to kill or maim others in
a very hazardous way.
Also on March 21, when members of the Austin Police
Department's SWAT team moved in on a suspect's vehicle, knowing
the likelihood was high that he had an explosive device with
him that would detonate, but they did their job that day
because they knew if they didn't, others' lives were at risk
and may be significantly harmed as well.
Given the focus of today's hearing is on information
sharing, I can't say enough about the collaboration that took
police between Federal, State, and local officials as we worked
to bring this to a conclusion.
Special agent in charge at the FBI, Christopher Combs, and
special agent in charge of the ATF, Fred Milanowski, from San
Antonio and Houston, respectively, pretty much took up a
residency in Austin throughout this investigation. We were in
lockstep as we worked toward bringing this to a conclusion.
While I did not have concerns about the assistance we would
get from our Federal partners throughout this investigation, I
was truly amazed by the number of agents that they brought to
bear in Austin along with the equipment and the skills. Again,
that allowed us to bring this to quick resolution.
Colonel Steve McCraw of the Texas Department of Public
Safety was also instrumental. He was a partner with us and he
gave us a lot of assistance through both the Texas Ranger
Division, along with 100 troopers that served in Austin
patrolling, trying to not only keep the community safe, but
provide a sense of safety during these difficult times.
Chief Jessica Robledo of the Pflugerville Police Department
and her officers were instrumental in the eventual search
warrant at the suspect's residence that took place after we had
took the suspect down. Chief Allen Banks of the Round Rock
Police Department and his officers were instrumental as well as
we ended up stopping the suspect in his city, and his officers
were very helpful.
Texas Governor Greg Abbott had offered any assistance that
we needed and was also first to come to the table offering
reward money for the identification of the suspect and any
evidence that would lead to us locating him.
I also want to acknowledge the Travis County District
Attorney Margaret Moore and U.S. Attorney John Bash and their
staffs. They were present throughout this investigation. They
were in the command center with us and they were advising us
every step of the way so that we could ensure that if we ended
up in a court of law, whether it be State or Federal, that
everything we did was consistent with those practices. It was
important to have them in with us.
Chairman McCaul, you as well. We were in constant contact
throughout this, and you were making sure that we had the
resources that we needed to keep our city safe, and I
appreciate that. When our community was at its worst, suffering
at its worst, law enforcement was at its best and our criminal
justice partners were at their best.
While Austin didn't have anywhere enough assets to handle
this on our own, the public safety assets that we did have was
in a large part due to the Homeland Security grant funds that
we had received as being part of a UASI city. We last received
that funding in 2010 and now we rely on State Homeland Security
grant funds that we have to share equitably amongst a 10-county
region.
So our ability to purchase the equipment and provide the
training that is so essential in this area is challenged, and
so to whatever extent possible for UASI funding to be returned
to a level so that all partnering cities and all partnering
entities have the ability to benefit from that program would be
a recommendation.
In conclusion, the events of March 2018 have forever
changed Austin. The lives of Mr. Anthony House and Mr. Draylen
Mason have been taken and can never be returned, and they will
not be forgotten. Our city will return to being a vibrant and
inclusive city that we have been prior to this incident, and we
will work to not forget the lessons learned. We will be
stronger together. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Chief Manley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brian Manley
April 18, 2018
overview
During the month of March 2018, the Austin, Texas community was
terrorized by a serial bomber who killed 2 and injured 5. Four of those
injured were in Austin and the fifth was in a Fed Ex warehouse in
Schertz, Texas. Those injured in Austin suffered severe to critical
injuries. On March 21, the bomber detonated a device inside his truck
as an APD SWAT team moved in to arrest him. The explosion resulted in
his death and injured a SWAT officer.
The investigation into the Austin serial bombings represented a
remarkable cooperative effort between local, State, and Federal law
enforcement officials. This document will highlight the individual
bombings, the resources that were dedicated to the investigation, and
the major accomplishments of the partnering agencies. A more exhaustive
after-action review will be conducted that will include an analysis of
the investigation and lessons learned.
the bombing incidents
The first bombing occurred at 6:55 am on March 2 at a single family
home in Northeast Austin. A resident, Anthony House, a 39-year-old
African American male went outside and located a package on the front
porch. Mr. House picked up the package and it exploded, causing
critical injuries that he would succumb to a short time later at a
local hospital. His daughter was inside the residence when the
explosion occurred but was not physically injured. The response to this
incident included members of the Austin Police Department (APD), the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the U.S. Postal Service (USPS).
Although investigators did not have reason to believe at that time that
the bombing was part of a larger scheme, it was decided at the scene to
conduct a joint local/Federal investigation.
The second bombing occurred on March 12 at 6:45 am at a single
family home in Central-East Austin. A resident, Draylen Mason, a 17-
year-old African American male went outside and located a package on
the front porch. Mr. Mason brought the package inside the residence and
it exploded as he and his mother Shamika Wilson opened it, causing
fatal injuries to Mr. Mason and serious injuries to his mother. Mr.
Mason was pronounced deceased at the scene. As in the first bombing,
the investigative response included the APD, the ATF, the FBI, and the
USPS. Given the similarities in the modus operandi, investigators
believed this incident was related to the explosion that occurred on
March 2.
While working the scene of the second bombing, a third bombing
occurred. At 11:49 am on March 12, Esperanza Herrera, a 75-year-old
Hispanic female located a package in front of her residence in
Southeast Austin. When she picked up the package, it exploded causing
her critical injuries. We split the investigative teams since we now
had two bombing scenes working simultaneously, with members of all
agencies at both scenes. Based on similarities in the modus operandi
and bomb components, investigators believed this incident was related
to the previous two bombings.
The fourth bombing occurred on March 18 at 8:30 pm on a residential
street in Southwest Austin. This bombing signaled a dramatic change in
the initiation method in that it was concealed next to a sidewalk and
activated by a trip-wire. While the first three explosions were the
result of a package being left at a specific home, this bombing did not
appear to target a specific person or address. Investigators again
believed this incident was related to the previous three bombings based
on similarities in components. Two Caucasian males who we have not
identified publicly were seriously injured as they activated the trip-
wire and were struck by shrapnel from the explosion. As in the previous
incidents, the on-scene investigation was conducted cooperatively
between APD, ATF, and the FBI.
On March 19 at 11:36 pm a bomb exploded in the Fed Ex ground
facility in Schertz, Texas. The bomb was contained in a package that
exploded as it went down the conveyor belt. An unnamed Fed Ex employee
working in the facility at this time suffered non-life threatening
injuries from the blast wave. Since this scene was outside the
jurisdiction of APD, it was processed by the FBI and the ATF. The on-
scene investigation showed similarities to the bombings that had
occurred in Austin and investigators believed it was related. Further
investigation revealed the package had been mailed from an Austin-area
Fed Ex store and was addressed to a location in Austin. The shipping
route had the package process through the Schertz facility.
Investigators were able to retrieve evidence believed to show the
suspect dropping off two packages at the Fed Ex store in Austin.
Investigators tracked the second package to a Fed Ex ground
facility located in Southeast Austin. Upon examination, it was found to
contain a bomb. The Austin Police Bomb Squad, along with bomb
technicians from ATF, the Houston Police Department, and the San
Antonio Police Department responded to the warehouse and were able to
render the device safe. The bomb located at this facility shared the
same characteristics as the previous five located in Austin and
Schertz.
The final explosive device involved in this bombing spree was the
one the bomber detonated as Austin Police SWAT officers attempted to
take him into custody in the early morning hours of March 21. That
explosion injured one officer and caused fatal wounds to the bomber.
The Medical Examiner ruled his death a suicide. Upon examination, that
bomb shared many similarities with the earlier bombs in this spree.
joint command
With APD as the lead law enforcement agency on the case, they
worked together with the FBI, the ATF, the USPS, and the Texas
Department of Public Safety (DPS) to conduct the operation from a joint
command center at the Combined Transportation Emergency Communications
Center (CTECC), located in Austin, Texas. The command center was
established directly following the two explosions that took place on
March 12. The overall investigation was coordinated through the command
center, and senior members of all agencies were present at the center
throughout the investigation to ensure information sharing and timely
decision making. The Unified Command Group held daily briefings at 8
o'clock am and 5 o'clock pm to brief out the events that occurred
during the previous operational period.
The ATF's National Response Team operated from the center and
handled the documentation and processing of leads as they were
received. Additionally, a case squad room was established for the FBI
and a legal affairs room was set up for the Travis County District
Attorney's Office and the United States Attorney's Office. An
additional room was set up for agents to write their reports as they
closed out each lead.
In addition, the U.S. Marshall's Service (USMS) assisted in the
field. The APD Tactical Intelligence unit is part of the USMS Lone Star
Fugitive Task Force and they assisted with investigation and
surveillance.
resources
In total, there were hundreds of Federal agents on the ground in
Austin during the serial bombing investigation and an additional 100
State Troopers.
APD assets and personnel utilized during the bombing investigation
included:
The Homicide Unit deployed 17 personnel to work on the
serial bombing murders.
The Special Weapons and Tactic Unit (SWAT) deployed 24
personnel to assist with tactical planning and the apprehension
of the suspect.
The Explosive Ordinance Division (EOD) deployed 12 personnel
to handle suspicious package calls, assist with on-scene post
blast investigation, and render the sixth bomb safe at the Fed
Ex warehouse in Austin.
The Explosive Ordinance Division (EOD) utilized a large
number of assets in this process, many of which were purchased
through Homeland Security grant funding. Equipment used
included the APD Bomb Squad Response Trucks, Remotec HD2
Robots, Logos X-Ray Systems, Nano X-Rays Systems, XR 150 and
200 X-ray source generators, Tactical Bomb Technician gear, EOD
10 Bomb Suits, and Render Safe equipment.
The Air Support Unit (ASU) deployed 8 personnel to provide
assistance with aerial surveillance and scene processing
The Austin Regional Intelligence Center (ARIC) and Tactical
Intelligence Unit deployed 32 personnel to assist in tracking
down leads and providing background information on possible
suspects. The team included 22 commissioned officers and 10
analysts. The Tactical Intelligence Unit is part of the U.S.
Marshall's Lonestar Fugitive Task Force, and this team
ultimately located the bomber based on information provided by
the FBI.
The Organized Crime Division (OCD) deployed 13 personnel to
assist with surveillance operations.
ATF assets and personnel that supported the Austin bombing
investigation included:
ATF dispatched more than 100 special agents, chemist,
engineers, and intelligence analysts.
ATF's National Response Team (NRT) responded with 33
personnel, including 7 Certified Explosive Specialists (CES), 4
Certified Fire Investigators, 3 Chemist, 1 Engineers, and 2
Intelligence Research Specialists. A second NRT team was also
deployed to support investigation, which consisted of an
additional 35 personnel.
In addition to the NRT, ATF has 77 additional field Agents.
This consisted of 57 Special Agents, 14 Special Agent Canine
Handlers and 6 Intelligence Research Specialists on scene for a
total of 145 ATF personnel on scene.
The FBI had 400 personnel and a large number of assets supporting
the Austin bombing investigation. These included:
FBI Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) deployed
approximately 108 personnel, to include:
(1) Behavioral Analysis Unit personnel.
(2) Information Technology Support (ITS) personnel.
(8) Crisis Management Specialists (CMS).
(62) Surveillance Operations Group (SOG) personnel.
As many as 32 Special Agent Bomb Technicians (SABT) were
deployed by the FBI to augment APD and the San Antonio
Police Department (SAPD).
(2) FBI aircraft and seven (7) crew members.
Approximately 16 SWAT members were deployed to support the
investigation.
(5) Electronic Technicians (ET's) and four (4) mobile
command units.
FBI Science and Technology Branch deployed:
As many as 70 Evidence Response Team members, including
team members from 9 other field offices.
(2) Evidence Control Tech personnel.
(12) Computer Analysis Response (CART) personnel and 3
CART mobile labs, including 2 from other field offices.
(3) Technical Hazards Response Unit personnel.
Operational Technology Division (OTD) personnel.
A total of 9 Intelligence Support personnel were deployed
from other FBI field offices.
A total of 4 Office of Public Affairs personnel provided
support with 2 from other field offices.
Additional support was provided by FBI Headquarters Criminal
Division to include 24 Digital Imaging and Video Recovery
(DIVRT) members from 8 different FBI field offices.
FBI San Antonio Field Office sent 5 members of its Executive
Management team and the Houston Field Office sent its Special
Agent in Charge (SAC).
In addition to the FBI and ATF assets, the USPS brought in
additional personnel and equipment to assist with the high volume of
suspicious package calls in the Austin region. The Texas DPS also
assisted by assigning 100 State Troopers to Austin to assist with calls
for service and other law enforcement duties. Additional Bomb Squad
teams from the Texas DPS, the Houston Police Department, and the San
Antonio Police Department also assisted APD during this investigation.
The Austin Fire Department and Austin/Travis County Emergency Medical
Services also played key roles at each bombing scene. The operation was
also coordinated with and provided support by the Pflugerville Police
Department during search warrant execution at the bomber's residence,
and the Round Rock Police Department during the takedown of the bomber.
critical accomplishments
The Austin Police Department Explosive Ordinance Division
(EOD) responded to 569 incidents and the Explosive Detection K-
9's responded to 195 incidents where patrol officers were
unable to safely deem a package non-hazardous.
APD received a total of 2,510 suspicious package calls from
March 2 to March 29, 2018.
The Austin Police Department Tactical Intelligence Unit
(members of the U.S. Marshall Task Force) found the bomber in
Round Rock once his location had been established by the FBI.
This allowed the APD SWAT to conduct a vehicle assault.
The Austin Police Air Support Unit (ASU) deployed to 4 bomb
investigation scenes and successfully coordinated with ground
surveillance units when the suspect was located in Round Rock,
Texas. The ASU kept the suspect within sight and provide ground
surveillance teams with tactical updates on locations, traffic,
pedestrians, and vehicles.
The Austin Regional Intelligence Center (ARIC), comprised of
21 public safety agencies, and the Austin Police Department
Tactical Intelligence Unit brought their full complement of
personnel to bear during the Austin Bombing Investigation. ARIC
personnel operated from both their center and the joint command
center and they assisted with working tips, gathering
intelligence, coordinating efforts between agencies, assisting
APD Homicide, and processing information that came in from the
Fusion network.
The Austin Police Special Weapons and Tactics Unit (SWAT)
partnered with the FBI and the ATF tactical assets in the
planning for several search warrants throughout this operation.
Once the bomber was located in Round Rock, Texas, and went
mobile, the APD SWAT team conducted a tactical stop on the
bomber's vehicle. During the stop, the bomber detonated a bomb
inside his vehicle. The explosion fatally injured the bomber
and caused minor injuries to a SWAT team officer.
The Austin Police Homicide Unit worked cooperatively with
the FBI and the ATF on the homicide and bombing investigations.
The APD Homicide Unit was the lead investigative unit and
responsible for overall crime scene management. This included
coordinating resources, working two active homicide
investigations from the joint command center, crime scene
response, hospital response, evidence recovery at 11 separate
crime scenes, and interviews of numerous witnesses and victims.
The Austin Police Homicide unit worked with the ATF, the
Travis County District Attorney's Office, and the Assistant
U.S. Attorney's Office in securing arrest and search warrants
for the bomber and his residence.
FBI Evidence Response Teams participated in the collection
of evidence at 11 crime scenes.
FBI SWAT assisted APD in executing a warrant at the bomber's
residence in Pflugerville, Texas. A significant amount of
explosive materials and other bomb components were located in
the residence.
FBI's investigative efforts resulted in the location of the
bomber in his vehicle, which enabled APD's Tactical
Intelligence unit to respond to the scene and contain him. This
kept him from entering the highway and injuring others.
FBI's 9 surveillance teams conducted 24/7 surveillance of
several suspects, including the bomber, during the
investigation.
ATF and FBI collected over 564 pieces of evidence at the
bombing scenes. The evidence was sent to the ATF National
Laboratory in Ammendale, Maryland for forensic analysis.
ATF completed over 429 reports of investigations since the
first incident on March 2, 2018.
Over 400 leads were vetted/investigated. Additional leads
will continue to be logged, tracked, and investigated by APD,
the ATF, and the FBI.
ATF victim-witness coordinators assisted APD Victim Services
counselors and remained in contact with victims and their
families throughout the investigation.
U.S. Attorney's Office remains in contact with the Travis
County District Attorney's Office and offered to make all
Federal resources available as needed.
ATF agents worked with the Travis County District Attorney's
Office, and the Assistant U.S. Attorney's Office in securing
the search and arrest warrant affidavits for the arrest of the
bomber and the search of his residence.
conclusion
The serial bombing spree that occurred in Austin, Texas would have
overwhelmed the resources of not only APD, but most major city police
departments across the country. The tremendous assistance from the FBI,
the ATF, the USPS, the USMS, the Texas DPS, and other local agencies
was integral in bringing this attack on Austin to quick resolve. The
cooperation among all agencies is also of note as everyone worked
together constructively and collaboratively, avoiding any ``turf''
issues that could have slowed the operation and left the Austin
community at risk for a longer period of time.
Austin will continue to be the vibrant and inviting city we were
before these attacks, but we are forever changed. We will not forget
the lives of Anthony House or Draylen Mason, senselessly taken by the
serial bomber. We will also not forget the importance of remaining
vigilant and looking out for one another's safety and well-being.
austin bombing locations
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Chief Manley, and thank you for
your service. You provide the leadership necessary. All eyes of
the Nation were on you, and you performed magnificently.
Chair now recognizes Commissioner Evans for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM B. EVANS, COMMISSIONER, BOSTON POLICE
DEPARTMENT, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
Mr. Evans. Thank you, Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member
Thompson. Again, I am Commissioner Evans. I have been with the
Boston Police Department for 38 years. I have been the
commissioner for 4\1/2\ years.
I want to thank the Members on behalf of Mayor Walsh and
myself. I want to thank you for asking me to participate in
this hearing today. My full testimony has been submitted to you
for the record and with the permission I would like to make a
few opening remarks.
First of all, I would like to take a moment to remember
fallen Yarmouth, Massachusetts police officer Sean Gannon. He
was killed in the line of duty serving a warrant last Thursday,
him and his K-9 dog was also shot. He is being laid to rest
today. Last night I was at his wake. We had thousands of
officers, but again, it goes to the dangers of being in this
profession. So I would like to recognize him.
As I reflect on the 5th-year anniversary of the bombing of
the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013, which was 2 days ago,
the importance of collaboration between Federal, State, and
local law enforcement partners is only reaffirmed. The same is
true for the importance of communication between law
enforcement, our public and private partners and the
communities we serve.
As we watch events unfold across the country, it is clear
that the timely sharing of information is at the center of a
successful police and community response. This is so true for
the recent bombings in Austin, Texas, which remind us all of
how quickly tragedy can descend upon innocent citizens and
cause senseless injury and death.
This includes 39-year-old Stephan House who was killed on
his front porch, 17-year-old Draylen Mason, who was killed by a
package at his home while his mother was badly injured, and
many others who were injured by the package bombs from, at that
time, an unknown enemy.
These tragic events all are too reminiscent of the Boston
tragedy my city suffered during the 2013 marathon, including a
lockdown and exhaustive manhunt by law enforcement, not knowing
if or when the next attack might occur. While watching the news
reports from Austin during this time, I understood and could
relate to the police and the community's concern as an
unidentified threat impacted their neighborhoods.
Like Boston, the residents of Austin stood strong in the
face of adversity while its local leaders, including my co-
panelist, Chief Brian Manley of the Austin Police Department
and other Texas representatives, stood with one voice, one
message, working to ease public tension while hunting for the
killer.
Also, in the aftermath of the marathon bombing, I knew that
behind the scenes there was a team of men and women working
around the clock to gather information and investigate leads
while sharing the information across multiple law enforcement
agencies, all with the common purpose to capture the suspect
that was causing such distress and harm to our city.
Ever since 9/11, information sharing between agencies both
large, small, local, State and Federal has been the benchmark
for successful prevention and response to threats. Trusting in
open communications between law enforcement and Federal
partners are crucial to keeping our communities safe. I have
witnessed the benefits of this type of information sharing
first-hand, and it continues to improve the success of our
agencies every day.
At the center of these successful partners is this timely
sharing of pertinent information. Chief Manley immediately
responded to the events in Austin with the FBI, the ATF,
joining him to work side-by-side during the investigation. As
soon as the bombs went off in Austin, a network of information
and data sharing was under way.
These communications include facts of what was taking place
in order to keep the community appeared appropriately, while
also searching for similarities to other events in the area.
Including in this intel network was the Austin Regional
Intelligence Center, 1 of 7 centers in Texas and 78 across
America under the Department of Homeland Security.
The center began gathering and sharing intel in order to
assist investigators on the street and across our Nation. One
of the early information law enforcement bulletins distributed
by the Texas Joint Crime Information Fusion Center, even the
source is the Boston Regional Intelligence Center and a
situational awareness bulletin on our approach to the explosive
devices. This was developed through a bulletin that we all
shared.
The FBI San Antonio Office was also forwarding situation
awareness bulletins across the country and to Boston. A long
list of local, State, and Federal partners kept communications
channels opened across the country. This list included the FBI,
Office of Partner Engagement, the Department of Homeland
Security, who continually shared information across the
country.
This network was especially important after an explosion
was identified at the FedEx location 60 miles from Austin. The
possibility that multiple explosions could have been shipped
across the country was worthwhile for a lot of us. This allowed
all jurisdictions to prepare should something come to the
Boston area.
In the end, Austin authorities, along with Texas State
assets, FBI, ATF, ultimately captured the suspect. But even
here, although the threat was gone, the need for information
didn't stop, and Texas leadership came together again to
provide us with an overview of what occurred. This education
will assist us all going forward.
Another one of the most important aspects of successful
information sharing is keeping everyone involved: See
Something, Say Something. In Boston we had a long history of
great relationship with our law enforcement partners,
especially responding to critical assets.
In Boston recently we had an incident where a New England
Patriot, Julian Edelman, received a threat on-line. Our
detectives were notified. We reached out to the Michigan Police
Department and we were able to bring that person into custody
before he threatened to shoot up a school, which shows the
importance of informational sharing.
This is why relations and information sharing is so
crucial. It saves lives. Thank you again for the opportunity to
speak today. I look forward to questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Evans follows:]
Prepared Statement of William B. Evans
April 18, 2018
On behalf of Mayor Martin Walsh and myself, I want to thank the
committee for asking me to participate in this hearing today. I would
like to take a moment to remember fallen Yarmouth Police Officer Sean
Gannon. Officer Gannon was killed in the line of duty last week and our
hearts are with his family, friends, and fellow officers as he is laid
to rest today.
As I reflect on the Five-Year Anniversary of the Bombing of the
Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013, the importance of collaboration
between Federal, State, and local law enforcement partners is only
reaffirmed. The same is true for the importance of the communication
between law enforcement, our public and private partners, and the
communities we serve.
As we watch events unfold across the country, it is clear that the
timely sharing of information is at the center of a successful police
and community response. This is so true for the recent bombings in
Austin Texas, which remind us all of how quickly tragedy can descend
upon innocent citizens and cause senseless injury and death. This
includes 39-year-old Stephan House, who was killed on his front porch;
17-year-old Draylen Mason, who was killed by a package in his home
while his mother was badly injured; and the many others who were
injured by the package bombs from, at the time, an unknown enemy.
These tragic events are all too reminiscent of the bombing my city
suffered during the 2013 Boston Marathon, including a lockdown and an
exhaustive manhunt by law enforcement not knowing if or when the next
attack might occur. While watching the news reports from Austin during
this time, I understood and could relate to the police and the
community's concern as an unidentified threat impacted their
neighborhoods. Like Boston, the residents of Austin stood strong in the
face of adversity while its local leaders, including my co-panelist
Chief Brian Manley of the Austin Police Department, and other Texas
representatives spoke with one voice, one message, working to ease the
public tension while hunting for a killer. Also, like in the aftermath
of the Marathon Bombing, I knew that behind the scenes there was a team
of men and women working around the clock to gather information and
investigate leads while sharing that information across multiple law
enforcement agencies, all with the common purpose of capturing the
suspect that was causing such distress and harm to the city.
Ever since September 11, 2001, information sharing between
agencies, both large and small, local, State, and Federal, has been the
benchmark for successful prevention and response to threats. Trusting
and open communications between local and Federal partners are crucial
to keeping our communities safe. I have witnessed the benefits of this
type of information sharing first-hand and it continues to improve the
success of our agencies every day.
At the center of these successful partnerships is this timely
sharing of this pertinent information, as shown by Chief Manley's
immediate response to the events in Austin, with the FBI and ATF
joining him to work side-by-side during the investigation. As soon as
the bombs went off in Austin, a network of information and data sharing
was under way. These communications included the facts of what was
taking place in order to help other communities prepare appropriately
while also searching for similarities to other events in order to
gather necessary intelligence to identify possible suspects. Included
in this intel network was the Austin Regional Intelligence Center, 1 of
7 centers in Texas and 78 across America under the Department of
Homeland Security umbrella. The Center began gathering and sharing
intelligence in order to assist investigators out on the street and
across our Nation.
One of the early information law enforcement bulletins distributed
by the Texas Joint Crime Information Fusion Center even sources a
Situational Awareness bulletin on approach to explosive devices
disseminated by the Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC) months
earlier. The FBI San Antonio office was also forwarding Situational
Awareness bulletins across the country, informing agencies and asking
them to contact the office with any information on any similar types of
suspicious activities or threats.
A long list of local, State, and Federal partners kept the
communication channels open. This list included the FBI Office of
Partner Engagement and the Department of Homeland Security, both
continuing to engage with, and inform local law enforcement Nation-wide
in the event of threat to those communities. This network was
especially important after an explosive was identified at the Fed Ex
location 60 miles from Austin. The possibility that multiple explosive
packages could have been shipped across the country again confirmed the
importance of knowledge shared among multiple jurisdictions. This
allowed law enforcement to prepare, including what to look for and how
to respond, should a similar threat come into their city.
In the end, Austin authorities, along with Texas State assets, the
FBI and ATF, located a suspect who ultimately took his own life with
his own explosive device. Although the threat was gone, the need for
information did not stop and the Texas leadership came together again
to provide an overview to multi-jurisdictional partners, including a
time line and synopsis of the events. This education in the aftermath
will assist all law enforcement if faced with this type of unfortunate
event in the future. I commend these local, State, and Federal
responders. Our communities are safer as a result of your efforts.
Another one of the most important aspects of successful information
sharing is keeping public and private partners informed, with one of
the most basic steps being:
See Something, Say Something.
The Department has developed a comprehensive information-sharing
partnership with our public and private-sector stakeholders called BRIC
Shield. There are more than 1,000 stakeholders from the private sector
and non-governmental organizations across the Metro Boston Region
registered to receive and share information through BRIC Shield for
public safety and homeland security purposes. The information shared
includes the latest crime bulletins, pattern, and trend analysis of
criminal activity in the region, international, National, and regional
analysis of homeland security incidents and threats as they relate to
the region, real-time alerts and situational awareness updates.
To further ensure the continuous flow of information, the
Department has officers assigned to the National Network of Fusion
Centers, the Joint Terrorism Task Force, the International Association
of Chiefs of Police Committee on Terrorism, the Major City Chiefs
Intelligence Commanders Group, and the National Operations Center. The
Department's representation within these organizations and committees
further supports the continuous flow of information among our law
enforcement partners.
In Boston, we have a long history of great relationships with our
law enforcement partners, as well as our community, whom we often train
with for better critical responses. Not only does the Department
coordinate with the community to solve crime, but coordination with our
law enforcement and private partners is an integral part of our
success. The Department participates in Urban Shield Boston--a multi-
agency training exercise funded by the Department of Homeland Security
designed to enhance the skills and abilities of our region's first
responders, as well as those responsible for coordinating and managing
large-scale incidents, and other members of the community. Similarly,
in June 2016, the Department, in collaboration with the Boston Red Sox,
the Department of Homeland Security, and the United States Army
Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center, conducted a
multijurisdictional counterterrorism exercise at Fenway Park. The
objective of the training exercise was to prepare law enforcement
officials, first responders, and Fenway Park personnel in emergency
procedures and protocols in the event of a mass emergency.
The Department's relationship with the community, and its ability
to maintain a steady flow of information sharing with the public, is
further enabled by our use of social media. In the days following the
Boston Marathon Bombing in 2013, the Department used social media to
inform the public without inciting fear, to instruct the residents on
what to do, and to instill a feeling of safety within the community.
This method of communication proved invaluable during such a difficult
time in Boston. Social media, including Twitter, Facebook, and
Instagram, coupled with the Department's website, BPDNews.com, has
allowed me to increase transparency and information sharing by posting
the results of internal affairs investigations, seeking the identity of
persons of interest and suspects in criminal activity, and seeking the
community's assistance in locating missing persons.
An example of the importance of community in information sharing
can be seen in a recent incident brought to our attention by Mr. Julian
Edelman, a wide receiver for the five-time World Champion New England
Patriots. Mr. Edelman was made aware of a post on his personal
Instagram account relative to a person threatening to shoot up a
school. Mr. Edelman notified his assistant to contact authorities and
the Boston Police Department was notified and responded. Boston Police
Detectives Autio and McKeon and Sergeant Detective Kenny O'Brien in his
last days on the job investigated the incident and notified the Port
Huron Police Department of the suspect's information. The BRIC also
transmitted information to the Michigan Intelligence Operations Center
and shared the same with our Federal partners for information purposes.
Based on the Boston Police Department's follow-up, the Port Huron
Police Department was able to locate and take the suspect into custody,
thereby potentially preventing a catastrophe from taking place in their
city.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Commissioner Evans.
The Chair now recognizes Chief Newsham for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF PETER NEWSHAM, CHIEF OF POLICE, WASHINGTON
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE
MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS ASSOCIATION
Chief Newsham. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking
Member Watson Coleman, and Members of the committee. My name is
Peter Newsham. I am the chief of police for the Metropolitan
Police Department here in Washington, DC. I am pleased to
appear here today representing the Major Cities Chiefs, an
association of police chiefs of the largest jurisdictions in
the United States and Canada.
We thank you for convening this hearing on a topic of
critical importance to the safety of the people we protect and
serve. Although we lead law enforcement agencies in the major
urban areas of the United States, we know that law enforcement
and agencies of all sizes share the same concerns about the
threat of violent extremists and terrorism. There is no higher
priority than coming together to share perspectives and lessons
learned that may help prevent these tragedies and protect our
communities.
To that end, the Major Cities Chiefs has worked closely
with the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives, as well as the Department of Homeland Security and
other Federal agencies to strengthen information sharing since
the Boston Marathon attacks. Today we will report on progress
and discuss next steps in our joint efforts.
Collectively, all of our agencies realized a very real
threat of lone-wolf attackers. Lone wolfs can be individuals
radicalized by various ideologies at home or abroad, or may
simply be someone facing a significant and untreated mental
health issue. As we know, foreign and domestic extremist
organizations have made headway in recruiting through the
internet and other wide-spread propaganda.
Information from our Federal partners who track those who
travel overseas for terrorist training, indicates a decline in
such travel. At the same time, however, we have seen a growing
threat from violent domestic extremists who are motivated by
hate and bias. This makes the role of local communities and law
enforcement all the more important.
One of our challenges is being able to identify individuals
in the United States who have been radicalized through various
forms of propaganda, and harder still to determine which pose
an immediate public threat. Given the significant threat from
lone-wolf extremists, one of the most important tools in
combatting them is local information.
One common thread running through tragedies in recent years
is that there have been warning signs that could be reported by
the public and should be recognized by local and Federal law
enforcement. All too often, conversations about warning signs
happen only after a tragedy occurs.
We need systems in place to learn from neighbors, schools,
employers, co-workers, and family members about persons who
pose a threat, and we must pay attention to these warnings. For
this reason, Major Cities Chiefs developed and piloted the
Suspicious Activity Reporting Program, or SARS, that is now a
permanent program at DHS.
SARS was designed to provide information to the FBI threat
database, eGuardian. Major Cities Chiefs considers the SARS
program to be the cornerstone of our information gathering from
the community and believes it should remain a top priority for
local and Federal law enforcement. We appreciate this
committee's support of this significant initiative.
But there may be other effective tools for recognizing
threats being developed in our communities. While law
enforcement executives rely on our networks to identify
programs, Federal support to identify and disseminate technical
assistance about innovative and best practices is vital.
For instance, there is a growing move to pass State
legislation that supports red flag laws. The Major Cities
Chiefs supports and encourages these laws that would provide
family and community members with an avenue for seeking court-
ordered emergency risk protection orders to allow for the
removal of firearms from individuals that pose a threat to our
communities.
While these programs rely on locally-driven efforts,
information sharing always needs to be a two-way street. Local
agencies can be the eyes and ears to gather information from
local communities. Federal agencies, for their part, must share
it with local law enforcement, intelligence, and other
resources.
I will highlight just some of the ways that Federal
agencies provide critical support for our work in communities.
Following the Boston attack in hearings held by this committee,
Major Cities Chiefs engaged with the FBI to review and change a
number of policies and procedures. The common purpose of these
efforts was to remove barriers to sharing information that
could prevent an incident of mass violence.
Over a period of months, the FBI considered and approved a
comprehensive set of measures to expand participation by local
agencies in regional Joint Terrorism Task Force operations and
to fully share all case information and threat intelligence.
This resulted in barriers coming down.
Specific areas of improvement included increasing local
access to Classified information, expanding responsibilities
for local personnel assigned to JTTFs, regular briefings for
local agencies on threat intelligence and case activities, and
fully embedding local personnel in all aspects of daily JTTF
operations.
Major Cities Chiefs has also joined with Major County
Sheriffs to form a network of senior intelligence officers from
every urban area, an organization without precedent in this
country.
Each jurisdiction has designated an intelligence commander.
Working as a team, these intelligence commanders exchange
information and share intelligence about threats, prevention,
and response. We coordinate these efforts with the JTTF in each
urban area, the fusion centers and DHS.
Major Cities Chiefs appreciates the support of the FBI and
DHS for the Intelligence Commanders network, which is a
critical component of Major Cities Chiefs' Criminal
Intelligence Enterprise. The CIE aims to better integrate local
criminal intelligence and counterterrorism operations.
The effort leverages existing networks, such as the JTTF
and fusion centers, to improve connectivity between State and
local enforcement resources. Major Cities Chiefs is also very
excited that the FBI has formally joined with us to establish a
common automated platform called the Threat Reporting
Priorities. The FBI has sponsored both development and
maintenance of the platform, as well as training our personnel.
Later this month, DHS and the FBI will host a meeting in
Houston to move this initiative forward. These are just a few
of the ways that Major Cities Chiefs and local and Federal law
enforcement work together to protect our communities.
While great strides have been made, we recognize that it is
not enough. Recent tragedies are a grim reminder that there is
still much work to do. Major Cities Chiefs plans to meet with
FBI Director Christopher Wray and executives to review current
JTTF and eGuardian policies to determine how we can further
strengthen information sharing.
Major Cities Chiefs plans to evaluate common policies and
procedures, threat briefings for urban areas, the role of local
police personnel, reporting threat intelligence and
intelligence operations.
In closing, I would like to thank the Chairman, the Ranking
Member, and the committee for your strong support of local law
enforcement. We know you share our commitment to evaluating and
implementing policies and programs that will strengthen the
partnership between local law enforcement and Federal partners.
Collectively, we are all sworn to serve and protect our
communities. That is a responsibility which I am sure will
guide all of our efforts. Thank you, and I am available to take
any questions that you have.
[The prepared statement of Chief Newsham follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter Newsham
April 18, 2018
Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members
of the committee. My name is Peter Newsham, and I am the chief of
police of the Metropolitan Police Department in the District of
Columbia. I am pleased to appear before you today representing the
Major Cities Chiefs, an association of Police Chiefs of the largest
jurisdictions in the United States. We thank you for convening this
hearing on a topic of critical importance to the safety of the people
we protect and serve. Although we lead law enforcement agencies in the
major urban areas of the United States, we know that law enforcement in
agencies of all sizes share the same concerns about the threat of
violent extremists and terrorism. There is no higher priority than
coming together to share perspectives and lessons learned that may help
to prevent these tragedies and protect the communities we serve.
To that end, the Major Cities Chiefs (MCC) has worked closely with
the Department of Justice (DOJ), including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (ATF), as well as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
and other Federal agencies to strengthen information sharing since the
Boston marathon attacks. Today we will report on progress and discuss
next steps in our joint efforts.
Collectively, all of our agencies realize the very real threat of
the lone-wolf attackers. Individuals may be radicalized by various
ideologies at home or abroad, or may be facing significant and
untreated mental health issues. Foreign and domestic extremist
organizations have made headway in recruiting via the internet and
wide-spread propaganda. While Federal agencies may track many of those
who go overseas for terrorist training, we have seen a decline in
travel for formal training. At the same time, we have seen a growing
threat from violent domestic extremists who are motivated by hate and
bias. This makes the role of local communities and law enforcement all
the more important. It is challenging to identify individuals in the
United States who have been radicalized through various forms of
propaganda, and harder still to determine which pose a public threat.
Given the significant threat from lone-wolf extremists, one of the
most important tools in combatting them is local information. One
common thread through tragedies in recent years is that there have been
warning signs that could be reported by the public and should be
recognized by local and Federal law enforcement. All too often,
conversations about warning signs happen only after a tragedy occurs.
We must have a system in place to learn about persons who pose a threat
from neighbors, schools, employers, co-workers, and family members, and
we must pay attention to these warnings.
For this reason, MCC developed and piloted the Suspicious Activity
Reporting Program (SARS) that is now a permanent program at DHS. SARS
was designed to provide information to the FBI threat database, E-
Guardian. MCC considers the SARS program to be the cornerstone of our
information gathering from the community, and believes it should remain
a top priority for local and Federal law enforcement. We appreciate
your support of this significant initiative.
But there may be other effective tools for recognizing threats
being developed in our communities. While law enforcement executives
like myself rely on our networks to identify programs, Federal support
to identify and disseminate technical assistance about innovative and
best practices is vital. For instance, there is a growing move to pass
State legislation that supports ``red flag'' laws. The MCC supports and
encourages these laws that would provide family and community members
with an avenue for seeking court-ordered emergency risk protection
orders to consider removing firearms from individuals that pose a
threat to the community. This is different than current tools that rely
on a specific risk to a targeted individual.
While these programs rely on locally-driven efforts, information
sharing is a two-way street. Local agencies can be the eyes and ears to
gather information from local communities. Federal agencies, for their
part, must share with local law enforcement intelligence from other
sources. I will highlight just some of the ways that Federal agencies
provide critical support for our work in communities.
Following the Boston attack and hearings held by this committee,
MCC engaged with the FBI to review and change a number of policies and
procedures. The common purpose of these efforts was to remove barriers
to sharing information that could prevent an incident of mass violence.
Over a period of months, the FBI considered and approved a
comprehensive set of measures to expand participation by local agencies
in regional Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) operations and to fully
share all case information and threat intelligence. This resulted in
barriers coming down. Specific areas of improvement included increasing
local access to Classified information, expanding responsibilities for
local personnel assigned to JTTFs, regular briefings for local agencies
on threat intelligence and case activities, and fully embedding local
personnel in all aspects of daily JTTF operations.
Major Cities Chiefs has also joined with Major County Sheriffs to
form a network of senior intelligence officers from every urban area,
an organization without precedent in this country. Each jurisdiction
has designated an Intelligence Commander. Working as a team, these
Intelligence Commanders exchange information and share intelligence
about threats, prevention, and response. We coordinate these efforts
with the JTTF in each urban area, the Fusion Centers, and DHS.
MCC appreciates the support of the FBI and DHS for the Intelligence
Commanders Network, which is a critical component of MCC's Criminal
Intelligence Enterprise (CIE). The CIE aims to better integrate local
criminal intelligence and counterterrorism operations. The effort
leverages existing networks such as the JTTF and fusion centers, to
improve connectivity between State and local law enforcement resources.
The FBI has formally joined with us to establish a common automated
platform, called the Threat Reporting Priorities (TRP). The FBI has
sponsored both development and maintenance of the platform, as well as
training our personnel. Later this month, DHS and the FBI will host a
meeting in Houston to move this initiative forward.
These are just a few of the ways that MCC, and local and Federal
law enforcement work together to protect our communities. While great
strides have been made, it is not enough. Recent tragedies are a grim
reminder that we are not done yet.
Major Cities Chiefs plans to meet with FBI Director Christopher
Wray and executives to review current JTTF and E-Guardian policies to
determine how we can further strengthen information sharing. The MCC
plans to evaluate the following areas:
Common Policies and Procedures.--Chiefs and the FBI must
ensure clear and consistent National policies and procedures to
support effective intelligence and case information sharing
within and between urban area JTTFs and the appropriate local
agency heads.
Threat Briefings for Urban Areas.--Regular Classified threat
briefings should be conducted by Federal agencies to cover any
and all intelligence concerning threats to the major cities,
including opening and closing cases.
Role of Local Police Personnel.--Detectives, investigators,
and analysts assigned to JTTFs must be fully embedded and have
full access to threat intelligence and case information.
Reporting Threat Intelligence.--Policies and practices must
encourage, and not restrict, assigned local personnel and
Federal agents to examine all intelligence databases and to
report back to their agencies on potential threats to the
community.
Intelligence Operations.--Chiefs and the FBI should
regularly assess how local intelligence units and fusion
centers can support JTTF cases.
In closing, I would like to thank Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
Thompson, and the committee for your strong support of local law
enforcement. We know you share our commitment to evaluating and
implementing policies and programs that will strengthen the partnership
between local law enforcement and Federal partners. We are all sworn to
serve and protect our communities, a responsibility which must guide
all of our efforts.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Chief Newsham.
I now recognize myself for questions. You know, I was a
Federal prosecutor both before 9/11 and after. September 11
represented a very significant failure in intelligence and
information sharing between the intelligence community, Federal
law enforcement and State, resulting in the Twin Towers being
brought down, the Pentagon being struck and this building, we
believe, was the final target.
That is why this committee has formed. That is why the
Department was formed, is to make sure that doesn't happen
again. When the Boston bombing occurred, I have to say it
raised serious questions about whether we were connecting the
dots, whether this information sharing was working.
I had Commissioner Ed Davis testify before this committee,
who told me that he knew nothing about an FBI guardian lead
being open on Tamerlan Tsarnaev, that he knew nothing of the
foreign intelligence warning. He knew nothing of his travels to
Dagestan and back, even though a Customs flag went up on him.
He knew nothing about the radical on-line postings.
In short, what he told me was that he didn't know he had a
terrorist in his backyard, and he had two police officers on
the Joint Terrorism Task Force. He said, ``You know, if I had
known that, just maybe I would have given him a second look.''
Then the answer I got back at the Federal level was well,
that case was closed and it wouldn't have made a difference. So
I think it possibly could have, but we are not here to look
backward. We are here to look forward.
Commissioner Evans and Chief Newsham, I think you have
outlined some very good lessons learned since that time, but
can you tell me what we have learned since that time and what
you are doing? How that has improved since the Boston bombing?
Mr. Evans. Sure, Chairman. I think the information sharing,
at least since I have been commissioner, has improved so much.
You know, if not weekly contact, sometimes daily contact with
Hank Shaw, who is the special agent in charge. We have had a
lot of events, whether they were free speech marches, like the
week after Charlottesville, you know, constant daily contact
about who was traveling where, what threats were to the city.
You know, just 2 days ago with the Boston Marathon bombing,
you know, continually in touch with Hank on is there any threat
to what is going on. Working with the Boston Regional
Intelligence Center, as well as, you know, the JTTF, as well as
the fusion centers, you know, we were pretty comfortable that
we had a pretty secure event.
I think the communication, you know, the access to
Guardian, that is all--really has improved. You know if we had
a big anti-gun rally--like, everything we do now is through the
State and our Federal partners.
I got to say, since Boston, I know there was some criticism
of the FBI, but I don't see it right now. I think the
communication has gotten so much better. It really has.
In anything, always I reach out to the special agent in
charge and it is just almost daily communication. So I got to
say sometimes, you know, there is some criticism, but even at
the FBI--at the final takedown in Watertown, I ran that final
scene. I tell the story that is not told that when it was very
hectic, the H.R. team came up to me and they made clear, asking
me, ``Are you the man in charge? Are you the incident
commander?''
I said yes. They said, ``Well, every decision we are going
to make from here on in is going to be through you.'' Whether
they are throwing smoke grenades or flashbangs, they didn't
take over. They worked with us.
I think ever since that time, the relationship has got
stronger, the communications has gotten better. So I see that
things have really improved, especially on the anniversary of
the 5-year bombing.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you. I think one of the big
improvements, I think, came from this committee's report. I
commend the FBI for entering into memorandums of
understanding----
Mr. Evans. Right.
Chairman McCaul. With the police chiefs so that their
participants on the JTTF, that they can actually talk about it.
Mr. Evans. Right.
Chairman McCaul. I think that was a big breakthrough as a
result. Chief, very briefly 'cause my time is running away.
Chief Newsham. Yes, you know, I would just echo some of the
comments that were made and to say that it has dramatically
improved, the information sharing from the FBI. The members of
my JTTF that interact with the bureau on a daily basis are
frequently in my office bringing up instances that I need to be
aware of in the event that we have to move resources to address
those issues.
So I have noticed a dramatic improvement in the level of
access that my task force officers have to information that the
bureau has and then they immediately share that information.
For larger issues that occur, there is a direct communication
between me and the assistant director in charge over at the
Washington field office.
Chairman McCaul. Chief Manley, I think the Austin bombing,
the way you handled it, your leadership represents how it is
supposed to work. I think it represents the progress we have
made since the Boston bombing as a country. I visited with ATF
and, you know, I visited Steve McCraw, who is a hero of mine,
and I also went over to the FBI field office to thank them and
present a flag to over 50 agents.
It was remarkable the change of culture within the FBI
that, you know, we were here to support the police chief. We
are working hand-in-glove with him. They provided great
technical analysis and data that I know really greatly
facilitated your investigation. I thought what a sea change for
the better.
Can you comment on that and I believe that what happened,
while tragic in Austin, has become somewhat of a model, I
think, looking forward?
Chief Manley. Yes, Mr. Chair. I would echo the comments of
the commissioner and the chief as well on what we do in Austin.
I won't spend time on that with the partnerships with JTTF and
the information sharing that is absolutely taking place. But as
we worked through the bombing spree in Austin, we formed a
unified command and we had senior representatives.
If it wasn't Mr. Milanowski and Mr. Combs and myself, then
it was our seconds that were present in that unified command
center, so that we people that were capable, authorized, and
willing to make the decisions that needed to be made. It was a
constant sense of partnership.
There was never once a request or an attempt to move the
overall investigation out of the purview of the police
department. But instead, it was a sense of support and making
sure that we had what we needed to have.
The events that took place in Austin would have overwhelmed
any police department across this country, the largest
included. To have the Federal assets come into town, to be able
to go through the amount of data we were pulling, whether it
was computer leads, whether it was video, everything that had
to be pulled together to try and make that critical link, there
was never a hesitation.
When needed, there were additional resources that were
brought to bear. So the partnership, again, between the
agencies, the agreement on the front end and, I think, the
constant communication throughout the event is what, I think,
we should model going forward for a community that would find
themselves in this circumstance. Praying that they don't but,
if they do, this absolutely worked.
I really do believe that in that command center that
everyone left their initials at the door, whether that was FBI,
ATF, APD, or the others that were there. Those initials were
left at the door because we realized we had a community under
siege and lives at risk. I really think that is the model going
forward.
Chairman McCaul. Yes, I couldn't agree more, and I think,
sir, you certainly earned your stripes.
With that, let me recognize Ranking Member Ms. Watson
Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
each of you for your testimony. It has been very helpful and
enlightening. I am learning a lot and I really need to learn
more, here.
Chief Manley, that was an incredible, was it 19 days of
horror in your community and I know that we are very pleased
that there was this collaboration and support and information
sharing. I have a couple of questions, though, about why it
took 19 days to find this particular individual.
So I would like to know, like, what was being shared
between the first incident and the second incident, which is
the 2nd to the 12th, that is different than what happened from
the 19th to the 21st where we actually caught this individual.
Please understand this is not a criticism. I am just trying
to figure out was there a way of, like, sort-of, compressing
the time in which we would have found what seems to be a rather
unsophisticated and troubled individual.
Chief Manley. Yes, Congresswoman. So what happened on March
2, although we did not have reason to believe in that moment
that this was part of a larger incident, what we had was a
singular bomb that had taken the life of an individual, we
still brought in the ATF. We still brought in the FBI and the
U.S. Postal Service that day. On the 2nd, they were on the
scene.
We actually sent all of the evidence with the ATF. We had
them conduct the post-blast analysis, and we did not try and
handle that within the resources of the police department,
recognizing the severity of what had happened.
So in those interceding days between the 2nd and the 12th,
when we had the two additional bombs that went off that day,
there was a lot of work being done in the background.
There was ATF working to analyze the bomb components,
again, hoping to find some type of either biological evidence
that might link to a suspect or identify the components that
were used to construct the device because then we would look to
try and see where those were available and we work backward.
A lot of information was being gathered regarding
purchases, regarding suspicious persons, and so all of that is
being looked at in these interceding days. What happened on
March 12th with the first bomb that went off, taking the life
of Mr. Draylen Mason, is at that moment we realized that it
would be too coincidental to have two isolated incidents and
that this was a pattern.
So at that point, we put together that unified command, and
we brought in a lot of additional personnel and we set up a
command center. So it is not that there was a different
approach. I think we then had the availability of a lot more
evidence.
We now had two additional blast scenes to investigate,
additional evidence was collected at both. Again, we started
getting more tips 'cause these were now two additional
neighborhoods that could tell us did they notice someone out of
place? Did they notice something out of place? Two additional
neighborhoods where we could go and retrieve video data from
that we could analyze and look for suspicious persons or
suspicious vehicles.
So I think the biggest change was with these additional
scenes. It provided us additional evidence and additional
potential witnesses that we were then able to feed into the
larger system we had constructed back at the command center to
try and collate all of this data.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So you had--excuse me. So you did have
community people who saw something and said something. So that
is a component of this, right?
Chief Manley. Absolutely. And the----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So----
Chief Manley. Go ahead.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. OK.
Chief Manley. Yes, we did have community people that we
canvassed each neighborhood after these incidents took place
and we----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I am going to take up on a little bit
of that right there. But I want to just ask sort-of a side
question. Was there any relationship information established
between the bomber and the three residences?
Chief Manley. To this point, we do not have any connection
between the bomber and the three residences----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Right.
Chief Manley. But instead it appears purely random. But I
do want to say this is still an active investigation, and we
still have a lot of records and computer files and all that are
actively being analyzed just to make sure, No. 1, there is no
link to any of the victims, but then also that there are no
other individuals that are involved in this.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. You all did a remarkable job. I
watched it. You know, I was glued to the TV as everyone else
was. The same thing with the Boston Marathon bombings. We were
glued to the TV and we were just very proud of law enforcement
solving these problems and making us a little bit more secure
in our comings and goings, because that is where we are
threatened, just in comings and goings.
This See Something, Say Something is very important here.
Over the past year, there have been numerous cases of concerned
citizens reporting suspected terrorism-related activity or the
possible radicalization of members within their community to
the authorities.
Given that these actions have in some cases led to
successful investigations and arrests, there is a growing
perception among some that community engagement is emerging as
a critical counterterrorism tactic.
At the same time, particularly given the rhetoric from this
administration toward racial, ethnic, and religious minorities,
many are indeed concerned that they could be a target of
unfounded and discriminatory reporting from their neighbors
simply because of their religion or how they look or whatever.
How do you balance these concerns, and how do you ensure
that individuals' privacy and civil liberties are being
respected while still encouraging community engagement and
appropriate reporting? This is actually a question I would love
to hear something from each of you.
We can start with you, Mr. Manley.
Chief Manley. Certainly. I think it is how you approach the
information that you have been given. Absolutely the See
Something, Say Something campaign is vital to the safety of
communities across this country. No community has enough police
officers to keep the community safe on their own. Without
active, effective partnerships the community is not as safe as
it needs to be.
So while understanding the concerns that exist within
communities across this country, I think it is how law
enforcement approaches these tips when we get them to make sure
that what has been reported is something that could truly be
threatening and that you then work the information that you are
given before you actually go out and take any action.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. To your knowledge are police
departments being sort-of retrained, culturally informed now? I
want to ask Mr. Newsham the same question on behalf of the----
Chief Newsham. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Association because it is important
how the law enforcement reacts to these tips that are coming in
and concerns that are being raised.
Chief Manley. Yes, Congresswoman, I agree. I think I will
speak for my department. We regularly train officers in the
area of cultural sensitivity and diversity, most recently
having put the entire police department through fair and
impartial police training where we look at biases, both
conscious and unconscious biases, and how those can impact your
thought, but how you cannot let them impact your actions. So
speaking for my agency, we have taken a pretty aggressive
stance toward this.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
Sir.
Chief Newsham. Yes, ma'am. That is a great question, the
question that you ask. The way that Major Cities Chiefs looks
at this issue is that, you know, the bottom line for any police
organization is building trust and legitimacy within the
communities that they serve.
The reason that you need trust and legitimacy is for the
very reason, the question that you raise. There probably will
be suspicious activity reports to law enforcement that are
unfounded for a host of reasons. The community has to trust
that the police agencies have had the training on implicit
bias, cultural sensitivity to be able to respond to those
situations, to make sure that we are keeping our communities
safe from extremists and from terrorism.
The only way that communities are going to make those
reports if they trust the agencies that they are reporting it
to. The bottom line for law enforcement agencies is to ensure
that their police officers are trained to recognize, you know,
the difference.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Just to close up on this question, if
I might? Is there standardized training mechanisms to deal with
this so that all the police forces who are willing to train
their employees are getting the same sort of information, so
that there is, sort-of, continuity and a consistency in the
training?
Chief Newsham. Yes, Major Cities Chiefs, what we do is when
we have our conferences and we discuss these issues with the
major city chiefs across the country, we try to express to them
that they have to have these types of trainings. But the answer
to your question is I don't believe there is a standardized
training that is being applied to all the agencies across the
country.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.----
Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes the gentlemen from
New York, Mr. King.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all the
witnesses that are here today for the testimony.
Chief Manley, I want to especially congratulate you on the
outstanding job and the leadership you demonstrated during
these recent tragedy and throughout your career, and I want to
thank you for that.
Chief Newsham, we have had dealings over the years. I want
to, you know, thank you for your efforts.
Commissioner Evans, if I can just follow up some questions
on the situation in Boston? I remember being up there, I guess,
just several weeks or months after the Boston Marathon
bombings, meeting with you and Commissioner Davis and all your
men and women and the great job that you did.
One thing that struck me at the time, though was how close
Watertown was, how there is almost interconnection between the
Boston Police, Watertown Police. It was hard even seeing
geographic boundaries at times.
When you do your training and when you do share
intelligence and when you coordinate activities, are those
smaller departments part of your training, part of your
planning?
Mr. Evans. Yes, they are. With the Boston Regional
Intelligence Center, every morning we do a conference call with
all the surrounding UASI cities and Watertown. We do it with
our State police officers and our Federal.
So anything going on, whether it is crime-related, whether
it is anything related to terrorism or any type of threats,
that is shared with everyone. You know, it is a great
informational source. If they have issues in their town, they
are letting us know. You know, it is a daily sharing of
information, and we do that every single day.
At the end of the day, we put out a BRIC report that is
shared with everyone. So there is a lot of good information
sharing across lines, you know, all across the State.
Mr. King. Now, at the time of the final showdown in Boston,
you were the incident commander, but that was in Watertown.
Mr. Evans. Yes.
Mr. King. Was that agreed upon beforehand with----
Mr. Evans. No. You know----
Mr. King. Boston P.D.?
Mr. Evans [continuing]. We were out there searching all day
and the city was shut down. Actually I was there from 1 in the
morning and we were just going from house to house looking for
the second suspect.
Honestly, the city was shut down. What happened was at 6
the Governor released the stay in place order and we were still
out there searching. All of a sudden someone came running up to
me and said they had seen someone in the boat.
So we quietly went to the boat, and myself and two of my
lieutenants were the first ones on the boat. I walked into the
leadership position because I was the superintendent at the
time. I was the highest-ranking official. Even though I was in
Watertown, which honestly, I am a city kid. I don't know all
the streets.
I had no idea where I was, to tell you the truth, but I was
in the right place at the right time, and I took control of
that scene. Whether it was the State or the Federal or the ATF,
everyone let me run with that scene. So I just happened on the
scene.
I think that was great about it. There was no fighting over
who was the commander. We all had a mission and the mission was
to get that individual in the boat out of there. Thank God we
did because I think we got a lot of information as far as what
his motives were and that there was no other threat out there.
Mr. King. God forbid something like that happens again, but
would there still be that connectivity between the various
police departments? I am just trying to imagine something like
that in other jurisdictions where you have three or four police
departments coming together and in such a unexpected situation.
Mr. Evans. Yes, I think it is crazy because that is one of
the big issues we battle with now when we have such a rapidly-
developing situation, that whole idea of controlling all the
outside agencies.
I mean, it just wasn't three or four. I think we had about
eight different agencies. When the shots rang out, you know, I
was the one screaming for everyone to hold their fire. But the
issue was all of these other agencies didn't have my radio
frequency, but we were able to by word of mouth stop all the
firing.
So I think self-deployment is the big issue, and I think we
all struggle with it. How do you stop the cavalry from coming
in when everyone knows--whether it is Austin, whether it is the
District of Columbia--and, you know, officers run toward the
danger, but unfortunately sometimes they run without reporting
to a command post.
So that was very hectic, and we learned from that. That is
one of the major things. How do you stop people from all
rushing in? When the shots fired, we were more concerned with
the crossfire, actually, 'cause everyone was around the boat at
that point.
I was screaming for people to stop their agencies from
coming in, but it sort-of got a little out of control at the
end, and thank God nobody was more seriously hurt.
But that is a thing we struggle with, sir, that, how do we
better control those final scenes where everybody wants to get
the bad guy, but there has got to be a lot more restraint?
Mr. King. OK. I have very little time remaining. If each of
you, just very quickly, the importance of the Federal grants
and each of you how important they are, the Homeland Security
grants as far as, you know, coping with the threats?
Mr. Evans. Well, I always look back at how Boston responded
after the bombing. We had done Urban Shield right before that
where we had a multiagency training program where we practice
what-ifs, you know, with different terrorist bombings going on
in different parts of the city.
That way we got to know everybody's capabilities and what
they bring to the table. We did training with the hospitals. We
did it with the universities. We did it, and it was through the
UASI money that pulled that off.
So when you talk about how we responded, we had everyone
off that scene within 22 minutes. Two-hundred-and-seventy
people went to the hospitals. Unfortunately, three who were
severely wounded and passed, they stayed on the scene, but
everyone got out of there. But that doesn't happen by accident.
The training with the hospitals, with everyone--and we
always look back and say, ``Thank God we had the Homeland
Security money to do that training,'' 'cause that was
instrumental and we continually use it. We did an active-
shooter exercise last year at Fenway Park. I think we were the
first ones to do it at a major sporting event.
How would we respond to an incident in Fenway Park? All our
Federal, State agencies were there and we did an active-
shooting incident. Leading up to this year's marathon, we did
tabletop exercises on what-ifs. We do active-shooter training.
We have probably done 400 in the last 2 years. You know, Naval
Postgraduate School down in Monterey, we send officers to.
All that grant money really helps us become a more
effective and efficient department, ready for the next tragedy.
Hopefully it never comes, but that makes us ready for these
events here.
Mr. King. Mr. Chairman, if the other chiefs could respond
in writing to the question of the impacts of Federal grants?
Chairman McCaul. Yes, if the chief would respond in
writing?
Mr. King. Let me also acknowledge Superintendent Lydon, who
is here. It is good to see you again, sir.
Chairman McCaul. Well, just echo my colleague's point, if
it wasn't for that Homeland Security grant money, I believe
there were exercises done about a month before the Boston
bombing. When you had that number of injured people being
triaged to hospitals, I think the loss of life could have been
far greater if it wasn't for that training.
Mr. Evans. I agree. You know, I look back, I still have a
lot of relationships with a lot of the individuals who have
suffered, you know, loss of legs, and they talk about the
treatment they got at those hospitals and the response.
You know, I am proud we all came together. Again, if it
wasn't for that training through Urban Shield, I don't think we
would have had nearly as great of response. So I am a big
supporter in the Homeland Security and all they do for us.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
Chair recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Ms. Rice.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to echo
what my colleague, Congressman King, and certainly the
Chairman, said about how important it is for the Federal
Government not just to talk about how important these
collaborations are, but especially in a post-9/11 world when
terrorism is even more rampant now than it was back then.
We have to back up our talk with money. I want to
acknowledge the Chairman of this committee who has consistently
fought for local law enforcement agencies to get the money from
the Federal Government. Not to say you are on your own. We will
help you in other ways, but we are not going to give you any
money.
I think that that says a lot about, you know, Mr. McCaul
because he said it during the Obama administration, as long as
I have been here, and he is saying it now. So this is not a
political issue for him nor is it, I believe, for the rest of
the Members of this committee. It is clearly, obviously,
important to all the work that you are doing.
Mr. Manley, I just want to ask you some questions about the
Austin attacks. There was a video tape the killer left?
Chief Manley. Yes. So the bomber used a video camera to
make a recording. Now, there is really no visual because it is
inside a--appears to be a dark video, but it is an audio
recording between 25 to 28 minutes long.
Miss Rice. What does he talk about?
Chief Manley. So without going into the specifics, he is
talking about his life. He actually fully described the six
bombs that we recovered, which again, allowed us to believe
that we had recovered all of the devices that he had
constructed. That was a concern given that he kept changing his
delivery method from a package left on a front porch to a
tripwire activated, and then he went to using the mail system.
So we were very concerned about that.
He talked about his feelings about the bombings or lack
thereof. Talked about mistakes that he made in what he believed
would allow us to capture him. That was the majority of what he
talked about. What we were looking for was motive, was reason.
Miss Rice. Did it give you any insight into his motive?
Chief Manley. There was no insight into his motive.
Instead, just----
Miss Rice. There was no racial implication or anything like
that or any religious implications at all?
Chief Manley. No. That was what we were looking for because
that would have been a determining factor of whether this would
have fallen under Federal terrorism statutes or FBI
jurisdiction. There was nothing on that recording whatsoever
that revealed any ideology, specifically one either based in
religion or politics.
Miss Rice. Is there a reason why that has not been released
publicly?
Chief Manley. A couple reasons. First of all, it is still
an active investigation and so----
Miss Rice. Is there reason to believe that there were other
people involved?
Chief Manley. Not what we know of right now. Now, there is
a lot of other data that we are still working through. Our
Federal partners have some computers that they are still
conducting the analysis on. I am told there is over a terabyte
of data that is having to be analyzed now.
So we are not done with this investigation. We don't
believe at this point that there is anybody else involved, but
we are not willing to say that until we know so.
The second reason, really, is the contagion effect. What we
know that when individuals that either conduct mass shootings
or in this case this bombing spree, we don't want to
potentially influence others that might be considering this or
if there is an individual that wants the type of infamy that
one can gain by having their words and their recordings and
their manifestos out in the public domain, really, until
eternity with the internet now.
Miss Rice. Well, I understand that, but I also think that
it is important to use each case as instruction. If you talk
about the program, you know, if you See Something, Say
Something, having more information about what the motives or
mindset of this individual was might help people identify that
similar behavior in people elsewhere.
I just want to talk--you know, there was an editorial in
the Austin American-Statesman that disagreed with the fact that
most major news outlets didn't label these bombings an act of
terrorism. They said, ``There is no mistaking the fear these
attacks inflicted on an entire city. That makes this
terrorism.'' I think that most people agree with that.
The New York Times also wrote that, ``Racial and religious
privilege appear to have intersected in how this bomber was
perceived. Because he is white, his acts were reduced to a
personal problem. And since he is a Christian, his faith was
considered coincidental.''
So one of the big focuses of this committee is making sure
that the terrorism, we don't allow it to come here. But we have
to be willing to acknowledge that acts like this--that there
was a neighborhood that was terrorized by an individual. Turned
out to be just one individual; could have been by more.
I think we can't try to sugarcoat things or not release
things because in every other case we know the history of every
posting on Facebook or whatever these people said. I don't
think that that has gone down the path that you suggested,
where you might be inciting people to behave in a similar way.
But I appreciate your decision as a law enforcement agency,
for sure. I applaud the way that your entire department handled
this under your leadership.
One last question, 'cause I have very few seconds left. Can
I ask just the entire panel for all three of your opinion about
how a National comprehensive universal background check system,
in your opinions, would it help prevent mass shootings?
Mr. Evans. Well, you know, I can speak--obviously, I
believe so. I am a big, strong advocate of universal background
checks. I think Massachusetts, more than any State, probably
has the toughest gun laws out there. As a result, we have the
lowest gunshot deaths of any country.
I think it becomes because we have tough gun laws. Anyone
who wants to get a license to carry in the city of Boston has
to go through--I have to sign off on it. We watch those very
closely. If someone has a felony, domestic violence, they have
anything in their background that sends up a red flag, they
will not get a license to carry.
I think that is why, you know, a major city, last year we
had, I think, 55 homicides on the year, which is pretty
impressive given other cities of our size. But that doesn't
happen by accident. That happens because we have tough gun
laws.
Our big issue in the city of Boston is you can go up to New
Hampshire and Maine, and that is where almost 20 percent of
guns that come into our State come from.
Anthony Braga from North Easton also indicated almost 25
percent of our guns come from the I-95 South. They are coming
from North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Virginia. You
know, so we are having a problem with guns flowing in because
all around us guns law that are lax.
Then quite frankly, I worry because there is talk coming
out of Washington, this whole idea of reciprocity of gun laws
where someone in a State that has lax gun laws, they will have
the ability to cross lines and have the same laws as they have
in our State.
So I have come out strongly. I know a lot of the major city
chiefs were all worried about gun laws, especially if you are
inner city chief, about gun laws being weaker because, you
know, every day in our country we have about 300 people who get
killed on our streets by guns.
You know, we have a major problem in the United States, and
I always say--I go to a lot of these scenes. I think if we see
the mothers, if you have dealt with the mothers, I think people
would understand why we need comprehensive universal background
checks.
I see it. I see the dangers that it does. I see so many
young African American kids killed on our streets, and that is
why we need stricter gun laws.
Chief Newsham. Yes, I would agree. Major Cities Chiefs is
supportive of universal background checks. I think we refer to
them as common-sense legislation that is needed across the
country. You know, the question I think you asked was whether
or not that would prevent some of these mass attacks that we
have had in our country.
The answer to that is, yes. But to echo what the
commissioner said, it would also prevent the shootings that we
are seeing our inner cities, and I don't think you will find a
major city chief that disagrees with that.
Chief Manley. Just briefly, I will agree with my colleagues
on the panel as well that I think it is a very effective tool.
I don't think that it will impede those that want to purchase
weapons and that should possess weapons from being able to, but
I think it is a strong step toward keeping them out of the
hands of individuals that should not possess them.
Miss Rice. Thank you, all, very much. You are our front
line and we are very lucky to have you all in your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
New York, Mr. Katko.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to initially
echo the sentiments of my colleagues on the committee that it
is all well and good to make inquiries, but if we don't provide
you the financial tools to fight the good fight on the front
lines, then we are not doing our job.
So I think we have the commitment of the committee as a
whole here to make sure that we always can get you as much
money and as much funding and support as we possibly can
because we understand what is at stake.
I must say, speaking with you before the hearing today and
talking to you and listening to this today, makes me miss my 20
years as a Federal organized crime prosecutor very much. During
that time, I spent an awful lot of time on--when you do
organized crime cases, the task force concepts and which were
really the precursor to the National fusion centers.
So I kind of want to talk about the fusion centers a little
bit and just kind of see how well they are operating or how
well you use them and what we can do better. Some of the things
I want to examine, in addition to just if you are using them,
what problems you have is I would like a candid discussion
about a couple of things that I have been concerned with in the
past.
Any task force, any fusion center, any time you have
collaborative efforts, the strength of each person on that is
important, but together it is much stronger.
A lot of times it seems like when the locals get on, they
don't get the status or the priorities that maybe the Feds get
or maybe the State representatives get. Especially when it
comes to, like, background checks and how long it takes them to
get their security clearances, how long does it take for them
to become a full-fledged member? Are they getting access to all
the information so they can be as effective a member of the
team as possible?
But then I want to ask you first of all, Chief Manley, and
then Commissioner Evans, tell me what level of participation do
you have in the fusion centers and what do you see as some of
the concerns or problems you have with it?
Chief Manley. So thank you, Congressman. I guess I would
initially go with the Austin, we actually, with our UASI
dollars, opened up the Regional Intelligence Center. This is
where we partner with, I believe, 19 other immediate agencies
around us so that we can make sure we are sharing information,
we are connecting the dots and we are not missing something.
Again, that would not likely have been possible for our
area without the UASI funding. That is how we invested our
dollars, along with some training.
As far as the partnerships and the participation and the
recognition by our Federal and State partners, I am not aware
that we have had any challenges in that area as far as getting
either access to information or being given a second seat at
the table.
But instead, what I sense is that the partnership is equal
and that we are getting not only the--and I don't want to say
recognition, but we are getting the attention that we need and
our issues are being brought front. I think that that is an
improvement. I think that that goes along with what we are
talking about today, the improved cooperation.
But the cost of running an operation like that, as I said,
I don't know that we ever would have been able to stand that up
without the investment with the UASI dollars. That is what is
important to us is to see that continue.
Mr. Katko. Yes. It is certainly a force multiplier, task
forces and fusion centers. You get a heck of a lot more bang
for your buck by putting a body or two there with all the
others who bring their strengths to the table as well.
Commissioner Evans, I would like to spend the rest of my
time talking about how the hell the Bruins choked the other
night, but I can't do that because it is not the proper place,
but maybe later. But I want to ask you the same question about
the fusion centers, your participation, if you have any
concerns with it.
Mr. Evans. I don't. I think, you know, in Boston, we have a
real active--I think, you know, we are one of the most active.
I think we have about 50 individuals who work in our fusion
center. We have someone assigned here to the District of
Columbia in the National Operations Center. So getting that
real-time information was key.
You know, when Chief Manley was dealing with his incidents,
we were getting real-time information about what was going on.
You know, even recently, you know, some of the intel we have
gotten from that--last week, working with the FBI, we got
information on an individual who might have a storage of guns
in his home who was, you know, unstable.
We talked to his wife who was paranoid. Through that
information sharing we did a search warrant on his home and we
got 5 rifles, 1 shotgun, and 7 high-powered handguns. So that
came about as a result of the sharing in the fusion center. So
we are getting a lot of good information and working across
this country.
When anything happens, we are getting real-time information
on whether it is terrorism, whether it is a person who has, you
know, mental issues. So it is a great source of information for
us.
Mr. Katko. We spend a considerable amount of time trying to
make sure that that is the case, so it is encouraging to hear
that information with the fusion centers. I will ask all three
panel members and then my time will be up.
One of the concerns we have had is when you have new
members from your departments going to the fusion centers or
these task forces, there is often a tremendous lag in the
amount of time when they ultimately get their security
clearances and so they can get exposed to all the information
that is available to the others on the fusion centers and task
forces.
Have any of you experienced any recent problems with delays
in getting the security clearances for your folks that are on
these task forces?
We can start with Mr. Newsham.
Chief Newsham. I think some of the experience that you
described of the significant delays is kind of the old-school
situation that we had, so it does appear to be improving. I
also understand that getting the background checks is a lengthy
process. It has to be very thorough before you are going to
allow anyone to have access to that information.
So, you know, just talking from Major Cities Chiefs'
perspectives and the conversations that I have had with the
other members of Major Cities Chiefs that there certainly has
been an improvement.
Mr. Katko. That is really good to hear.
Commissioner.
Mr. Evans. I agree. I mean, it has gotten better. I can
tell you, you know, I remember applying. They basically ask
you, like, so many--like, everything but your shoe size on
that. I have never gone such a----
Mr. Katko. They are not asking your shoe size? They are
supposed to, I think.
Mr. Evan. No. I know. I know. But, you know, it is a long
process, but, you know, to get the clearance, they have to vet
people well. Unfortunately, it doesn't move as quick as we
would like it, but that is, unfortunately, part of the process.
You know, whether you have foreign ties, foreign
investments, they ask you everything. So they are very thorough
and, unfortunately, you know, sometimes that can be longer than
we want.
Mr. Katko. OK. Well, that is one of the concerns we do have
is that they need to move--once you get on the task force, you
need to--you are not effective. You are not getting any
information.
Mr. Evans. Right.
Mr. Katko. Chief.
Chief Manley. I would concur, and especially what the
commissioner just said. The process itself is a lengthy
process, but I don't believe that local officials are getting
put in a backseat to others. I think that we are getting
processed just as quickly as others. However, the process
itself is rather arduous.
Mr. Katko. OK. Things seem like they are improving. That is
good to hear. Thank you, all, gentlemen, very much for what you
do. I hope and pray every day that law enforcement is safe and
that we don't have any more terrorist concerns in this country.
It is not realistic to think they are not coming, but it is
also realistic to think that we are doing as much as we
possibly can, and that is because of folks like you, so thank
you very much.
Chairman McCaul. Chair recognizes the gentlelady from
Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the Chairman and let me thank
Ms. Watson Coleman for her presence as Vice Chair today, and
let me also acknowledge Mr. Thompson, the Ranking Member, for
this hearing.
Also, I want to acknowledge Chief Manley and Chief Evans
and Chief Newsham for their leadership and service to the
Nation.
I, too, want to, however, mention and give accolades to the
late Barbara Bush. We in Houston are particularly chauvinistic
and enthusiastic about the fact that we had both President H.W.
Bush and his lovely bride as our constituents and as residents
of our great city.
Although the Nation is mourning, we in Houston and we in
Texas are shedding tears for, as a member of that community, I
would always see Barbara Bush with her smiling face, advocating
for things that help people. During Hurricane Harvey, they were
still standing as moral compass for those who are suffering.
I thank them for their efforts together, but I thank her
for setting the tone for what a leading First Lady is and
should be. I give to her family my deepest sympathy.
This is a very important hearing, and I want to start by
indicating that this is somewhat a new phenomenon that we have
to deal with here in the United States. So my questions will be
somewhat poignant, but they will not be personal. The help that
you all can give me and give us as a committee will be, I
think, extremely important.
First, Chief Manley, I do want to acknowledge in this
instance, as I offer sympathy to Chief Evans from Boston, to
all of those who were lost in these terroristic acts, I want to
mention Anthony Stephan House, a fellow Texan, was the first
individual that lost his life. Thirty-nine years old, a father,
a humble man who was doing nothing wrong and opened an unmarked
package, as I understand. Certainly want to give sympathy to
his family.
Then to Draylen Mason, who not only has a connection in
Austin, but has a connection all the way to Houston, Texas,
talented bass player with a bright future. I understand that
those who attended his home-going service were just simply
amazed at the genius of this young man and the service he had
already given in his young 17 years.
Sympathy to his mother, who is healing as well, and his
grandfather, who is a major leader, major clergy, who many of
my pastors in Houston know and are mournful of his loss.
Chief Manley, it is important to note how quickly you
responded to the bombing of the first victim, to let the
community know just what was happening so that they would be on
notice that something had gone awry.
Chief Manley. Thank you, Congresswoman. We held a press
conference on March 2, the day of that first bombing. I was
with members of both the ATF and the FBI. We briefed our
community on what had happened on the fact that it was a
package that had exploded and, again, wanting to make sure that
the community was aware that that is how this murder had taken
place.
So on the day of the incident we did have a conversation
through the media about what had happened. We came back, I
believe it was 3 days later. We gave a press conference that
Monday with an update on the investigation, what we had
conducted to that point.
In that press conference, was an assistant chief who
conducted that one, specifically went over the importance of
suspicious packages and steps that we would want the community
to take if they felt like there was a suspicious package, ways
that they would report that, things to avoid doing, such as
touching or handling.
So that was a conversation that took place the day of as we
talked about how it had happened. But then we followed up the
following--I believe it was Monday with a more detailed press
conference talking about safety around suspicious packages.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you understand the impact in the
African American community as it relates to bombs. The bombings
of the little girls in Birmingham. The atmosphere was a
terrorizing atmosphere. Did you interact with the NAACP?
To Chief Evans, we do not have a Federal crime under
domestic terrorism. What do you think? How effective would that
be? Getting my two questions, how effective would it be to have
a defined crime of domestic terrorism? I know some States have
it. We have a definition, but not a crime.
But I think it is important, in Chief Manley's point, is
that the first two victims were African Americans. It would
lead people who have been subjected to this violence to think
in that manner. Were you sensitive to that, and did you
ultimately recognize that this was a terrorizing effect and
call this terrorism?
Mr. Evans, I will ask you about the domestic terrorism.
Yes, Mr. Manley.
Chief Manley. So I think we addressed it in the media
briefing that we did, realizing on March 12 when the second
bomb went off that this was not, in fact, an isolated incident
as we believed it may have been on that first one on March 2.
We were aware that both victims----
Ms. Jackson Lee. There was no reason at--Mr. Manley was not
a criminal, so you all--you know, that was--I am sorry. His
name is not Manley. Mr. House was not a criminal. You finally
recognized that that it wasn't his fault.
Chief Manley. Yes. This was not of his doing and we
recognized that as we investigated. I think, as with most
homicide investigations, your investigator will start off
looking at the victim because that leads you in the direction
of who may have wanted to do them harm.
So I think that it is a normal step that you take in an
investigation such as this if you don't immediately have
witnesses that can tell you why it happened or who had done it,
you have got to try and piece together the person's life to
understand who would want to do them harm. So I know those
steps were taking place.
Then as far as being sensitive, I think we realized and
spoke about it after March 12 when we had this second victim.
We recognized that both of the bombings at that point had
occurred in East Austin, which is where a majority of our
minority community lives and that both victims were, in fact,
victims of color.
We were speaking about it at that time saying that while we
don't have any specific link to terrorism or to hate, we cannot
rule that out either. So we kept that as a possibility
throughout the entire investigation.
That is still a possibility today as we still have a lot of
evidence to sift through. We just do not have anything at this
point that would lead to that type of a motivation, but that is
still part of the on-going investigation.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Chief Evans, can you discuss the domestic
terrorism dilemma that we have?
Mr. Evans. Well, in our particular--I am sorry. In our
particular case, obviously, you know, we had four individuals
killed----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right.
Mr. Evans [continuing]. So that did go that way. You know,
Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the second, he was charged Federally under
that. You know, now he sits on death row because of that. But,
you know, I think, you know, obviously, any message we can send
to potential terrorists out there, whether it is in a law or
any type of statement, I think, is real important.
But I think right now the Federal Government steps in when
there is an act of terrorism, and honestly I think the laws are
in place to prosecute, at least in our case, in Boston, where
we had four young people killed and the Federal Government
handled that. Ultimately he was given the death penalty.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent to
place into the record a letter dated April 18, asking that we,
in a Classified setting, be able to view the 28-minute video
made by Mark A. Conditt, the so-called Austin bomber.
Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Letter From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee to Chairman McCaul and Ranking
Member Thompson
April 18, 2018.
The Honorable Michael McCaul,
Chair, House Committee on Homeland Security.
The Honorable Bennie Thompson,
Ranking Member, House Committee on Homeland Security.
Dear Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson: I am writing to
request that as Chair and Ranking Member you provide an opportunity for
Members of the Committee to view the 28-minute video made by Mark A.
Conditt so called the ``Austin Bomber.'' According to an Austin
American Statesman Editorial published on Thursday, April 12, 2018, the
video is in the possession oflaw enforcement authorities who
investigated the bombings. I am reiterating my request that you arrange
a briefing for Members of the Committee regarding the recent bombing in
Austin, Texas.
The city of Austin experienced several bomb attacks that spanned
several weeks. These incidents of senseless violence against innocent
people were a mass terror event that paralyzed a city and required
local, state, and federal law enforcement to stop the attacks. We need
to know who taught this bomber and whether the means he used to learn
may portend future threats for unsuspecting communities. One of the
more disturbing aspects of the attacks is the use of a tripwire because
he was a highly skilled bomb maker.
Thank you for your work to secure our nation from terrorist threats
by keeping the Committee Members informed regarding the most critical
security issues facing our nation. I look forward to your positive
reply to this request for a viewing of the video and a briefing by
relevant agencies that were part of the investigation.
Very truly yours,
Sheila Jackson Lee,
Member of Congress.
Austin bombing victim Draylen Mason admitted to prestigious Ohio music
school before his death
By Doug Criss and Keith Allen, CNN.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
(CNN).--Draylen Mason had already played his way into a selective
Texas music school before he was killed by a package bomb left outside
of his Austin home two weeks ago. Now comes the heartbreaking news that
he had also been accepted into another one.
Mason, a talented 17-year-old bass player, was accepted into the
Oberlin Conservatory of Music earlier this month, before he was killed
on March 12.
Michael Manderen, the Ohio school's admissions director, said Mason
was offered one of 130 spots available at the school this fall, out of
a total of 1,500 applicants.
``It is tragic that he could very well have been one of those
select incoming students,'' Manderen says. ``This is so sad, and our
hearts go out to the family and community.''
Mason did not know about his acceptance into the program prior to
his death, but would have received notice of his admission late last
week, Manderen says.
The conservatory has been in communication with Mason's bass
teacher in Austin, Manderen said, and is planning a memorial of some
type for Mason and his family at a later date.
`remarkable talent'
Mason had already been accepted into the selective Butler School of
Music at the University of Texas at Austin, CNN affiliate KXAN
reported.
He was the ``most remarkable talent in a most remarkable youth
orchestra program called Austin Sound Waves,'' said Doug Dempster, dean
of the College of Fine Arts at UT Austin.
The Austin Sound Waves program offers free music instruction to
artistically under-served children.
``At Sound Waves performances one could often see him leaning in to
lead and coach younger and more tentative players,'' Dempster told
KXAN. ``His gentle confidence seemed to come from a conviction that
hard work and talent was going to work for him. It did.''
panic and mayhem
Mason was one of two people killed this month in a wave of package
bombings that terrified Austin.
Anthony Stephan House, a senior project manager at a Texas
limestone supplier, also died in the explosions.
After nearly three weeks of panic and mayhem, police last week
cornered the man they described as the serial bomber--23-year-old Mark
Anthony Conditt. When SWAT officers approached his SUV, Conditt blew
himself up in a ditch outside Austin.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I just want to thank Chief Manley's team
for their great and committed work and hope they understand
that people were terrorized. I do believe there needs to be a
Federal domestic terrorism crime because there seems to be a
distinction in who is terrorizing people and who is not.
I thank Chief Evans and I thank the chief representing the
national chiefs because of the work that you all do, Chief
Newsham, and I look forward to working with you on some of
these issues dealing with gun violence.
I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. Let me just briefly comment. I think we
all agree this was a terrorizing event. As the gentlelady
knows, being on judiciary committee, domestic terrorism is a
legal definition----
Ms. Jackson Lee. But not a----
Chairman McCaul. But not a Federal charge. I think that is
something that I have----
Ms. Jackson Lee. It ought to be----
Chairman McCaul. If I could finish? I have tasked the
Congressional Review Service to study this issue as to whether
that would be a good idea. Also have had discussions with
Federal law enforcement upon that issue as well.
So with that, the Chair now recognizes----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you--Captain Higgins from Louisiana.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chief Manley, Commissioner Evans, Chief Newsham, thank you
for your representation of the thin blue line and your service
to your communities and our Nation.
I have a question that has never really been clarified for
me, Commissioner, regarding the Boston bombings. When the
second Tsarnaev brother was taken into custody, my
understanding is the Obama administration directed your boots
on the ground to not Mirandize that subject. How was that
communicated and by whom? How did it get to the field where the
arrest was made?
Mr. Evans. Well, again, I was out on the street. You know,
we were searching house to house and, you know, I remember my
pager going off. I remember almost everything that day. I
looked at my pager and that came right across my pager.
You know, I have never ever had a circumstance in my career
where it says, ``If you capture this individual, do not
Mirandize him.'' I----
Mr. Higgins. How did you react to that? 'Cause that strikes
me as very odd.
Mr. Evans. Again, you know, I was out in the street.
Obviously, I am sure it came from Washington down to, you know,
the local FBI----
Mr. Higgins. When you say it came from Washington, and I
don't mean to interrupt you, Commissioner----
Mr. Evans. Yes, from----
Mr. Higgins [continuing]. But just to clarify, from DOJ or
who?
Mr. Evans. I would say from the--yes, DOJ. That was sent
down to the local SAC of the FBI, who then broadcasted it to
Commissioner Davis, who then passed it along on the field.
Mr. Higgins. Can you clarify for the committee, what public
safety exception, exactly, was referred to? Was there a
statute--or----
Mr. Evans. Well, I think I think there is always exigency
should the country be at risk of something of this nature, very
much like what we do every day and whether we need
justification to go into someone's house and get a warrant, go
into a supermarket when there is a gun hidden somewhere.
There is always an exception on exigency, and I think this
was a prime example. Our country had to find out if we got this
individual, how many more suspects were out there. So I think
this was an exigency very much like Austin, that if we caught
the individual we have to find out, no matter what, how big
this plot was.
Mr. Higgins. Well, I concur that, that that gentleman
should have been subject to extensive interrogation, but it
always struck me as odd to deny Miranda would perhaps be a
poison pill for the case file as it moved forward. That order
ended up being revoked. How was that revoked? By what means was
it revoked?
Mr. Evans. Well, I think once he was in custody and he was
in the hospital and he was being guarded by the Boston Police
Department and the FBI, that I think his lawyers went to the
Federal judge. I think through that the decision was given from
here on in, he will be Mirandized.
Mr. Higgins. Well, thank you for clarifying that. I am
still not quite clear----
Mr. Evans. Right.
Mr. Higgins [continuing]. On how and why that happened.
Mr. Evans. Again, never seen it in my career.
Mr. Higgins. Neither have I. The Tsarnaevs created these
IDs allegedly from the radicalized Islamic terrorist
publication Inspire. But the level of sophistication of their
weapons was beyond Inspire instructions. Was it ever determined
clearly by what means they came to learn to use remote
detonating capabilities?
Mr. Evans. I don't think it ever was finally determined.
Obviously, we always monitor Inspire. And as their tactics
change, we obviously adjust, whether it is, you know, car bombs
or, you know, different tactics. But to get to your question, I
don't think we ever really realized where they got the
knowledge to build a bomb like that.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you. Gentlemen, I wasn't going to broach
this subject, but since it has been presented to you as a panel
and before this committee, Commissioner, I will begin with you
because you answered the question. What exactly did you mean by
comprehensive universal background checks? How would that
manifest to the citizens that we serve within the parameters of
the Constitution that we represent?
Mr. Evans. Well, again, I always say, with all due respect,
I think, you know, when we have tough gun laws, I think it
makes a difference. I look at certain cities----
Mr. Higgins. I heard that. But I am specifically asking,
and I ask so respectfully, sir, how exactly would so-called
comprehensive universal background checks manifest in the
United States of America----
Mr. Evans. Unfortunately----
Mr. Higgins [continuing]. Within the parameters of our
Constitution?
Mr. Evans. Right. I go to a lot of homicide scenes, and I
see the carnage and I see the young mothers grieving, and I see
so many guns on the street, and sometimes in the hands of
people who have no right to have the guns.
Mr. Higgins. You have made that clear, sir. But I ask
again, perhaps another member of the panel, if the Chairman
will allow, in what way would so-called comprehensive universal
background checks manifest within the parameters of the
Constitution that we serve in these United States of America?
Chief Newsham. Yes, I am not sure that there are any
Constitutional prohibitions against universal background
checks.
Mr. Higgins. How would it manifest, sir? You are talking
about the exchange of firearms. What about inherited firearms?
What about gifted firearms? What about pre-1968, pre-serial
number firearms?
Chief Newsham. Right, and----
Mr. Higgins. How would the exchange of these weapons
involve a so-called comprehensive universal background check?
Chief Newsham. I can say collectively that the Major Cities
Chiefs believes that far too many firearms are getting in the
hands of people who----
Mr. Higgins. This has been stated several times, but my
question has not been answered.
Chief Newsham. But I think your question was answered,
respectfully, sir, that there does not appear to be any
Constitutional prohibitions against universal background checks
that I am aware of.
Mr. Higgins. But how would that--Mr. Chairman, my time has
expired. I would like to submit a question in writing to the
panel members and perhaps receive an answer back in a timely
manner. I yield.
Chairman McCaul. The question in writing will be submitted
to the witnesses.
Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Mrs.
Demings.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Chiefs and
Commissioner, thank you for your service and thank you for the
service of the men and women that you command every day. We are
glad you are here. Let me just say this--and thank you for your
common-sense answers to the question about background checks.
I spent 27 years at the Orlando Police Department. I had
the honor of serving as the chief of police. As we talk about
information sharing, I do remember, coming on in 1984, a time
when we did not have the capability through technology, but
more important than that, we didn't really have the desire much
to communicate with our Federal and State partners.
But we now know 9/11 changed everything. I share your
sentiments in terms of my interaction on the ground with the
men and women of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other
Federal agencies.
When I think about some major incidents and scenes that we
have been involved in, there is no way that we could have
effectively handled those scenes without our Federal partners.
So things have definitely gotten better.
I know we have talked quite a bit about Federal funding.
Coming from Orlando, and certainly you know our history,
Federal funding is real critical to me. I would like for you,
yet again, to, for the record, talk about how important Federal
funding is to your agency dealing--or how important it was in
dealing with the threats that you have already faced and the
potential threats that you and your men and women face every
day.
Chief Manley, we will start with you.
Chief Manley. Thank you, Congresswoman. I don't know that I
can emphasize enough the importance of the Federal dollars to
allow us to do what we do, both in a training and in an
equipment area. You can't have game day be the first time you
are trying to do an operation, you are trying to work with your
partners, both local, State, and Federal. You can't have that
be your first occurrence.
We were fortunate enough to use grant dollars to host an
Urban Shield exercise in Austin years ago that really showed
both the strengths of the system that we had in place, but it
also identified areas where we needed to make improvements.
If we don't have the money available to us to allow us to
conduct those kind of training exercises, then there are
communities across this country that are not as safe as they
should be because they have not yet had to practice for that
worst-day scenario.
I mentioned earlier that we used the UASI dollars that we
received to fund our ARIC, our Austin Regional Intelligence
Center. Without those dollars, I don't know that we would have
been able to put together enough money to put that center
together.
Sitting here today, I know of things, of incidents and
events that were stopped because of the work that we were able
to do with our Federal partners as well as through our
intelligence center, identifying something that was imminent.
So I know my community is safer because of the investment
in Federal dollars. Most of those were coming through the UASI.
We are left now to deal with the grant money that comes through
the State Homeland Security program, which we are grateful to
have, but it has to support a 10-county region, and so we are
just one entity within that.
So that is why I would encourage, to whatever extent
possible, that UASI be full-funded so that partnering and
recognized agencies are able to utilize dollars from that
program to make our communities safer across this country.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you.
Commissioner Evans.
Mr. Evans. I think I spoke to it before, like the chief,
about the whole idea of being able to fund UASI. You know, our
fusion center, you know, we have been able to hire people to
work it through the Federal funds, so obviously to do an Urban
Shield.
I think that, like I said before, was so instrumental in
how we responded to the Boston Marathon bombing. We continually
train on it. We continually, every marathon, use funds from the
Federal Government to do these tabletop exercises.
We are able to also train high-level leadership down in
Monterey through the Post-Naval Graduate School, which is a
great program. I went through it. I know Superintendent Lydon
went through it. There are so many good things. There is the
equipment we get that our budget sometimes will not support.
So whether it is technology, whether it is regular
equipment, whether it is training, whether--you know, I can't
speak enough for it. It troubles me that we are thinking of
cutting back on this because I think part of our success is
always about being preemptive, not reactive. That is what
Homeland Security does. It gives us the tools to prevent
tragedies before they happen.
Mrs. Demings. Chief Newsham.
Chief Newsham. Yes, ma'am. I don't know if you remember,
but I think we met at the candlelight vigil last year.
Mrs. Demings. We did.
Chief Newsham. I want to say that I want to thank you for
coming. That is an event we hold every year in the district
during Police Week to recognize men and women who have lost
their lives in law enforcement, and we appreciate your support
on that.
With regards to the Homeland Security money, it is really
important in that it can level the playing field for major
cities. There are cities that are in varying degrees of
economic strength. To the extent that major cities can tap into
that money, it really levels the playing field.
You know, when you are making very difficult budget
decisions as a leader in a police agency, that is one of the
ones that stays as a priority, but you also have local crime
fighting that is pretty close with the priority. So to the
extent that that money is available, it is critical for us so
we can receive the training that the equipment that we need to
make our cities across the country safer.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. Thank the gentlelady. In our
reauthorization bill, we nearly doubled the President's
request. I also want to thank the gentlelady for her amendment
on the active-shooter grant program of $39 million to include
former UASI cities such as Austin, Texas, and Orlando.
I look forward to working with you and my police chief. I
know that DHS is now reviewing its risk assessment to determine
the current UASI cities. So anyway, thanks for bringing up the
question.
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Sheriff
Rutherford.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A lot has been
discussed here today about UASI and collection of intelligence
and data that is out in the field. I think when you look at
cases like Lee Malvo and John Muhammad, clearly, there were
opportunities missed around the country because of information
that was in databases that really wasn't being shared or
analyzed.
So UASI was, I think, very important, that funding and
being able to bring agencies together. But I would also point
out, and I know, Commissioner, you and the chief are, in fact,
from LInX regions, Law Enforcement Information Exchange.
NCIS, the Naval Criminal Intelligence Service, when they
partnered with Northrop Grumman, they come into these regions
and build these information sharing systems, was a tremendous
benefit all across the country. There are now 14 of them and
that is how most fusion centers are actually being fed the data
that they are analyzing.
So my point is this. I would like to ask for the
International Association of Chiefs of Police and others to
assist. I just spoke with appropriations to put the LInX
program, the funding within NCIS, into the appropriations
budget as a line item so that we can continue the good work
that is being done there in bringing this data together.
But not only bringing the data together, because part of
what we also need is the analytics. You reveal--look, like I
have told folks, the problem in law enforcement, Mr. Chairman,
is not that we don't have the data. The problem is we have so
much data. The trick is how do you use these analytical tools
to dip into that huge stream of data then get out just what you
need.
So what I am curious about is if you would support that
kind of funding stream, also, from NCIS to continue the LInX
programs.
Anyone.
Mr. Evans. Absolutely. I mean, it is such a tool for us on
this, and, you know, obviously we have analysts, a lot of them
right out of college who are pretty sharp kids. The ability to
keep them and the ability to hire more, obviously, is always a
challenge for us.
But, you know, I am 100 percent behind. I mean, it is clear
we don't have enough analysts to get through all the data, but
clearly it helps us tremendously.
Chief Manley. I would agree with the Commissioner. I
believe the worst position we can put ourselves in is having
the information, but not having done something with it because
then we have not----
Mr. Rutherford. Right.
Chief Manley. Kept our community safe. I think we all
recognize the challenges and the shortcomings we have, and
often it is resource-based. You said it best. We have the
information. We have a lot of information and we have a lot of
talented individuals in police departments across this country
that are skilled analysts, whether they are coming from private
sector or coming from the military.
But we will never have enough analysts because the work
that they do allows us to put the officers where they need to
be so they will have the greatest impact. It allows us to
identify not only what is happening in our communities, but
also in the realm of predictive policing.
Where I think policing is going, the investments in those
programs are imperative. So if there are more dollars that
could be moved into that area, it would be very appropriate.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you.
Chief Newsham. Yes. The only thing I would add, too, is,
you know, the conversation that you just had with us is similar
to the conversation that has been going on at Major Cities
Chiefs about the volume of data and then the need not to miss
something. That requires folks who have the expertise and
analytics to be able to draw from that data to come up with,
you know, useable information for law enforcement executives.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you. I would say, Mr. Chairman, that
the capability of dealing with that mega data is certainly
something that UASI could really help with.
I know whether you are a Tier 1 city or a Tier 2 city in
UASI, you know, I think some of the challenges that we had with
UASI in the first rollout--you know, everybody thought they
needed a Tier 1 bomb team. Everybody thought they needed a Tier
1 SWAT team, when we don't.
What we really should have done, I think, from the Federal
standpoint, was forced a regional approach. So I look forward
to going back around on that and maybe rolling UASI back out
with a regional approach that makes a lot of sense and gets us
the best bang for our buck.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. I thank the gentleman for his experience
that you bring to the committee.
I also want to recognize my Tomball Fire Chief Randy Parr,
who is here with us today. Randy, thanks so much for being
here.
Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms.
Barragan.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for your
testimony here today. I just want to reiterate how important I
think the homeland grant funding is. We heard your testimony
today, just to reiterate how important it is for you to prepare
in the event there is an incident so that you can properly
respond.
So I think it is great to have you come in and testify
about that today so the Congress can continue to not just fully
fund it, but to look for opportunities to increase as opposed
to reduce those grant opportunities so that we can continue the
interoperable emergency communications. I won't even ask what
cut will do because I think you have kind-of testified to that.
I also want to thank you for your response on the universal
background check. You know, the reality is that gun violence in
America, as you mentioned, is on-going. It is a problem that we
have to address.
To see a panel unanimously talk about the need for
universal background checks, it is refreshing because this is a
topic that, even in Congress, we just can't get a floor debate
on these things. So it is very frustrating sometimes,
especially as a new freshman Member who comes here and wants to
have a debate on these issues.
With that said, you are tasked with protecting and serving
our community and know in recent years, also, there have been a
lot of more high-profile mass shootings across the country, and
they have been involving these assault-style weapons.
My question for you is, how does these availability of
these weapons make your job to protect and serve your
communities more difficult, and what would be your suggestions
to keep these types of weapons out of the hands of those who
shouldn't have them?
Chief Newsham. You know, I have said this several times
before that assault weapons were designed specifically for
killing human beings in a warfare situation and there is no
need to have assault weapons in our communities at all.
The ability to, you know, destroy human life on a large
scale with these weapons is unbelievable. You know, we have to
train with these weapons because there is the real possibility
that there could be an offender that has one of these weapons
that comes in to do harm.
So we have a pretty good understanding of the capacity of
these weapons to inflict harm on large numbers of people in a
very quick amount of time. I don't see any reason to have them
in our community in any way, shape, or form. I don't see any
good reason to have these weapons in our community.
Ms. Barragan. OK, thank you.
Mr. Evans.
Mr. Evans. I agree 100 percent. I think I spoke before
about how many young kids are killed in our cities, not only in
Boston, but across the country. Whether it is AR-15s or these
semi-automatic handguns, there is no place for those in a city,
really, and especially in the hands of young kids who don't
know the danger that they cause.
In Massachusetts, we are fortunate. Again, we have an
assault rifle, you know, ban on having those. Also, we just
banned bump stocks. So we are very good about, you know,
getting tough on these. I reckon back to the whole idea that we
are the safest State in the country because we are so tight on
the guns.
You know, there is one thing that keeps me awake at night
and it is getting the call of young child or a young adult
being killed by violence on our streets. Sometimes, whether it
is Parkland or it is these big shootings, but every day in our
cities across America we have young African Americans, young
kids getting killed, and it is almost like we accept it. We
shouldn't.
I think it is all because we have so many guns in this
country. So I am a big advocate of way too many guns, not too
many laws, and I think Massachusetts leads the charge.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you.
Mr. Manley.
Chief Manley. The prevalence of weapons I will agree is
problematic across the country. Assault weapons like this are
problematic because of the high capacity and the ability to
inflict harm on much larger groups. You don't need an assault
weapon for home protection. There are other ways that you can
keep your home safe, your community safe, yourself safe. So I
don't see the need.
Then especially when they are so easily modified to be
fully automatic and make them that much more deadly or, with
what we saw in Las Vegas, the ability to use bump stock
technology, again, making them capable of firing at just an
incredible rate and taking a large loss of life.
Ms. Barragan. Well, thank you. I am going to just quickly
here--you made a comment, I believe it was Mr. Manley, that
there was no link in the Austin bombings to terrorism or hate
and, you know, the victims were people of color. How is that
not a link at all?
Chief Manley. So the first three involved victims of color,
the first two being African American, one was a Hispanic
female. The fourth bomb was placed in a residential
neighborhood of Austin where two Anglo males were actually the
victims of that bomb.
Then the fifth and sixth bombs were bombs that were mailed
and they were not mailed to members of the minority community
as well. So what we really have right now, barring something
that comes out of the additional analysis that is still going
on, is we have victims that were selected at random.
We cannot link the bomber to the addresses where the first
three packages were left. So whether we will at some point
through analysis or not, I don't know.
So initially, after the first three, we were recognizing
publicly that although we had no reason or information or
evidence to show that it was, we could not rule that out yet.
To this point, I will tell you we still can't 'cause we are
still conducting the investigation.
Ms. Barragan. Well, thank you for clarifying that 'cause
what what appears to be is that when there are violent acts by
people of color it is treated as terrorism; while it is being
perpetrated by a non-person of color it is not. So thank you
for clarifying that.
I think this is a much larger conversation I hope we can
have one day. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields.
I want to thank the witnesses for your valuable testimony.
I want to close with, you know, a personal story. You know, and
I have often said it is time now to heal for the Austin
community and for the victims.
I spoke with one of the victim's families. She told me a
moving story of healing from Esperanza Herrera, or Hope as they
call her. The third Austin bomb in the series of attacks
injured Hope when she picked up a package outside of her 95-
year-old mother's house.
Two weeks later, Hope had forgiven the bomber, which is
incredible, and believes that God's hand was involved with her
survival. Hope recalls that the last name of the ATF Victim
Services official who came to her house, her last name was
Faith.
The homicide criminal investigator, his officer, as you
know, Chief Manley, his name was Officer Love. She took that as
a sign to help her heal: Faith, Hope and Love.
As we all heal and the successful investigation winds down,
I think we must remember the tremendous job that the Federal,
State, and local law enforcement level, and you, sir, Police
Chief Manley, as our fearless leader with the entire Nation
watching.
With that, we are going to take a quick break and bring
back the second panel.
[Recess.]
Chairman McCaul. We are pleased to welcome our second panel
of witnesses. Our second panel includes Mr. Kerry Sleeper, the
assistant director for partnership and engagement at the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Mr. James McDermond, the
assistant director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives.
We thank both of you for being here today. Your full
statements will appear in the record.
The Chair now recognizes Assistant Director Sleeper for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF KERRY L. SLEEPER, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, PARTNERSHIP
AND ENGAGEMENT, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Sleeper. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Watson
Coleman, other Members of the committee, it is my privilege to
appear before you today as the assistant director of the FBI
for the Office of Partner Engagement. We welcome this
opportunity to meet regarding the status of the FBI's
information-sharing initiatives within the FBI and with our law
enforcement partners.
The Office of Partner Engagement implements initiatives and
strategies which support engagement, communication,
coordination, and cooperation efforts with law enforcement,
intelligence, public and private agencies and partners in a
continuous effort to enhance the FBI's capabilities in the
domestic information-sharing architecture.
I would like to begin my prepared remarks by affirming the
FBI's continued commitment to ensuring threat information is
shared accurately and timely among our valued Federal, State,
local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement partners. As we
are all aware, the devastating attacks at the 2013 Boston
Marathon highlighted challenges and deficiencies in information
sharing.
In response, the FBI working with this and several of our
oversight committees, as well as National-level law enforcement
associations, such as the Major Cities Chiefs who were in here
just moments ago, took several steps to enhance information
sharing with our State and local partners, to include regular
FBI executive meetings with key partners, improvements to JTTF
processes and procedures for sharing information, and
enhancements to the eGuardian program, which today facilitates
the reporting and sharing of terrorism, criminal, cyber events,
and suspicious activities by our law enforcement partners.
Shortly after the attacks in Boston, the FBI witnessed a
significant increase in the threat from ISIS and its
affiliates, al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. The
threat from international terrorism became more diversified and
individualized as lone actors self-radicalize in the homeland.
This shift required the FBI to evaluate more closely the
effectiveness of terrorism information sharing with our local
law enforcement partners. In doing this, the FBI undertook
several initiatives to improve engagement and collaboration.
In coordination with the National Fusion Center Association
and other Federal partners, the FBI developed the Enhanced
Engagement Initiative, or EEI. The EEI is a resource designed
to provide FBI field offices and fusion centers with a common
set of recommendations to ensure greater continuity and
standardization of terrorism information-sharing efforts.
By focusing on key areas of engagement, such as JTTF
participation and coordination, suspicious activity reporting
and intelligence analysis, production, and dissemination, the
EEI supports the FBI in its efforts to ensure the fusion
centers have a complete understanding of the terrorism threat
and are appropriately leveraged with other field-based
information-sharing partners to address the ever-changing
threat landscape.
In support of the EEI, the FBI has developed and delivers a
2-week Analytic Writing for Fusion Center Analysts course,
which provides training on the intelligence process and writing
to intelligence community standards.
At the request of the NFCA, the FBI has also provided
greater guidance to its fusion center partners on the FBI's
most commonly shared products and how they should be further
disseminated, as well as joint guidance to State and local
partners regarding actions they may expect from the FBI and DHS
in response to specific and credible threats or incidents.
In coordination with the Major Cities Chiefs Association,
the FBI is developing a process to aid police departments in
identifying and prioritizing threats within their areas of
responsibility, with the ability to then compare their findings
with departments across other jurisdictions.
From the above, it is clear that the FBI is more integrated
with its law enforcement partners than ever before on the
terrorism threat. Moreover, coordination with our Federal
partners is much stronger and more collaborative. The FBI and
DHS regularly hold joint conference calls with our law
enforcement partners as terrorism and other critical incidents
unfold.
These calls are generally at the un-Classified level, but
may be Classified depending on the nature of the event. These
calls enable the FBI and DHS to provide timely but, more
importantly, accurate information to our partners, who seek a
consistent message from their Federal partners.
For example, following the recent attacks in Austin, Texas,
the Austin chief of police, with support from special agents in
charge of the FBI and ATF offices, hosted a conference call to
provide in-depth details regarding the investigation and on-
going efforts. Several thousand law enforcement personnel,
utilizing over 300 phone lines, participated in the call to
gain insight into the attacker's methods and tactics and to
discuss how resources can be deployed in support of these
events.
Five years after the tragic attacks in Boston, we are
witnessing a shift in the threat landscape. While we remain
intently focused on counterterrorism efforts, law enforcement
departments and agencies across the country are facing an
unprecedented increase in a multitude of threats.
Violent crime, mass casualties, and school violence are
prevalent, while nation-state adversaries are becoming bolder
in their efforts to sow discord within our communities. The
volume and variety of these threats require that State, local,
and Federal law enforcement and Homeland Security personnel
understand the threats, openly discuss and share information on
the threats and identify means to collectively mitigate the
threats.
In conclusion, the FBI today is sharing more information
with its law enforcement partners than ever before. Our
partnerships are strong and must continue to grow. This occurs
through daily interactions and direct support to interagency
initiatives, such as the FBI hosting the upcoming 2018
Intelligence Summit, which is intended to further improve
information-sharing practices with our law enforcement
partners.
We are assessing where the FBI can do better and we are
making changes. One significant example is the on-going
Guardian expansion project, which will enable the FBI to manage
tips and complaints across all program areas with a single
intake system for suspicious activity reporting, tips, leads,
and other information received by the FBI, to include
information received through the FBI's public access line.
Despite this, the FBI and its law enforcement partners
still face challenges that are difficult to overcome and
therefore limit our ability to fully identify, collect, and
share information. The ``Going Dark'' problem is preventing
enforcement, who have a legal authority, from obtaining
critical evidence in support of criminal and National security
investigations.
The Dark Web is enabling illicit and criminal activities
that are far more difficult to dismantle. The FBI is providing
Dark Web familiarization training to local law enforcement
partners to provide familiarity on the methods and tools used
to conduct these investigations against actors utilizing Dark
Web, but more is needed.
This concludes my remarks, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy
to respond to any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sleeper follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kerry L. Sleeper
April 18, 2018
It is my privilege to appear before you today as the assistant
director of the FBI for the Office of Partner Engagement. We welcome
this opportunity to meet regarding the status of the FBI's information-
sharing initiatives within the FBI and with our law enforcement
partners.
The OPE implements initiatives and strategies which support
engagement, communication, coordination, and cooperation efforts with
law enforcement, intelligence, public and private agencies and partners
in a continuous effort to enhance the FBI's capabilities in the
Domestic Information-Sharing Architecture. The OPE accomplishes this
mission by establishing and maintaining methods and practices to
enhance engagement, coordination, and information sharing with the U.S.
intelligence community; intelligence commander groups; Federal, State,
local, and Tribal law enforcement; and public and private organizations
and working groups.
boston and post-boston
I would like to begin my prepared remarks by affirming the FBI's
continued commitment to ensuring threat information is shared
accurately and timely among our valued Federal, State, local, Tribal,
and territorial law enforcement partners. As we are all aware, the
devastating attacks at the 2013 Boston Marathon highlighted challenges
and deficiencies in information sharing. In response, the FBI--working
with this and several of our oversight committees as well as National-
level law enforcement associations--took several steps to enhance
information sharing with our State and local partners, to include
regular FBI executive meetings with key partners; improvements to Joint
Terrorism Task Forces (``JTTF'') processes and procedures for sharing
information; and enhancements to the eGuardian program, which today
facilitates the reporting and sharing of terrorism, criminal, and cyber
events and suspicious activities by our law enforcement partners.
Additionally, the FBI continues to strengthen its partnership with the
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (``OCDETF'') in order to
identify and link counterterrorism investigations through law
enforcement investigation records that reside at the Department of
Justice's multi-agency OCDETF Fusion Center, which regularly supports
several investigations, including the Boston Bombing investigation.
Shortly after the attacks in Boston, the FBI witnessed a
significant increase in the threat from ISIS and its affiliates, from
al-Qaeda, and from other terrorist organizations. The threat from
international terrorism has become more diversified and individualized,
as lone actors continue to self-radicalize in the homeland. This shift
requires the FBI to evaluate more closely the effectiveness of
terrorism information sharing with our law enforcement partners. In
doing this, the FBI has undertaken several initiatives to improve
engagement and collaboration.
In coordination with the National Fusion Center Association
(``NFCA'') and other Federal partners, the FBI developed the Enhanced
Engagement Initiative, or ``EEI.'' The EEI is a resource designed to
provide FBI field offices and fusion centers with a common set of
recommendations to ensure greater continuity and standardization of
terrorism information-sharing efforts. By focusing on key areas of
engagement (such as JTTF participation and coordination, suspicious
activity reporting, and intelligence analysis, production, and
dissemination), the EEI supports the FBI and its efforts to ensure that
State and local fusion centers have a complete understanding of the
terrorism threat and are appropriately leveraged with other field-based
information-sharing partners to address the ever-changing threat
landscape.
In support of the EEI, the FBI has developed and delivers a 2-week
Analytic Writing for Fusion Center Analysts course, which provides
training on the intelligence process and writing to intelligence
community standards. This course has enabled fusion centers to identify
greater opportunities to write intelligence products that benefit both
their local area of responsibility and the Federal Government. It is
anticipated that more than 130 fusion center analysts will successfully
complete this training by the end of the fiscal year. At the request of
the NFCA, the FBI also has provided greater guidance to its fusion
center partners, using additional resources. We recently developed and
disseminated a document entitled, ``Dissemination of FBI Threat
Information to State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers,'' which
provides a list of the FBI's most commonly shared products and guidance
on how they should be further disseminated. Last year, in coordination
with the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI developed and broadly
disseminated the ``Emerging Threat and Incident Notifications''
document to provide State and local partners with an overview of
actions they may expect from the FBI and DHS in response to specific
and credible threats or incidents.
From the above, it is clear that the FBI is more integrated with
its law enforcement partners than ever before on the terrorism threat.
Nearly 90 FBI personnel are assigned to 64 of the 79 fusion centers,
and the FBI's Classified network, FBINET, is installed in 58 centers.
Ten fusion centers are co-located with the FBI, and we continue to
process security clearances for fusion center personnel, while engaging
in joint initiatives that are yielding positive results. In addition,
we have witnessed growth within our JTTFs, with a total of 184 JTTFs
and over 4,300 JTTF members across the country. Simply stated, FBI JTTF
investigations, disruptions, arrests, and convictions cannot occur
without the tremendous support and dedication of our law enforcement
partners in the field.
Moreover, coordination with our Federal partners is much stronger
and more collaborative. The FBI and DHS regularly hold joint conference
calls with our law enforcement partners as terrorism and other critical
incidents unfold. These calls generally are at the un-Classified level,
but may be Classified depending on the nature of the event. The calls
enable the FBI and DHS to provide timely but, more importantly,
accurate information to our partners, who seek a consistent message
from the Federal Government. For example, following the recent bomb
attacks in Austin, Texas, the Austin Chief of Police, with support from
the Special Agents in Charge of the local FBI and ATF offices, hosted a
conference call to provide in-depth details regarding the investigation
and on-going efforts. Thousands of law enforcement personnel on over
300 lines participated in the call to gain insight into the attacker's
methods and tactics, and to discuss how resources can be deployed in
support of these types of events.
Five years after the tragic attacks in Boston, we are witnessing a
shift in the threat landscape. While we all remain intently focused on
counterterrorism efforts, law enforcement departments and agencies
across the country are facing an unprecedented increase in a multitude
of threats. Violent crime, mass casualties, and school violence remain
formidable threats, while nation-state adversaries are becoming bolder
in their efforts to sow discord within our communities. The volume and
variety of these threats require that State, local, and Federal law
enforcement and homeland security personnel understand the threats,
openly discuss and share information on the threats, and identify means
to collectively mitigate the threats.
violent crime trends
To better understand violent crime trends, the FBI is working
closely with several National-level law enforcement associations on
programs and initiatives aimed at providing greater awareness and
collaboration on priority threats. The FBI is collecting homicide and
shooting data for inclusion in monthly and annual reports that are
disseminated to participating departments and agencies. These reports
provide real-time awareness of relevant data, which inform FBI and
National-level strategies to combat violent crime. We also have created
the Law Enforcement Watch, which is an FBI product that captures
relevant news articles pertaining to executive-level law enforcement
issues, school violence, police killed or injured in action, and use of
force. This product is produced daily and is distributed broadly to our
law enforcement partners for their situational awareness.
In coordination with the Major Cities Chiefs Association
(``MCCA''), the FBI is developing a process to aid police departments
in identifying and prioritizing criminal threats within their areas of
responsibility, with the ability to then compare their findings with
those of departments across other jurisdictions. In response to a
request from the MCCA, the FBI developed and delivers the Introduction
to Intelligence Theory & Application for Law Enforcement Supervisors
course, which is designed to assist law enforcement supervisors who
oversee intelligence units to implement and manage intelligence-led
policing. The FBI and Major Cities Chiefs also have engaged in an in-
depth study to identify National-level best practices to reduce the
rise in violent crime across some of America's most violent cities.
Additionally, the FBI is in its second consecutive year of conducting
studies identifying commonalities among assailants who killed or
attacked law enforcement officers. We believe that this research will
provide law enforcement partners with information on assailants'
mindset, which may help in identifying additional officer-safety
measures.
mass casualty events
Perhaps one of the most troubling threats currently facing law
enforcement is mass casualty events, including attacks within and
violent threats against our schools. The FBI is leading several
initiatives aimed at providing awareness and education to better equip
our law enforcement partners to respond to on-going threats, but more
importantly, to identify and mitigate threats before they occur.
The FBI continues to provide basic active-shooter response
training, known as ALERRT, to sworn law enforcement officers within the
United States and to foreign partners abroad. This 16-hour course
provides law enforcement officers with standard tactical training on
how best to isolate, distract, and neutralize an active shooter. In
response to threats against schools, the FBI is prioritizing ALERRT
training for School Resource Officers. The FBI also continues to
collect active-shooter data, and will soon publish a biennial report of
active-shooter incidents that will cover the 2016-2017 time frame.
In response to tragic events like the October 2017 mass shooting in
Las Vegas, the FBI is developing the Escape Public Awareness Campaign,
which will focus on public awareness messages emphasizing the
importance of quick action to escape the scene of an active, violent
attack. It is the FBI's hope that these messages will inspire quick
action by potential victims that will reduce casualties.
In the wake of the February 14 school shooting in Parkland,
Florida, the FBI is engaging more proactively with its law enforcement
partners on school threats. We are compiling and sharing data related
to threats of violent attacks against schools, while discussing how
best to accurately collect this data in a standard way across the
country. Our Behavioral Analysis specialists at Headquarters and in
each field office are actively engaged with field office personnel and
local law enforcement who are working school threats, as well as with
community members who require greater education on the threat.
Recently, our Behavioral Threat Assessment Center (``BTAC'') provided
FBI field coordinators with numerous resources to utilize in outreach
efforts, including ``The School Shooter--A Quick Reference Guide.'' In
addition to providing key questions and descriptive statistics and
motives, this 1-page guide along with a corresponding training
presentation for use in outreach efforts, identifies concerning
behaviors and potential warning signs of a shooter that should prompt
further inquiry by appropriate community members or law enforcement.
Furthermore, the FBI's BTAC has embarked on an aggressive field-wide
threat assessment enhancement effort that will include the provision of
advanced training for field office personnel on threat assessment and
threat management.
The FBI also intends to address school shootings through the
development of a documentary video that explores the details of past
shooting events. This video will examine factors that led to the
perpetrator's attack, behaviors, and indicators of a potential shooter,
and preventive measures that should be considered by schools and law
enforcement. This video will be the third in a series created by the
FBI to build community awareness of the pathways to violent behavior.
In addition, in the coming months, the FBI intends to host a school
violence seminar with key law enforcement partners to discuss several
aspects of this increasing threat (including what we have learned from
Parkland), crisis intervention and response plans, and information
sharing.
counterintelligence threat
I would now like to shift my comments to the counterintelligence
threat, which typically has not been a topic of information sharing
with our law enforcement partners, but must be central to discussions
moving forward. The FBI conducts targeted outreach within the
intelligence community and with entities possessing information and
assets sought by our enemies. However, the tactics of our adversaries
have broadened beyond more traditional methods, requiring greater
awareness and engagement with our local law enforcement partners. In
response, the FBI is developing a Counterintelligence Awareness and
Information Sharing program designed to increase awareness, information
sharing, and reporting on counterintelligence matters that could affect
our law enforcement partners. The FBI currently is providing
counterintelligence threat briefings at National-level law enforcement
meetings and other appropriate venues, and is disseminating a monthly
Counterintelligence Bulletin that contains an overview of relevant
hearings, press releases, and reporting on counterintelligence matters.
Moving forward, the FBI would like to work more closely with its law
enforcement partners to identify incidents of state-sponsored influence
campaigns intended to fuel discord within local communities.
conclusion and challenges
The FBI today is sharing more information with its law enforcement
partners than ever before. Our partnerships are strong, and will
continue to grow. This occurs through daily interactions and direct
support to interagency initiatives, such as the FBI hosting the
upcoming 2018 Intelligence Summit, which is intended to further improve
information-sharing practices with our law enforcement partners.
We are assessing where the FBI can do better and we are making
changes. One significant example is the on-going Guardian Expansion
Project, which will enable the FBI to manage tips and complaints across
all program areas, with a single intake system for suspicious activity
reporting, tips, leads, and other information received by the FBI,
including information received through the FBI's Public Access Line.
Despite this, the FBI and its law enforcement partners still face
challenges that are difficult to overcome and therefore limit our
ability to fully identify, collect, and share information. The ``Going
Dark'' problem is inhibiting law enforcement's ability, even with legal
authority, from obtaining critical evidence in support of criminal and
National security investigations. The Dark Web is enabling illicit and
criminal activities that are more difficult to dismantle. The FBI is
providing Dark Web Familiarization training to law enforcement partners
to provide familiarity on the methods and tools used to conduct
investigations and to assist Federal agencies investigating actors who
use the Dark Web, but more is needed. Finally, appropriately addressing
potentially violent persons who also have underlying mental disorders
or mental illness remains a concern for public safety. The FBI
currently is developing training for FBI Investigative personnel to
recognize the signs of mental illness, and to identify techniques and
resources available to all law enforcement when interacting with
persons exhibiting signs of a potential mental disorder or illness.
More resources and commitments are also required at the Federal, State,
local, and community level to effectively understand and address this
issue.
This concludes my prepared remarks, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy
to respond to any questions.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Director Sleeper. Let me just
comment on the Going Dark issue. This committee issued a report
on that----
Mr. Sleeper. Yes, sir.
Chairman McCaul [continuing]. Problem, and I would
recognize it from a law enforcement standpoint. I stand
committed to working with you to resolve it.
The Chair now recognizes Assistant Director McDermond.
STATEMENT OF JAMES E. MC DERMOND, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION BUREAU, BUREAU OF
ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, AND EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE
Mr. McDermond. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Watson
Coleman, and Members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the ways the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives shares
threat information and intelligence with its Federal, State,
and local law enforcement partners.
I am honored to be here today with FBI Assistant Director
Kerry Sleeper, a leader in promoting information sharing and
coordination among law enforcement.
Before discussing the important subject of information
sharing, on behalf of Deputy Director Brandon and all of the
men and women of ATF, I extend deeply-felt condolences to the
families, friends, and loved ones of those who were killed or
injured during the recent bombings in Austin, Texas.
The senseless Austin bombings are another terrible and
compelling reminder of the need for ATF to maintain unrelenting
vigilance in our mission to identify and combat criminals who
use firearms, explosives, and fire to commit violent crimes.
ATF's core mission includes preventing the criminal
diversion and misuse of explosives and the investigation of
arson and criminal bombing incidents.
A central aspect of this mission is providing support to
our law enforcement and public safety partners who also respond
to and investigate bombing and arson incidents. We do this
through training, research and development, and leveraging
expertise and technology, and importantly, providing access to
timely, accurate information.
In 2004, then-Attorney General Ashcroft directed the
consolidation of all Department of Justice arson and explosive
incident databases into a single system, known today as ATF's
Bomb Arson Tracking System, and that it be administered by the
United States Bomb Data Center.
BATS is a web-based case management system which provides
Federal, State, and local arson and explosive investigators
access to up-to-date arson and explosive investigative data
from across the Nation.
While I have focused much of my written statement for the
record to the committee on ATF's capacity to share information
and support investigations involving arson and explosives, I
would also like to describe briefly ATF's broader commitment to
the development and sharing of intelligence and information,
particularly with respect to violent criminals and criminal
organizations, such as gangs.
Throughout our existence, ATF has pioneered ways of
providing law enforcement community with timely access to
intelligence about violent criminals. For example, in 1994, ATF
established the Violent Gangs and Terrorist Organization File,
known as VGTOF, within the National Crime Information Center
system, known as NCIC. The VGTOF file provides secure access to
NCIC users to intelligence information about violent gangs and
their membership.
To enhance ready access to ATF's information and
intelligence data, in 2006, we established and continue to
maintain an information portal on the Regional Information
Sharing System known as RISSNET, a Congressionally-funded
program consisting of over 9,000 law enforcement member
agencies with 130,000 authorized users; seamless, secure access
to our BATS database; eTrace firearms tracking system; and our
GangNet intelligence database.
In addition, ATF provides open and closed investigative
case data from our case management system to the FBI's National
Data Exchange known as N-DEx. N-DEx is a National information-
sharing system that enables criminal justice agencies to share,
link, analyze and share local, State, Tribal, and Federal
records.
Last, ATF posts intelligence products in the form of
bulletins, alerts, advisories, and general intelligence
information on the Homeland Security Information Network known
as HSIN.
The ultimate successes in Boston and Austin bombing
investigations reinforced a principle ATF has long recognized:
Building and maintaining established partnerships based on
trust and mutual respect is essential to effective information
sharing in both daily routine interactions and when critical
incidents occur.
As a result of our deep-rooted daily working relationships
with Federal, State, and local law enforcement organizations,
formal and informal information sharing is a daily occurrence
for ATF. We continue to focus on strengthening those
relationships to enhance further communication of the critical
information needed to keep our community safe.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, thank you again
for this opportunity to discuss with you the importance of law
enforcement information sharing. We look forward to working
with this committee and Members of Congress to better serve and
protect our Nation. I am happy to answer any questions that the
committee may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McDermond follows:]
Prepared Statement of James E. McDermond
April 18, 2018
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the ways in which the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (ATF) shares threat information and intelligence with its
Federal, State, and local law enforcement partners.
Before discussing the important subject of data sharing, on behalf
of Deputy Director Brandon and all of the men and women of ATF, I
extend deeply felt condolences to the families, friends, and loved ones
of those who were killed or injured during the recent bombings in
Austin, Texas. The senseless Austin bombings are another terrible and
compelling reminder of the need for ATF to maintain unrelenting
vigilance in our mission to identify and combat criminals who use
firearms, explosives, and fire to commit violent crimes.
ATF is committed to protecting our communities from violent
criminals, criminal organizations, the illegal use and trafficking of
firearms, the illegal use and storage of explosives, bombings, acts of
arson, and acts of terrorism, and we have long recognized the critical
role that information and intelligence sharing serves in keeping our
communities safe. To ensure we receive and share information that is
crucial to public safety, ATF vigorously cultivates deep and enduring
relationships with communities, industries we regulate, law enforcement
partners, and public safety agencies. We work very closely with State
and local law enforcement to reduce and prevent the firearm violence
that plagues too many of our communities, and to share our expertise
and unique resources in the investigation and prevention of arson and
the criminal use of explosives. When ATF obtains information through
its investigations--or by any other sources--relating to terrorism, we
immediately provide that information to our partners at the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Our role in combatting terrorism is to
be the best possible partner to the FBI, and I am honored to be here
today with FBI Assistant Director Kerry Sleeper, a leader in
consistently promoting information sharing and coordination among law
enforcement.
I would like to highlight for you some of the programs through
which ATF shares information and provides training, resources, and
expertise to our law enforcement partners, and discuss with the
committee the role ATF has played in critical incident investigations
such as the Boston Marathon bombing and the recent serial bombing in
Austin, Texas.
ATF's core mission includes preventing the criminal diversion and
misuse of explosives and the investigation of arson and criminal
bombing incidents. A central aspect of this mission is providing
support to our law enforcement and public safety partners who also
respond to and investigate bombing and arson events. We do this through
training and research, development and leveraging expertise and
technology, and, importantly, providing access to timely, accurate
information. ATF provides these services through several unique
programs that are coordinated through ATF's National Center for
Explosives Training and Research (NCETR). The main NCETR campus is
located in Huntsville, Alabama, on the Army's Redstone Arsenal; this
facility houses ATF's Explosives Enforcement and Training Division,
Explosives Research and Development Division, Fire Investigation and
Arson Enforcement Division, and the United States Bomb Data Center
(USBDC).
The USBDC is now the sole National repository for explosives and
arson-related incident data. ATF has operated the USBDC since Congress
directed its establishment in the Federal explosives laws. The USBDC's
mission is to increase regional and National situational awareness by
collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information and intelligence
products to assist Federal agents; investigators from State, local,
Tribal, and military departments; and international partners in
preventing violent crime and acts of terrorism. These products include
statistical and technical information, as well as analysis trends
related to the criminal use of explosives and arson. Another key
function of the USBDC is to collect information about the theft or loss
of explosive materials. Explosives licensees and permittees are
required by Federal law to report theft or loss of explosives to ATF
and local authorities within 24 hours. Using this theft/loss data, the
USBDC provides timely security alerts to U.S. law enforcement partners
across the country when these incidents occur. ATF has developed the
USBDC into a vital intelligence and information resource, with current
participation from more than 2,600 interagency partners.
In 2004, then-Attorney General Ashcroft directed the consolidation
of all Department of Justice arson and explosives incident databases
into a single system. To execute this directive, ATF, through the
USBDC, established the Bomb Arson Tracking System (BATS). BATS garnered
wide acceptance, and now has nearly 13,000 active users and contains
information on more than 490,000 explosives and arson-related
incidents.
ATF's National Canine Division (NCD) in Front Royal, Virginia, is
another vital component of ATF's support for our law enforcement
partners in the investigation of explosives, arson, and firearms
offenses. The NCD trains teams of explosives and accelerant detection
canines and handlers for ATF's own arson and explosives mission, and
for numerous Federal, State, local, and international law enforcement
partners. The NCD utilizes the National Odor Recognition Training
Standard (NORT), an ATF-developed cutting-edge training regimen that
enables trained canines to detect more than 19,000 different explosives
compounds. Congress has recognized this standard as a benchmark for
explosives canine proficiency. Since 1990, ATF has trained 919
explosives and 253 accelerant canine detection teams. ATF-trained
canine teams are utilized across the country and by several foreign
partner law enforcement agencies, and they serve a crucial role in
protecting the public.
In addition to the support provided by the USBDC, BATS, and the
NCD, one of the most important assets ATF contributes to our Nation's
capacity to prevent, investigate, and solve crimes involving arson and
explosives is a specialized cadre of ATF Special Agents who receive
unparalleled training in the scientific, technical, and legal aspects
of investigating crimes involving fire and explosives. This cadre of
agents is trained through our Certified Fire Investigator (CFI) and
Certified Explosives Specialists (CES) programs. ATF's CFIs are the
only certified fire investigators in the Federal Government, and their
support is routinely sought by our State and local partners for arson
investigations involving loss of life and major property damage. In
2017, ATF CFIs conducted more than 2,300 fire scene examinations.
ATF's CESs specialize in the investigation of non-terrorism-related
criminal acts involving explosives, bombings, and explosives threats,
which comprise more than 90 percent of all explosives-related incidents
Nationally every year. As with our CFIs, our State and local partners
frequently request assistance from ATF CESs when bombings and other
explosives incidents occur. ATF CESs are often assisted by highly-
skilled Explosives Enforcement Officers (EEO). EEOs are ATF's technical
experts in matters involving improvised explosive devices (IED) and
destructive devices. Many of ATF EEOs previously served as explosive
ordnance disposal technicians in the U.S. military, where they
initially received specialized explosives training. EEOs render bombs
and other destructive devices safe, conduct advanced disassembly
procedures in order to preserve and exploit evidence, provide
explosives device determinations for criminal prosecutions, and
routinely conduct explosives threat assessments of vulnerable
buildings, airports, and National monuments. On average, an ATF EEO has
16 years of experience in the explosives field before joining ATF.
Together with other ATF Special Agents, and often with the support of
EEOs, ATF CESs opened approximately 1,000 explosives investigations in
fiscal year 2017. In calendar year 2016, BATS reported 699 explosions
of which 439 were bombings.
ATF's Forensic Science Laboratories (FSL) and its Fire Research
Laboratory (FRL) also provide substantial support to our State and
local partners through the examination and analysis of evidence, expert
testimony, technical support, and advanced training. Similar to the CFI
program, the FRL is the only National laboratory dedicated to the
research of fire-science, and is the most comprehensive criminal fire
research facility in the world. ATF's forensic scientists, examiners,
and technicians specialize in the examination of evidence typically
recovered in fire, explosives, and firearm-related crimes, and our
partners frequently rely on their expertise to assist in the most
challenging investigations of violent crimes and fire and explosives
incidents.
The Boston Marathon bombing and the recent serial bombings in
Austin are two high-profile examples of the support ATF routinely
provides to our Federal, State, and local partners when an explosives
incident occurs. More than 200 ATF personnel directly participated in
the investigation of the Boston Marathon bombing. These personnel
included 6 CESs, 5 laboratory chemists, and 9 explosive detection
canine teams, who worked side-by-side with the Boston Police
Department, Massachusetts State Police, and FBI in the post-blast
investigation, including the clearing of unattended bags left by
bystanders at the Marathon blast scene to render the area safe for
investigators. ATF also served a critical role in the tracing of a
firearm with an obliterated serial number that was used by the bombers
in a shoot-out with the police, and an ATF Special Agent medic, on-
scene at the arrest of the surviving bomber, provided critical first-
aid.
In Austin, ATF CESs responded with the Austin Police Department
(PD) to the initial bombing on March 2, and continued to work closely
with Austin Police and the FBI as the bombings continued over a 19-day
period. As the investigation unfolded, more than 110 ATF personnel
directly participated in round-the-clock operations, including 7 CESs,
3 EEOs, 4 CFIs, and 14 explosives detection canine teams. At the
request of the Austin PD, ATF's forensic lab served as the sole
forensic examiner of the more than 200 pieces of evidence recovered
from the detonated and disarmed IEDs involved in the bombings. ATF
Special Agents were also the affiants for the Federal arrest warrant
issued for the suspect before he killed himself by detonating an
explosive device (when Austin PD attempted to execute that warrant) and
for the Federal search warrant for the suspect's residence.
In both Boston and Austin, ATF and the FBI fully coordinated their
support to the local authorities, sharing intelligence and crucial
information as the investigations unfolded. This coordination reflected
ATF and the FBI's parallel understanding that building and maintaining
established partnerships based on trust and mutual respect is essential
to effective information sharing in both daily, routine interactions,
and when critical incidents occur. As a result of our deep-rooted daily
working relationships with State and local law enforcement
organizations, formal and informal information sharing is a daily
occurrence for ATF, and we will continue to focus on strengthening
those relationships to further enhance two-way communication of
critical information.
Finally, recent events have focused attention on another aspect of
information sharing, which is how law enforcement organizations handle
tips received from the public. In light of these events, ATF conducted
a thorough review of its processes and procedures for handling tips. As
a result of that review, we have developed and deployed a new system
called ``iTip'' to receive, review, and act upon tips from the public.
``iTip'' is an electronic system which permits us to document,
disseminate, and track tips we receive from the public, and we have
updated our protocols and policies to ensure consistent, effective
follow-through on these tips.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, thank you again for the
opportunity to discuss with you the importance of law enforcement
information sharing. We look forward to working with this committee and
Members of Congress to better serve and protect our Nation.
I am happy to answer any questions that the committee may have.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Director McDermond. Let me just
say at the outset, I think while maybe too often Members of
Congress are critical and while we do have an oversight
responsibility, I just want to personally thank both the FBI
and the ATF for a job well done in my home town of Austin.
I met with members of ATF locally. I went by the local
field office of the FBI to say thank you and present a flag and
meet the agents. I won't describe the one who provided the
critical analysis on this case, but just very impressive work.
I just want to say as a resident of Austin, thank you for what
you did.
Mr. McDermond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sleeper. Thank you.@
Chairman McCaul. Thank you. You know, and the whole Boston
hearings, it was not ever, and I always said this was not
intended as a gotcha exercise but rather how can we learn? As
with anything, there is a post-mortem lessons learned. We can
learn from any event like that to see how we can do a better
job.
I commend the FBI for making progress since the Boston
bombings in several key areas that I think made a difference
when it came to Austin. I want to go through some of these and
then, Director Sleeper, allow you to comment, and Director
McDermond.
As you know, this committee made several recommendations in
its report, many of which were adopted. I think the most
critical was the amended language on the MOUs with locals to
emphasize that information sharing is encouraged, not
discouraged, particularly in the Boston case, the police
commissioner not having access to the information that his
people in his police department did.
Senior leaders pledged to communicate the value of
information sharing. They conducted regular briefings, expanded
access to classified Guardian system and unclassified Guardian,
and expanded access to other FBI databases. That is a big step
forward with Federal, State, and local.
Then, finally, DHS made changes to how records of travelers
reviewed by customs personnel, which was a problem in the
Boston case, to enhance those systems, you know, and make sure
that CBP and JTTF officers pass that information to the JTTF
case agents electronically rather than writing down on Post-it
Notes, which is what happened, as you know, in the Boston case.
So if you wouldn't mind commenting on that? But I also just
want to--not only was the Federal, State, and local partnership
exemplary in the Austin model, but I think also between the
Federal agencies. I heard nothing but how FBI and ATF worked so
well together and that hasn't historically always been the
case. Either it is State and local level or between Federal law
enforcement agencies, so I want to commend you for that.
Director Sleeper, would you like to comment on the progress
that the FBI has made?
Mr. Sleeper. Mr. Chairman, thank you. As I said in my
opening testimony, the FBI recognized the deficiencies in
information sharing post-Boston and the appropriate changes.
Working closely with our partners, mutual changes were agreed
upon and made. It wasn't just the changes in the information-
sharing processes, procedures, MOUs; it went well beyond that.
It was a cultural shift not only in the Federal Government,
not only in the FBI, but our State and local partners,
recognizing we are facing a diversified threat now, far more
diversified than ever. We can't effectively address that in the
law enforcement community unless we are working shoulder-to-
shoulder.
Those 1,000 State and local officers that are in our JTTFs
are shoulder-to-shoulder with our agents. Director Wray
frequently cites examples of him going into field offices and
being briefed by the JTTFs and it is actually a State and a
local officer, a unit supervisor, that is briefing him.
So we have come a long ways. We will continue to,
obviously, drive that integration because a threat demands it.
The public demands that we are as responsible as possible. But
certainly this committee assisted us post-Boston in
understanding and appreciating where we needed to go with our
partners, so we appreciate your support in that process.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you. Thank you for mentioning the
culture change. We recommended that, but we can't legislate
that. But I had personally, as a former Federal prosecutor both
before and after 9/11 and now today have, have really seen the
change.
It is really one for the better. I think the FBI was very
wise to hire you, sir, as a local sheriff in Vermont to be in
the position you are in today.
Mr. Sleeper. A trooper, sir, but thank you.
Chairman McCaul. Director McDermond.
Mr. McDermond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just say
that, you know, we have all made great strides since 9/11 to
better keep each other informed. But I would say that, you
know, as an organization, ATF is one that prides itself on
partnerships and relationships.
It is through those relationships, particularly during a
critical incident wherein the information is not yet in any one
database that we have made available to our partners, but it is
through those relationships that the trust is built, which
enables that free flow of information, I think, as the chief of
Austin indicated in his case, you know, all of those initials
were left at the door. That is what is important.
But again, we are an agency that works day in and day out
with our partners. We cannot complete our mission without those
partnerships. Again, it is through those partnerships that the
trust is built so that when a critical incident presents itself
those barriers no longer exist.
Chairman McCaul. Yes, I like the phrase the chief used and
yourself: Leaving the titles at the door.
So the Chair now recognizes Ms. Watson Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you very much. Let me thank you
both for your service. Let me just say that I am a proud
American and I am proud of your organizations and the
professionalism that is displayed by all of your employees.
I have some questions, and I really want to just focus a
little bit on what happened in Parkland as an illustration of
how we fail to recognize that there were instances of See
Something, Say Something and tips, but we weren't able to
really do what we needed to do to preclude that horrible
situation.
When the FBI receives a call to the tip hotline, what is
the process for responding to that, to evaluating it or
addressing the tip? Who actually gets that call? Specifically,
what were the gaps that resulted in the failure to address the
reported tips about Nikolas Cruz, who subsequently carried out
this tragic shooting in Parkland? What has the FBI done to
prevent this from reoccurring?
Mr. Sleeper. Thank you, Representative.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Sleeper.
Mr. Sleeper. First, let me state very clearly, as the
director and the deputy director have said, the FBI could have
and should have done more to further investigate the tip that--
--
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I appreciate that. I just want to know
what happened.
Mr. Sleeper. So there is an on-going internal investigation
on that, Representative, now. We would be able to fill you in
more completely once that investigation is completed. What I
can tell you is there was immediate remedial action taken to
address the initially-observed deficiency, that is the failure
to understand the threat completely and communicate it into an
information-sharing system.
But the details on it, due to the internal investigation,
Representative, I would like to wait until that is completed,
and we will get back to you with the details on it.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So let me just ask you this, actually,
through the Chairman. A, would the information that you need to
share with me that I am interested in, specifically an answer
to these questions, would that need to be done in a Classified
setting?
Mr. Sleeper. No, it would not.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. OK. So then I am going to ask that we
do have a very detailed response to each aspect of this
question that I have put forth here today. Not to criticize,
but to understand what in the system didn't work and what are
we doing about it now that should ensure that something of this
nature, with so much scuttlebutt going on around this
individual, not happen again.
Mr. Sleeper. Representative, the FBI wants to provide
complete transparency on this process. We just need to wait
until this internal process is completed before----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. How long do you think that is going to
be?
Mr. Sleeper. I will find out for you, Representative, and
get back to you.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you so much. It is my
understanding that after the Boston bombing, the FBI sent out a
directive to the field requiring increased information sharing
between the FBI, the Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies. A, what did that directive require? Does the FBI
still follow that directive today?
What other initiatives or measures has the FBI implemented
since Boston to promote information sharing on Homeland
Security threats? What more remains to be done? I can repeat
every one of those questions to you one-by-one, if you want.
Mr. Sleeper. Representative, there have been a number of
steps that continue to today, and let me start with today.
Christopher Combs, the SAC from Austin who was working with the
chief is briefing all of our special agents in charge of the
FBI today at our SAC conference across the city.
He is briefing them on how information sharing should work
and did work and the best practices. So continuously
reinforcing to our leaders in the field how critical and how
important it is.
Getting back to immediately post-Boston, this committee,
Major Cities Chiefs, the FB, and a number of our partners
convened a series of meeting on what would be effective for the
FBI in order to improve information sharing. All of those
recommendations were taken into consideration, each and every
one of them.
All of them have been implemented in the sense of task
force officers having complete access to information, task
force officers being expected to look at all threat information
for their AOR, not just the case they are working on, but all
threat information in their AOR.
The closing of cases and Guardian leads, of conveying that
information to State and local partners upon closure of the
investigation determine if there is a continuing public safety
concern on those individuals that we can't legally pursue any
longer because of DIA guidelines, but that individual still may
be a public safety concern to the community.
Additional training of officers, a series of on-going steps
occurred, and I would like to think that is why the chiefs that
were here and the other chiefs that we work with literally on a
daily basis, are saying that information between the FBI and
their State and local partners is flowing very effectively.
Where we do observe an issue, that is generally dealt with at
the local field level and dealt with very quickly.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. I just had one last--OK.
This has to do with information gaps as well. I am particularly
focused on what needs to be done to ensure that everyone that
needs to be feeding into this information sharing process is
doing so.
I am reminded of the Sutherland Springs, Texas, shooter
who, really because of his personal history, should not have
been permitted to purchase a gun. Are you aware of anything
that your office is doing or HEF is doing that working with our
armed forces who has a responsibility to put this information
someplace so that it is available when a person of this ilk
that they know about shouldn't have a gun is able to purchase a
gun?
I don't know if that is for you, Mr. Desmond. I probably
think I need glasses that are stronger than the ones I am
wearing. I am having a hard time today seeing. Mr. McDermond, I
am sorry, having a hard time today focusing on distance. Thank
you.
I don't know if that is the question that I needed to ask
you. I need to know what is happening on a Federal level,
talking to another partner here, which would be the armed
forces, that has a responsibility to feed information into some
kind of system where it should so that we would know that the
person who committed that horrible crime at the church and
killed all those innocent people would not have had access to a
gun, the purchase of a gun, if his information were where it
should have been.
If you can't answer it, you could tell me you will look
into it and answer it, but it is a very important question.
Mr. McDermond. Congresswoman Watson Coleman, I can say----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. It is--as well.
Mr. McDermond. That both the ATF and NFB are working with
the Department of Defense to improve the input of military
records. This is part of the attorney general's coordination to
ensure that those records will now be placed into the NICS
system.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. OK.
Anything you need to add to that, Mr. Sleeper?
Mr. Sleeper. Representative, what we are seeing as a result
of the latest incidents, just as post-9/11 and Boston was a
challenge in information sharing in the sense of taking foreign
intelligence and bringing it in domestically and sharing it
with our State and local partners, what we are seeing as a
result of latest incidents, we are finding that there is
information. There is threat information that is siloed in non-
traditional partner information-sharing groups.
It is a complex issue. It is not going to be resolved
easily. It needs to be done thoughtfully. But we need to
recognize that many of the individuals that are committing
these acts are known to law enforcement, they are known to the
mental health community, they are known to the social services
community, and they are known to the education community as
well.
All of those communities make some type of an assessment
those individuals could be a risk or a threat, but seldom is
that information integrated into a specific threat assessment
on those individuals.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. It is--right?
Mr. Sleeper. That is where I see our challenge in moving
toward.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Yes. Who would be the logical entity
to sort of be the keeper of that information and the
disseminator of it when necessary?
Mr. Sleeper. We are just in the infancy of that discussion.
I heard the chiefs have a discussion with the attorney general
about a month ago, and this was the single issue regarding the
threats to schools that was most alarming in the sense that
many of these individuals have, for the lack of a better term,
come upon our radar previously.
Some have been in treatment, some pass through treatment,
some have been in jail, have come out of jail. How do we
collectively, from a broad government perspective, share this
information appropriately?
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Yes, we need to collect it and have it
someplace where it is easily retrievable and accountable. Yes,
bingo.
Mr. Sleeper. Those discussions are beginning to take place.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Yes, thank you Mr. Sleeper.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. That is a very good point.
Chair recognizes Mrs. Demings.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to
both of our witnesses for being with us today.
Director Sleeper, back to Ms. Watson Coleman's original
question about the tip line and the Parkland shooting, I
certainly understand that you have an active investigation
going on. We certainly would not want to compromise that in any
way, just like we would not want to compromise any
investigation that is going on.
But if tips started coming into your hotline this very
moment, have steps been taken to prevent whatever went wrong in
the Parkland shooting with those tips to prevent the same thing
from happening again?
Mr. Sleeper. Yes, they have.
Mrs. Demings. Can you talk somewhat about that, what steps
you have taken?
Mr. Sleeper. Immediate steps involved a complete review of
previous tips coming in to determine there was no hanging
threat out there. Additional personnel have been assigned to
the project to add an additional layer of supervision on
decisions that are being made, so additional staff.
The size and volume of the tips of the PAL line, the Public
Access Line, is quite remarkable, over 700,000 tips a year by
phone, over 700,000 tips a year electronically. So about 1.5
million tips a year coming into that facility between phones
and emails.
Again, a rapid evaluation by FBI executives and leadership
to first immediately identify the deficiencies that were
observed were mitigated. Those have been mitigated,
Representative.
Mrs. Demings. Great, thank you so much. I know that your
bureau works very closely on a regular basis with local law
enforcement. In your testimony, you mentioned that in response
to school shootings like Parkland, that you are engaging more
proactively with law enforcement. Can you talk a little bit
about that as well?
Mr. Sleeper. The discussion again with all of the
associations--and the FBI will be hosting a school safety
symposium in June sometime here in the District of Columbia to
bring together the partners and coalesce what we in the law
enforcement community can do to strengthen or prevent violence
in our schools as much as we can.
The discussions are focusing around what can we do? What
can we do more effectively in identifying behaviors and
indicators that are likely to allow us to identify those most
likely to commit an act of violence? What tools do we currently
have that we can mitigate that threat?
Non-traditional tools may not rise to a level--that threat
may not rise to the level of some type of criminal prosecution,
but might we be able to leverage resources at the community
level, such as community mental health, crisis interventions
that could take that individual at risk and hopefully off-ramp
them so that they don't commit an act.
In the future, longer-term discussions on how we can work
with school resource officers, hardening of schools, and what
we may be able to do. Yesterday, I met with Max Schachter.
Tragically, his son was lost in Parkland. We had a significant
discussion on what he and other people may be able to do to
strengthen school safety and harden schools.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you.
Director McDermond, could you talk a little bit about your,
I believe it is the iTip line and your interaction and
coordination with local law enforcement as well, particularly
as it pertains to school shootings?
Mr. McDermond. Yes, Congresswoman. With respect to our iTip
line, that is as a result of the Parkland incident we took a
look ourselves at how we handle tips coming into ATF. They come
in through the traditional ways, tip lines, email, as well as
text.
Since Parkland, we have taken additional steps to introduce
new technology through our iTip. It is an app that can assist
us in better managing those tips as they are received, triaged,
and then acted upon. So if the tips are something that falls
within our mission lane, more often than not we are notifying
our local partners anyway because we cannot complete our
mission without that support.
So they are aware of the tip really at the same time we
are. If it is something that is outside our scope, our
responsibility, we ensure that that information is immediately
passed to the agency that has jurisdiction in that area.
With respect to school shootings, we are working very
closely with the department on the initiatives that the
attorney general has announced, or did announce, in March. But
with respect to what we are doing today, it is working with our
partners in bringing our resources to bear to look at these
types of incidents and what we can do to try to prevent them in
the future.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. Gentlelady yields back.
I just had two quick follow-ups. Director Sleeper, on the
MOUs and the recommendations, have the new MOUs been signed
with all the JTTFs across the Nation?
Mr. Sleeper. No, sir. They haven't all been signed simply
because the difficulty in the thousands of MOUs that are out
there and actually some agencies preferring not to sign MOUs.
We have gone beyond the MOUs, Chairman.
I believe the MOU is intended to immediately address the
concerns or the deficiencies that were observed. I believe we
are light years beyond those initial recommendations. I am
comfortable in speaking to my State and local partners that
they concur with that.
Chairman McCaul. Well, and clearly the previous panel
agrees with you. The Guardian leads, I think one of the
frustrations was the ``case closed'' mentality. Well, that case
was closed and, even if there is new evidence, like the fact he
went to Dagestan and back, would not reopen it.
I commend you for sharing that with the State and locals
because I understand the DOJ guidelines as a formal Federal--
and you are constrained by that. But if you can share it with
State and locals, they can maybe provide further investigation
and more eyes and ears on a potential, you know, suspect. So
that is a very good change moving forward.
Then I will just end on the gun issue. I used to prosecute
gun cases and the NICS, National--it is the check system. It is
only as good as the information that is in it. I am glad that
we were able to pass the Fix NICS Bill in the omnibus, which
will hopefully get more data shared and put into the system so
we don't have people falling through the cracks, like we have
seen so many times previously.
I know, also, that your agency, sir, is looking at the bump
stock issue and reviewing that. I think we are pretty much all
in agreement that that, what happened in Vegas, turned a legal
firearm into an illegal firearm.
So with that, I want to thank the witnesses for being here.
The record will be held open for 10 days, according to
committee rules, and the committee now stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:54 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Honorable Lou Barletta for Brian Manley
Question 1a. Recently, Pennsylvania law enforcement in my district
experienced an attack during which a man opened fire on several
officers in the city of Harrisburg. Thankfully, none of the officers
were seriously injured, and the gunman was neutralized. However, my
concern is not the effectiveness of our response to these types of
events, but our efforts to prevent them from occurring in the first
place.
Can any of you speak from the local law enforcement perspective as
to what needs to be made available or improved to ensure information-
sharing practices can prevent a future Boston Marathon or Austin
bombings?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. How can we take steps now to better protect our
communities from such attacks in the future?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Daniel M. Donovan for Brian Manley
Question 1a. It is vital that the public have confidence in the
alerts they receive from their Government--Federal, State, or local
alerts. I fear that the erroneous alert in Hawaii in January may erode
that trust and could lead to people opting out of the system.
Can you please share how wireless emergency alerts were used in
Austin during the recent bombing attacks?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. How effective of a tool is this for Austin, Boston,
and D.C. public safety agencies?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2a. New York City successfully used wireless emergency
alerts to notify the public of the Chelsea bombing and solicit help in
apprehending the suspect. However, the alerts would have been even more
effective if authorities were able to include a photo of the suspect
with the alert.
Can you please speak to some of the challenges you have faced with
using wireless emergency alerts?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2b. What enhancements would you like to see to the system
and how would that improve the effectiveness?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Lou Barletta for William B. Evans
Question 1a. Recently, Pennsylvania law enforcement in my district
experienced an attack during which a man opened fire on several
officers in the city of Harrisburg. Thankfully, none of the officers
were seriously injured, and the gunman was neutralized. However, my
concern is not the effectiveness of our response to these types of
events, but our efforts to prevent them from occurring in the first
place.
Can any of you speak from the local law enforcement perspective as
to what needs to be made available or improved to ensure information-
sharing practices can prevent a future Boston Marathon or Austin
bombings?
Question 1b. How can we take steps now to better protect our
communities from such attacks in the future?
Answer. As I have testified to previously, effective information
sharing does not only include our law enforcement partners. In order to
be successful, it requires relationships with the community. A great
example of that success can be seen in the ``See Something, Say
Something'' program. To further facilitate the reporting of suspicious
activity, the Department has implemented an anonymous tip line that
allows people to confidentially send information, either by phone or
text, directly to the Department if they observe a crime or other
suspicious activity. Also, the Department has developed a comprehensive
information-sharing partnership with our public and private-sector
stakeholders called BRIC Shield. Stakeholders from the private sector
and non-governmental organizations across the Metro Boston Region
register to receive and share information through BRIC Shield for
public safety and homeland security purposes. The information shared
includes the latest crime bulletins, pattern and trend analysis of
criminal activity in the region, international, National, and regional
analysis of homeland security incidents and threats as they relate to
the region, real-time alerts and situational awareness updates. As
technology continues to advance, it is important for law enforcement
agencies to ensure that they are utilizing these programs in the most
effective and efficient manner to further the flow of information to
the public and allow the public to share information in return.
Finally, the Department has committed personnel to various task
forces and committees to further support open communication and
information sharing. As indicated in my testimony, these include the
National Network of Fusion Centers, the Joint Terrorism Task Force, the
International Association of Chiefs of Police Committee on Terrorism,
the Major City Chiefs Intelligence Commanders Group, and the National
Operations Center.
In order to ensure that our officers are prepared when faced with
another attack on our city, the Department is committed to providing
training regarding suspicious activity reporting to the entire police
force. Specifically, officers also receive training on suspicious
activity and characteristics reporting, led by members of the BRIC.
During this training, officers are given examples of suspicious
activities, including weapons collection, surveillance, recruiting, and
testing or probing of security, and are reminded of behaviors to look
for during major public events. To ensure that all observations are
reported appropriately, officers have multiple options, including in a
police report or by contacting the BRIC directly. Analysts assigned to
the BRIC can provide additional information when such a report is
received, through open-source research and information sharing with
other law enforcement agencies. Additionally, Homeland Security
Analysts assigned to the BRIC are able to track the event as a
Suspicious Activity Report, which enables them to identify trends and
patterns, as well as share information with other law enforcement
agencies.
The Department also participates in several multi-agency training
exercises, designed to enhance the skills and abilities of our region's
first responders, as well as those responsible for coordinating and
managing large-scale incidents, and other members of the community.
These exercises include Urban Shield and a multijurisdictional
counterterrorism exercise at Fenway Park. These exercises identify and
stretch regional resources to their limits and strengthens incident
command systems, while expanding regional collaboration and building
relationships.
Questions From Honorable Daniel M. Donovan for William B. Evans
Question 1a. The Middle-Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of
2012 established the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet) and
allocated spectrum to public safety. Included in the FirstNet
authorizing provisions was a requirement for jurisdictions operating on
a spectrum known as the ``T-Band'' to migrate off that spectrum so it
could be auctioned. The auction is required by 2021, with public safety
migrating by 2023.
How will this migration impact public safety in Boston and the
District of Columbia in the current threat climate?
Question 1b. What are you the most concerned about?
Question 1c. What costs are expected to be incurred with this
change?
Answer. Migration from T-Band will not directly impact the
Department systems but loss of T-Band frequencies would eliminate the
BAPERN (Boston Area Police Emergency Radio Network) network which
provides radio interoperability between jurisdictions in the Boston
region and which the Department utilizes for multi-jurisdictional
responses. The Department supports the decision to opt-in to FirstNet
at the State level but also supports delaying the auction of T-band
spectrum until a suitable replacement for regional radio
interoperability is identified.
a. Loss of T-band will result in a significant reduction of radio
interoperability between law enforcement agencies in eastern
Massachusetts.
b. Lack of radio interoperability would negatively impact law
enforcement operations and officer safety.
c. The costs of reestablishing a regional radio network are unknown
at this time.
Question 2a. It is vital that the public have confidence in the
alerts they receive from their government--Federal, State, or local
alerts. I fear that the erroneous alert in Hawaii in January may erode
that trust and could lead to people opting out of the system.
Can you speak to how Boston PD used emergency alerts in the wake of
the Boston Marathon bombing 5 years ago?
Question 2b. How effective of a tool is this for Boston public
safety agencies?
Answer. Social media has served as an excellent tool for sharing
and receiving information from the public. In the days following the
Boston Marathon Bombing, the Department used social media to inform the
public without inciting fear, to instruct the residents on what to do,
and to instill a feeling of safety within the community. This method of
communication proved invaluable during such a difficult time in Boston.
In fact, in the years following the attack, the Department has
continued to see a steady increase in the number of social media
followers, and currently has 532,615 Twitter followers, 193,594
Facebook followers (and has received 202,058 ``likes''), 23,679
Instagram followers and receives an average of 2.46 million page views
per year on the Department's website, BPDNews.com. The site has already
received 781,262 views this year. Social media has allowed me to
increase transparency and information sharing by posting the results of
internal affairs investigations, seeking the identity of persons of
interest and suspects in criminal activity, and seeking the community's
assistance in locating missing persons.
Question 3a. New York City successfully used wireless emergency
alerts to notify the public of the Chelsea bombing and solicit help in
apprehending the suspect. However, the alerts would have been even more
effective if authorities were able to include a photo of the suspect
with the alert.
Can you please speak to some of the challenges you have faced with
using wireless emergency alerts?
Question 3b. What enhancements would you like to see to the system
and how would that improve the effectiveness?
Answer. The Department does not currently utilize wireless
emergency alerts.
Question 4a. What is the effectiveness of alerting individuals who
are on the T or on the metro?
Question 4b. What challenges have you faced alerting individuals
who are underground?
Answer. The Department does not currently utilize wireless
emergency alerts.
Questions From Honorable Lou Barletta for Peter Newsham
Question 1a. Recently, Pennsylvania law enforcement in my district
experienced an attack during which a man opened fire on several
officers in the city of Harrisburg. Thankfully, none of the officers
were seriously injured, and the gunman was neutralized. However, my
concern is not the effectiveness of our response to these types of
events, but our efforts to prevent them from occurring in the first
place.
Can any of you speak from the local law enforcement perspective as
to what needs to be made available or improved to ensure information-
sharing practices can prevent a future Boston Marathon or Austin
bombings?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. How can we take steps now to better protect our
communities from such attacks in the future?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Daniel M. Donovan for Peter Newsham
Question 1a. The Middle-Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of
2012 established the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet) and
allocated spectrum to public safety. Included in the FirstNet
authorizing provisions was a requirement for jurisdictions operating on
spectrum known as the ``T-Band'' to migrate off that spectrum so it
could be auctioned. The auction is required by 2021, with public safety
migrating by 2023.
How will this migration impact public safety in the District of
Columbia in the current threat climate?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. What are you the most concerned about?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1c. What costs are expected to be incurred with this
change?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1d. How effective of a tool is this for D.C. public safety
agencies?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2a. New York City successfully used wireless emergency
alerts to notify the public of the Chelsea bombing and solicit help in
apprehending the suspect. However, the alerts would have been even more
effective if authorities were able to include a photo of the suspect
with the alert.
Can you please speak to some of the challenges you have faced with
using wireless emergency alerts?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2b. What enhancements would you like to see to the system
and how would that improve the effectiveness?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3a. What is the effectiveness of alerting individuals who
are on the metro?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3b. What challenges have you faced alerting individuals
who are underground?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
[all]