[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DOE MODERNIZATION: ADVANCING THE ECONOMIC AND NATIONAL SECURITY
BENEFITS OF AMERICA'S NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 6, 2018
__________
Serial No. 115-97
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
energycommerce.house.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
30-989 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
GREG WALDEN, Oregon
Chairman
JOE BARTON, Texas FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
Vice Chairman Ranking Member
FRED UPTON, Michigan BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois ANNA G. ESHOO, California
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GENE GREEN, Texas
STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
GREGG HARPER, Mississippi G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey DORIS O. MATSUI, California
BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky KATHY CASTOR, Florida
PETE OLSON, Texas JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia JERRY McNERNEY, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois PETER WELCH, Vermont
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida PAUL TONKO, New York
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
BILLY LONG, Missouri DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana KURT SCHRADER, Oregon
BILL FLORES, Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, III,
SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana Massachusetts
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma TONY CARDENAS, California
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina RAUL RUIZ, California
CHRIS COLLINS, New York SCOTT H. PETERS, California
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan7
TIM WALBERG, Michigan
MIMI WALTERS, California
RYAN A. COSTELLO, Pennsylvania
EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
Subcommittee on Energy
FRED UPTON, Michigan
Chairman
PETE OLSON, Texas BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
Vice Chairman Ranking Member
JOE BARTON, Texas JERRY McNERNEY, California
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois SCOTT H. PETERS, California
ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio GENE GREEN, Texas
GREGG HARPER, Mississippi MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia KATHY CASTOR, Florida
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia PETER WELCH, Vermont
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio PAUL TONKO, New York
BILLY LONG, Missouri DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana KURT SCHRADER, Oregon
BILL FLORES, Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, III,
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma Massachusetts
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey (ex
TIM WALBERG, Michigan officio)
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
GREG WALDEN, Oregon (ex officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Michigan, opening statement.................................... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Bobby L. Rush, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Illinois, opening statement................................. 4
Hon. Greg Walden, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Oregon, opening statement...................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
State of New Jersey, opening statement......................... 7
Witnesses
Edward G. McGinnis, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Nuclear Energy, Department of Energy........................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Answers to submitted questions............................... 182
Art Atkins, Associate Deputy Administrator for Global Material
Security, Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National
Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy.......... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 20
Answers to submitted questions............................... 189
James Owendoff, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Management, Department of Energy................. 24
Prepared statement........................................... 26
Answers to submitted questions............................... 193
Victor M. McCree, Executive Director for Operations, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.......................................... 30
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Answers to submitted questions............................... 197
William C. Ostendorff, Distinguished Visiting Professor of
National Security Studies, U.S. Naval Academy.................. 66
Prepared statement........................................... 69
Mark Peters, Ph.D., Director, Idaho National Laboratory.......... 73
Prepared statement........................................... 76
Answers to submitted questions............................... 205
Maria G. Korsnick, President and Chief Executive Officer, Nuclear
Energy Institute............................................... 84
Prepared statement........................................... 86
David C. Trimble, Director, Natural Resources and Environment,
Government Accountability Office............................... 104
Prepared statement........................................... 106
Ashley E. Finan, Ph.D., Policy Director, Nuclear Innovation
Alliance....................................................... 141
Prepared statement........................................... 143
Answers to submitted questions............................... 210
Submitted Material
Letter of February 5, 2018, from Jon J. Indall, Counsel for
Uranium Producers of America, to Mr. Upton and Mr. Rush,
submitted by Mr. Olson......................................... 179
DOE MODERNIZATION: ADVANCING THE ECONOMIC AND NATIONAL SECURITY
BENEFITS OF AMERICA'S NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2018
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Energy,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Fred Upton
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Upton, Olson, Barton,
Shimkus, Latta, Harper, Kinzinger, Griffith, Johnson, Long,
Bucshon, Flores, Mullin, Hudson, Cramer, Walberg, Duncan,
Walden (ex officio), Rush, McNerney, Peters, Green, Doyle,
Castor, Sarbanes, Welch, Tonko, Loebsack, Schrader, Kennedy,
Butterfield, and Pallone (ex officio).
Staff present: Allie Bury, Legislative Clerk, Energy/
Environment; Kelly Collins, Staff Assistant; Jordan Davis,
Director of Policy and External Affairs; Wyatt Ellertson,
Professional Staff Member, Energy/Environment; Melissa
Froelich, Chief Counsel, Digital Commerce and Consumer
Protection; Adam Fromm, Director of Outreach and Coalitions;
Jordan Haverly, Policy Coordinator, Environment; Zach Hunter,
Communications Director; A.T. Johnston, Senior Policy Advisor,
Energy; Ben Lieberman, Senior Counsel, Energy; Mary Martin,
Deputy Chief Counsel, Energy & Environment; Brandon Mooney,
Deputy Chief Energy Advisor; Mark Ratner, Policy Coordinator;
Tina Richards, Counsel, Environment; Annelise Rickert, Counsel,
Energy; Dan Schneider, Press Secretary; Peter Spencer, Senior
Professional Staff Member, Energy; Jason Stanek, Senior
Counsel, Energy; Madeline Vey, Policy Coordinator, Digital
Commerce and Consumer Protection; Hamlin Wade, Special Advisor
for External Affairs; Andy Zach, Senior Professional Staff
Member, Environment; Priscilla Barbour, Minority Energy Fellow;
Jeff Carroll, Minority Staff Director; Rick Kessler, Minority
Senior Advisor and Staff Director, Energy and Environment; John
Marshall, Minority Policy Coordinator; Alexander Ratner,
Minority Policy Analyst; Andrew Souvall, Minority Director of
Communications, Member Services, and Outreach; Tuley Wright,
Minority Energy and Environment Policy Advisor; and C.J. Young,
Minority Press Secretary.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Upton. Good morning. Welcome to our second DOE
modernization hearing, which will consider various issues that
affect the economic and national security benefits associated
with maintaining and advancing our Nation's nuclear
infrastructure.
In 1954, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act to provide
for the peaceful, civilian use of nuclear energy, both domestic
and abroad. Congress gave the Atomic Energy Commission--the
predecessor agency of DOE and the NRC--the responsibility to
oversee this nascent nuclear industry. And the nuclear industry
in time achieved great success for the U.S., and contributed to
global safety and security.
Today, more than 60 years later, many Atomic Energy Act
provisions remain unchanged. Yet the world nuclear outlook has
changed dramatically, and certain policies governing domestic
involvement and participation in global markets really no
longer reflect reality.
The U.S. is no longer the undisputed leader in civilian
nuclear technology. Four hundred and forty commercial nuclear
power reactors operate in 31 countries, with additional
countries pursuing peaceful nuclear power programs. And for
many years, subsidized state-owned nuclear companies have been
successfully competing against our companies for commercial
opportunities.
Throughout this Congress, we have examined two key
challenges confronting the nuclear industry: how electricity
markets function, as part of our ``Powering America'' series,
and how to get our Nation's nuclear waste management back on
track.
Today's hearing is going to look at a wide array of other
challenges facing the U.S. nuclear industry, and what is needed
at DOE and NRC to maintain U.S. nuclear capabilities and
leadership, and the security benefits that flow from that.
Some of the examples:
For instance, the U.S. lacks a vibrant domestic fuel cycle.
Domestic uranium production has dropped to levels not seen
since before nuclear reactors were commercialized. The sole
domestic uranium conversion plant is on standby, and there is
no U.S.-owned enrichment capacity.
Last year brought news of Westinghouse, an historic leader
certainly in the nuclear fuel cycle, filing for bankruptcy
protection; the abandonment in South Carolina of one of just
two nuclear power plants under construction; and more operating
nuclear power plants announcing premature shutdowns.
In my home district in Michigan, two nuclear sites provide
hundreds of well-paying jobs, support local communities through
tax revenue, and partner with charities throughout Southwest
Michigan.
And as we examine these issues, we should remember that
nuclear technology is not just about generating electricity. It
serves critical economic and national security functions, such
as powering our space exploration missions, developing
lifesaving medical treatments, protecting our Nation's borders,
maintaining international nuclear safety and security
leadership. These activities depend on the intellectual and
technical capabilities provided by a robust nuclear
infrastructure.
So, this morning we are going to hear from two panels of
witnesses, including three key DOE officials who lead nuclear
offices, as well as the NRC's Executive Director of Operations.
These witnesses will discuss the role of nuclear leadership.
Our distinguished second panel will provide additional
perspective. I would like to welcome back Bill Ostendorff to
the committee. You will remember that Mr. Ostendorff testified
before our panel on many occasions during his tenure as an NRC
Commissioner. Now, he is a Distinguished Visiting Professor at
the U.S. Naval Academy, teaching a class about Congress--maybe
we need some lessons here on national security--to future naval
officers.
We are also going to hear from two national thought leaders
on future nuclear technology development, including Dr. Mark
Peters, the Director of the Idaho National Lab; and Dr. Ashley
Finan, Nuclear Innovation Alliance's Policy Director. Drs.
Peters and Finan will provide their perspective on existing
innovative nuclear opportunities and the Federal Government's
role in providing the necessary framework.
I also welcome Maria Korsnick, the President and CEO of the
Nuclear Energy Institute, NEI. This is her second appearance
before the committee. And I appreciate her leadership during an
uncertain time in the nuclear industry.
So, thank you all for being here.
[The statement of Mr. Upton follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. Fred Upton
Welcome to our second DOE modernization hearing, which will
consider various issues that affect the economic and national
security benefits associated with maintaining and advancing our
Nation's nuclear infrastructure.
In 1954, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act to provide
for the peaceful, civilian use of nuclear energy, both domestic
and abroad. Congress gave the Atomic Energy Commission--the
predecessor agency of DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission--the responsibility to oversee this nascent nuclear
industry. The nuclear industry in time achieved great success
for the United States and contributed to global safety and
security.
Today, more than 60 years later, many Atomic Energy Act
provisions remain unchanged. Yetthe world nuclear outlook has
changed dramatically, and certain policies governing domestic
involvement and participation in global markets no longer
reflect reality.
The United States is no longer the undisputed leader in
civilian nuclear technology. 440 commercial nuclear power
reactors operate in 31 countries, with additional countries
pursuing peaceful nuclear power programs. And for many years,
subsidized state-owned nuclear companies have been successfully
competing against our companies for commercial opportunities.
Throughout this Congress, we have examined two key
challenges confronting the nuclear industry: how electricity
markets function, as part of our ``Powering America'' series,
and how to get our Nation's nuclear waste management back on
track.
Today's hearing will look at a wide array of other
challenges facing the U.S. nuclear industry, and what is needed
at DOE and NRC to maintain U.S. nuclear capabilities and
leadership, and the security benefits that flow from that.
Examples of challenges abound.
For instance, the United States lacks a vibrant domestic
fuel cycle. Domestic uranium production has dropped to levels
not seen since before nuclear reactors were commercialized. The
sole domestic uranium conversion plant is on standby and there
is no U.S.-owned enrichment capacity.
Last year brought news of Westinghouse, an historic leader
in the nuclear fuel cycle, filing for bankruptcy protection;
the abandonment in South Carolina of one of just two nuclear
power plants under construction; and more operating nuclear
power plants announcing premature shutdowns.
In my home district in Michigan, two nuclear sites provide
hundreds of well-paying jobs, support local communities through
tax revenue, and partner with charities throughout Southwest
Michigan.
As we examine these issues, we should remember that nuclear
technology is not just about generating electricity. It serves
critical economic and national security functions, such as
powering our space exploration missions, developing lifesaving
medical treatments, protecting our Nation's borders, and
maintaining international nuclear safety and security
leadership. These activities depend on the intellectual and
technical capabilities provided by a robust nuclear
infrastructure.
This morning, we will hear from two panels of witnesses,
including three key DOE officials who lead nuclear offices, as
well as the NRC's Executive Director of Operations. These
witnesses will discuss the role of nuclear leadership.
Our distinguished second panel will provide additional
perspective. I would like to welcome back Bill Ostendorff to
the committee. Mr. Ostendorff testified before our panel on
many occasions during his tenure as an NRC Commissioner. Now,
he is a Distinguished Visiting Professor at the U.S. Naval
Academy, teaching a class about Congress and national security
to future Naval officers.
We will also hear from two national thought leaders on
future nuclear technology development including Dr. Mark
Peters, the Director of Idaho National Laboratory, and Dr.
Ashley Finan, the Nuclear Innovation Alliance's Policy
Director. Drs. Peters and Finan will provide their perspective
on exciting innovative nuclear opportunities and the Federal
Government's role in providing the necessary framework.
I also welcome Maria Korsnick, the President and CEO of the
Nuclear Energy Institute. This is Ms. Korsnick's second
appearance before this committee and I appreciate her
leadership during an uncertain time in the nuclear industry.
Thank you all for being here today, and I yield back.
Mr. Upton.
With that, I yield to the ranking member of the
subcommittee, my friend Mr. Rush, for an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOBBY L. RUSH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Mr. Rush. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this important hearing today on advancing the economic and
national security benefits of our Nation's nuclear
infrastructure. Mr. Chairman, as I understand, there are
several views regarding nuclear policy that the majority has
noted in its memo. I look forward to working with the majority
side as we proceed through regular order and bring these bills
up in a legislative hearing in order to hear from expert
witnesses on the constant questions and impacts of these bills.
Mr. Chairman, I believe we may be able to come to a
bipartisan agreement on most, if not all, of these bills in
order to increase their chances of actually becoming law.
Mr. Chairman, as I have stated many times, I principally
subscribe to an all-of-the-above in the portfolio as we move
towards a low-carbon energy economy. I have also stated on many
occasions, Mr. Chairman, that I believe nuclear policy must
play a vital role as a source of safe, reliable, low-carbon
power, and help us meet both the energy and environmental needs
of the 21st Century.
While I did not agree with the recent Department of Energy
notice of proposed rulemaking issued last year that was
recently removed, revoked by FERC, I continue to maintain that
we must find a way to appropriately appraise nuclear energy
nationally. Mr. Chairman, I believe this must be done in a
fair, methodical, and transparent manner by elected policy
holders rather than those that are done hastily and in secret
by unelected agency officials.
Therefore, it is my hope that in addition to today's
hearing, we will have other opportunities to hear from
stakeholders on the benefits, on the impacts of more
traditional nuclear facilities as well as more advanced nuclear
technology, including nonlight water reactors and light water
small modular reactor design.
Mr. Chairman, these new and emerging technologies will
allow for the production of nuclear power more efficiently and
with less waste than in current technology. Mr. Chairman, I can
imagine a scenario where these small, less costly reactors can
be utilized to power hard-to-reach, remote populations, whether
they be in small rural communities in the Midwest, or native
villages in Alaska, or even to help the thousands of Americans
still living without power in Puerto Rico or the U.S. Virgin
Islands.
To be sure, Mr. Chairman, there remains significant issues
that must be addressed, including issues of safety, licensing,
and commercialization of these advanced technologies. It is my
intention, Mr. Chairman, that members of this subcommittee can
indeed address many of these issues with bipartisan solutions
that will benefit the Nation as a whole.
So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to engaging today's
distinguished panelists on both challenges and as well as the
opportunities that lie ahead in this very important nuclear
century.
Mr. Chairman, with that I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Upton. The gentleman yields back. The Chair would
recognize the chairman of the full committee, the gentleman
from the good State of Oregon, for an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GREG WALDEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OREGON
Mr. Walden. I thank the chairman. And I thank our panelists
and all the witnesses for your testimony today and for helping
us with these very, very important issues.
This morning, as you know, we will examine several issues
associated with the future of the Nation's nuclear power
industry: the current domestic nuclear supply chain,
international market opportunities, regulatory and policy
matters, and what is necessary for developing and deploying
future nuclear technologies.
Now, the testimony and our discussion represent another
step in our efforts to more appropriately align the Department
of Energy's missions, management, and priorities with the
challenges that face our Nation today.
At root today, is a question of our Nation's capabilities,
not only to propel nuclear innovation generally, but also to
ensure an infrastructure that is critical to our economic and
to our national security
Today's civilian nuclear industry was born out of
American's national security needs and imperatives from 70
years ago. The first controlled nuclear reactions led to the
Manhattan Project. That helped win World War II. The 1958
launch of the world's first nuclear-powered submarine, the
U.S.S. Nautilus, marked the birth of our nuclear navy and
resulted in our subsequent naval dominance.
President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace provided for
peaceful, civilian use of nuclear technology, and that remains
the foundation of the nuclear industry that is in place today.
Since that time, the civilian nuclear industry and its
related infrastructure have been intertwined with our national
security needs: projecting U.S. safety and security practices
the world over, ensuring engineering and scientific
understanding to safeguard nuclear materials, and developing
the economic and commercial relationships that ensure a more
secure world.
To continue to harvest the economic and national security
benefits associated with our domestic nuclear energy
infrastructure, however, we must recognize the world looks
different than it did at the birth of the nuclear age.
Consequently, we must take steps to update the relevant
policies. These policies must be forward looking to enable
innovation and the deployment of new, advanced nuclear
technologies.
Oregon-based NuScale is an example of one of those
innovative nuclear companies. NuScale's small modular reactor
proposed design recently received approval for a significant
milestone when the Nuclear Regulatory Commission signed off on
the design's passive cooling system. This decision is a game
changer for the regulatory framework. And I applaud both NRC
and NuScale on their breakthrough.
The Department of Energy's recent public-private
partnership with NuScale helped enable these near-term
successes. So, to unleash long-term innovation, DOE must
capitalize and nurture its nuclear infrastructure, including
research and test facilities, intellectual expertise, and
institutional leadership. This foundation is critical to both
economic and national security imperatives, but requires long-
term program stewardship, in addition to the underlying
statutory authority and direction.
Today's hearing continues the committee's ongoing review of
the Department of Energy, but I should also note that it has
been more than 30 years since the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
was last reauthorized. Congressmen Kinzinger and Doyle's
legislation to improve NRCC's efficiency--excuse me, NRC's
efficiency--old habits die hard--and budget process is a good
start. And I appreciate their interest and their leadership on
this issue.
This morning's diverse witness panels will help inform our
efforts to reinvigorate our Nation's critical nuclear
infrastructure. And I look forward to your testimony.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
[The statement of Mr. Walden follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. Greg Walden
This morning we will examine several issues associated with
the future of our Nation's nuclear industry--the current
domestic nuclear supply chain, international market
opportunities, regulatory and policy matters, and what is
necessary for developing and deploying future nuclear
technologies.
The testimony and our discussion represent another step in
our efforts to more appropriately align the Department of
Energy's missions, management, and priorities with the
challenges facing our Nation today.
At root today is a question of our Nation's capabilities
not only to propel nuclear innovation generally, but to ensure
an infrastructure that is critical to our economic and our
national security.
Today's civilian nuclear industry was borne out of
America's national security imperatives from over 70 years ago.
The first controlled nuclear reactions led to the Manhattan
Project, which helped win World War II. The 1958 launch of the
world's first nuclear-powered submarine, the U.S.S. Nautilus,
marked the birth of our nuclear navy and resulted in our
subsequent naval dominance.
President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace provided for
peaceful, civilian use of nuclear technology, which remains the
foundation of the nuclear industry in place today.
Since that time, the civilian nuclear industry and its
related infrastructure have been intertwined with our national
security needs-projecting U.S. safety and security practices
the world over, ensuring engineering and scientific
understanding to safeguard nuclear materials, and developing
the economic and commercial relationships that ensure a more
secure world.
To continue to harvest the economic and national security
benefits associated with our domestic nuclear energy
infrastructure, however, we must recognize the world looks
different than it did at the birth of the nuclear age.
Consequently, we must take steps to update the relevant
policies. These policies must be forward looking to enable
innovation and the development and deployment of new advanced
nuclear technologies.
Oregon-based Nuscale is an example of one of those
innovative nuclear companies. Nuscale's small modular reactor
proposed design recently received approval for a significant
milestone when the Nuclear Regulatory Commission signed off on
the design's passive cooling system. This decision is a
gamechanger for the regulatory framework and I applaud both NRC
and NuScale on this breakthrough.
The Department of Energy's recent public-private
partnership with NuScale helped enable these near-term
successes. To unleash long-term innovation, DOE must capitalize
and nurture its nuclear infrastructure, including research and
test facilities, intellectual expertise, and institutional
leadership. This foundation is critical to both economic and
national security imperatives, but requires long-term program
stewardship, in addition to the underlying statutory authority
and direction.
Today's hearing continues the committee's ongoing review of
DOE, but I should also note that it has been over 30 years
since the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was last reauthorized.
Congressmen Kinzinger and Doyle's legislation to improve NRC's
efficiency and budgetary process is a good start and I
appreciate their interest and leadership on this issue.
This morning's diverse witness panels will help inform our
efforts to reinvigorate our Nation's critical nuclear
infrastructure and I look forward to the testimony.
Mr. Upton. Time is yielded back.
The Chair would recognize the ranking member of the full
committee, the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pallone, for an
opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today's hearing is
the second in the subcommittee's Department of Energy
modernization series. It is an important step in our bipartisan
efforts to advance the economic and national security benefits
of America's nuclear infrastructure.
First, I must mention that while the majority's memo lists
three bills for consideration today, we have been assured by
the majority that this is not a legislative hearing on these
bills. Without commenting on the merits of the legislation, I
want to make clear that it's essential for this subcommittee to
hold a legislative hearing prior to moving these bills. It's
critical that Members have the opportunity to engage with
appropriate witnesses who can properly analyze the impact of
the proposals.
At the subcommittee's first DOE modernization hearing I
noted the department can improve and more successfully fulfill
its mission. Today's hearing is the logical next step, because
I believe that DOE's Office of Environmental Management and the
National Nuclear Security Administration are two of the key
entities within DOE that are in greater need of oversight.
For example, the environmental management program in recent
years has been plagued by high-profile leaks of radioactive
waste, contractor problems, missed deadlines, and escalating
cleanup costs. In 2014, an Augustine-Mies Panel report
concluded that NNSA lacks a stable, executable plan for
modernization. The report also found that NNSA faces challenges
in its governance of the nuclear security enterprise. And I
believe this is an area where we can work in a bipartisan
fashion to address these issues.
We must also ensure that taxpayer dollars are being managed
in a fiscally responsible manner. For example, according to the
GAO 2017 high-risk designation, DOE's Office of Environmental
Management has spent $35 billion in the last 6 years alone,
primarily on treating and disposing of nuclear and hazardous
waste. Yet, environmental liability grew over the same period
by over $90 billion. So it is particularly important that DOE
address environmental liabilities in a cost effective way,
while also ensuring public health and safety.
These concerns lead me to question whether DOE's nuclear
activities need some sort of formal external regulation and
independent oversight, whether by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission or another entity. DOE's track record for regulating
itself over the past 40 years is mixed at best. External
regulation may be a way to improve that record. And this is an
idea that the Subcommittee on Energy had explored on a
bipartisan basis in the past. It may be time to do so again.
Today's hearing also affords us the opportunity to
contemplate what American nuclear infrastructure might look
like in the coming decades. It is no secret that building new
nuclear power plants has been a challenge. The Vogtle Project
in Georgia has experienced skyrocketing costs and prolonged
construction delays, while the V.C. Summer Nuclear Power Plant
in South Carolina has been abandoned entirely, all the while
more and more existing plants are announcing plans to
permanently shut down. These include in New Jersey the Oyster
Creek Nuclear Generating Station just south of my congressional
district, which last week announced it will close in October of
this year, 1 year earlier than planned.
If our country is going to meet its carbon reduction goals,
then nuclear energy may still be needed as a part of the
solution for awhile. And after all, despite the President's
efforts, we are fortunately still a party to the Paris Climate
Accord. So, while I do not think the Federal Government should
be subsidizing nuclear plants in the competitive markets, it is
important that we invest in research into advanced nuclear
reactors that can potentially generate power more efficiently,
with less waste than our current reactor fleet.
So I look forward to hearing from our two knowledgeable
panels about DOE's nuclear mission and where we should focus
efforts to improve these programs.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Upton. The gentleman's time has expired, and he yields
back. So, at this point, we will listen to our testimony by our
four distinguished witnesses.
I would note that your testimony in full is made a part of
the record, so we would like to limit your remarks in summary
to no more than 5 minutes.
Mr. McGinnis, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the
Office of Nuclear Energy, we will start with you. Welcome.
Thank you.
STATEMENTS OF EDWARD G. MCGINNIS, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; ART ATKINS,
ASSOCIATE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR GLOBAL MATERIAL SECURITY,
OFFICE OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; JAMES OWENDOFF,
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; AND VICTOR M. MCCREE,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF EDWARD G. MCGINNIS
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you very much, Chairman Upton. I would
also like to thank Ranking Minority Member Rush, and also the
other members of this subcommittee. It is a great privilege to
be here today.
Let me just start out by saying the United States pioneered
the development and peaceful use of nuclear power to produce
around-the-clock, emissions-free electricity. As a result of
U.S. leadership in nuclear energy, American citizens have
benefitted from the truly unique source of electricity for the
last seven decades. Nuclear power plants have served as
bedrocks to communities across the country to thousands,
providing high-paying, skilled jobs to hundreds of thousands of
Americans. And our nuclear energy capabilities have supported
our Nation's energy security, grid reliability, and national
security.
However, the U.S. nuclear energy sector is now under
historic downward pressure, has lost a tremendous amount of its
once dominant global market share, and has seen a significant
degradation in our manufacturing base. In response, the
President, on June 29th of last year, announced that we would
conduct a complete review of the U.S. nuclear energy policy to
help find new ways to revive and expand this crucial energy
resource.
The Department of Energy is now working to implement the
President's direction, vigorously I might add. Within the
department's office of Nuclear Energy, we focus our work in
three mission areas: the Nation's existing fleet, the
development of advanced nuclear reactor concepts, and also fuel
cycle technologies.
The department is partnering with industry to develop the
technical basis for the continued safe and economic operation
of the current fleet of nuclear power plants, as well as
developing technical solutions to enhance the economics,
performance, and safety of nuclear power plants. This includes
supporting the development of technologies such as accident
tolerant fuels, which have the potential to significantly
increase the performance of our Nation's current fleet of
reactors, while also reducing costs.
By continuing to support improvements to the efficiency,
productivity, and operating lifetimes of our Nation's nuclear
fleet through technology R&D, the department is helping
industry realize its full potential in contributing to our
Nation's emissions-free, reliable electricity supply.
The department is also working to advance our Nation's next
generation of advanced reactors, including potentially game-
changing advanced Small Modular Reactors. Advanced reactor
concepts have the potential to deliver improved performance and
efficiency, reduced costs, enhanced resource utilization and
waste minimization, as well as enhanced flexibility to include
nonelectric applications, and even load following.
The department recently announced a $30 million funding
opportunity in fiscal year 2018 to support early stage research
and development of advanced nuclear energy technology. By
focusing on the development of innovative advanced reactors,
and leveraging private-public partnerships in a world class
national laboratory system, we can support strong domestic
industry now and into the future.
The department is also working to support the civilian
nuclear fuel cycle. We recently took an important step toward
revitalizing our fuel cycle R&D capabilities when Idaho
National Laboratory resumed operations at the Transient Reactor
Test Facility, otherwise known as TREAT, which had been shut
down since 1994. This capability is an important asset to
nuclear scientists and engineers as they work to increase the
safe and performance--safety and performance of current and
future nuclear reactors.
The department is also conducting research and development
activities that would be necessary for the development of a
versatile, fast test reactor. Development of that would be very
important potentially. While a decision whether or not to
deploy an advanced fast spectrum test reactor has not been
made, such a reactor would accelerate innovation in advanced
fuels and materials for U.S. vendors, and pave the path to U.S.
global leadership in advanced nuclear R&D by reestablishing
this capability.
Finally, in conclusion, the administration is fully
committed to nuclear energy as a vital component of our
Nation's energy system. By leveraging private-public
partnerships and our national laboratory system, we can support
the development of a new class of U.S. advanced reactors; an
innovative, responsive nuclear energy supply chain; and
advanced nuclear energy fuel cycle technologies, positioning
the U.S. for dominance in the 21st Century.
Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. McGinnis follows:]
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Mr. Upton. Thank you.
Mr. Atkins is Associate Deputy Administrator for Global
Material Security at the National Nuclear Security
Administration. Welcome to you.
STATEMENT OF ART ATKINS
Mr. Atkins. Thank you. Chairman Upton, Chairman Walden,
Ranking Member Rush, and members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to represent the Department of Energy's
National Nuclear Security Administration and discuss its
important role in national security. We truly appreciate your
interest in NNSA's critical missions and your continued support
of its projects and its people.
NNSA is charged with three important and enduring national
security missions:
First, maintaining the safety, security, reliability, and
effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile;
Second, preventing, countering, and responding to global
nuclear threats, and;
Third, providing naval nuclear propulsion to the U.S.
Navy's fleet of aircraft carriers and submarines.
At the same time, NNSA recognizes the important role played
by civil nuclear energy, both in the United States and abroad,
and the connectivity that exists with our national security
missions.
For instance, the science and engineering performed by our
labs, plants, and sites underpins our critical defense in
nonproliferation missions, and the advances in these
interdisciplinary efforts yield concrete benefits to the civil
nuclear industry, and vice versa.
While the burgeoning international market provides a
significant commercial opportunity for the U.S. nuclear
industry, the export of U.S. nuclear technology still poses
significant nuclear nonproliferation concerns. Therefore, it
must be carefully managed.
NNSA is committed to striking the appropriate balance
between facilitating legitimate commerce, while also
controlling proliferation of weapons-usable material,
equipment, technology, and expertise. In implementing NNSA's
mission, we ensure that not only is the United States abiding
by the highest nonproliferation standards in nuclear exports,
but that those standards are also matched by our global
partners and global suppliers.
There are two primary mechanisms we implement to achieve
these standards. The first, 123 Agreements. These establish the
legal framework for U.S. companies to export nuclear reactors,
nuclear fuel, and equipment to foreign companies and
governments.
NNSA plays an important role in the conclusion of 123
Agreements. We provide, on behalf of DOE, technical assistance
to the State Department, which leads negotiations on new 123
Agreements.
Additionally, the Secretary of Energy has the legal
authority to authorize proposed exports of unclassified U.S.
nuclear technology and assistance. This authority is
implemented under 10 C.F.R. Part 810 regulation, which NNSA is
responsible for administering.
In response to feedback from U.S. industry and other
stakeholders, we have taken a number of steps to simplify and
update the Part 810 regulation, and have implemented
significant improvements in the process for reviewing export
applications. These efforts have already reduced average
processing time from more than 18 months to approximately 12
months. And our goal is to reduce this review time even
further.
However, some challenges remain outside of NNSA's control.
For instance, the lengthiest part of the Part 810 review
process is the effort to obtain the required government-to-
government nonproliferation assurance. This is handled by the
State Department. This process can often take 6 months or
longer.
The U.S. Government works closely with partner countries to
obtain these assurance, but industry also has a pivotal role to
play. We encourage U.S. exporters to discuss the importance of
these assurances with their customers who, in turn, can
highlight the issue with their government counterparts.
Equally as important, NNSA also bears responsibility for
managing our Nation's stockpile of uranium, most of which was
produced during the Cold War. The department requires a
reliable supply of enriched uranium to accomplish important
defense and nondefense needs. In order to meet the requirements
for enriched uranium, the department currently relies on
downwinding campaigns. The department downwinds excess highly
enriched uranium, including material that is surplus for
defense needs, to create low-enriched uranium suitable for
power reactors, research reactors, and medical isotope
production.
Longer term, NNSA's Defense Programs is working to
reestablish a domestic uranium enrichment capability to ensure
the supply of low-enriched uranium fuel for tritium production,
a need that cannot be met by commercial industry. We are
exploring unified strategies in which a domestic uranium
enrichment capability could also meet departmental and
commercial needs for high-assay LEU and HEU for naval
propulsion.
To conclude, NNSA recognizes that the effective
implementation of our mission is strengthened by strong
partnerhips with industry. NNSA needs these strong industry
partners to resolve the critical national security issues that
we face.
Again I want to thank you for your support for our programs
and your time. And I look forward to answering any questions
that you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Atkins follows:]
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Mr. Upton. Thank you.
Next we have James Owendoff, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary at the Office of Environmental Management, Department
of Energy. Welcome again.
STATEMENT OF JAMES OWENDOFF
Mr. Owendoff. Chairman Upton, Chairman Walden, Ranking
Member Rush, and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the Department of Energy's Environmental Management
Program.
The Federal Government's nuclear weapons production
programs have made significant contributions to our Nation's
defense for decades, helping end World War II and the Cold War.
In addition, Government-sponsored nuclear energy research also
made significant contributions to domestic energy growth and
prosperity. The legacy of these programs is a massive amount of
radioactive and chemical waste and contaminated facilities at
sites across the country. It is the mission of DOE's Office of
Environmental Management to clean up or remediate legacy waste
and facilities.
This legacy includes 90 million gallons of radioactive
liquid waste stored in aging underground tanks.
This legacy also includes 5,000 contaminated facilities,
700,000 tons of depleted uranium, millions of cubic meters of
contaminated soil, billions of gallons of contaminated water,
spent nuclear fuel, and other nuclear materials.
EM must execute its mission as safely, efficiently, and
cost-effectively as possible. This involves constructing new
infrastructure, like waste storage facilities and waste
treatment plants. This mission also involves the management and
retrieval of liquid waste, as well as the decommissioning and
demolition of deteriorating facilities that ultimately reduce
maintenance and monitoring costs.
EM's first priority is worker safety, as well as protection
of the public health and the environment. These are essential
components of our cleanup objectives. EM will continue to
discharge its responsibilities by conducting cleanup within a
``Safe Performance of Work.'' This culture integrates
protection of the environmental, safety, and protection of
worker and public health into all work activities.
Taking many variables into account, such as risk reduction
and compliance agreements, EM has the following priorities:
radioactive tank waste stabilization, treatment, and disposal;
spent nuclear fuel receipt, storage, and disposition; special
nuclear material consolidation, stabilization, and disposition;
transuranic and mixed/low-level waste treatment and disposal;
soil and groundwater remediation; and excess facilities
deactivation and decommissioning.
Across these programmatic areas it is important to note
that approximately half goes to maintaining our facilities
across the complex in a safe, operational-ready stance. This
includes activities such as facility infrastructure maintenance
and complex-wide safeguards and security, and cybersecurity
activities. The scope of these activities covers security of
special nuclear materials and safety of high-level radioactive
waste and spent fuel, along with the maintenance of thousands
of square feet of deteriorating nuclear processing facilities
awaiting eventual future demolition.
The nature and length of the EM mission, coupled with the
sheer technological complexity of cleanup means that we always
face challenges--some anticipated, others unexpected. These
obstacles certainly warrant our careful attention, but EM also
has proven its ability to meet tangible results.
When we began the program in 1989, EM was responsible for a
total of 107 sites, covering 3,100 square miles, that area,
larger than Rhode Island and Delaware combined. During early
years we focused on characterizing waste. Since then, EM has
accomplished cleanup and closure of major sites in Colorado,
Ohio, Missouri, and Florida; decommissioning of a gaseous
diffusion plant in Tennessee; vitrification of more than 4,000
canisters of high-level waste in South Carolina; and removal of
all the plutonium metal and oxides from Washington State.
That is, ensuring there is an essential safe work
environment at all of our sites is our highest priority. As we
work to best position EM for success now and into the future,
we also continue to pursue robust technology development, and
infrastructure investments that ensure safe and uninterrupted
operations.
EM's progress means safe, cleaner sites in the communities
that hosted defense nuclear activities for decades. This kind
of progress is not possible without our workforce, Members of
Congress, regulators, community leaders, and other partners.
Mr. Chairman, I welcome the input of the committee as EM
continues work on aggressive, achievable cleanup plans that
recognize these difficult technical challenges, while making
substantial progress on the many goals we share with you and
your constituents.
Thank you for this opportunity.
[The statement of Mr. Owendoff follows:]
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Mr. Upton. Thank you.
Last on this panel we are joined by Mr. McCree, Executive
Director of Operations from the NRC. Welcome to you, sir.
STATEMENT OF VICTOR M. MCCREE
Mr. McCree. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Upton,
Ranking Member Rush, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee. I appear before you today representing the staff
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I am pleased to have this
opportunity to meet with you to discuss the steps that we have
taken to ensure the NRC's readiness to fulfill our mission in
light of advancements in nuclear technologies being
contemplated by the nuclear industry. The NRC is actively
working with stakeholders, including the Department of Energy,
to establish shared expectations and develop strategies to
prepare for future reviews.
We are also enhancing our processes to execute our safety
and security mission in a manner that reflects our Principles
of Good Regulation. Today I will briefly highlight several of
our efforts.
Regarding new reactors, in March of last year the NRC
docketed the first application for a small modular reactor
design certification submitted by NuScale Power. And the
overall regulatory review of the design is progressing on the
established schedule.
In May of 2016, the NRC received an application from the
Tennessee Valley Authority, or TVA, for an early site permit at
the Clinch River Nuclear Site in Tennessee to evaluate the
suitability for a potential new small modular reactor. This
review is also, this review is also progressing on schedule.
With respect to future advanced reactor designs, the NRC
staff has developed a multi-part strategy to prepare for the
review of nonlight water reactor technologies. This strategy
has three objectives: enhancing technical readiness; optimizing
regulatory readiness; and enhancing communication. We have made
significant progress in fulfilling these objectives.
Five developers of nonlight water reactor designs have
expressed their intent to begin regulatory interactions with
the NRC. And we have already begun formal pre-application
interactions with Oklo, Incorporated, on its compact fast
reactor design. We anticipate starting additional pre-
application reviews this year and next fiscal year, in 2019,
and beginning one or more advanced reactor application reviews
in the next 2 to 4 years.
Regarding our effectiveness and efficiency initiatives, in
June 2014, the NRC began an initiative, referred to as Project
Aim, to enhance the agency's ability to plan and executive its
mission in a more effective and efficient manner. Although we
have achieved a significant milestone last year by completing
the major deliverables for each of the 19 discrete tasks, and
realizing approximately $48 million in reductions, we are
committed to continuing actions to improve our effectiveness,
efficiency, and agility.
In fact, this month the NRC staff started an initiative to
further transform our regulatory approach to better handle
potential new and novel technology, such as accident tolerant
fuel and advanced nonlight water reactors.
In the area of human resources, the NRC developed a
Strategic Workforce Plan that is focused on having the right
people with the right skills and competencies at the right time
and place to achieve the agency's safety and security mission.
We are continuing to refine this plan to ensure the NRC's
workforce planning efforts are timely and responsive to changes
in workload, while the agency retains and develops the skills
needed to support our mission.
As for fees, the NRC understands the importance of a
predictable, transparent, clear, and understandable fee
structure. To this end, the NRC is overhauling its fee billing
process to offer greater transparency, using several methods,
including testing the use of flat fees; revising how billable
work is tracked and reported; and starting next month,
identifying each unique activity charge and the name of the
person who performed the work on the invoices.
With respect to other domestic and international
activities, in cooperation with DOE, the nuclear industry is
researching advanced fuel designs that are expected to exhibit
improved safety margins under both normal and postulated
accident conditions, when compared to fuel types that are used
today. Several vendors are exploring candidate designs, which
are collectively referred to as accident tolerant fuel, or ATF
as you heard earlier.
In response, the NRC will soon finalize a comprehensive
plan to ensure that we are prepared to effectively and
efficiently review ATF designs. Our regulatory interaction with
the DOE in preparing our project plan has allowed us to explore
opportunities to leverage experimental and computational work
already conducted by the department.
As for our international activities, the NRC serves as the
licensing authority for proposed exports and imports of pf
commercial nuclear equipment and materials, and is committed to
maintaining robust partnerships with our regulatory
counterparts worldwide. These interactions allow the NRC to
share best practices, shape the content and scope of technical
publications, participate in peer reviews, and access research
facilities not available in the U.S.
In closing, the NRC continues to focus on fulfilling our
safety and security mission in a more transparent, effective,
and efficient manner. Chairman Upton, Ranking Member Rush, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today, and would be happy to
respond to your questions. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. McCree follows:]
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Mr. Upton. Thank you all for your testimony. And I know you
made a very strong case for maintaining the U.S. leadership
position, not only here--obviously--in the United States, but
also worldwide in so many different ways.
I have to say that many of us, just about all of us here
support an all-of-the-above energy strategy, and that includes
safe nuclear power, something that we indeed care about. And
for a host of reasons we have seen a number of major nuclear
gener--electric generators frozen or beginning now to decline
as that number is reduced, as a number of different facilities
have announced that they are going to be shutting down.
But you also make the point, as the second panel, that our
leadership is needed, particularly on defense. I was, I was
fortunate to be at the dedication, the christening of the
U.S.S. Ford, the new class of aircraft carriers this last year,
a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Know lots of folks who
serve on our nuclear-powered submarines with the obvious
reasons why they are efficient. So the need for trained
personnel in the nuclear engineering field is enormous here in
the U.S., but worldwide.
And as the number of major facilities, electric generating
facilities are frozen or beginning to decline, I think many of
us are looking at the prospects of smaller generators, smaller
units to be approved. This has been in the mix for some time, a
number of years. And I would guess that probably, Mr. McGinnis
and Mr. McCree, you are probably the--where exactly are we in
terms of seeing some of those promising designs be approved?
And what is your guess as to the timeline, if it is approved,
that we would actually begin to see these smaller generating
units actually be brought into the commercial sector to serve
the Nation? Mr. McGinnis?
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. And
I certainly defer to my colleague Mr. McCree to add.
But right now I agree, we are in an extremely challenging
moment in time. Many in the industry and in my office's view
actually see our Nation at an inflection point with regards to
the, to the future of our nuclear fleet. In fact, I would say
we are at a tipping point.
Our ability to bring in new reactors in the pipeline is
key. We have an historic number of premature shutdowns of
plants that many would not have ever predicted 4 or 5 years
ago, fully amortized assets, multibillion-dollar low operating
and management costs, yet we are seeing that today in some of
the districts of Members here today.
So it is a great challenge. We have a pipeline that once
had about 27 units back in 2007 092008, working its way through
the NRC. We have a grand total of one construction and
operation license going through with Florida Power and Light.
And we have one advanced SMR design. That advanced SMR design,
as we mentioned, is NuScale. I think it is potentially
significantly game changing. There are a number of other U.S.
small modular and other advanced designs.
Frankly, I would say the United States is still
unequivocally the leader in the design development of advanced
reactors, bar none. We are challenged in the deployment, that
is for sure. But with regards to the advanced reactors, we are
leading. And it is an exciting time to figure it out.
The NuScale design reflecting the strong support and
investment, frankly, from Congress. Almost $200 million we have
invested in technically partnering with NuScale. It has the
promise of being the first advanced SMR reactor entering the
fleet in our country. 2026 is the timeline for Idaho National
Lab. And UAMPS is the municipal utility looking at it.
And great compliments to the NRC, they are in fact, as the
chairman mentioned, really conducting an historic review of our
Nation's first advanced reactor.
A couple of things that this NuScale reactor brings in my
view is game changing: one is financeability. As opposed to an
$8 billion unit for a gigawatt larger before financing, you are
looking at a unit that may cost only about a billion to a
billion-and-a-half to put that base plant, with 350 to 450
million per unit adding to it, allowing the utility to take
bites at a time.
Mr. Upton. I know my time has expired. But, Mr. McCree, do
you just want to comment, do you verify what Mr. McGinnis has
said in terms of the timeline that we may be on?
Mr. McCree. Yes, Chairman. Thank you for the question.
With regard to the timeline, as I alluded to in my
testimony, we docketed the NuScale application in March of last
year and informed them of a 42-month review schedule, which if
continued to move at the pace that they are moving, would
support a final safety evaluation for design certification in
September of 2020.
The review is proceeding on schedule. We are 70 percent
through the Phase 1 of a 6-phase review. And we are working
very closely with the applicant NuScale to address the issues
that have been revealed thus far.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
Mr. Rush.
Mr. Rush. I certainly want to thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Atkins, in the April 2017 report from the GAO, the GAO
concluded that the estimates provided by the NNSA of the
funding necessary to carry out the NRC's modernization agenda
sometimes, sometimes exceeded the President's budget proposal
by millions of dollars. GAO also found that the cost of some
major modernization programs, including nuclear weapon
refurbishment, could also be severely underestimated.
One recommendation that the GAO made was for the NNSA to
include a cost-benefit analysis of its modernization program in
future versions of its annual plan on stockpile stewardship.
What position does the NNSA take on both the problems
identified by GAO and the recommended solutions? Are you
confident that the agency can respectfully perform its duties
with its current level of funding?
Mr. Atkins. Thank you for your question, sir.
The department and the NNSA recognizes that it is of vital
importance to recapitalize and modernize our aging
infrastructure. This is something that NNSA is very committed
to. And it is true, over time the resources have not kept pace
with the need for modernization that we have seen to ensure the
facilities that are necessary to maintain, a safe, reliable,
and effective stockpile are maintained.
We have increased our budget request since 2015 to work on
the backlog of deferred maintenance. And in '16 and '17 we were
able to actually stop the increase in deferred maintenance. So
it is something that we continue to work on and we will
continue to endeavor to improve.
As far as the GAO's recommendation, we take all of the
recommendations that the GAO has provided very seriously. And
there is a commitment to incorporate a cost-benefit into that,
into that, sir.
Mr. Rush. Mr. Owendoff, they say the 2017 GAO study also
found that DOE has charges in addressing its environmental
oversight and the amount of funding needed to invest all of its
cleanup responsibility. Specifically GAO noted that the cost
estimate for DOE's proposal for separate defense and commercial
nuclear waste repositories excluded the cost and timeframe for
site selection and site characterization. This omission could
cost the agency millions more than the DOE-reported
environmental liabilities.
Has DOE implemented any of the 28 recommendations that GAO
proposed in order to reduce the long-term costs, as well as the
environmental risks more quickly?
Secondly, what is the timeline for enacting all of these
recommendations so that the taxpayers' dollars are being
utilized more efficiently?
Mr. Owendoff. Thank you for the question, Mr. Rush.
Certainly, as I mentioned, over half of our budget goes towards
maintaining a safe condition with the radioactive material,
special nuclear materials at our facilities. So with the
balance of the funds we utilize those in the highest risk
areas. As I mentioned, that principally is radioactive liquid
waste and spent fuel, to put in place facilities that can, in
the case of tank waste, bring that into glass, vitrified in
glass. We think we have been very successful in that program.
Certainly there are going to be first of a kind, one of a
kind challenges that we have that are not faced, certainly, in
the commercial industry or that we have to build. One of those
is a waste treatment plant at Hanford. That has been a
challenge for us. But I think on the flip side, if you look at
our closure and cleanup of Rocky Flats, we did that within the
money that we estimated. You can go to Rocky Flats now and it's
preserved that you can walk across.
This is a challenging business, sir. And we take it
seriously. And we are working each and every day at how we can
be more cost effective.
Mr. Rush. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair
recognizes the chairman of the full committee Mr. Walden.
Mr. Walden. I thank the gentleman. And, again, thank you
all for your assistance in our efforts on these issues.
Mr. McCree, as I mentioned in my opening statement, and as
we have discussed a bit before the committee, the NRC's
recently determining that NuScale's design for a small modular
reactor would not need what is known as a Class 1E power
requirements for offsite electricity. This class of power is a
regulatory standard set for design of safety-related nuclear
power plant electricity systems.
What's the impact of this determination with respect to
potential changes for regulatory and licensing requirements?
Mr. McCree. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.
What this reflects is our focus on design functionality,
the functionality of the design that will be later demonstrated
and validated by the applicant and/or the COL, as opposed to
greater design detail. It's a philosophical but substantive
change that I believe will contribute to more efficient but
just as effective reviews in this important area.
Mr. Walden. So if this goes all the way through the process
and is approved, what will this actually mean for the power
sector?
Mr. McCree. Well, I would defer to my colleague from the
DOE. Our focus, of course, as the independent safety
regulators----
Mr. Walden. Right.
Mr. McCree [continuing]. Our role is to assure that this
application is safe and that it can be certified and later
built if there was a utility that wants to do that. But, again,
I would defer to my colleague from the DOE.
Mr. Walden. Would you like to respond to that?
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you very much. Yes, I would.
It would mean a tremendous amount. We don't use the word
``game changer'' lightly. The wall that has faced utilities in
the form of financing, up front capital, cannot be overstated.
Notwithstanding the other game changing aspects of small
modular reactors such as NuScale, we are talking about highly
flexible, 12 different 15 megawatt electric units, all of which
is designed to be operated at different levels.
So you are offering great opportunity, flexibility for a
utility to have it serve as load following, to have it serve,
pair it up with other hybrid sources of generation. And also
from a financing perspective, as I said, not having to put $8
billion up front and not have any generation from that for
many, many years, they are only putting down a small subset.
I think what the implication is is potentially dramatically
opening up the market, a market that would never really be
materialized with large reactors, as valuable as large reactors
still are. We just simply have utilities that don't have the
financial wherewithal and also are very, I would say very
excited about the design attributes.
Mr. Walden. And when you talk about this, can you give me a
perspective that relates to integrating renewables onto the
grid using this type of nuclear power? Does that give you more
flexibility because of the modular nature?
Mr. McGinnis. Indeed. The flexibility is exactly why we are
now looking and doing R&D on hybrid generation where we are
looking at--in fact you will hear from Dr. Peters I would think
with regards to Idaho. That is where we are doing cutting edge
work. We are literally looking at pairing an advanced small
modular reactor with the wind turbine, with the solar plant.
The benefits of both are, can be very significant.
Mr. Walden. And can they ramp up and ramp down----
Mr. McGinnis. Yes.
Mr. Walden [continuing]. Like, say, a gas turbine plant
does?
Mr. McGinnis. Right.
Mr. Walden. You would be able to do that with nuclear?
Mr. McGinnis. Indeed. Not only do you have, one reason why
is you have 12 different units. And the intent, the design of
course is going through the NRC now for validation----
Mr. Walden. Right.
Mr. McGinnis [continuing]. From a safety perspective, but
the intent is to offer the operator significant versatility in
having different load following or power generation throughout
the day. And so that can be--that is a power combination with
intermittence and bringing in the emissions-free baseload
generation. It is quite exciting in my view.
Mr. Walden. Which is what this would be, emissions-free----
Mr. McGinnis. Yes.
Mr. Walden [continuing]. Nuclear?
Mr. McGinnis. Indeed. Absolutely.
Mr. Walden. I will restrain myself. But this committee has
voted 49 to 4 to also resolve the long-term nuclear waste
storage issue. And the extent to which those who seek to move
forward with additional nuclear power can assist our committee
in its efforts to get this to the President's desk, we would be
most appreciative.
With that, I would yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair would note that votes on the House floor are
taking place. The second bells have rung. We have got at least
three votes here that are queued up. So, we are going to go
vote. It probably will be at least a half hour, and we will
resume with questioning on the Democratic side.
With that, we stand in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Upton. We will resume. Sorry for the delay, but we had
a number of votes on the floor. And we will resume with Mr.
McNerney from California for 5 minutes. The gentleman is
recognized.
Mr. McNerney. I thank the Chair. I rushed over here with my
friend Mr. Shimkus to make sure I didn't hold up the hearing
any today.
Mr. McGinnis, you had a lot of interesting topics that you
kind of went over. One of them was accident resistant fuels.
Can you kind of describe what that is?
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you for that question. Indeed, accident
tolerant fuels is, really represents a class of advanced fuels
that are being developed. There are three commercially led
designs that are being where we are technically partnering with
these three consortia. We selected them through a competitive
process. And it includes one led by GE, one led by
Westinghouse, and one led by what was known as AREVA.
These three designs are being developed to be able to go in
the current fleet of reactors and brings increased safety and
economic benefits. Potentially there is great promise.
Utilities are very interested in it. In fact, we are going to
see a major milestone this year. We are going to see the first
test pins, and also relatedly, test assemblies going into a
U.S. operating reactor to begin testing this new fuel.
There are three different types, but essentially all three
offer improved cladding that can have greater heat tolerance,
and also improvement in economics.
So, those are moving forward. By end of 2019 we expect all
three of these designs to have their initial test pins
operating in reactors. We are looking at about 2025, hopefully
even sooner, to have the first official fuel reloads going in
if things get proven out to go into fleet. So these are,
frankly, seen as game changers by many of the utility operators
and owners of the, of the nuclear reactor fleet.
Mr. McNerney. Well, SMRs are--to change the subject--SMRs
are a big talk and maybe game changers, as we have discussed.
The load following characteristics sound pretty good. I have a
hard time picturing how you are going to get nuclear reactors
to follow fast loads, but I will wait to be shown that. I will
remain skeptical.
And we talked about an SMR design being approved by the
NRC. What about SMRs overseas, what are the--what is happening
overseas? Mr. Atkins, you are probably the right one to answer
that question.
Mr. Atkins. Pardon me. Thank you for your question, but
actually I believe this is probably----
Mr. McNerney. OK.
Mr. Atkins [continuing]. More of a question for Mr.
McGinnis.
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you again. In the past, for the past 11
years, until recently being put in this position, I led the
international nuclear work for the Department of Energy, which
included advocacy for our U.S. nuclear exporters. And I can
tell you firsthand, there are numerous countries, nuclear
markets around the world that are watching very closely the
progress of these U.S. SMR designs.
And they are highly interested in these SMR designs, in
particular the U.S. SMR designs, as indicated. We really are
the leaders, bar none, in the design development. So one thing
that would happen is you would--if we prove out the advanced
SMRs in the U.S., this could open up an entire market globally
for countries whose grids are just too small for a gigawatt or
larger, but don't have the capital to be able to finance.
Mr. McNerney. So would we be producing them and selling
them, or would other countries take over our designs and
produce them and sell them in our place?
Mr. McGinnis. Ultimately, if a company has non-Government
money in it, non-Federal dollars, it is going to be their call.
Obviously, with tech transfer and other nonproliferation and
NRC oversight for any exports. But I can tell you that when it
comes to, in the Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear
Energy, dollars that are put towards technically partnering,
developing IP, joint development of an SMR, for example, we are
definitely going to have a say in our cooperative agreements.
And we are going to, frankly, insist that we see these, these
reactors serve as an export product, not just migrating
overseas.
I can tell you that for NuScale, for example, it is
intended to be factory produced. And the intent is absolutely
to produce them in the United States. And they have already
done a study that looked at the supply chain which essentially,
in my view, validated the ability to be able to produce all the
major components in the United States then export.
Mr. McNerney. I was going to ask Mr. Owendoff about nuclear
waste. But I think I am going to have to let Mr. Shimkus take
that one.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Upton. It is teed up. Mr. Olson.
Mr. Olson. I thank the Chair.
And welcome to our four witnesses. I am sorry for the vote
cycle between your first appearance and second one.
Nuclear power is very big back home in Texas 22. The South
Texas Project Plant is about 100 miles south of my district,
based in Texas. Opened in 1979. Been up and running now for
almost close to 40 years.
Hurricane Harvey direct hit on that reactor, those, those
two reactors. Not one hiccup. Power flowing, nothing whatsoever
happened because that Hurricane hit it dead on. That is
impressive. That is why I will thank you for that.
My questions for you, Mr. Atkins and Mr. McGinnis, by law
any nuclear material that is used for atomic energy must be
mined and enriched here in America. And while current
projection indicates that this is not a problem in the future,
the declining uranium industry and mining could make this a
problem down the road.
How are DOE and NNSA considering these long-term material
needs given the short-term outlook for domestic nuclear fuel?
Mr. McGinnis, Mr. Atkins, who wants to start off?
Mr. Atkins. Well, I can certainly address that question as
it relates to the use of uranium for the national defense
mission. And that is, that is all uranium needs to be U.S.
flagged, as well as produced with only U.S. origin technology.
So, we cannot use uranium that has been processed with foreign
technology for our weapons program.
Mr. Olson. Mr. McGinnis.
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you again. I would like to just
reinforce that the nuclear energy sector in this country is
seen by this administration as a national security issue. These
are--the role of nuclear energy plays a key role in our
Nation's energy security and broader.
I would say that clearly extends to the health and
viability of our Nation's nuclear fuel supply sector. And that
certainly extends to the uranium mining sector. We want to do
everything we can to support a market that provides the
opportunities for the uranium miners in the United States to
prosper and compete, particularly against state-owned
enterprises that are coming in, whether it is Kazakhstan or
others.
It is a highly competitive market. And as you likely well
know, our Nation's American-owned uranium mining sector is in a
very, very challenging moment.
Mr. Olson. Yes, sir. You read my mind, too, sir. As you
mentioned, President Trump put out the National Security
Strategy of the United States of America. He issued that in
December of this past year. And it states, and I quote, ``The
United States will promote policies and incentives that return
the key national security industries to American shores.''
And at the same time, the United States can no longer build
a nuclear reactor using only U.S.-made parts and U.S.-owned
technology which, as you mentioned, is required by law. Is it
critical, to the whole panel, we make our technology and
equipment here in America with American ownership? And how
should we view a ``global'' marketplace?
Mr. McGinnis, first shot.
Mr. McGinnis. First I want to say that the White House is
conducting a nuclear policy review per the direction of the
President, and certainly is looking at the full breadth or our
Nation's nuclear energy sector, again, for the purpose of
revitalizing and expanding our nuclear sector, and that
includes the fuel supply.
I can tell you that in my view, not just the national
security side, from an energy security side I think it is very
important that we have a healthy, robust U.S. nuclear supply
sector. And in the export market it is particularly important
that our leading companies that sell reactors and other
services overseas they are, that they are in a position to be
able to partner with U.S. nuclear fuel suppliers to pair with
the reactors.
Mr. Olson. The disaster in India, we built the reactor and
went to--I see you are kind of shaking your head down there.
Mr. Atkins, your comments about a global nuclear marketplace?
Mr. Atkins. Well, I think it certainly is important fo the
defense mission that there is a strong and competitive domestic
nuclear industry. There are clearly benefits on both sides. For
the defense material, it really needs to come as a solution for
our additional needs for uranium, really needs to come from the
Government programs.
We are, as I have mentioned, we are pursuing a domestic
enrichment capability that will meet our needs for tritium
production by the tritium need date of 2038 to 2041. That is a
high priority for the department. But we are also looking at
how that capability can also serve other needs, including
commercial needs, such as needs for ISA uranium for research
reaction, research reactors and medical isotope production, as
well as a future need into the 2040s for HEU for naval
propulsion.
Mr. Olson. Thank you, sir.
I saw the chairman has his finger on the trigger there to
shut me off. So, Mr. Owendoff and Mr. McCree, please answer
that question for the record.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back by saying everybody in this
room should know it has been 98 days since my Houston Astros
have become the world champions. With all due respect to Mr.
Doyle, that is 96 days more than your Eagles have been
champions.
So I yield back.
Mr. Doyle. I am not an Eagles fan. I am a Pittsburgh
Steelers fan. Let us get that straight.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and
the ranking member for holding the hearing today.
As Hurricane Harvey hit our districts in South Texas, the
South Texas Project and Nuclear Plant based in Bay City was
hit, too. Despite how rough the hurricane was, workers
weathered the storm at the controls and kept the lights on for
over two million people in the Houston area.
Workers at the plant managed to convince a local grocery
store manager to open up to replenish supplies, and ran to
Walmart to buy $2,000 worth of underwear, clean socks, and
other essentials for plant workers who could not get back to
their flooded homes, and worked in rotational shifts throughout
the multi-day storm. I have no doubt that the loss of the power
would have occurred without this, and would have led to even a
more tragic loss of life and destruction in the storm's path.
Nuclear also often gets a bad rap, especially when it comes
to natural disasters. South Texas project as recently as 2011
was going to expand to build two new reactors on site. After
Fukushima disaster, funding evaporated. And I look forward to
talking with our witnesses today about the importance of
nuclear energy and what role it is to play in the grid of the
future.
Mr. McGinnis, in your testimony you talk about the upcoming
civil nuclear review. What are some of the general ideas we can
expect to see when it comes to ways to revise and expand
nuclear power?
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you very much. In multiple ways
concurrent and not waiting until a nuclear policy review is
completely done, we have a challenging time in our nuclear
sector. As indicated, it is at an inflection, if not tipping
point. I think to the great compliment of the White House we
have been told clearly at the Department of Energy, take
actions now as far as ways by which we can support reviving and
revitalizing and expanding the nuclear sector.
So, with regards to the current fleet, with regards to
South Texas Power Plant, it is a critical, vital asset that we
can rely on 24/7, rain, sleet, or snow. So, we are very, very
proud of the workers, of the dedication of that nuclear power
plant during the most important time to provide power to the
residents. Very proud of that.
And that only, in my view, serves to reinforce how
important it is with our all-of-the-above strategy that we
support a continued vibrant nuclear sector to complement the
other generating sources in our electricity grid mix.
Mr. Green. Well, and coming from Texas it is, you know,
with the natural gas so cheap, and if you just economically
look at it, but that power plant provides about 20 percent of
the power in our area. And we could always use additional
stationary power that would be good for 40 to 50 years.
How close are we seeing small modular reactors as a
mainstream possibility? And how could that revolutionize the
nuclear industry?
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you. Very close, in my view, sir.
As indicated, NuScale represents probably the most mature,
from a deployment perspective, of those advanced light water
reactor small modular reactors. That is one reason why we have
invested in a technical partnership with them.
2026 is, again, an important target date. As indicated in
my testimony, in my remarks, we are facing, in my view, a cliff
sooner than we thought with regards to the, the drop in our
fleet of reactors at 20 percent. And we are facing now a very
possibility, real possibility of having a dramatic reduction
from 20 percent dramatically down by the end of the 2020s. So
it is very important that we see these new advanced SMRs coming
in the pipeline and coming into market by the late 2020s. 2026
is the right time.
I want to also mention microreactors. Those have tremendous
promise. They are smaller generation, 2 to even as high as 30
megawatts electric, but they are very exciting, very promising.
And there are, in fact, a couple of them; one in particular
that we are communicating with that has plans of potentially
deploying its first microreactor by 2021 or 2022 in the United
States.
Mr. Green. OK. Can you talk, can you talk a little bit
about the non-LWR technologies are different from typical
reactors? And how is the application process different for
these reactors?
Mr. McGinnis. Yes, indeed. We are actually funding,
partnering with a number of nonlight water advanced reactor
companies in the United States that are really leading the
world in advanced technologies. The applications go well beyond
electricity generation.
We are talking about gas-cooled high-temperature reactors
that offer applications for petrochemical, for hydrogen
production, and other hybrid generation. We have other designs
such as molten salt. We have TerraPower with Southern
developed. TerraPower is a company partly owned by Bill Gates.
They are working on a molten salt design that has very
promising nonelectric application. Certainly sodium-cooled fast
reactors, we have deep experience in that.
So, essentially those are game changing. Once they--and
hopefully they do get proven out, and then suddenly we will
have a much broader opportunity to apply the nuclear reactors
to nonelectric applications.
Mr. Green. I yield back what time I don't have.
Mr. Olson [presiding]. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
now calls upon the heartbeat of Ennis, Texas, the vice chairman
of the full committee, Mr. Barton, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Barton. I am sure that some people in Ennis would
dispute that. But I appreciate it.
Anyway, I am not sure who to ask these questions to because
I am going to go a little bit off the purpose of the hearing.
Mr. McGinnis, or Deputy Principal Secretary McGinnis, I guess
is the highest ranker. So I am going to go with you. But if the
others think it is your question, feel free to step in.
Secretary McGinnis, can you tell me how many dollars
ratepayers have paid into the high-level nuclear waste disposal
fund since its inception?
Mr. McGinnis. I want to give you the exact number, so I
have to get back with you on that. But certainly it is very
substantial. And the Nuclear Waste Fund is in the, I believe,
$30 billion range, but that includes interest.
Mr. Barton. My number is $35 billion. But $30 billion is a
big number. So that is good.
Can you tell us how many of those dollars have actually
been spent for high-level nuclear waste disposal? Again, I
don't need the exact number, just a general number.
Mr. McGinnis. I will definitely have to get back with you
because I don't want to give an inaccurate number. I can tell
you that the Office of Nuclear Energy right now has a very,
very minimal number, in the single digits in millions, maybe.
Mr. Barton. Yes, it is not 35. It is well below 30 to 35
billion. No matter how you do the accounting, it is a small
number.
Mr. McGinnis. Yes.
Mr. Barton. You could even say zero and it wouldn't be too
far off the mark.
Is the department aware that this subcommittee and the full
committee passed a bill to break the impasse on that? And it
passed the full committee 49 to 4, and it would allow for
interim storage. It would allow for spending for a permanent
waste depository. It would allow for the licensing process to
go forward for a yes or no answer at Yucca Mountain.
That bill has not been scheduled for floor time yet. And it
hasn't gone to the floor because the appropriators have, in
their infinite wisdom, spent the $35 billion that was deposited
in the Waste Fund, for other purposes. And that may or may not
have been a good thing to do at the time. But the fact remains
that the bill that passed out of this committee is a long-term
permanent solution, bipartisan. And we are now at an impasse
with the appropriators because they claim they don't have any
money to fund high-level waste disposal, and don't want to
agree to a long-term funding profile.
Is the department aware of that problem?
Mr. McGinnis. We are aware of the legislation. And I would
like to, respectfully, just emphasize that we submitted $120
million not only to resume the license application, but also
for the initiation of a robust interim storage program.
Mr. Barton. Well, you know, the expert on this particular
issue is Congressman Shimkus on our side. So but I want to ask
could you use your good offices to encourage the department,
the Trump administration to help come up with a solution on
funding on a long-term basis so we can get this bill to the
floor and then to the other body, the other body being the
Senate.
I have been here since '85. I was in the department in 1982
when the High Level Nuclear Waste Disposal Act was passed. And
I would like to still be in Congress when we actually fund it.
And as your current Secretary said famously back in Texas,
let's get on down the road.
So, can you encourage the department and the Trump
administration to help us find a solution to this funding
issue, please?
Mr. McGinnis. I and my colleague at the Department of
Energy will do our very best. And also as the Secretary said,
it is very important that we stop kicking the can down the
road.
Mr. Barton. All right, thank you. And with that, I yield
back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Olson. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now calls upon a fan of Terry Bradshaw, not Ron
Jaworski, Mr. Doyle, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is clear to me that the nuclear energy industry is
critical to our country. It provides us reliable baseload power
with no carbon emissions. It provides thousands of good jobs
around the country. And it's a vital component of our national
security.
And I share the opinion of many analysts and energy experts
who believe that we can't lose this source of energy if we have
any hope of meeting our Paris emission targets. It is clear
that we need to do more to bolster this ailing industry, so I
am glad we are having this hearing today. And that would
include holding a formal hearing on H.R. 1320, which I worked
on with Representative Kinzinger. And I would like to thank him
for his leadership on this issue. And I hope this committee can
hold a legislative hearing on it soon.
Mr. Atkins, I want to ask you about the 123 Agreements.
Your testimony highlights the role that your agency has in
these agreements. And given the existing market issues for
nuclear power here domestically, it seems like international
markets will be critical for maintaining a strong nuclear
industry in the United States.
I just want to know, do you feel that there is adequate
cooperation and communication between the range of Federal
agencies required to draft these types of agreements?
Mr. Atkins. Thank you for that question. You know, we, our
position is that the U.S. still has the best technology
available. And we want to facilitate access to global markets.
We do work very closely with the Department of State and other
agencies that are involved with 1--the negotiation of 123
Agreements. And we believe that this relationship is very
productive.
We most recently have negotiated, finished negotiations
with Mexico in 2016. And that agreement is currently in the
White House for final review.
And we are in the process of negotiating with the United
Kingdom, too, on a new 123 Agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation with them that would replace the existing agreement
as they pull out of the European atomic energy community.
So there is a lot going on in this space. And we, we do
invest quite a bit of time and effort. And we are confident
that we have the right team to push this forward.
Mr. Doyle. Yes. And just following up, many of these 123
Agreements and standards were drafted at a time of American
dominance in the nuclear sector. And as you know now, the field
has many more international players. How does NNSA view these
developments in consideration with the existing 123 Agreement
process?
Mr. Atkins. I think we, we continue to be committed to, to
see, you know, these 123 Agreements go forward with the, the
best nonproliferation standards that are possible. But I think
that there is an attitude of realism, and that we, we have to
balance the importance of ensuring that our industry is able to
compete and not withheld from these markets.
So, so there is certainly consideration given to changes in
the environment, and we adjust our policy accordingly.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you.
Mr. McCree, the current NRC funding structure requires fee
payments from existing or operational plants that make up about
90 percent of the NRC budget. With the dramatic increase of
premature retirements, are you concerned about the
sustainability of this existing structure for your agency's
budget?
Mr. McCree. So, thanks for the question. As I indicated in
my testimony, we are committed to ensuring that our fees are,
and our fee process is clear; that the fees are fair; and that
the process is transparent. And to that end, regarding
potential shutdowns of operating nuclear power plants, one of
the first things that we do is adjust our budget as the plant
goes into decommissioning to reflect the lower amount of work
that we anticipate as a plant goes from an operating status
into a decommissioning environment.
That is essential and that helps to minimize the burden, if
you would, of the costs that would convey to the rest of the
industry.
We are also engaging in additional activities, again from a
fee fairness standpoint, that I believe would give additional
balance in the area. So, we are interested of course in, again,
making sure that there is clarity, and fairness, and
transparency. I wouldn't characterize it as a concern.
Mr. Doyle. Mr. McGinnis, I was encouraged to read your
strong support for the nuclear industry. As you explain in your
testimony, it provides 60 percent of the Nation's emissions-
free electricity. However, when you look at the fiscal year
2018 budget request we received, it features a $283 million cut
from fiscal year 2016 levels. The request went from just under
a billion down to 730 million.
So, while I appreciate the emphasis the department has
placed on early stage R&D, and your openness to advanced
nuclear, your testimony and the budget request seem
contradictory. Should we anticipate a revised request in this
year's budget request?
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you very much. It would be premature to
speak about the request. That is going to be rolled out next
week. Hopefully, you will see some positive aspects of that in
our budget request.
But having worked in the Office of Nuclear Energy for 11
years, I can say one thing emphatically, and that is there have
been many, many bright, capable leaders in the Office of
Nuclear Energy and industry that have attempted to support the
nuclear sector in a manner that is going to change from this
downward trajectory, this tipping point, back to an upward
growth.
And, frankly, we have not succeeded. We are witnessing an
historic downward trend right now. Whatever we are doing, it is
not enough.
So I would just like to respectfully say what I have done
in my office is taken that to heart and asked ourselves not
just a function of additional funds, but what are the things we
are missing? What are the things that we can be doing, at least
on the Federal side?
We can make our facilities, Idaho National Lab, advanced
test facilities that companies could never hope to pay for and
build themselves, make it more user friendly. We have another
approach where we are--we have a funding opportunity
announcement with industry. We have already announced it. And
we are getting strong responses.
The intent for that is to get away from the Federal
Government or DOE, Office of Nuclear Energy, trying to pre-
judge what the most important space for the Department of
Energy to be in in partnering with the nuclear companies, and
let them propose to us where the specific highest impact areas
are.
So I am excited about some things that we are doing that
are even beyond just the function of the actual level of
budget, which I think is necessary. We need a robust budget.
Mr. Doyle. I see our chairman has been hitting his gavel
for quite some time. So I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you.
Mr. Doyle. I yield back.
Mr. Olson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now calls
upon the chairman of the Environment Subcommittee, Mr. Shimkus,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate Joe
Barton's comments, so I am going to get--I want to prove that I
am not a Johnny One Note on closing the nuclear fuel cycle and
I'm going to go with some different areas.
Ostendorff for sure will appreciate this from a simple
infantryman. So we mine uranium, we process it into yellow
cake, we convert it into UF6. That is what happens, and we
would like for it to be happening in Metropolis, Illinois. We
enrich it to U-235. And then we use it for fuel, civilian
reactor fuel. We use it for our Navy fleet. And we use it for
our weapons.
So my question goes on the bartering process which kind of
undercuts this process and I believe really hurts the chain,
the fuel chain development, and threatens it at the most. So,
Mr. Owendoff, what is the administration doing to help move
funding for its important cleanup missions to be fully
appropriated by Congress?
Mr. Owendoff. Sir, thank you for the question. Certainly
barter has been an important part of the cleanup at the
Portsmouth site. Last year, in May of 2017, the Secretary
reduced the amount that we would barter from 1,600 metric tons
a year to 1,200 metric tons a year. He is ----
Mr. Shimkus. So let me just go. Is the administration doing
anything to move this to an appropriations process to help fund
these cleanups versus its bartering process? That is the basic
question.
Mr. Owendoff. Sure. We did that last year, sir, in 2017.
Mr. Shimkus. Well, you are diminishing it.
Mr. Owendoff. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shimkus. The question is are you moving it, are you
asking to move it to an appropriations process away from a
bartering process?
Mr. Owendoff. I believe that we have, we have done that. It
is----
Mr. Shimkus. Why don't you just come and talk to me about
the issue.
Mr. Owendoff. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shimkus. Obviously it is important.
Mr. Owendoff. Sure.
Mr. Shimkus. Mr. McGinnis, can you provide an update on the
status of DOE's revision of its uranium management plan?
Mr. McGinnis. Yes, indeed. In fact, we are towards the tail
end of revising the uranium management plan. And we intend to
then put it out into the Federal Register notice for public
input.
And, again, one of the things that I worked in my early
years in the Office of Nuclear Energy was the initial
development of the uranium management plan back in 2008 or so.
I believe it has been very valuable in showing transparency and
the full sweep of nuclear transfers that the Department of
Energy is engaged in.
Mr. Shimkus. Let me follow up on a comment you made about a
concern about possible state actors undercutting our production
in the future. We have got this administrative review going on
to figure out what happened in December with the suspension of
the agreement on uranium from the Russian Federation. There are
many of us who are concerned that, just like any trade issue,
if it is unfair trade, if it is subsidized by a government
entity might be good for lower prices but not good for the U.S.
manufacturing sector. And that is what we are talking about,
manufacturing fuel for this.
Can you, will you provide an update on the expected timing
of this review and DOE's role as part, your role in this
process?
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you very much. The Department of
Commerce is the lead for the Suspension Agreement and the
oversight and enforcement of that agreement. There is a second
action that was recently submitted to Department of Commerce by
the Uranium Miners' Assoc--or uranium miners who are
petitioning a separate but ultimately possibly related issue
from a sector issue.
We work very closely with the Department of Commerce. In
fact, we met with them yesterday on these very issues. So they
look to the Department of Energy as experts to provide
important----
Mr. Shimkus. OK, let me--and I don't--just because of time,
we will talk with the Department of Commerce and follow up on
that.
Mr. Atkins, does the NNSA have any issues involved in this
discussion with Department of Commerce on this agreement and
the review?
Mr. Atkins. We, given that the Department of Commerce has
the lead, we certainly are working closely with them to ensure
that the national security interests are represented in the
investigation, certainly.
Mr. Shimkus. What does that mean in English?
Mr. Atkins. It means we are working with the Department of
Commerce. They are in the lead on considering the petition, and
we are representing what are the implications for the national
security issue.
Mr. Shimkus. Let me finish with Mr. McGinnis.
I have also been involved with Eastern European issues. And
obviously NUCON Power being built, and the Russians building.
And we are not building. What happens to our lead if other
countries aren't looking for us to help build nuclear power
plants?
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you for the question. A lot happens,
both in the export and also the national security space. In my
view--and I will defer to Mr. Atkins to elaborate--but again,
as having led the international export support for nuclear
energy for 11 years, I have worked very closely with the
Russian exporters, with the Chinese exporters, and others. And
when they win these reactor deals, there is no U.S. content in
these reactors, period.
So, the contracts that are written that directly, most
determinatively lay out an agreement on the control of the
materials is being determined by that supplier. And it is not
American companies in these cases.
Mr. Shimkus. Let me help my chairman out. Thank you.
Mr. Olson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now calls
upon the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Castro, for 5 minutes--
Castor.
Ms. Castor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
witnesses for being here today.
The United States has been the leader for decades in
nuclear research and in commercial nuclear power deployment.
But I have to tell you that folks on the west coast of Florida
view nuclear power and its future with a very skeptical eye.
And it stems from the fact a few years ago the legislature
passed a utility-backed law for advanced nuclear recovery fees.
And one utility commenced to open a new nuclear power plant and
also fix one of the older ones.
The fix went awry. And the other plant was never
constructed. And yet, the ratepayers were on the hook for
almost $3 billion, and not one kilowatt hour of energy was
produced. And they are still paying those fees.
So I would like to know, Mr. McGinnis, what, what do you
say to them? They, they see very high capital costs. They
understand the issue of nuclear waste. They understand the
natural gas revolution, the low cost of natural gas, the low
cost of demand management, the low cost of clean energy and
renewables. I think they understand the importance of a diverse
energy portfolio and to have carbon-free energy sources.
But net/net, boy, this has not been a good deal for folks
in my neck of the woods. What do you say to them about the
future of nuclear power?
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you very much. Respectfully, we have 99
reactors operating around the country, as we know; nearly
500,000 jobs directly and indirectly support that very
important, high-paying industry. We do see a very, very
important role of nuclear.
With regards to specific commercial projects in specific
States, ultimately these are issues that are determined and
driven largely by the companies, by the regulators, by the
States. And we respect that. Certainly we want to see healthy,
viable plants, construction start and see-through, and return
that investment to the ratepayers. That is what we want to do.
But to the extent to which the Department of Energy can
play a role, we are working in our wheelhouse, which is
research and development, and we are working with companies,
utilities or for the purpose of developing technologies that
can support better economics, more efficiency, with strong
safety. We are doing our best in our arena. And we certainly
want to see healthy, successful nuclear projects, just like the
all-of-the-above with other energy projects in this country.
Ms. Castor. Do any of the other witnesses have a comment
and what you would say to ratepayers that, you know, trying to
convince them that, yes, this is important for the United
States Congress to prioritize nuclear energy over other
investments?
[No response.]
Ms. Castor. OK. Mr. McGinnis, some of the other witnesses
in their testimony have said that the Department of Energy,
while it is positive that they have $30 million on the street
for early stage R&D in the development of small modular
reactors, that really the Department of Energy is interested in
this but not truly invested in the future. How do you answer
that?
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you very much. I think when you hear
some of the other witnesses, including the Director of the
Idaho National Lab, I think you will hear a compelling
reinforcement of how we are not just interested, we are fully
invested. We live and breathe the health and viability of our
nuclear sector in my office; I can tell you at the laboratories
where they are doing work for us.
So we think, and we are doing----
Ms. Castor. So the laboratories do an outstanding job. I
mean this is probably one of the great points of pride for the
United States of America, everything that is happening in the
national laboratories. What is going on with commercialization,
though, and deployment? I think that is probably the criticism.
Mr. McGinnis. Yes. And one of the things we must do is look
in the mirror and see our weaknesses, not just our strengths.
Our strengths are advanced reactor designs, bar none the most
efficient fleet operated in the world; best regulatory body.
But what we have to work on is deployment. We have, obviously,
gone for decades without building a reactor until we see what
is happening in Vogtle.
We have much to look back and see what we can do to
improve. We have a lot to work on in the space where we can
actually take research and development, make our laboratory
capabilities accessible to the utilities, such as advanced
tolerant fuel--accident tolerant fuels. That could be a
significant impact on the economics.
But what we are trying to do is take our laboratory
capabilities, which the--which my office largely significantly
funds, and make those capabilities available to industry as
they move forward.
Ms. Castor. Yield back.
Mr. Olson. Time has expired. The Chair will now call upon
the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Latta, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Latta. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
very much for our witnesses for being here. And before I get to
my questions I would also like to begin by repeating what the
witnesses' comments about the importance of nuclear power.
I have been in support of nuclear power because I believe
it is important for our energy mix and our national security. I
also believe it is important that we take the entire supply
chain, including the communities that support nuclear power
plants into account. I want to think about how nuclear power
impacts our energy and security.
We must continue to work to ensure that the U.S. remains on
the forefront of nuclear innovation, and this has to involve a
discussion of our current fleet, as well as the future of
nuclear in this country.
And if I can start with you, Mr. McCree. In December, the
NRC released a report titled ``A Regulatory Review Roadmap for
Non-Light Water Reactors,'' which provided a list of options
available for NRC to review both pre-application and formal
applications for advanced nuclear technologies. I appreciate
NRC's leadership to work through some of the policy challenges
associated with licensing of advanced nuclear designs.
Mr. McCree, what do you view as the most critical issues to
resolve as part of your regulatory review of nonlight water
reactor efforts to provide some certainty to the stakeholders?
Mr. McCree. Congressman, thank you for the question. The
document that you reference, the Regulatory Review Roadmap, is
actually one of the seven items--seven activities, rather, that
we explicitly identified in our, as part of our new term
strategy to address the three objectives that I mentioned in my
opening remarks: optimizing our regulatory infrastructure; our
technical infrastructure; and our communications.
It outlines literally a roadmap, an approach from the
research and development through the conceptual and
preliminary, and then the final stages of design and
development for an advanced nonlight water reactor, with an
approach that, that is more flexible, that is staged. That is
terminology that both the industry, the DOE, and the NRC
understand to provide greater predictability, efficiency,
transparency on what comes next; when and how to engage the
regulator in these advanced nonlight water reactor designs.
That is a key step. There are other important deliverables
in the near term, including identifying the design criteria, if
you would, the current fleet of plants where most were
developed using a general design criteria in our regulations.
We need to adapt and identify design criteria that support
nonlight water reactor designs.
The DOE developed a document, Principal Design Criteria,
and we have used that to create a draft of design criteria for
these same reactor designs. So that, and other activities are
explicitly identified in our plan as we are moving forward.
Mr. Latta. When we look at that plan, and with the
initiative, what do you think is going to be the most
challenging part for the NRC as you move forward?
Mr. McCree. Well, again, I am hesitant to identify one that
is most challenging. I think all are achievable. And we
developed the interfaces with the DOE and with the industry,
with the applicants, to work through a full range of issues.
There are policy matters that we will engage the Commission
on, one of which already is from the emergency preparedness
perspective, we have already issued the regulatory basis for
that. There are other issues associated with the siting and
with security that need to be engaged, again, from a policy
perspective.
Again, all are achievable activities, and we are just
applying continued effort to progress on them.
Mr. Latta. OK. Let me follow up with one other question if
I may with you. The NRC under existing statute must recover
approximately 90 percent of its fees from licenses. NRC
currently bills its licensees or applicants about $263 per
hour, which is a high burden on companies seeking to develop
new nuclear technologies.
The Advanced Nuclear Technology Development Act, which I
authored, authorized limited funding outside of the fee base
for the development of certain generic regulatory activity to
help facilitate new technologies. And there will be a witness
on the second panel today that proposed reforming the fee
structure for new reactors.
Has NRC explored reforms to its fee structure to allow more
predictability in its fee collection to help assure we nurture
the domestic nuclear innovators and with some flexibility along
with that?
Mr. McCree. So as I indicated in my opening remarks, we are
certainly interested in our fees, our fee structure being
clear, more transparent and fair. And that would apply to
advanced nonlight water reactor vendor applicants as well. So
they will benefit from the improvements that we make in this
area as well.
Mr. Latta. Well, thank you very much.
And, Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I yield back.
Mr. Olson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now calls
upon the gentleman from the Empire State, Mr. Tonko, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you all for
being here.
Mr. Owendoff, you mentioned the Separations Process
Research Unit, their cleanup--which is in my district--in your
testimony. SPRU demonstrates how difficult, long and, indeed,
expensive these cleanups can be. I appreciate the office's
attention to the site, but I know there are many of these sites
from the 1940s and 1950s around the country that also need
funding and remediation.
Similarly, the majority's memo mentioned Congressman Reed's
bill on the West Valley Demonstration Project. I support this
approach, and hope this is something the committee can more
fully consider in the future. But I would also like to stress
that this should be done in regular order. I hope the majority
might be interested in examining that issue further.
The work being done to research and develop advanced
nuclear technologies, such as small modular reactors, is
incredibly important. We need new nuclear reactor designs that
produce cost-competitive electricity safely. It is critical for
making major reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. But this
cannot be done without Federal R&D funding. DOE research
dollars are at the heart of the United States' global energy
competitiveness.
Mr. McGinnis, can you describe, please, the relationship
between the DOE, the national labs, and the private sector in
developing nuclear energy research priorities?
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you very much. The relationship is very
strong. We work, obviously we--the majority of our funds that
we apply to our research and development go to our national
labs, such as Idaho National Lab, Oak Ridge National Lab, and
others. We are pushing the envelope, trying to be more
innovative.
So we are really putting a value on having all the
leaders--industry, even the universities, national labs--coming
together and working together to go at some of the technical
barriers that are preventing or keeping us back from realizing
the new innovative technologies in our market.
We also work very closely, again, with the NRC. They have
such a key role. And a lot of the technical issues we are
attempting to dispatch will directly, in my view, help and
benefit the NRC as they go through these reviews as well.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you. And I mentioned the relationship
amongst the agency labs and the private sector. What role have
the labs, the national labs, played in the development of
advanced nuclear reactors?
Mr. McGinnis. Vital roles. Idaho National Lab is a founder
in advanced test react--in advanced reactors. They have, I
believe, built over the years 57 or so reactors. And now they
are also home to one of our lead test capabilities in the
advanced test reactor, and just resuming the transient test
reactor, which both of those are unique capabilities for our
country.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you.
And our national labs are critical to not only nuclear but
all energy innovation. So I would once again urge that the
President's budget request reflects this and preserves DOE's
energy innovation budget. It is absolutely critical.
I also want to highlight the importance of maintaining a
robust, domestic nuclear enterprise from manufacturing, to
supply chain, to human infrastructure. Mr. McGinnis or Mr.
Atkins, do either of you want to comment on the importance that
preserving these capabilities goes to both our national
security interests as well as the future of the United States'
nuclear energy industry?
Mr. Atkins. From the nuclear security side of things we
clearly see an interplay between the domestic civil side and
the national defense side. As has been discussed a number of
times, there are fewer and fewer operational nuclear facilities
in the United States, and certainly our domestic and our
ability to have an effective nuclear security program is really
reliant on people that have hands-on experience in the nuclear
field. And so, having a vital domestic nuclear industry helps
us to provide those opportunities for people that may in fact
at some point in their careers come back to the--come to the
national defense side.
So, you know, in terms of innovations on both sides, we
hope to see some push and pull from this as well. We think that
this is a symbiotic relationship that needs to continue.
Mr. Tonko. And Mr. McGinnis.
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you very much. The fact is, reality is
we have lost a lot of our manufacturing capability. We want to
take what we are still world class at, advanced modeling and
simulation, additive manufacturing, and other innovative
approaches we are seeing in the labs and also in industry, take
that and what we are calling leapfrogging. We want to leapfrog
back into the leadership of manufacturing.
There are promising areas such as modeling and simulation,
additive manufacturing, even 3-D printing. Very exciting. We
have facilities in the northeast and others commercially where
we are partnering with them.
So I think we have a real impact opportunity in that arena.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you. And with that, Mr. Chair, I yield
back.
Mr. Olson. The gentleman's time has expired. And the Chair
calls upon the gentleman from the Commonwealth of Virginia, Mr.
Griffith, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McCree, some nuclear technology companies are looking
to the Canadian or British nuclear regulatory bodies to help
advance a regulatory model for advanced reactors. What lessons
can be learned from looking at fellow regulatory bodies? And is
there a role for the NRC to partner with those governments to
provide a standard roadmap amongst our allied countries?
Mr. McCree. Congressman, thank you for your question.
Regarding partnerships, as I alluded to at a high level in my
opening remarks, we at the NRC have a very robust relationship
with our international regulatory counterparts. You mentioned
the Canadians, and particularly the Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission is our regulatory counterpart. I am very familiar,
actually, with their--with my counterpart there. We serve on
several committees together, and have engaged as recently as
August. I was in Ottawa engaging in conversation with several
other regulators and the Nuclear Energy Agency about
cooperation on small modular reactor, in the area of small
modular reactors, which I believe can bear fruit.
Of course, there would need to be, as we have concluded, a
common, some commonality in the types of reactor designs that
are being reviewed respectively for us to have some mutual and
synergistic sharing. I see that happening. I know the
Commission is, of course, interested in that as well.
With the recent announcement by NuScale of potential
pursuit of vendor design review by the Canadians, there is
certainly that opportunity perhaps in the near term with
NuScale. And, again, I believe it would be synergistic. We
won't just learn from them. I would venture to say that there
is great opportunity for them to learn from us as well.
Mr. Griffith. I appreciate that. Thank you very much.
Also, when was the last time that the NRC operated with a
full complement of Commissioners, do you know?
Mr. McCree. Congressman, I have to take that for the
record.
Mr. Griffith. No, I understand.
Mr. McCree. I believe it is--I wouldn't speculate, but I
believe it has been well over a year ago that we had a full
Commission.
Mr. Griffith. And it is better if you have a full
Commission, isn't it?
Mr. McCree. I certainly enjoy the Commission that we have
today and have actually served in the agency long enough to
have seen the full Commission work very well. And when we were
less than a full Commission we were similarly effective. But,
again, I believe we would look forward to having a full
Commission.
Mr. Griffith. Is there an incentive to have five? I think
you are operating currently with three.
Mr. Ostendorff, you served as an NRC Commissioner in
varying compositions. Is a full slate of five a little bit
better than three? Are five minds better than three?
I won't go to Mr. Ostendorff, put him on the spot this
time.
Mr. Ostendorff. Let me help you out. I was there as a
Commissioner from 2010 to 2016. I think the last time there
were five Commissioners there was in 2014.
And I can speak, from a diversity of view and
collaboration, we are always better off with five Commissioners
than three.
Mr. Griffith. I appreciate that. Thank you. I do appreciate
that as well.
Now, I will shift down with what little time I have
remaining to Mr. McGinnis. You talked earlier in some of the
questions to--that Mr. Shimkus asked, we talked about the
impacts of having to import our uranium, et cetera. What is DOE
doing? I got all that you are working with the Commerce
Department. What is DOE doing with trying to make sure that we
make mining of uranium in the United States safe?
Because just outside of my district there is a big rock of
uranium that the State of Virginia has been hesitant, for
safety reasons, to allow the mining of. So what are we doing
from DOE's perspective to make that better?
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you very much. The Office of Nuclear
Energy at the Department of Energy really does focus on
research development within the fuel cycle. It does include
front-end extraction issues.
With regards to regulatory oversight, that would be beyond
my office. Always stand ready to provide input, but certainly
those are, those are issues, responsibilities that fall under
other agencies and other programs.
Certainly can take that for the record and get you more
information, if you would like.
Mr. Griffith. I would appreciate that very much. I think
the folks over in Pennsylvania County would appreciate it, too,
because there is a big asset sitting there that rightfully they
are concerned about mining. But at the same time, it is
estimate 7 to 8 years ago was it is a $12 billion rock sitting
there. Might be nice to get to it.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Olson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair reminds all
Members there is no panel jumping.
The Chair now calls----
Mr. Griffith. In all fairness, Mr. Chairman, that was my
fault. I can't blame that on them.
Mr. Olson. The Chair now calls upon the gentleman from
Ohio, Mr. Johnson, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it.
You know, I have been drafting legislation to improve the
efficiency of the approval process for what is known as the
Part 810 authorization. And I am eager to introduce it once we
get it finalized.
At our recent subcommittee hearing with both--with senior
DOE leadership, both Deputy Secretary Brouilette, and then NNSA
Administrator Klotz, assured me that U.S. civilian nuclear
industry engagement in the global market is priority for this
administration. Information we have received from DOE, as well
as recent reports from the Nuclear Innovation Alliance, detail
longer review times for certain projects, and additional delays
within the inter-agency approval process.
So, Mr. Atkins, let me ask you about a couple of specific
issues related to this. The previous administration's DOE
reversed a longstanding policy which allowed the Secretary to
delegate signature authority for certain authorizations as a
result of a more strict interpretation of the Atomic Energy
Act. Do you know if the current administration is looking at
changing that policy?
Mr. Atkins. Sir, at this time the general counsel has
continued to stand by their interpretation of the Atomic Energy
Act, that the Secretary of Energy cannot delegate that.
Mr. Johnson. That wasn't my question.
Mr. Atkins. We are not considering.
Mr. Johnson. OK. So you are saying that you are going to,
right now you are going to stay with the interpretation of the
previous administration? You are not looking at reviewing or
changing that?
Mr. Atkins. We are always looking to review ways to
increase the speed of reviews. But my understanding is that we
are not looking at delegating that authority.
Mr. Johnson. OK. Would the administration consider a
statutory clarification to be helpful in this regard?
Mr. Atkins. The understanding is that it would require a
legislative change to change that, and that we would certainly
be interested in working with Congress on that.
Mr. Johnson. OK. Under the Bush administration I understand
that the Energy Secretary would receive the authorization
package from DOE staff, which the Secretary could approve
contingent on receiving the necessary assurances from the State
Department that are required under the Part 10--810 rules.
However, now, currently DOE waits on the entire approval
package in a sequential manner, which has increased the length
of time for companies seeking DOE signoff.
Will DOE consider returning to the more efficient process
by which the Secretary can sign off on an authorization ending
the sign-off by the State Department?
Mr. Atkins. I think that the short answer, I will give you
the short answer here: yes. I think we are willing to
reconsider that and are reconsidering that. The long review
time is really this international nonproliferation assurance
requirement that we have. But we are willing to do whatever we
can to shave whatever time that--time off the review that we
can.
Mr. Johnson. OK. I will look forward to working with you on
that.
Acting Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy Mr. McGinnis,
as noted in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the U.S. has no
ability to enrich uranium with domestic technology for either
national security or commercial purposes. What steps is DOE
taking to restore domestic enrichment capability for our
Nation?
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you very much. Very important question.
And my colleague Mr. Atkins can talk to the national security
side, which is a very, very important driver for looking at
reconstituting or establishing enrichment capacity for our
country.
From a nuclear energy perspective, I can tell you that the
issue of whether or not we--there should be other actions taken
to support reestablishing American-owned commercial enrichment,
those issues are also being looked at. It is part and parcel of
the nuclear policy review that is being conducted as well right
now.
But I do think you might find it useful to hear, on the
national security side, what is driving the examination of
possible enrichment capacity or planned enrichment capacity for
national security reasons.
Mr. Johnson. Mr. Atkins.
Mr. Atkins. This really comes back to the requirement for
tritium production for the national defense needs. Really,
there is no commercial alternative at this point, given that,
one, there is no commercial enrichment capability domestically,
and also the prevalence of foreign, the use of foreign
technology in the field.
So really the department is, through its Defense Programs
Office, is committed to pursuing a domestic enrichment
capability for this requirement. We have a series of
downblending campaigns that they are ongoing now to meet the
immediate need. But we will run out of, the projection is we
will run out of enriched uranium at the 2038 time frame. So we
have a series of efforts ongoing right now to consider the
alternatives for technologies to meet such a need.
Mr. Johnson. Have you looked at any of the studies that DOE
has already done in the previous administration for what the
possibilities are?
Mr. Atkins. I can't speak to that, sir, but I could
certainly get back to you.
Mr. Johnson. OK.
Mr. Atkins. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Olson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now calls
upon the gentleman from the Land of Lincoln, Mr. Kinzinger, for
5 minutes.
Mr. Kinzinger. Right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank
you all for spending time with us and being here.
My district in Illinois has four nuclear power plants,
eight reactors, and five, actually, spent fuel storage sites.
We all know it provides, nuclear power provides reliable,
carbon-free electricity around the clock, even when it is
negative 15, like it was at the beginning of the year in
Illinois. Nuclear power not only provides good jobs and clean
energy, but also represents an opportunity for continued U.S.
leadership around the globe. From helping our allies to
operating their plants safely--to operate their plants safely,
or having the expertise needed to lead on nonproliferation
issues, nuclear power is vital to our Nation and to our
national security.
I would like to thank my colleague Representative Doyle,
who truly recognizes the importance of these issues, and has
worked tirelessly with me on H.R. 1320, the NUKE Act. I truly
believe this bipartisan bill is a step in the right direction
to help our existing fleet, and also the next generation of
nuclear technology.
We will start with Mr. McGinnis and then Mr. McCree. But,
first, Mr. McGinnis. The Atomic Energy Act prohibits foreign
ownership, control, and domination of U.S. commercial nuclear
interests and nuclear plants. In 2016, the NRC budget hearing
before this committee, then Chairman Burns said that this
prohibition is something that is worth taking a look at. The
provision in my bill would do just that by having the GAO
report on the feasibility and implications of repealing this
provision.
So, Mr. McGinnis, since the Atomic Energy Act was signed
into law the U.S. Government has established processes to
review national security interests in key sectors, such as the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. Would it
make sense for Congress to consider alternative policies to
review foreign investment in our nuclear facilities?
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you very much. Certainly, the CFIUS
process you talked about is extremely important. We greatly
care and we very closely watch and monitor foreign investments
in nuclear generating assets and companies.
With regards to whether or not there should be additional
actions taken, I would have to get back with you on that.
Mr. Kinzinger. But is it worth taking a look at?
Mr. McGinnis. I will certainly get back with you and offer
you any suggestions on that.
Mr. Kinzinger. So you can't tell me if it is worth taking a
look at? That is all I am asking.
Mr. McGinnis. Certainly worth--we welcome Congress' strong
monitoring of the situation----
Mr. Kinzinger. Right.
Mr. McGinnis [continuing]. In supporting a robust nuclear
industry.
Mr. Kinzinger. I got it. Good work.
Mr. McCree, in an increasingly global market is this
restriction worth taking a look at? And if so, what do you
think would be the potential impacts?
Mr. McCree. Congressman, thank you for your question. I
would offer that the Commission has not taken a position on the
proposed legislation and I, so I would not--it would be
inappropriate for me to speak for the Commission.
Mr. Kinzinger. All right. Another provision in H.R. 1320
requests GAO study the impact of eliminating what is known as a
mandatory hearing for uncontested licensing procedures.
Removing this requirement would allow the Commission, if no
affected person requests a hearing, to issue a construction
permit and operating license, or an amendment to those permits
and licenses without holding a hearing. The NRC has previously
informed Congress that it believes amending the Atomic Energy
Act to eliminate the mandatory uncontested hearing on combined
license and early site permitting applications could enhance
the efficiency of NRC operations.
Mr. McCree, if this requirement were removed, it is my
understanding that the Commission would be required to provide
public notice of the opportunity to request a hearing. Is that
correct?
Mr. McCree. Congressman, I believe you are quoting
correctly from previous testimony by members of the Commission.
So I would acknowledge that.
I am not aware of any Commission request for similar
legislation or similar elimination of the mandatory hearing
recently, however. So I would again defer to the Commission on
that.
Mr. Kinzinger. OK. In the licensing review process, what
are the public comment opportunities beside the mandatory
hearing? Can you elaborate on these?
Mr. McCree. I would need to get back to you for the record
on that.
Mr. Kinzinger. I hope you do.
Well, that was quick, I guess, Mr. Chairman. So 52 seconds
I yield back.
Mr. Olson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now calls
upon a fellow Texan, Mr. Flores, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Flores. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate
the panel for today's informative discussion.
I believe there is great potential when we look at the
opportunities for small modular reactors, and also with
innovative next gen designs that have been developed thus far.
And am excited about what can come beyond that.
There are a bunch of challenges in front of us that need to
be addressed before we--in order to provide a successful
pathway for these new technologies to come to fruition. One
issue in particular relates to the availability of what is
known as high-assay, low-enriched uranium. This specific
material, uranium, enriched at higher levels than what is
available in the current commercial market, may offer more
flexibility and more efficient electricity generation than what
we have available today.
There is a recent industry survey of 16 leading U.S.
advanced reactor technology developers, found that the lack of
access to high-assay LEU ranks at the top of policy concerns
that require resolution to move forward with these projects.
Just a few weeks ago in front of this subcommittee, DOE Under
Secretary Menezes confirmed DOE's interest in addressing this
concern.
So my question is to you, Mr. McGinnis. Are you familiar
with this barrier to advanced nuclear innovators?
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you, Congressman. Yes, I am.
Mr. Flores. Can you offer any thoughts about how this can
be addressed?
Mr. McGinnis. I can tell you from the nuclear energy sector
in particular, those who are working to develop our Nation's
next class of advanced reactors, many of those reactor designs
will require higher levels of enrichment, as you have
indicated, high-assay LEU, which is another way of saying 16,
17, or 18 percent enrichment as opposed to the 4.5 or so
percent that our fleet uses now.
We do believe it is a very important issue. It is a supply
chain issue. It is an energy security supply issue. And it
extends to also the NNSA's space as well as our advanced
reactor deployment plans.
Mr. Flores. In light of that, I assume that the NRC is
looking at the policy challenges associated with the material.
Is that correct, Mr. McCree?
Mr. McCree. Mr. Flores, thank you for your question. And at
this point we don't see what would represent policy issues.
There are a number of technical issues. Mr. McGinnis mentioned
some of them. It even goes to the criticality analyses,
neutronics that would be represented in the core. From a
transport packaging perspective there are issues. And even in
the fuel cycle, you know, what enrichment capabilities exist.
Would there be a need for new facilities or an amendment to a
license at an existing facility, and et cetera?
So there are a number of issues like that associated with
the supply chain that would need to be addressed. But that is
more than a technical issue rather than a policy issue.
Mr. Flores. Mr. McGinnis, would a DOE program to manage
this material similar to how DOE provides fuel for research
reactors be an option?
Mr. McGinnis. To be clear on your question, you are
referring to high-assay LEU with research reactors?
Mr. Flores. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. McGinnis. Yes, that is very important supply chain
issue as well.
Mr. Flores. Would that be an option to use for these
advanced generation nuclear reactors?
Mr. McGinnis. Well, I would rephrase it to say, from my
view research reactors, a number of them, have high enrichment
fuel requirements as well.
Mr. Flores. Right.
Mr. McGinnis. Higher level. And they will need a supply
chain. There is no commercially available higher enriched level
available now. And we will have to come to terms with that.
Mr. Flores. OK. To the extent that Congress wants to take a
look at this, I am assuming your office would be willing to
work with us to try to develop policy solutions?
Mr. McGinnis. Yes, certainly.
Mr. Flores. Mr. Owendoff, I have 58 seconds left. West
Valley Demonstration Project was a commercial demonstration
reprocessing technology, but it ceased operation about 40 years
ago. The department is still overseeing the decommissioning and
decontamination work at the site; is that correct?
Mr. Owendoff. Yes, it is, Congressman.
Mr. Flores. The last time that the project was authorized
was in 1982. Would DOE support legislation to reauthorize this
project?
Mr. Owendoff. I think we have provided technical advice in
the past. And we will continue to work with you, Congressman.
Mr. Flores. What other issues would need to be addressed if
we--at West, at the West Valley site?
Mr. Owendoff. I think it is a complex issue. So if we can,
for the record, work with your office, sir.
Mr. Flores. OK. You can do that supplementally after the
hearing.
Mr. Owendoff. Yes, sir.
Mr. Flores. OK, thank you very much. I yield back.
Mr. Owendoff. Yes, sir.
Mr. Olson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair sees no
Member seek to ask questions, so on behalf of the committee,
thank you to the first panel. I will remind our Members they
have 10 legislative days to submit questions for the record
and, to all the panelists, you have 10 days to reply to those
questions.
Thank you, thank you, thank you. You are dismissed.
Panel two, you are up. And be advised that a vote is coming
up sometime next 45 minutes, so please be expeditious. Thank
you.
You all have had your water. Are you ready to rock and
roll? OK, the second panel is starting.
Our first speaker with an opening 5-minute statement will
be Bill Ostendorff. He has been on the first panel, but he is
also Distinguished Visiting Professor of National Security at
the United States Naval Academy. Go Navy. You have 5 minutes,
sir.
STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM C. OSTENDORFF, DISTINGUISHED VISITING
PROFESSOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY;
MARK PETERS, PH.D., DIRECTOR, IDAHO NATIONAL LABORATORY; MARIA
G. KORSNICK, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NUCLEAR
ENERGY INSTITUTE; DAVID C. TRIMBLE, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES
AND ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; AND ASHLEY
E. FINAN, PH.D., POLICY DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR INNOVATION ALLIANCE
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. OSTENDORFF
Mr. Ostendorff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I must acknowledge
my friend Congressman Shimkus here, and congratulate him on the
Army-Navy victory back in December. I would be remiss in not
doing so.
I thank you for the chance to be here today. While I an
currently a professor of National Security Studies at the Naval
Academy I am not here on behalf of the Navy. Rather, I am here
to speak of my experience in submarines, in the nuclear weapons
programs and the NRC.
I would like to offer a few thoughts on the national
security imperatives of what I call the U.S. nuclear
enterprise. By nuclear enterprise, I simply refer to three
significant programs:
First, the Nation's nuclear weapons program, the Manhattan
Project; second, the Navy's nuclear propulsion program under
Naval Reactors; and third, the Nation's commercial nuclear
industry.
Let me share my own experience in all three legs of the
enterprise, spanning four decades.
After graduating from the Naval Academy, I entered Admiral
Rickover's Nuclear Navy. I embarked upon a naval career that
spanned 26 years, with 16 years of sea duty on six submarines.
I carried both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons on three
of these submarines. I was also privileged to command a Los
Angeles class attack submarine, the USS Norfolk, for 3 years,
during which time we drove that submarine 100,000 miles. That
submarine and its reactor plant were engineering marvels, and
the crews professional and highly motivated.
After retiring from the Navy and working for the House
Armed Services Committee, I was confirmed by the Senate to
serve as Principal Deputy Administrator at NNSA, overseeing the
30,000-plus people in the nuclear weapons complex. Later, in
2010, I was confirmed to serve as a Commissioner of the NRC,
where I served from 2010 to 2016.
My 40 years in submarines, nuclear weapons, and commercial
reactors has ingrained in me the vital role of human capital in
the nuclear enterprise.
Nuclear is different. This work is hard, it is challenging,
it requires the best trained engineers and scientists. But
without that nuclear-related work to actually perform, those
unique human capabilities atrophy at an alarming speed. And as
that reactor technology work decreases in the United States, so
does the ability and opportunity for the United States to
influence nuclear safety and security worldwide.
Are there national security consequences to a declining
commercial nuclear industry? Absolutely.
Let us first look domestically.
A prerequisite for national security is energy security.
Nuclear energy provides carbon-free, reliable baseload
generation. It would be unwise for our Federal Government to
sit by and watch the current industry decline continue, for at
some point that decline becomes irreversible. It is naive to
think we could revive the nuclear industry at some future point
if it lies dormant for even just a generation.
Economically, the nuclear industry provides well-paying
jobs, supporting local communities across the country.
Let's look at human capital for a brief moment. Many of the
current nuclear plant operators at commercial plants started
out in the Nuclear Navy. Will the prospects of reduced
opportunity for employment in the commercial industry have a
negative impact no the Nuclear Navy's ability to recruit? I do
not have any data to share, but I think the answer may be yes.
What about the impact of a declining industry on
undergraduate and graduate programs in nuclear engineering?
What about the ongoing partnerships between community
colleges and the nuclear plants that hire their graduates with
associates degrees?
I now turn to the impacts in the international arena. The
ability of the U.S. to lead in nuclear safety, security, and
nonproliferation efforts is significantly lessened as
commercial activity erodes. To engage internationally, the
United States must participate. I saw this firsthand as a
Commissioner in the aftermath of the 2011 reactor accident at
Fukushima in Japan. The U.S. was a key leader worldwide in
post-accident nuclear safety regulation.
I also saw this when speaking on best practices for both
physical and cybersecurity for the IAEA in Vienna in 2015. Many
countries look to the U.S. for regulatory lessons learned--
whether safety or security--because of the reputation and size
of our program.
When I was sworn in as a Commissioner at the NRC in 2010,
the New Reactor staff was reviewing license applications for 26
reactors. Today, that NRC staff is reviewing just two designs.
While construction of the two AP 1000 units is in progress at
the Vogtle site, no others are being built in the U.S. today.
As our nuclear industry shrinks, our nuclear voice is not
as loud as it once was internationally.
Who fills that void? Russia currently dominates the export
market for nuclear fuel and reactor technology. China is
embarked on an aggressive domestic nuclear construction program
and is poised to move out internationally.
It would be a natural development for Russia and China to
control the nuclear export market and to aspire to key
leadership roles at the IAEA and other international nuclear
forums.
Finally, the traditional U.S. leadership role in nuclear
nonproliferation is clearly threatened by this alarming trend.
In closing, it is a fact that our nuclear industry is in
decline. There are clear, significant national security
consequences at stake. This matter is urgent. I applaud the
committee for bringing attention to this vitally important
topic.
I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Ostendorff follows:]
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Mr. Olson. Thank you, Mr. Ostendorff. And thank you so much
for your service in our Navy. And people in the audience should
know he was a driver. They are boats, not ships. I flew a plane
that hunted them, a P-3 Orion. We could find those Soviets, but
could never find them unless they wanted to let us find them.
So thank you for that as well.
The next panelist is Dr. Peters from the Idaho National
Laboratory. Dr. Peters, you have 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MARK PETERS
Dr. Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you,
Chairman Upton, and Ranking Member Rush, for the opportunity to
be here with you today. And also thank all the members of the
committee for joining us.
My name is Mark Peters, and I am the Director of Idaho
National Laboratory. INL is the Nation's lead nuclear energy
research and development laboratory, the place where 52
original nuclear reactors were designed, constructed, and
operated.
It is our mission to provide the research, development, and
demonstration foundation to extend the lives of the current
operating fleet, develop the next generation of nuclear
reactors, and provide integrated nuclear fuel cycle solutions.
As we have already heard, nuclear energy is a vital
component of America's energy system. And, in particular,
advanced nuclear energy technologies provide an opportunity for
the U.S. to meet future electricity demands while benefitting
our economy, our environment, and our national security.
The United States remains in a position of strength.
However, the future is not guaranteed. We are at a critical
junction, a turning point as I like to say. Decisions made
today will determine if the U.S. continues to lead the world in
civil nuclear energy, innovation, and production.
I remain optimistic about the future of nuclear energy
because of the science and innovation coming out of our
national laboratories, universities, and the private sector. We
have the finest research, development, and demonstration
facilities, the most developed capabilities, and the best
minds.
I am also optimistic because of our history. America has
always risen to the challenge. Before us is a grand opportunity
to maintain and enhance our leadership going forward, while
ensuring U.S. nonproliferation and safety approaches continue
to be the world's standards.
When the U.S. domestic nuclear energy industry languishes,
our international leadership role suffers. Russia and China are
aggressively expanding their nuclear capabilities. These
nations, with their state-sponsored nuclear industries, enjoy
tremendous advantages over the private sector in the U.S., and
understand the decades-long influence that results from
building a nuclear power plant in another country.
We also should not forget the benefits that U.S. nuclear
energy brings to economic development. A healthy domestic
industry allows for a robust export market and international
influence. So national security and economic opportunity are
powerful motivators to maintain and eventually build upon our
advantages. So, how do we accomplish this?
First, by making sure we sustain our current nuclear
reactor fleet. INL is working with utilities to modernize
control rooms and work to provide the basis to extend the life
of power plants beyond 60 years. We have transitioned the
Light-Water Reactor Sustainability Program from one concerned
primarily with licensing to include helping utilities reduce
operating costs.
But if we are to maintain that advantage, we must set up
private-public partnerships to develop and deploy the next
generation of nuclear reactors.
Our national labs are ideal places to do the research and
development and then actually partner with industry to
demonstrate these new technologies. Our current example is the
emergence of light-water small modular reactors, as we have
already heard multiple times this morning. It is great news for
the American nuclear energy industry, and the Nation as a
whole, that the NuScale small modular reactor continues to work
its way through the NRC process.
We have been involved at INL with NuScale from the
beginning, providing technical support and guidance. And as you
heard this morning, NuScale's first SMR is planned for the INL
Site, in partnership with Utah Associated Municipal Power
Systems' utility consortium in the West. We will also be
working with them on the Joint Use Modular Plant program that
would allow the laboratory to actually use the first few
modules in the 2026 time frame to actually develop and
demonstrate advanced energy system processes, in collaboration
with NuScale and UAMPS.
As you have already heard, SMRs are a game changer. They
are smaller, safer, cheaper to build, easier to license, and a
window into a lucrative and an influential export market to go
forward.
We are also working on advanced reactor designs, including
coolants beyond light water reactor, cooled reactors. And as
mentioned this morning, this will allow us to not only produce
electricity, but also penetrate other markets with nuclear
processes, for example, the manufacturing and transportation
sector.
We are also excited to be working with the private sector
to develop and demonstrate small, very small reactors,
microreactor technologies. I think they have the possibilities
of powering remote communities and military bases around the
world.
Key to all this is maintaining the research infrastructure
of places like Idaho National Laboratory, Argonne National
Laboratory, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory going forward,
like the Advanced Test Reactor, like the Transient Test
Reactor, and like the Materials and Fuels Complex at INL.
We are also embarking on a development, design and
deployment of a Versatile Fast Neutron Source that we would
like to have in place within a decade that would further our
U.S. leadership and provide that important infrastructure.
So, let us remain the world leader and a tone setter by
developing a sound civil nuclear energy policy. I put to you
that our national labs and universities give us a tremendous
technical advantage over our competitors across the globe. Let
us approach the great opportunity with urgency, and a
collective desire to achieve results and excitement to attract
the net generation of nuclear scientists and engineers to our
field. For the good of our economy, our environment, and our
national security, let us embrace this challenge.
I am happy to answer questions.
[The statement of Dr. Peters follows:]
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Mr. Olson. Thank you, Dr. Peters.
Our next speaker is Ms. Maria Korsnick. And she is the
President and CEO of the Nuclear Energy Institute. Ma'am, you
have 5 minutes for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF MARIA G. KORSNICK
Ms. Korsnick. I appreciate the opportunity to testify
before you to highlight the state of America's nuclear industry
today
Nuclear power runs 24 hours a day, 7 days a week; provides
almost 20 percent of America's electricity. These plants are
hardened facilities that are protected from physical and cyber
threats, helping to ensure the resiliency of our electricity
system in the face of potential disruptions.
The 99 reactors that we have in our nuclear fleet today
represent 60 percent of the clean electricity in our country.
Our Nation's nuclear industry, however, is at a crossroads, and
we urgently need tangible signals from Congress that it values
nuclear power. And this is not a partisan issue. I see Members
on both sides of the dias who either have lost nuclear plants
in their States and local communities, or may soon experience
this unfortunate event.
And you are not alone. America is in danger of losing
dozens of her nuclear reactors in the next 10 years. To put
this in perspective, units that have recently closed, and those
who have announced specific plans to close would produce 90
million megawatt hours of clean energy. That is enough
electricity to power 8.4 million homes each year. And this is a
conservative estimate, as there are additional plants who have
not provided a firm date but are clearly at risk, like the Ohio
plants.
But it doesn't have to be this way. Nuclear power's
contributions to this country deserve to be recognized. And
this committee has the power to make that reality. A single
nuclear plant creates hundreds of jobs and millions of dollars
in revenue for rural towns and cities. And it produced
unmatched amounts of carbon-free clean air electricity. And, as
recently illustrated, it has the ability to withstand extreme
weather events and continue to produce low-cost electricity, a
major factor in ensuring the resiliency of our grid.
And for these reasons and more, we need to value nuclear
power and work together to find a way to keep these essential
plants online.
There are really four areas that need attention.
First is fair compensation.
Second is the fuel cycle. And that means the front end, the
mining and enrichment piece; and the back end, a workable used
fuel program.
Third is reforming the NRC. That involves both the fee
structure and streamlining licensing of new technologies.
And fourth is exporting our technology. We need to level
the playing field for our nuclear firms to compete against
foreign governments.
My written testimony includes a number of legislative
actions that would advance the prospects for nuclear energy to
meet our Nation's needs. I commend Chairman Upton for hosting a
series of hearings on the electricity markets. And I cannot
stress enough the importance of ensuring appropriate market
compensation for the attributes of nuclear power. Market
reforms are essential to the viability of the U.S. fleet.
Simply put, we need your help to ensure that FERC and its
associated RTOs and ISOs fully value the benefits provided by
our plants.
I would also encourage the committee to consider innovative
approaches, such as making it easier for Federal agencies to
enter into power purchase agreements with new and existing
reactors.
I thank this committee for taking action on used fuel
legislation. And I do hope we can work to ensure House passage
of that legislation in the near future, and another bipartisan
piece of legislation led by Congressmen Kinzinger and Doyle to
address the much-needed NRC fee reform. We do appreciate these
efforts, and hope we can get them to the President's desk this
year.
There is exciting innovation in the nuclear industry. It is
happening across the company from reactor startups to the
cutting edge research being conducted at our national labs, as
you have heard. And this gives me hope. But if America, the
country with the most reactors in the world, sits back and lets
our fleet atrophy, that important innovation will die off as
well. And we cannot let that happen.
Right now, of the 58 reactors under construction worldwide,
only two are being built here in the United States. And even
those projects are in jeopardy pending congressional action on
the Nuclear Production Tax Credit. Comparatively, Russia is
building seven reactors, and China 19. We are in imminent
danger of ceding our global leadership in technology, that we
invented, to the Russians and the Chinese.
Failure to lead the next wave of global nuclear
construction means a significantly diminished ability to
promote U.S. safety standards, nonproliferation behaviors, and
security norms around the world. Simply put, U.S. influence
grows when we have a strong civil nuclear industry.
Nuclear power has always answered the call of this Nation.
It has powered our homes, our businesses, and our navy. It is
allowing for space exploration and visits to Mars. It has
helped fund schools and essential services in local communities
across this country. Today the nuclear industry is here to ask
America's leaders to answer our call. Please work with us to
make sure this American technology does not become a ghost of
our past. Your help and your active support is urgently needed.
Thank you. And I look forward to answering your questions.
[The statement of Ms. Korsnick follows:]
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Mr. Olson. Thank you, Ms. Korsnick.
Mr. Trimble is recognized for 5 minutes as well. He is the
Natural Resources and Environment Director at the Government
Accountability Office. Five minutes, sir. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF DAVID C. TRIMBLE
Mr. Trimble. Thank you. Chairman Olson, Ranking Member
Rush, and members of the subcommittee, the critical missions of
the Department of Energy depend on the extraordinary
capabilities found at the department and its network of
laboratories and production facilities across the country.
These capabilities depend on the large and unique capital
assets found at these facilities, but also the expertise of the
workforce that is a product of years of on-the-job training and
experience that exists nowhere else in the world.
These capabilities serve all of DOE missions, including
weapons, cleanup, nonproliferation, energy, and science. To
successfully execute these missions, DOE must maintain,
rebuild, and renew both its physical and human capital. DOE's
efforts, however, are hindered by longstanding management
challenges that have been well documented in reports by Mies-
Augustine, CRENEL, the Academies, and GAO.
The growing fiscal and budgetary pressures facing the
Government mean that DOE can no longer afford to poorly manage
these billion-dollar programs.
My testimony today will highlight some of the challenges
facing DOE, including the affordability of NNSA's nuclear
modernization programs, the growing costs of DOE's
environmental liabilities, management challenges in the
nonproliferation program, and DOE's efforts to improve its
management of programs, projects, and contracts.
Regarding weapons, NNSA faces challenges with the
affordability of its nuclear modernization programs. Our review
of the fiscal year 2017 modernization plan found misalignment
between NNSA's plan and projected budgetary resources, which
could make it difficult for NNSA to afford its planned
portfolio of modernization programs. We found that NNSA's
estimates of program costs exceeded the projected budgetary
resources included in the President's planned near and long-
term modernization budgets.
Regarding environmental cleanup, DOE's growing
environmental liabilities demonstrate the need for DOE to
improve its oversight and management of its cleanup mission. In
2017, we added the Federal Government's environmental
liabilities to our high-risk list. DOE is responsible for about
370 of the 450 billion-dollar total, and DOE's total cleanup
liability has been growing.
Over a recent 6-year period, DNN spent $35 billion on
cleanup, while its liabilities grew by $90 billion. I should
also note that these liability estimates do not include all of
DOE's future cleanup responsibilities.
Our recent works have identified opportunities where DOE
may be able to save tens of billions of dollars by taking risk-
informed approach to treating a portion of this Low Activity
Waste at its Hanford site.
Regarding nonproliferation, DNN has not consistently used
program management leading practices. We found that DNN's
policies do not require programs that establish life cycle
estimates or manage their performance against schedule and
across baselines. In addition, we found that DNN's R&D results
were not being tracked consistently to help evaluate the
success of that program.
To successfully meet the challenges facing it, DOE needs to
improve its management of its programs, projects, and
contracts, areas that have been on GAO's high-risk list for
almost three decades. In recent years, DOE has taken some
important steps, including requiring the development of cost
estimates in accordance with best practices; creating new
oversight structures; and ensuring that major projects,
designs, and technologies are sufficiently matured before
construction.
However, significant challenges remain:
First, DOE still lacks reliable, enterprise-wide cost
information. Without this information, meaningful cost analyses
across programs, contractors, and sites are not possible.
Reliable detailed data are also needed for DOE to manage its
risk of fraud.
Second, DOE has not always followed its own requirements.
In 2015, we reported that DOE initiated a new project, Low
Activity Waste Pretreatment System, to accelerate waste
treatment at Hanford. We found this project was selected
without full consideration of alternatives, and DOE's cost
estimates were not reliable. Additionally, DOE has not
consistently applied these recent reforms to its largest
cleanup project at the Hanford site.
Third, regarding program management, we found in 2017 that
NNSA had established program management requirements for
commodities like uranium, plutonium, and tritium. However,
these requirements are not being met due to staff shortages.
In closing, let me note that we have several ongoing
engagements for this committee examining these management
challenges. And we strongly support the oversight efforts of
the committee.
Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions.
[The statement of Mr. Trimble follows:]
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Mr. Olson. Thank you, Mr. Trimble.
Our final opening statements if from Dr. Ashley Finan from
the Nuclear Innovation Alliance. She is the Policy Director
there. Five minutes, ma'am, and welcome.
STATEMENT OF ASHLEY E. FINAN
Dr. Finan. Thank you, Chairman Olson, Ranking Member Rush,
and distinguished members of this subcommittee. Thank you for
holding this hearing and for giving me the opportunity to
testify. I am honored to be here today.
I am Ashley Finan, Policy Director for the Nuclear
Innovation Alliance. The NIA is a nonprofit organization
dedicated to supporting entrepreneurialism and accelerated
innovation and commercialization of advanced nuclear energy.
The world will increase its energy demand by 40 percent or
more by 2050, driven by an emerging middle class in the
developing work, and the need to bring electricity to 1.2
billion people who lack it today. At the same time, it is well
understood that clean energy is essential to human health, and
many analyses point to the pressing need to transition to an
emissions-free energy system.
Nuclear energy will play a vital role in a future energy
supply that addresses these priorities. The question for us is:
will the United States be a part of that?
In the U.S. and elsewhere, start-up companies are
pioneering advanced nuclear designs that offer opportunities
for increased safety and affordability, enhanced
nonproliferation attributes, and a reduction in nuclear waste.
These designs can revolutionize the nuclear industry and
revitalize U.S. exports with products that take advantage of
the latest manufacturing and computing technology, that are
competitive in markets across the globe, and that exceed the
expectations of customers and the public.
But the transition from design to commercialization and
deployment has been hampered by significant underinvestment in
research, development, and demonstration, by a slow and
underprepared licensing process, and by a long and lengthening
export control process.
The Government plays several roles in the commercialization
and expert of a nuclear energy technology. It is an R&D
collaborator, a demonstration partner, a regulator, and a
promoter. In turn, as with any new technology, the Nation
profits from the economic impact of the product and the exports
and jobs it creates.
Unique to nuclear energy, though, are several other
benefits: including centurylong strategic trade relationships
with customer countries; reliable clean energy to fuel domestic
and global prosperity; and stronger U.S. influence over global
nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation standards.
We have not seen a booming U.S. nuclear export business in
decades. Not least among many causes is the lack of a
compelling nuclear energy product from the private sector. The
market demands plants that are more resilient and flexible,
lower impact, and simpler and cheaper to build and to operate.
As I touched on earlier, companies are answering that call, and
they are innovating. They are finding a U.S. Government that is
curious and interested, but not wholly invested, and not always
ready to innovate.
Meanwhile, Russia is building a fast test reactor to
replace its retiring predecessor, as well as a lead fast
reactor to join its two operating sodium reactors. China is
simultaneously running several major R&D programs, and its
commercial high temperature gas reactor will be connected to
the grid this year. India's prototype fast reactor will also
enter operation this year.
I don't want to be alarmist. This does not need to devolve
into a geopolitical race. But it is a harsh reality of business
that if we are last to market, we are likely to become
irrelevant. And it is a harsh reality of global nuclear
security that the countries supplying nuclear power have the
strongest hand in influencing how nuclear programs are
protected from misuse and how safely those programs are run.
Export application timelines through DOE's Part 810
specific authorization process have slowed from 150 days on
average to over 400 days between 2000 and 2014, with some
decisions taking over 900 days. This authorization is often
required very early in the marketing process to allow companies
to share information with potential customers. Long processing
times make it difficult for U.S. companies to compete.
The NIA has proposed actions to improve these timelines in
its ``Part 810 Reform'' report, including changes to DOE's
processing structure. We need to address this issue.
Similarly, NRC licensing of advanced reactor technology is
fraught with major challenges, as described in detail in my
written testimony. The NRC has begun addressing these
challenges, but they have done so with extraordinarily limited
resources. This work needs to be pursued with dedicated funding
and with urgency.
To secure a leadership position in the global nuclear
market, the U.S. needs to move its designs from development to
demonstration and deployment. The NIA made recommendations in
its ``Leading on SMRs'' report: Congress and the administration
should expand support for the development of first-of-a-kind
demonstration projects, and it should explore opportunities for
advanced nuclear reactors to provide reliable power to Federal
facilities.
The private sector cannot do this alone. And it is time for
Government to move from being interested to being invested. It
is time for Government to act with urgency and to support
innovation earnestly. These efforts will help bring our
homegrown advanced reactor technologies to market more quickly,
so that these transformative technologies can leapfrog
international competition.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify. I would be
pleased to respond to any questions you might have, today or in
the future.
[The statement of Dr. Finan follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Olson. Thank you, Dr. Finan. Now is the fun time,
Members' questions. And the chairman gives himself 5 minutes
for a round of questions.
The first question is to you, Ms. Korsnick. You mention in
your opening statement the work other companies are doing to
deploy nuclear reactors. And I want to translate that to Texan.
You said we are getting whipped, I think. We are being whipped
by these guys overseas.
Part of their deployment overseas is by cost and Government
support, but they have regulatory hurdles as well that are part
of their equation. My question is, can you talk about what they
do that is different than what we do? Are they big differences?
Are they safer, the pros, the cons? How can we catch up pretty
quickly, because we are losing the race right now.
Ms. Korsnick. Yes. So, as we have talked here, the
competition is significantly in Russia and China. And I would
say they look at their nuclear fleet in a much more strategic
way. They decide quite up front that if they are involved in
your energy they have some amount of control of your future.
So, a Russia person knocking on your door would say, ``I am
going to build you a reactor. I am going to operate your
reactor. And I am going to take your used fuel.''
It is not the same business proposition, quite frankly,
that we can make.
On the positive side for us, we have very strong
technology, very good technology, and we still have countries
that are very interested to do business with the United States.
But we need to be more aggressive. We have got to level the
playing field. We need to make it much more easy for our
businesses to do business in the nuclear sector.
Mr. Olson. I have a question 2. Much of the conversation on
nuclear energy is focused on commercial reactors for power,
generating electricity. However, those reactors are just one
piece of the entire fuel cycle. You have processes like mining,
conversion, enrichment. They are all critical to have a robust
nuclear industry.
We also forget about the workers. Comments were mentioned
during the first panel, the South Texas Power Plant right there
in Bay City is having a crisis of workers because opened up in
1979, those workers have been there since then, they are now
retiring. Luckily, they have approached Wharton County Junior
College, they have a campus down there, to train the next
succession of workers, because without them that place goes
dark.
And so, what is the state of our industry across the
broader fuel cycle, what changes do we need dramatically now,
and what to work on in the future to get this thing, this ship,
righted quickly?
Ms. Korsnick. So, if you look at the worker picture, I
would say currently the picture is not too bad. The challenge
that we have is if we don't continue to invest in this
industry--and we heard from speakers earlier--that people don't
continue to study nuclear engineering. They don't continue to
go into these programs.
But over the last several years the nuclear industry has
paired with local community colleges, et cetera, and put
programs in place to keep that pipeline of talent, if you will,
strong. Those programs have paid off. And I would say currently
the pipeline is healthy. But that is because the current state,
if you will, there's some view that there are jobs to be held.
As they watch these plants close, that picture changes very
quickly.
Mr. Olson. Next question is for you, Dr. Peters. I
understand that DOE, as you mentioned, has entered into a site
use permit for the INL and NuScale to construct the first SMR.
Your testimony, though, is that INL has partnered with NuScale
since the outset in their efforts to build this new design.
Based on that experience, what policies should be considered in
the future to make what you are doing go all across the
country?
Dr. Peters. Thank you for your question, Mr. Chairman. So,
so we have partnered with them from the beginning. And that
started with actually a DOE grant, a few decades ago actually.
So it has been a long run.
But the partnership that we have with them now, it is there
is a permit that, an MOU effectively, that says, here, what it
looks like to use our site. But there is also strong
collaborations with them vis-a-vis potential use of some of the
modules for, for research use, and also power purchase
agreements between them and the Government. So I think those
sorts of approaches can be used with other reactor vendors, so
things like power purchase agreements, like using, using them
for research.
And using the site. We have built 52 reactors on our site,
so there is plenty of space. We can actually demonstrate more.
So I think you have just got to take what we have already done
and transfer that over to other reactor vendors.
I should also tell you--I can't get into specifics here,
partly because of NDAs and whatnot--but there are other
companies that are calling us now and saying, hey, with this
NuScale-UAMPS deal can we actually talk to you about how we
might be able to do that on your site as well?
So there is a lot of promise there. I would emphasize that
the innovation and the advanced reactor space in the U.S. could
put us back, could put us back in the lead if we play it right.
Mr. Olson. And, sir, that is music to my ears.
My time has expired. The Chair now calls upon the ranking
member of the subcommittee, Mr. Rush, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rush. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Korsnick, I have said it on several occasions that I
believe that we must establish policies that place the light on
our nuclear fleet, the sources of safe, reliable, low-carbon
energy. However, I did not agree with the DOE NOFA because it
appeared to be nonhastening and with little transparency or
dissertation for how that outcome was decided.
And second, during our Powering America series of hearings
we heard that fuel diversity is as important to reliability as
any other characteristic.
So the question remains how do we get to the point where
our nuclear fleet is thoroughly and reasonably valued for some
of these unique attributes but we are not picking winners and
losers only based on the 90-day storage rule.
So the question is, Do you support a strictly market-based
approach wherein the ITOs implement price reform efforts to
recognize the different contributions of nuclear resources,or
do you believe that there is a role for Congress in helping to
enact policy objectives, such as moving toward a low-carbon
economy that will make the most of the contributions made by
the Nation's nuclear fleet?
And I also want to ask for a response from the other
members of the panel.
Ms. Korsnick. Thank you. I would say ultimately we do favor
a market solution. But I would say that that market solution is
too slow in coming. And so, the challenge that we have is as
the market is trying to sort this out we are going to see still
yet several additional plants close.
And, you know, I would just step back and say at a high
level, currently, you know, electricity as a commodity, every
electron is treated equally. Some of those electrons produce
pollution to produce those; some of those electrons were
produced in an intermittent fashion; some of those were
produced from a baseload reliable resource; some produced
carbon to make them; some produced emissions, some didn't. And
so, at the end of the day we need a process where the market
really values how those electrons were produced and not just
that electrons were thrown onto the grid.
And this is the process that the market needs to, you know,
to step through. We do appreciate an all-of-the-above energy
strategy. But, again, the challenge that we have is the
market's response has just been too slow in coming.
Mr. Rush. Any other? Yes, sir.
Mr. Ostendorff. Congressman Rush, thank you for your
question. I completely agree with Ms. Korsnick here. And would
suggest that if under your--in your opening statement this
morning you talked about all-of-the-above.
Mr. Rush. Right.
Mr. Ostendorff. And I am part of that strategy. From my own
philosophy, you need to recognize what we do to imperil nuclear
energy as a potential source in the future if we don't support
it right now.
Defendants say we need to not just be interested, we need
to invest. I completely agree with what she just said here.
This is not something that can wait 10 years and decide the
Federal Government should invest; it needs to happen now. It is
not going to get any better with time. And as more plants
continue to close because of economic issues, I think we might
face the reality of not having this open as a future option for
us.
Mr. Rush. Ms. Finan.
Dr. Finan. I think that nuclear power is important because
it can address a wide array of concerns, including but not
limited to national security, energy security, air emissions,
and reliability--all of those simultaneously. So it is
appropriate to value all of those attributes as we think about
our energy sources.
And the NIA will be pleased to work with the committee to
evaluate ways that Congress can help.
Mr. Rush. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
Mr. Olson. The gentleman yields back. The chair now calls
upon the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Shimkus, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it is good to
follow my colleague from Illinois.
Also, I am going to follow up. I am changing my order of
questions. I want to go to Ms. Korsnick on this whole debate of
market-based solution too slow.
Republican conservatives we believe in markets. And we
believe that--but we also believe that if there is a risk
profile or uncertainty, that is a cost that is passed on. So in
my first panel round you heard me talk about the front end of
the fuel cycle. Of course now I guess the question is, On the
back end of the fuel cycle, because of Federal Government
inaction, is there risk and additional cost incurred by the
nuclear industry in holding, maintaining, storing, litigating
the back end of the fuel cycle?
Ms. Korsnick. There is a cost. But I would say it is even
steeper than, than what perhaps you are suggesting. And I would
say one of the number one reasons that people question the
viability of nuclear power is because we do not have a waste
strategy.
And so it is not only a cost in operation, it is a
reputational cost, quite frankly, to the industry at large that
says we don't understand. It must be really difficult to solve.
It must be, in fact, technically impossible because, as the
United States, we haven't solved it in decades.
And to try to counter that with, well, no, it is not
technically difficult; no, there is a very technically feasible
solution; we have just chosen, in fact, not to adopt it; it has
actually put an albatross around the neck of the nuclear
industry to, quite frankly, go forward with viable public
support.
Mr. Shimkus. Yes, and I am glad you finished that way
because I would say we do have a strategy. We do have a law. We
just have failed to implement it. It has really been a
political failure, not a scientific failure.
Of course, Mr. Ostendorff and I have had this discussion
when he appeared before us with the NRC, and it took court
cases to ring out of the hands of the NRC the safety and
evaluation report that said long-term storage would be safe for
a million years, which took a lot longer. I thought it was
going to take a million years to get that report out.
But having said that, I want to go to Mr. Ostendorff. And I
don't want to read the whole, the national security strategy of
the United States of America, issued a report in December, but
the basic premise is the Nation's ability to produce needed
parts, systems help, and secure supply chains, and skilled U.S.
workforce. That is their concern based upon the national
strategy.
In your previous life as a boat captain, is there a
concern? Is that a valid concern if we lose this expertise?
Mr. Ostendorff. I would suggest--I will answer this two
ways, Mr. Shimkus. First, my experience on boats is a long time
ago. But I can tell you at the end of the Cold War when I had
taken command of a submarine in 1992, there were 100 attack
submarines in the U.S. Navy. Today that number is 53. So the
industry's base of providing products for naval reactors as an
organization for nuclear powered submarines and aircraft
carriers--and the cruisers have gone away, the cruisers have
all been decommissioned--that product base where the supply is
naval reactors has shrunk.
Naval reactors has indicated that they are doing oK right
now, but there is not a lot of other options for them to go to.
And whereas you used to have companies that did work for naval
reactors and for the commercial nuclear industry, now it is
just sole source naval reactors. And so that has your overhead
costs increased because they have a smaller customer base.
Those kinds of issues are real.
Mr. Shimkus. So in my couple seconds left, even former
Energy Secretary Menezes mentioned that we have, we are the
gold standard of engineering, development, construction. As we
go through this high-risk profile of uncertainty do--and this
is really you all kind of mentioned it in your opening
statements--do we really believe that Russia and China, with
their deployment and their construction, will be safer and
trained better than if we were competitive in the world market?
Ms. Korsnick, what do you think on, on safety, security,
international aspects in this Russia, China, world leadership
debate?
Ms. Korsnick. I think if your question is is the United
States still the best operators of nuclear plants today, it is
unquestionable that we are. You can see with our strong
operational record and our 90 percent capacity factor. So I
would say we are by far the best from an operational excellence
perspective.
But at the end of the day, if the Chinese and the Russians
are building the reactor, then that is the technology that is
going to be out there, and that is the technology that people
are going to want to understand how to operate and what to
learn from. And that is why it, strategically, it is important
for us to get our designs out there.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Olson. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now calls upon a Member who, during the first
panel, is a big fan of Lynn Swann but not Harold Carmichael,
the man from western Pennsylvania, Mr. Doyle, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Korsnick, I wanted to ask you a question about your
testimony regarding NRC fee structures. Can you explain how the
current fee structure penalizes reactor licensees that continue
to operate if another licensee decides to discontinue
operation?
Ms. Korsnick. Well, right now the way that the structure
has, across the licensees, 90 percent of the budget for the NRC
needs to be collected from the licensees. And so as plants shut
down there is just fewer to spread those costs across to
achieve that 90 percent.
Mr. Doyle. Yes. And I think H.R. 1320, the bill that
Representative Kinzinger and I have introduced and which you
highlighted in your testimony, would address this issue. And I
appreciate you mentioning it in your testimony.
Dr. Finan, in your written testimony you express similar
concerns over the current fee structure of the NRC. In your
testimony you urge, in preparation for the licensing of
advanced reactors, consistent public funding for the agency.
First, could you speak to what fee reform would be beneficial
to the nuclear industry going forward, and what level of
funding you would recommend?
Dr. Finan. Well, the NIA supports reforms that address the
NIA's fee structure. And in particular, H.R. 1320 would enable
the NRC to use dedicated funds to prepare for advanced reactor
reviews. That is an important part of that bill.
It is also important that that authorization is paired with
adequate appropriations to enable progress on that front. The
NRC has identified figures of around $10 million per year as
being adequate to support their ongoing effort.
I think that, additionally, the NRC's current schedule is
slower than the innovators would like to see. So if there is a
way to bump that up a little bit and allow the NRC to
accelerate and move faster, that would be well worth it.
Mr. Doyle. Great.
Can you tell me what other regulatory reforms you think we
should consider to help spur deployment of advanced reactors?
Dr. Finan. Well, I think that, you know, one important area
is in the Part 810 reforms. We have issued a report recently
recommending several reforms to Part 810. It is the export
control regulations have evolved over the years. Initially
there were 15 countries that required specific authorization.
Over time, and by 2015 that had grown tenfold to 149. And in
particular, in 2015 the number doubled from 75 to 149.
That, paired with the very long review times are really
putting our companies at a disadvantage overseas. So we need to
address that. And we have made several recommendations
regarding the DOE's processing structure and some other
opportunities to move that faster.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you.
Ms. Korsnick, in your testimony you said the nuclear
industry is at a crossroads. I want you to just elaborate on
the current outlook for the nuclear industry.
Ms. Korsnick. Well, I would say from a current outlook
perspective, you know, five plants have shut down; eight plants
have announced that they are going to shut down within the next
several years. And those are ones that have just, as I said,
given a specific date or a specific year that they are going to
shut down.
And there are a handful of others that are clearly
challenged. I mentioned the power plants in Ohio, for example.
Those were not included in the eight that we mentioned, but
clearly are challenged to continue to operate.
And so, if you look at that, you know, holistically, as I
mentioned, it is more than 90 million megawatts of clean air
energy that would be produced on an annual basis. That is a
lot. And I know that there has been great technology in solar,
and wind, and others that have been brought to bear. But we are
digging a very deep hole for clean air that will be very
difficult to fill. I would say it is not possible for the other
clean air technologies to fill that.
So we are simply, if you will, working backwards.
Mr. Doyle. Why don't you also just speak a little bit about
the economic benefit of the industry to our country? I think
people----
Ms. Korsnick. Well, yes, I mean it is powerful. I mean,
somebody mentioned that we employ, you know, 500,000 workers
both directly and indirectly. I think from a tax base
perspective I think we contribute, you know, $16 billion,
something of that magnitude, might be $12 billion. So, I mean,
it is a very strong contributor, in fact, to our economy.
I was a site vice president at a power plant in New York,
and I saw firsthand the impact of these plants. You know, when
I had to talk to the local mayor and the school superintendent
about the possibility of the plant that I ran potentially
shutting down, you know, they said, but, Maria, you are the
school system. Right? We are so dependent on the tax base that
you are to this local community that, you know, quite frankly
they, they didn't really have a way to go forward without.
And that is very typical of where these plants operate in
the rural communities and towns that they are a part of. You
know, they are a part of the hospital system, the police
system, the school system. And, you know, they have been
operating reliably for so many years.
And I will remind you that when these plants were
originally commissioned, you know, they were really
commissioned for 40 years of operation. That 40 years has
turned into 60 years. You just have a plant go forward this
year that is taking that 60 years and asking for 80 years of
operation. So these are gems. These are highly reliable, clean
air technology. We are talking things that operate 80 years.
And there is nothing magic about 80; they can probably go for
100 years.
So this kind of technology, this kind of investment, this
is infrastructure in the United States, and we should look at
it in that capacity.
Mr. Doyle. Right. I see, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
courtesy of letting--I just want to say as I close, as
Commissioner Ostendorff said, that it is unwise for us to sit
by and watch this industry decline because at some point
decline becomes irreversible. I want you to know I couldn't
agree with that statement any more. And I think we all need to
take that very seriously.
Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for your courtesy.
Mr. Olson. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
To follow up on the gentleman's comments, Ms. Korsnick, you
should know about South Texas Power Plant. When Hurricane
Harvey hit the big power plant in my district had four coal
generators and four natural gas. The coal got wet. All that
coal is down. That nuclear plant kept running in the worst part
of the hurricane. So that is an important part. It is reliable,
it is there, it is clean, we have to make more of it.
The Chair calls upon Mr. Flores from Texas for 5 minutes.
Mr. Flores. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the panel
sharing their enlightened responses with us today.
Ms. Korsnick, I appreciate your answers to Mr. Doyle's
questions about the impact that these plants have on the local
communities. I was privileged in my first term to represent the
Comanche Peak complex up in Somerwell County, Texas. And
without those plants I mean there is no school system, no
police. You are exactly right. There is no community. So I
appreciate your comments on that.
I am privileged to represent two tier one research and
education universities: Texas A&M, which has a highly acclaimed
nuclear program; and also the University of Texas which was the
home to former NRC Commissioner Dale Klein.
Mr. Ostendorff, as a professor of national security at the
Naval Academy and as a former officer in the Nuclear Navy, are
you concerned about whether young men and women who are looking
at their future careers, including those at the Naval Academy,
are you concerned about what they are going to think about the
nuclear industry moving forward in light of its state today?
Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir, I am. There is no, there is no
question about it.
I don't have any statistics to share with you, but I see
midshipmen all the time. I have been an adviser to the Naval
Academy's nuclear engineering program. And I have spoken at the
University of Texas, their engineering program, about nuclear
issues when I was a Commissioner. And I see people saying,
young people today in their twenties and early--I would say in
their twenties, they are really looking ahead. What are the
options out there for me 10 years, 20 years from now? And they
are taking a very calculated look at what opportunities exist
or do not exist.
And as Maria has said, when you have five plants that are
shut down, eight more have announced to shut down, the signals
are there. There is no ambiguity about the current status of
the nuclear industry. And I have very strong feelings that that
is a negative signal for people to want to pursue that.
Mr. Flores. OK. Just in a few seconds each, does anybody
else on the panel have any comments on that issue?
Dr. Peters. Yes, I would, I would comment on that. Just
reemphasize that, well, just briefly, I was at Texas A&M in
November for an interaction between the laboratory and Texas
A&M. And I was enthused by, I was in a room of about 100
students, and I got inundated with questions afterwards,
including resumes and whatnot. So that is a good thing.
But I think that is fleeting. If we don't--you know, that
will go away. Five years from now, that will not be the same
room if we don't do something now.
Mr. Flores. Right. And I appreciate Ms. Korsnick's comments
and also Dr. Finan's comments about we, as policy makers, have
to invest in helping to have a healthy nuclear industry moving
forward.
Would anybody on the panel like to comment about the role
of university nuclear programs and how these programs interact
with ongoing research, and industry, and issues as we move into
advanced nuclear? Anybody have any comments?
Dr. Peters. Well, they are vital. We have close
partnerships, the laboratories all work closely with the
nuclear universities, the universities with nuclear programs
across the Nation. They are vitally important.
And maintaining their infrastructure is really important as
well. So the research reactor, like at Texas A&M for example,
and other universities, because that teaches the kids how, not
only how to operate reactors but also the kind of research that
you can do in those reactors. So that is all very, very
important.
But also, more collaborative programs, having DOE and the
NRC continue their graduate fellowship, fellowship programs.
And that is always something we collectively support up here, I
know. But also more collaborations where we bring more kids to
the lab for internships and whatnot. And we are working that
very actively.
But they are vital. That is the pipeline. If we don't keep
those alive, we are in trouble.
Mr. Flores. Dr. Finan, you look like you would like to add
something.
Dr. Finan. I would just add that the university programs
and the students play a vital role in inspiring the industry
and the labs to think differently and to do things in a more
innovative way. So they are really crucial, not just as a
pipeline but as driving the industry to think big.
Mr. Flores. OK, thank you.
Anybody else on this?
[No response.]
Mr. Flores. OK. Thank you for your participation today. I
yield back.
Mr. Olson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now calls
upon the pride of Saratoga Springs, New York, Mr. Tonko, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Tonko. There you have it. Welcome, everybody.
I always am quoted as saying I want the United States to be
the leader of the global clean energy economy. And that
certainly includes advanced nuclear.
It seems clear from today's testimony that other countries
around the world are overtaking us in commercial nuclear
energy. Other nations see the need for clean energy as well as
the export market opportunities. So there is a big question of
what will be the consequences of nations like Russia or China
dominating the global market.
And I know that, Dr. Finan, you had provided some examples
of that in earlier questioning.
But, Dr. Peters, I believe our Nation has a tremendous
advantage over our global competitors due to having the best
facilities and universities in the world. You just made mention
of that partnership of the labs. Can you drill down a little
deeper for us about the importance of funding for our national
labs and how they interact with the Department of Energy in
terms of support for R&D investments, and what that means to
our advanced nuclear research agenda?
Dr. Peters. Sure. So the labs as a whole, across all of the
DOE research portfolio, have--there is a partnership associated
with it. There is the oversight component. But I feel very good
about the partnership and helping set the research agendas from
the Office of Science, which you are familiar with in
Brookhaven, over to the applied programs like nuclear.
As you heard Mr. McGinnis say earlier, a small number of
the labs, including INL, work very closely with them to help
set the research agendas. So I feel good about the partnership.
I can't say, I can't agree more on the need for stable,
stable research funding, and not having this up and down, up
and down. We are maintaining large facilities. We are retaining
world class workforce.
I would also say it is, it is a question of maintaining
international leadership because other countries are trying to
emulate the national lab system.
Mr. Tonko. Yes.
Dr. Peters. That is going on across the world.
Mr. Tonko. It is interesting that you point out the
certainty level.
Dr. Peters. Yes.
Mr. Tonko. And where we have been losing some people in an
international competition, where it may not even be about the
applied salary as opposed to that the certainty is there.
Dr. Peters. Right.
Mr. Tonko. There is this long-term commitment. And I am
hearing that now in your statement.
Dr. Peters. Yes. The lab records as a whole have concerns,
lack of stability. We have exciting work to do. That is never a
question. It is the lack of certainty from year to year that
does tend--and it is either folks who perhaps foreign nationals
who work at the lab, which are an important part of the lab,
who go back to their home country. Or, for that matter, U.S.
people who go to a university to work, or over to industry.
And I always say I am not afraid to lose good people if it
is for the right reason. But that is not the right reason.
Mr. Tonko. Yes, absolutely.
And, Mr. Ostendorff, you made some very strong comments
about human infrastructure with which I completely agree. A
great point that you made. And this sector needs our Nation's
best engineers and scientists. And I have been able to meet
with amazing young people pursuing these careers in my
district. Sailors training at Kesselring in Saratoga County;
nuclear engineers over at RPI, some of whom have gone on to
work at Knolls Atomic Power Lab in Niskayuna.
And the failure to develop the next generation of nuclear
technology, coupled with the decommissioning of our existing
nuclear fleet, would certainly hurt our ability to maintain an
industrial base, supply chain, and the necessary human
infrastructure in order to have the United States be a global
leader.
If those capabilities go away, can you explain the
difficulty to rebuild that infrastructure, the human
infrastructure?
Mr. Ostendorff. Just a real quick comment. I lived in
Saratoga Springs 6 months in 1977 going to Ballston Spa
prototype, S3G core-3. So I----
Mr. Tonko. Good choice.
Mr. Ostendorff [continuing]. Know that area well.
But and the people there were military and civilian.
General Electric had the contract. And so we were working with
a mixed workforce where people took great pride in this. And
others, you know, Dr. Finan has very capably mentioned the
security aspect, knowing what the future presents as far as
opportunities, that is very essential. And people will beat
their feet to go elsewhere if they don't have the
opportunities.
And very quickly, we have seen, Ms. Korsnick is more of an
expert on this than I am, but I saw as NRC Commissioner how
hard it was for us to start the construction of the AP1000
reactors in the United States. Just look at Lake Charles,
Louisiana--I grew up in Louisiana, so I can say this--they
struggled mightily to develop the modular construction for
these containment pieces that, because we had not done that for
many years, didn't have welding qualification standards in
place, did not have the NQA-1 nuclear stamp processes. Those
things are much better today than they were, but back in 2012
when construction started it was not going that well.
And so I think we should not underestimate how hard it is
to resume something after a long hiatus.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you. That is a very helpful insight.
So, with that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Olson. He yields back.
The Chair now calls upon a Member who is from one of six
States that were a part of the Republic of Texas, Mr. Mullin
from Oklahoma.
Mr. Mullin. Oh, my goodness. If you didn't have such a good
baseball season, I would make some wisecrack about our great
football season.
Hey, Mr. Ossendorff--am I saying that right?
Mr. Ostendorff. Ostendorff.
Mr. Mullin. Ostendorff. All right. I apologize about that.
Thank you, first of all, the entire panel for being here.
It is very enlightening for all of us and for Congress as a
whole.
But, you know, for years the U.S. led in nuclear power. And
as we have said multiple times already here, you know, China
has quickly taking that role. Strategically speaking what does
that, what does that mean for the U.S.? What does that mean for
the future of our nuclear power and the stability, even on
national security issues, for us moving forward?
Mr. Ostendorff. So let me give you these two examples. I
will use the one I was personally involved in was the aftermath
of the March 2011 Fukushima event.
Mr. Mullin. Right.
Mr. Ostendorff. The United States' industry, NEI, U.S.
industry, NRC, Department of Energy, State Department played a
major role in helping Japan look at how to move forward. We
would not have had that opportunity if we were not operating
the largest reactor fleet at the time, period. There is no
question about that. We were a key player, Japan looked to us.
And I think we added a lot of value to nuclear safety
worldwide.
Second area let's talk about, and others have mentioned,
China and Russia developing new reactor technology. And I used
to do a lot with Russia when I was an official of NNSA 10 years
ago. Russia has significant technical capabilities on the
engineering side; a long history of nuclear engineering on the
commercial side; and then their submarine force. Our ability as
a country to influence future nuclear standards going forward
is almost nil if we are not doing something ourselves in the
United States.
Mr. Mullin. Good point.
Mr. Ostendorff. And if we are not a player, we don't get a
voice. It is as simple as that.
Mr. Mullin. So how would you think that plays into our
national security risks?
Mr. Ostendorff. So, one example I would just offer: our
ability as a country to have an understanding of what other
countries' abilities are in uranium enrichment, the ability to
produce weapons grade material for a bomb. Our understanding of
other countries' ability is informed by people like Dr. Peters
and INL staff, because they are doing research, they have the
technology every day.
So, not to get into classified issues, which is not the
purpose of us being here, but there is a nexus with
understanding other countries' capabilities by being involved
in nuclear technology, research, and development.
Mr. Mullin. So is it safe to say because of our lack of
really moving forward with our nuclear technology and the
nuclear power that we have, and it seems that we are drawing
backwards, is there going to be a drain on the expertise of
personnel that is going to be available to be able to
understand where to move to, understand what our threats are
and what the future holds for it?
Mr. Ostendorff. I think we will always have dedicated
Americans ready to work and support Department of Defense,
intelligence community, and so forth. However, in many cases
they leverage the research done, Argonne National Laboratory,
Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and so forth. They also
leverage the lessons learned from the NuScale, looking at their
SMR designs.
And so as we decrease that reactor technology R&D in this
country there will be less of an opportunity for us to have an
understanding of what is in the art of the possible elsewhere.
Mr. Mullin. So just kind of an overview, could you tell us
where you feel like the industry is headed, and in what areas
we could help in?
Mr. Ostendorff. Well, I think, as others have greater
expertise than I will just give you my layman's version. Let me
go back to Dr. Finan's comment. I think at this stage the
Federal Government needs to invest. I think Department of
Energy has done a very credible job of trying to support----
Mr. Mullin. Invest in specific areas?
Mr. Ostendorff. Oh, I am going to talk about small modular
reactors just for a moment.
Mr. Mullin. OK.
Mr. Ostendorff. I think the small modular reactor work that
Department of Energy, Office of Energy, Mr. McGinnis' group has
been very good. I am not sure that is going to be sufficient to
ensure that SMRs are going to be economically marketable.
A former head of Naval Reactors talked about the building
of the 18-unit Ohio Class submarines back in the 1970s and
early 1980s. That former four-star admiral in a discussion 4
years ago said that Naval Reactors learned about a 78 percent
efficiency curve going from the first Trident submarine build
to the 18th. We have to have X number of units to spread the
risk out. It is just not going to be sufficient for the United
States to build just one or two SMRs. We need to be able to
spread that risk out over many more than that.
I think perhaps the Federal Government has a role in
investing in that project.
Mr. Mullin. Yes. My time is out. Panel, thank you so much.
Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for, for the time you allowed
me, and I yield back.
Mr. Olson. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now calls upon the gentleman from the Wolverine
State, Mr. Walberg, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the
panel for being here. Having a nuclear power plant in my
district, this is an important issue to understand.
Ms. Korsnick, I understand that in addition to paying fees
to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, commercial nuclear power
plants also fund FEMA's REP program as well. Industry fees I am
told total over 30 million annually to support FEMA's efforts
to coordinate State, local, and Tribal governments to plan, to
train, and conduct preparedness exercises in the event of a
radiological emergency, which we hope never takes place.
This program supports some important activities. However,
given the ongoing cost pressures on our fleet of nuclear
reactors I want to be assured that these fees are only directed
to activities that support the program's mission.
And so, Mr. Korsnick, are you aware of this program? And
secondarily, what sort of oversight is necessary to make sure
the program is run efficiently?
Ms. Korsnick. Yes, thank you. I am aware of the program.
The program, it stands for Radiological Emergency Preparedness
Program. And we actually are very concerned, relative to the
transparency, of how these funds are being spent. I do think
that it is important. And we ask, in fact, this committee as
oversight to help us gain that transparency.
Because right now, although we put in a sufficient amount
of those funds--and you mentioned, you know, $30 million--it is
very difficult to appreciate exactly how these funds are being
spent. And, in fact, there has been allegations to suggest that
they are being spent on non-REP activities.
Mr. Walberg. Do you have any examples of that?
Ms. Korsnick. Well, I can just say that there has been
allegations that were made. I don't personally, I can't
personally substantiate the veracity of those allegations. But
we do suggest that an audit of those funds would be
appropriate.
Now, would this, this audit provide that transparency that
you are seeking? And how? Is there a mechanism--help me out
with that--is there a mechanism by which if you did have an
audit that that information could be transparent to you and be
useful?
Ms. Korsnick. Yes. And I guess what I am suggesting is I do
think that that would be an important thing to take on. Perhaps
that is something that this committee, with your jurisdiction,
could help encourage that such an audit would be performed.
And then, of course, depending on the results of that
audit, obviously, you know, we could be the best next steps
going forward. Would there be some additional transparency
requirements, different reports perhaps that would need to be,
that would need to be made?
But I think a good first step is to get an audit.
Mr. Walberg. OK. Any further, anything from the rest of the
panel?
[No response.]
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Olson. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now calls upon the gentleman from the Palmetto
State, Mr. Duncan, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Duncan. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am surprised that you
know that we are the Palmetto State, but we are glad we are
because 57.6 percent of the State's electricity comes from
nuclear power. So, very apropos to the hearing today.
Captain Ostendorff, you mentioned in your opening statement
that a prerequisite for national security is energy national
security. And I couldn't agree with you more.
First off, thank you for your service to our country in the
United States Navy and all that you continue to do training the
young men and women of the future in the Navy today.
You also mentioned it is imperative the U.S. remain a
global leader in nonproliferation efforts. And this depends
upon as domestic, commercial activity increases. The President
mentioned in his State of the Union a push for a robust 21st
Century nuclear program for our nuclear arsenal, deterrence,
and all that goes along with that.
Nuclear energy has almost zero emissions. That is a good
thing. But as we create that energy we also create nuclear
waste. Oconee Nuclear Station and Oconee County, South
Carolina, has about 40 years' worth of nuclear waste sitting on
site.
The Vogtle Plant probably has the same amount.
So we have got all this nuclear waste sitting on site in
dry cast or wet storage at nuclear production sites. We have in
the nuclear weapons arsenal production, whether it is what
happened at Hanford or Savannah River Site creating our nuclear
arsenal, we have a lot of yucky stuff that is being taken out
of the ground through environmental management efforts. And a
cleanup site at Hanford and the EM down at Savannah River Site,
we could go through Idaho and Oak Ridge and all these others,
but at the end of the day we end up with a lot of yucky, highly
radioactive waste, whether it is in the tank farms or whether
it is the spent fuel rods that are sitting in dry and wet
storage around the country. And you heard Shimkus, Chairman
Shimkus mention earlier about Yucca Mountain.
We need as a nation to embrace the law of the land, which
is a long-term, stable storage facility. After all the science,
all the money, everything, taking money from ratepayers in
South Carolina to create Yucca Mountain as a long-term storage
site, but yet it sits in mothballs because of politics. But the
law of the land is the law of the land. So we need to do
something with that waste.
Take that in consideration of what happened in South
Carolina this year. I am a proponent for nuclear energy. I
think it is a great source of electricity to meet the 21st
Century and beyond, electricity needs to manufacture, heat and
cool our homes, or whatnot, possibly power our cars. And we
need to build more nuclear power plants in this country because
we have aging nuclear reactors around the country. Whether that
is California or South Carolina, the facts are the facts that
they are aging.
And we are starting actually to decommission some reactors
in the Northeast. And some of those decommissioned reactor
parts, reactors parts come to South Carolina to a storage
facility in Barnwell, low--level nuclear waste facility.
So if we are going to build new nuclear plants we need
something to change, because what we just saw in South Carolina
was 7, 8 years into a project to build two new nuclear
reactors, and the company made mistakes, defaulted, and that is
mothballed. Billions of dollars, tens of billions of dollars
invested and two new nuclear reactors in South Carolina that
will never come online.
So going forward, wanting nuclear reactors and nuclear
power to be a part of our energy matrix, how do we ensure for
the investors that are going to be needed that if you invest
tens of billions of dollars, mainly because of the regulatory
environment that we have, the length of time it takes to permit
a new power plant, how are we going to assure them that you
best invest those tens of billions of dollars--and there are
years of investment, time investment--how are we going to
assure them that 7, 8, 9 years down the road, the rug isn't
going to be pulled out from under that project and those
investors are going to lose that money? The ratepayers that had
to pay extra are going to lose that money, as what is happening
in South Carolina.
The General Assembly is debating this issue today on what
ratepayers do. So how do we assure the investors, how do we
assure the Nation we are going to meet our energy needs, we are
going to be able to invest those large dollars?
I guess where I am going is how can we do it cheaper,
better, faster to bring nuclear online? Is it small modular
reactors? Is it shrinking the permitting process? Is it
creating several pre-approved plants for nuclear reactors and
replicating those, versus having a brand new permitting process
over and over and over? What is the answer? Captain?
Mr. Ostendorff. Wow, there is a lot there. Yes, sir.
Mr. Duncan. And I am last, so you might have a few extra
seconds.
Mr. Ostendorff. I think I would on the construction fees,
again I am not, I am not a construction expert. I have been,
because I have been to Summer many times and Vogtle many times,
and Watts Bar 2 when there was a resumption of construction
there starting 6 years ago. I have seen the NRC resident
inspectors and construction inspectors working. I have seen the
industry working. And I think one overarching piece of this is
when you don't do something for many years it is extremely
difficult to start it up and do it error free the first time.
It is not an excuse. It is not a justification. It is just
a fact of life, human nature.
Some of the construction delays were associated with
inadequacy of completion of engineering drawings at Summer, at
AP1000. Summer was the--earlier I mentioned the construction,
the modular components for containment, there were welding
problems, quality assurance problems. I would say that those on
much better track today in 2018 at Vogtle than they were 5
years ago at Summer, even 3 years ago at Summer.
So part of this is, we have to recognize when you have a
process that sits in mothballs for a number of years and you
don't exercise it, you should not be surprised that there be
problems starting it back up. That is one piece.
Small modular reactors I think are very promising. The
earlier panel talked about that at some length between
Department of Energy and NRC. I think there is a lot of promise
there. At the same time, I think in order to see that move out
there has to be a number of buyers to make economic sense for
NuScale. And I think the Federal Government perhaps has a role
to play there in investing. Dr. Peters has talked about that in
his testimony.
The third piece--and I will stop there due to time--is, and
Ms. Korsnick mentioned it, I do think there is a role for
Congress to look at the market structure.
Anecdote: Fall of 2015, when I was NRC Commissioner, we
were meeting at FERC headquarters. Every other year we met with
the FERC group. And closure of Pilgrim in Cape Cod,
Massachusetts, was being discussed. This is 2 years and 3
months ago. This was November of 2015. And one of the staff
individuals said, Hey, Pilgrim is going to shut down in 2019,
and 50 percent or more of the carbon-free electricity in
Massachusetts will go away.
And I asked the Chairman of FERC and his Commissioner
colleagues, ``Is that a concern to FERC?''
And he said, ``No, Commissioner Ostendorff, it is not. Our
job is to provide the lowest cost possible to the consumer.''
And so, without some rethinking of what the role nuclear
plays in the future, what a sabbatical from nuclear means for
the ability to bring it back up 50 years from now, I think
there is a value judgment to be made, a chance to look at
markets and how we look at reliable baseload, carbon-free
generation, and what human capital expertise that is unique to
this technology that merits further investment.
Mr. Duncan. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the extra time.
At any given time we have in this country over 100 small
reactors floating around the seas of the world in the United
States Navy without any mishap. That ought to be considered.
And also, as we continue to look at the nuclear weapon
enhancement that the President talked about, remember, there is
going to be yucky stuff as a residual.
And with that, I yield back.
Mr. Olson. I thank you. Before my friend leaves, you talked
about the safety of our nuclear submarines. We have lost two.
We have lost the Scorpion and the Thresher. Both sunk
dramatically. And what happened, though, the design, the scram
sets itself down. It worked perfectly.
The Scorpion was coming back home from deployment; never
showed up. It took us a couple months to be able to find her,
like 12,000 feet of water. We go there about every 5 years just
to check out to make sure there is no radiation coming from
her. It sank in 1968. Not one thing has come out over almost 50
years. That is safety.
And seeing there are no further witnesses of which to ask
questions, I would like to thank all, all the witnesses for
being here today on the 98th day of the Astros being the world
champs in baseball.
And before we conclude our last break, I would like to ask
consent for one document for the record, a document from
Uranium Producers of America. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
Mr. Olson. And pursuant to committee rules, I will remind
all Members that they have 10 business days to submit
additional questions for the record. And I ask that the
witnesses submit their responses within 10 business days upon
receipt of those questions.
Without objection, this committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:17 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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