[House Prints, 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress 2d Session COMMITTEE PRINT
_______________________________________________________________________
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
A COMPILATION OF MAJOR LAWS,
TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND
EXECUTIVE DOCUMENTS
----------
R E P O R T
prepared for the
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
by the
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
JULY 2000
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York,
Chairman
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
TOM LANTOS, California JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American SamoaCHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
PAT DANNER, Missouri EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama PETER T. KING, New York
BRAD SHERMAN, California STEVEN CHABOT, Ohio
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey Carolina
JIM DAVIS, Florida MATT SALMON, Arizona
EARL P0MEROY, North Dakota AMO HOUGHTON, New York
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts TOM CAMPBELL, California
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
BARBARA LEE, California KEVIN BRADY, Texas
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
FOREWORD
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC, July 25, 2000.
This updated compendium prepared by the Congressional
Research Service, entitled ``International Terrorism: A
Compilation of Major Laws, Treaties, Agreements, and Executive
Documents'' was requested by me on behalf of the Committee on
International Relations. The earlier editions have proven to be
a very useful source for those responsible for dealing with
issues of international terrorism.
In addition to U.S. legislation and executive documents
related to terrorism, the volume also includes bilateral and
multilateral treaties and agreements, as well as other
multilateral documents. I would like to acknowledge the efforts
of those in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of
the Congressional Research Service who worked on the project.
The principal contributors to this volume were C. Winston
Woodland who coordinated the assembly of the report, and
Carolyn Hatcher who prepared major portions. Others who
provided significant contributions included Terrence Lisbeth,
Dagnija Sterste-Perkins, Marjorie A. Browne, Ellen Grigorian,
and Raphael Perl, under the direction of Francis T. Miko. I
also want to acknowledge the advice and assistance provided by
Michael Kraft of the Office of Counterterrorism, Department of
State.
Benjamin A. Gilman,
Chairman.
LETTER OF SUBMITTAL
----------
Congressional Research Service,
The Library of Congress,
Washington, DC, July 24, 2000.
Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: In response to the Committee's request,
I am submitting an updated version of a compendium entitled:
``International Terrorism: A Compilation of Major Laws,
Treaties, Agreements, and Executive Documents,'' first issued
as a committee print in August 1987 and subsequently updated in
July 1991 and December 1994.
The compilation includes major statutes of interest to the
committee along with related Executive orders, documents, and
reports. It also includes international treaties and
agreements, as well as relevant documents of international
organizations. The principal contributors to this volume were
C. Winston Woodland who coordinated the assembly of the volume
and Carolyn Hatcher who prepared major portions. Others who
provided significant contributions included Terrence Lisbeth,
Dagnija Sterste-Perkins, Marjorie A. Browne, Ellen Grigorian,
and Raphael Perl. The volume was prepared under the overall
direction of Francis T. Miko. Michael Kraft of the office of
Counterterrorism, Department of State, provided extensive
advice and support.
Sincerely,
Daniel P. Mulhollan, Director.
ABSTRACT
----------
This compilation comprises major laws, treaties and
agreements, and executive documents relating to U.S. and
international efforts to combat terrorism. The legislation is
subdivided into sections relating to foreign assistance, the
Department of State, defense legislation, trade and financial
issues, aviation security, and other issues.
It also includes a selection of significant executive
orders, executive department regulations, and other executive
branch documents and reports. Sections on international
agreements include bilateral agreements, as well as relevant
multilateral treaties. Other multilateral documents include
selected statements from economic summit conferences, United
Nations Security Council resolutions, and documents of other
organizations.
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Foreword......................................................... iii
Letter of Submittal.............................................. v
Abstract......................................................... vii
A. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND RELATED LEGISLATION.................... 1
1. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (Public Law
87-195) (partial text)....................................... 3
2. Arms Export Control Act, as amended (Public Law 90-629)
(partial text)............................................... 11
3. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172).... 19
4. Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992, as amended
(Title XVI of Public Law 102-484)............................ 30
5. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1985, as amended (Public Law 99-83) (partial text)........... 35
6. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1981, as amended (Public Law 97-113) (partial text).......... 40
7. Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-513) (partial
text)........................................................ 42
8. International Narcotics Control Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-
623) (partial text).......................................... 46
9. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-277) (partial text). 47
10. Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law
105-277) (partial text)...................................... 58
Title I--Department of Justice............................. 58
11. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal year
1999 (Public Law 105-277) (partial text)..................... 61
Title II--Antiterrorism.................................... 61
12. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1997 (Public Law 104-208) (partial text). 68
B. DEPARTMENT OF STATE LEGISLATION............................... 69
1. State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as amended
(Public Law 84-885) (partial text)........................... 71
2. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public
Law 104-93) (partial text)................................... 78
3. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1998 and
1999 (Public Law 105-277) (partial text)..................... 80
4. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and
1995, as amended (Public Law 103-236) (partial text)......... 82
5. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and
1993, as amended (Public Law 102-138) (partial text)......... 86
6. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and
1989, as amended (Public Law 100-204) (partial text)......... 87
7. Department of State and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
1999 (Public Law 105-277) (partial text)..................... 90
8. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999
(Public Law 105-277) (partial text).......................... 91
9. Hostage Relief Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-449)............... 93
C. TRADE AND FINANCIAL LEGISLATION............................... 101
1. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public
Law 104-132) (partial text).................................. 105
2. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, as
amended (Public Law 99-399) (partial text)................... 121
3. Crimes and Criminal Procedure (Title 18, United States Code)
(partial text)............................................... 160
4. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Public
Law 103-322) (partial text).................................. 209
5. Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official
Guests of the United States (Public Law 92-539) (partial
text)........................................................ 210
6. Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989 (Public
Law 101-222) (partial text).................................. 211
7. Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 (Public Law
101-298) (partial text)...................................... 212
8. 1984 Act To Combat International Terrorism, as amended
(Public Law 98-533) (partial text)........................... 213
9. Foreign Sovereign Immunities (Title 28, United States Code)
(partial text)............................................... 215
D. DEFENSE LEGISLATION........................................... 227
1. Armed Forces Legislation (Title 10, United State Code)
(partial text)............................................... 229
2. Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261) (partial text)................ 237
3. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law
105-262) (partial text)...................................... 243
4. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998
(Public Law 105-85) (partial text)........................... 244
5. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997
(Public Law 104-201) (partial text).......................... 248
6. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995
(Public Law 103-337) (partial text).......................... 249
7. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994
(Public Law 103-160) (partial text).......................... 252
8. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993
(Public Law 102-484) (partial text).......................... 254
9. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987
(Public Law 99-661) (partial text)........................... 260
10. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-
145) (partial text).......................................... 261
11. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (Title 50, United States
Code) (partial text)......................................... 263
12. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public
Law 104-93) (partial text)................................... 274
E. TRADE AND FINANCIAL LEGISLATION............................... 275
1. Trade Act of 1974, as amended (Public Law 93-618) (partial
text)........................................................ 277
2. Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (Public Law 96-
72) (partial text)........................................... 282
3. Trade Expansion Act of 1969, as amended (Public Law 87-794)
(partial text)............................................... 291
4. Trading With The Enemy Act, as amended (Public Law 65-91)
(partial text)............................................... 295
5. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, as amended
(Public Law 95-223) (partial text)........................... 298
6. Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended (Public Law 79-
173) (partial text).......................................... 303
7. Internal Revenue Code........................................ 308
8. Bretton Woods Agreements Act Amendments, 1978, as amended
(Public Law 95-435) (partial text)........................... 312
9. International Financial Institutions Act, as amended (Public
Law 95-118) (partial text)................................... 313
10. Inter-American Development Bank Act, as amended (Public Law
86-147) (partial text)....................................... 315
F. AVIATION SECURITY............................................. 317
1. Aviation Programs (Title 49, United State Code) (partial
text)........................................................ 319
2. Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-
264) (partial text).......................................... 343
3. Crimes and Criminal Procedures (Title 18, United States Code) 348
4. Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, as amended (Public
Law 101-604) (partial text).................................. 351
5. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1985 (Public Law 99-83) (partial text)....................... 358
G. OTHER LEGISLATION............................................. 361
1. The Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (Public Law
82-414)...................................................... 363
2. Middle East Activities....................................... 374
3. National Emergencies Act, as amended (Public Law 94-412)..... 393
4. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998
(Public Law 105-277) (partial text).......................... 398
H. EXECUTIVE ORDERS.............................................. 399
1. Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with the
Taliban (Executive Order 13129, July 4, 1999)................ 401
2. Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting
Transactions with Sudan (Executive Order 13067, November 3,
1997)........................................................ 404
3. Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Iran
(Executive Order 13059, August 19, 1997)..................... 406
4. Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Iran
(Executive Order 12959, May 6, 1995)......................... 410
5. Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the
Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources (Executive Order
12957, March 15, 1995)....................................... 412
6. Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to
Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process (Executive Order 12947,
January 24, 1995)............................................ 413
7. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Executive Order
12938, November 14, 1994).................................... 416
8. Continuation of Export Control Regulations (Executive Order
12924, August 19, 1994)...................................... 421
9. Barring Overflight, Takeoff, and Landing of Aircraft, Flying
to or from Libya (Executive Order 12801, April 15, 1992)..... 423
10. Victims of Terrorism Compensation (Executive Order 12598,
June 17, 1987)............................................... 425
11. Blocking Libyan Government Property in the United States or
Held by U.S. Persons (Executive Order 12544, January 8, 1986) 426
12. Prohibiting Trade and Certain Transactions Involving Libya
(Executive Order 12543, January 7, 1986)..................... 427
13. Imports of Refined Petroleum Products from Libya (Executive
Order 12538, November 15, 1985).............................. 429
14. Revocation of Prohibitions Against Transactions Involving
Iran (Executive Order 12282, January 19, 1981)............... 430
15. Hostage Relief Act of 1980--Delegation of Authority
(Executive Order 12268, January 15, 1981).................... 431
16. Administration of the Export Administration Act of 1969, as
amended (Executive Order 12002, July 7, 1977)................ 432
I. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS.............................. 435
1. Department of State:......................................... 437
2. Department of the Treasury................................... 468
3. Federal Aviation Administration:............................. 489
J. OTHER EXECUTIVE BRANCH DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS.................. 537
1. Office of the President...................................... 539
2. Office of the Vice President................................. 663
3. Department of State.......................................... 755
4. Department of Defense........................................ 886
5. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration...... 977
6. Department of Treasury....................................... 1016
7. Department of Transportation................................. 1094
K. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS.......................................... 1235
1. Counter terrorism............................................ 1237
2. Aviation Security............................................ 1242
3. Extradition.................................................. 1289
4 Mutual Legal Assistance....................................... 1380
L. MULTILATERAL TREATIES......................................... 1423
1. Treaties in Force to Which the United States is a Party...... 1425
2. Treaties Signed by the United States, But Not Yet in Force... 1512
3. Treaties to Which the United States is Not a Party........... 1521
M. OTHER MULTILATERAL DOCUMENTS.................................. 1535
1. Economic Summits of the G-7/G-8 and Related Meetings......... 1537
2. Other Conferences............................................ 1565
3. Hemispheric Documents........................................ 1572
4. International Civil Aviation Organization Documents.......... 1593
5. United Nations Documents..................................... 1627
APPENDIX......................................................... 1701
Legislative Requirements for Reports to Congress Concerning
International Terrorism...................................... 1701
=======================================================================
A. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND RELATED LEGISLATION
CONTENTS
Page
1. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (Public Law
87-195) (partial text)....................................... 3
Part II:...................................................
Chapter 8--Antiterrorism Assistance.................. 3
Section 571--General Authority................... 3
Section 572--Purposes............................ 3
Section 573--Limitations......................... 4
Section 574--Authorizations of Appropriations.... 5
Part III:.................................................. 6
Section 620A--Prohibition on Assistance to
Governments Supporting International Terrorism. 6
Section 620G--Prohibition on Assistance to
Countries That Aid Terrorist States............ 8
Section 620H--Prohibition on Assistance to
Countries that Provide Military Equipment to
Terrorist States............................... 9
Part IV--Enterprise for the Americas Initiative............ 9
Section 701--Purpose................................. 9
Section 703--Eligibilty for Benefits................. 10
2. Arms Export Control Act, as amended (Public Law 90-629)
(partial text)............................................... 11
Chapter 1--Foreign and National Security Policy Objectives
and Restraints......................................... 11
Section 6--Foreign Intimidation and Harassment of
Individuals in the United States................. 11
Chapter 3--Military Export Controls........................ 11
Section 38--Control of Arms Exports and Imports...... 11
Section 40--Transactions With Countries Supporting
Acts of International Terrorism.................. 12
Section 40A--Transactions with Countries not Fully
Cooperating with United States Antiterrorism
Efforts.......................................... 17
Chapter 7--Control of Missiles and Missile Equipment or
Technology............................................. 18
Section 72--Denial of the Transfer of Missile
Equipment or Technology by United States Persons. 18
Section 73--Transfers of Missile Equipment or
Technology by Foreign Persons.................... 18
3. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172).... 19
4. Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992, as amended
(Title XVI of Public Law 102-484)............................ 30
5. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1985, as amended (Public Law 99-83) (partial text)........... 35
Title V--International Terrorism and Foreign Airport
Security............................................... 35
Part A--International Terrorism Generally............ 35
Part B--Foreign Airport Security..................... 37
Title XIII--Miscellaneous Provisions....................... 39
Section 1302--Codification of Policy Prohibiting
Negotations with the Palestine Liberation
Organization..................................... 39
6. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1981, as amended (Public Law 97-113) (partial text).......... 40
Title VII--Miscellaneous Provisions........................ 40
Section 718--Condemnation of Libya for Its Support of
International Terrorist Movements................ 40
Section 719--United States Citizens Acting in the
Service of International Terrorism............... 40
7. Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-513) (partial
text)........................................................ 42
Title V--General Provisions................................ 42
Section 586--Short Title............................. 42
Section 586F--Declarations Regarding Iraq's Long-
standing Violations of International Law......... 42
Section 586G--Sanctions Against Iraq................. 44
Section 586H--Waiver Authority....................... 45
8. International Narcotics Control Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-
623) (partial text).......................................... 46
Section 2(b)(2)--Economic Assistance and Administration of
Justice Programs for Andean Countries.................. 46
9. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-277) (partial text). 47
Title II--Bilateral Economic Assistance.................... 47
Department of State--Nonproliferation, Anti-
Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs......... 47
Title V--General Provisions................................ 48
Section-528--Prohibition on Bilateral Assistance to
Terrorist Countries.............................. 48
Section 540--Special Authorities..................... 49
Section 543--Eligibility for Assistance.............. 49
Section 551--Prohibition on Assistance to Foreign
Countries that Export Lethal Military Equipment.. 50
Section 559--Special Debt Relief for the Poorest..... 51
Section 586--Sense of Congress Regarding Iran........ 52
Section 591--National Commission on Terrorism........ 52
Section 596--Sense of Congress Regarding the Trial in
the Netherlands of the Suspects Indicted in the
Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103..................... 55
10. Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law
105-277) (partial text)...................................... 58
Title I--Department of Justice............................. 58
11. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal year
1999 (Public Law 105-277) (partial text)..................... 61
Title II--Antiterrorism.................................... 61
12. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1997 (Public Law 104-208) (partial text). 68
Title V--General Provisions................................ 68
Section 589--Civil Liability for Acts of State
Sponsored Terrorism.............................. 68
=======================================================================
1. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended
Partial text of Public Law 87-195 [S. 1983], 75 Stat. 424, approved
September 4, 1961, as amended
AN ACT To promote the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of
the United States by assisting peoples of the world in their efforts
toward economic development and internal and external security, and for
other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this
Act may be cited as ``The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.''
* * * * * * *
PART II
* * * * * * *
Chapter 8--Antiterrorism Assistance \1\
Sec. 571.\2\ General Authority.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law that restricts assistance to foreign countries
(other than sections 502B and 620A of this Act), the President
is authorized to furnish, on such terms and conditions as the
President may determine, assistance to foreign countries in
order to enhance the ability of their law enforcement personnel
to deter terrorists and terrorist groups from engaging in
international terrorist acts such as bombing, kidnaping,
assassination, hostage taking, and hijacking. Such assistance
may include training services and the provision of equipment
and other commodities related to bomb detection and disposal,
management of hostage situations, physical security, and other
matters relating to the detection, deterrence, and prevention
of acts of terrorism, the resolution of terrorist incidents,
and the apprehension of those involved in such acts.
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\1\ Ch. 8 was added by the International Security and Development
Assistance Authorizations Act of 1983 (sec. 101(b)(2) of the Further
Continuing Appropriations, 1984; Public Law 98-151; 97 Stat. 972).
Pursuant to Public Law 98-151, ch. 8 was enacted as contained in title
II of H.R. 2992, as reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
on May 17, 1983, except for sec. 575 (redesignated in 1996 as sec.
574), which was included in Public Law 98-151.
Sec. 122 of Public Law 104-164 (110 Stat. 1428) provided the
following:
``sec. 122. research and development expenses.
``Funds made available for fiscal years 1996 and 1997 to carry out
chapter 8 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2349aa et seq.; relating to antiterrorism assistance) may be made
available to the Technical Support Working Group of the Department of
State for research and development expenses related to contraband
detection technologies or for field demonstrations of such technologies
(whether such field demonstrations take place in the United States or
outside the United States).''.
\2\ 22 U.S.C. 2349aa. Delegation of Authority No. 145 (February 4,
1984) delegated the functions conferred upon the President by chapter 8
to the Director of the Office for Combating Terrorism.
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Sec. 572.\3\ Purposes.--Activities conducted under this
chapter shall be designed--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ 22 U.S.C. 2349aa-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) to enhance the antiterrorism skills of friendly
countries by providing training and equipment to deter
and counter terrorism;
(2) to strengthen the bilateral ties of the United
States with friendly governments by offering concrete
assistance in this area of great mutual concern; and
(3) to increase respect for human rights by sharing
with foreign civil authorities modern, humane, and
effective antiterrorism techniques.
Sec. 573.\4\ Limitations.--(a) Whenever the President
determines it to be consistent with and in furtherance of the
purposes of this chapter, and on such terms and conditions
consistent with this Act as he may determine, any agency of the
United States Government is authorized to furnish services and
commodities, without charge to funds available to carry out
this chapter, to an eligible foreign country, subject to
payment in advance of the value thereof (within the meaning of
section 644(m)) in United States dollars by the foreign
country. Credits and the proceeds of guaranteed loans made
available to such countries pursuant to the Arms Export Control
Act shall not be used for such payments. Collections under this
chapter shall be credited to the currently applicable
appropriation, account, or fund of the agency providing such
services and commodities and shall be available for the
purposes for which such appropriation, account, or fund is
authorized to be used.
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\4\ 22 U.S.C. 2349aa-2. Sec. 121(b)(1) of Public Law 104-164 (110
Stat. 1428) struck out ``Specific Authorities and'' from the section
heading. Sec. 121(b)(2) of that Public Law struck out subsec. (a) of
this section and redesignated subsecs. (b) through (f) as subsecs. (a)
through (e), respectively. Subsec. (f), however, had been struck out
previously by Public Law 104-132 (see note below). Subsec. (a) had read
as follows:
``(a) Notwithstanding section 660 of this Act, services and
commodities may be granted for the purposes of this chapter to eligible
foreign countries, subject to reimbursement of the value thereof
(within the meaning of section 644(m)) pursuant to section 632 of this
Act from funds available to carry out this chapter.''.
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(b) The Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor \5\ shall be consulted in the \6\
determinations of the foreign countries that will be furnished
assistance under this chapter and determinations of the nature
of assistance to be furnished to each such country.
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\5\ Sec. 163(e)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 405), amended
the title designation by striking out ``Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs'', and inserting in lieu thereof ``Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor''.
\6\ Sec. 328(a)(1) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132; 110 Stat. 1257) struck out
``development and implementation of the antiterrorism assistance
program under this chapter, including'' at this point.
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(c) \7\ (1) Arms and ammunition may be provided under this
chapter only if they are directly related to antiterrorism
assistance.
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\7\ Subsec. (c), redesignated from subsec. (d) by sec. 121(b)(3) of
Public Law 104-164 (110 Stat. 1428), was amended and restated by sec.
328(a)(2) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(Public Law 104-132; 110 Stat. 1257). Portions were amended and
restated earlier by sec. 213(b) of Public Law 101-604 (104 Stat. 3086),
sec. 507 of Public Law 99-399 (100 Stat. 873).
In view of amendments to this subsection by Public Law 104-132,
amendments contained in sec. 121(b)(4) of Public Law 104-164 (110 Stat.
1428) cannot be executed. Sec. 121(b)(4) of that Public Law required:
``(b) limitations.--Section 573 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2349aa-2) is
amended-- * * *
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``(4) in subsection (c) (as redesignated)--
``(A) by striking paragraphs (1) and (2);
``(B) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (5) as
paragraphs (1) through (3), respectively; and
``(C) by amending paragraph (2) (as redesignated) to
read as follows:
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``(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), funds made
available to carry out this chapter shall not be made available for the
procurement of weapons and ammunition.
``(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to small arms and ammunition
in categories I and III of the United States Munitions List that are
integrally and directly related to antiterrorism training provided
under this chapter if, at least 15 days before obligating those funds,
the President notifies the appropriate congressional committees
specified in section 634A of this Act in accordance with the procedures
applicable to reprogramming notifications under such section.
``(C) The value (in terms of original acquisition cost) of all
equipment and commodities provided under this chapter in any fiscal
year may not exceed 25 percent of the funds made available to carry out
this chapter for that fiscal year.''.
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(2) The value (in terms of original acquisition cost) of
all equipment and commodities provided under this chapter in
any fiscal year shall not exceed 30 percent of the funds made
available to carry out this chapter for that fiscal year.
(d) This chapter does not apply to information exchange
activities conducted by agencies of the United States
Government under other authority for such purposes.
(f) \8\ [Repealed--1996]
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\8\ Subsec. (f) was added by sec. 501(c) of Public Law 99-83 (99
Stat. 221), and struck out by sec. 328(a)(3) of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132; 110 Stat.
1257). It had read as follows:
``(f) Funds made available to carry out this chapter may not be
used for personnel compensation or benefits.''.
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Sec. 574.\9\ * * * [Repealed--1996]
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\9\ Formerly at 22 U.S.C. 2349aa-3. Sec. 121(c) of Public Law 104-
164 (110 Stat. 1428) repealed sec. 574, which had required reports to
Congress on antiterrorism assistance.
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Sec. 574.\10\ Authorizations of Appropriations.--(a) There
are authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out
this chapter $9,840,000 for the fiscal year 1986 and
$14,680,000 for the fiscal year 1987.
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\10\ 22 U.S.C. 2349aa-4. Redesignated from sec. 575 to sec. 574 by
sec. 121(d) of Public Law 104-164 (110 Stat. 1428). The authorization
for fiscal year 1986 was enacted by sec. 501(a) of the International
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-83; 99
Stat. 219). The authorization for fiscal year 1987 of $14,680,000 was
inserted in lieu of the amount of $9,840,000 (originally enacted by
Public Law 99-83) by sec. 401 of Public Law 99-399 (100 Stat. 862).
Previous authorizations include: fiscal year 1984--$5,000,000; fiscal
year 1985--no authorization; fiscal years 1988 through 1999--no
authorization.
Congress did not enact an authorization for fiscal year 1999.
Instead, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1999 (division A, sec. 101(d) of Public Law 105-
277; 112 Stat. 2681), waived the requirements for authorization, and
title II of that Act provided the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining and related programs
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``For necessary expenses for nonproliferation, anti-terrorism and
related programs and activities, $198,000,000, to carry out the
provisions of chapter 8 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 for anti-terrorism assistance, section 504 of the FREEDOM Support
Act for the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, section 23 of the
Arms Export Control Act or the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for
demining activities, the clearance of unexploded ordnance, and related
activities, notwithstanding any other provision of law, including
activities implemented through nongovernmental and international
organizations, section 301 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for a
voluntary contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
and a voluntary contribution to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO), and for a United States contribution to the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission: Provided,
That the Secretary of State shall inform the Committees on
Appropriations at least twenty days prior to the obligation of funds
for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission:
Provided further, That of this amount not to exceed $15,000,000, to
remain available until expended, may be made available for the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, notwithstanding any other
provision of law, to promote bilateral and multilateral activities
relating to nonproliferation and disarmament: Provided further, That
such funds may also be used for such countries other than the New
Independent States of the former Soviet Union and international
organizations when it is in the national security interest of the
United States to do so: Provided further, That such funds shall be
subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on
Appropriations: Provided further, That of the funds appropriated under
this heading not less than $35,000,000 should be made available for
demining, clearance of unexploded ordnance, and related activities:
Provided further, That of the funds made available for demining and
related activities, not to exceed $500,000, in addition to funds
otherwise available for such purposes, may be used for expenses related
to the operation and management of the demining program: Provided
further, That funds appropriated under this heading may be made
available for the International Atomic Energy Agency only if the
Secretary of State determines (and so reports to the Congress) that
Israel is not being denied its right to participate in the activities
of that Agency.''.
See also in that Act: sec. 506--Prohibition on Financing Nuclear
Goods; sec. 515--Notification Requirements; and sec. 576--Assistance
for the Middle East.
Sec. 328(b) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (Public Law 104-132; 110 Stat. 1257) provided the following:
``(b) Assistance to Foreign Countries To Procure Explosives
Detection Devices and Other Counterterrorism Technology.--(1) Subject
to section 575(b), up to $3,000,000 in any fiscal year may be made
available--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``(A) to procure explosives detection devices and other
counterterrorism technology; and
``(B) for joint counterterrorism research and development
projects on such technology conducted with NATO and major non-
NATO allies under the auspices of the Technical Support Working
Group of the Department of State.
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``(2) As used in this subsection, the term `major non-NATO allies'
means those countries designated as major non-NATO allies for purposes
of section 2350a(i)(3) of title 10, United States Code.
``(c) Assistance to Foreign Countries.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law (except section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961) up to $1,000,000 in assistance may be provided to a foreign
country for counterterrorism efforts in any fiscal year if--
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``(1) such assistance is provided for the purpose of
protecting the property of the United States Government or the
life and property of any United States citizen, or furthering
the apprehension of any individual involved in any act of
terrorism against such property or persons; and
``(2) the appropriate committees of Congress are notified not
later than 15 days prior to the provision of such
assistance.''.
(b) Amounts appropriated under this section are authorized
to remain available until expended.
* * * * * * *
PART III
Chapter 1--General Provisions
* * * * * * *
Sec. 620A.\11\, \12\ Prohibition on Assistance
to Governments Supporting International Terrorism.
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\11\ 22 U.S.C. 2371.
\12\ Section 620A was added by sec. 303 of the International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-
329; 90 Stat. 753). It was amended and restated by sec. 503(a) of the
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (Public
Law 99-83; 99 Stat. 220). It was further amended and restated by sec. 5
of the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989 (Public
Law 101-222; 103 Stat. 1897).
Section 10 of the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of
1989 (Public Law 101-222; 103 Stat. 1900) provided the following in
relation to the amendment of sec. 620A:
``Sec. 10. self-defense in accordance with international law.
``The use by any government of armed force in the exercise of
individual or collective self-defense in accordance with applicable
international agreements and customary international law shall not be
considered an act of international terrorism for purposes of the
amendments made by this Act.''.
The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1999 (division A, sec. 101(d) of Public Law 105-
277; 112 Stat. 2681), provided the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``prohibition on bilateral assistance to terrorist countries
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Sec. 528. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds
appropriated for bilateral assistance under any heading of this Act and
funds appropriated under any such heading in a provision of law enacted
prior to enactment of this Act, shall not be made available to any
country which the President determines--
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``(1) grants sanctuary from prosecution to any individual or
group which has committed an act of international terrorism, or
``(2) otherwise supports international terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``(b) The President may waive the application of subsection (a) to
a country if the President determines that national security or
humanitarian reasons justify such waiver. The President shall publish
each waiver in the Federal Register and, at least fifteen days before
the waiver takes effect, shall notify the Committees on Appropriations
of the waiver (including the justification for the waiver) in
accordance with the regular notification procedures of the Committees
on Appropriations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * * * *
``prohibition on assistance to foreign governments that export lethal
military equipment to countries supporting international terrorism
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Sec. 551. (a) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made
available by this Act may be available to any foreign government which
provides lethal military equipment to a country the government of which
the Secretary of State has determined is a terrorist government for
purposes of section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act or any other
comparable provision of law. The prohibition under this section with
respect to a foreign government shall terminate 12 months after that
government ceases to provide such military equipment. This section
applies with respect to lethal military equipment provided under a
contract entered into after October 1, 1997.
``(b) Assistance restricted by subsection (a) or any other similar
provision of law, may be furnished if the President determines that
furnishing such assistance is important to the national interests of
the United States.
``(c) Whenever the waiver of subsection (b) is exercised, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report with respect to the furnishing of such assistance. Any such
report shall include a detailed explanation of the assistance estimated
to be provided, including the estimated dollar amount of such
assistance, and an explanation of how the assistance furthers United
States national interests.''.
See also in that Act: sec. 540--Special Authorities; sec. 543--
Eligibility for Assistance; and sec. 559--Special Debt Relief for the
Poorest; and sec. 591--National Commission on Terrorism.
See also sec. 586 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991 (Public Law 101-513; 104
Stat. 2047), cited as the ``Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990'',in sec. A.7 of
this publication.
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(a) \13\ Prohibition.--The United States shall not provide
any assistance under this Act, the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act of 1954, the Peace Corps Act, or
the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 to any country if the
Secretary of State determines that the government of that
country has repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism.
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\13\ See also 18 U.S.C. 2332d, as added by sec. 321 of Public Law
104-132 (110 Stat. 1254), which provides that U.S. persons engaging in
financial transactions with the government of a country designated as
supporting international terrorism under sec. 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2405) shall be fined under title 18,
imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.
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(b) Publication of Determinations.--Each determination of
the Secretary of State under subsection (a), including each
determination in effect on the date of the enactment of the
Antiterrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989, shall be
published in the Federal Register.
(c) Rescission.--A determination made by the Secretary of
State under subsection (a) may not be rescinded unless the
President submits to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate--
(1) before the proposed rescission would take effect,
a report certifying that--
(A) there has been a fundamental change in
the leadership and policies of the government
of the country concerned;
(B) that government is not supporting acts of
international terrorism;
(C) that government has provided assurances
that it will not support acts of international
terrorism in the future; or
(2) at least 45 days before the proposed rescission
would take effect, a report justifying the rescission
and certifying that--
(A) the government concerned has not provided
any support for international terrorism during
the preceding 6-month period; and
(B) the government concerned has provided
assurances that it will not support acts of
international terrorism in the future.
(d) Waiver.--Assistance prohibited by subsection (a) may be
provided to a country described in that subsection if--
(1) the President determines that national security
interests or humanitarian reasons justify a waiver of
subsection (a), except that humanitarian reasons may
not be used to justify assistance under part II of this
Act (including chapter 4, chapter 6, and chapter 8), or
the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945; and
(2) at least 15 days before the waiver takes effect,
the President consults with the Committee on Foreign
Affairs \14\ of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate regarding
the proposed waiver and submits a report to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
containing--
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\14\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided
that referenses to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(A) the name of the recipient country;
(B) a description of the national security
interests or humanitarian reasons which require
the waiver;
(C) the type and amount of and the
justification for the assistance to be provided
pursuant to the waiver; and
(D) the period of time during which such
waiver will be effective.
The waiver authority granted in this subsection may not be used
to provide any assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 which is also prohibited by section 40 of the Arms Export
Control Act.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 620G.\15\, \16\ PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES
THAT AID TERRORIST STATES.
(a) Withholding of Assistance.--The President shall
withhold assistance under this Act to the government of any
country that provides assistance to the government of any other
country for which the Secretary of State has made a
determination under section 620A.
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\15\ 22 U.S.C. 2377. Sec. 325 of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132; 110 Stat. 1256) added
this sec. 620G.
Sec. 149 of Public Law 104-164 (110 Stat. 1436) also added a new
sec. 620G, relating to depleted uranium ammunition.
\16\ Sec. 329 of that Act (110 Stat. 1258) defined assistance as
follows:
``(1) the term `assistance' means assistance to or for the benefit
of a government of any country that is provided by grant, concessional
sale, guaranty, insurance, or by any other means on terms more
favorable than generally available in the applicable market, whether in
the form of a loan, lease, credit, debt relief, or otherwise, including
subsidies for exports to such country and favorable tariff treatment of
articles that are the growth, product, or manufacture of such country;
and
``(2) the term `assistance' does not include assistance of the type
authorized under chapter 9 of part 1 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (relating to international disaster assistance).''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Waiver.--Assistance prohibited by this section may be
furnished to a foreign government described in subsection (a)
if the President determines that furnishing such assistance is
important to the national interests of the United States and,
not later than 15 days before obligating such assistance,
furnishes a report to the appropriate committees of Congress
including--
(1) a statement of the determination;
(2) a detailed explanation of the assistance to be
provided;
(3) the estimated dollar amount of the assistance;
and
(4) an explanation of how the assistance furthers
United States national interests.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 620H.\16\, \17\ PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES
THAT PROVIDE MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO TERRORIST
STATES.
(a) Prohibition.--
(1) In general.--The President shall withhold
assistance under this Act to the government of any
country that provides lethal military equipment to a
country the government of which the Secretary of State
has determined is a terrorist government for the
purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), or 620A of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ 22 U.S.C. 2378. Sec. 326 of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132; 110 Stat. 1256) added
sec. 620H.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Applicability.--The prohibition under this
section with respect to a foreign government shall
terminate 1 year after that government ceases to
provide lethal military equipment. This section applies
with respect to lethal military equipment provided
under a contract entered into after the date of
enactment of this Act.\18\
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\18\ ``[D]ate of enactment of this Act'' probably refers to
enactment of the amendment, April 24, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Waiver.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
assistance may be furnished to a foreign government described
in subsection (a) if the President determines that furnishing
such assistance is important to the national interests of the
United States and, not later than 15 days before obligating
such assistance, furnishes a report to the appropriate
committees of Congress including--
(1) a statement of the determination;
(2) a detailed explanation of the assistance to be
provided;
(3) the estimated dollar amount of the assistance;
and
(4) an explanation of how the assistance furthers
United States national interests.
* * * * * * *
PART IV--ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS INITIATIVE \19\
SEC. 701.\20\ PURPOSE.
The purpose of this part is to encourage and support
improvement in the lives of the people of Latin America and the
Caribbean through market-oriented reforms and economic growth
with interrelated actions to promote debt reduction, investment
reforms, community based conservation, and sustainable use of
the environment, and child survival and child development. The
Facility will support these objectives through administration
of debt reduction operations under this part for those
countries with democratically elected governments that meet
investment reforms and other policy conditions.
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\19\ Sec. 602(a) of the Jobs Through Exports Act of 1992 (Public
Law 102-549; 106 Stat. 3664) added Part IV--Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative, secs. 701-710. Formerly, Part IV, which related to
amendments to other laws, was repealed by sec. 401 of the FA Act of
1962.
\20\ 22 U.S.C. 2430.
* * * * * * *
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SEC. 703.\21\ ELIGIBILITY FOR BENEFITS.
(a) Requirements.--To be eligible for benefits from the
Facility under this part, a country must be a Latin American or
Caribbean country--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ 22 U.S.C. 2430b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) whose government is democratically elected;
(2) whose government has not repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism;
(3) whose government is not failing to cooperate on
international narcotics control matters;
(4) whose government (including its military or other
security forces) does not engage in a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights;
(5) that has in effect, has received approval for,
or, as appropriate in exceptional circumstances, is
making significant progress toward--
(A) an International Monetary Fund standby
arrangement, extended Fund arrangement, or an
arrangement under the structural adjustment
facility or enhanced structural adjustment
facility, or in exceptional circumstances, a
Fund monitored program or its equivalent,
unless the President determines (after
consultation with the Enterprise for the
Americas Board) that such an arrangement or
program (or its equivalent) could reasonably be
expected to have significant adverse social or
environmental effects; and
(B) as appropriate, structural or sectoral
adjustment loans from the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development or the
International Development Association, unless
the President determines (after consultation
with the Enterprise for the Americas Board)
that the resulting adjustment requirements
could reasonably be expected to have
significant adverse social or environmental
effects;
(6) has put in place major investment reforms in
conjunction with an Inter-American Development Bank
loan or otherwise is implementing, or is making
significant progress toward, an open investment regime;
and
(7) if appropriate, has agreed with its commercial
bank lenders on a satisfactory financing program,
including, as appropriate, debt or debt service
reduction.
(b) Eligibility Determinations.--Consistent with subsection
(a), the President shall determine whether a country is
eligible to receive benefits under this part. The President
shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of his
intention to designate a country as an eligible country at
least 15 days in advance of any formal determination.
* * * * * * *
2. The Arms Export Control Act
Public Law 90-629 [H.R. 15681], 82 Stat. 1320, approved October 22,
1968, as amended
AN ACT To consolidate and revise foreign assistance legislation
relating to reimbursable military exports.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this
Act may be cited as the ``Arms Export Control Act''.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The new title, ``Arms Export Control Act,'' was added in lieu
of ``The Foreign Military Sales Act'' by sec. 201 of the International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-
329; 90 Stat. 734). Sec. 201 further stated that ``any reference to the
Foreign Military Sales Act shall be deemed to be a reference to the
Arms Export Control Act.''.
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Chapter 1--FOREIGN AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY OBJECTIVES AND
RESTRAINTS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 6.\2\ Foreign Intimidation and Harassment of
Individuals in the United States.--No letters of offer may be
issued, no credits or guarantees may be extended, and no export
licenses may be issued under this Act with respect to any
country determined by the President to be engaged in a
consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment
directed against individuals in the United States. The
President shall report any such determination promptly to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the chairman of
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 22 U.S.C. 2756. Sec. 6. was added by sec. 115 of the
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 (Public
Law 97-113; 95 Stat. 1528).
* * * * * * *
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Chapter 3--MILITARY EXPORT CONTROLS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 38.\3\ Control of Arms Exports and Imports.--(a)(1) *
* *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ 22 U.S.C. 2778.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) \4\ Decisions on issuing export licenses under this
section shall be made in coordination with the Director of the
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, taking into
account the Director's assessment as to whether the export of
an article would contribute to an arms race, aid in the
development of weapons of mass destruction, support
international terrorism, increase the possibility of outbreak
or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of
bilateral or multilateral arms control or nonproliferation
agreements or other arrangements. The Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency is authorized, whenever the
Director determines that the issuance of an export license
under this section would be detrimental to the national
security of the United States, to recommend to the President
that such export license be disapproved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Sec. 714(a)(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 497), amended
and restated para. (2). The paragraph formerly read as follows:
``(2) Decisions on issuing export licenses under this section shall
be made in coordination with the director of the United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency and shall take into account the
Director's opinion as to whether the export of an article will
contribute to an arms race, support international terrorism, increase
the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the
development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements.''.
* * * * * * *
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Sec. 40.\5\ Transactions With Countries Supporting Acts of
International Terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ 22 U.S.C. 2780. See also 22 CFR Part 120-130. Sec. 40 was added
by sec. 509(a) of Public Law 99-399 (100 Stat. 874). Sec. 40 was
amended and restated by the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments
Act of 1989 (Public Law 101-222; 103 Stat. 1892). It previously read as
follows:
``Sec. 40. Exports to Countries Supporting Acts of International
Terrorism.
``(a) Prohibition.--Except as provided in subsection (b), items on
the United States Munitions List may not be exported to any country
which the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section
6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
2405(j)(1)(A)), has repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism.
``(b) Waiver.--The President may waive the prohibition contained in
subsection (a) in the case of a particular export if the President
determines that the export is important to the national interests of
the United States and submits to the Congress a report justifying that
determination and describing the proposed export. Any such waiver shall
expire at the end of 90 days after it is granted unless the Congress
enacts a law extending the waiver.''.
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(a) Prohibited Transactions by the United States
Government.--The following transactions by the United States
Government are prohibited:
(1) Exporting or otherwise providing (by sale, lease
or loan, grant, or other means), directly or
indirectly, any munitions item to a country described
in subsection (d) under the authority of this Act, the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or any other law
(except as provided in subsection (h)). In implementing
this paragraph, the United States Government--
(A) shall suspend delivery to such country of
any such item pursuant to any such transaction
which has not been completed at the time the
Secretary of State makes the determination
described in subsection (d), and
(B) shall terminate any lease or loan to such
country of any such item which is in effect at
the time the Secretary of State makes that
determination.
(2) Providing credits, guarantees, or other financial
assistance under the authority of this Act, the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, or any other law (except as
provided in subsection (h)), with respect to the
acquisition of any munitions item by a country
described in subsection (d). In implementing this
paragraph, the United States Government shall suspend
expenditures pursuant to any such assistance obligated
before the Secretary of States makes the determination
described in subsection (d). The President may
authorize expenditures otherwise required to be
suspended pursuant to the preceding sentence if the
President has determined, and reported to the Congress,
that suspension of those expenditures causes undue
financial hardship to a supplier, shipper, or similar
person and allowing the expenditure will not result in
any munitions item being made available for use by such
country.
(3) Consenting under section 3(a) of this Act, under
section 505(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
under the regulations issued to carry out section 38 of
this Act, or under any other law (except as provided in
subsection (h)), to any transfer of any munitions item
to a country described in subsection (d). In
implementing this paragraph, the United States
Government shall withdraw any such consent, which is in
effect at the time the Secretary of State makes the
determination described in subsection (d), except that
this sentence does not apply with respect to any item
that has already been transferred to such country.
(4) Providing any license or other approval under
section 38 of this Act for any export or other transfer
(including by means of a technical assistance
agreement, manufacturing licensing agreement, or
coproduction agreement) of any munitions item to a
country described in subsection (d). In implementing
this paragraph, the United States Government shall
suspend any such license or other approval which is in
effect at the time the Secretary of State makes the
determination described in subsection (d), except that
this sentence does not apply with respect to any item
that has already been exported or otherwise transferred
to such country.
(5) Otherwise facilitating the acquisition of any
munitions item by a country described in subsection
(d). This paragraph applies with respect to activities
undertaken--
(A) by any department, agency, or other
instrumentality of the Government,
(B) by any officer or employee of the
Government (including members of the United
States Armed Forces), or
(C) by any other person at the request or on
behalf of the Government.
The Secretary of State may waive the requirements of the second
sentence of paragraph (1), the second sentence of paragraph
(3), and the second sentence of paragraph (4) to the extent
that the Secretary determines, after consultation with the
Congress, that unusual and compelling circumstances require
that the United States Government not take the actions
specified in that sentence.
(b) Prohibited Transactions by United States Persons.--
(1) In general.--A United States person may not take
any of the following actions:
(A) Exporting any munitions item to any
country described in subsection (d).
(B) Selling, leasing, loaning, granting, or
otherwise providing any munitions item to any
country described in subsection (d).
(C) Selling, leasing, loaning, granting, or
otherwise providing any munitions item to any
recipient which is not the government of or a
person in a country described in subsection (d)
if the United States person has reason to know
that the munitions item with be made available
to any country described in subsection (d).
(D) Taking any other action which would
facilitate the acquisition, directly or
indirectly, of any munitions item by the
government of any country described in
subsection (d), or any person acting on behalf
of that government, if the United States person
has reason to know that that action will
facilitate the acquisition of that item by such
a government or person.
(2) Liability for actions of foreign subsidiaries,
etc.--A United State person violates this subsection if
a corporation or other person that is controlled in
fact by that United States person (as determined under
regulations, which the President shall issue), takes an
action described in paragraph (1) outside the United
States.
(3) Applicability to actions outside the united
states.--Paragraph (1) applies with respect to actions
described in that paragraph which are taken either
within or outside the United States by a United States
person described in subsection (l)(3)(A) or (B). To the
extent provided in regulations issued under subsection
(l)(3)(D), paragraph (1) applies with respect to
actions described in that paragraph which are taken
outside the United State by a person designated as a
United States person in those regulations.
(c) Transfers to Governments and Persons Covered.--This
section applies with respect to--
(1) the acquisition of munitions items by the
government of a country described in subsection (d);
and
(2) the acquisition of munitions items by any
individual, group, or other person within a country
described in subsection (d), except to the extent that
subparagraph (D) of subsection (b)(1) provides
otherwise.
(d) \6\ Countries Covered by Prohibition.--The prohibitions
contained in this section apply with respect to a country if
the Secretary of State determines that the government of that
country has repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism. For purposes of this subsection, such
acts shall include all activities that the Secretary determines
willfully aid or abet the international proliferation of
nuclear explosive devices to individuals or groups or willfully
aid or abet an individual or groups in acquiring unsafeguarded
special nuclear material.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Sec. 551 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1999 (division A, sec. 101(d) of
Public Law 105-277; 112 Stat. 2681), provided the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``prohibition on assistance to foreign governments that export lethal
military equipment to countries supporting international terrorism
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Sec. 551. (a) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made
available by this Act may be available to any foreign government which
provides lethal military equipment to a country the government of which
the Secretary of State has determined is a terrorist government for
purposes of section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act or any other
comparable provision of law. The prohibition under this section with
respect to a foreign government shall terminate 12 months after that
government ceases to provide such military equipment. This section
applies with respect to lethal military equipment provided under a
contract entered into after October 1, 1997.
``(b) Assistance restricted by subsection (a) or any other similar
provision of law, may be furnished if the President determines that
furnishing such assistance is important to the national interests of
the United States.
``(c) Whenever the waiver of subsection (b) is exercised, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report with respect to the furnishing of such assistance. Any such
report shall include a detailed explanation of the assistance estimated
to be provided, including the estimated dollar amount of such
assistance, and an explanation of how the assistance furthers United
States national interests.''.
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(e) Publication of Determinations.--Each determination of
the Secretary of State under subsection (d) shall be published
in the Federal Register.
(f) Rescission.--(1) A determination made by the Secretary
of State under subsection (d) may not be rescinded unless the
President submits to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate--
(A) before the proposed rescission would take effect,
a report certifying that--
(i) there has been a fundamental change in
the leadership and policies of the government
of the country concerned;
(ii) that government is not supporting acts
of international terrorism; and
(iii) that government has provided assurances
that it will not support acts of international
terrorism in the future; or
(B) at least 45 days before the proposed rescission
would take effect, a report justifying the rescission
and certifying that--
(i) the government concerned has not provided
any support for international terrorism during
the preceding 6-month period; and
(ii) the government concerned has provided
assurances that it will not support acts of
international terrorism in the future.
(2) (A) No rescission under paragraph (1)(B) of a
determination under subsection (d) may be made if the Congress,
within 45 days after receipt of a report under paragraph
(1)(B), enacts a joint resolution the matter after the
resolving clause of which is as follows: ``That the proposed
rescission of the determination under section 40(d) of the Arms
Export Control Act pursuant to the report submitted to the
Congress on ________________ is hereby prohibited.'', the blank
to be completed with the appropriate date.
(B) A joint resolution described in subparagraph (A) and
introduced within the appropriate 45-day period shall be
considered in the Senate and the House of Representatives in
accordance with paragraphs (3) through (7) of section 8066(c)
of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act (as contained
in Public Law 98-473), except that references in such
paragraphs to the Committees on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives and the Senate shall be deemed to be references
to the Committee on Foreign Affairs \7\ of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate, respectively.
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\7\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided that
references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
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(g) Waiver.--The President may waive the prohibitions
contained in this section with respect to a specific
transaction if--
(1) the President determines that the transaction is
essential to the national security interests of the
United States; and
(2) not less than 15 days prior to the proposed
transaction, the President--
(A) consults with the Committee on Foreign
Affairs \7\ of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate; and
(B) submits to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a
report containing--
(i) the name of any country involved
in the proposed transaction, the
identity of any recipient of the items
to be provided pursuant to the proposed
transaction, and the anticipated use of
those items;
(ii) a description of the munitions
items involved in the proposed
transaction (including their market
value) and the actual sale price at
each step in the transaction (or if the
items are transferred by other than
sale, the manner in which they will be
provided);
(iii) the reasons why the proposed
transaction is essential to the
national security interests of the
United States and the justification for
such proposed transaction;
(iv) the date on which the proposed
transaction is expected to occur; and
(v) the name of every United States
Government department, agency, or other
entity involved in the proposed
transaction, every foreign government
involved in the proposed transaction,
and every private party with
significant participation in the
proposed transaction.
To the extent possible, the information specified in
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2) shall be provided in
unclassified form, with any classified information provided in
an addendum to the report.
(h) Exemption for Transactions Subject to National Security
Act Reporting Requirements.--The prohibitions contained in this
section do not apply with respect to any transaction subject to
reporting requirements under title V of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.; relating to congressional
oversight of intelligence activities).
(i) Relation to Other Laws.--
(1) In general.--With regard to munitions items
controlled pursuant to this Act, the provisions of this
section shall apply notwithstanding any other
provisions of law, other than section 614(a) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2364(a)).
(2) Section 614(a) waiver authority.--If the
authority of section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 is used to permit a transaction under that
Act or the Arms Export Control Act which is otherwise
prohibited by this section, the written policy
justification required by that section shall include
the information specified in subsection (g)(2)(B) of
this section.
(j) Criminal Penalty.--Any person who willfully violates
this section shall be fined for each violation not more than
$1,000,000, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
(k) Civil Penalties; Enforcement.--In the enforcement of
this section, the President is authorized to exercise the same
powers concerning violations and enforcement which are
conferred upon departments, agencies, and officials by sections
11(c), 11(e), 11(g), and 12(a) of the Export Administration Act
of 1979 (subject to the same terms and conditions as are
applicable to such powers under that Act), except that,
notwithstanding section 11(c) of that Act, the civil penalty
for each violation of this section may not exceed $500,000.
(l) Definitions.--As used in this section--
(1) the term ``munitions item'' means any item
enumerated on the United States Munitions list (without
regard to whether the item is imported into or exported
from the United States);
(2) the term ``United States'', when used
geographically, means the several States, the District
of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any
territory or possession of the United States;
(3) the term ``United States person'' means--
(A) any citizen or permanent resident alien
of the United States;
(B) any sole proprietorship, partnership,
company, association, or corporation having its
principal place of business within the United
States or organized under the laws of the
United States, any State, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,
or any territory or possession of the United
States;
(C) any other person with respect to that
person's actions while in the United States;
and
(D) to the extent provided in regulations
issued by the Secretary of state, any person
that is not described in subparagraph (A), (B),
or (C) but--
(i) is a foreign subsidiary or
affiliate of a United States person
described in subparagraph (B) and is
controlled in fact by that United
States person (as determined in
accordance with those regulations), or
(ii) is otherwise subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States
with respect to that person's actions while
outside the United States;
(4) the term ``nuclear explosive device'' has the
meaning given that term in section 830(4) of the
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994; and
(5) the term ``unsafeguarded special nuclear
material'' has the meaning given that term in section
830(8) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of
1994.
Sec. 40A.\8\ Transactions With Countries Not Fully
Cooperating With United States Antiterrorism Efforts.--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ 22 U.S.C. 2781. Sec. 330 of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132; 110 Stat. 1258) added
this sec. 40A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Prohibited Transactions.--No defense article or defense
service may be sold or licensed for export under this Act in a
fiscal year to a foreign country that the President determines
and certifies to Congress, by May 15 of the calendar year in
which that fiscal year begins, is not cooperating fully with
United States antiterrorism efforts.
(b) Waiver.--The President may waive the prohibition set
forth in subsection (a) with respect to a specific transaction
if the President determines that the transaction is important
to the national interests of the United States.
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 7--CONTROL OF MISSILES AND MISSILE EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY \9\
* * * * * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Sec. 1703 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1991 (Public Law 101-510; 104 Stat. 1745) added chapter 7, secs.
71-74.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 72.\10\ Denial of the Transfer of Missile Equipment or
Technology by United States Persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ 22 U.S.C. 2797a.
* * * * * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) \11\ Presumption.--In determining whether to apply
sanctions under subsection (a) to a United States person
involved in the export, transfer, or trade of an item on the
MTCR Annex, it should be a rebuttable presumption that such
item is designed for use in a missile listed in the MTCR Annex
if the President determines that the final destination of the
item is a country the government of which the Secretary of
State has determined, for purposes of 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979, has repeatedly provided support for
acts of international terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Sec. 734(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 505), added subsec.
(c).
* * * * * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 73.\12\ Transfers of Missile Equipment or Technology
by Foreign Persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ 22 U.S.C. 2797b.
* * * * * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(f) \13\ Presumption.--In determining whether to apply
sanctions under subsection (a) to a foreign person involved in
the export, transfer, or trade of an item on the MTCR Annex, it
should be a rebuttable presumption that such item is designed
for use in a missile listed in the MTCR Annex if the President
determines that the final destination of the item is a country
the government of which the Secretary of State has determined,
for purposes of 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of
1979, has repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Sec. 734(b) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 505), added subsec.
(f).
* * * * * * *
3. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996
Public Law 104-172 [H.R. 3107], 110 Stat. 1541, approved August 5, 1996
AN ACT To impose sanctions on persons making certain investments
directly and significantly contributing to the enhancement of the
ability of Iran or Libya to develop its petroleum resources, and on
persons exporting certain items that enhance Libya's weapons or
aviation capabilities or enhance Libya's ability to develop its
petroleum resources, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1.\1\ SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
of 1996''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 50 U.S.C. 1701 note. In a memorandum of November 21, 1996 (61
F.R. 64249), the President made the following delegations of authority
under this Act:
``. . . I hereby delegate to the Secretary of State the functions
vested in the President by the following provisions of the Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172) (`the Act'), such
functions to be exercised in consultation with the Departments of the
Treasury and Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, and
with the Export-Import Bank and the Federal Reserve Board and other
interested agencies as appropriate: sections 4(c), 5(a), 5(b), 5(c),
5(f), 6(1), 6(2), and 9(c). I hereby delegate to the Secretary of State
the functions vested in the President by the following provisions of
the Act: sections 4(a), 4(b), 4(d), 4(e), 5(d), 5(e), 9(a), 9(b), and
10. * * * The following functions vested in the President by the
following provisions of the Act delegated by this memorandum may be
redelegated: 4(a), 4(b), 4(d), 4(e), 4(d), 5(e), and 10. All other
functions delegated by this memorandum may not be redelegated.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 2.\1\ FINDINGS.
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The efforts of the Government of Iran to acquire
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver
them and its support of acts of international terrorism
endanger the national security and foreign policy
interests of the United States and those countries with
which the United States shares common strategic and
foreign policy objectives.
(2) The objective of preventing the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and acts of international
terrorism through existing multilateral and bilateral
initiatives requires additional efforts to deny Iran
the financial means to sustain its nuclear, chemical,
biological, and missile weapons programs.
(3) The Government of Iran uses its diplomatic
facilities and quasi-governmental institutions outside
of Iran to promote acts of international terrorism and
assist its nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile
weapons programs.
(4) The failure of the Government of Libya to comply
with Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 of the Security
Council of the United Nations, its support of
international terrorism, and its efforts to acquire
weapons of mass destruction constitute a threat to
international peace and security that endangers the
national security and foreign policy interests of the
United States and those countries with which it shares
common strategic and foreign policy objectives.
SEC. 3.\1\ DECLARATION OF POLICY.
(a) Policy With Respect to Iran.--The Congress declares
that it is the policy of the United States to deny Iran the
ability to support acts of international terrorism and to fund
the development and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction
and the means to deliver them by limiting the development of
Iran's ability to explore for, extract, refine, or transport by
pipeline petroleum resources of Iran.
(b) Policy With Respect to Libya.--The Congress further
declares that it is the policy of the United States to seek
full compliance by Libya with its obligations under Resolutions
731, 748, and 883 of the Security Council of the United
Nations, including ending all support for acts of international
terrorism and efforts to develop or acquire weapons of mass
destruction.
SEC. 4.\1\ MULTILATERAL REGIME.
(a) Multilateral Negotiations.--In order to further the
objectives of section 3, the Congress urges the President to
commence immediately diplomatic efforts, both in appropriate
international fora such as the United Nations, and bilaterally
with allies of the United States, to establish a multilateral
sanctions regime against Iran, including provisions limiting
the development of petroleum resources, that will inhibit
Iran's efforts to carry out activities described in section 2.
(b) Reports to Congress.--The President shall report to the
appropriate congressional committees, not later than 1 year
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and periodically
thereafter, on the extent that diplomatic efforts described in
subsection (a) have been successful. Each report shall
include--
(1) the countries that have agreed to undertake
measures to further the objectives of section 3 with
respect to Iran, and a description of those measures;
and
(2) the countries that have not agreed to measures
described in paragraph (1), and, with respect to those
countries, other measures (in addition to that provided
in subsection (d)) the President recommends that the
United States take to further the objectives of section
3 with respect to Iran.
(c) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of
section 5(a) with respect to nationals of a country if--
(1) that country has agreed to undertake substantial
measures, including economic sanctions, that will
inhibit Iran's efforts to carry out activities
described in section 2 and information required by
subsection (b)(1) has been included in a report
submitted under subsection (b); and
(2) the President, at least 30 days before the waiver
takes effect, notifies the appropriate congressional
committees of his intention to exercise the waiver.
(d) Enhanced Sanction.--
(1) Sanction.--With respect to nationals of countries
except those with respect to which the President has
exercised the waiver authority of subsection (c), at
any time after the first report is required to be
submitted under subsection (b), section 5(a) shall be
applied by substituting ``$20,000,000'' for
``$40,000,000'' each place it appears, and by
substituting ``$5,000,000'' for ``$10,000,000''.
(2) Report to congress.--The President shall report
to the appropriate congressional committees any country
with respect to which paragraph (1) applies.
(e) Interim Report on Multilateral Sanctions; Monitoring.--
The President, not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, shall report to the appropriate
congressional committees on--
(1) whether the member states of the European Union,
the Republic of Korea, Australia, Israel, or Japan have
legislative or administrative standards providing for
the imposition of trade sanctions on persons or their
affiliates doing business or having investments in Iran
or Libya;
(2) the extent and duration of each instance of the
application of such sanctions; and
(3) the disposition of any decision with respect to
such sanctions by the World Trade Organization or its
predecessor organization.
SEC. 5.\1\ IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.
(a) Sanctions With Respect to Iran.--Except as provided in
subsection (f), the President shall impose 2 or more of the
sanctions described in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 6
if the President determines that a person has, with actual
knowledge, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act,
made an investment of $40,000,000 or more (or any combination
of investments of at least $10,000,000 each, which in the
aggregate equals or exceeds $40,000,000 in any 12-month
period), that directly and significantly contributed to the
enhancement of Iran's ability to develop petroleum resources of
Iran.
(b) Mandatory Sanctions With Respect to Libya.--
(1) Violations of prohibited transactions.--Except as
provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose
2 or more of the sanctions described in paragraphs (1)
through (6) of section 6 if the President determines
that a person has, with actual knowledge, on or after
the date of the enactment of this Act, exported,
transferred, or otherwise provided to Libya any goods,
services, technology, or other items the provision of
which is prohibited under paragraph 4(b) or 5 of
Resolution 748 of the Security Council of the United
Nations, adopted March 31, 1992, or under paragraph 5
or 6 of Resolution 883 of the Security Council of the
United Nations, adopted November 11, 1993, if the
provision of such items significantly and materially--
(A) contributed to Libya's ability to acquire
chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or
destabilizing numbers and types of advanced
conventional weapons or enhanced Libya's
military or paramilitary capabilities;
(B) contributed to Libya's ability to develop
its petroleum resources; or
(C) contributed to Libya's ability to
maintain its aviation capabilities.
(2) Investments that contribute to the development of
petroleum resources.--Except as provided in subsection
(f), the President shall impose 2 or more of the
sanctions described in paragraphs (1) through (6) of
section 6 if the President determines that a person
has, with actual knowledge, on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act, made an investment of
$40,000,000 or more (or any combination of investments
of at least $10,000,000 each, which in the aggregate
equals or exceeds $40,000,000 in any 12-month period),
that directly and significantly contributed to the
enhancement of Libya's ability to develop its petroleum
resources.
(c) Persons Against Which the Sanctions Are To Be
Imposed.--The sanctions described in subsections (a) and (b)
shall be imposed on--
(1) any person the President determines has carried
out the activities described in subsection (a) or (b);
and
(2) any person the President determines--
(A) is a successor entity to the person
referred to in paragraph (1);
(B) is a parent or subsidiary of the person
referred to in paragraph (1) if that parent or
subsidiary, with actual knowledge, engaged in
the activities referred to in paragraph (1); or
(C) is an affiliate of the person referred to
in paragraph (1) if that affiliate, with actual
knowledge, engaged in the activities referred
to in paragraph (1) and if that affiliate is
controlled in fact by the person referred to in
paragraph (1).
For purposes of this Act, any person or entity described in
this subsection shall be referred to as a ``sanctioned
person''.
(d) Publication in Federal Register.--The President shall
cause to be published in the Federal Register a current list of
persons and entities on whom sanctions have been imposed under
this Act. The removal of persons or entities from, and the
addition of persons and entities to, the list, shall also be so
published.
(e) Publication of Projects.\2\--The President shall cause
to be published in the Federal Register a list of all
significant projects which have been publicly tendered in the
oil and gas sector in Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The Department of State published such a list in Public Notice
No. 2501, January 2, 1997 (62 F.R. 1141).
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(f) Exceptions.--The President shall not be required to
apply or maintain the sanctions under subsection (a) or (b)--
(1) in the case of procurement of defense articles or
defense services--
(A) under existing contracts or subcontracts,
including the exercise of options for
production quantities to satisfy requirements
essential to the national security of the
United States;
(B) if the President determines in writing
that the person to which the sanctions would
otherwise be applied is a sole source supplier
of the defense articles or services, that the
defense articles or services are essential, and
that alternative sources are not readily or
reasonably available; or
(C) if the President determines in writing
that such articles or services are essential to
the national security under defense
coproduction agreements;
(2) in the case of procurement, to eligible products,
as defined in section 308(4) of the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979 (19 U.S.C. 2518(4)), of any foreign country
or instrumentality designated under section 301(b)(1)
of that Act (19 U.S.C. 2511(b)(1));
(3) to products, technology, or services provided
under contracts entered into before the date on which
the President publishes in the Federal Register the
name of the person on whom the sanctions are to be
imposed;
(4) to--
(A) spare parts which are essential to United
States products or production;
(B) component parts, but not finished
products, essential to United States products
or production; or
(C) routine servicing and maintenance of
products, to the extent that alternative
sources are not readily or reasonably
available;
(6) to information and technology essential to United
States products or production; or
(7) to medicines, medical supplies, or other
humanitarian items.
SEC. 6.\1\ DESCRIPTION OF SANCTIONS.
The sanctions to be imposed on a sanctioned person under
section 5 are as follows:
(1) Export-import bank assistance for exports to
sanctioned persons.--The President may direct the
Export-Import Bank of the United States not to give
approval to the issuance of any guarantee, insurance,
extension of credit, or participation in the extension
of credit in connection with the export of any goods or
services to any sanctioned person.
(2) Export sanction.--The President may order the
United States Government not to issue any specific
license and not to grant any other specific permission
or authority to export any goods or technology to a
sanctioned person under--
(i) the Export Administration Act of 1979;
(ii) the Arms Export Control Act;
(iii) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or
(iv) any other statute that requires the
prior review and approval of the United States
Government as a condition for the export or
reexport of goods or services.
(3) Loans from united states financial
institutions.--The United States Government may
prohibit any United States financial institution from
making loans or providing credits to any sanctioned
person totaling more than $10,000,000 in any 12-month
period unless such person is engaged in activities to
relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are
provided for such activities.
(4) Prohibitions on financial institutions.--The
following prohibitions may be imposed against a
sanctioned person that is a financial institution:
(A) Prohibition on designation as primary
dealer.--Neither the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System nor the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York may designate, or permit the
continuation of any prior designation of, such
financial institution as a primary dealer in
United States Government debt instruments.
(B) Prohibition on service as a repository of
government funds.--Such financial institution
may not serve as agent of the United States
Government or serve as repository for United
States Government funds.
The imposition of either sanction under subparagraph
(A) or (B) shall be treated as 1 sanction for purposes
of section 5, and the imposition of both such sanctions
shall be treated as 2 sanctions for purposes of section
5.
(5) Procurement sanction.--The United States
Government may not procure, or enter into any contract
for the procurement of, any goods or services from a
sanctioned person.
(6) Additional sanctions.--The President may impose
sanctions, as appropriate, to restrict imports with
respect to a sanctioned person, in accordance with the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701 and following).
SEC. 7.\1\ ADVISORY OPINIONS.
The Secretary of State may, upon the request of any person,
issue an advisory opinion to that person as to whether a
proposed activity by that person would subject that person to
sanctions under this Act. Any person who relies in good faith
on such an advisory opinion which states that the proposed
activity would not subject a person to such sanctions, and any
person who thereafter engages in such activity, will not be
made subject to such sanctions on account of such activity.
SEC. 8.\1\ TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.
(a) Iran.--The requirement under section 5(a) to impose
sanctions shall no longer have force or effect with respect to
Iran if the President determines and certifies to the
appropriate congressional committees that Iran--
(1) has ceased its efforts to design, develop,
manufacture, or acquire--
(A) a nuclear explosive device or related
materials and technology;
(B) chemical and biological weapons; and
(C) ballistic missiles and ballistic missile
launch technology; and
(2) has been removed from the list of countries the
governments of which have been determined, for purposes
of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of
1979, to have repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism.
(b) Libya.--The requirement under section 5(b) to impose
sanctions shall no longer have force or effect with respect to
Libya if the President determines and certifies to the
appropriate congressional committees that Libya has fulfilled
the requirements of United Nations Security Council Resolution
731, adopted January 21, 1992, United Nations Security Council
Resolution 748, adopted March 31, 1992, and United Nations
Security Council Resolution 883, adopted November 11, 1993.
SEC. 9.\1\ DURATION OF SANCTIONS; PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER.
(a) Delay of Sanctions.--
(1) Consultations.--If the President makes a
determination described in section 5(a) or 5(b) with
respect to a foreign person, the Congress urges the
President to initiate consultations immediately with
the government with primary jurisdiction over that
foreign person with respect to the imposition of
sanctions under this Act.
(2) Actions by government of jurisdiction.--In order
to pursue consultations under paragraph (1) with the
government concerned, the President may delay
imposition of sanctions under this Act for up to 90
days. Following such consultations, the President shall
immediately impose sanctions unless the President
determines and certifies to the Congress that the
government has taken specific and effective actions,
including, as appropriate, the imposition of
appropriate penalties, to terminate the involvement of
the foreign person in the activities that resulted in
the determination by the President under section 5(a)
or 5(b) concerning such person.
(3) Additional delay in imposition of sanctions.--The
President may delay the imposition of sanctions for up
to an additional 90 days if the President determines
and certifies to the Congress that the government with
primary jurisdiction over the person concerned is in
the process of taking the actions described in
paragraph (2).
(4) Report to congress.--Not later than 90 days after
making a determination under section 5(a) or 5(b), the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the status of consultations with
the appropriate foreign government under this
subsection, and the basis for any determination under
paragraph (3).
(b) Duration of Sanctions.--A sanction imposed under
section 5 shall remain in effect--
(1) for a period of not less than 2 years from the
date on which it is imposed; or
(2) until such time as the President determines and
certifies to the Congress that the person whose
activities were the basis for imposing the sanction is
no longer engaging in such activities and that the
President has received reliable assurances that such
person will not knowingly engage in such activities in
the future, except that such sanction shall remain in
effect for a period of at least 1 year.
(c) Presidential Waiver.--
(1) Authority.--The President may waive the
requirement in section 5 to impose a sanction or
sanctions on a person described in section 5(c), and
may waive the continued imposition of a sanction or
sanctions under subsection (b) of this section, 30 days
or more after the President determines and so reports
to the appropriate congressional committees that it is
important to the national interest of the United States
to exercise such waiver authority.
(2) Contents of report.--Any report under paragraph
(1) shall provide a specific and detailed rationale for
the determination under paragraph (1), including--
(A) a description of the conduct that
resulted in the determination under section
5(a) or (b), as the case may be;
(B) in the case of a foreign person, an
explanation of the efforts to secure the
cooperation of the government with primary
jurisdiction over the sanctioned person to
terminate or, as appropriate, penalize the
activities that resulted in the determination
under section 5(a) or (b), as the case may be;
(C) an estimate as to the significance--
(i) of the provision of the items
described in section 5(a) to Iran's
ability to develop its petroleum
resources, or
(ii) of the provision of the items
described in section 5(b)(1) to the
abilities of Libya described in
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of
section 5(b)(1), or of the investment
described in section 5(b)(2) on Libya's
ability to develop its petroleum
resources, as the case may be; and
(D) a statement as to the response of the
United States in the event that the person
concerned engages in other activities that
would be subject to section 5(a) or (b).
(3) Effect of report on waiver.--If the President
makes a report under paragraph (1) with respect to a
waiver of sanctions on a person described in section
5(c), sanctions need not be imposed under section 5(a)
or (b) on that person during the 30-day period referred
to in paragraph (1).
SEC. 10.\1\ REPORTS REQUIRED.
(a) Report on Certain International Initiatives.--Not later
than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
every 6 months thereafter, the President shall transmit a
report to the appropriate congressional committees describing--
(1) the efforts of the President to mount a
multilateral campaign to persuade all countries to
pressure Iran to cease its nuclear, chemical,
biological, and missile weapons programs and its
support of acts of international terrorism;
(2) the efforts of the President to persuade other
governments to ask Iran to reduce the presence of
Iranian diplomats and representatives of other
government and military or quasi-governmental
institutions of Iran and to withdraw any such diplomats
or representatives who participated in the takeover of
the United States embassy in Tehran on November 4,
1979, or the subsequent holding of United States
hostages for 444 days;
(3) the extent to which the International Atomic
Energy Agency has established regular inspections of
all nuclear facilities in Iran, including those
presently under construction; and
(4) Iran's use of Iranian diplomats and
representatives of other government and military or
quasi-governmental institutions of Iran to promote acts
of international terrorism or to develop or sustain
Iran's nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile
weapons programs.
(b) Other Reports.--The President shall ensure the
continued transmittal to the Congress of reports describing--
(1) the nuclear and other military capabilities of
Iran, as required by section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978 and section 1607 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1993; and
(2) the support provided by Iran for acts of
international terrorism, as part of the Department of
State's annual report on international terrorism.
SEC. 11.\1\ DETERMINATIONS NOT REVIEWABLE.
A determination to impose sanctions under this Act shall
not bereviewable in any court.
SEC. 12.\1\ EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES.
Nothing in this Act shall apply to any activities subject
to the reporting requirements of title V of the National
Security Act of 1947.
SEC. 13.\1\ EFFECTIVE DATE; SUNSET.
(a) Effective Date.--This Act shall take effect on the date
of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Sunset.--This Act shall cease to be effective on the
date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
SEC. 14.\1\ DEFINITIONS.
As used in this Act:
(1) Act of international terrorism.--The term ``act
of international terrorism'' means an act--
(A) which is violent or dangerous to human
life and that is a violation of the criminal
laws of the United States or of any State or
that would be a criminal violation if committed
within the jurisdiction of the United States or
any State; and
(B) which appears to be intended--
(i) to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion;
or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a
government by assassination or
kidnapping.
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the
Committee on Finance, the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Ways and Means, the Committee on Banking and Financial
Services, and the Committee on International Relations
of the House of Representatives.
(3) Component part.--The term ``component part'' has
the meaning given that term in section 11A(e)(1) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
2410a(e)(1)).
(4) Develop and development.--To ``develop'', or the
``development'' of, petroleum resources means the
exploration for, or the extraction, refining, or
transportation by pipeline of, petroleum resources.
(5) Financial institution.--The term ``financial
institution'' includes--
(A) a depository institution (as defined in
section 3(c)(1) of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act), including a branch or agency of
a foreign bank (as defined in section 1(b)(7)
of the International Banking Act of 1978);
(B) a credit union;
(C) a securities firm, including a broker or
dealer;
(D) an insurance company, including an agency
or underwriter; and
(E) any other company that provides financial
services.
(6) Finished product.--The term ``finished product''
has the meaning given that term in section 11A(e)(2) of
the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
2410a(e)(2)).
(7) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person''
means--
(A) an individual who is not a United States
person or an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence into the United States; or
(B) a corporation, partnership, or other
nongovernmental entity which is not a United
States person.
(8) Goods and technology.--The terms ``goods'' and
``technology'' have the meanings given those terms in
section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50
U.S.C. App. 2415).
(9) Investment.--The term ``investment'' means any of
the following activities if such activity is undertaken
pursuant to an agreement, or pursuant to the exercise
of rights under such an agreement, that is entered into
with the Government of Iran or a nongovenmental entity
in Iran, or with the Government of Libya or a
nongovernmental entity in Libya, on or after the date
of the enactment of this Act:
(A) The entry into a contract that includes
responsibility for the development of petroleum
resources located in Iran or Libya (as the case
may be), or the entry into a contract providing
for the general supervision and guarantee of
another person's performance of such a
contract.
(B) The purchase of a share of ownership,
including an equity interest, in that
development.
(C) The entry into a contract providing for
the participation in royalties, earnings, or
profits in that development, without regard to
the form of the participation.
The term ``investment'' does not include the entry
into, performance, or financing of a contract to sell
or purchase goods, services, or technology.
(10) Iran.--The term ``Iran'' includes any agency or
instrumentality of Iran.
(11) Iranian diplomats and representatives of other
government and military or quasi-governmental
institutions of iran.--The term ``Iranian diplomats and
representatives of other government and military or
quasi-governmental institutions of Iran'' includes
employees, representatives, or affiliates of Iran's--
(A) Foreign Ministry;
(B) Ministry of Intelligence and Security;
(C) Revolutionary Guard Corps;
(D) Crusade for Reconstruction;
(E) Qods (Jerusalem) Forces;
(F) Interior Ministry;
(G) Foundation for the Oppressed and
Disabled;
(H) Prophet's Foundation;
(I) June 5th Foundation;
(J) Martyr's Foundation;
(K) Islamic Propagation Organization; and
(L) Ministry of Islamic Guidance.
(12) Libya.--The term ``Libya'' includes any agency
or instrumentality of Libya.
(13) Nuclear explosive device.--The term ``nuclear
explosive device'' means any device, whether assembled
or disassembled, that is designed to produce an
instantaneous release of an amount of nuclear energy
from special nuclear material (as defined in section
11(aa) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954) that is
greater than the amount of energy that would be
released from the detonation of one pound of
trinitrotoluene (TNT).
(14) Person.--The term ``person'' means--
(A) a natural person;
(B) a corporation, business association,
partnership, society, trust, any other
nongovernmental entity, organization, or group,
and any governmental entity operating as a
business enterprise; and
(C) any successor to any entity described in
subparagraph (B).
(15) Petroleum resources.--The term ``petroleum
resources'' includes petroleum and natural gas
resources.
(16) United states or state.--The term ``United
States'' or ``State'' means the several States, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,
American Samoa, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands,
and any other territory or possession of the United
States.
(17) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) a natural person who is a citizen of the
United States or who owes permanent allegiance
to the United States; and
(B) a corporation or other legal entity which
is organized under the laws of the United
States, any State or territory thereof, or the
District of Columbia, if natural persons
described in subparagraph (A) own, directly or
indirectly, more than 50 percent of the
outstanding capital stock or other beneficial
interest in such legal entity.
4. Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992
Partial text of Public Law 102-484 [National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1993; H.R. 5006], 106 Stat. 2315, approved October 23,
1992, as amended
TITLE XVI--IRAN-IRAQ ARMS NON-PROLIFERATION ACT OF 1992
SEC. 1601.\1\ SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act of 1992''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 50 U.S.C. 1701 note. In a September 27, 1994, memorandum for
the Secretary of State, the President delegated all functions vested in
the President by this title to the Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Secretaries of Defense, Treasury, Commerce, the Director of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and other heads of appropriate
departments and agencies (59 F.R. 50685).
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SEC. 1602. UNITED STATES POLICY.
(a) In General.--It shall be the policy of the United
States to oppose, and urgently to seek the agreement of other
nations also to oppose, any transfer to Iran or Iraq of any
goods or technology, including dual-use goods or technology,
wherever that transfer could materially contribute to either
country's acquiring chemical, biological, nuclear, or
destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional
weapons.
(b) Sanctions.--(1) In the furtherance of this policy, the
President shall apply sanctions and controls with respect to
Iran, Iraq, and those nations and persons who assist them in
acquiring weapons of mass destruction in accordance with the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act of 1978, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and
Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, chapter 7 of the Arms Export
Control Act,\2\ and other relevant statutes, regarding the non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of
their delivery.
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\2\ For text of chapter 7 of the Arms Export Control Act, see
section A.2 of this publication.
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(2) The President should also urgently seek the agreement
of other nations to adopt and institute, at the earliest
practicable date, sanctions and controls comparable to those
the United States is obligated to apply under this subsection.
(c) Public Identification.--The Congress calls on the
President to identify publicly (in the report required by
section 1607) any country or person that transfers goods or
technology to Iran or Iraq contrary to the policy set forth in
subsection (a).
SEC. 1603. APPLICATION TO IRAN OF CERTAIN IRAQ SANCTIONS.
The sanctions against Iraq specified in paragraphs (1)
through (4) of section 586G(a) of the Iraq Sanctions Act of
1990 (as contained in Public Law 101-513),\3\ including denial
of export licenses for United States persons and prohibitions
on United States Government sales, shall be applied to the same
extent and in the same manner with respect to Iran.
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\3\ For text, see sec. A.7 of this publication.
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SEC. 1604. SANCTIONS AGAINST CERTAIN PERSONS.
(a) Prohibition.--If any person transfers or retransfers
goods or technology so as to contribute knowingly and
materially to the efforts by Iran or Iraq (or any agency or
instrumentality of either such country) to acquire chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons or \4\ to acquire destabilizing
numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons, then the
sanctions described in subsection (b) shall be imposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Sec. 1408(a) of Public Law 104-106 (110 Stat. 494) inserted
``to acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or'' before ``to
acquire''.
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(b) Mandatory Sanctions.--The sanctions to be imposed
pursuant to subsection (a) are as follows:
(1) Procurement sanction.--For a period of two years,
the United States Government shall not procure, or
enter into any contract for the procurement of, any
goods or services from the sanctioned person.
(2) Export sanction.--For a period of two years, the
United States Government shall not issue any license
for any export by or to the sanctioned person.
SEC. 1605. SANCTIONS AGAINST CERTAIN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
(a) Prohibition.--If the President determines that the
government of any foreign country transfers or retransfers
goods or technology so as to contribute knowingly and
materially to the efforts by Iran or Iraq (or any agency or
instrumentality of either such country) to acquire chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons or \5\ to acquire destabilizing
numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons, then--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Sec. 1408(b) of Public Law 104-106 (110 Stat. 494) inserted
``to acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or'' before ``to
acquire''.
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(1) the sanctions described in subsection (b) shall
be imposed on such country; and
(2) in addition, the President may apply, in the
discretion of the President, the sanction described in
subsection (c).
(b) Mandatory Sanctions.--Except as provided in paragraph
(2), the sanctions to be imposed pursuant to subsection (a)(1)
are as follows:
(1) Suspension of united states assistance.--The
United States Government shall suspend, for a period of
one year, United States assistance to the sanctioned
country.
(2) Multilateral development bank assistance.--The
Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United
States Executive Director to each appropriate
international financial institution to oppose, and vote
against, for a period of one year, the extension by
such institution of any loan or financial or technical
assistance to the sanctioned country.
(3) Suspension of codevelopment or coproduction
agreements.--The United States shall suspend, for a
period of one year, compliance with its obligations
under any memorandum of understanding with the
sanctioned country for the codevelopment or
coproduction of any item on the United States Munitions
List (established under section 38 of the Arms Export
Control Act), including any obligation for
implementation of the memorandum of understanding
through the sale to the sanctioned country of technical
data or assistance or the licensing for export to the
sanctioned country of any component part.
(4) Suspension of military and dual-use technical
exchange agreements.--The United States shall suspend,
for a period of one year, compliance with its
obligations under any technical exchange agreement
involving military and dual-use technology between the
United States and the sanctioned country that does not
directly contribute to the security of the United
States, and no military or dual-use technology may be
exported from the United States to the sanctioned
country pursuant to that agreement during that period.
(5) United states munitions list.--No item on the
United States Munitions List (established pursuant to
section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act) may be
exported to the sanctioned country for a period of one
year.
(c) Discretionary Sanction.--The sanction referred to in
subsection (a)(2) is as follows:
(1) Use of authorities of international emergency
economic powers act.--Except as provided in paragraph
(2), the President may exercise, in accordance with the
provisions of that Act, the authorities of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act with
respect to the sanctioned country.
(2) Exception.--Paragraph (1) does not apply with
respect to urgent humanitarian assistance.
SEC. 1606. WAIVER.
The President may waive the requirement to impose a
sanction described in section 1603, in the case of Iran, or a
sanction described in section 1604(b) or 1605(b), in the case
of Iraq and Iran, 15 days after the President determines and so
reports to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Armed Services
and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives \6\ that it
is essential to the national interest of the United States to
exercise such waiver authority. Any such report shall provide a
specific and detailed rationale for such determination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Sec. 1(a)(1) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided that
references to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on
National Security of the House of Representatives. Sec. 1(a)(5) of that
Act provided that references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs shall
be treated as referring to the Committee on International Relations.
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SEC. 1607. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
(a) Annual Report.--Beginning one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter, the
President shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services and
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Armed
Services and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
\6\ a report detailing--
(1) all transfers or retransfers made by any person
or foreign government during the preceding 12-month
period which are subject to any sanction under this
title; and
(2) the actions the President intends to undertake or
has undertaken pursuant to this title with respect to
each such transfer.
(b) Report on Individual Transfers.--Whenever the President
determines that a person or foreign government has made a
transfer which is subject to any sanction under this title, the
President shall, within 30 days after such transfer, submit to
the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the
Senate and the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives \6\ a report--
(1) identifying the person or government and
providing the details of the transfer; and
(2) describing the actions the President intends to
undertake or has undertaken under the provisions of
this title with respect to each such transfer.
(c) Form of Transmittal.--Reports required by this section
may be submitted in classified as well as in unclassified form.
SEC. 1608. DEFINITIONS.
For purposes of this title:
(1) The term ``advanced conventional weapons''
includes--
(A) such long-range precision-guided
munitions, fuel air explosives, cruise
missiles, low observability aircraft, other
radar evading aircraft, advanced military
aircraft, military satellites, electromagnetic
weapons, and laser weapons as the President
determines destabilize the military balance or
enhance offensive capabilities in destabilizing
ways;
(B) such advanced command, control, and
communications systems, electronic warfare
systems, or intelligence collection systems as
the President determines destabilize the
military balance or enhance offensive
capabilities in destabilizing ways; and
(C) such other items or systems as the
President may, by regulation, determine
necessary for purposes of this title.
(2) The term ``cruise missile'' means guided missiles
that use aerodynamic lift to offset gravity and
propulsion to counteract drag.
(3) The term ``goods or technology'' means--
(A) any article, natural or manmade
substance, material, supply, or manufactured
product, including inspection and test
equipment; and
(B) any information and know-how (whether in
tangible form, such as models, prototypes,
drawings, sketches, diagrams, blueprints, or
manuals, or in intangible form, such as
training or technical services) that can be
used to design, produce, manufacture, utilize,
or reconstruct goods, including computer
software and technical data.
(4) The term ``person'' means any United States or
foreign individual, partnership, corporation, or other
form of association, or any of their successor
entities, parents, or subsidiaries.
(5) The term ``sanctioned country'' means a country
against which sanctions are required to be imposed
pursuant to section 1605.
(6) The term ``sanctioned person'' means a person
that makes a transfer described in section 1604(a).
(7) The term ``United States assistance'' means--
(A) \7\ any assistance under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et
seq.), other than urgent humanitarian
assistance or medicine;
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\7\ Sec. 1408(c) of Public Law 104-106 (110 Stat. 494) amended and
restated subpara. (A), which formerly read as follows:
``(A) any assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
other than--
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``(i) urgent humanitarian assistance or medicine, and
``(ii) assistance under chapter 11 of part I (as enacted by
the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and
Open Markets Support Act of 1992);''.
(B) sales and assistance under the Arms
Export Control Act;
(C) financing by the Commodity Credit
Corporation for export sales of agricultural
commodities; and
(D) financing under the Export-Import Bank
Act.
5. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985
Partial text of Public Law 99-83 [S. 960], 99 Stat. 190, approved
August 8, 1985 as amended
AN ACT To authorize international development and security assistance
programs and Peace Corps programs for fiscal years 1986 and 1987, and
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1985''.
* * * * * * *
TITLE V--INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND FOREIGN AIRPORT SECURITY \1\
Part A--International Terrorism Generally
SEC. 501. * * *
SEC. 502. COORDINATION OF ALL UNITED STATES TERRORISM-RELATED
ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
(a) Coordination.--The Secretary of State shall be
responsible for coordinating all assistance related to
international terrorism which is provided by the United States
Government.
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\1\ See Section F for the text of legislation on foreign airport
security.
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(b) Reports.--Not later than February 1 each year, the
Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate United
States Government agencies, shall report to the appropriate
committees of the Congress on the assistance related to
international terrorism which was provided by the United States
Government during the preceding fiscal year. Such reports may
be provided on a classified basis to the extent necessary, and
shall specify the amount and nature of the assistance provided.
(c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing contained in this
section shall be construed to limit or impair the authority or
responsibility of any other Federal agency with respect to law
enforcement, domestic security operations, or intelligence
activities as defined in Executive Order 12333.\2\
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\2\ For text, see U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International
Relations. Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1996, (Washington,
G.P.O., 1997), vol. II, sec. D.
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SEC. 503.\3\ PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES SUPPORTING
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Sec. 503(a) amended sec. 620A of the FAA of 1961. Sec. 503(b)
amended sec. 3(f) of the AECA.
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SEC. 504. PROHIBITION ON IMPORTS FROM AND EXPORTS TO LIBYA.
(a) Prohibition on Imports.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the President may prohibit any article grown,
produced, extracted, or manufactured in Libya from being
imported into the United States.
(b) Prohibition on Exports.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the President may prohibit any goods or
technology, including technical data or other information,
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or exported by
any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,
from being exported to Libya.
(c) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term
``United States'', when used in a geographical sense, includes
territories and possessions of the United States.
SEC. 505.\4\ BAN ON IMPORTING GOODS AND SERVICES FROM COUNTRIES
SUPPORTING TERRORISM.
(a) Authority.--The President may ban the importation into
the United States of any good or service from any country which
supports terrorism or terrorist organizations or harbors
terrorist or terrorist organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ 22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9.
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(b) Consultation.--The President, in every possible
instance, shall consult with the Congress before exercising the
authority granted by this section and shall consult regularly
with the Congress so long as that authority is being exercised.
(c) Reports.--Whenever the President exercises the
authority granted by this section, he shall immediately
transmit to the Congress a report specifying--
(1) The country with respect to which the authority
is to be exercised and the imports to be prohibited;
(2) the circumstances which necessitate the exercise
of such authority;
(3) why the President believes those circumstances
justify the exercise of such authority; and
(4) why the President believes the prohibitions are
necessary to deal with those circumstances.
At least once during each succeeding 6-month period after
transmitting a report pursuant to this subsection, the
President shall report to the Congress with respect to the
actions taken, since the last such report, pursuant to this
section and with respect to any changes which have occurred
concerning any information previously furnished pursuant to
this subsection.
(d) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term
``United States'' includes territories and possessions of the
United States.
SEC. 506. INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TERRORISM COMMITTEE.
The Congress calls upon the President to seek the
establishment of an international committee, to be known as the
International Anti-Terrorism Committee, consisting of
representatives of the member countries of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, Japan, and such other countries as may be
invited and may choose to participate. The purpose of the
Committee should be to focus the attention and secure the
cooperation of the governments and the public of the
participating countries and of other countries on the problems
and responses to international terrorism, by serving as a forum
at both the political and law enforcement levels.
SEC. 507. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM CONTROL TREATY.
It is the sense of the Congress that the President should
establish a process by which democratic and open societies of
the world, which are those most plagued by terrorism, negotiate
a viable treaty to effectively prevent and respond to terrorist
attacks. Such a treaty should incorporate an operative
definition of terrorism, and should establish effective close
intelligence-sharing, joint counterterrorist training, and
uniform laws on asylum, extradition, and swift punishment for
perpetrators of terrorism. Parties to such a treaty should
include, but not be limited to, those democratic nations who
are most victimized by terrorism.
SEC. 508. STATE TERRORISM.
It is sense of the Congress that all civilized nations
should firmly condemn the increasing use of terrorism by
certain states as an official instrument for promoting their
policy goals, as evidenced by such examples as the brutal
assassination of Major Arthur D. Nicholson, Junior, by a member
of the Soviet armed forces.
Part B--Foreign Airport Security
SEC. 551. SECURITY STANDARDS FOR FOREIGN AIR TRANSPORTATION.
(a) \5\ Security at Foreign Airports.--* * * [Repealed--
1994]
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\5\ Sec. 7(b) of Public Law 103-272 (108 Stat. 1379) repealed sec.
551(a) and (b), which enacted an amendment to sec. 1115 of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, and related amendments, concerning security
standards in foreign air transportation, codified at 49 U.S.C. App.
1515.
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(b) Conforming Amendments.--* * * [Repealed--1994]
(c) Closing of Beirut International Airport.--It is the
sense of the Congress that the President is urged and
encouraged to take all appropriate steps to carry forward his
announced policy of seeking the effective closing of the
international airport in Beirut, Lebanon, at least until such
time as the Government of Lebanon has instituted measures and
procedures designed to prevent the use of that airport by
aircraft hijackers and other terrorists in attacking civilian
airlines or their passengers, hijacking their aircraft, or
taking or holding their passengers hostage.
SEC. 552.\6\ * * * [Repealed--1994]
SEC. 553.\7\ * * * [Repealed--1994]
SEC. 554. ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
STANDARDS.
The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Transportation,
jointly, shall call on the member countries of the
International Civil Aviation Organization to enforce that
Organization's existing standards and to support United States
actions enforcing such standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Formerly at 49 U.S.C. app. 1515a. Sec. 552, relating to travel
advisories and suspension of foreign assistance, was repealed by sec.
7(b) of Public Law 103-272 (108 Stat. 1379).
\7\ Formerly at 49 U.S.C. app. 1356b. Sec. 553, relating to the
United States airmarshal program, was repealed by sec. 7(b) of Public
Law 103-272 (108 Stat. 1379).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 555. INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION BOYCOTT OF COUNTRIES SUPPORTING
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.
It is the sense of the Congress that the President--
(1) should call for an international civil aviation
boycott with respect to those countries which the
President determines--
(A) grant sanctuary from prosecution to any
individual or group which has committed an act
of international terrorism, or
(B) otherwise support international
terrorism; and
(2) should take steps, both bilateral and
multilateral, to achieve a total international civil
aviation boycott with respect to those countries.
SEC. 556.\8\ * * * [Repealed--1994]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Formerly 49 U.S.C. app. 1515 note. Sec. 556, relating to
multilateral and bilateral agreements with respect to aircraft
sabotage, aircraft hijacking, and airport security, was repealed by
sec. 7(b) of Public Law 103-272 (108 Stat. 1379).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 557. RESEARCH ON AIRPORT SECURITY TECHNIQUES FOR DETECTING
EXPLOSIVES.
In order to improve security at international airports,
there are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of
Transportation from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (in
addition to amounts otherwise available for such purpose)
$5,000,000, without fiscal year limitation, to be used for
research on and the development of airport security devices or
techniques for detecting explosives.
SEC. 558. HIJACKING OF TWA FLIGHT 847 AND OTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM.
The Congress joins with all Americans in celebrating the
release of the hostages taken from Trans World Airlines flight
847. It is the sense of the Congress that--
(1) purser Uli Derickson, pilot John Testrake, co-
pilot Philip Maresca, flight engineer Benjamin
Zimmermann, and the rest of the crew of Trans World
Airlines flight 847 displayed extraordinary valor and
heroism during the hostages' ordeal and therefore
should be commended;
(2) the hijackers who murdered United States Navy
Petty Officer Stethem should be immediately brought to
justice;
(3) all diplomatic means should continue to be
employed to obtain the release of the 7 United States
citizens previously kidnapped and still held in
Lebanon;
(4) acts of international terrorism should be
universally condemned; and
(5) the Secretary of State should be supported in his
efforts to gain international cooperation to prevent
future acts of terrorism.
SEC. 559. * * *
TITLE XIII--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
SEC. 1301. * * *
SEC. 1302.\9\ CODIFICATION OF POLICY PROHIBITING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
(a) United States Policy.--The United States in 1975
declared in a memorandum of agreement with Israel, and has
reaffirmed since, that ``The United States will continue to
adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine
Liberation Organization, whereby it will not recognize or
negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as
the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize
Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ 22 U.S.C. 2151 note. Sec. 531 of the Foreign Assistance
Appropriations Act, 1986 (Sec. 101(i) of Public Law 99-190; 99 Stat.
1307), provided the following:
``In reaffirmation of the 1975 memorandum of agreement between the
United States and Israel, and in accordance with section 1302 of the
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (Public
Law 99-83), no employee of or individual acting on behalf of the United
States Government shall recognize or negotiate with the Palestine
Liberation Organization or representatives thereof, so long as the
Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel's right to
exist, does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and
does not renounce the use of terrorism.''. Sec. 530 of the Foreign
Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1987 (sec. 101(f)
of Public Law 99-591; 100 Stat. 3341-231) contained identical language.
Sec. 527 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act 1987 (see. 101(f) of Public Law 99-591; 100 Stat.
3341-230) provided:
``Notwithstanding any other provision of law or this Act, none of
the funds provided for ``International organizations and programs''
shall be available for the United States proportionate share for any
programs for the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Southwest
African Peoples Organization, Libya, Iran, or, at the discretion of the
President, Communist countries listed in section 620(f) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.''.
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(b) Reaffirmation and Codification of Policy.--The United
States hereby reaffirms that policy. In accordance with that
policy, no officer or employee of the United States Government
and no agent or other individual acting on behalf of the United
States Government shall negotiate with the Palestine Liberation
Organization or any representatives thereof (except in
emergency or humanitarian situations) unless and until the
Palestine Liberation Organization recognizes Israel's right to
exist, accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242
and 338 and renounces the use of terrorism, except that no
funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other Act
may be obligated or made available for the conduct of the
current dialogue on the Middle East process with any
representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization if the
President knows and advises the Congress that the
representative directly participated in the planning or
execution of a particular terrorist activity which resulted in
the death or kidnapping of a United States citizen.
* * * * * * *
6. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981
Partial text of Public Law 97-113 [S. 1196], 95 Stat. 1519, approved
December 29, 1981, as amended
AN ACT To authorize appropriations for the fiscal years 1982 and 1983
for international security and development assistance and for the Peace
Corps, to establish the Peace Corps as an autonomous agency, and for
other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
short title
Section 1. This Act may be cited as the ``International
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981''.
* * * * * * *
TITLE VII--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
condemnation of libya for its support of international terrorist
movements
Sec. 718. (a) The Congress condemns the Libyan Government
for its support of international terrorist movements, its
efforts to obstruct positive movement toward the peaceful
resolution of problems in the Middle East region, and its
actions to destabilize and control governments of neighboring
states in Africa.
(b) The Congress believes that the President should conduct
an immediate review of concrete steps the United States could
take, individually and in concert with its allies, to bring
economic and political pressure on Libya to cease such
activities, and should submit a report on that review to the
Congress within one hundred and eighty days after the date of
enactment of this Act. Such a review should include the
possibility of tariffs on or prohibitions against the import of
crude oil from Libya.
united states citizens acting in the service of international terrorism
Sec. 719. (a) It is the sense of the Congress that the
spread of international terrorism poses a grave and growing
danger for world peace and for the national security of the
United States. As a part of its vigorous opposition to the
activities of international terrorist leaders and the increase
of international terrorism, the United States should take all
steps necessary to ensure that no United States citizen is
acting in the service of terrorism or of the proponents of
terrorism.
(b) * * *
* * * * * * *
7. Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990
Partial text of Public Law 101-513 [Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991; H.R. 5114],
104 Stat. 1979 at 2047, approved November 5, 1990
AN ACT Making appropriations for foreign operations, export financing,
and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1991, and
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the
following sums are appropriated, out of any money in the
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for foreign operations,
export financing, and related programs for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 1991, and for other purposes, namely:
* * * * * * *
TITLE V--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
iraq sanctions act of 1990
SEC. 586. SHORT TITLE.
Sections 586 through 586J of this Act may be cited as the
``Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990''.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 586F. DECLARATIONS REGARDING IRAQ'S LONG-STANDING VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
(a) Iraq's Violations of International Law.--The Congress
determines that--
(1) the Government of Iraq has demonstrated repeated
and blatant disregard for its obligations under
international law by violating the Charter of the
United Nations, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the
Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (done at
Geneva, June 17, 1925), as well as other international
treaties;
(2) the Government of Iraq is a party to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights and is obligated under the Covenants,
as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
to respect internationally recognized human rights;
(3) the State Department's Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices for 1989 again characterizes Iraq's
human rights record as ``abysmal'';
(4) Amnesty International, Middle East Watch, and
other independent human rights organizations have
documented extensive, systematic, and continuing human
rights abuses by the Government of Iraq, including
summary executions, mass political killings,
disappearances, widespread use of torture, arbitrary
arrests and prolonged detention without trial of
thousands of political opponents, forced relocation and
deportation, denial of nearly all civil and political
rights such as freedom of association, assembly,
speech, and the press, and the imprisonment, torture,
and execution of children;
(5) since 1987, the Government of Iraq has
intensified its severe repression of the Kurdish
minority of Iraq, deliberately destroyed more than
3,000 villages and towns in the Kurdish regions, and
forcibly expelled more than 500,000 people, thus
effectively depopulating the rural areas of Iraqi
Kurdistan;
(6) Iraq has blatantly violated international law by
initiating use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq
war;
(7) Iraq has also violated international law by using
chemical weapons against its own Kurdish citizens,
resulting in tens of thousands of deaths and more than
65,000 refugees;
(8) Iraq continues to expand its chemical weapons
capability, and President Saddam Hussein has threatened
to use chemical weapons against other nations;
(9) persuasive evidence exists that Iraq is
developing biological weapons in violation of
international law;
(10) there are strong indications that Iraq has taken
steps to produce nuclear weapons and has attempted to
smuggle from the United States, in violation of United
States law, components for triggering devices used in
nuclear warheads whose manufacture would contravene the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to
which Iraq is a party; and
(11) Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has threatened to
use terrorism against other nations in violation of
international law and has increased Iraq's support for
the Palestine Liberation Organization and other
Palestinian groups that have conducted terrorist acts.
(b) Human Rights Violations.-- * * *
(c) Support for International Terrorism.--(1) The Congress
determines that Iraq is a country which has repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism, a country which
grants sanctuary from prosecution to individuals or groups
which have committed an act of international terrorism, and a
country which otherwise supports international terrorism. The
provisions of law specified in paragraph (2) and all other
provisions of law that impose sanctions against a country which
has repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism, which grants sanctuary from prosecution to an
individual or group which has committed an act of international
terrorism, or which otherwise supports international terrorism
shall be fully enforced against Iraq.
(2) The provisions of law referred to in paragraph (1) are--
(A) section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act;
(B) section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961;
(C) sections 555 and 556 of this Act (and the
corresponding sections of predecessor foreign
operations appropriations Acts); and
(D) section 555 of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985.
(d) Multilateral Cooperation.--The Congress calls on the
President to seek multilateral cooperation--
(1) to deny dangerous technologies to Iraq;
(2) to induce Iraq to respect internationally
recognized human rights; and
(3) to induce Iraq to allow appropriate international
humanitarian and human rights organizations to have
access to Iraq and Kuwait, including the areas in
northern Iraq traditionally inhabited by Kurds.
SEC. 586G. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ.
(a) Imposition.--Except as provided in section 586H, the
following sanctions shall apply with respect to Iraq:
(1) FMS sales.--The United States Government shall
not enter into any sale with Iraq under the Arms Export
Control Act.
(2) Commercial arms sales.--Licenses shall not be
issued for the export to Iraq of any item on the United
States Munitions List.
(3) Exports of certain goods and technology.--The
authorities of section 6 of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405) shall be used to
prohibit the export to Iraq of any goods or technology
listed pursuant to that section or section 5(c)(1) of
that Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2404(c)(1)) on the control
list provided for in section 4(b) of that Act (50
U.S.C. App. 2403(b)).
(4) Nuclear equipment, materials, and technology.--
(A) NRC licenses.--The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission shall not issue any license or other
authorization under the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 and following) for the
export to Iraq of any source or special nuclear
material, any production or utilization
facility, any sensitive nuclear technology, any
component, item, or substance determined to
have significance for nuclear explosive
purposes pursuant to section 109b. of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2139(b)),
or any other material or technology requiring
such a license or authorization.
(B) Distribution of nuclear materials.--The
authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
shall not be used to distribute any special
nuclear material, source material, or byproduct
material to Iraq.
(C) DOE authorizations.--The Secretary of
Energy shall not provide a specific
authorization under section 57b. (2) of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2077(b)(2)) for any activity that would
constitute directly or indirectly engaging in
Iraq in activities that require a specific
authorization under that section.
(5) Assistance from international financial
institutions.--The United States shall oppose any loan
or financial or technical assistance to Iraq by
international financial institutions in accordance with
section 701 of the International Financial Institutions
Act (22 U.S.C. 262d).
(6) Assistance through the export-import bank.--
Credits and credit guarantees through the Export-Import
Bank of the United States shall be denied to Iraq.
(7) Assistance through the commodity credit
corporation.--Credit, credit guarantees, and other
assistance through the Commodity Credit Corporation
shall be denied to Iraq.
(8) Foreign assistance.--All forms of assistance
under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2151 and following) other than emergency assistance for
medical supplies and other forms of emergency
humanitarian assistance, and under the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 and following) shall be
denied to Iraq.
(b) Contract Sanctity.--For purposes of the export controls
imposed pursuant to subsection (a)(3), the date described in
subsection (m)(1) of section 6 of the Export Administration Act
of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405) shall be deemed to be August 1,
1990.
SEC. 586H. WAIVER AUTHORITY.
(a) In General.--The President may waive the requirements of
any paragraph of section 586G(a) if the President makes a
certification under subsection (b) or subsection (c).
(b) Certification of Fundamental Changes in Iraqi Policies
and Actions.--The authority of subsection (a) may be exercised
60 days after the President certifies to the Congress that--
(1) the Government of Iraq--
(A) * * *
(B) * * *
(C) does not provide support for
international terrorism;
* * * * * * *
(c) Certification of Fundamental Changes in Iraqi Leadership
and Policies.--The authority of subsection (a) may be exercised
30 days after the President certifies to the Congress that--
(1) there has been a fundamental change in the
leadership of the Government of Iraq; and
(2) the new Government of Iraq has provided reliable
and credible assurance that--
(A) * * *
(B) * * *
(C) it is not and will not provide support
for international terrorism; and
(D) * * *
(d) Information To Be Included in Certifications.--Any
certification under subsection (b) or (c) shall include the
justification for each determination required by that
subsection. The certification shall also specify which
paragraphs of section 586G(a) the President will waive pursuant
to that certification.
* * * * * * *
8. International Narcotics Control Act of 1990
Partial text of Public Law 101-623 [H.R. 5567], 104 Stat. 3350,
approved November 21, 1990
AN ACT To authorize international narcotics control activities for
fiscal year 1991, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) \1\ Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``International Narcotics Control Act of 1990''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 22 U.S.C. 2151 note.
* * * * * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 2. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS FOR
ANDEAN COUNTRIES.
(a) * * *
(b) Administration of Justice Programs.--
(1) Additional assistance for bolivia, colombia, and
peru.-- * * *
(2) Protection against narco-terrorist attacks.--
Funds used in accordance with paragraph (1) may be used
to provide to Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru,
notwithstanding section 660 of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2420; relating to the
prohibition on assistance to law enforcement agencies),
such assistance as the government of that country may
request to provide protection against narco-terrorist
attacks on judges, other government officials, and
members of the press.
* * * * * * *
9. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1999
Partial text of section 101(d) of Division A of Public Law 105-277
[H.R. 4328], 112 Stat. 2681, approved October 21, 1998
(d) For programs, projects or activities in the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1999, provided as follows, to be effective
as if it had been enacted into law as the regular
appropriations Act:
AN ACT Making appropriations for foreign operations, export financing,
and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1999, and
for other purposes.
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--BILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
Funds Appropriated to the President
For expenses necessary to enable the President to carry out
the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for
other purposes, to remain available until September 30, 1999,
unless otherwise specified herein, as follows:
* * * * * * *
Department of State
* * * * * * *
nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining and related programs
For necessary expenses for nonproliferation, anti-terrorism
and related programs and activities, $198,000,000, to carry out
the provisions of chapter 8 of part II of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 for anti-terrorism assistance, section
504 of the FREEDOM Support Act for the Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund, section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act or
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for demining activities, the
clearance of unexploded ordnance, and related activities,
notwithstanding any other provision of law, including
activities implemented through nongovernmental and
international organizations, section 301 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 for a voluntary contribution to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a voluntary
contribution to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO), and for a United States contribution to
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Preparatory
Commission: Provided, That the Secretary of State shall inform
the Committees on Appropriations at least twenty days prior to
the obligation of funds for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty Preparatory Commission: Provided further, That of this
amount not to exceed $15,000,000, to remain available until
expended, may be made available for the Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund, notwithstanding any other provision of law,
to promote bilateral and multilateral activities relating to
nonproliferation and disarmament: Provided further, That such
funds may also be used for such countries other than the New
Independent States of the former Soviet Union and international
organizations when it is in the national security interest of
the United States to do so: Provided further, That such funds
shall be subject to the regular notification procedures of the
Committees on Appropriations: Provided further, That of the
funds appropriated under this heading not less than $35,000,000
should be made available for demining, clearance of unexploded
ordnance, and related activities: Provided further, That of the
funds made available for demining and related activities, not
to exceed $500,000, in addition to funds otherwise available
for such purposes, may be used for expenses related to the
operation and management of the demining program: Provided
further, That funds appropriated under this heading may be made
available for the International Atomic Energy Agency only if
the Secretary of State determines (and so reports to the
Congress) that Israel is not being denied its right to
participate in the activities of that Agency.
* * * * * * *
TITLE V--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
prohibition on bilateral assistance to terrorist countries
Sec. 528.\1\ (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, funds appropriated for bilateral assistance under any
heading of this Act and funds appropriated under any such
heading in a provision of law enacted prior to enactment of
this Act, shall not be made available to any country which the
President determines--
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\1\ Sec. 576 of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act, 1988,
first enacted a ``Prohibition on Bilateral Assistance to Terrorist
Countries''. Sec. 564 of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act,
1990, substantially reworded this prohibition, providing the criteria
for restriction, and the requirement for Presidential determination and
waiver.
See also sec. 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, sec. 40
of the Arms Export Control Act (this volume), and sec. 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act (Sec. E, this volume).
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(1) grants sanctuary from prosecution to any
individual or group which has committed an act of
international terrorism, or
(2) otherwise supports international terrorism.
(b) The President may waive the application of subsection
(a) to a country if the President determines that national
security or humanitarian reasons justify such waiver. The
President shall publish each waiver in the Federal Register
and, at least fifteen days before the waiver takes effect,
shall notify the Committees on Appropriations of the waiver
(including the justification for the waiver) in accordance with
the regular notification procedures of the Committees on
Appropriations.
* * * * * * *
special authorities
Sec. 540. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) \2\ (1) Waiver.--The President may waive the provisions
of section 1003 of Public Law 100-204 if the President
determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate
that it is important to the national security interests of the
United States.
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\2\ In a memorandum of November 25, 1998, for the Secretary of
State, the President ``determine[d] and certif[ied] that it is
important to the national security interests of the United States to
waive the provisions of section 1003 of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987,
Public Law 100-204, through May 24, 1999.'' (Presidential Determination
No. 99-5; 63 F.R. 68145).
Sec. 3 of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1993, as
amended (Public Law 103-125; 107 Stat. 1309), authorized the President
to suspend certain provisions of law as they applied to the P.L.O. or
entities associated with it if certain conditions were met and the
President so certified and consulted with relevant congressional
committees. This authority was continued in the Middle East Peace
Facilitation Act of 1994 (part E of Public Law 103-236) and the Middle
East Peace Facilitation Act of 1995 (title VI of the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
1996; Public Law 104-107).
New authority to waive certain provisions was continued in general
provisions of this Act; see also secs. 552, 556, 566, and 584.
The President issued such a certification in Presidential
Determination No. 94-13 of January 14, 1994 (59 F.R. 4777), which was
extended until January 1, 1995, by Presidential Determination No. 94-30
of June 30, 1994 (59 F.R. 35607); until July 1, 1995, by Presidential
Determination No. 95-12 of December 31, 1994 (60 F.R. 2673); until
August 15, 1995, by Presidential Determination No. 95-31 of July 2,
1995 (60 F.R. 35827); until October 1, 1995, by Presidential
Determination No. 95-36 of August 14, 1995 (60 F.R. 44725); until
November 1, 1995, by Presidential Determination No. 95-50 of September
30, 1995 (60 F.R. 53093); until December 31, 1995, by Presidential
Determination No. 96-5 of November 13, 1995 (60 F.R. 57821); until
March 31, 1996, by Presidential Determination No. 96-8 of January 4,
1996 (61 F.R. 2889); until June 15, 1996, by Presidential Determination
No. 96-20 of April 1, 1996 (61 F.R. 26019); until August 12, 1996, by
Presidential Determination No. 96-32 of June 14, 1996 (61 F.R. 32629);
until February 12, 1997, by Presidential Determination No. 96-41 of
August 12, 1996 (61 F.R. 43137); until August 12, 1997, by Presidential
Determination No. 97-17 of February 21, 1997 (62 F.R. 9903); through
June 4, 1998, by Presidential Determination No. 98-8 of December 5,
1997 (62 F.R. 66255); through November 26, 1998, by Presidential
Determination No. 98-29 of June 3, 1998 (63 F.R. 32711); and through
May 24, 1999, by Presidential Determination No. 99-5 of November 25,
1998 (63 F.R. 68145).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Period of Application of Waiver.--Any waiver pursuant
to paragraph (1) shall be effective for no more than a period
of six months at a time and shall not apply beyond twelve
months after enactment of this Act.
* * * * * * *
eligibility for assistance
Sec. 543.\3\ (a) Assistance Through Nongovernmental
Organizations.--Restrictions contained in this or any other Act
with respect to assistance for a country shall not be construed
to restrict assistance in support of programs of
nongovernmental organizations from funds appropriated by this
Act to carry out the provisions of chapters 1, 10, and 11 of
part I and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, and from funds appropriated under the heading
``Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States'':
Provided, That the President shall take into consideration, in
any case in which a restriction on assistance would be
applicable but for this subsection, whether assistance in
support of programs of nongovernmental organizations is in the
national interest of the United States: Provided further, That
before using the authority of this subsection to furnish
assistance in support of programs of nongovernmental
organizations, the President shall notify the Committees on
Appropriations under the regular notification procedures of
those committees, including a description of the program to be
assisted, the assistance to be provided, and the reasons for
furnishing such assistance: Provided further, That nothing in
this subsection shall be construed to alter any existing
statutory prohibitions against abortion or involuntary
sterilizations contained in this or any other Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Similar language was first enacted in sec. 562 of the Foreign
Assistance Appropriations Act, 1993.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Public Law 480.--During fiscal year 1999, restrictions
contained in this or any other Act with respect to assistance
for a country shall not be construed to restrict assistance
under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954: Provided, That none of the funds appropriated to carry
out title I of such Act and made available pursuant to this
subsection may be obligated or expended except as provided
through the regular notification procedures of the Committees
on Appropriations.
(c) Exception.--This section shall not apply--
(1) with respect to section 620A of the Foreign
Assistance Act or any comparable provision of law
prohibiting assistance to countries that support
international terrorism; or
(2) with respect to section 116 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 or any comparable provision of
law prohibiting assistance to countries that violate
internationally recognized human rights.
* * * * * * *
prohibition on assistance to foreign governments that export lethal
military equipment to countries supporting international terrorism
Sec. 551.\4\ (a) None of the funds appropriated or
otherwise made available by this Act may be available to any
foreign government which provides lethal military equipment to
a country the government of which the Secretary of State has
determined is a terrorist government for purposes of section
40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act or any other comparable
provision of law. The prohibition under this section with
respect to a foreign government shall terminate 12 months after
that government ceases to provide such military equipment. This
section applies with respect to lethal military equipment
provided under a contract entered into after October 1, 1997.
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\4\ Similar language was first enacted as sec. 573 of the Foreign
Assistance Appropriations Act, 1994. See also sec. 620A of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961.
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(b) Assistance restricted by subsection (a) or any other
similar provision of law, may be furnished if the President
determines that furnishing such assistance is important to the
national interests of the United States.
(c) Whenever the waiver of subsection (b) is exercised, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report with respect to the furnishing of such
assistance. Any such report shall include a detailed
explanation of the assistance estimated to be provided,
including the estimated dollar amount of such assistance, and
an explanation of how the assistance furthers United States
national interests.
* * * * * * *
special debt relief for the poorest
Sec. 559. (a) \5\ Authority To Reduce Debt.--The President
may reduce amounts owed to the United States (or any agency of
the United States) by an eligible country as a result of--
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\5\ In a memorandum of July 8, 1996, the President delegated to the
Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretaries of
State and Defense, the functions, authorities, and duties conferred on
the President by sec. 570(a) of this Act, sec. 561(a) of Public Law
103-306, and any similar subsequent provision of law (61 F.R. 38563).
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(1) guarantees issued under sections 221 and 222 of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;
(2) credits extended or guarantees issued under the
Arms Export Control Act; or
(3) any obligation or portion of such obligation for
a Latin American country, to pay for purchases of
United States agricultural commodities guaranteed by
the Commodity Credit Corporation under export credit
guarantee programs authorized pursuant to section 5(f )
of the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act of June
29, 1948, as amended, section 4(b) of the Food for
Peace Act of 1966, as amended (Public Law 89-808), or
section 202 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978, as
amended (Public Law 95-501).
(b) Limitations.--
(1) The authority provided by subsection (a) may be
exercised only to implement multilateral official debt
relief and referendum agreements, commonly referred to
as ``Paris Club Agreed Minutes''.
(2) The authority provided by subsection (a) may be
exercised only in such amounts or to such extent as is
provided in advance by appropriations Acts.
(3) The authority provided by subsection (a) may be
exercised only with respect to countries with heavy
debt burdens that are eligible to borrow from the
International Development Association, but not from the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
commonly referred to as ``IDA-only'' countries.
(c) Conditions.--The authority provided by subsection (a)
may be exercised only with respect to a country whose
government--
(1) does not have an excessive level of military
expenditures;
(2) has not repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism;
(3) is not failing to cooperate on international
narcotics control matters;
(4) (including its military or other security forces)
does not engage in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights;
and
(5) is not ineligible for assistance because of the
application of section 527 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995.
(d) Availability of Funds.--The authority provided by
subsection (a) may be used only with regard to funds
appropriated by this Act under the heading ``Debt restructuring
''.
(e) Certain Prohibitions Inapplicable.--A reduction of debt
pursuant to subsection (a) shall not be considered assistance
for purposes of any provision of law limiting assistance to a
country. The authority provided by subsection (a) may be
exercised notwithstanding section 620(r) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961.
* * * * * * *
sense of congress regarding iran
Sec. 586. (a) The Congress finds that--
(1) according to the Department of State, Iran
continues to support international terrorism, providing
training, financing, and weapons to such terrorist
groups as Hizballah, Islamic Jihad and Hamas;
(2) Iran continues to oppose the Arab-Israeli peace
process and refuses to recognize Israel's right to
exist;
(3) Iran continues aggressively to seek weapons of
mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them;
(4) it is long-standing United States policy to offer
official government-to-government dialogue with the
Iranian regime, such offers having been repeatedly
rebuffed by Tehran;
(5) more than a year after the election of President
Khatemi, Iranian foreign policy continues to threaten
American security and that of our allies in the Middle
East; and
(6) despite repeated offers and tentative steps
toward rapprochement with Iran by the Clinton
Administration, including a decision to waive sanctions
under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act and the President's
veto of the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act,
Iran has failed to reciprocate in a meaningful manner.
(b) Therefore it is the sense of the Congress that--
(1) the Administration should make no concessions to
the Government of Iran unless and until that government
moderates its objectionable policies, including taking
steps to end its support of international terrorism,
opposition to the Middle East peace process, and the
development and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their means of delivery; and
(2) there should be no change in United States policy
toward Iran until there is credible and sustained
evidence of a change in Iranian policies.
* * * * * * *
national commission on terrorism
Sec. 591. (a) Establishment of National Commission on
Terrorism.--
(1) Establishment.--There is established a national
commission on terrorism to review counter-terrorism
policies regarding the prevention and punishment of
international acts of terrorism directed at the United
States. The commission shall be known as ``The National
Commission on Terrorism''.
(2) Composition.--The commission shall be composed of
10 members appointed as follows:
(A) Three members shall be appointed by the
Majority Leader of the Senate.
(B) Three members shall be appointed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(C) Two members shall be appointed by the
Minority Leader of the Senate.
(D) Two members shall be appointed by the
Minority Leader of the House of
Representatives.
(E) The appointments of the members of the
commission should be made no later than 3
months after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
(3) Qualifications.--The members should have a
knowledge and expertise in matters to be studied by the
commission.
(4) Chair.--The Speaker of the House of
Representatives, after consultation with the majority
leader of the Senate and the minority leaders of the
House of Representatives and the Senate, shall
designate one of the members of the Commission to serve
as chair of the Commission.
(5) Period of appointment: vacancies.--Members shall
be appointed for the life of the Commission. Any
vacancy in the Commission shall be filled in the same
manner as the original appointment.
(6) Security clearances.--All Members of the
Commission should hold appropriate security clearances.
(b) Duties.--
(1) In general.--The commission shall consider issues
relating to international terrorism directed at the
United States as follows:
(A) Review the laws, regulations, policies,
directives, and practices relating to
counterterrorism in the prevention and
punishment of international terrorism directed
towards the United States.
(B) Assess the extent to which laws,
regulations, policies, directives, and
practices relating to counterterrorism have
been effective in preventing or punishing
international terrorism directed towards the
United States. At a minimum, the assessment
should include a review of the following:
(i) Evidence that terrorist
organizations have established an
infrastructure in the western
hemisphere for the support and conduct
of terrorist activities.
(ii) Executive branch efforts to
coordinate counterterrorism activities
among Federal, State, and local
agencies and with other nations to
determine the effectiveness of such
coordination efforts.
(iii) Executive branch efforts to
prevent the use of nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons by terrorists.
(C) Recommend changes to counterterrorism
policy in preventing and punishing
international terrorism directed toward the
United States.
(2) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date
on which the Commission first meets, the Commission
shall submit to the President and the Congress a final
report of the findings and conclusions of the
commission, together with any recommendations.
(c) Administrative Matters.--
(1) Meetings.--
(A) The commission shall hold its first
meeting on a date designated by the Speaker of
the House which is not later than 30 days after
the date on which all members have been
appointed.
(B) After the first meeting, the commission
shall meet upon the call of the chair.
(C) A majority of the members of the
commission shall constitute a quorum, but a
lesser number may hold meetings.
(2) Authority of individuals to act for commission.--
Any member or agent of the commission may, if
authorized by the commission, take any action which the
commission is authorized to take under this section.
(3) Powers.--
(A) The commission may hold such hearings,
sit and act at such times and places, take such
testimony, and receive such evidence as the
commission considers advisable to carry out its
duties.
(B) The commission may secure directly from
any agency of the Federal Government such
information as the commission considers
necessary to carry out its duties. Upon the
request of the chair of the commission, the
head of a department or agency shall furnish
the requested information expeditiously to the
commission.
(C) The commission may use the United States
mails in the same manner and under the same
conditions as other departments and agencies of
the Federal Government.
(4) Pay and expenses of commission members.--
(A) Subject to appropriations, each member of
the commission who is not an employee of the
government shall be paid at a rate not to
exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate
of basic pay prescribed for level IV of the
Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title
5, United States Code, for each day (including
travel time) during which such member is
engaged in performing the duties of the
commission.
(B) Members and personnel for the commission
may travel on aircraft, vehicles, or other
conveyances of the Armed Forces of the United
States when travel is necessary in the
performance of a duty of the commission except
when the cost of commercial transportation is
less expensive.
(C) The members of the commission may be
allowed travel expenses, including per diem in
lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for
employees of agencies under subchapter I of
chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code,
while away from their homes or regular places
of business in the performance of services for
the commission.
(D)(i) A member of the commission who is an
annuitant otherwise covered by section 8344 or
8468 of title 5, United States Code, by reason
of membership on the commission shall not be
subject to the provisions of such section with
respect to membership on the commission.
(ii) A member of the commission who is a
member or former member of a uniformed service
shall not be subject to the provisions of
subsections (b) and (c) of section 5532 of such
title with respect to membership on the
commission.
(5) Staff and administrative support.--
(A) The chairman of the commission may,
without regard to civil service laws and
regulations, appoint and terminate an executive
director and up to three additional staff
members as necessary to enable the commission
to perform its duties. The chairman of the
commission may fix the compensation of the
executive director and other personnel without
regard to the provisions of chapter 51, and
subchapter III of chapter 53, of title 5,
United States Code, relating to classification
of positions and General Schedule pay rates,
except that the rate of pay may not exceed the
maximum rate of pay for GS-15 under the General
Schedule.
(B) Upon the request of the chairman of the
commission, the head of any department or
agency of the Federal Government may detail,
without reimbursement, any personnel of the
department or agency to the commission to
assist in carrying out its duties. The detail
of an employee shall be without interruption or
loss of civil service status or privilege.
(d) Termination of Commission.--The commission shall
terminate 30 days after the date on which the commission
submits a final report.
(e) Funding.--There are authorized to be appropriated such
sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
section.
* * * * * * *
sense of congress regarding the trial in the netherlands of the
suspects indicted in the bombing of pan am flight 103
Sec. 596. (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following
findings:
(1) On December 21, 1988, 270 people, including 189
United States citizens, were killed in a terrorist
bombing on Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.
(2) Britain and the United States indicted 2 Libyan
intelligence agents--Abdel Basset Al-Megrahi and Lamen
Khalifa Fhimah--in 1991 and sought their extradition
from Libya to the United States or the United Kingdom
to stand trial for this heinous terrorist act.
(3) The United Nations Security Council called for
the extradition of the suspects in Security Council
Resolution 731 and imposed sanctions on Libya in
Security Council Resolutions 748 and 883 because Libyan
leader, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, refused to transfer
the suspects to either the United States or the United
Kingdom to stand trial.
(4) The sanctions in Security Council Resolutions 748
and 883 include a worldwide ban on Libya's national
airline, a ban on flights into and out of Libya by
other nations' airlines, a prohibition on supplying
arms, airplane parts, and certain oil equipment to
Libya, and a freeze on Libyan government funds in other
countries.
(5) Colonel Qadhafi has continually refused to
extradite the suspects to either the United States or
the United Kingdom and has insisted that he will only
transfer the suspects to a third and neutral country to
stand trial.
(6) On August 24, 1998, the United States and the
United Kingdom proposed that Colonel Qadhafi transfer
the suspects to the Netherlands, where they would stand
trial before a Scottish court, under Scottish law, and
with a panel of Scottish judges.
(7) The United States-United Kingdom proposal is
consistent with those previously endorsed by the
Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab
States, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Islamic
Conference.
(8) The United Nations Security Council endorsed the
United States-United Kingdom proposal on August 27,
1998, in United Nations Security Council Resolution
1192.
(9) The United States Government has stated that this
proposal is nonnegotiable and has called on Colonel
Qadhafi to respond promptly, positively, and
unequivocally to this proposal by ensuring the timely
appearance of the two accused individuals in the
Netherlands for trial before the Scottish court.
(10) The United States Government has called on Libya
to ensure the production of evidence, including the
presence of witnesses before the court, and to comply
fully with all the requirements of the United Nations
Security Council resolutions.
(11) Secretary of State Albright has said that the
United States will urge a multilateral oil embargo
against Libya in the United Nations Security Council if
Colonel Muammar Qadhafi does not transfer the suspects
to The Netherlands to stand trial.
(12) The United Nations Security Council will convene
on October 30, 1998, to review sanctions imposed on
Libya.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) Colonel Qadhafi should promptly transfer the
indicted suspects Abdel Basset Al-Megrahi and Lamen
Khalifa Fhimah to The Netherlands to stand trial before
the Scottish court;
(2) the United States Government should remain firm
in its commitment not to negotiate with Colonel Qadhafi
on any of the details of the proposal approved by the
United Nations in United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1192; and
(3) if Colonel Qadhafi does not transfer the indicted
suspects Abdel Basset Al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa
Fhimah to The Netherlands by October 29, 1998, the
United States Permanent Representative to the United
Nations should--
(A) introduce a resolution in the United
Nations Security Council to impose a
multilateral oil embargo against Libya;
(B) actively promote adoption of the
resolution by the United Nations Security
Council; and
(C) assure that a vote will occur in the
United Nations Security Council on such a
resolution.
* * * * * * *
This Act may be cited as the ``Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1999''.
10. Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 1999
Partial text of Public Law 105-277 [Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999; H.R. 4328], 112 Stat. 2681-50,
approved October 21, 1998
* * * * * * *
Sec. 101. * * *
(b) For programs, projects or activities in the Departments
of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, provided as follows, to be
effective as if it had been enacted into law as the regular
appropriations Act:
AN ACT Making appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice,
and State, the Judiciary, and related agencies for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 1999, and for other purposes.
TITLE I--DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
General Administration
salaries and expenses
* * * * * * *
counterterrorism fund
For necessary expenses, as determined by the Attorney
General, $10,000,000, to remain vailable until expended, to
reimburse any Department of Justice organization for (1) the
costs incurred in establishing the operational capability of an
office or facility which has been damaged or destroyed as a
result of any domestic or international terrorist incident; (2)
the costs of providing support to counter, investigate or
prosecute domestic or international terrorism, including
payment of rewards in connection with these activities; (3) the
costs of conducting a terrorism threat assessment of Federal
agencies and their facilities; (4) the costs associated with
ensuring the continuance of essential Government functions
during a time of emergency;and (5) the costs of activities
related to the protection of the Nation's critical
infrastructure: Provided, That any Federal agency may be
reimbursed for the costs of detaining in foreign countries
individuals accused of acts of terrorism that violate the laws
of the United States: Provided further, That funds provided
under this paragraph shall be available only after the Attorney
General notifies the Committees on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives and the Senate in accordance with section
605 of this Act.
In addition, for necessary expenses, as determined by the
Attorney General, $135,000,000, to remain available until
expended, to reimburse or transfer to agencies of the
Department of Justice for any costs incurred in connection
with: (1) providing bomb training and response capabilities to
State and local law enforcement agencies; (2) providing
training and related equipment for chemical, biological,
nuclear, and cyber attack prevention and response capabilities
for States, cities, territories, and local jurisdictions; and
(3) providing grants, contracts, cooperative agreements, and
other assistance authorized by sections 819, 821, and 822 of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996:
Provided, That such funds transferred to the Office of Justice
Programs may include amounts for management and administration,
which shall be transferred to and merged with the ``Justice
Assistance'' account.
* * * * * * *
Federal Bureau of Investigation
salaries and expenses
For necessary expenses of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for detection, investigation, and prosecution of
crimes against the United States; including purchase for
police-type use of not to exceed 2,668 passenger motor
vehicles, of which 2,000 will be for replacement only, without
regard to the general purchase price limitation for the current
fiscal year, and hire of passenger motor vehicles; acquisition,
lease, maintenance, and operation of aircraft; and not to
exceed $70,000 to meet unforeseen emergencies of a confidential
character, to be expended under the direction of, and to be
accounted for solely under the certificate of, the Attorney
General, $2,746,805,000; of which not to exceed $50,000,000 for
automated data processing and telecommunications and technical
investigative equipment and not to exceed $1,000,000 for
undercover operations shall remain available until September
30, 2000; of which not less than $292,473,000 shall be for
counterterrorism investigations, foreign counterintelligence,
and other activities related to our national security; of which
not to exceed $61,800,000 shall remain available until
expended; of which not to exceed $10,000,000 is authorized to
be made available for making advances for expenses arising out
of contractual or reimbursable agreements with State and local
law enforcement agencies while engaged in cooperative
activities related to violent crime, terrorism, organized
crime, and drug investigations; and of which $1,500,000 shall
be available to maintain an independent program office
dedicated solely to the automation of fingerprint
identification services: Provided, That not to exceed $45,000
shall be available for official reception and representation
expenses: Provided further, That no funds in this Act may be
used to provide ballistics imaging equipment to any State or
local authority which has obtained similar equipment through a
Federal grant or subsidy unless the State or local authority
agrees to return that equipment or to repay that grant or
subsidy to the Federal Government.
In addition, $223,356,000 for such purposes, to remain
available until expended, to be derived from the Violent Crime
Reduction Trust Fund, as authorized by the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, as amended, and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 115. (a)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, for fiscal year 1999, the Attorney General may obligate
any funds appropriated for or reimbursed to the
Counterterrorism programs, projects or activities of the
Department of Justice to purchase or lease equipment or any
related items, or to acquire interim services, without regard
to any otherwise applicable Federal acquisition rule, if the
Attorney General determines that--
(A) there is an exigent need for the equipment,
related items, or services in order to support an
ongoing counterterrorism, national security, or
computercrime investigation or prosecution;
(B) the equipment, related items, or services
required are not available within the Department of
Justice; and
(C) adherence to that Federal acquisition rule
would--
(i) delay the timely acquisition of the
equipment, related items, or services; and
(ii) adversely affect an ongoing
counterterrorism, national security, or
computercrime investigation or prosecution.
(2) In this subsection, the term ``Federal acquisition
rule'' means any provision of title II or IX of the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, the Office of
Federal Procurement Policy Act, the Small Business Act, the
Federal Acquisition Regulation, or any other provision of law
or regulation that establishes policies, procedures,
requirements, conditions, or restrictions for procurements by
the head of a department or agency or the Federal Government.
(b) The Attorney General shall immediately notify the
Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives
and the Senate in writing of each expenditure under subsection
(a), which notification shall include sufficient information to
explain the circumstances necessitating the exercise of the
authority under that subsection.
* * * * * * *
This title may be cited as the ``Department of Justice
Appropriations Act, 1999''.
11. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999
Title II of division B of Public Law 105-277 [Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999; H.R.
4328], 112 Stat. 2681-565, approved October 21, 1998
DIVISION B--EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--ANTITERRORISM
CHAPTER 1
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation
salaries and expenses
For an additional amount for ``Salaries and Expenses'',
$21,680,000, to remain available until expended: Provided, That
the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency
requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Administration of Foreign Affairs
diplomatic and consular programs
Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956, an additional amount for ``Diplomatic
and Consular Programs'', $773,700,000, to remain available
until expended, of which $25,700,000 shall be available only to
the extent that an official budget request that includes the
designation of the entire amount of the request as an emergency
requirement as defined in the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, is transmitted by the
President to the Congress: Provided, That as determined by the
Secretary of State, such funds may be used to procure services
and equipment overseas necessary to improve worldwide security
and reconstitute embassy operations in Kenya and Tanzania on
behalf of any other agency: Provided further, That the entire
amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency
requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.
salaries and expenses
Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956, an additional amount for ``Salaries
and Expenses'', $12,000,000, to remain available until
expended: Provided, That the entire amount is designated by the
Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section
251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, as amended.
office of inspector general
Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956, an additional amount for ``Office of
Inspector General'', $1,000,000, to remain available until
expended: Provided, That the entire amount is designated by the
Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section
251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, as amended.
security and maintenance of united states missions
Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956, an additional amount for ``Security
and Maintenance of United States Missions'', $627,000,000, to
remain available until expended; of which $56,000,000 is for
security projects, relocations, and security equipment on
behalf of missions of other U.S. Government agencies, which
amount may be transferred to any appropriation for this
purpose, to be merged with and available for the same time
period as the appropriation to which transferred; and of which
$185,000,000 is for capital improvements or relocation of
office and residential facilities to improve security, which
amount shall become available fifteen days after notice thereof
has been transmitted to the Appropriations Committees of both
Houses of Congress: Provided, That the entire amount is
designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant
to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.
emergencies in the diplomatic and consular service
Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956, an additional amount for ``Emergencies
in the Diplomatic and Consular Service'', $10,000,000, to
remain available until expended: Provided, That the entire
amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency
requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.
CHAPTER 2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE--MILITARY
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide
(including transfer of funds)
For an additional amount for ``Operation and Maintenance,
Defense- Wide'', $358,427,000, to remain available for
obligation until expended: Provided, That the Secretary of
Defense may transfer these funds to fiscal year 1999
appropriations for operation and maintenance; procurement;
research, development, test and evaluation; and family housing:
Provided further, That the funds transferred shall be merged
with and be available for the same purposes and for the same
time period as the appropriation to which transferred: Provided
further, That the transfer authority provided under this
heading is in addition to any other transfer authority
available to the Department of Defense: Provided further, That
the entire amount made available under this heading is
designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant
to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended: Provided further, That
the entire amount shall be available only to the extent that an
official budget request for $358,427,000, that includes
designation of the entire amount of the request as an emergency
requirement as defined in the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, is transmitted by the
President to the Congress.
GENERAL PROVISIONS, THIS CHAPTER
Sec. 201.\1\ Maintenance and Operation of Equipment. * * *
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\1\ Sec. 201 amended sec. 374 of title 10, United States Code. See
sec. D.1 of this publication for text..
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(including transfer of funds)
Sec. 202. In addition to amounts appropriated or otherwise
made available in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act,
1999, $50,000,000 is hereby appropriated, only to initiate and
expand activities of the Department of Defense to prevent,
prepare for, and respond to a terrorist attack in the United
States involving weapons of mass destruction: Provided, That
$35,000,000 of the funds made available in this section shall
be transferred to the following accounts in the specified
amounts:
``National Guard Personnel, Army'', $4,000,000;
``National Guard Personnel, Air Force'', $1,000,000;
``Operation and Maintenance, Army'', $2,000,000;
``Operation and Maintenance, Army National Guard'',
$20,000,000; and
``Procurement, Defense-Wide'', $8,000,000:
Provided further, That of the funds made available in this
section, $15,000,000 shall be transferred to ``Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Army'', only to develop and
support a long term, sustainable Weapons of Mass Destruction
emergency preparedness training program: Provided further, That
funds transferred pursuant to this section shall be merged with
and be available for the same purposes and for the same time
period as the appropriation to which transferred: Provided
further, That the transfer authority provided in this section
is in addition to any other transfer authority available to the
Department of Defense: Provided further, That the entire amount
provided in this section is designated by the Congress as an
emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as
amended: Provided further, That the entire amount shall be
available only to the extent that an official budget request
for $50,000,000, that includes designation of the entire amount
of the request as an emergency requirement as defined in the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as
amended, is transmitted by the President to the Congress.
Sec. 203. In addition to amounts appropriated or otherwise
made available in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act,
1999, $120,500,000, to remain available for obligation until
expended, is appropriated to the proper accounts within the
Department of the Air Force: Provided, That the additional
amount shall be made available only for the provision of crisis
response aviation support for critical national security, law
enforcement and emergency response agencies: Provided further,
That the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an
emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as
amended: Provided further, That the entire amount shall be
available only to the extent that an official budget request
for $120,500,000, that includes designation of the entire
amount of the request as an emergency requirement as defined in
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,
as amended, is transmitted by the President to the Congress:
Provided further, That the President of the United States shall
submit to the Congress by March 15, 1999, an interagency
agreement for the utilization of Department of Defense assets
to support the crisis response requirements of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency.
CHAPTER 3
FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO THE PRESIDENT
International Security Assistance
economic support fund
(including transfer of funds)
Notwithstanding section 10 of Public Law 91-672, for an
additional amount for ``Economic Support Fund'' for assistance
for Kenya and Tanzania, $50,000,000, to remain available until
September 30, 2000: Provided, That the entire amount is
designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant
to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended: Provided further, That
funds appropriated under this paragraph may be made available
for administrative costs associated with assistance provided
under this paragraph: Provided further, That $2,500,000 shall
be transferred to and merged with ``Operating Expenses of the
Agency for International Development'' for security and related
expenses: Provided further, That $1,269,000 shall be
transferred to and merged with ``Peace Corps'' for security and
related expenses: Provided further, That the transfers
authorized in the preceding provisos shall be in addition to
sums otherwise available for such purposes: Provided further,
That funds appropriated under this paragraph shall only be
available through the regular notification procedures of the
Committees on Appropriations.
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs
Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956 and section 10 of Public Law 91-672,
for an additional amount for ``Nonproliferation, Anti-
Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs'' for anti-terrorism
assistance, $20,000,000, to remain available until September
30, 2000: Provided, That the entire amount is designated by the
Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section
251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, as amended.
CHAPTER 4
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
National Park Service
operation of the national park system
For an additional amount for ``Operation of the National
Park System'' for emergency security related expenses,
$2,320,000, to remain available until expended: Provided, That
the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency
requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.
construction
For an additional amount for ``Construction'' for emergency
security related expenses, $3,680,000, to remain available
until expended: Provided, That the entire amount is designated
by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section
251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, as amended.
CHAPTER 5
ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL
Capitol Visitor Center
For necessary expenses for the planning, engineering,
design, and construction, as each such milestone is approved by
the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate, the
Committee on House Oversight of the House of Representatives,
the Committees on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate, and other appropriate
committees of the House of Representatives and of the Senate,
of a new facility to provide greater security for all persons
working in or visiting the United States Capitol and to enhance
the educational experience of those who have come to learn
about the Capitol building and Congress, $100,000,000, to be
supplemented by private funds, which shall remain available
until expended: Provided, That Section 3709 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States (41 U.S.C. 5) shall not apply to
the funds made available under this heading: Provided further,
That the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an
emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as
amended.
CAPITOL POLICE BOARD
Security Enhancements
For the Capitol Police Board for security enhancements to
the Capitol complex, including the buildings and grounds of the
Library of Congress, $106,782,000, to remain available until
expended: Provided, That such security enhancements shall be
carried out in accordance with a plan or plans approved by the
Committee on House Oversight of the House of Representatives,
the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate, the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives,
and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate: Provided
further, That the Capitol Police Board shall transfer to the
Architect of the Capitol such portion of the funds made
available under this heading as the Architect may require for
expenses necessary to provide support for the security
enhancements, subject to the approval of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate: Provided further,
That the Capitol Police Board shall transfer to the Librarian
of Congress such portion of the funds made available under this
heading as the Librarian may require for expenses necessary to
provide support for the security enhancements, subject to the
approval of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate: Provided further, That the entire amount is designated
by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section
251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, as amended.
GENERAL PROVISION, THIS CHAPTER
The responsibility for design, installation, and
maintenance of security systems to protect the physical
security of the buildings and grounds of the Library of
Congress is transferred from the Architect of the Capitol to
the Capitol Police Board. Such design, installation, and
maintenance shall be carried out under the direction of the
Committee on House Oversight of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate,
and without regard to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes of
the United States (41 U.S.C. 5). Any alteration to a
structural, mechanical, or architectural feature of the
buildings and grounds of the Library of Congress that is
required for a security system under the preceding sentence may
be carried out only with the approval of the Architect of the
Capitol.
CHAPTER 6
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
facilities and equipment
(airport and airway trust fund)
For an additional amount for ``Facilities and Equipment'',
$100,000,000, for necessary expenses for acquisition,
installation and related activities supporting the deployment
of bulk and trace explosives detection systems and other
advanced security equipment at airports in the United States,
to remain available until September 30, 2001: Provided, That
the entire amount shall be available only to the extent an
official budget request for a specific dollar amount that
includes designation of the entire amount of the request as an
emergency requirement as defined in the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, is
transmitted by the President to the Congress: Provided further,
That the entire amount is designated as an emergency
requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.
CHAPTER 7
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
salaries and expenses
For an additional amount for ``Salaries and Expenses'',
$3,548,000, to remain available until expended: Provided, That
the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency
requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.
United States Secret Service
salaries and expenses
For an additional amount for ``Salaries and Expenses'',
$80,808,000, to remain available until expended: Provided, That
the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency
requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.
12. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1997
Partial text of Public Law 104-208 [Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 1997; H.R. 3610], 110 Stat. 3009, approved September 30, 1996
* * * * * * *
civil liability for acts of state sponsored terrorism
Sec. 589. (a) an official, employee, or agent of a foreign
state designated as a state sponsor of terrorism designated
under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979
while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment,
or agency shall be liable to a United States national or the
national's legal representative for personal injury or death
caused by acts of that official, employee, or agent for which
the courts of the United States may maintain jurisdiction under
section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code, for money
damages which may include economic damages, solatium, pain, and
suffering, and punitive damages if the acts were among those
described in section 1605(a)(7).
(b) Provisions related to statute of limitations and
limitations on discovery that would apply to an action brought
under 28 U.S.C. 1605(f) and (g) shall also apply to actions
brought under this section. No action shall be maintained under
this action if an official, employee, or agent of the United
States, while acting within the scope of his or her office,
employment, or agency would not be liable for such acts if
carried out within the United States.
Titles I through V of this Act may be cited as the
``Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1997''.
=======================================================================
B. DEPARTMENT OF STATE LEGISLATION
CONTENTS
Page
1. State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as amended
(Public Law 84-885) (partial text)........................... 71
Title I--Basic Authorities Generally....................... 71
Section 1--Secretary of State--Coordinator for
Counterterrorism................................. 71
Section 36--Rewards for Information on Terrorism..... 71
Section 39--Counterterrorism Protection Fund......... 75
Section 40--Authority to Control Certain Terrorism-
Related Services................................. 75
Section 51--Denial of Visas.......................... 77
2. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public
Law 104-93) (partial text)................................... 78
Title III--General Provisions.............................. 78
Section 310--Assistance to Foreign Countries......... 78
Title VI--Federal Bureau of Investigation.................. 78
3. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1998 and
1999 (Public Law 105-277) (partial text)..................... 80
Subtitle B--Foreign Relations Authorization................ 80
Title XX--General Provisions............................... 80
Chapter 2--Consular Authorities of the Department of State. 80
Section 2221--Use of Certain Passport Processing Fees
for Enhanced Passport Services................... 80
4. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and
1995, as amended (Public Law 103-236) (partial text)......... 82
Title I--Department of State and Related Agencies.......... 82
Part B--Authorities and Activities................... 82
Section 133--Terrorism Rewards and Reports....... 82
Section 140--Visas............................... 82
Title V--Foreign Policy.................................... 83
Part A--General Provisions........................... 83
Section 517--Sense of the Senate on the
Establishment of an International Criminal
Court.......................................... 83
Section 518--International Criminal Court
Participation.................................. 84
Part B--Spoils of War Act............................ 85
Section 516--Short Title......................... 85
Section 553--Prohibition on Transfers to
Countries which Support Terrorism.............. 85
5. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and
1993, as amended (Public Law 102-138) (partial text)......... 86
Title III--Miscellaneous Foreign Policy Provisions......... 86
Part A--Foreign Policy Provisions.................... 86
Section 304--Report on Terrorist Assets in the
United States.................................. 86
6. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and
1989, as amended (Public Law 100-204) (partial text)......... 87
Title I--The Department of State........................... 87
Part B--Department of State Authorities and
Activities....................................... 87
Section 140--Annual Country Reports on Terrorism. 87
7. Department of State and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
1999 (Public Law 105-277) (partial text)..................... 90
Title IV--Department of State and Related Agencies......... 90
Diplomatic and Consular Programs..................... 90
8. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999
(Public Law 105-277) (partial text).......................... 91
Title II--Antiterrorism.................................... 91
Chapter 1--Department of State Administration of
Foreign Affairs.................................. 91
Diplomatic and Consular Programs................. 91
9. Hostage Relief Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-449)............... 93
=======================================================================
1. State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956
Public Law 84-885 [S. 2569], 70 Stat. 890, approved August 1, 1956, as
amended
AN ACT To provide certain basic authority for the Department of State.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this
Act may be cited as the ``State Department Basic Authorities
Act of 1956''.
TITLE I--BASIC AUTHORITIES GENERALLY
organization of the department of state
Section 1. (a) Secretary of State.--
* * * * * * *
(f)\1\ Coordinator for Counterterrorism.--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Sec. (f) was added by Sec. 2301(a) of Public Law 105-277 (112
Stat. 2681-824)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) In general.--There is within the office of the
Secretary of State a Coordinator for Counterterrorism (in this
paragraph referred to as the `Coordinator') who shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate.
(2) Duties.--
(A) In general.--The Coordinator shall perform such
duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of
State shall prescribe.
(B) Duties described.--The principal duty of the
Coordinator shall be the overall supervision (including
policy oversight of resources) of international
counterterrorism activities. The Coordinator shall be
the principal adviser to the Secretary of State on
international counterterrorism matters. The Coordinator
shall be the principal counterterrorism official within
the senior management of the Department of State and
shall report directly to the Secretary of State.
(3) Rank and status of ambassador.--The Coordinator shall
have the rank and status of Ambassador at Large.''.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 36.\2\ DEPARTMENT OF STATE REWARDS PROGRAM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 22 U.S.C. 2708. Sec 36 was added by sec. 102 of Public Law 98-
533 (98 Stat. 2708). It was subsequently amended by Public Law 100-690
(102 Stat. 4287); by Public Law 103-236 (108 Stat. 519); by Public Law
104-134 (110 Stat. 1321-45); In 1998, sec. 36 was amended both by sec.
2202 of Public Law 105-277 (112 Stat. 2681-805) and subsequently by
sec. 101 of Public Law 105-323 (112 Stat. 3029).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Establishment.--
(1) In general.--There is established a program for
the payment of rewards to carry out the purposes of
this section.
(2) Purpose.--The rewards program shall be designed
to assist in the prevention of acts of international
terrorism, international narcotics trafficking, and
other related criminal acts.
(3) Implementation.--The rewards program shall be
administered by the Secretary of State, in
consultation, as appropriate, with the Attorney
General.
(b) Rewards Authorized.--In the sole discretion of the
Secretary (except as provided in subsection (c)(2)) and in
consultation, as appropriate, with the Attorney General, the
Secretary may pay a reward to any individual who furnishes
information leading to--
(1) the arrest or conviction in any country of any
individual for the commission of an act of
international terrorism against a United States person
or United States property;
(2) the arrest or conviction in any country of any
individual conspiring or attempting to commit an act of
international terrorism against a United States person
or United States property;
(3) the arrest or conviction in any country of any
individual for committing, primarily outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, any
narcotics-related offense if that offense involves or
is a significant part of conduct that involves--
(A) a violation of United States narcotics
laws such that the individual would be a major
violator of such laws;
(B) the killing or kidnapping of--
(i) any officer, employee, or
contract employee of the United States
Government while such individual is
engaged in official duties, or on
account of that individual's official
duties, in connection with the
enforcement of United States narcotics
laws or the implementing of United
States narcotics control objectives; or
(ii) a member of the immediate family
of any such individual on account of
that individual's official duties, in
connection with the enforcement of
United States narcotics laws or the
implementing of United States narcotics
control objectives; or
(C) an attempt or conspiracy to commit any
act described in subparagraph (A) or (B);
(4) the arrest or conviction in any country of any
individual aiding or abetting in the commission of an
act described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3); or
(5) the prevention, frustration, or favorable
resolution of an act described in paragraph (1), (2),
or (3).
(c) Coordination.--
(1) Procedures.--To ensure that the payment of
rewards pursuant to this section does not duplicate or
interfere with the payment of informants or the
obtaining of evidence or information, as authorized to
the Department of Justice, the offering,
administration, and payment of rewards under this
section, including procedures for--
(A) identifying individuals, organizations,
and offenses with respect to which rewards will
be offered;
(B) the publication of rewards;
(C) the offering of joint rewards with
foreign governments;
(D) the receipt and analysis of data; and
(E) the payment and approval of payment,
shall be governed by procedures developed by
the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Attorney General.
(2) Prior approval of attorney general required.--
Before making a reward under this section in a matter
over which there is Federal criminal jurisdiction, the
Secretary of State shall obtain the concurrence of the
Attorney General.
(d) Funding.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--Notwithstanding
section 102 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987 (Public Law 99-93; 99 Stat.
408), but subject to paragraph (2), there are
authorized to be appropriated to the Department of
State from time to time such amounts as may be
necessary to carry out this section.
(2) Limitation.--No amount of funds may be
appropriated under paragraph (1) which, when added to
the unobligated balance of amounts previously
appropriated to carry out this section, would cause
such amounts to exceed $15,000,000.
(3) Allocation of funds.--To the maximum extent
practicable, funds made available to carry out this
section should be distributed equally for the purpose
of preventing acts of international terrorism and for
the purpose of preventing international narcotics
trafficking.
(4) Period of availability.--Amounts appropriated
under paragraph (1) shall remain available until
expended.
(e) Limitations and Certification.--
(1) Maximum amount.--No reward paid under this
section may exceed $2,000,000.
(2) Approval.--A reward under this section of more
than $100,000 may not be made without the approval of
the Secretary.
(3) Certification for payment.--Any reward granted
under this section shall be approved and certified for
payment by the Secretary.
(4) Nondelegation of authority.--The authority to
approve rewards of more than $100,000 set forth in
paragraph (2) may not be delegated.
(5) Protection measures.--If the Secretary determines
that the identity of the recipient of a reward or of
the members of the recipient's immediate family must be
protected, the Secretary may take such measures in
connection with the payment of the reward as he
considers necessary to effect such protection.
(f) Ineligibility.--An officer or employee of any entity of
Federal, State, or local government or of a foreign government
who, while in the performance of his or her official duties,
furnishes information described in subsection (b) shall not be
eligible for a reward under this section.
(g) Reports.--
(1) Reports on payment of rewards.--Not later than 30
days after the payment of any reward under this
section, the Secretary shall submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees with respect to
such reward. The report, which may be submitted in
classified form if necessary, shall specify the amount
of the reward paid, to whom the reward was paid, and
the acts with respect to which the reward was paid. The
report shall also discuss the significance of the
information for which the reward was paid in dealing
with those acts.
(2) Annual reports.--Not later than 60 days after the
end of each fiscal year, the Secretary shall submit a
report to the appropriate congressional committees with
respect to the operation of the rewards program. The
report shall provide information on the total amounts
expended during the fiscal year ending in that year to
carry out this section, including amounts expended to
publicize the availability of rewards.
(h) Publication Regarding Rewards Offered by Foreign
Governments.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this
section, in the sole discretion of the Secretary, the resources
of the rewards program shall be available for the publication
of rewards offered by foreign governments regarding acts of
international terrorism which do not involve United States
persons or property or a violation of the narcotics laws of the
United States.
(i) Determinations of the Secretary.--A determination made
by the Secretary under this section shall be final and
conclusive and shall not be subject to judicial review.
(j) Definitions.--As used in this section:
(1) Act of international terrorism.--The term `act of
international terrorism' includes--
(A) any act substantially contributing to the
acquisition of unsafeguarded special nuclear
material (as defined in paragraph (8) of
section 830 of the Nuclear Proliferation
Prevention Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 3201 note))
or any nuclear explosive device (as defined in
paragraph (4) of that section) by an
individual, group, or non-nuclear-weapon state
(as defined in paragraph (5) of that section);
and
(B) any act, as determined by the Secretary,
which materially supports the conduct of
international terrorism, including the
counterfeiting of United States currency or the
illegal use of other monetary instruments by an
individual, group, or country supporting
international terrorism as determined for
purposes of section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
2405(j)(1)(A)).
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
`appropriate congressional committees' means the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate.
(3) Member of the immediate family.--The term `member
of the immediate family', with respect to an
individual, includes--
(A) a spouse, parent, brother, sister, or
child of the individual;
(B) a person with respect to whom the
individual stands in loco parentis; and
(C) any person not covered by subparagraph
(A) or (B) who is living in the individual's
household and is related to the individual by
blood or marriage.
(4) Rewards program.--The term `rewards program'
means the program established in subsection (a)(1).
(5) United states narcotics laws.--The term `United
States narcotics laws' means the laws of the United
States for the prevention and control of illicit
trafficking in controlled substances (as such term is
defined in section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances
Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6))).
(6) United states person.--The term `United States
person' means--
(A) a citizen or national of the United
States; and
(B) an alien lawfully present in the United
States.
* * * * * * *
counterterrorism protection fund
Sec. 39.\3\ (a) Authority.--The Secretary of State may
reimburse domestic and foreign persons, agencies, or
governments for the protection of judges or other persons who
provide assistance or information relating to terrorist
incidents primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States. Before making a payment under this section in a
matter over which there is Federal criminal jurisdiction, the
Secretary shall advise and consult with the Attorney General.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ 22 U.S.C. 2711. Sec. 39 was added by sec. 504(2) of Public Law
99-399 (100 Stat. 871).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary of State for
``Administration of Foreign Affairs'' $1,000,000 for fiscal
year 1986 and $1,000,000 for fiscal year 1987 for use in
reimbursing persons, agencies, or governments under this
section.
(c) Designation of Fund.--Amounts made available under this
section may be referred to as the ``Counterterrorism Protection
Fund''.
authority to control certain terrorism-related services
Sec. 40.\4\ (a) Authority.--The Secretary of State may, by
regulation, impose controls on the provisions of the services
described in subsection (b) if the Secretary determines that
provision of such services would aid and abet international
terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ 22 U.S.C. 2712. Sec. 40 was added by sec. 506(2) of Public Law
99-399 (100 Stat. 872).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Services Subject to Control.--The services subject to
control under subsection (a) are the following:
(1) Serving in or with the security forces of a
designated foreign government.
(2) Providing training or other technical services
having a direct military, law enforcement, or
intelligence application, to or for the security forces
of a designated foreign government.
Any regulations issued to impose controls on services described
in paragraph (2) shall list the specific types of training and
other services subject to the controls.
(c) Persons Subject of Controls.--These services may be
controlled under subsection (a) when they are provided within
the United States by any individual or entity and when they are
provided anywhere in the world by a United States person.
(d) Licenses.--In carrying out subsection (a), the
Secretary of State may require licenses, which may be revoked,
suspended, or amended, without prior notice, whenever such
action is deemed to be advisable.
(e) Definitions.--
(1) Designated foreign government.--As used in this
section, the term ``designated foreign government'
means a foreign government that the Secretary of State
has determined, for purposes of section 6(j)(1) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979, has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism.
(2) Security forces.--As used in this section, the
term ``security forces'' means any military or
paramilitary forces, any police or other law
enforcement agency (including any police or other law
enforcement agency at the regional or local level), and
any intelligence agency of a foreign government.
(3) United states.--As used in this section, the term
``United States'' includes any State, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any
territory or possession of the United States.
(4) United states person.--As used in this section,
the term ``United States person'' means any United
States national, any permanent resident alien, and any
sole proprietorship, partnership, company, association,
or corporation organized under the laws of or having
its principal place of business within the United
States.
(f) Violations.--
(1) Penalties.--Whoever willfully violates any
regulation issued under this section shall be fined not
more than $100,000 or five times the total compensation
received for the conduct which constitutes the
violation, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for not
more than ten years, or both, for each such offense.
(2) Investigations.--The Attorney General and the
Secretary of the Treasury shall have authority to
investigate violations of regulations issued under this
section.
(g) Congressional Oversight.--
(1) Review of regulations.--Not less than 30 days
before issuing any regulations under this section
(including any amendment thereto), the Secretary of
State shall transmit the proposed regulations to the
Congress.
(2) Reports.--Not less than once every six months,
the Secretary of State shall report to the Congress
concerning the number and character of licenses granted
and denied during the previous reporting period, and
such other information as the Secretary may find to be
relevant to the accomplishment of the objectives of
this section.
(h) Relationship to Other Laws.--The authority granted by
this section is in addition to the authorities granted by any
other provision of law.
* * * * * * *
denial of visas \5\
Sec. 51.\5\ (a) Report to Congress.--The Secretary shall
report, on a timely basis, to the appropriate committees of the
Congress each time a consular post denies a visa on the grounds
of terrorist activities or foreign policy. Such report shall
set forth the name and nationality of each such person and a
factual statement of the basis for such denial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ 22 U.S.C. 2723. Sec. 127(a) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-138; 105
Stat. 660), added sec. 51. See also sec. 128 of that Act, relating to
visa lookout systems.
Functions vested in the Secretary of State in this section were
further delegated to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, in
consultation with the Under Secretary for Management, by Delegation of
Authority No. 193, January 7, 1992 (Public Notice 1555; 57 F.R. 2298;
January 21, 1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Limitation.--Information contained in such report may be
classified to the extent necessary and shall protect
intelligence sources and methods.
(c) Appropriate Committees.--For the purposes of this section
the term ``appropriate committees of the Congress'' means the
Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
\6\ of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the
Judiciary and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided that
references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
* * * * * * *
2. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996
Public Law 104-93 [H.R. 1665], 109 Stat. 961, approved January 6, 1996
AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1996 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this
Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1996''.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996''.
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
SEC. 310. ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds
authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used to
provide assistance to a foreign country for counterterrorism
efforts if--
(1) such assistance is provided for the purpose of
protecting the property of the United States Government
or the life and property of any United States citizen,
or furthering the apprehension of any individual
involved in any act of terrorism against such property
or persons; and
(2) the Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives are notified not later than 15
days prior to the provision of such assistance.
* * * * * * *
TITLE VI--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SEC. 601. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION AND CONSUMER REPORTS TO FBI FOR
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PURPOSES.
(a) In General.--The Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C.
1681 et seq.) is amended by adding after section 623 the
following new section:``
Sec. 624.\1\ Disclosures to FBI for counterintelligence purposes
``(a) Identity of Financial Institutions.--Notwithstanding
section 604 or any other provision of this title, a consumer
reporting agency shall furnish to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation the names and addresses of all financial
institutions (as that term is defined in section 1101 of the
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978) at which a consumer
maintains or has maintained an account, to the extent that
information is in the files of the agency, when presented with
a written request for that information, signed by the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the Director's
designee, which certifies compliance with this section. The
Director or the Director's designee may make such a
certification only if the Director or the Director's designee
has determined in writing that--
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\1\ 15 USC 1681u.
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``(1) such information is necessary for the conduct
of an authorized foreign counterintelligence
investigation; and
``(2) there are specific and articulable facts giving
reason to believe that the consumer--
``(A) is a foreign power (as defined in
section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978) or a person who is
not a United States person (as defined in such
section 101) and is an official of a foreign
power; or
``(B) is an agent of a foreign power and is
engaging or has engaged in an act of
international terrorism (as that term is
defined in section 101(c) of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978) or
clandestine intelligence activities that
involve or may involve a violation of criminal
statutes of the United States.
* * * * * * *
``(c) Court Order for Disclosure of Consumer Reports.--
Notwithstanding section 604 or any other provision of this
title, if requested in writing by the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, or a designee of the Director, a court
may issue an order ex parte directing a consumer reporting
agency to furnish a consumer report to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, upon a showing in camera that--
``(1) the consumer report is necessary for the
conduct of an authorized foreign counterintelligence
investigation; and
``(2) there are specific and articulable facts giving
reason to believe that the consumer whose consumer
report is sought--
``(A) is an agent of a foreign power, and
``(B) is engaging or has engaged in an act of
international terrorism (as that term is
defined in section 101(c) of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978) or
clandestine intelligence activities that
involve or may involve a violation of criminal
statutes of the United States.
* * * * * * *
3. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999
Partial text of subdivision B of Public Law 105-277 [Omnibus
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999; H.R.
4328], 112 Stat. 2681-801, approved October 21, 1998
SUBDIVISION B--FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION
TITLE XX--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 2001.\1\ SHORT TITLE.
This subdivision may be cited as the ``Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999''.
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\1\ 22 U.S.C. 2651 note.
* * * * * * *
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SEC. 2202. REVISION OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE REWARDS PROGRAM.\2\ * * *.
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 2--CONSULAR AUTHORITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEC. 2221. USE OF CERTAIN PASSPORT PROCESSING FEES FOR ENHANCED
PASSPORT SERVICES.
For each of the fiscal years 1998 and 1999, of the fees
collected for expedited passport processing and deposited to an
offsetting collection pursuant to title V of the Department of
State and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
1995 (Public Law 103-317; 22 U.S.C. 214 note), 30 percent shall
be available only for enhancing passport services for United
States citizens, improving the integrity and efficiency of the
passport issuance process, improving the secure nature of the
United States passport, investigating passport fraud, and
deterring entry into the United States by terrorists, drug
traffickers, or other criminals.
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\2\ Sec. 2202 amends section 36 of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956. The text of this amendment can be found at
sec. B.1 in this volume.
* * * * * * *
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TITLE XXIII--ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE; DEPARTMENT OF
STATE PERSONNEL; THE FOREIGN SERVICE
CHAPTER 1--ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEC. 2301. COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM.\3\ * * *.
* * * * * * *
(b) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--Section 161 of
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and
1995 (Public Law 103-236) is amended by striking subsection
(e).
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\3\ Sec. 2301 amends section 1 of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956. The text of this amendment can be found at
sec. B.1 in this volume.
4. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995
Public Law 103-236 [H.R. 2333], 108 Stat. 382, approved April 30, 1994,
as amended
AN ACT To authorize appropriations for the Department of State, the
United States Information Agency, and related agencies, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1.\1\ SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 22 U.S.C. 2651 note.
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TITLE I--DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND RELATED AGENCIES
* * * * * * *
PART B--AUTHORITIES AND ACTIVITIES
* * * * * * *
SEC. 133. TERRORISM REWARDS AND REPORTS.
(a) Rewards for Information on Acts of International
Terrorism in the United States.--
(1) \2\ * * *
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\2\ Para. (1) amended sec. 36 of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708).
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(2) Notwithstanding section 36(g) of the State
Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C.
2708), in addition to amounts otherwise available the
Department of State may expend not more than $4,000,000
in fiscal years 1994 and 1995 to pay rewards pursuant
to section 36(a) of such Act.
(b) \3\ Annual Reports on Terrorism.--* * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Subsec. (b) amended sec. 140(b)(2) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f); and
sec. 304(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-138).
* * * * * * *
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SEC. 140. VISAS.
(a) * * *
(b) \4\ Automated Visa Lookout System.--Not later than 18
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of State shall implement an upgrade of all overseas
visa lookout operations to computerized systems with automated
multiple-name search capabilities.
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\4\ 8 U.S.C. 1182 note.
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(c) \4\ Processing of Visas for Admission to the United
States.--
(1)(A) Beginning 24 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, whenever a United States
consular officer issues a visa for admission to the
United States, that official shall certify, in writing,
that a check of the Automated Visa Lookout System, or
any other system or list which maintains information
about the excludability of aliens under the Immigration
and Nationality Act, has been made and that there is no
basis under such system for the exclusion of such
alien.
(B) If, at the time an alien applies for an immigrant
or nonimmigrant visa, the alien's name is included in
the Department of State's visa lookout system and the
consular officer to whom the application is made fails
to follow the procedures in processing the application
required by the inclusion of the alien's name in such
system, the consular officer's failure shall be made a
matter of record and shall be considered as a serious
negative factor in the officer's annual performance
evaluation.
(2) If an alien to whom a visa was issued as a result
of a failure described in paragraph (1)(B) is admitted
to the United States and there is thereafter probable
cause to believe that the alien was a participant in a
terrorist act causing serious injury, loss of life, or
significant destruction of property in the United
States, the Secretary of State shall convene an
Accountability Review Board under the authority of
title III of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and
Antiterrorism Act of 1986.
* * * * * * *
TITLE V--FOREIGN POLICY
PART A--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
SEC. 517. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT.
(a) Senate Findings.--The Senate makes the following
findings:
(1) The freedom and security of the international
community rests on the sanctity of the rule of law.
(2) The international community is increasingly
threatened by unlawful acts such as war crimes,
genocide, aggression, crimes against humanity,
terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, and
other crimes of an international character.
(3) The prosecution of individuals suspected of
carrying out such acts is often impeded by political
and legal obstacles such as amnesties, disputes over
extradition, differences in the structure and
capabilities of national courts, and the lack of
uniform guidelines under which to try such individuals.
(4) The war crimes trials held in the aftermath of
World War II at Nuremberg, Germany, and Tokyo, Japan,
demonstrated that fair and effective prosecution of war
criminals could be carried out in an international
forum.
(5) Since its inception in 1945 the United Nations
has sought to build on the precedent established at the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials by establishing a permanent
international criminal court with jurisdiction over
crimes of an international character.
(6) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 44/39,
adopted on December 4, 1989, called on the
International Law Commission to study the feasibility
of an international criminal court.
(7) In the years after passage of that resolution the
International Law Commission has taken a number of
steps to advance the debate over such a court,
including--
(A) the provisional adoption of a draft Code
of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind;
(B) the creation of a Working Group on an
International Criminal Jurisdiction and the
formulation by that Working Group of several
concrete proposals for the establishment and
operation of an international criminal court;
and
(C) the determination that an international
criminal court along the lines of that
suggested by the Working Group is feasible and
that the logical next step would be to proceed
with the formal drafting of a statute for such
a court.
(8) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/33,
adopted on November 25, 1992, called on the
International Law Commission to begin the process of
drafting a statute for an international criminal court
at its next session.
(9) Given the developments of recent years, the time
is propitious for the United States to lend its support
to this effort.
(b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate
that--
(1) the establishment of an international criminal
court with jurisdiction over crimes of an international
character would greatly strengthen the international
rule of law;
(2) such a court would thereby serve the interests of
the United States and the world community; and
(3) the United States delegation should make every
effort to advance this proposal at the United Nations.
(c) * * *
SEC. 518. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT PARTICIPATION.
The United States Senate will not consent to the
ratification of a treaty providing for United States
participation in an international criminal court with
jurisdiction over crimes of an international nature which
permits representatives of any terrorist organization,
including but not limited to the Palestine Liberation
Organization, or citizens, nationals or residents of any
country listed by the Secretary of State under section 6(j) of
the Export Administration Act of 1979 as having repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism, to sit in
judgement \5\ on American citizens.
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\5\ As enrolled. Should read ``judgment''.
* * * * * * *
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PART B--SPOILS OF WAR ACT
SEC. 551.\6\ SHORT TITLE.
This part may be cited as the ``Spoils of War Act of
1994''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ 50 U.S.C. 2201 note.
* * * * * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 553.\7\ PROHIBITION ON TRANSFERS TO COUNTRIES WHICH SUPPORT
TERRORISM.
Spoils of war in the possession, custody, or control of the
United States may not be transferred to any country determined
by the Secretary of State, for purposes of section 40 of the
Arms Export Control Act, to be a nation whose government has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ 50 U.S.C. 2202.
* * * * * * *
5. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993
Partial text of Public Law 102-138 [H.R. 1415], 105 Stat. 647, approved
October 28, 1991, amended by
AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 for
the Department of State, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1.\1\ SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 22 U.S.C. 2651 note.
* * * * * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TITLE III--MISCELLANEOUS FOREIGN POLICY PROVISIONS
PART A--FOREIGN POLICY PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
SEC. 304. REPORT ON TERRORIST ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES.
(a) Reports to Congress.--Beginning 90 days after the date of
enactment of this Act and every 365 days thereafter, the
Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney
General and appropriate investigative agencies,\2\ shall submit
to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs \3\
and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives a report describing the nature and extent of
assets held in the United States by terrorist countries and any
organization engaged in international terrorism. Each such
report shall provide a detailed list and description of
specific assets.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Sec. 133(b)(2)(A) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 396), struck
out ``Treasury'' and inserted in lieu thereof ``Treasury, in
consultation with the Attorney General and appropriate investigative
agencies,''.
\3\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided that
references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
\4\ Sec. 133(b)(2)(B) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 396), added
this sentence.
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(b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
(1) the term ``terrorist countries'', refers to
countries designated by the Secretary of State under
section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act; and
(2) the term ``international terrorism'' has the
meaning given such term in section 140(d) of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988
and 1989.
6. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989
Partial text of Public Law 100-204 [H.R. 1777], 101 Stat. 1331,
approved December 22, 1987, as amended
AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 for
the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, the
Voice of America, the Board for International Broadcasting, and for
other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1.\1\ SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 22 U.S.C. 2651 note.
* * * * * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TITLE I--THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Part B--Department of State Authorities and Activities
* * * * * * *
SEC. 140.\2\ ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM.
(a) Requirement of Annual Country Reports on Terrorism.--The
Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate, by April 30 \3\ of each year, a full and complete
report providing--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 22 U.S.C. 2656f.
\3\ Sec. 122 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-246; 104 Stat. 27), struck out
``March 31'' and inserted in lieu thereof ``April 30''.
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(1) detailed assessments with respect to each foreign
country--
(A) in which acts of international terrorism
occurred which were, in the opinion of the
Secretary, of major significance;
(B) about which the Congress was notified
during the preceding five years pursuant to
section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act
of 1979; and
(C) which the Secretary determines should be
the subject of such report; \4\
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\4\ Sec. 578(1) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (sec. 101(c) of title I of
the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997; Public Law 104-208;
110 Stat. 3009), struck out ``and'' at the end of para. (1), struck out
a period at the end of para. (2) and inserted instead a semicolon, and
added new paras. (3) and (4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) all relevant information about the activities
during the preceding year of any terrorist group, and
any umbrella group under which such terrorist group
falls, known to be responsible for the kidnapping or
death of an American citizen during the preceding five
years, any terrorist group known to be financed by
countries about which Congress was notified during the
preceding year pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979, and any other known
international terrorist group which the Secretary
determines should be the subject of such report; \4\
(3) \4\ with respect to each foreign country from
which the United States Government has sought
cooperation during the previous five years in the
investigation or prosecution of an act of international
terrorism against United States citizens or interests,
information on--
(A) the extent to which the government of the
foreign country is cooperating with the United
States Government in apprehending, convicting,
and punishing the individual or individuals
responsible for the act; and
(B) the extent to which the government of the
foreign country is cooperating in preventing
further acts of terrorism against United States
citizens in the foreign country; and
(4) \4\ with respect to each foreign country from
which the United States Government has sought
cooperation during the previous five years in the
prevention of an act of international terrorism against
such citizens or interests, the information described
in paragraph (3)(B).
(b) Provisions To Be Included in Report.--The report required
under subsection (a) should to the extent feasible include (but
not be limited to)--
(1) with respect to subsection (a)(1)--
(A) a review of major counterterrorism
efforts undertaken by countries which are the
subject of such report, including, as
appropriate, steps taken in international fora;
(B) the response of the judicial system of
each country which is the subject of such
report with respect to matters relating to
terrorism affecting American citizens or
facilities, or which have, in the opinion of
the Secretary, a significant impact on United
States counterterrorism efforts, including
responses to extradition requests; and
(C) significant support, if any, for
international terrorism by each country which
is the subject of such report, including (but
not limited to)--
(i) political and financial support;
(ii) diplomatic support through
diplomatic recognition and use of the
diplomatic pouch;
(iii) providing sanctuary to
terrorists or terrorist groups; and
(iv) the positions (including voting
records) on matters relating to
terrorism in the General Assembly of
the United Nations and other
international bodies and fora of each
country which is the subject of such
report; and
(2) with respect to subsection (a)(2), any--
(A) significant financial support provided by
foreign governments to those groups directly,
or provided in support of their activities;
(B) provisions of significant military or
paramilitary training or transfer of weapons by
foreign governments to those groups;
(C) provision of diplomatic recognition or
privileges by foreign governments to those
groups;
(D) provision by foreign governments of
sanctuary from prosecution to these groups or
their members responsible for the commission,
attempt, or planning of an act of international
terrorism; and
(E) efforts by the United States to eliminate
international financial support provided to
those groups directly or provided in support of
their activities.
(c) Classification of Report.--
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2),\5\ the
report required under subsection (a) shall, to the
extent practicable, be submitted in an unclassified
form and may be accompanied by a classified appendix.
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\5\ Sec. 578(2)(A) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (sec. 101(c) of title I of
the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997; Public Law 104-208;
110 Stat. 3009), struck out ``The report'' in subsec. (c) and inserted
in lieu thereof ``(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the
report''. Sec. 578(2)(B) of that Act also indented para. (1).
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(2) \6\ If the Secretary of State determines that the
transmittal of the information with respect to a
foreign country under paragraph (3) or (4) of
subsection (a) in classified form would make more
likely the cooperation of the government of the foreign
country as specified in such paragraph, the Secretary
may transmit the information under such paragraph in
classified form.
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\6\ Sec. 578(2)(C) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (sec. 101(c) of title I of
the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997; Public Law 104-208;
110 Stat. 3009), added para. (2).
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(d) Definitions.--As used in this section--
(1) the term ``international terrorism'' means
terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more
than 1 country;
(2) the term ``terrorism'' means premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents; and
(3) the term ``terrorist group'' means any group
practicing, or which has significant subgroups which
practice, international terrorism.
(e) Reporting Period.--
(1) The report required under subsection (a) shall
cover the events of the calendar year preceding the
year in which the report is submitted.
(2) The report required by subsection (a) to be
submitted by March 31, 1988, may be submitted no later
than August 31, 1988.
7. Department of State and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999
Partial text of Public Law 105-277 [Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999; H.R. 4328], 112 Stat. 2681-92,
approved October 21, 1998
* * * * * * *
Sec. 101. * * *
(b) For programs, projects, or activities in the
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, provided as follows,
to be effective as if it had been enacted into law as the
regular appropriations Act:
AN ACT Making appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice,
and State, the Judiciary, and related agencies for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 1999, and for other purposes.
* * * * * * *
TITLE IV--DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND RELATED AGENCIES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Administration of Foreign Affairs
diplomatic and consular programs
For necessary expenses of the Department of State and the
Foreign Service not otherwise provided for, including expenses
authorized by the State Department Basic Authorities Act of
1956, as amended; representation to certain international
organizations in which the United States participates pursuant
to treaties, ratified pursuant to the advice and consent of the
Senate, or specific Acts of Congress; acquisition by exchange
or purchase of passenger motor vehicles as authorized by 31
U.S.C. 1343, 40 U.S.C. 481(c), and 22 U.S.C. 2674; and for
expenses of general administration, $1,644,300,000: Provided,
That, of the amount made available under this heading, not to
exceed $4,000,000 may be transferred to, and merged with, funds
in the ``Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service''
appropriations account, to be available only for emergency
evacuations and terrorism rewards: * * *
* * * * * * *
8. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999
Partial text of Title II of division B of Public Law 105-277 [Omnibus
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal
Year 1999; H.R. 4328], 112 Stat. 2681-565, approved October 21, 1998
DIVISION B--EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--ANTITERRORISM
CHAPTER 1
* * * * * * *
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Administration of Foreign Affairs
diplomatic and consular programs
Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956, an additional amount for ``Diplomatic
and Consular Programs'', $773,700,000, to remain available
until expended, of which $25,700,000 shall be available only to
the extent that an official budget request that includes the
designation of the entire amount of the request as an emergency
requirement as defined in the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, is transmitted by the
President to the Congress: Provided, That as determined by the
Secretary of State, such funds may be used to procure services
and equipment overseas necessary to improve worldwide security
and reconstitute embassy operations in Kenya and Tanzania on
behalf of any other agency: Provided further, That the entire
amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency
requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.
salaries and expenses
Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956, an additional amount for ``Salaries
and Expenses'', $12,000,000, to remain available until
expended: Provided, That the entire amount is designated by the
Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section
251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, as amended.
office of inspector general
Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956, an additional amount for ``Office of
Inspector General'', $1,000,000, to remain available until
expended: Provided, That the entire amount is designated by the
Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section
251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, as amended.
security and maintenance of united states missions
Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956, an additional amount for ``Security
and Maintenance of United States Missions'', $627,000,000, to
remain available until expended; of which $56,000,000 is for
security projects, relocations, and security equipment on
behalf of missions of other U.S. Government agencies, which
amount may be transferred to any appropriation for this
purpose, to be merged with and available for the same time
period as the appropriation to which transferred; and of which
$185,000,000 is for capital improvements or relocation of
office and residential facilities to improve security, which
amount shall become available fifteen days after notice thereof
has been transmitted to the Appropriations Committees of both
Houses of Congress: Provided, That the entire amount is
designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant
to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.
emergencies in the diplomatic and consular service
Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956, an additional amount for ``Emergencies
in the Diplomatic and Consular Service'', $10,000,000, to
remain available until expended: Provided, That the entire
amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency
requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.
9. Hostage Relief Act of 1980 \1\
Public Law 96-449 [H.R. 7085], 94 Stat. 1967, approved October 14, 1980
AN ACT To provide certain benefits to individuals held hostage in Iran
and to similarly situated individuals, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this
Act may be cited as the ``Hostage Relief Act of 1980''.
TITLE I--SPECIAL PERSONNEL BENEFITS
definitions
Sec. 101. For purposes of this title--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 5 U.S.C. 5561 note. See also sec. 599C of the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
1991 (Public Law 101-513; 104 Stat. 2064), as amended by sec. 302 of
Public Law 102-138 (105 Stat. 707), and further amended by sec. 5 of
Public Law 102-499 (106 Stat. 3266), relating to benefits for U.S.
hostages in Iraq and Kuwait and U.S. hostages captured in Lebanon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) The term ``American hostage'' means any
individual who, while--
(A) in the civil service or the uniformed
services of the United States, or
(B) a citizen or resident alien of the United
States rendering personal service to the United
States abroad similar to the service of a civil
officer or employee of the United States (as
determined by the Secretary of State),
is placed in a captive status during the hostage
period.
(2) The term ``hostage period'' means the period
beginning on November 4, 1979, and ending on the later
of--
(A) the date the President specifies, by
Executive order, as the date on which all
citizens and resident aliens of the United
States who were placed in a captive status due
to the seizure of the United States Embassy in
Iran have been returned to the United States or
otherwise accounted for, or
(B) January 1, 1983.
(3) The term ``family member'', when used with
respect to any American hostage, means--
(A) any dependent (as defined in section 5561
of title 5, United States Code) of such
hostage; and
(B) any member of the hostage's family or
household (as determined under regulations
which the Secretary of State shall prescribe).
(4) The term ``captive status'' means a missing
status arising because of a hostile action abroad--
(A) which is directed against the United
States during the hostage period; and
(B) which is identified by the Secretary of
State in the Federal Register.
(5) The term ``missing status''--
(A) in the case of employees, has the meaning
given it in section 5561(5) of title 5, United
States Code;
(B) in the case of members of the uniformed
services, has the meaning given it in section
551(2) of title 37, United States Code; and
(C) in the case of other individuals, has a
similar meaning as that provided under such
sections, as determined by the Secretary of
State.
(6) The terms ``pay and allowances'', ``employee'',
and ``agency'' have the meanings given to such terms in
section 5561 of title 5, United States Code, and the
terms ``civil service'', ``uniformed services'', and
``armed forces'' have the meanings given to such terms
in section 2101 of such title 5.
pay and allowances may be allotted to special savings fund
Sec. 102. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury shall establish
a savings fund to which the head of an agency may allot all or
any portion of the pay and allowances of any American hostage
which are for pay periods during which the American hostage is
in a captive status and which are not subject to an allotment
under section 5563 of title 5, United States Code, under
section 553 of title 37, United States Code, or under any other
provision of law.
(b) Amounts so allotted to the savings fund shall bear
interest at a rate which, for any calendar quarter, shall be
equal to the average rate paid on United States Treasury bills
with three-month maturities issued during the preceding
calendar quarter. Such interest shall be compounded quarterly.
(c) Amounts may be allotted to the savings fund from pay
and allowances for any pay period ending after November 4,
1979, and before the establishment of the savings fund.
Interest on amounts allotted from the pay and allowances for
any such pay period shall be calculated as if the allotment had
occurred at the end of the pay period.
(d) Amounts in the savings fund credited to any American
hostage shall be considered as pay and allowances for purposes
of section 5563 of title 5, United States Code (or in the case
of a member of the uniformed services, for purposes of section
553 of title 37, United States Code) and shall otherwise be
subject to withdrawal under procedures which the Secretary of
the Treasury shall establish.
medical and health care and related expenses
Sec. 103. Under regulations prescribed by the President,
the head of an agency may pay (by advancement or reimbursement)
any individual who is an American hostage, or any family member
of such an individual, for medical and health care, and other
expenses related to such care, to the extent such care--
(1) is incident to that individual being an American
hostage; and
(2) is not covered by insurance.
education and training
Sec. 104. (a)(1) Under regulations prescribed by the
President, the head of an agency shall pay (by advancement or
reimbursement) a spouse or child of an American hostage for
expenses incurred for subsistence, tuition, fees, supplies,
books, and equipment, and other educational expenses, while
attending an educational or training institution.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (3), payments shall be
available under this subsection for a spouse or child of an
individual who is an American hostage for education or training
which occurs--
(A) after the nineteenth day after the date the
individual is placed in a captive status, and
(B) on or before--
(i) the end of any semester or quarter (as
appropriate) which begins before the date on
which the hostage ceases to be in a captive
status, or
(ii) if the educational or training
institution is not operated on a semester or
quarter system, the earlier of the end of any
course which began before such date or the end
of the twelve-week period following that date.
In order to respond to special circumstances, the President may
specify a date for purposes of cessation of assistance under
subparagraph (B) which is later than the date which would
otherwise apply under subparagraph (B).
(3) In the event an American hostage dies and the death is
incident to that individual being an American hostage, payments
shall be available under this subsection for a spouse or child
of an individual who is an American hostage for education or
training which occurs after the date of death.
(4) The preceding provisions of this subsection shall not
apply with respect to any spouse or child who is eligible for
assistance under chapter 35 of title 38, United States Code.
(b)(1) In order to respond to special circumstances, the
head of an agency may, under regulations prescribed by the
President, pay (by advancement or reimbursement) an American
hostage for expenses incurred for subsistence, tuition, fees,
supplies, books, and equipment, and other educational expenses,
while attending an educational or training institution.
(2) Payments shall be available under this subsection for
an American hostage for education or training which occurs--
(A) after the termination of such hostages' captive
status, and
(B) on or before--
(i) the end of any semester or quarter (as
appropriate) which begins before the date which
is 10 years after the day on which the hostage
ceases to be in a captive status, or
(ii) if the educational or training
institution is not operated on a semester or
quarter system, the earlier of the end of any
course which began before such date or the end
of the twelve-week period following that date.
(c) Assistance under this section shall be discontinued for
any individual whose conduct or progress is unsatisfactory
under standards consistent with those established pursuant to
section 1724 of title 38, United States Code.
(d) In no event may assistance be provided under this
section for any individual for a period in excess of forty-five
months (or the equivalent thereof in part-time education or
training).
(e) Regulations prescribed by the President under this
section shall provide that the program under this section be
consistent with the assistance program under chapters 35 and 36
of title 38, United States Code.
extension of applicability of certain benefits of the soldiers' and
sailors' civil relief act of 1940
Sec. 105. (a) Under regulations prescribed by the
President, an American hostage is entitled to the benefits
provided by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940
(50 U.S.C. App. 501 et seq.), including the benefits provided
by section 701 (50 U.S.C. App. 591) but excluding the benefits
provided by sections 104, 105, 106, 400 through 408, 501
through 512, and 514 (50 U.S.C. App. 514, 515, 516, 540 through
548, 561 through 572, and 574).
(b) In applying such Act for purposes of this section--
(1) the term ``person in the military service'' is
deemed to include any such American hostage;
(2) the term ``period of military service'' is deemed
to include the period during which such American
hostage is in a captive status; and
(3) references to the Secretary of the Army, the
Secretary of the Navy, the Adjutant General of the
Army, the Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Commandant,
United States Marine Corps, are deemed to be references
to the Secretary of State.
(c) The preceding provisions of this section shall not
apply with respect to any American hostage covered by such
provisions of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of
1940 by reason of being in the Armed Forces.
applicability to colombian hostage
Sec. 106. Notwithstanding the requirements of section
101(1), for purposes of this title, Richard Starr of Edmonds,
Washington, who, as a Peace Corps volunteer, was held captive
in Colombia and released on or about February 10, 1980, shall
be held and considered to be an American hostage placed in a
captive status on November 4, 1979.
effective date
Sec. 107. The preceding provisions of this title shall take
effect as of November 4, 1979.
TITLE II--TAX PROVISIONS
compensation excluded from gross income
Sec. 201. For purposes of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986,\2\ the gross income of an individual who was at any time
an American hostage does not include compensation from the
United States received for any month during any part of which
such individual was--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Sec. 2 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-514; 100
Stat. 2095) struck out ``Internal Revenue Code of 1954'' and inserted
in lieu thereof ``Internal Revenue Code of 1986'', wherever it is cited
in any law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) in captive status, or
(2) hospitalized as a result of such individual's
captive status.
income taxes of hostage where death results from captive status
Sec. 202. (a) General Rule.--In the case of an individual
who was at any time an American hostage and who dies as a
result of injury or disease or physical or mental disability
incurred or aggravated while such individual was in captive
status--
(1) any tax imposed by subtitle A of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 \2\ shall not apply with respect
to--
(A) the taxable year in which falls the date
of such individual's death, or
(B) any prior taxable year ending on or after
the first day such individual was in captive
status, and
(2) any tax imposed under such subtitle A for taxable
years preceding those specified in paragraph (1) which
is unpaid at the date of such individual's death
(including interest, additions to the tax, and
additional amounts)--
(A) shall not be assessed,
(B) if assessed, the assessment shall be
abated, and
(C) if collected, shall be credited or
refunded as an overpayment.
(b) Death Must Occur Within 2 Years of Cessation of Captive
Status.--This section shall not apply unless the death of the
individual occurs within 2 years after such individual ceases
to be in captive status.
spouse may file joint return
Sec. 203. (a) General Rule.--If an individual is an
American hostage who is in captive status, such individual's
spouse may elect to file a joint return under section 6013(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 \2\ for any taxable year--
(1) which begins on or before the day which is 2
years after the date on which the hostage period ends,
and
(2) for which such spouse is otherwise entitled to
file such a joint return.
(b) Certain Rules Made Applicable.--For purposes of
subsection (a), paragraphs (2) and (4) of section 6013(f) of
such Code (relating to joint return where individual is in
missing status) shall apply as if the election described in
subsection (a) of this section were an election described in
paragraph (1) of such section 6013(f).
time for performing certain acts postponed by reason of captive status
Sec. 204. (a) General Rule.--In the case of any individual
who was at any time an American hostage, any period during
which he was in captive status (and any period during which he
was outside the United States and hospitalized as a result of
captive status), and the next 180 days thereafter, shall be
disregarded in determining, under the internal revenue laws, in
respect of any tax liability (including any interest, penalty,
additional amount, or addition to the tax) of such individual--
(1) whether any of the acts specified in paragraph
(1) of section 7508(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 \2\ was performed within the time prescribed
therefor, and
(2) the amount of any credit or refund (including
interest).
(b) Application to Spouse.--The provisions of this section
shall apply to the spouse of any individual entitled to the
benefits of subsection (a). The preceding sentence shall not
cause this section to apply to any spouse for any taxable year
beginning more than 2 years after the date on which the hostage
period ends.
(c) Section 7508(d) Made Applicable.--Subsection (d) of
section 7508 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 \2\ shall
apply to subsection (a) in the same manner as if the benefits
of subsection (a) were provided by subsection (a) of such
section 7508.
definitions and special rules
Sec. 205. (a) American Hostage.--For purposes of this
title, the term ``American hostage'' means any individual who,
while--
(1) in the civil service or the uniformed services of
the United States, or
(2) a citizen or resident alien of the United States
rendering personal service to the United States abroad
similar to the service of a civil officer or employee
of the United States (as determined by the Secretary of
State),
is placed in a captive status during the hostage period.
(b) Hostage Period.--For purposes of this title, the term
``hostage period'' means the period beginning on November 4,
1979, and ending on whichever of the following dates is the
earlier:
(1) the date the President specifies, by Executive
order, as the date on which all citizens and resident
aliens of the United States who were placed in a
captive status due to the seizure of the United States
Embassy in Iran have been returned to the United States
or otherwise accounted for, or
(2) December 31, 1981.
(c) Captive Status.--For purposes of this title--
(1) In general.--The term ``captive status'' means a
missing status arising because of a hostile action
abroad--
(A) which is directed against the United
States during the hostage period, and
(B) which is identified by the Secretary of
State in the Federal Register.
(2) Missing status defined.--The term ``missing
status''--
(A) in the case of employees, has the meaning
given it in section 5561(5) of title 5, United
States Code,
(B) in the case of members of the uniformed
services, has the meaning given it in section
551(2) of title 37, United States Code, and
(C) in the case of other individuals, has a
similar meaning as that provided under such
sections, as determined by the Secretary of
State.
For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term
``employee'' has the meaning given to such term by
section 5561(2) of title 5, United States Code.
(d) Hospitalized as a Result of Captive Status.--
(1) In general.--For purposes of this title, an
individual shall be treated as hospitalized as a result
of captive status if such individual is hospitalized as
a result of injury or disease or physical or mental
disability incurred or aggravated while such individual
was in captive status.
(2) 2-year limit.--Hospitalization shall be taken
into account for purposes of paragraph (1) only if it
is hospitalization--
(A) occurring on or before the day which is 2
years after the date on which the individual's
captive status ends (or, if earlier, the date
on which the hostage period ends), or
(B) which is part of a continuous period of
hospitalization which began on or before the
day determined under subparagraph (A).
(e) Civil Service; Uniformed Services.--For purposes of
this section, the terms ``civil service'' and ``uniformed
services'' have the meanings given to such terms by section
2101 of title 5, United States Code.
(f) Application of Title to All Tehran Hostages.--In the
case of any citizen or resident alien of the United States who
is determined by the Secretary of State to have been held
hostage in Tehran at any time during November 1979, for
purposes of this title--
(1) such individual shall be treated as an American
hostage whether or not such individual meets the
requirements of paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a),
and
(2) if such individual was not in the civil service
or the uniformed services of the United States--
(A) section 201 shall be applied by
substituting ``earned income (as defined in
section 911(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986) \2\ attributable to'' for ``compensation
from the United States received for'', and
(B) the amount excluded from gross income
under section 201 for any month shall not
exceed the monthly equivalent of the annual
rate of basic pay payable for level V of the
Executive Schedule.
(g) Application of Title to Individual Held Captive in
Colombia.--For purposes of this title, Richard Starr of
Edmonds, Washington, who, as a Peace Corps volunteer, was held
captive in Colombia, shall be treated as an American hostage
who was in captive status beginning on November 4, 1979, and
ending on February 10, 1980.
(h) Special Rules.--
(1) Compensation.--For purposes of this title, the
term ``compensation'' shall not include any amount
received as an annuity or as retirement pay.
(2) Wage withholding.--Any amount excluded from gross
income under section 201 shall not be treated as wages
for purposes of chapter 24 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986.\2\
study of tax treatment of hostages
Sec. 206. (a) Study.--The Chief of Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation shall study all aspects of the tax
treatment of citizens and resident aliens of the United States
who are taken hostage or are otherwise placed in a missing
status.
(b) Report.--The Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation shall, before July 1, 1981, report the results of the
study made pursuant to subsection (a) to the Committee on Ways
and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Finance of the Senate.
TITLE III--TREATMENT OF THE HOSTAGES IN IRAN
visits by the international red cross
Sec. 301. (a) The Congress finds that--
(1) the continued illegal and unjustified detention
of the American hostages by the Government of Iran has
resulted in the deterioration of relations between the
United States and Iran; and
(2) the protracted length and the conditions of their
confinement have reportedly endangered the physical and
mental well-being of the hostages.
(b) Therefore, it is the sense of the Congress that the
President should make a formal request of the International
Committee of the Red Cross to--
(1) make regular and periodic visits to the American
hostages being held in Iran for the purpose of
determining whether the hostages are being treated in a
humane and decent manner and whether they are receiving
proper medical attention;
(2) urge other countries to solicit the cooperation
of the Government of Iran in the visits to the hostages
by the International Committee of the Red Cross; and
(3) report to the United States its findings after
each such visit.
=======================================================================
C. ANTITERRORISM AND DIPLOMATIC SECURITY LEGISLATION
CONTENTS
Page
1. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public
Law 104-132) (partial text).................................. 105
Title II--Justice for Victims.............................. 105
Title III--International Terrorism Prohibitions............ 106
Title V--Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons
Restrictions........................................... 110
Title VI--Implementation of Plastic Explosives Convention.. 115
Title VII--Criminal Law Modifications to Counter Terrorism. 116
Title VIII--Assistance to Law Enforcement.................. 117
2. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, as
amended (Public Law 99-399) (partial text)................... 121
Title I--Diplomatic Security............................... 123
Title II--Personnel........................................ 127
Title III--Performance and Accountability.................. 128
Title IV--Diplomatic Security Program...................... 132
Title V--State Department Authorities to Combat
International Terrorism................................ 139
Title VI--International Nuclear Terrorism.................. 139
Title VII--Multilateral Cooperation to Combat International
Terrorism.............................................. 141
Title VIII--Victims of Terrorism Compensation.............. 142
Title IX--Maritime Security................................ 153
Title XI--Security at Military Bases Abroad................ 157
Title XII--Criminal Punishment of International Terrorism.. 158
3. Crimes and Criminal Procedure (Title 18, United States Code)
(partial text)............................................... 160
Part 1--Crimes............................................. 160
Chapter 1--General provisions........................ 160
Section 7--Special Maritime and Territorial
Jurisdiction of the United States Defined...... 160
Chapter 2--Aircraft and Motor Vehicles............... 161
Section 32--Destruction of Aircraft or Aircraft
Facilities..................................... 161
Section 37--Violence at International Airports... 162
Chapter 7--Assault................................... 163
Section 112--Protection of Foreign Officials,
Official Guests, and Internationally Protected
Persons........................................ 163
Chapter 10--Biological Weapons....................... 164
Section 175--Prohibitions with Respect to
Biological Weapons............................. 164
Section 175a--Requests for Military Assistance to
Enforce Prohibition in Certain Emergencies..... 165
Section 176--Seizure, Forfeiture, and Destruction 165
Section 177--Injunctions......................... 165
Section 178--Definitions......................... 166
Chapter 39--Explosives and combustibles.............. 166
Section 831--Prohibited Transactions Involving
Nuclear Materials.............................. 166
Chapter 41--Extortion and threats.................... 170
Section 878--Threats and Extortion Against
Foreign Officials, Official Guests, or
Internationally Protected Persons.............. 170
Chapter 44--Firearms................................. 170
Section 922--Includes Undetectable Firearms Act
of 1988........................................ 170
Section 924--Penalties........................... 171
Chapter 45--Foreign relations........................ 177
Section 970--Protection of Property Occupied by
Foreign Governments............................ 177
Chapter 51--Homicide................................. 178
Section 1116--Murder or Manslaughter of Foreign
Officials, Official Guests, or Internationally
Protected Persons.............................. 178
Section 1117--Conspiracy to Murder............... 180
Chapter 55--Kidnapping............................... 180
Section 1201--Kidnapping......................... 180
Section 1203--Hostage Taking..................... 180
Chapter 75--Passports and Visas...................... 182
Section 1541--Issuance without Authority......... 182
Section 1542--False Statement in Application and
Use of Passport................................ 182
Section 1543--Forgery or False Use of Passport... 183
Section 1544--Misuse of Passport................. 183
Section 1545--Safe Conduct Violation............. 183
Section 1546--Fraud and Misuse of Visas, Permits,
and Other Documents............................ 183
Chapter 111--Shipping................................ 185
Section 2280--Violence Against Maritime
Navigation..................................... 185
Section 2281--Violence Against Maritime Fixed
Platforms...................................... 187
Chapter 113B--Terrorism.............................. 189
Section 2331--Definitions........................ 189
Section 2332--Criminal Penalties................. 190
Section 2332a--Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction 191
Section 2332b--Acts of Terrorism Transcending
National Boundaries............................ 192
Section 2332c--Use of Chemical Weapons........... 195
Section 2332d--Financial Transactions............ 195
Section 2332e--Requests for Military Assistance
to Enforce Prohibition in Certain Emergencies.. 196
Section 2333--Civil Remedies..................... 196
Section 2334--Jurisdiction and Venue............. 196
Section 2335--Limitation of Actions.............. 197
Section 2336--Other Limitations.................. 197
Section 2337--Suits Against Government Officials. 198
Section 2338--Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction..... 198
Section 2339A--Providing Material Support to
Terrorists..................................... 198
Section 2339B--Providing Material Support or
Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist
Organizations.................................. 198
Chapter 204--Rewards for Information Concerning
Terrorist Acts................................... 202
Section 3071--Information for Which Rewards
Authorized..................................... 202
Section 3072--Determination of Entitlement;
Maximum Amount; Presidential Approval;
Conclusiveness................................. 202
Section 3073--Protection of Identity............. 203
Section 3074--Exception of Governmental Officials 203
Section 3075--Authorization for Appropriations... 203
Section 3076--Eligibility for Witness Security
Program........................................ 203
Section 3077--Definitions........................ 203
Chapter 213--Limitations............................. 204
Section 3286--Extension of Statute of Limitation
for Certain Terrorism Offenses................. 204
Section 3291--Nationality, Citizenship and
Passports...................................... 205
Chapter 228--Death sentence.......................... 205
Section 3592--Mitigating and aggravating factors
to be considered in determining whether a
sentence of death is justified; include (c)(9). 205
4. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Public
Law 103-322) (partial text).................................. 209
Title XI--Terrorism........................................ 209
Section 120004--Sentencing Guidelines Increase for
Terrorist Crimes................................. 209
5. Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official
Guests of the United States (Public Law 92-539) (partial
text)........................................................ 210
6. Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989 (Public
Law 101-222) (partial text).................................. 211
Section 10--Self-Defense in Accordance with International
Law.................................................... 211
7. Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 (Public Law 101-
298) (partial text).......................................... 212
Section 2--Purpose and Intent.............................. 212
8. 1984 Act To Combat International Terrorism, as amended (Public
Law 98-533) (partial text)................................... 213
Title II--International Cooperation........................ 213
Title III--Security of United States Missions Abroad....... 214
9. Foreign Sovereign Immunities (Title 28, United States Code)
(partial text)............................................... 215
Chapter 85--District Courts; Jurisdiction.................. 215
Section 1330--Actions against Foreign States......... 215
Chapter 97--Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States.... 215
=======================================================================
1. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
Partial text of Public Law 104-132 [S. 735], 110 Stat. 1214, approved
April 24, 1996
Note.--Except for the provisions noted below, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
amends other legislation and has been incorporated into
those laws, or consists of legislation not generally
related to foreign policy. Complete text of the Act may
be found at 110 Stat. 1214.
AN ACT To deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide for an
effective death penalty, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996''.
SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.
The table of contents of this Act is as follows: * * *
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle B--Jurisdiction for Lawsuits Against Terrorist States
SEC. 221.\1\ JURISDICTION FOR LAWSUITS AGAINST TERRORIST STATES. * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Sec. 221 amended 28 USC 1605 and 1610, relating to foreign
sovereign immunity. See Sec. C.9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtitle C--Assistance to Victims of Terrorism
SEC. 231. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ``Justice for Victims of
Terrorism Act of 1996''.
SEC. 232. VICTIMS OF TERRORISM ACT.
(a) Authority To Provide Assistance and Compensation to
Victims of Terrorism.--The Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42
U.S.C. 10601 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section
1404A the following new section:
``SEC. 1404B.\2\ COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS OF TERRORISM OR
MASS VIOLENCE.
``(a) Victims of Acts of Terrorism Outside the United
States.--The Director \3\ may make supplemental grants as
provided in section 1404(a) to States to provide compensation
and assistance to the residents of such States who, while
outside of the territorial boundaries of the United States, are
victims of a terrorist act or mass violence and are not persons
eligible for compensation under title VIII of the Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 42 U.S.C. 10603b.
\3\ Director of the Crime Victims Fund, Department of the Treasury,
as established by the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (title II of Public
Law 98-473; 42 U.S.C. 10601 et seq..).
* * * * * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 233. COMPENSATION OF VICTIMS OF TERRORISM.
(a) * * *
(b) \4\ Foreign Terrorism.--Section 1403(b)(6)(B) of the
Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10602(b)(6)(B)) is
amended by inserting ``are outside of the United States (if the
compensable crime is terrorism, as defined in section 2331 of
title 18, United States Code), or'' before ``are States not
having''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Sec. 1403(b)(6)(B) of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984, as
amended, effective April 24, 1997, provides as follows:
``Sec. 10602. Crime victim compensation
``(b) Eligible crime victim compensation programs
* * *
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``(6) such program provides compensation to residents of the
State who are victims of crimes occurring outside the State
if--
``(A) the crimes would be compensable crimes had they
occurred inside that State; and
``(B) the places the crimes occurred in are outside
of the United States (if the compensable crime is
terrorism, as defined in section 2331 of title 18,
United States Code), or are States not having eligible
crime victim compensation programs;''.
(c) * * *
(d) Effective Date.--This section and the amendments made
by this section shall take effect 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act.
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM PROHIBITIONS
Subtitle A--Prohibition on International Terrorist Fundraising
SEC. 301.\5\ FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ 18 U.S.C. 2339B note.
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(1) international terrorism is a serious and deadly
problem that threatens the vital interests of the
United States;
(2) the Constitution confers upon Congress the power
to punish crimes against the law of nations and to
carry out the treaty obligations of the United States,
and therefore Congress may by law impose penalties
relating to the provision of material support to
foreign organizations engaged in terrorist activity;
(3) the power of the United States over immigration
and naturalization permits the exclusion from the
United States of persons belonging to international
terrorist organizations;
(4) international terrorism affects the interstate
and foreign commerce of the United States by harming
international trade and market stability, and limiting
international travel by United States citizens as well
as foreign visitors to the United States;
(5) international cooperation is required for an
effective response to terrorism, as demonstrated by the
numerous multilateral conventions in force providing
universal prosecutive jurisdiction over persons
involved in a variety of terrorist acts, including
hostage taking, murder of an internationally protected
person, and aircraft piracy and sabotage;
(6) some foreign terrorist organizations, acting
through affiliated groups or individuals, raise
significant funds within the United States, or use the
United States as a conduit for the receipt of funds
raised in other nations; and
(7) foreign organizations that engage in terrorist
activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that
any contribution to such an organization facilitates
that conduct.
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this subtitle is to provide
the Federal Government the fullest possible basis, consistent
with the Constitution, to prevent persons within the United
States, or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,
from providing material support or resources to foreign
organizations that engage in terrorist activities.
SEC. 302. DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) In General.--Chapter 2 of title II of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1181 et seq.) is amended by
adding at the end the following: * * * \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Sec. 302 added a new sec. 219 (8 U.S.C. 1189), relating to the
designation of foreign terrorist organizations, to the Immigration and
Nationality Act. See Sec. 6.1.
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(b) * * *
SEC. 303. PROHIBITION ON TERRORIST FUNDRAISING.
(a) In General.--Chapter 113B of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new
section: * * * \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Sec. 303(a) added a new sec. 2339B to 18 U.S.C., relating to
providing material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist
organizations; see Sec. 6.1. Subsecs. (b) and (c) made technical
amendments to 18 U.S.C.
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(b) * * *
(c) * * *
Subtitle B--Prohibition on Assistance to Terrorist States
SEC. 321. FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS WITH TERRORISTS.
(a) In General.--Chapter 113B of title 18, United States
Code, relating to terrorism, is amended by inserting after the
section 2332c added by section 521 of this Act the following
new section: * * * \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Sec. 321(a) added a new sec. 2332d to 18 U.S.C., relating to
financial transactions with terrorists. See Sec. 6.1. Subsec. (b) made
a technical amendment to the same title.
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(b) * * *
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall become effective 120 days after the date of enactment of
this Act.
SEC. 322. FOREIGN AIR TRAVEL SAFETY.
Section 44906 of title 49, United States Code, is amended
to read as follows: * * * \9\
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\9\ Sec. 322 amended and restated 49 U.S.C. 44906, relating to
foreign air carrier security programs. See Sec. F.1.
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SEC. 323. MODIFICATION OF MATERIAL SUPPORT PROVISION.
Section 2339A of title 18, United States Code, is amended
to read as follows: * * * \10\
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\10\ Sec. 323 amended and restated 18 U.S.C. 2339A, relating to
providing material support to terrorists. See Sec. C.3.
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SEC. 324.\11\ FINDINGS.
The Congress finds that--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ 22 U.S.C. 2377 note.
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(1) international terrorism is among the most serious
transnational threats faced by the United States and
its allies, far eclipsing the dangers posed by
population growth or pollution;
(2) the President should continue to make efforts to
counter international terrorism a national security
priority;
(3) because the United Nations has been an inadequate
forum for the discussion of cooperative, multilateral
responses to the threat of international terrorism, the
President should undertake immediate efforts to develop
effective multilateral responses to international
terrorism as a complement to national counter terrorist
efforts;
(4) the President should use all necessary means,
including covert action and military force, to disrupt,
dismantle, and destroy international infrastructure
used by international terrorists, including overseas
terrorist training facilities and safe havens;
(5) the Congress deplores decisions to ease, evade,
or end international sanctions on state sponsors of
terrorism, including the recent decision by the United
Nations Sanctions Committee to allow airline flights to
and from Libya despite Libya's noncompliance with
United Nations resolutions; and
(6) the President should continue to undertake
efforts to increase the international isolation of
state sponsors of international terrorism, including
efforts to strengthen international sanctions, and
should oppose any future initiatives to ease sanctions
on Libya or other state sponsors of terrorism.
SEC. 325. PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES THAT AID TERRORIST
STATES.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 151 et seq.)
is amended by adding immediately after section 620F the
following new section: * * * \12\
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\12\ Sec. 325 added a new sec. 620G to the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2377), relating to a prohibition on assistance to
countries that aid terrorist states. See Sec. A.1.
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SEC. 326. PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES THAT PROVIDE MILITARY
EQUIPMENT TO TERRORIST STATES.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 151 et seq.)
is amended by adding immediately after section 620G the
following new section: * * * \13\
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\13\ Sec. 326 added a new sec. 620H to the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2377), relating to a prohibition on assistance to
countries that provide military equipment to terrorist states. See Sec.
A.1.
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SEC. 327. OPPOSITION TO ASSISTANCE BY INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS TO TERRORIST STATES.
The International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C.
262c et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 1620 the
following new section: * * * \14\
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\14\ Sec. 327 added a new sec. 1621 to the International Financial
Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262p-4q), relating to opposition to
assistance by international financial institutions to terrorist states.
See Sec. E.9.
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SEC. 328. ANTITERRORISM ASSISTANCE.
(a) Foreign Assistance Act.--Section 573 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa-2) is amended--* * *
\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ See Sec. A.1.
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(b) Assistance to Foreign Countries To Procure Explosives
Detection Devices and Other Counterterrorism Technology.--(1)
Subject to section 575(b), up to $3,000,000 in any fiscal year
may be made available--
(A) to procure explosives detection devices and other
counterterrorism technology; and
(B) for joint counterterrorism research and
development projects on such technology conducted with
NATO and major non-NATO allies under the auspices of
the Technical Support Working Group of the Department
of State.
(2) As used in this subsection, the term ``major non-NATO
allies'' means those countries designated as major non-NATO
allies for purposes of section 2350a(i)(3) of title 10, United
States Code.
(c) Assistance to Foreign Countries.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law (except section 620A of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961) up to $1,000,000 in assistance may be
provided to a foreign country for counterterrorism efforts in
any fiscal year if--
(1) such assistance is provided for the purpose of
protecting the property of the United States Government
or the life and property of any United States citizen,
or furthering the apprehension of any individual
involved in any act of terrorism against such property
or persons; and
(2) the appropriate committees of Congress are
notified not later than 15 days prior to the provision
of such assistance.
SEC. 329.\16\ DEFINITION OF ASSISTANCE.
For purposes of this title--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ 22 U.S.C. 2349aa)-10 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) the term ``assistance'' means assistance to or
for the benefit of a government of any country that is
provided by grant, concessional sale, guaranty,
insurance, or by any other means on terms more
favorable than generally available in the applicable
market, whether in the form of a loan, lease, credit,
debt relief, or otherwise, including subsidies for
exports to such country and favorable tariff treatment
of articles that are the growth, product, or
manufacture of such country; and
(2) the term ``assistance'' does not include
assistance of the type authorized under chapter 9 of
part 1 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating
to international disaster assistance).
SEC. 330. PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE UNDER ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT FOR
COUNTRIES NOT COOPERATING FULLY WITH UNITED STATES
ANTITERRORISM EFFORTS.
Chapter 3 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2771 et
seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: * * * \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Sec. 330 added a new sec. 40A to the Arms Export Control Act
(22 U.S.C. 2781), relating to transactions with countries not fully
cooperating with United States antiterrorism efforts. See Sec. A.2.
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TITLE IV--TERRORIST AND CRIMINAL ALIEN REMOVAL AND EXCLUSION
Subtitle A--Removal of Alien Terrorists
SEC. 401. ALIEN TERRORIST REMOVAL.
(a) In General.--The Immigration and Nationality Act is
amended by adding at the end the following new title: * * *
\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Sec. 401(a) added a new title V to the Immigration and
Nationality Act, relating to alien terrorist removal procedures. See 8
U.S.C. 1531-1537. Subsec. (b) through (e) made related technical
amendments.
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(b)-(e) * * *
(f) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act and
shall apply to all aliens without regard to the date of entry
or attempted entry into the United States.
Subtitle B--Exclusion of Members and Representatives of Terrorist
Organizations * * * \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Subtitle B made several amendments to the Immigration and
Nationality Act relating to the exclusion of alien terrorists, denial
of visas and other relief. See 8 U.S.C. 1182, 1251, 1253, 1254, 1255,
and 1259.
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Subtitle C--Modification to Asylum Procedures * * * \20\
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\20\ Subtitle C made several amendments to the Immigration and
Nationality Act relating to asylum procedures. See 8 U.S.C. 1105a,
1158, and 1225.
* * * * * * *
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TITLE V--NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS RESTRICTIONS
Subtitle A--Nuclear Materials
SEC. 501.\21\ FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ 18 U.S.C. 831 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) nuclear materials, including byproduct materials,
can be used to create radioactive dispersal devices
that are capable of causing serious bodily injury as
well as substantial damage to property and to the
environment;
(2) the potential use of nuclear materials, including
byproduct materials, enhances the threat posed by
terrorist activities and thereby has a greater effect
on the security interests of the United States;
(3) due to the widespread hazards presented by the
threat of nuclear contamination, as well as nuclear
bombs, the United States has a strong interest in
ensuring that persons who are engaged in the illegal
acquisition and use of nuclear materials, including
byproduct materials, are prosecuted for their offenses;
(4) the threat that nuclear materials will be
obtained and used by terrorist and other criminal
organizations has increased substantially since the
enactment in 1982 of the legislation that implemented
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material, codified at section 831 of title 18, United
States Code;
(5) the successful efforts to obtain agreements from
other countries to dismantle nuclear weapons have
resulted in increased packaging and transportation of
nuclear materials, thereby decreasing the security of
such materials by increasing the opportunity for
unlawful diversion and theft;
(6) the trafficking in the relatively more common,
commercially available, and usable nuclear and
byproduct materials creates the potential for
significant loss of life and environmental damage;
(7) report trafficking incidents in the early 1990's
suggest that the individuals involved in trafficking in
these materials from Eurasia and Eastern Europe
frequently conducted their black market sales of these
materials within the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Baltic States, the former Soviet Union, Central Europe,
and to a lesser extent in the Middle European
countries;
(8) the international community has become
increasingly concerned over the illegal possession of
nuclear and nuclear byproduct materials;
(9) the potentially disastrous ramifications of
increased access to nuclear and nuclear byproduct
materials pose such a significant threat that the
United States must use all lawful methods available to
combat the illegal use of such materials;
(10) the United States has an interest in encouraging
United States corporations to do business in the
countries that comprised the former Soviet Union, and
in other developing democracies;
(11) protection of such United States corporations
from threats created by the unlawful use of nuclear
materials is important to the success of the effort to
encourage business ventures in these countries, and to
further the foreign relations and commerce of the
United States;
(12) the nature of nuclear contamination is such that
it may affect the health, environment, and property of
United States nationals even if the acts that
constitute the illegal activity occur outside the
territory of the United States, and are primarily
directed toward foreign nationals; and
(13) there is presently no Federal criminal statute
that provides adequate protection to United States
interests from nonweapons grade, yet hazardous
radioactive material, and from the illegal diversion of
nuclear materials that are held for other than peaceful
purposes.
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this title is to provide
Federal law enforcement agencies with the necessary means and
the maximum authority permissible under the Constitution to
combat the threat of nuclear contamination and proliferation
that may result from the illegal possession and use of
radioactive materials.
SEC. 502. EXPANSION OF SCOPE AND JURISDICTIONAL BASES OF NUCLEAR
MATERIALS PROHIBITIONS.
Section 831 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--*
* * \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ See Sec. C.3.
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SEC. 503. REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THEFTS OF EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS FROM
ARMORIES.
(a) Study.--The Attorney General and the Secretary of
Defense shall jointly conduct a study of the number and extent
of thefts from military arsenals (including National Guard
armories) of firearms, explosives, and other materials that are
potentially useful to terrorists.
(b) Report to the Congress.--Not later than 6 months after
the date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney General and the
Secretary of Defense shall jointly prepare and transmit to the
Congress a report on the findings of the study conducted under
subsection (a).
Subtitle B--Biological Weapons Restrictions
SEC. 511.\23\ ENHANCED PENALTIES AND CONTROL OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ 42 U.S.C. 262 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) certain biological agents have the potential to
pose a severe threat to public health and safety;
(2) such biological agents can be used as weapons by
individuals or organizations for the purpose of
domestic or international terrorism or for other
criminal purposes;
(3) the transfer and possession of potentially
hazardous biological agents should be regulated to
protect public health and safety; and
(4) efforts to protect the public from exposure to
such agents should ensure that individuals and groups
with legitimate objectives continue to have access to
such agents for clinical and research purposes.
(b) Criminal Enforcement.--Chapter 10 of title 18, United
States Code, is amended-- * * * \24\
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\24\ Subsec. (b) amended 18 U.S.C. 175-178. For text, see Sec. C.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) Terrorism.--Section 2332a(a) of title 18, United States
Code,\25\ is amended by inserting ``, including any biological
agent, toxin, or vector (as those terms are defined in section
178)'' after ``destruction''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ See Sec. C.3.
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(d) Regulatory Control of Biological Agents.--
(1) List of biological agents.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary shall, through
regulations promulgated under subsection (f),
establish and maintain a list of each
biological agent that has the potential to pose
a severe threat to public health and safety.
(B) Criteria.--In determining whether to
include an agent on the list under subparagraph
(A), the Secretary shall--
(i) consider--
(I) the effect on human
health of exposure to the
agent;
(II) the degree of
contagiousness of the agent and
the methods by which the agent
is transferred to humans;
(III) the availability and
effectiveness of immunizations
to prevent and treatments for
any illness resulting from
infection by the agent; and
(IV) any other criteria that
the Secretary considers
appropriate; and
(ii) consult with scientific experts
representing appropriate professional
groups.
(e) Regulation of Transfers of Listed Biological Agents.--
The Secretary shall, through regulations promulgated under
subsection (f), provide for--
(1) the establishment and enforcement of safety
procedures for the transfer of biological agents listed
pursuant to subsection (d)(1), including measures to
ensure--
(A) proper training and appropriate skills to
handle such agents; and
(B) proper laboratory facilities to contain
and dispose of such agents;
(2) safeguards to prevent access to such agents for
use in domestic or international terrorism or for any
other criminal purpose;
(3) the establishment of procedures to protect the
public safety in the event of a transfer or potential
transfer of a biological agent in violation of the
safety procedures established under paragraph (1) or
the safeguards established under paragraph (2); and
(4) appropriate availability of biological agents for
research, education, and other legitimate purposes.
(f) Regulations.--The Secretary shall carry out this
section by issuing--
(1) proposed rules not later than 60 days after the
date of enactment of this Act; and
(2) final rules not later than 120 days after the
date of enactment of this Act.
(g) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
(1) the term ``biological agent'' has the same
meaning as in section 178 of title 18, United States
Code; and
(2) the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of
Health and Human Services.
Subtitle C--Chemical Weapons Restrictions
SEC. 521. CHEMICAL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION; STUDY OF FACILITY FOR
TRAINING AND EVALUATION OF PERSONNEL WHO RESPOND TO
USE OF CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN URBAN AND
SUBURBAN AREAS.
(a) Chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction.--Chapter 113B of
title 18, United States Code, relating to terrorism, is amended
by inserting after section 2332b as added by section 702 of
this Act the following new section: * * * \26\
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\26\ Sec. 521(a) added a new sec. 2332c to 18 U.S.C., relating to
the use of chemical weapons. See Sec. C.3. Subsec. (c) made a clerical
amendment to 18 U.S.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) \27\ Study of Facility for Training and Evaluation of
Personnel Who Respond To Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons
in Urban and Suburban Areas.--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ 50 U.S.C. 1522 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
(A) the threat of the use of chemical and
biological weapons by Third World countries and
by terrorist organizations has increased in
recent years and is now a problem of worldwide
significance;
(B) the military and law enforcement agencies
in the United States that are responsible for
responding to the use of such weapons require
additional testing, training, and evaluation
facilities to ensure that the personnel of such
agencies discharge their responsibilities
effectively; and
(C) a facility that recreates urban and
suburban locations would provide an especially
effective environment in which to test, train,
and evaluate such personnel for that purpose.
(2) Study of facility.--
(A) In general.--The President shall
establish an interagency task force to
determine the feasibility and advisability of
establishing a facility that recreates both an
urban environment and a suburban environment in
such a way as to permit the effective testing,
training, and evaluation in such environments
of government personnel who are responsible for
responding to the use of chemical and
biological weapons in the United States.
(B) Description of facility.--The facility
considered under subparagraph (A) shall
include--
(i) facilities common to urban
environments (including a multistory
building and an underground rail
transit system) and to suburban
environments;
(ii) the capacity to produce
controllable releases of chemical and
biological agents from a variety of
urban and suburban structures,
including laboratories, small
buildings, and dwellings;
(iii) the capacity to produce
controllable releases of chemical and
biological agents into sewage, water,
and air management systems common to
urban areas and suburban areas;
(iv) chemical and biocontaminant
facilities at the P3 and P4 levels;
(v) the capacity to test and evaluate
the effectiveness of a variety of
protective clothing and facilities and
survival techniques in urban areas and
suburban areas; and
(vi) the capacity to test and
evaluate the effectiveness of variable
sensor arrays (including video, audio,
meteorological, chemical, and biosensor
arrays) in urban areas and suburban
areas.
(C) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of
Congress that the facility considered under
subparagraph (A) shall, if established--
(i) be under the jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Defense; and
(ii) be located at a principal
facility of the Department of Defense
for the testing and evaluation of the
use of chemical and biological weapons
during any period of armed conflict.
(c) * * *
TITLE VI--IMPLEMENTATION OF PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES CONVENTION
SEC. 601.\28\ FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ 18 U.S.C. 841 note. Secs. 602-605 of this title amended 18
U.S.C. to implement the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives
for the Purpose of Detection, done at Montreal, March 1, 1991. See 18
U.S.C. 841, 842, 844, 845. Sec. 606 amended sec. 596(c)(1) of the
Tariff Act of 1930; see 19 U.S.C. 1595a(c)(1)).
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(1) plastic explosives were used by terrorists in the
bombings of Pan American Airlines flight number 103 in
December 1988 and UTA flight number 722 in September
1989;
(2) plastic explosives can be used with little
likelihood of detection for acts of unlawful
interference with civil aviation, maritime navigation,
and other modes of transportation;
(3) the criminal use of plastic explosives places
innocent lives in jeopardy, endangers national
security, affects domestic tranquility, and gravely
affects interstate and foreign commerce;
(4) the marking of plastic explosives for the purpose
of detection would contribute significantly to the
prevention and punishment of such unlawful acts; and
(5) for the purpose of deterring and detecting such
unlawful acts, the Convention on the Marking of Plastic
Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Done at
Montreal on 1 March 1991, requires each contracting
State to adopt appropriate measures to ensure that
plastic explosives are duly marked and controlled.
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this title is to fully
implement the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives
for the Purpose of Detection, Done at Montreal on 1 March 1991.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 607.\29\ EFFECTIVE DATE.
Except as otherwise provided in this title, this title and
the amendments made by this title shall take effect 1 year
after the date of enactment of this Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ 18 U.S.C. 841 note.
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TITLE VII--CRIMINAL LAW MODIFICATIONS TO COUNTER TERRORISM
Subtitle A--Crimes and Penalties
* * * * * * *
SEC. 702. ACTS OF TERRORISM TRANSCENDING NATIONAL BOUNDARIES.
(a) Offense.--Chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code,
relating to terrorism, is amended by inserting after section
2332a the following new section: * * * \30\
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\30\ Sec. 702(a) added a new sec. 2332b to 18, U.S.C., relating to
acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries. See Sec. C.3.
Subsecs. (b) and (c) made technical amendments.
* * * * * * *
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SEC. 709. DETERMINATION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTING THE
DISSEMINATION OF BOMB-MAKING INSTRUCTIONAL
MATERIALS.
(a) Study.--The Attorney General, in consultation with such
other officials and individuals as the Attorney General
considers appropriate, shall conduct a study concerning--
(1) the extent to which there is available to the
public material in any medium (including print,
electronic, or film) that provides instruction on how
to make bombs, destructive devices, or weapons of mass
destruction;
(2) the extent to which information gained from such
material has been used in incidents of domestic or
international terrorism;
(3) the likelihood that such information may be used
in future incidents of terrorism;
(4) the application of Federal laws in effect on the
date of enactment of this Act to such material;
(5) the need and utility, if any, for additional laws
relating to such material; and
(6) an assessment of the extent to which the first
amendment protects such material and its private and
commercial distribution.
(b) Report.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney General
shall submit to the Congress a report that contains the
results of the study required by this section.
(2) Availability.--The Attorney General shall make
the report submitted under this subsection available to
the public.
* * * * * * *
TITLE VIII--ASSISTANCE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
Subtitle A--Resources and Security
SEC. 801.\31\ OVERSEAS LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING ACTIVITIES.
The Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury are
authorized to support law enforcement training activities in
foreign countries, in consultation with the Secretary of State,
for the purpose of improving the effectiveness of the United
States in investigating and prosecuting transnational offenses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ 28 U.S.C. 509 note.
* * * * * * *
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SEC. 807.\32\ COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL COUNTERFEITING OF UNITED STATES
CURRENCY.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of the Treasury (hereafter
in this section referred to as the ``Secretary''), in
consultation with the advanced counterfeit deterrence steering
committee, shall--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ 18 U.S.C. 470 note.
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(1) study the use and holding of United States
currency in foreign countries; and
(2) develop useful estimates of the amount of
counterfeit United States currency that circulates
outside the United States each year.
(b) Evaluation Audit Plan.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall develop an
effective international evaluation audit plan that is
designed to enable the Secretary to carry out the
duties described in subsection (a) on a regular and
thorough basis.
(2) Submission of detailed written summary.--The
Secretary shall submit a detailed written summary of
the evaluation audit plan developed pursuant to
paragraph (1) to the Congress before the end of the 6-
month period beginning on the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(3) First evaluation audit under plan.--The Secretary
shall begin the first evaluation audit pursuant to the
evaluation audit plan no later than the end of the 1-
year period beginning on the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(4) Subsequent evaluation audits.--At least 1
evaluation audit shall be performed pursuant to the
evaluation audit plan during each 3-year period
beginning after the date of the commencement of the
evaluation audit referred to in paragraph (3).
(c) Reports.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall submit a written
report to the Committee on Banking and Financial
Services of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the
Senate on the results of each evaluation audit
conducted pursuant to subsection (b) within 90 days
after the completion of the evaluation audit.
(2) Contents.--In addition to such other information
as the Secretary may determine to be appropriate, each
report submitted to the Congress pursuant to paragraph
(1) shall include the following information:
(A) A detailed description of the evaluation
audit process and the methods used to develop
estimates of the amount of counterfeit United
States currency in circulation outside the
United States.
(B) The method used to determine the currency
sample examined in connection with the
evaluation audit and a statistical analysis of
the sample examined.
(C) A list of the regions of the world, types
of financial institutions, and other entities
included.
(D) An estimate of the total amount of United
States currency found in each region of the
world.
(E) The total amount of counterfeit United
States currency and the total quantity of each
counterfeit denomination found in each region
of the world.
(3) Classification of information.--
(A) In general.--To the greatest extent
possible, each report submitted to the Congress
under this subsection shall be submitted in an
unclassified form.
(B) Classified and unclassified forms.--If,
in the interest of submitting a complete report
under this subsection, the Secretary determines
that it is necessary to include classified
information in the report, the report shall be
submitted in a classified and an unclassified
form.
(d) Sunset Provision.--This section shall cease to be
effective as of the end of the 10-year period beginning on the
date of the enactment of this Act.
(e) Rule of Construction.--No provision of this section
shall be construed as authorizing any entity to conduct
investigations of counterfeit United States currency.
(f) Findings.--The Congress hereby finds the following:
(1) United States currency is being counterfeited
outside the United States.
(2) The One Hundred Third Congress enacted, with the
approval of the President on September 13, 1994,
section 470 of title 18, United States Code, making
such activity a crime under the laws of the United
States.
(3) The expeditious posting of agents of the United
States Secret Service to overseas posts, which is
necessary for the effective enforcement of section 470
and related criminal provisions, has been delayed.
(4) While section 470 of title 18, United States
Code, provides for a maximum term of imprisonment of 20
years as opposed to a maximum term of 15 years for
domestic counterfeiting, the United States Sentencing
Commission has failed to provide, in its sentencing
guidelines, for an appropriate enhancement of
punishment for defendants convicted of counterfeiting
United States currency outside the United States.
(g) Timely Consideration of Requests for Concurrence in
Creation of Overseas Posts.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall--
(A) consider in a timely manner the request
by the Secretary of the Treasury for the
placement of such number of agents of the
United States Secret Service as the Secretary
of the Treasury considers appropriate in posts
in overseas embassies; and
(B) reach an agreement with the Secretary of
the Treasury on such posts as soon as possible
and, in any event, not later than December 31,
1996.
(2) Cooperation of treasury required.--The Secretary
of the Treasury shall promptly provide any information
requested by the Secretary of State in connection with
such requests.
(3) Reports required.--The Secretary of the Treasury
and the Secretary of State shall each submit, by
February 1, 1997, a written report to the Committee on
Banking and Financial Services of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs of the Senate explaining the reasons
for the rejection, if any, of any proposed post and the
reasons for the failure, if any, to fill any approved
post by such date.
(h) Enhanced Penalties for International Counterfeiting of
United States Currency.--Pursuant to the authority of the
United States Sentencing Commission under section 994 of title
28, United States Code, the Commission shall amend the
sentencing guidelines prescribed by the Commission to provide
an appropriate enhancement of the punishment for a defendant
convicted under section 470 of title 18 of such Code.
* * * * * * *
Subtitle B--Funding Authorizations for Law Enforcement
* * * * * * *
SEC. 820. ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES TO PROCURE EXPLOSIVE
DETECTION DEVICES AND OTHER COUNTERTERRORISM
TECHNOLOGY.
There are authorized to be appropriated to the National
Institute of Justice Office of Science and Technology not more
than $10,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 1997 and 1998 to
provide assistance to foreign countries facing an imminent
danger of terrorist attack that threatens the national interest
of the United States, or puts United States nationals at risk,
in--
(1) obtaining explosive detection devices and other
counterterrorism technology;
(2) conducting research and development projects on
such technology; and
(3) testing and evaluating counterterrorism
technologies in those countries.
SEC. 821. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO SUPPORT COUNTERTERRORISM
TECHNOLOGIES.
There are authorized to be appropriated to the National
Institute of Justice Office of Science and Technology not more
than $10,000,000 for fiscal year 1997, to--
(1) develop technologies that can be used to combat
terrorism, including technologies in the areas of--
(A) detection of weapons, explosives,
chemicals, and persons;
(B) tracking;
(C) surveillance;
(D) vulnerability assessment; and
(E) information technologies;
(2) develop standards to ensure the adequacy of
products produced and compatibility with relevant
national systems; and
(3) identify and assess requirements for technologies
to assist State and local law enforcement in the
national program to combat terrorism.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 823. FUNDING SOURCE.
Appropriations for activities authorized in this subtitle
may be made from the Violent Crime Reduction Trust Fund.
2. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986
Partial text of Public Law 99-399 [H.R. 4151], 100 Stat. 853, approved
August 27, 1986, as amended
AN ACT To provide enhanced diplomatic security and combat international
terrorism, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,\1\
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\1\22 U.S.C. 4801 note.
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SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Omnibus Diplomatic Security
and Antiterrorism Act of 1986''.
SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.
The table of contents of this Act is as follows:
Page
Sec. 1. Short title.............................................. 724
Sec. 2. Table of contents........................................ 724
TITLE I--DIPLOMATIC SECURITY
Sec. 101. Short title............................................. 726
Sec. 102. Findings and purposes................................... 726
Sec. 103. Responsibility of the Secretary of State................ 727
Sec. 106. Cooperation of other Federal agencies................... 730
Sec. 107. Protection of foreign consulates........................ 731
TITLE II--PERSONNEL
Sec. 201. Diplomatic Security Service............................. 731
Sec. 202. Director of Diplomatic Security Service................. 731
Sec. 203. Special Agents.......................................... 731
TITLE III--PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Sec. 301. Accountability review................................... 732
Sec. 302. Accountability Review Board............................. 733
Sec. 303. Procedures.............................................. 733
Sec. 304. Findings and recommendations by a Board................. 735
Sec. 305. Relation to other proceedings........................... 736
TITLE IV--DIPLOMATIC SECURITY PROGRAM
Sec. 401. Authorization........................................... 736
Sec. 402. Diplomatic construction program......................... 738
Sec. 403. Security requirements for contractors................... 740
Sec. 404. Qualifications of persons hired for the diplomatic
construction program.......................................... 740
Sec. 405. Cost overruns........................................... 740
Sec. 406. Efficiency in contracting............................... 740
Sec. 407. Advisory Panel on Overseas Security..................... 741
Sec. 408. Training to improve perimeter security at United States
diplomatic missions aboard.................................... 741
Sec. 409. Protection of public entrances of United States
diplomatic missions abroad.................................... 741
Sec. 410. Certain protective functions............................ 741
Sec. 411. Reimbursement of the Department of the Treasury......... 741
Sec. 412. Inspector General for the United States Information
Agency........................................................ 741
Sec. 413. Inspector General for the Department of State........... 742
Sec. 414. Prohibition on the use of funds for facilities in
Israel, Jerusalem, or the West Bank........................... 742
Sec. 415. Use of cleared personnel to ensure secure maintenance
and repair of diplomatic facilities abroad.................... 743
TITLE V--STATE DEPARTMENT AUTHORITIES TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Sec. 501. Rewards for international terrorists.................... 743
Sec. 502. Rewards for information relating to international
narcoterrorism and drug trafficking [amends other legislation]
Sec. 503. Coordination of terrorism-related assistance [amends
other legislation]
Sec. 504. Counterterrorism Protection Fund [amends other
legislation]
Sec. 505. Terrorism-related travel advisories..................... 743
Sec. 506. Authority to control certain terrorism-related services
[amends other legislation]
Sec. 507. Management of antiterrorism assistance programs [amends
other legislation]
Sec. 508. Nonlethal airport security equipment and commodities for
Egypt......................................................... 744
Sec. 509. Exports to countries supporting acts of international
terrorism [amends other legislation]
TITLE VI--INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Sec. 601. Actions to combat international nuclear terrorism....... 744
Sec. 602. Authority to suspend nuclear cooperation with nations
which have not ratified the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material [amends other legislation]
Sec. 603. Consultation with the Department of Defense concerning
certain nuclear exports and subsequent arrangements [amends
other legislation]
Sec. 604. Review of physicial security standards.................. 745
Sec. 605. International review of nuclear terrorism problem....... 745
Sec. 606. Criminal history record checks [amends other
legislation]
TITLE VII--MULTILATERAL COOPERATION TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Sec. 701. International Antiterrorism Committee................... 745
Sec. 702. International arrangement relating to passports and
visas......................................................... 746
Sec. 703. Protection of Americans endangered by the appearance of
their place of birth on their passports....................... 746
Sec. 704. Use of diplomatic privileges and immunities for
terrorism purposes............................................ 746
Sec. 705. Reports on progress in increasing multilateral
cooperation................................................... 746
TITLE VIII--VICTIMS OF TERRORISM COMPENSATION
Sec. 801. Short title............................................. 746
Sec. 802. Payment to individuals held in captive status between
November 4, 1979, and January 21, 1981........................ 747
Sec. 803. Benefits for captives and other victims of hostile
action........................................................ 747
Sec. 804. Retention of leave by alien employees following injury
from hostile action abroad.................................... 751
Sec. 805. Transition provisions................................... 751
Sec. 806. Benefits for members of uniformed services who are
victims of hostile action..................................... 752
Sec. 807. Regulations............................................. 758
Sec. 808. Effective date of entitlements.......................... 758
TITLE IX--MARITIME SECURITY
Sec. 901. Short title............................................. 758
Sec. 902. International measures for seaport and shipboard
security...................................................... 758
Sec. 903. Measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and
crews on board ships.......................................... 759
Sec. 904. Panama Canal security................................... 759
Sec. 905. Threat of terrorism to United States ports and vessels.. 759
Sec. 906. Port, harbor, and coastal facility security............. 759
Sec. 907. Security standards at foreign ports..................... 760
Sec. 908. Travel advisories concerning security at foreign ports.. 760
Sec. 909. Suspension of passengers services....................... 761
Sec. 910. Sanctions for the seizure of vessels by terrorists...... 761
Sec. 911. Definitions............................................. 762
Sec. 912. Authorization of appropriations......................... 762
Sec. 913. Reports................................................. 762
TITLE X--FASCELL FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM
* * * * * * *
TITLE XI--SECURITY AT MILITARY BASES ABROAD
Sec. 1101. Findings............................................... 763
Sec. 1102. Recommended actions by the Secretary of Defense........ 763
Sec. 1103. Report to the Congress................................. 763
TITLE XII--CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Sec. 1201. Encouragement for negotiation of a convention.......... 763
Sec. 1202. Extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over terrorist
conduct....................................................... 764
TITLE XIII--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Sec. 1301. Peace Corps authorization of appropriations [amends
other legislation]
Sec. 1302. Demonstrations at embassies in the District of Columbia 764
Sec. 1303. Kurt Waldheim's retirement allowance................... 764
Sec. 1304. Eradication of Amblyomma Variegatum [amends other
legislation]
Sec. 1305. Strengthen foreign language skills..................... 765
Sec. 1306. Forfeiture of proceeds derived from espionage
activities.................................................... 765
Sec. 1307. Expression of support of activities of the United
States Telecommunications Training Institute.................. 766
Sec. 1308. Policy toward Afghanistan.............................. 766
TITLE I--DIPLOMATIC SECURITY
SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.
Titles I through IV of this Act may be cited as the
``Diplomatic Security Act''.
SEC. 102.\2\ FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds and declares that--
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\2\ 22 U.S.C. 4801.
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(1) the United States has a crucial stake in the
presence of United States Government personnel
representing United States interests abroad;
(2) conditions confronting United States Government
personnel and missions abroad are fraught with security
concerns which will continue for the foreseeable
future; and
(3) the resources now available to counter acts of
terrorism and protect and secure United States
Government personnel and missions abroad, as well as
foreign officials and missions in the United States,
are inadequate to meet the mounting threat to such
personnel and facilities.
(b) \3\ Purposes.--The purposes of titles I through IV
are--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Sec. 162(g)(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 406), struck
out para. (2) and redesignated paras. (3) through (6) as paras. (2)
through (5), respectively. Para. (2) had provided:
``(2) to provide for an Assistant Secretary of State to head the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the Department of State, and to set
forth certain provisions relating to the Diplomatic Security Service of
the Department of State;''.
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(1) to set forth the responsibility of the Secretary
of State with respect to the security of diplomatic
operations in the United States and abroad;
(2) to maximize coordination by the Department of
State with Federal, State, and local agencies and
agencies of foreign governments in order to enhance
security programs;
(3) to promote strengthened security measures and to
provide for the accountability of United States
Government personnel with security-related
responsibilities;
(4) to set forth the responsibility of the Secretary
of State with respect to the safe and efficient
evacuation of United States Government personnel, their
dependents, and private United states citizens when
their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or
natural disaster; and
(5) to provide authorization of appropriations for
the Department of State to carry out its
responsibilities in the area of security and
counterterrorism, and in particular to finance the
acquisition and improvements of United States
Government missions abroad, including real property,
buildings, facilities, and communications, information,
and security systems.
SEC. 103.\4\ RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
(a) Security Functions.--(1) The Secretary of State shall
develop and implement (in consultation with the heads of other
Federal agencies having personnel or missions abroad where
appropriate and within the scope of the resources made
available) policies and programs, including funding levels and
standards, to provide for the security of United States
Government operations of a diplomatic nature and foreign
government operations of a diplomatic nature in the United
States. Such policies and programs shall include--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ 22 U.S.C. 4802.
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(A) protection of all United States Government
personnel on official duty abroad (other than those
personnel under the command of a United States area
military commander) and their accompanying dependents;
(B) establishment and operation of security functions
at all United States Government missions abroad (other
than facilities or installations subject to the control
of a United States area military commander);
(C) establishment and operation of security functions
at all Department of State facilities in the United
States; and
(D) protection of foreign missions, international
organizations, and foreign officials and other foreign
persons in the United States, as authorized by law.
(2) \5\ Security responsibilities shall include the
following:
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\5\ The Secretary of State delegated functions authorized under
this subsection to the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security
(Department of State Public Notice 2086; sec. 8 of Delegation of
Authority No. 214; 59 F.R. 50790).
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(A) Former office of security functions.--Functions
and responsibilities exercised by the Office of
Security, Department of State, before November 11,
1985.
(B) Security and protective operations.--
(i) Establishment and operation of post
security and protective functions abroad.
(ii) Development and implementation of
communications, computer, and information
security.
(iii) Emergency planning.
(iv) Establishment and operation of local
guard services abroad.
(v) Supervision of the United States Marine
Corps security guard program.
(vi) Liaison with American overseas private
sector security interests.
(vii) Protection of foreign missions and
international organizations, foreign officials,
and diplomatic personnel in the United States,
as authorized by law.
(viii) Protection of the Secretary of State
and other persons designated by the Secretary
of State, as authorized by law.
(ix) Physical protection of Department of
State facilities, communications, and computer
and information systems in the United States.
(x) Conduct of investigations relating to
protection of foreign officials and diplomatic
personnel and foreign missions in the United
States, suitability for employment, employee
security, illegal passport and visa issuance or
use, and other investigations, as authorized by
law.
(xi) Carrying out the rewards program for
information concerning international terrorism
authorized by section 36(a) of the State
Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956.
(xii) Performance of other security,
investigative, and protective matters as
authorized by law.
(C) Counterterrorism planning and coordination.--
Development and coordination of counterterrorism
planning, emergency action planning, threat analysis
programs, and liaison with other Federal agencies to
carry out this paragraph.
(D) Security technology.--Development and
implementation of technical and physical security
programs, including security-related construction,
radio and personnel security communications, armored
vehicles, computer and communications security, and
research programs necessary to develop such measures.
(E) Diplomatic courier service.--Management of the
diplomatic courier service.
(F) Personnel training.--Development of facilities,
methods, and materials to develop and upgrade necessary
skills in order to carry out this section.
(G) Foreign government training.--Management and
development of antiterrorism assistance programs to
assist foreign government security training which are
administered by the Department of State under chapter 8
of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2349aa et seq.).
(b) Overseas Evacuations.--The Secretary of State shall
develop and implement policies and programs to provide for the
safe and efficient evacuation of United States Government
personnel, dependents, and private United States citizens when
their lives are endangered. Such policies shall include
measures to identify high risk areas where evacuation may be
necessary and, where appropriate, providing staff to United
States Government missions abroad to assist in those
evacuations. In carrying out these responsibilities, the
Secretary shall--
(1) develop a model contingency plan for evacuation
of personnel, dependents, and United States citizens
from foreign countries;
(2) develop a mechanism whereby United States
citizens can voluntarily request to be placed on a list
in order to be contacted in the event of an evacuation,
or which, in the event of an evacuation, can maintain
information on the location of United States citizens
in high risk areas submitted by their relatives;
(3) assess the transportation and communications
resources in the area being evacuated and determine the
logistic support needed for the evacuation; and
(4) develop a plan for coordinating communications
between embassy staff, Department of State personnel,
and families of United States citizens abroad regarding
the whereabouts of those citizens.
(c) Oversight of Posts Abroad.--The Secretary of State
shall--
(1) have full responsibility for the coordination of
all United States Government personnel assigned to
diplomatic or consular posts or other United States
missions abroad pursuant to United States Government
authorization (except for facilities, installations, or
personnel under the command of a United States area
military commander);
(2) establish appropriate overseas staffing levels
for all such posts or missions for all Federal agencies
with activities abroad (except for personnel and
activities under the command of a United States area
military commander or regional inspector general
offices under the jurisdiction of the Inspector
General, Agency for International Development).
(d) \5\ Federal Agency.--As used in this title and title
III, the term ``Federal agency'' includes any department or
agency of the United States Government.
SEC. 104.\6\ * * * [REPEALED--1994]
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\6\ Formerly at 22 U.S.C. 4803. Sec. 162(g)(3) of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law
103-236; 108 Stat. 407), repealed sec. 104, which established the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security, overseen by the Assistant Secretary for
Diplomatic Security.
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SEC. 105.\7\ * * * [REPEALED--1994]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Formerly at 22 U.S.C. 4804. Sec. 162(g)(4) of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law
103-236; 108 Stat. 407), repealed sec. 105, which stated the
responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security.
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SEC. 106.\8\ COOPERATION OF OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES.
(a) Assistance.--In order to facilitate fulfillment of the
responsibilities described in section 103(a), other Federal
agencies shall cooperate (through agreements) to the maximum
extent possible with the Secretary of State. Such agencies may,
with or without reimbursement, provide assistance to the
Secretary, perform security inspections, provide logistical
support relating to the differing missions and facilities of
other Federal agencies, and perform other overseas security
functions as may be authorized by the Secretary. Specifically,
the Secretary may agree to delegate operational control of
overseas security functions of other Federal agencies to the
heads of such agencies, subject to the Secretary's authority as
set forth in section 103(a). The agency head receiving such
delegated authority shall be responsible to the Secretary in
the exercise of the delegated operational control.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ 22 U.S.C. 4805.
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(b) Other Agencies.--Nothing contained in titles I through
IV shall be construed to limit or impair the authority or
responsibility of any other Federal, State, or local agency
with respect to law enforcement, domestic security operations,
or intelligence activities as defined in Executive Order 12333.
(c) Certain Lease Arrangements.--The Administrator of
General Services is authorized to lease (to such extent or in
cash amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts) such amount
of space in the United States as may be necessary for the
Department of State to accommodate the personnel required to
carry out this title. The Department of State shall pay for
such space at the rate established by the Administrator of
General Services for space and related services.
SEC. 107.\9\ PROTECTION OF FOREIGN CONSULATES.
The Secretary of State shall take into account security
considerations \10\ in making determinations with respect to
accreditation of all foreign consular personnel in the United
States.
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\9\ 22 U.S.C. 4806. The Secretary of State delegated functions
authorized under this section to the Chief of Protocol (Department of
State Public Notice 2086; sec. 15 of Delegation of Authority No. 214;
59 F.R. 50790).
\10\ Sec. 162(g)(5) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 407), struck
out ``The Chief of Protocol of the Department of State shall consult
with the Assistant Secretary of Diplomatic Security'' and inserted in
lieu thereof ``The Secretary of State shall take into account security
considerations''.
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TITLE II--PERSONNEL \11\
SEC. 201. DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE.
The Secretary of State may establish a Diplomatic Security
Service, which shall perform such functions as the Secretary
may determine.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Sec. 162(g)(6) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 407), struck
out ``DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE'' and inserted in lieu thereof
``PERSONNEL''.
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SEC. 202.\12\ DIRECTOR OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE.
Any such Diplomatic Security Service should be headed by a
Director designated by the Secretary of State. The Director
should be a career member of the Senior Foreign Service or the
Senior Executive Service and shall be qualified for the
position by virtue of demonstrated ability in the areas of
security, law enforcement, management, and public
administration. Experience in management or operations abroad
should be considered an affirmative factor in the selection of
the Director.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ 22 U.S.C. 4822.
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SEC. 203.\13\ SPECIAL AGENTS.
Special agent positions shall be filled in accordance with
the provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C.
3901 et seq.) and title 5, United States Code. In filling such
positions, the Secretary of State shall actively recruit women
and members of minority groups. The Secretary of State shall
prescribe the qualifications required for assignment or
appointment to such positions. The qualifications may include
minimum and maximum entry age restrictions and other physical
standards and shall incorporate such standards as may be
required by law in order to perform security functions, to bear
arms, and to exercise investigatory, warrant, arrest, and such
other authorities, as are available by law to special agents of
the Department of State and the Foreign Service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ 22 U.S.C. 4823.
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SEC. 206.\14\ CONTRACTING AUTHORITY.
The Secretary of State is authorized to employ individuals
or organizations by contract to carry out the purposes of this
Act, and individuals employed by contract to perform such
services shall not by virtue of such employment be considered
to be employees of the United States Government for purposes of
any law administered by the Office of Personnel Management
(except that the Secretary may determine the applicability to
such individuals of any law administered by the Secretary
concerning the employment of such individuals); and such
contracts are authorized to be negotiated, the terms of the
contracts to be prescribed, and the work to be performed, where
necessary, without regard to such statutory provisions as
relate to the negotiation, making and performance of contracts
and performance of work in the United States.
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\14\ 22 USC 4824. Sec. 206 was added by Public Law 105-277 (112
Stat. 2681-586).
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TITLE III--PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
SEC. 301.\15\ ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW.
In any case of serious injury, loss of life, or significant
destruction of property at or related to a United States
Government mission abroad, and in any case of a serious breach
of security involving intelligence activities of a foreign
government directed at a United States Government mission
abroad, which is covered by the provisions of titles I through
IV (other than a facility or installation subject to the
control of a United States area military commander), the
Secretary of State shall convene an Accountability Review Board
\16\ (hereafter in this title referred to as the ``Board'').
With respect to breaches of security involving intelligence
activities, the Secretary of State may delay establishing an
Accountability Review Board if, after consultation with the
Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
and the Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the Secretary
determines that doing so would compromise intelligence sources
and methods. The Secretary shall promptly advise the Chairmen
of such committees of each determination pursuant to this
section to delay the establishment of an Accountability Review
Board. The Secretary shall not convene a Board where the
Secretary determines that a case clearly involves only causes
unrelated to security.
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\15\ 22 U.S.C. 4831.
\16\ In Department of State Public Notice 2349 (61 F.R. 8322;
February 22, 1996), the Deputy Secretary of State:
``* * * determined that the November 13, 1995, car-bomb attack on
the headquarters of the Office of Program Manager, Saudi Arabian
National Guard in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, involved loss of life related
to a U.S. mission abroad. Therefore, I am convening an Accountability
Review Board, as required by that statute, to examine the facts and
circumstances of the attack and report to me such findings and
recommendations as it deems appropriate, * * *''.
In Department of State Public Notice 2191 (60 F.R. 21020; April 28,
1995), the Deputy Secretary of State:
``* * * determined that the March 8, 1995, terrorist attack on the
Consulate shuttle bus in Karachi, Pakistan, involved loss of life
related to a U.S. mission abroad. Therefore I am convening an
Accountability Review Board, as required by that statute, to examine
the facts and circumstances of the attack and report to me such
findings and recommendations as it deems appropriate, * * *.''.
Previously, an accountability review board was convened to
investigate an explosion at the U.S. ambassador's residence in Lima,
Peru (State Department Public Notice 1587; April 15, 1992; 57 F.R.
14744).
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SEC. 302.\17\ ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARD.
(a) Membership.--A Board shall consist of five members, 4
appointed by the Secretary of State, and 1 appointed by the
Director of Central Intelligence. The Secretary of State shall
designate the Chairperson of the Board. Members of the Board
who are not Federal officers or employees shall each be paid at
a rate not to exceed the maximum rate of basic pay payable for
level GS-18 of the General Schedule for each day (including
travel time) during which they are engaged in the actual
performance of duties vested in the Board. Members of the Board
who are Federal officers or employees shall receive no
additional pay by reason of such membership.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ 22 U.S.C. 4832.
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(b) Facilities, Services, Supplies, and Staff.--
(1) Supplied by department of state.--A Board shall
obtain facilities, services, and supplies through the
Department of State. All expenses of the Board,
including necessary costs of travel, shall be paid by
the Department of State. Travel expenses authorized
under this paragraph shall be paid in accordance with
subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States
Code or other applicable law.
(2) Detail.--At the request of a Board, employees of
the Department of State or other Federal agencies,
members of the Foreign Service, or members of the
uniformed services may be temporarily assigned, with or
without reimbursement, to assist the Board.
(3) Experts and consultants.--A Board may employ and
compensate (in accordance with section 3109 of title 5,
United States Code) such experts and consultants as the
Board considers necessary to carry out its functions.
Experts and consultants so employed shall be
responsible solely to the Board.
SEC. 303.\18\ PROCEDURES.
(a) Evidence.--
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\18\ 22 U.S.C. 4833.
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(1) United states government personnel and
contractors.--
(A) With respect to any individual described
in subparagraph (B), a Board may--
(i) administer oaths and
affirmations;
(ii) require that depositions be
given and interrogatories answered; and
(iii) require the attendance and
presentation of testimony and evidence
by such individual.
Failure of any such individual to comply with a
request of the Board shall be grounds for
disciplinary action by the head of the Federal
agency in which such individual is employed or
serves, or in the case of a contractor,
debarment.
(B) The individuals referred to in
subparagraph (A) are--
(i) employees as defined by section
2105 of title 5, United States Code
(including members of the Foreign
Service);
(ii) members of the uniformed
services as defined by section 101(3)
of title 37, United States Code;
(iii) employees of instrumentalities
of the United States; and
(iv) individuals employed by any
person or entity under contract with
agencies or instrumentalities of the
United States Government to provide
services, equipment, or personnel.
(2) Other persons.--With respect to a person who is
not described in paragraph (1)(B), a Board may
administer oaths and affirmations and require that
depositions be given and interrogatories answered.
(3) Subpoenas.--(A) The Board may issue a subpoena
for the attendance and testimony of any person (other
than a person described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii)
of paragraph (1)(B)) and the production of documentary
or other evidence from any such person if the Board
finds that such a subpoena is necessary in the
interests of justice for the development of relevant
evidence.
(B) In the case of contumacy of refusal to obey a
subpoena issued under this paragraph, a court of the
United States within the jurisdiction of which a person
is directed to appear or produce information, or within
the jurisdiction of which the person is found, resides,
or transacts business, may upon application of the
Attorney General, issue to such person an order
requiring such person to appear before the Board to
give testimony or produce information as required by
the subpoena.
(C) Subpoenaed witnesses shall be paid the same fee
and mileage allowances which are paid subpoenaed
witnesses in the courts of the United States.
(b) Confidentiality.--A Board shall adopt for
administrative proceedings under this title such procedures
with respect to confidentiality as may be deemed necessary,
including procedures relating to the conduct of closed
proceedings or the submission and use of evidence in camera, to
ensure in particular the protection of classified information
relating to national defense, foreign policy, or intelligence
matters. The Director of Central Intelligence shall establish
the level of protection required for intelligence information
and for information relating to intelligence personnel,
including standards for secure storage.
(c) Records.--Records pertaining to administrative
proceedings under this title shall be separated from all other
records of the Department of State and shall be maintained
under appropriate safeguards to preserve confidentiality and
classification of information. Such records shall be prohibited
from disclosure to the public until such time as a Board
completes its work and is dismissed. The Department of State
shall turn over to the Director of Central Intelligence
intelligence information and information relating to
intelligence personnel which shall then become records of the
Central Intelligence Agency. After that time, only such
exemptions from disclosure under section 552(b) of title 5,
United States Code (relating to freedom of information), as
apply to other records of the Department of State, and to any
information transmitted under section 304(c) to the head of a
Federal agency or instrumentality, shall be available for the
remaining records of the Board.
(d) Status of Boards.--The provisions of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App. 1 et seq.) and section
552b of title 5 of the United States Code (relating to open
meetings) shall not apply to any Board.
SEC. 304.\19\ FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY A BOARD.
(a) Findings.--A Board convened in any case shall examine
the facts and circumstances surrounding the serious injury,
loss of life, or significant destruction of property at or
related to a United States Government mission abroad or
surrounding the serious breach of security involving
intelligence activities of a foreign government directed at a
United States Government mission abroad (as the case may be)
and shall make written findings determining--
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\19\ 22 U.S.C. 4834.
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(1) the extent to which the incident or incidents
with respect to which the Board was convened was
security related;
(2) whether the security systems and security
procedures at that mission were adequate;
(3) whether the security systems and security
procedures were properly implemented;
(4) the impact of intelligence and information
availability; and
(5) such other facts and circumstances which may be
relevant to the appropriate security management of
United States missions abroad.
(b) Program Recommendations.--A Board shall submit its
findings (which may be classified to the extent deemed
necessary by the Board) to the Secretary of State, together
with recommendations as appropriate to improve the security and
efficiency of any program or operation which the Board has
reviewed.
(c) Personnel Recommendations.--Whenever a Board finds
reasonable cause to believe that an individual described in
section 303(a)(1)(B) has breached the duty of that individual,
the Board shall--
(1) notify the individual concerned,
(2) transmit the finding of reasonable cause,
together with all information relevant to such finding,
to the head of the appropriate Federal agency or
instrumentality, and
(3) recommend that such agency or instrumentality
initiate an appropriate investigatory or disciplinary
action.
In determining whether an individual has breached a duty of
that individual, the Board shall take into account any standard
of conduct, law, rule, regulation, contract, or order which is
pertinent to the performance of the duties of that individual.
(d) Reports.--
(1) Program recommendations.--In any case in which a
Board transmits recommendations to the Secretary of
State under subsection (b), the Secretary shall, not
later than 90 days after the receipt of such
recommendations, submit a report to the Congress on
each such recommendation and the action taken with
respect to that recommendation.
(2) Personnel recommendations.--In any case in which
a Board transmits a finding of reasonable cause under
subsection (c), the head of the Federal agency or
instrumentality receiving the information shall review
the evidence and recommendations and shall, not later
than 30 days after the receipt of that finding,
transmit to the Congress a report specifying--
(A) the nature of the case and a summary of
the evidence transmitted by the Board; and
(B) the decision by the Federal agency or
instrumentality, to take disciplinary or other
appropriate action against that individual or
the reasons for deciding not to take
disciplinary or other action with respect to
that individual.
SEC. 305.\20\ RELATION TO OTHER PROCEEDINGS.
Nothing in this title shall be construed to create
administrative or judicial review remedies or rights of action
not otherwise available by law, nor shall any provision of this
title be construed to deprive any person of any right or legal
defense which would otherwise be available to that person under
any law, rule, or regulation.
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\20\ 22 U.S.C. 4835.
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TITLE IV--DIPLOMATIC SECURITY PROGRAM
SEC. 401.\21\ AUTHORIZATION.
(a) Diplomatic Security Program.--
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\21\ 22 U.S.C. 4851. Sec. 302 of the Department of State
Appropriations Act, 1989 (Public Law 100-459; 102 Stat. 2207; 22 U.S.C.
4851 note), provided the following:
``The Secretary of State shall report to the appropriate committees
of the Congress on the obligation of funds provided for diplomatic
security and related expenses every month.''.
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(1) In general.--In addition to amounts otherwise
available for such purposes, the following amounts are
authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years 1986 and
1987, for the Department of State to carry out
diplomatic security construction, acquisition, and
operations pursuant to the Department of State's
Supplemental Diplomatic Security Program, as justified
to the Congress for the respective fiscal year for
``Administration of Foreign Affairs,'' as follows:
(A) For ``Salaries and Expenses,''
$308,104,000.
(B) For ``Acquisition and Maintenance of
Buildings Abroad,'' $857,806,000.
(C) For ``Counterterrorism Research and
Development,'' $15,000,000.
(2) Antiterrorism assistance.--* * *.
(3) \22\ * * * [Repealed--1995]
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\22\ Sec. 101(c) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 388), repealed para.
(3), effective October 1, 1995. It had read, as amended, as follows:
``(3) Capital construction, fiscal years 1988 through 1990.--There
is authorized to be appropriated for the Department of State for
``Acquisition and Maintenance of Buildings Abroad'' for each of the
fiscal years 1988 through 1990, $417,962,000 to carry out diplomatic
security construction, acquisition, and operations pursuant to the
Department of State's Supplemental Diplomatic Security Program.
Authorizations of appropriations under this paragraph shall remain
available until the appropriations are made.''.
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(4) Allocation of amounts authorized to be
appropriated.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated by
this sub-
section, and by the amendment made by paragraph (2),
shall be allocated as provided in the table entitled
``Diplomatic Security Program'' relating to this
section which appears in the Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Committee of Conference to accompany
H.R. 4151 of the 99th Congress (the Omnibus Diplomatic
Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986).
(b) Notification to authorizing Committees of Requests for
Appropriations.--In any fiscal year, whenever the Secretary of
State submits to the Congress a request for appropriations to
carry out the program described in subsection (a), the
Secretary shall notify the Committee on Foreign Affairs \23\ of
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate of such request, together with a
justification of each item listed in such request.
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\23\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided
that references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
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(c) * * * [Repealed--1994]
(d) Prohibition on Reallocations of Authorizations.--
Section 24(d) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of
1956 (22 U.S.C. 2692(d)) shall not apply with respect to any
amounts authorized to be appropriated under this section.
(e) Security Requirements of Other Foreign Affairs
Agencies.--Based solely on security requirements and within the
total amount of funds available for security, the Secretary of
State shall ensure that an equitable level of funding is
provided for the security requirements of other foreign affairs
agencies.
(f) Insufficiency of Funds.--In the event that sufficient
funds are not available in any fiscal year for all of the
diplomatic security construction, acquisition, and operations
pursuant to the Department of State's Supplemental Diplomatic
Security Program, as justified to the Congress for such fiscal
year, the Secretary of State shall report to the Congress the
effect that the insufficiency of funds will have with respect
to the Department of State and each of the other foreign
affairs agencies.
(g) Allocation of Funds for Certain Security Programs.--Of
the amount of funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection
(a)(1)(A), $34,537,000 shall be available to the Secretary of
State only for the protection of classified office equipment,
the expansion of information systems security, and the hiring
of American systems managers and operators for computers at
high threat locations.
(h) Furniture, Furnishings, and Equipment.
(1) Use of existing furniture, furnishings, and
equipment.--If physically possible, facilities
constructed or acquired pursuant to subsection (a)
shall be furnished and equipped with the furniture,
furnishings, and equipment that were being used in the
facilities being replaced, rather than with newly
acquired furniture, furnishings, and equipment.
SEC. 402.\24\ DIPLOMATIC CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM.
(a) Preference for United States Contractors.--
Notwithstanding section 11 of the Foreign Service Buildings
Act, 1926, and where adequate competition exists, only United
States persons and qualified United States joint venture
persons may--
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\24\ 22 U.S.C. 4852.
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(1) bid on a diplomatic construction or design
project which has an estimated total project value
exceeding $10,000,000; and
(2) bid on a diplomatic construction or design
project which involves technical security, unless the
project involves low-level technology, as determined by
the Secretary of State.
(b) Exception.--Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect
to any diplomatic construction or design project in a foreign
country whose statutes prohibit the use of United States
contractors on such projects. The exception contained in this
subsection shall only become effective with respect to a
foreign country 30 days after the Secretary of State certifies
to the Committee on Foreign Affairs \25\ and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate what specific actions he has taken
to urge such foreign country to permit the use of United States
contractors on such projects, and what actions he shall take
with respect to that country as authorized by title II of the
State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4301
et seq.; commonly referred to as the ``Foreign Missions Act'').
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\25\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided
that references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
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(c) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section--
(1) the term ``adequate competition'' means with
respect to a construction or design project, the
presence of two or more qualified bidders submitting
responsive bids for that project;
(2) the term ``United States person'' means a person
which--
(A) is incorporated or legally organized
under the laws of the United States, including
State, the District of Columbia, and local
laws;
(B) has its principal place of business in
the United States;
(C) has been incorporated or legally
organized in the United States--
(i) for more than 5 years before the
issuance date of the invitation for
bids or request for proposals with
respect to a construction project under
subsection (a)(1); and
(ii) for more than 2 years before the
issuance date of the invitation for
bids or request for proposals with
respect to a construction or design
project which involves physical or
technical security under subsection
(a)(2);
(D) has performed within the United States
administrative and technical, professional, or
construction services similar in complexity,
type of construction, and value to the project
being bid;
(E) with respect to a construction project
under subsection (a)(1), has achieved total
business volume equal to or greater than the
value of the project being bid in 3 years of
the 5-year period before the date specified in
subparagraph (C)(i);
(F)(i) employs United State citizens in at
least 80 percent of its principal management
positions in the United States,
(ii) employs United States citizens in more
than half of its permanent, full-time positions
in the United States, and
(iii) will employ United States citizens in
at least 80 percent of the supervisory
positions on the foreign buildings office
project site; and
(G) has the existing technical and financial
resources in the United States to perform the
contract; and
(3) the term ``qualified United States joint venture
person'' means a joint venture in which a United States
person or persons owns at least 51 percent of the
assets of the joint venture.
(d) American Minority Contractors.--Not less than 10
percent of the amount appropriated pursuant to section 401(a)
for diplomatic construction or design projects each fiscal year
shall be allocated to the extent practicable for contracts with
American minority contractors.
(e) American Small Business Contractors.--Not less than 10
percent of the amount appropriated pursuant to section 401(a)
for diplomatic construction or design projects each fiscal year
shall be allocated to the extent practicable for contracts with
American small business contractors.
(f) Limitation on Subcontracting.--With respect to a
diplomatic construction project, a prime contractor may not
subcontract more than 50 percent of the total value of its
contract for that project.
SEC. 403.\26\ SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTRACTORS.
Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of State shall issue regulations to--
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\26\ 22 U.S.C. 4853.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) strengthen the security procedures applicable to
contractors and subcontractors involved in any way with
any diplomatic construction or design project; and
(2) permit a contractor or subcontractor to have
access to any design or blueprint relating to such a
project only in accordance with those procedures.
SEC. 404.\27\ QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONS HIRED FOR THE DIPLOMATIC
CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM.
In carrying out the diplomatic construction program
referred to in section 401(a), the Secretary of State shall
employ as professional staff (by appointment, contract, or
otherwise) only those persons with a demonstrated specialized
background in the fields of construction law, or contract
management. In filling such positions, the Secretary shall
actively recruit women and members of minority groups.
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\27\ 22 U.S.C. 4854.
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SEC. 405.\28\ COST OVERRUNS.
Any amount required to complete any capital project
described in the Department of State's Supplemental Diplomatic
Security Program, as justified to the Congress for the
respective fiscal year, which is in excess of the amount made
available for that project pursuant to section 401(a) (1) or
(3) shall be treated as a reprogramming of funds under section
34 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22
U.S.C. 2706) and shall not be available for obligation or
expenditure except in compliance with the procedures applicable
to such reprogrammings.
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\28\ 22 U.S.C. 4855.
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SEC. 406.\29\ EFFICIENCY IN CONTRACTING.
(a) Bonuses and Penalties.--The Director of the Office of
Foreign Buildings shall provide for a contract system of
bonuses and penalties for the diplomatic construction program
funded pursuant to the authorizations of appropriations
provided in this title. Not later than 3 months after the date
of enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit a report to
the Congress on the implementation of this section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ 22 U.S.C. 4856.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Surety Bonds and Guarantees.--The Director of the
Office of Foreign Buildings shall require each person awarded a
contract for work under the diplomatic construction program to
post a surety bond or guarantee, in such amount as the Director
may determine, to assure performance under such contract.
(c) Disqualification of Contractors.--No person doing
business with Libya may be eligible for any contract awarded
pursuant to this Act.
SEC. 407.\30\ ADVISORY PANEL ON OVERSEAS SECURITY.
Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the
Congress on the implementation of the 91 recommendations
contained in the final report of the Advisory Panel on Overseas
Security. If any such recommendation has been rejected, the
Secretary shall provide the reasons why that recommendation was
rejected.
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\30\ 22 U.S.C. 4857.
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SEC. 408.\31\ TRAINING TO IMPROVE PERIMETER SECURITY AT UNITED STATES
DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ABROAD.
(a) Training.--It is the sense of Congress that the
President should use the authority under chapter 8 of title II
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to
antiterrorism assistance) to improve perimeter security of
United States diplomatic missions abroad.
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\31\ 22 U.S.C. 4858. Sec. 139(20) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108
Stat. 398), repealed subsec. (b) of this section, which had required
that the President report annually ``on the progress and problems of
improving perimeter security of United States diplomatic missions
abroad.''.
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SEC. 409.\32\ PROTECTION OF PUBLIC ENTRANCES OF UNITED STATES
DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ABROAD.
The Secretary of State shall install and maintain a walk-
through metal detector or other advanced screening system at
public entrances of each United States diplomatic mission
abroad.
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\32\ 22 U.S.C. 4859.
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SEC. 410. CERTAIN PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS.
Section 208(a) of title 3, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end thereof the following: ``In carrying out
any duty under section 202(7), the Secretary of State is
authorized to utilize any authority available to the Secretary
under title II of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of
1956.''.
SEC. 411.\33\ REIMBURSEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY.
The Secretary of State shall reimburse the appropriate
appropriations account of the Department of the Treasury out of
funds appropriated pursuant to section 401(a)(1) for the actual
costs incurred by the United States Secret Service, as agreed
to by the Secretary of the Treasury, for providing protection
for the spouses of foreign heads of state during fiscal years
1986 and 1987.
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\33\ 22 U.S.C. 4860.
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SEC. 412. INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY.
(a) * * *.
(b) Earmark.--Of the funds authorized to be appropriated to
the United States Information Agency for the fiscal year 1987,
not less than $3,000,000 shall be available only for the
operation of the office of the Inspector General established by
the amendment made by subsection (a).
(c) Position at Level IV of the Executive Schedule.--
Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end thereof the following:
``Inspector General, United States Information Agency.''.
SEC. 413.\34\ INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
(a) Direction to establish.--The Congress directs the
Secretary of State to proceed immediately to establish an
Office of Inspector General of the Department of State not
later than October 1, 1986. Not later than January 31, 1987,
the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs \35\ of the House of Representatives on the progress of
establishing that office. Such report shall include an
accounting of the obligation of funds for fiscal year 1987 for
that office.
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\34\ 22 U.S.C. 4861.
\35\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided
that references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
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(b) Duties and responsibilities.--The Inspector General of
the Department of State (as established by the amendment made
by section 150(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987) is authorized to perform all duties
and responsibilities, and to exercise the authorities, stated
in section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C.
3929) and in the Inspector General Act of 1978.
(c) Earmark.--Of the amounts made available for fiscal year
1987 for salaries and expenses under the heading
``Administration of Foreign Affairs'', not less than $6,500,000
shall be used for the sole purpose of establishing and
maintaining the Office of Inspector General of the Department
of State.
(d) Limitation on appointment.--No career member of the
Foreign Service, as defined by section 103 of the Foreign
Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3903), may be appointed
Inspector General of the Department of State.
(e) Position at level iv of the executive schedule.--
Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code (as amended by
section 412), is amended by adding at the end thereof the
following:
``Inspector General, Department of State.''.
(6) \36\ * * * [Repealed--1986]
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\36\ Paragraph (6) was repealed by sec. 405 of Public Law 99-529
(100 Stat. 3010).
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(b) * * * [Repealed--1987]
(c) * * *
SEC. 414.\37\ PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FUNDS FOR FACILITIES IN ISRAEL,
JERUSALEM, OR THE WEST BANK.
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act
may be obligated or expended for site acquisition, development,
or construction of any facility in Israel, Jerusalem, or the
West Bank.
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\37\ 22 U.S.C. 4862. Sec. 305 of the Department of State
Appropriations Act, 1989 (Public Law 100-459; 102 Stat. 2208), provided
the following:
``Sec. 305. Notwithstanding section 130 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988-89 and section 414 of the
Diplomatic Security Act and any other provisions of law, such funds as
are authorized, or that may be authorized, under the Diplomatic
Security Act or any other statute, and appropriated to the Department
of State under this or any other Act, may be hereafter obligated or
expended for site acquisition, development, and construction of two new
diplomatic facilities in Israel, Jerusalem, or the West Bank, provided
that each facility (A) equally preserves the ability of the United
States to locate its Ambassador or its Consul General at that site,
consistent with United States policy; (B) shall not be denominated as
the United States Embassy or Consulate until after the construction of
both facilities has begun, and construction of one facility has been
completed, or is near completion; and (C) unless security
considerations require otherwise, commences operation
simultaneously.''.
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SEC. 415. USE OF CLEARED PERSONNEL TO ENSURE SECURE MAINTENANCE AND
REPAIR OF DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES ABROAD.
(a) Policies and Regulations.--The Secretary of State shall
develop and implement policies and regulations to provide for
the use of persons who have been granted an appropriate United
states security clearance to ensure that the security of areas
intended for the storage of classified materials or the conduct
of classified activities in a United States diplomatic mission
or consular post abroad is not compromised in the performance
of maintenance and repair services in those areas.
(b) Study and Report.--The Secretary of State shall conduct
a study of the feasibility and necessity of requiring that, in
the case of certain United States diplomatic facilities abroad,
no contractor shall be hired to perform maintenance or repair
services in an area intended for the storage of classified
materials or the conduct of classified activities unless such
contractor has been granted an appropriate United States
security clearance. Such study shall include, but is not
limited to, United States facilities located in Cairo, New
Delhi, Riyadh, and Tokyo. Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State
shall report the results of such study to the Chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee
on Foreign Affairs \38\ of the House of Representatives.
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\38\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided
that references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
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TITLE V--STATE DEPARTMENT AUTHORITIES TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
SEC. 501.\39\ REWARDS FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS.
It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of State
should more vigorously utilize the moneys available under
section 36(a) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of
1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708(a); relating to rewards for information on
international terrorism) to more effectively apprehend and
prosecute international terrorists. It is further the sense of
the Congress that the Secretary of State should consider widely
publicizing the sizable rewards available under present law so
that major international terrorist figures may be brought to
justice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ 22 U.S.C. 2708 note. Sec. 12 of the International Narcotics
Control Act of 1989 (Public Law 101-231; 103 Stat. 1963), amended
section 36(c) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, to
increase the amount available for rewards for information leading to
the arrest and conviction in any country of any individual involved in
the commission of an act of international terrorism from $500,000 to
$2,000,000.
* * * * * * *
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SEC. 505.\40\ TERRORISM-RELATED TRAVEL ADVISORIES.
The Secretary of State shall promptly advise the Congress
whenever the Department of State issues a travel advisory, or
other public warning notice for United States citizens
traveling abroad, because of a terrorist threat or other
security concern.
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\40\ 22 U.S.C. 2656e.
* * * * * * *
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SEC. 508. NONLETHAL AIRPORT SECURITY EQUIPMENT AND COMMODITIES FOR
EGYPT.
In addition to funds otherwise available for such purposes
under chapter 8 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, assistance authorized to carry out the purposes of
chapter 4 of part II of such Act for the fiscal years 1986 and
1987 (as well as undisbursed balances of previously obligated
funds under such chapter) which are allocated for Egypt may be
furnished, notwithstanding section 660 of such Act, for the
provision of nonlethal airport security equipment and
commodities, and training in the use of such equipment and
commodities. The authority contained in this section shall be
exercised by the Department of State's office responsible for
administering chapter 8 of part II of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, in coordination with the Agency for International
Development.
* * * * * * *
TITLE VI--INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR TERRORISM
SEC. 601.\41\ ACTIONS TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR TERRORISM.
(a) Actions to be Taken by the President.--The Congress
hereby directs the President--
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\41\ 22 U.S.C. 3244.
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(1) to seek universal adherence to the Convention on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material;
(2) to--
(A) conduct a review, enlisting the
participation of all relevant departments and
agencies of the Government, to determine
whether the recommendations on Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material published by the
International Atomic Energy Agency are adequate
to deter theft, sabotage, and the use of
nuclear facilities and materials in acts of
international terrorism, and
(B) transmit the results of this review to
the Director-General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency;
(3) to take, in concert with United States allies and
other countries, such steps as may be necessary--
(A) to keep to a minimum the amount of
weapons-grade nuclear material in international
transit, and
(B) to ensure that when any such material is
transported internationally, it is under the
most effective means for adequately protecting
it from acts or attempted acts of sabotage or
theft by terrorist groups or nations; and
(4) to seek agreement in the United Nations Security
Council to establish--
(A) an effective regime of international
sanctions against any nation or subnational
group which conducts or sponsors acts of
international nuclear terrorism, and
(B) measures for coordinating responses to
all acts of international nuclear terrorism,
including measures for the recovery of stolen
nuclear material and the clean-up of nuclear
releases.
(b) Reports to the Congress.--The President shall report to
the Congress annually, in the reports required by section 601
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3281),
on the progress made during the preceding year in achieving the
objectives described in this section.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 604. REVIEW OF PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS.
(a) Reviews.--The Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director of the Arms
Controls and Disarmament Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission shall each review the adequacy of the physical
security standards currently applicable with respect to the
shipment and storage (outside the United States) of plutonium,
and uranium enriched to more than 20 percent in the isotope 233
or the isotope 235, which is subject to United States prior
consent rights, with special attention to protection against
risks of seizure or other terrorist acts.
(b) Reports.--Not later than 6 months after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary
of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission shall each submit a written report to the Committee
on Foreign Affairs \42\ of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate setting forth the
results of the review conducted pursuant to this section,
together with appropriate recommendations.
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\42\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided
that references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
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SEC. 605. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE NUCLEAR TERRORISM PROBLEM.
The Congress strongly urges the President to seek a
comprehensive review of the problem of nuclear terrorism by an
international conference.
* * * * * * *
TITLE VII--MULTILATERAL COOPERATION TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
SEC. 701. INTERNATIONAL ANTITERRORISM COMMITTEE.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
(1) international terrorism is and remains a serious
threat to the peace and security of free, democratic
nations;
(2) the challenge of terrorism can only by met
effectively by concerted action on the part of all
responsible nations;
(3) the major developed democracies evidenced their
commitment to cooperation in the fight against
terrorism by the 1978 Bonn Economic Summit Declaration
on Terrorism; and
(4) that commitment was renewed and strengthened at
the 1986 Tokyo Economic Summit and expressed in a joint
statement on terrorism.
(b) International Antiterrorism Committee--The Congress
hereby directs the President to continue to seek the
establishment of an international committee, to be known as the
International Antiterrorism Committee. As a first step in
establishing such committee, the President should propose to
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the establishment of a
standing political committee to examine all aspects of
international terrorism, review opportunities for cooperation,
and make recommendations to member nations. After the
establishment of this committee, the President should invite
such other countries who may choose to participate. The purpose
of the International Antiterrorism Committee should be to focus
the attention and secure the cooperation of the governments and
the public of the participating countries and of other
countries on the problems and responses to international
terrorism (including nuclear terrorism), by serving as a forum
at both the political and law enforcement levels.
SEC. 702. INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO PASSPORTS AND VISAS.
The Congress strongly urges the President to seek the
negotiation of international agreements (or other appropriate
arrangements) to provide for the sharing of information
relating to passports and visas in order to enhance cooperation
among countries in combating international terrorism.
SEC. 703. PROTECTION OF AMERICANS ENDANGERED BY THE APPEARANCE OF THEIR
PLACE OF BIRTH ON THEIR PASSPORTS.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds that some citizens of the
United States may be specially endangered during a hijacking or
other terrorist incident by the fact that their place of birth
appears on their United States passport.
(b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United
States shall submit a report to the Congress on the
implications of deleting the place of birth as a required item
of information on passports.
SEC. 704. USE OF DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES FOR TERRORISM
PURPOSES.
The Congress strongly urges the President to instruct the
Permanent Representative of the United States to the United
Nations to seek the adoption of a resolution in the United
Nations condemning the use for terrorist purposes of diplomatic
privileges and immunities under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, especially the misuse of diplomatic
pouches and diplomatic missions.
SEC. 705. REPORTS ON PROGRESS IN INCREASING MULTILATERAL COOPERATION.
Not later than February 1, 1987, the President shall submit
a report to the Congress on the steps taken to carry out each
of the preceding sections of this title (except for section
703) and the progress being made in achieving the objectives
described in these sections.
TITLE VIII--VICTIMS OF TERRORISM COMPENSATION
SEC. 801. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Victims of Terrorism
Compensation Act.''
SEC. 802. PAYMENT TO INDIVIDUALS HELD IN CAPTIVE STATUS BETWEEN
NOVEMBER 4, 1979, AND JANUARY 21, 1981.
The amount of the payment for individuals in the Civil
Service referred to in section 5569(d) of title 5, United
States Code (as added by section 803 of this title), or for
individuals in the uniformed services referred to in section
559(c) of title 37, United States Code (as added by section 806
of this title), as the case may be, shall be $50 for each day
any such individual was held in captive status during a period
commencing on or after November 4, 1979, and ending on or
before January 21, 1981.
SEC. 803. BENEFITS FOR CAPTIVES AND OTHER VICTIMS OF HOSTILE ACTION.
(a) In General.--Subchapter VII of chapter 55 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end therefore
the following:
``Sec. 5569. Benefits for captives
``(a) For the purpose of this section--
``(1) `captive' means any individual in a captive
status commencing while such individual is--
``(A) in the Civil Service, or
``(B) a citizen, national, or resident alien
of the United States rendering personal service
to the United States similar to the service of
an individual in the Civil Service (other than
as a member of the uniformed services);
``(2) `captive status' means a missing status which,
as determined by the President, arises because of a
hostile action and is a result of the individual's
relationship with the Government;
``(3) `missing status'--
``(A) in the case of an employee, has the
meaning provided under section 5561(5) of this
title; and
``(B) in the case of an individual other than
an employee, has a similar meaning; and
``(4) `family member,' as used with respect to a
person, means--
``(A) any dependent of such person; and
``(B) any individual (other than a dependent
under subparagraph (A)) who is a member of such
person's family or household.
``(b)(1) The Secretary of the Treasury shall establish a
savings fund to which the head of an agency may allot all or
any portion of the pay and allowances of any captive to the
extent that such pay and allowances are not subject to an
allotment under section 5563 of this title or any other
provision of law.
``(2) Amounts so allotted to the savings fund shall bear
interest at a rate which, for any calendar quarter, shall be
equal to the average rate paid on United States Treasury bills
with 3-month maturities issued during the preceding calendar
quarter. Such interest shall be compounded quarterly.
``(3) Amounts in the savings fund credited to a captive
shall be considered as pay and allowances for purposes of
section 5563 of this title and shall otherwise be subject to
withdrawal under procedures which the Secretary of the Treasury
shall establish.
``(4) Any interest accruing under this subsection on--
``(A) any amount for which an individual is indebted
to the United States under section 5562(c) of this
title shall be deemed to be part of the amount due
under such section 5562(c); and
``(B) any amount referred to in section 5566(f) of
this title shall be deemed to be part of such amount
for purposes of such section 5566(f).
``(5) An allotment under this subsection may be made
without regard to section 5563(c) of this title.
``(c) The head of an agency shall pay (by advancement or
reimbursement) any individual who is a captive, and any family
member of such individual, for medical and health care, and
other expenses related to such care, to the extent that such
care--
``(1) is incident to such individual being a captive;
and
``(2) is not covered--
``(A) by any Government medical or health
program; or
``(B) by insurance.
``(d)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (3), the President
shall make a cash payment, computed under paragraph (2), to any
individual who became or becomes a captive commencing on or
after November 4, 1979. Such payment shall be made before the
end of the one-year period beginning on the date on which the
captive status of such individual terminates or, in the case of
any individual whose status as a captive terminated before the
date of the enactment of the Victims of Terrorism Compensation
Act, before the end of the one-year period beginning on such
date.
``(2) Except as provided in section 802 of the Victims of
Terrorism Compensation Act, the amount of the payment under
this subsection with respect to an individual held as a captive
shall be not less than one-half of the amount of the world-wide
average per diem rate under section 5702 of this title which
was in effect for each day that individual was so held.
``(3) The President--
``(A) may refer a payment under this subsection in
the case of any individual who, during the one-year
period described in paragraph (1), is charged with an
offense described in subparagraph (B), until final
disposition of such charge; and
``(B) may deny such payment in the case of any
individual who is convicted of an offense described in
subsection (b) or (c) of section 8312 of this title
committed--
``(i) during the period of captivity of such
individual; and
``(ii) related to the captive status of such
individual.
``(4) A payment under this subsection shall be in addition
to any other amount provided by law.
``(5) The provisions of subchapter VIII of this chapter
(or, in the case of any person not covered by such subchapter,
similar provisions prescribed by the President) shall apply
with respect to any amount due an individual under paragraph
(1) after such individual's death.
``(6) Any payment made under paragraph (1) which is later
denied under paragraph (3)(B) is a claim of the United States
Government for purposes of section 3711 of title 31.
``(e)(1) Under regulations prescribed by the President, the
benefits provided by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act of 1940 including the benefits provided by section 701 of
such Act but excluding the benefits provided by sections 104,
105, 106, 400 through 408, 501 through 512, and 514 of such
Act, shall be provided in the case of any individual who is a
captive.
``(2) In applying such Act under this subsection--
``(A) the term `person in the military service' is
deemed to include any such captive;
``(B) the term `period of military service' is deemed
to include the period during which the individual is in
a captive status; and
``(C) references to the Secretary of the Army, the
Secretary of the Navy, the Adjutant General of the
Army, the Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Commandant,
United States Marine Corps, are deemed, in the case of
any captive, to be references to an individual
designated for that purpose by the President.
``(f)(1)(A) Under regulations prescribed by the President,
the head of an agency shall pay (by advancement or
reimbursement) a spouse or child of a captive for expenses
incurred for subsistence, tuition, fees, supplies, books, and
equipment, and other educational expenses, while attending an
educational or training institution.
``(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), payments
shall be available under this paragraph for a spouse or child
of an individual who is a captive for education or training
which occurs--
``(i) after that individual has been in captive
status for 90 days or more, and
``(ii) on or before--
``(I) the end of any semester or quarter (as
appropriate) which begins before the date on
which the captive status of that individual
terminates, or
``(II) if the educational or training
institution is not operated on a semester or
quarter system, the earlier of the end of any
course which began before such date or the end
of the 16-week period following that date.
In order to respond to special circumstances, the appropriate
agency head may specify a date for purposes of cessation of
assistance under clause (ii) which is later than the date which
would otherwise apply under such clause.
``(C) In the event a captive dies and the death is incident
to that individual being a captive, payments shall be available
under this paragraph for a spouse or child of such individual
for education or training which occurs after the date of such
individual's death.
``(D) The preceding provisions of this paragraph shall not
apply with respect to any spouse or child who is eligible for
assistance under chapter 35 of title 38 or similar assistance
under any other provision of law.
``(E) For the purpose of this paragraph, `child' means a
dependent under section 5561(3)(B) of this title.
``(2)(A) In order to respond to special circumstances, the
head of an agency may pay (by advancement or reimbursement) a
captive for expenses incurred for subsistence, tuition, fees,
supplies, books, and equipment, and other educational expenses,
while attending an educational or training institution.
``(B) Payments shall be available under this paragraph for
a captive for education or training which occurs--
``(i) after the termination of that individual's
captive status, and
``(ii) on or before--
``(I) the end of any semester or quarter (as
appropriate) which begins before the date which
is 10 years after the day on which the captive
status of that individual terminates, or
``(II) if the educational or training
institution is not operated on a semester or
quarter system, the earlier of the end of any
course which began before such date or the end
of the 16-week period following that date, and
shall be available only to the extent that such payments are
not otherwise authorized by law.
``(3) Assistance under this subsection--
``(A) shall be discontinued for any individual whose
conduct or progress is unsatisfactory under standards
consistent with those established pursuant to section
1724 of title 38; and
``(B) may not be provided for any individual for a
period in excess of 45 months (or the equivalent
thereof in other than fulltime education or training).
``(4) Regulations prescribed to carry out this subsection
shall provide that the program under this subsection shall be
consistent with the assistance program under chapters 35 and 36
of title 38.
``(g) Any benefit provided under subsection (c) or (d) may,
under regulations prescribed by the President, be provided to a
family member of an individual if--
``(1) such family member is held in captive status;
and
``(2) such individual is performing service for the
United States as described in subsection (a)(1)(A) when
the captive status of such family member commences.
``(h) Except as provided in subsection (d), this section
applies with respect to any individual in a captive status
commencing after January 21, 1981.
``(i) Notwithstanding any other provision of this
subchapter, any determination by the President under subsection
(a)(2) or (d) shall be conclusive and shall not be subject to
judicial review.
``(j) The President may prescribe regulations necessary to
administer this section.
``(k) Any benefit or payment pursuant to this section shall
be paid out of funds available for salaries and expenses of the
relevant agency of the United States.
``Sec. 5570. Compensation for disability or death
``(a) For the purpose of this section--
``(1) `employee' means--
``(A) any individual in the Civil Service;
and
``(B) any individual rendering personal
service to the United States similar to the
service of an individual in the Civil Service
(other than as a member of the uniformed
services); and
``(2) `family member', as used with respect to an
employee, means--
``(A) any dependent of such employee; and
``(B) any individual (other than a dependent
under subparagraph (A)) who is a member of the
employee's family or household.
``(b) The President shall prescribe regulations under which
an agency head may pay compensation for the disability or death
of an employee or a family member of an employee if, as
determined by the President, the disability or death was caused
by hostile action and was a result of the individual's
relationship with the Government.
``(c) Any compensation otherwise payable to an individual
under this section in connection with any disability or death
shall be reduced by any amounts payable to such individual
under any other program funded in whole or in part by the
United States (excluding any amount payable under section
5569(d) of this title) in connection with such disability or
death, except that nothing in this subsection shall result in
the reduction of any amount below zero.
``(d) A determination by the President under subsection (b)
shall be conclusive and shall not be subject to judicial
review.
``(e) Compensation under this section may include payment
(whether by advancement or reimbursement) for any medical or
health expenses relating to the death or disability involved to
the extent that such expenses are not covered under subsection
(c) of section 5569 of this title (other than because of
paragraph (2) of such subsection).
``(f) This section applies with respect to any disability
or death resulting from an injury which occurs after January
21, 1981.
``(g) Any benefit or payment pursuant to this section shall
be paid out of funds available for salaries and expenses of the
relevant agency of the United States.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The analysis for chapter 55 of
title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the
item relating to section 5568 the following:
``5569. Benefits for captives.
``5570. Compensation for disability or death.''.
SEC. 804. RETENTION OF LEAVE BY ALIEN EMPLOYEES FOLLOWING INJURY FROM
HOSTILE ACTION ABROAD.
Section 6325 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end thereof the following: ``The preceding
provisions of this section shall apply in the case of an alien
employee referred to in section 6301(2)(viii) of this title
with respect to any leave granted to such alien employee under
section 6310 of this title or section 408 of the Foreign
Service Act of 1980.''.
SEC. 805. TRANSITION PROVISIONS.
(a) Savings Fund.--(1) Amounts may be allotted to the
savings fund under subsection (b) of section 5569 of title 5,
United States Code (as added by section 803(a) of this Act)
from pay and allowances for any pay period ending after January
21, 1981, and before the establishment of such fund.
(2) Interest on amounts so allotted with respect to any
such pay period shall be calculated as if the allotment had
occurred at the end of such pay period.
(b) Medical and Health Care; Educational Expenses.--
Subsections (c) and (f) of such section 5569 (as so added)
shall be carried out with respect to the period after January
21, 1981, and before the effective date of those subsections,
under regulations prescribed by the President.
(c) Definition.--For the purpose of this subsection, ``pay
and allowances'' has the meaning provided under section 5561 of
title 5, United States Code.
SEC. 806. BENEFITS FOR MEMBERS OF UNIFORMED SERVICES WHO ARE VICTIMS OF
HOSTILE ACTION.
(a) Payments.--(1) Chapter 10 of title 37, United States
Code is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
section:
``Sec. 559. Benefits for members held as captives
``(a) In this section:
``(1) The term `captive status' means a missing
status of a member of the uniformed services which, as
determined by the President, arises because of a
hostile action and is a result of membership in the
uniformed services, but does not include a period of
captivity of a member as a prisoner of war if Congress
provides to such member, in an Act enacted after August
27, 1986,\43\ monetary payment in respect of such
period of captivity.
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\43\ Sec. 1484(d)(4) of Public Law 101-510 (104 Stat. 1717) amended
title 37, sec. 559, by striking out ``the date of the enactment of the
Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``August 27, 1986''.
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``(2) The term `former captive' means a person who,
as a member of the uniformed services, was held in a
captive status.
``(b)(1) The Secretary of the Treasury shall establish a
savings fund to which the Secretary concerned may allot all or
any portion of the pay and allowances of any member of the
uniformed services who is in a captive status to the extent
that such pay and allowances are not subject to an allotment
under section 553 of this title or any other provision of law.
``(2) Amounts so allotted shall bear interest at a rate
which for any calendar quarter, shall be equal to the average
rate paid on United States Treasury bills with three-month
maturities issued during the preceding calendar quarter. Such
interest shall be computed quarterly.
``(3) Amounts in the savings fund credited to a member
shall be considered as pay and allowances for purposes of
section 553(c) of this title and shall otherwise be subject to
withdrawal under procedures which the Secretary of the Treasury
shall establish.
``(4) Any interest accruing under this subsection on--
``(A) any amount for which a member is indebted to
the United States under section 552(c) of this title
shall be deemed to be part of the amount due under such
section; and
``(B) any amount referred to in section 556(f) of
this title shall be deemed to be part of such amount
for purposes of such section.
``(5) An allotment under this subsection may be made
without regard to section 553(c) of this title.
``(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (3), the President
shall make a cash payment to any person who is a former
captive. Such payment shall be made before the end of the one-
year period beginning on the date on which the captive status
of such person terminates.
``(2) Except as provided in section 802 of the Victims of
Terrorism Compensation Act (5 U.S.C. 5569 note), the amount of
such payment shall be determined by the President under the
provisions of section 5569(d)(2) of title 5.
``(3)(A) The President--
``(i) may defer such payment in the case of any
former captive who during such one-year period is
charged with an offense described in clause (ii) of
this subparagraph, until final disposition of such
charge; and
``(ii) may deny such payment in the case of any
former captive who is convicted of a captivity-related
offense--
``(I) referred to in subsection (b) or (c) of
section 8312 of title 5; or
``(II) under chapter 47 of title 10 (the
Uniform Code of Military Justice) that is
punishable by dishonorable discharge,
dismissal, or confinement for one year or more.
``(B) For the purposes of subparagraph (A) of this
paragraph, a captivity-related offense is an offense that is--
``(i) committed by a person while the person is in a
captive status; and
``(ii) related to the captive status of the person.
``(4) A payment under this subsection is in addition to any
other amount provided by law.
``(5) Any amount due a person under this subsection shall,
after the death of such person, be deemed to be pay and
allowances for the purposes of this chapter.
``(6) Any payment made under paragraph (1) that is later
denied under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) is a claim of the United
States Government for purposes of section 3711 of title 31.
``(d) A determination by the President under subsection
(a)(1) or (c) is final and is not subject to judicial
review.''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:
``559. Benefits for members held as captives.''.
(3)(A)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), section 559 of
title 37, United States Code, as added by paragraph (1), shall
apply to any person whose captive status begins after January
21, 1981.
(ii)(I) Subsection (c) of such section shall apply to any
person whose captive status begins on or after November 4,
1979.
(II) In the case of any person whose status as a captive
terminated before the date of the enactment of this Act, the
President shall make a payment under paragraph (1) of such
subsection before the end of the one-year period beginning on
such date.
(B) Amounts may be allotted to a savings fund established
under such section from pay and allowances for any pay period
ending after January 21, 1981, and before the establishment of
such fund.
(C) Interest on amounts so allotted with respect to any
such pay period shall be calculated as if the allotment had
occurred at the end of such pay period.
(b) Disability and Death Benefits.--(1) Chapter 53 of title
10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof
the following new section:
``Sec. 1032. Disability and death compensation: dependents of members
held as captives
``(a) \44\ The President shall prescribe regulations under
which the Secretary concerned may pay compensation for the
disability or death of a dependent of a member of the uniformed
services if the President determines that the disability or
death--
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\44\ Functions vested in the President by this section were
delegated to the Secretary of Defense, to be exercised in consultation
with the Secretary of Labor, by Executive Order 12598 (June 17, 1987;
52 F.R. 23421).
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``(1) was caused by hostile action; and
``(2) was a result of the relationship of the
dependent to the member of the uniformed services.
``(b) Any compensation otherwise payable to a person under
this section in connection with any disability or death shall
be reduced by any amount payable to such person under any other
program funded in whole or in part by the United States in
connection with such disability or death, except that nothing
in this subsection shall result in the reduction of any amount
below zero.
``(c) A determination by the President under subsection (a)
is conclusive and is not subject to judicial review.
``(d) In this section:
``(1) The term `dependent' has the meaning given that
term in section 551 of title 37.
``(2) The term `Secretary concerned' has the meaning
given that term in section 101 of that title.''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:
``1032. Disability and death compensation: dependents of members held as
captives.''.
(3) Section 1032 of title 10, United States Code, as added
by paragraph (1), shall apply with respect to any disability or
death resulting from an injury that occurs after January 21,
1981.
(c) Medical Benefits.--(1) Chapter 55 of title 10, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the
following new section:
``Sec. 1095a. Medical care: members held as captives and their
dependents
``(a) Under regulations prescribed by the President, the
Secretary concerned shall pay (by advancement or reimbursement)
any person who is a former captive, and any dependent of that
person or of a person who is in a captive status, for health
care and other expenses related to such care, to the extent
that such care--
``(1) is incident to the captive status; and
``(2) is not covered--
``(A) by any other Government medical or
health program; or
``(B) by insurance.
``(b) In the case of any person who is eligible for medical
care under section 1074 or 1076 of this title, such regulations
shall require that, whenever practicable, such care be provided
in a facility of the uniformed services.
``(c) In this section:
``(1) `captive status' and `former captive' have the
meanings given those terms in section 559 of title 37.
``(2) `dependent' has the meaning given that term in
section 551 of that title.''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:
``1095a. Medical care: members held as captives and their dependents.''.
(3)(A) Section 1095 of title 10, United States Code, as
added by paragraph (1), shall apply with respect to any person
whose captive status begins after January 21, 1981.
(B) The President shall prescribe specific regulations
regarding the carrying out of such section with respect to
persons whose captive status begins during the period beginning
on January 21, 1981, and ending on the effective date of that
section.
(d) Educational Assistance.--(1) Part III of title 10,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the
following new chapter:
``CHAPTER 110--EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR MEMBERS HELD AS CAPTIVES AND
THEIR DEPENDENTS \45\
``Sec.
``2181. Definitions.
\45\ Functions vested in the President by this chapter were delegated to
the Secretary of Defense by Executive Order 12598 (June 17, 1987; 52
F.R. 23421).
``2182. Educational assistance: dependents of captives.
``2183. Educational assistance: former captives.
``2184. Termination of assistance.
``2185. Programs to be consistent with programs administered by the
Department of Veterans Affairs.
``Sec. 2181. Definitions
``In this chapter:
``(1) The terms `captive status' and `former captive'
have the meanings given those terms in section 559 of
title 37.
``(2) The term `dependent' has the meaning given that
term in section 551 of that title.
``Sec. 2182. Educational assistance: dependents of captives
``(a) Under regulations prescribed by the President, the
Secretary concerned shall pay (by advancement or reimbursement)
a dependent of a person who is in a captive status for expenses
incurred, while attending an educational or training
institution, for--
``(1) substance;
``(2) tuition;
``(3) fees;
``(4) supplies;
``(5) books;
``(6) equipment; and
``(7) other educational expenses.
``(b) Except as provided in section 2184 of this title,
payments shall be available under this section for dependent of
a person who is in a captive status for education or training
that occurs--
``(1) after that person is in a captive status for
not less than 90 days; and
``(2) on or before--
``(A) the end of any semester or quarter (as
appropriate) that begins before the date on
which the captive status of that person
terminates;
``(B) the earlier of the end of any course
that began before such date or the end of the
16-week period following that date if the
education or training institution is not
operated on a semester or quarter system; or
``(C) a date specified by the Secretary
concerned in order to respond to special
circumstances.
``(c) If a person in a captive status or a former captive
dies and the death is incident to the captivity, payments shall
be available under this section for a dependent of that person
for education or training that occurs after the date of the
death of that person.
``(d) The provisions of this section shall not apply
to any dependent who is eligible for assistance under
chapter 35 of title 38 or similar assistance under any
other provision of law.
``Sec. 2183. Educational assistance: former captives
``(a) In order to respond to special circumstances, the
Secretary concerned may pay (by advancement or reimbursement) a
person who is a former captive for expenses incurred, while
attending an educational or training institution, for--
``(1) substance;
``(2) tuition;
``(3) fees;
``(4) supplies;
``(5) books;
``(6) equipment; and
``(7) other educational expenses.
``(b) Except as provided in section 2184 of this title,
payments shall be available under this section for a person who
is a former captive for education or training that occurs--
``(1) after the termination of the status of that
person as a captive; and
``(2) on or before--
``(A) the end of any semester or quarter (as
appropriate) that begins before the end of the
10-year period beginning on the date on which
the status of that person as a captive
terminates; or
``(B) if the educational or training
institution is not operated on a semester or
quarter system, the earlier of the end of any
course that began before such date or the end
of the 16-week period following that date.
``(c) Payments shall be available under this section only
to the extent that such payments are not otherwise authorized
by law.
``Sec. 2184. Termination of assistance
``Assistance under this chapter--
``(1) shall be discounted for any person whose
conduct or progress is unsatisfactory under standards
consistent with those established under section 3524 of
title 38; and
``(2) may not be provided for any person for more
than 45 months (for the equivalent in other than full-
time education or training).
``Sec. 2185. Programs to be consistent with programs administered by
the Department of Veterans Affairs
``Regulations prescribed to carry out this chapter shall
provide that the programs under this chapter shall be
consistent with the educational assistance programs under
chapters 35 and 36 of title 38.''.
(2) The table of chapters at the beginning of subtitle A of
such title, and the table of chapters at the beginning of part
III of such subtitle, are amended by inserting after the item
relating to chapter 109 the following new item:
``110. Educational Assistance for Members Held as Captives and
Their Dependents...................................2181''.
(3) Chapter 110 of title 10, United States Code, as added
by paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to persons whose
captive status begins after January 21, 1981.
(e) Account Used for Payment of Compensation for Victims of
Terrorism.--(1) Chapter 19 of title 37, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
``Sec. 1013. Payment of compensation for victims of terrorism
``Any benefit or payment pursuant to section 559 of this
title, or section 1051 or 1095a or chapter 110 of title 10,
shall be paid out of funds available to the Secretary concerned
for military personnel.''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:
``1013. Payment of compensation for victims of terrorism.''.
SEC. 807. REGULATIONS.
Any regulation required by this title or by any amendment
made by this title shall take effect not later than 6 months
after the date of enactment of this Act.
SEC. 808. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ENTITLEMENTS.
Provisions enacted by this title which provide new spending
authority described in section 401(c)(2)(C) of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 shall not be effective until
October 1, 1986.
TITLE IX--MARITIME SECURITY
SEC. 901. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``International Maritime and
Port Security Act''.
SEC. 902.\46\ INTERNATIONAL MEASURES FOR SEAPORT AND SHIPBOARD
SECURITY.
The Congress encourages the President to continue to seek
agreement through the International Maritime Organization on
matters of international seaport and shipboard security, and
commends him on his efforts to date. In developing such
agreement, each member country of the International Maritime
Organization should consult with appropriate private sector
interests in that country. Such agreement would establish
seaport and vessel security measures and could include--
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\46\ 46 U.S.C. app. 1801.
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(1) seaport screening of cargo and baggage similar to
that done at airports;
(2) security measures to restrict access to cargo,
vessels, and dockside property to authorized personnel
only;
(3) additional security on board vessels;
(4) licensing or certification of compliance with
appropriate security standards; and
(5) other appropriate measures to prevent unlawful
acts against passengers and crews on board vessels.
SEC. 903. MEASURES TO PREVENT UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST PASSENGERS AND
CREWS ON BOARD SHIPS.
(a) Report on Progress of IMO.--The Secretary of
Transportation and the Secretary of State, jointly, shall
report to the Congress by February 28, 1987, on the progress of
the International Maritime Organization in developing
recommendations on Measures to prevent Unlawful Acts Against
Passengers and Crews On Board Ships.
(b) Content of Report.--The report required by subsection
(a) shall include the following information--
(1) the specific areas of agreement and disagreement
on the recommendations among the member nations of the
International Maritime Organization;
(2) the activities of the Maritime Safety Committee,
the Facilitation Committee, and the Legal Committee of
the International Maritime Organization in regard to
the proposed recommendations; and
(3) the security measures specified in the
recommendations.
(c) Security Measures at United States Ports.--If the
member nations of the International Maritime Organization have
not finalized and accepted the proposed recommendations by
February 28, 1987, the Secretary of Transportation shall
include in the report required by this section a proposed plan
of action (including proposed legislation if necessary) for the
implementation of security measures at United States ports and
on vessels operating from those parts based on the assessment
of threat from acts of terrorism reported by the Secretary of
Transportation under section 905.
SEC. 904. PANAMA CANAL SECURITY.
Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this
Act, the President shall report to the Congress on the status
of physical security at the Panama Canal with respect to the
threat of terrorism.
SEC. 905.\47\ THREAT OF TERRORISM TO UNITED STATES PORTS AND VESSELS.
Not later than February 28, 1987, and annually thereafter,
the Secretary of Transportation shall report to the Congress on
the threat from acts of terrorism to United States ports and
vessels operating from those ports.
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\47\ 46 U.S.C. app. 1802
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SEC. 906. PORT, HARBOR, AND COASTAL FACILITY SECURITY.
The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (33 U.S.C. 1221
et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 6 of the
following new section:
``Sec. 7. Port, Harbor, and Coastal Facility Security.
``(a) General Authority.--The Secretary may take actions
described in subsection (b) to prevent or respond to an act of
terrorism against--
``(1) an individual, vessel, or public or commercial
structure, that is--
``(A) subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States; and
``(B) located within or adjacent to the
marine environment; or
``(2) a vessel of the United States or an individual
on board that vessel.
``(b) Specific Authority.--Under subsection (a), the
Secretary may--
``(1) carry out or require measures, including
inspections, port and harbor patrols, the establishment
of security and safety zones, and the development of
contingency plans and procedures, to prevent or respond
to acts of terrorism; and
``(2) recruit members of the Regular Coast Guard and
the Coast Guard Reserve and train members of the
Regular Coast Guard and the Coast Guard Reserve in the
techniques of preventing and responding to acts of
terrorism.''.
SEC. 907.\48\ SECURITY STANDARDS AT FOREIGN PORTS.
(a) Assessment of Security Measures.--The Secretary of
Transportation shall develop and implement a plan to assess the
effectiveness of the security measures maintained at those
foreign ports which the Secretary, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, determines pose a high risk of acts of
terrorism directed against passenger vessels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ 46 U.S.C. app. 1803.
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(b) Consultation With the Secretary of State.--In carrying
out subsection (a), the Secretary of Transportation shall
consult the Secretary of State with respect to the terrorist
threat which exists in each country and poses a high risk of
acts of terrorism directed against passenger vessels.
(c) Report of Assessments.--Not later than 6 months after
the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Transportation shall report to the Congress on the plan
developed pursuant to subsection (a) and how the Secretary will
implement the plan.
(d) Determination and Notification to Foreign Country.--If,
after implementing the plan in accordance with subsection (a),
the Secretary of Transportation determines that a port does not
maintain and administer effective security measures, the
Secretary of State (after being informed by the Secretary of
Transportation) shall notify the appropriate government
authorities of the country in which the port is located of such
determination, and shall recommend the steps necessary to bring
the security measures in use at that port up to the standard
used by the Secretary of Transportation in making such
assessment.
(e) Antiterrorism Assistance Related to Maritime
Security.--The President is encouraged to provide antiterrorism
assistance related to maritime security under chapter 8 of part
II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to foreign countries,
especially with respect to a port which the Secretary of
Transportation determines under subsection (d) does not
maintain and administer effective security measures.
SEC. 908.\49\ TRAVEL ADVISORIES CONCERNING SECURITY AT FOREIGN PORTS.
(a) Travel Advisory.--Upon being notified by the Secretary
of Transportation that the Secretary has determined that a
condition exists that threatens the safety or security of
passengers, passenger vessels, or crew traveling to or from a
foreign port which the Secretary of Transportation has
determined pursuant to section 907(d) to be a port which does
not maintain and administer effective security measures, the
Secretary of State shall immediately issue a travel advisory
with respect to that port. Any travel advisory issued pursuant
to this subsection shall be published in the Federal Register.
The Secretary of State shall take the necessary steps to widely
publicize that travel advisory.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ 46 U.S.C. app. 1804.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Lifting of Travel Advisory.--The travel advisory
required to be issued under subsection (a) may be lifted only
if the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, has determined that effective security
measures are maintained and administered at the port with
respect to which the Secretary of Transportation had made the
determination described in section 907(d).
(c) Notification to Congress.--The Secretary of State shall
immediately notify the Congress of any change in the status of
a travel advisory imposed pursuant to this section.
SEC. 909.\50\ SUSPENSION OF PASSENGER SERVICES.
(a) President's Determination.--Whenever the President
determines that a foreign nation permits the use of territory
under its jurisdiction as a base of operations or training for,
or as a sanctuary for, or in any way arms, aids, or abets, any
terrorist or terrorist group which knowingly uses the illegal
seizure of passenger vessels or the threat thereof as an
instrument of policy, the President may, without notice or
hearing and for as long as the President determines necessary
to assure the security of passenger vessels against unlawful
seizure, suspend the right of any passenger vessel common
carrier to operate to and from, and the right of any passenger
vessel of the United States to utilize, any port in that
foreign nation for passenger service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ 46 U.S.C. app. 1805.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Prohibition.--It shall be unlawful for any passenger
vessel common carrier, or any passenger vessel of the United
States, to operate in violation of the suspension of rights by
the President under this section.
(c) Penalty.--(1) If a person operates a vessel in
violation of this section, the Secretary of the department in
which the Coast Guard is operating may deny the vessels of that
person entry to United States ports.
(2) A person violating this section is liable to the United
States Government for a civil penalty of not more than $50,000.
Each day a vessel utilizes a prohibited port shall be a
separate violation of this section.
SEC. 910.\51\ SANCTIONS FOR THE SEIZURE OF VESSELS BY TERRORISTS.
The Congress encourages the President--
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\51\ 46 U.S.C. app. 1806.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) to review the adequacy of domestic and
international sanctions against terrorists who seize or
attempt to seize vessels; and
(2) to strengthen where necessary, through bilateral
and multilateral efforts, the effectiveness of such
sanctions.
Not later than one year after the date of enactment of this
Act, the President shall submit a report to the Congress which
includes the review of such sanctions and the efforts to
improve such sanctions.
SEC. 911.\52\ DEFINITIONS.
For purposes of this title--
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\52\ 46 U.S.C. app. 1807.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) the term ``common carrier'' has the same meaning
given such term in section 3(6) of the Shipping Act of
1984 (46 U.S.C. App. 1702(6)); and
(2) the terms ``passenger vessel'' and ``vessel of
the United States'' have the same meaning given such
terms in section 2102 of title 46, United States Code.
SEC 912.\53\ AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated $12,500,000 for
each of the fiscal years 1987 through 1991, to be available to
the Secretary of Transportation to carry out this title.
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\53\ 46 U.S.C. app. 1808.
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SEC. 913.\54\ REPORTS.
(a) Consolidation.--To the extent practicable, the reports
required under sections 903, 905, and 907 shall be consolidated
into a single document before being submitted to the Congress.
Any classified material in those reports shall be submitted
separately as an addendum to the consolidated report.
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\54\ 46 U.S.C. app. 1809.
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(b) Submission to Committees.--The reports required to be
submitted to the Congress under this title shall be submitted
to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representatives
\55\ and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation of the Senate.
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\55\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided
that references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
The House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries was abolished
in the 104th Congress, and sec. 1(b)(3) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat.
186) stated that the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the
House of Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee
on National Security of the House of Representatives, in the case of a
provision of law relating to interoceanic canals, the Merchant Marine
Academy and State Maritime Academies, or national security aspects of
merchant marine.
* * * * * * *
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TITLE XI--SECURITY AT MILITARY BASES ABROAD
SEC. 1101.\56\ FINDINGS.
The Congress finds that--
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\56\ 10 U.S.C. 133 note.
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(1) there is evidence that terrorists consider bases
and installations of United States Armed Forces outside
the United States to be targets for attack;
(2) more attention should be given to the protection
of members of the Armed Forces, and members of their
families, stationed outside the United States; and
(3) current programs to educate members of the Armed
Forces, and members of their families, stationed
outside of the United States to the threats of
terrorist activity and how to protect themselves should
be substantially expanded.
SEC. 1102.\56\ RECOMMENDED ACTIONS BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.
It is the sense of the Congress that--
(1) the Secretary of Defense should review the
security of each base and installation of the
Department of Defense outside the United States,
including the family housing and support activities of
each such base or installation, and take the steps the
Secretary considers necessary to improve the security
of such bases and installations; and
(2) the Secretary of Defense should institute a
program of training for members of the Armed Forces,
and for members of their families, stationed outside
the United States concerning security and
antiterrorism.
SEC. 1103.\56\ REPORT TO THE CONGRESS.
Not later than June 30, 1987, the Secretary of Defense
shall report to the Congress on any actions taken by the
Secretary described in section 1102.
TITLE XII--CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
SEC. 1201. ENCOURAGEMENT FOR NEGOTIATION OF A CONVENTION.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress
that the President should establish a process encourage the
negotiation of an international convention to prevent and
control all aspects of international terrorism.
(b) Relation to Existing International Conventions.--Such
convention should address the prevention and control of
international terrorism in a comprehensive fashion, taking into
consideration matters not covered by--
(1) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft (the Hague, December 16, 1970; 22
U.S.T. 1641, TIAS 7192);
(2) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal,
September 23, 1971; 24 U.S.T. 564, TIAS 7570);
(3) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons
(New York, December 14, 1973; 28 U.S.T. 1975, TIAS
8532);
(4) the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages
(New York, December 17, 1979; XVIII International Legal
Materials 1457);
(5) the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Materials (October 26, 1979; XVIII
International Legal Materials 1419); and
(6) the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo, September 14, 1963;
20 U.S.T. 2941, TIAS 6768).
(c) What the Convention Should Provide.--Such convention
should provide--
(1) an explicit definition of conduct constituting
terrorism;
(2) effective close intelligence-sharing, joint
counterterrorist training, and uniform rules for asylum
and extradition for perpetrators of terrorism; and
(3) effective criminal penalties for the swift
punishment of perpetrators of terrorism.
(d) Consideration of an International Tribunal.--The
President should also consider including on the agenda for
these negotiations the possibility of eventually establishing
an international tribunal for prosecuting terrorists.
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\57\ Sec. 1202 added a new chapter 113A to title 18, U.S.C.
(redesignated as chapter 113B).
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SEC. 1202.\57\ EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER TERRORIST
CONDUCT. * * *
* * * * * * *
3. Crimes and Criminal Procedure
Title 18, United States Code--Crimes and Criminal Procedure
PART I--CRIMES
CHAPTER 1--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 7. Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States defined
The term ``special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States'', as used in this title, includes:
(1) The high seas, any other waters within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United
States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular
State, and any vessel belonging in whole or in part to
the United States or any citizen thereof, or to any
corporation created by or under the laws of the United
States, or of any State, Territory, District, or
possession thereof, when such vessel is within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United
States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular
State.
(2) Any vessel registered, licensed, or enrolled
under the laws of the United States, and being on a
voyage upon the waters of any of the Great Lakes, or
any of the waters connecting them, or upon the Saint
Lawrence River where the same constitutes the
International Boundary Line.
(3) Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the
United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent
jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or
otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of
the legislature of the State in which the same shall
be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal,
dockyard, or other needful building.
(4) Any island, rock, or key containing deposits of
guano, which may, at the discretion of the President,
be considered as appertaining to the United States.
(5) Any aircraft belonging in whole or in part to the
United States, or any citizen thereof, or to any
corporation created by or under the laws of the United
States, or any State, Territory, district, or
possession thereof, while such aircraft is in flight
over the high seas, or over any other waters within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United
States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular
State.
(6) Any vehicle used or designed for flight or
navigation in space and on the registry of the United
States pursuant to the Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies and the Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space, while that vehicle is in
flight, which is from the moment when all external
doors are closed on Earth following embarkation until
the moment when one such door is opened on Earth for
disembarkation or in the case of a forced landing,
until the competent authorities take over the
responsibility for the vehicle and for persons and
property aboard.
(7) Any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation
with respect to an offense by or against a national of
the United States.
(8) To the extent permitted by international law, any
foreign vessel during a voyage having a scheduled
departure from or arrival in the United States with
respect to an offense committed by or against a
national of the United States.
CHAPTER 2--AIRCRAFT AND MOTOR VEHICLES
Sec. 32. Destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities
(a) Whoever willfully--
(1) sets fire to, damages, destroys, disables, or
wrecks any aircraft in the special aircraft
jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft
used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or
foreign air commerce;
(2) places or causes to be placed a destructive
device or substance in, upon, or in proximity to, or
otherwise makes or causes to be made unworkable or
unusable or hazardous to work or use, any such
aircraft, or any part or other materials used or
intended to be used in connection with the operation of
such aircraft, if such placing or causing to be placed
or such making or causing to be made is likely to
endanger the safety of any such aircraft;
(3) sets fire to, damages, destroys, or disables any
air navigation facility, or interferes by force or
violence with the operation of such facility, if such
fire, damaging, destroying, disabling, or interfering
is likely to endanger the safety of any such aircraft
in flight;
(4) with the intent to damage, destroy, or disable
any such aircraft, sets fire to, damages, destroys, or
disables or places a destructive device or substance
in, upon, or in proximity to, any appliance or
structure, ramp, landing area, property, machine, or
apparatus, or any facility or other material used, or
intended to be used, in connection with the operation,
maintenance, loading, unloading or storage of any such
aircraft or any cargo carried or intended to be carried
on any such aircraft;
(5) performs an act of violence against or
incapacitates any individual on any such aircraft, if
such act of violence or incapacitation is likely to
endanger the safety of such aircraft;
(6) communicates information, knowing the information
to be false and under circumstances in which such
information may reasonably be believed, thereby
endangering the safety of any such aircraft in flight;
or
(7) attempts to do anything prohibited under
paragraphs (1) through (6) of this subsection;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
twenty years or both.
(b) Whoever willfully--
(1) performs an act of violence against any
individual on board any civil aircraft registered in a
country other than the United States while such
aircraft is in flight, if such act is likely to
endanger the safety of that aircraft;
(2) destroys a civil aircraft registered in a country
other than the United States while such aircraft is in
service or causes damage to such an aircraft which
renders that aircraft incapable of flight or which is
likely to endanger that aircraft's safety in flight;
(3) places or causes to be placed on a civil aircraft
registered in a country other than the United States
while such aircraft is in service, a device or
substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or
to cause damage to that aircraft which renders that
aircraft incapable of flight or which is likely to
endanger that aircraft's safety in flight; or
(4) attempts to commit an offense described in
paragraphs (1) through (3) of this subsection;
shall, if the offender is later found in the United States, be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both.
(c) Whoever willfully imparts or conveys any threat to do
an act which would violate any of paragraphs (1) through (5) of
subsection (a) or any of paragraphs (1) through (3) of
subsection (b) of this section, with an apparent determination
and will to carry the threat into execution shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
Sec. 37. Violence at international airports
(a) Offense.--A person who unlawfully and intentionally,
using any device, substance, or weapon--
(1) performs an act of violence against a person at
an airport serving international civil aviation that
causes or is likely to cause serious bodily injury (as
defined in section 1365 of this title) or death; or
(2) destroys or seriously damages the facilities of
an airport serving international civil aviation or a
civil aircraft not in service located thereon or
disrupts the services of the airport, if such an act
endangers or is likely to endanger safety at that
airport, or attempts to do such an act, shall be fined
under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or
both; and if the death of any person results from
conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be
punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years
or for life.
(b) Jurisdiction.--There is jurisdiction over the
prohibited activity in subsection (a) if--
(1) the prohibited activity takes place in the United
States; or
(2) the prohibited activity takes place outside the
United States and the offender is later found in the
United States.
(c) It is a bar to Federal prosecution under subsection (a)
for conduct that occurred within the United States that the
conduct involved was during or in relation to a labor dispute,
and such conduct is prohibited as a felony under the law of the
State in which it was committed. For purposes of this section,
the term ``labor dispute'' has the meaning set forth in section
2(c) \1\ of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, as amended (29 U.S.C.
113(c)).
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\1\ So in original. Probably should be section ``13(c)''.
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CHAPTER 7--ASSAULT
Sec. 112.\2\ Protection of foreign officials, official guests, and
internationally protected persons
(a) Whoever assaults, strikes, wounds, imprisons, or offers
violence to a foreign official, official guest, or
internationally protected person or makes any other violent
attack upon the person or liberty of such person, or, if likely
to endanger his person or liberty, makes a violent attack upon
his official premises, private accommodation, or means of
transport or attempts to commit any of the foregoing shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years,
or both. Whoever in the commission of any such act uses a
deadly or dangerous weapon, or inflicts bodily injury shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years,
or both.
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\2\ Sec. 112 was enacted by the Act for the Protection of Foreign
Officials and Official Guests of the United States (Public Law 92-539;
86 Stat. 1070), and was amended and restated by sec. 5 of Public Law
94-467. Sec. 2 of Public Law 92-539 provided the following statement of
findings and delcaration of policy:
``Sec. 2. The Congress recognizes that from the beginning of our
history as a nation, the police power to investigate, prosecute, and
punish common crimes such as murder, kidnapping, and assault has
resided in the several States, and that such power should remain with
the States.
``The Congress finds, however, that harassment, intimidation,
obstruction, coercion, and acts of violence committed against foreign
officials or their family members in the United States or against
official guests of the United States adversely affect the foreign
relations of the United States.
``Accordingly, this legislation is intended to afford the United
States jurisdiction concurrent with that of the several States to
proceed against those who by such acts interfere with its conduct of
foreign affairs.''.
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(b) Whoever willfully--
(1) intimidates, coerces, threatens, or harasses a
foreign official or an official guest or obstructs a
foreign official in the performance of his duties;
(2) attempts to intimidate, coerce, threaten, or
harass a foreign official or an official guest or
obstruct a foreign official in the performance of his
duties; or
(3) within the United States but outside the District
of Columbia and within one hundred feet of any building
or premises in whole or in part owned, used, or
occupied for official business or for diplomatic,
consular, or residential purposes by--
(A) a foreign government, including such use
as a mission to an international organization;
(B) an international organization;
(C) a foreign official; or
(D) an official guest;
congregates with two or more other persons with intent
to violate any other provision of this section;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than six
months, or both.
(c) For the purpose of this section ``foreign government'',
``foreign official'', ``internationally protected person'',
``international organization'', ``national of the United
States'', and ``official guest'' shall have the same meanings
as those provided in section 1116(b) of this title.
(d) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed or
applied so as to abridge the exercise of rights guaranteed
under the first amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
(e) If the victim of an offense under subsection (a) is an
internationally protected person outside the United States, the
United States may exercise jurisdiction over the offense if (1)
the victim is a representative, officer, employee, or agent of
the United States, (2) an offender is a national of the United
States, or (3) an offender is afterwards found in the United
States. As used in this subsection, the United States includes
all areas under the jurisdiction of the United States including
any of the places within the provisions of sections 5 and 7 of
this title and section 46501(2) of title 49.
(f) In the course of enforcement of subsection (a) and any
other sections prohibiting a conspiracy or attempt to violate
subsection (a), the Attorney General may request assistance
from any Federal, State, or local agency, including the Army,
Navy, and Air Force, any statute, rule, or regulation to the
contrary, notwithstanding.
CHAPTER 10--BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS \3\
Sec. 175. Prohibitions with respect to biological weapons
(a) In General.--Whoever knowingly develops, produces,
stockpiles, transfers, acquires, retains, or possesses any
biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for use as a
weapon, or knowingly assists a foreign state or any
organization to do so, or attempts, threatens, or conspires to
do the same, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for
life or any term of years, or both. There is extraterritorial
Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section
committed by or against a national of the United States.
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\3\ The Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 enacted a new
chapter 10 to 18 U.S.C. relating to biological weapons to implement the
Biological Weapons Convention. The freestanding sections of the Act
provided as follows:
``AN ACT To implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction, by prohibiting
certain conduct relating to biological weapons, and for other purposes.
``Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
``SECTION 1. [18 U.S.C. 175 note] SHORT TITLE.
``This Act may be cited as the `Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism
Act of 1989'.
``SEC. 2. [18 U.S.C. 175 note] PURPOSE AND INTENT.
``(a) Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to--
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``(1) implement the Biological Weapons Convention, an
international agreement unanimously ratified by the United
States Senate in 1974 and signed by more than 100 other
nations, including the Soviet Union; and
``(2) protect the United States against the threat of
biological terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``(b) Intent of Act.--Nothing in this Act is intended to restrain
or restrict peaceful scientific research or development.''.
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(b) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term
`for use as a weapon' does not include the development,
production, transfer, acquisition, retention, or possession of
any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for
prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes.
Sec. 175a.\4\ Requests for military assistance to enforce prohibition
in certain emergencies
The Attorney General may request the Secretary of Defense
to provide assistance under section 382 of title 10 in support
of Department of Justice activities relating to the enforcement
of section 175 of this title in an emergency situation
involving a biological weapon of mass destruction. The
authority to make such a request may be exercised by another
official of the Department of Justice in accordance with
section 382(f)(2) of title 10.''.
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\4\ Sec. 1416(c)(1)A) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2723) enacted a new
sec. 175a.
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Sec. 176. Seizure, forfeiture, and destruction
(a) In General.--(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2),
the Attorney General may request the issuance, in the same
manner as provided for a search warrant, of a warrant
authorizing the seizure of any biological agent, toxin, or
delivery system that--
(A) exists by reason of conduct prohibited under
section 175 of this title; or
(B) is of a type or in a quantity that under the
circumstances has no apparent justification for
prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes.
(2) In exigent circumstances, seizure and destruction of
any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system described in
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) may be made upon
probable cause without the necessity for a warrant.
(b) Procedure.--Property seized pursuant to subsection (a)
shall be forfeited to the United States after notice to
potential claimants and an opportunity for a hearing. At such
hearing, the Government shall bear the burden of persuasion by
a preponderance of the evidence. Except as inconsistent
herewith, the same procedures and provisions of law relating to
a forfeiture under the customs laws shall extend to a seizure
or forfeiture under this section. The Attorney General may
provide for the destruction or other appropriate disposition of
any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system seized and
forfeited pursuant to this section.
(c) Affirmative Defense.--It is an affirmative defense
against a forfeiture under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section
that--
(1) such biological agent, toxin, or delivery system
is for a prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful
purpose; and
(2) such biological agent, toxin, or delivery system,
is of a type and quantity reasonable for that purpose.
Sec. 177. Injunctions
(a) In General.--The United States may obtain in a civil
action an injunction against--
(1) the conduct prohibited under section 175 of this
title;
(2) the preparation, solicitation, attempt, threat,
or conspiracy to engage in conduct prohibited under
section 175 of this title; or
(3) the development, production, stockpiling,
transferring, acquisition, retention, or possession, or
the attempted development, production, stockpiling,
transferring, acquisition, retention, or possession of
any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system of a
type or in a quantity that under the circumstances has
no apparent justification for prophylactic, protective,
or other peaceful purposes.
(b) Affirmative Defense.--It is an affirmative defense
against an injunction under subsection (a)(3) of this section
that--
(1) the conduct sought to be enjoined is for a
prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purpose;
and
(2) such biological agent, toxin, or delivery system
is of a type and quantity reasonable for that purpose.
Sec. 178. Definitions
As used in this chapter--
(1) the term ``biological agent'' means any micro-
organism, virus, infectious substance, or biological
product that may be engineered as a result of
biotechnology, or any naturally occurring or
bioengineered component of any such microorganism,
virus, infectious substance, or biological product,
capable of causing--
(A) death, disease, or other biological
malfunction in a human, an animal, a plant, or
another living organism;
(B) deterioration of food, water, equipment,
supplies, or material of any kind; or
(C) deleterious alteration of the
environment;
(2) the term ``toxin'' means the toxic material of
plants, animals, microorganisms, viruses, fungi, or
infectious substances, or a recombinant molecule,
whatever its origin or method of production,
including--
(A) any poisonous substance or biological
product that may be engineered as a result of
biotechnology produced by a living organism; or
(B) any poisonous isomer or biological
product, homolog, or derivative of such a
substance;
(3) the term `delivery system' means--
(A) any apparatus, equipment, device, or
means of delivery specifically designed to
deliver or disseminate a biological agent,
toxin, or vector; or
(B) any vector;
(4) the term ``vector'' means a living organism, or
molecule, including a recombinant molecule, or
biological product that may be engineered as a result
of biotechnology, capable of carrying a biological
agent or toxin to a host; and
(5) the term ``national of the United States'' has
the meaning prescribed in section 101(a)(22) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
CHAPTER 39--EXPLOSIVES AND COMBUSTIBLES
Sec. 831. Prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials
(a) Whoever, if one of the circumstances described in
subsection (c) of this section occurs--
(1) without lawful authority, intentionally receives,
possesses, uses, transfers, alters, disposes of, or
disperses any nuclear material and--
(A) thereby knowingly causes the death of or
serious bodily injury to any person or
substantial damage to property; or
(B) knows that circumstances exist which are
likely to cause the death of or serious bodily
injury to any person or substantial damage to
property;
(2) with intent to deprive another of nuclear
material, knowingly--
(A) takes and carries away nuclear material
of another without authority;
(B) makes an unauthorized use, disposition,
or transfer, of nuclear material belonging to
another; or
(C) uses fraud and thereby obtains nuclear
material belonging to another;
(3) knowingly--
(A) uses force; or
(B) threatens or places another in fear that any
person other than the actor will imminently be subject
to bodily injury;
and thereby takes nuclear material belonging to another from
the person or presence of any other;
(4) intentionally intimidates any person and thereby
obtains nuclear material belonging to another;
(5) with intent to compel any person, international
organization, or governmental entity to do or refrain
from doing any act, knowingly threatens to engage in
conduct described in paragraph (2)(A) or (3) of this
subsection;
(6) knowingly threatens to use nuclear material to
cause death or serious bodily injury to any person or
substantial damage to property under circumstances in
which the threat may reasonably be understood as an
expression of serious purposes;
(7) attempts to commit an offense under paragraph
(1), (2), (3), or (4) of this subsection; or
(8) is a party to a conspiracy of two or more persons
to commit an offense under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or
(4) of this subsection, if any of the parties
intentionally engages in any conduct in furtherance of
such offense;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this
section.
(b) The punishment for an offense under--
(1) paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (a) of
this section is--
(A) a fine under this title; and
(B) imprisonment--
(i) for any term of years or for life
(I) if, while committing the offense,
the offender knowingly causes the death
of any person; or (II) if, while
committing an offense under paragraph
(1) or (3) of subsection (a) of this
section, the offender, under
circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the life of an
individual, knowingly engages in any
conduct and thereby recklessly causes
the death of or serious bodily injury
to any person; and
(ii) for not more than 20 years in
any other case; and
(2) paragraph (8) of subsection (a) of this section
is--
(A) a fine under this title; and
(B) imprisonment--
(i) for not more than 20 years if the
offense which is the object of the
conspiracy is punishable under
paragraph (1)(B)(i); and
(ii) for not more than 10 years in
any other case.
(c) The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) of this
section are that--
(1) the offense is committed in the United States or
the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, or the special aircraft jurisdiction
of the United States (as defined in section 46501 of
title 49);
(2) the defendant is a national of the United States,
as defined in section 101 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101);
(3) at the time of the offense the nuclear material
is in use, storage, or transport, for peaceful
purposes, and after the conduct required for the
offense occurs the defendant is found in the United
States, even if the conduct required for the offense
occurs outside the United States; or
(4) the conduct required for the offense occurs with
respect to the carriage of a consignment of nuclear
material for peaceful purposes by any means of
transportation intended to go beyond the territory of
the state where the shipment originates beginning with
the departure from a facility of the shipper in that
state and ending with the arrival at a facility of the
receiver within the state of ultimate destination and
either of such states is the United States.
(d) The Attorney General may request assistance from the
Secretary of Defense under chapter 18 of title 10 in the
enforcement of this section and the Secretary of Defense may
provide such assistance in accordance with chapter 18 of title
10, except that the Secretary of Defense may provide such
assistance through any Department of Defense personnel.
(e)(1) The Attorney General may also request assistance
from the Secretary of Defense under this subsection in the
enforcement of this section. Notwithstanding section 1385 of
this title, the Secretary of Defense may, in accordance with
other applicable law, provide such assistance to the Attorney
General if--
(A) an emergency situation exists (as jointly
determined by the Attorney General and the Secretary of
Defense in their discretion); and
(B) the provision of such assistance will not
adversely affect the military preparedness of the
United States (as determined by the Secretary of
Defense in such Secretary's discretion).
(2) As used in this subsection, the term ``emergency
situation'' means a circumstance--
(A) that poses a serious threat to the interests of
the United States; and
(B) in which--
(i) enforcement of the law would be
seriously impaired if the assistance
were not provided; and
(ii) civilian law enforcement
personnel are not capable of enforcing
the law.
(3) Assistance under this section may include--
(A) use of personnel of the Department of Defense to
arrest persons and conduct searches and seizures with
respect to violations of this section; and
(B) such other activity as is incidental to the
enforcement of this section, or to the protection of
persons or property from conduct that violates this
section.
(4) The Secretary of Defense may require reimbursement as a
condition of assistance under this section.
(5) The Attorney General may delegate the Attorney
General's function under this subsection only to a Deputy,
Associate, or Assistant Attorney General.
(f) As used in this section--
(1) the term ``nuclear material'' means material
containing any--
(A) plutonium with an isotopic concentration
not in excess of 80 percent plutonium 238;
(B) uranium not in the form of ore or ore
residue that contains the mixture of isotopes
as occurring in nature;
(C) uranium that contains the isotope 233 or
235 or both in such amount that the abundance
ratio of the sum of those isotopes to the
isotope 238 is greater than the ratio of the
isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in
nature; or
(D) uranium 233;
(2) the term ``international organization'' means a
public international organization designated as such
pursuant to section 1 of the International
Organizations Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. 288) or a
public organization created pursuant to treaty or other
agreement under international law as an instrument
through or by which two or more foreign governments
engage in some aspect of their conduct of international
affairs;
(3) the term ``serious bodily injury'' means bodily
injury which involves--
(A) a substantial risk of death;
(B) extreme physical pain;
(C) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or
(D) protracted loss or impairment of the
function of a bodily member, organ, or mental
faculty; and
(4) the term ``bodily injury'' means--
(A) a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn, or
disfigurement;
(B) physical pain;
(C) illness;
(D) impairment of a function of a bodily
member, organ, or mental faculty; or
(E) any other injury to the body, no matter
how temporary.
CHAPTER 41--EXTORTION AND THREATS
Sec. 878.\5\ Threats and extortion against foreign officials, official
guests, or internationally protected persons
(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully threatens to violate
section 112, 1116, or 1201 shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both, except that
imprisonment for a threatened assault shall not exceed three
years.
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\5\ Added by sec. 8 of Public Law 94-467 (90 Stat. 1997).
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(b) Whoever in connection with any violation of subsection
(a) or actual violation of section 112, 1116, or 1201 makes any
extortionate demand shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(c) For the purpose of this section ``foreign official'',
``internationally protected person'', ``national of the United
States'', and ``official guest'' shall have the same meanings
as those provided in section 1116(a) of this title.
(d) If the victim of an offense under subsection (a) is an
internationally protected person outside the United States, the
United States may exercise jurisdiction over the offense if (1)
the victim is a representative, officer, employee, or agent of
the United States, (2) an offender is a national of the United
States, or (3) an offender is afterwards found in the United
States. As used in this subsection, the United States includes
all areas under the jurisdiction of the United States including
any of the places within the provisions of section 5 and 7 of
this title and section 46501(2) of title 49.
CHAPTER 44--FIREARMS
Sec. 922. Unlawful acts
* * * * * * *
(p)(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture,
import, sell, ship, deliver, possess, transfer, or receive any
firearm--
(A) that, after removal of grips, stocks, and
magazines, is not as detectable as the Security
Exemplar, by walk-through metal detectors calibrated
and operated to detect the Security Exemplar; or
(B) any major component of which, when subjected to
inspection by the types of x-ray machines commonly used
at airports, does not generate an image that accurately
depicts the shape of the component. Barium sulfate or
other compounds may be used in the fabrication of the
component.
(2) For purposes of this subsection--
(A) the term ``firearm'' does not include the frame
or receiver of any such weapon;
(B) the term ``major component'' means, with respect
to a firearm, the barrel, the slide or cylinder, or the
frame or receiver of the firearm; and
(C) the term ``Security Exemplar'' means an object,
to be fabricated at the direction of the Secretary,
that is--
(i) constructed of, during the 12-month
period beginning on the date of the enactment
of this subsection, 3.7 ounces of material type
17-4 PH stainless steel in a shape resembling a
handgun; and
(ii) suitable for testing and calibrating
metal detectors:
Provided, however, That at the close of such 12-month
period, and at appropriate times thereafter the
Secretary shall promulgate regulations to permit the
manufacture, importation, sale, shipment, delivery,
possession, transfer, or receipt of firearms previously
prohibited under this subparagraph that are as
detectable as a ``Security Exemplar'' which contains
3.7 ounces of material type 17-4 PH stainless steel, in
a shape resembling a handgun, or such lesser amount as
is detectable in view of advances in state-of-the-art
developments in weapons detection technology.
(3) Under such rules and regulations as the Secretary shall
prescribe, this subsection shall not apply to the manufacture,
possession, transfer, receipt, shipment, or delivery of a
firearm by a licensed manufacturer or any person acting
pursuant to a contract with a licensed manufacturer, for the
purpose of examining and testing such firearm to determine
whether paragraph (1) applies to such firearm. The Secretary
shall ensure that rules and regulations adopted pursuant to
this paragraph do not impair the manufacture of prototype
firearms or the development of new technology.
(4) The Secretary shall permit the conditional importation
of a firearm by a licensed importer or licensed manufacturer,
for examination and testing to determine whether or not the
unconditional importation of such firearm would violate this
subsection.
(5) This subsection shall not apply to any firearm which--
(A) has been certified by the Secretary of Defense or
the Director of Central Intelligence, after
consultation with the Secretary and the Administrator
of the Federal Aviation Administration, as necessary
for military or intelligence applications; and
(B) is manufactured for and sold exclusively to
military or intelligence agencies of the United States.
(6) This subsection shall not apply with respect to any
firearm manufactured in, imported into, or possessed in the
United States before the date of the enactment of the
Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 924. Penalties
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection,
subsection (b), (c), or (f) of this section, or in section 929,
whoever--
(A) knowingly makes any false statement or
representation with respect to the information required
by this chapter to be kept in the records of a person
licensed under this chapter or in applying for any
license or exemption or relief from disability under
the provisions of this chapter;
(B) knowingly violates subsection (a)(4), (f), (k),
(r), (v), or (w) of section 922;
(C) knowingly imports or brings into the United
States or any possession thereof any firearm or
ammunition in violation of section 922(l); or
(D) willfully violates any other provision of this
chapter,
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
(2) Whoever knowingly violates subsection (a)(6), (d), (g),
(h), (i), (j), or (o) of section 922 shall be fined as provided
in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
(3) Any licensed dealer, licensed importer, licensed
manufacturer, or licensed collector who knowingly--
(A) makes any false statement or representation with
respect to the information required by the provisions
of this chapter to be kept in the records of a person
licensed under this chapter, or
(B) violates subsection (m) of section 922,
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than one
year, or both.
(4) Whoever violates section 922(q) shall be fined under
this title, imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the term of
imprisonment imposed under this paragraph shall not run
concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed under
any other provision of law. Except for the authorization of a
term of imprisonment of not more than 5 years made in this
paragraph, for the purpose of any other law a violation of
section 922(q) shall be deemed to be a misdemeanor.
(5) \6\ Whoever knowingly violates subsection (s) or (t) of
section 922 shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not
more than 1 year, or both.
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\6\ So in original. Two pars. (5) have been enacted.
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(5)(A)(i) \6\ A juvenile who violates section 922(x) shall
be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or
both, except that a juvenile described in clause (ii) shall be
sentenced to probation on appropriate conditions and shall not
be incarcerated unless the juvenile fails to comply with a
condition of probation.
(ii) A juvenile is described in this clause if--
(I) the offense of which the juvenile is charged is
possession of a handgun or ammunition in violation of
section 922(x)(2); and
(II) the juvenile has not been convicted in any court
of an offense (including an offense under section
922(x) or a similar State law, but not including any
other offense consisting of conduct that if engaged in
by an adult would not constitute an offense) or
adjudicated as a juvenile delinquent for conduct that
if engaged in by an adult would constitute an offense.
(B) A person other than a juvenile who knowingly violates
section 922(x)--
(i) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not
more than 1 year, or both; and
(ii) if the person sold, delivered, or otherwise
transferred a handgun or ammunition to a juvenile
knowing or having reasonable cause to know that the
juvenile intended to carry or otherwise possess or
discharge or otherwise use the handgun or ammunition in
the commission of a crime of violence, shall be fined
under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or
both.
(b) Whoever, with intent to commit therewith an offense
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or
with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that an offense
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year is to
be committed therewith, ships, transports, or receives a
firearm or any ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce
shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both.
(c)(1)(A) \7\ Except to the extent that a greater minimum
sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any
other provision of law, any person who, during and in relation
to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for
an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or
dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be
prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a
firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a
firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime--
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\7\ Sec. 924(c) was ammended by Public Law 105-386 (112 Stat.
3469).
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(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not
less than 5 years;
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.
(B) If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a
violation of this subsection--
(i) is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled
shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon, the person
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not
less than 10 years; or
(ii) is a machinegun or a destructive device, or is
equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler,
the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
of not less than 30 years.
(C) In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under
this subsection, the person shall--
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not
less than 25 years; and
(ii) if the firearm involved is a machinegun or a
destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm
silencer or firearm muffler, be sentenced to
imprisonment for life.
(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law--
(i) a court shall not place on probation any person
convicted of a violation of this subsection; and
(ii) no term of imprisonment imposed on a person
under this subsection shall run concurrently with any
other term of imprisonment imposed on the person,
including any term of imprisonment imposed for the
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during
which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term ``drug
trafficking crime'' means any felony punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et
seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App.
1901 et seq.).
(3) For purposes of this subsection the term ``crime of
violence'' means an offense that is a felony and--
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another, or
(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk
that physical force against the person or property of
another may be used in the course of committing the
offense.
(4) \8\ For purposes of this subsection, the term
`brandish' means, with respect to a firearm, to display all or
part of the firearm, or otherwise make the presence of the
firearm known to another person, in order to intimidate that
person, regardless of whether the firearm is directly visible
to that person.
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\8\ Sec. 924(c)(4) was added by Public Law 105-386 (112 Stat.
3469).
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(d)(1) Any firearm or ammunition involved in or used in any
knowing violation of subsection (a)(4), (a)(6), (f), (g), (h),
(i), (j), or (k) of section 922, or knowing importation or
bringing into the United States or any possession thereof any
firearm or ammunition in violation of section 922(l), or
knowing violation of section 924, or willful violation of any
other provision of this chapter or any rule or regulation
promulgated thereunder, or any violation of any other criminal
law of the United States, or any firearm or ammunition intended
to be used in any offense referred to in paragraph (3) of this
subsection, where such intent is demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence, shall be subject to seizure and
forfeiture, and all provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 relating to the seizure, forfeiture, and disposition of
firearms, as defined in section 5845(a) of that Code, shall, so
far as applicable, extend to seizures and forfeitures under the
provisions of this chapter: Provided, That upon acquittal of
the owner or possessor, or dismissal of the charges against him
other than upon motion of the Government prior to trial, or
lapse of or court termination of the restraining order to which
he is subject, the seized or relinquished firearms or
ammunition shall be returned forthwith to the owner or
possessor or to a person delegated by the owner or possessor
unless the return of the firearms or ammunition would place the
owner or possessor or his delegate in violation of law. Any
action or proceeding for the forfeiture of firearms or
ammunition shall be commenced within one hundred and twenty
days of such seizure.
(2)(A) In any action or proceeding for the return of
firearms or ammunition seized under the provisions of this
chapter, the court shall allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee, and the United
States shall be liable therefor.
(B) In any other action or proceeding under the provisions
of this chapter, the court, when it finds that such action was
without foundation, or was initiated vexatiously, frivolously,
or in bad faith, shall allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee, and the United
States shall be liable therefor.
(C) Only those firearms or quantities of ammunition
particularly named and individually identified as involved in
or used in any violation of the provisions of this chapter or
any rule or regulation issued thereunder, or any other criminal
law of the United States or as intended to be used in any
offense referred to in paragraph (3) of this subsection, where
such intent is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence,
shall be subject to seizure, forfeiture, and disposition.
(D) The United States shall be liable for attorneys' fees
under this paragraph only to the extent provided in advance by
appropriation Acts.
(3) The offenses referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2)(C)
of this subsection are--
(A) any crime of violence, as that term is defined in
section 924(c)(3) of this title;
(B) any offense punishable under the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.) or the
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C.
951 et seq.);
(C) any offense described in section 922(a)(1),
922(a)(3), 922(a)(5), or 922(b)(3) of this title, where
the firearm or ammunition intended to be used in any
such offense is involved in a pattern of activities
which includes a violation of any offense described in
section 922(a)(1), 922(a)(3), 922(a)(5), or 922(b)(3)
of this title;
(D) any offense described in section 922(d) of this
title where the firearm or ammunition is intended to be
used in such offense by the transferor of such firearm
or ammunition;
(E) any offense described in section 922(i), 922(j),
922(l), 922(n), or 924(b) of this title; and
(F) any offense which may be prosecuted in a court of
the United States which involves the exportation of
firearms or ammunition.
(e)(1) In the case of a person who violates section 922(g)
of this title and has three previous convictions by any court
referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent
felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on
occasions different from one another, such person shall be
fined not more than $25,000 and imprisoned not less than
fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a
probationary sentence to, such person with respect to the
conviction under section 922(g).
(2) As used in this subsection--
(A) the term ``serious drug offense'' means--
(i) an offense under the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.),
the Controlled Substances Import and
Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or
the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
(46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.) for which
a maximum term of imprisonment of ten
years or more is prescribed by law; or
(ii) an offense under State law,
involving manufacturing, distributing,
or possessing with intent to
manufacture or distribute, a controlled
substance (as defined in section 102 of
the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum term
of imprisonment of ten years or more is
prescribed by law;
(B) the term ``violent felony'' means any crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the
use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive
device that would be punishable by imprisonment for
such term if committed by an adult, that--
(i) has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of
another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or
extortion, involves use of explosives,
or otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another; and
(C) the term ``conviction'' includes a finding that a
person has committed an act of juvenile delinquency
involving a violent felony.
(f) In the case of a person who knowingly violates section
922(p), such person shall be fined under this title, or
imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
(g) Whoever, with the intent to engage in conduct which--
(1) constitutes an offense listed in section 1961(1),
(2) is punishable under the Controlled Substances Act
(21 U.S.C. 802 et seq.), the Controlled Substances
Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or the
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1901
et seq.),
(3) violates any State law relating to any controlled
substance (as defined in section 102(6) of the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6))), or
(4) constitutes a crime of violence (as defined in
subsection (c)(3)),
travels from any State or foreign country into any other State
and acquires, transfers, or attempts to acquire or transfer, a
firearm in such other State in furtherance of such purpose,
shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined in accordance
with this title, or both.
(h) Whoever knowingly transfers a firearm, knowing that
such firearm will be used to commit a crime of violence (as
defined in subsection (c)(3)) or drug trafficking crime (as
defined in subsection (c)(2)) shall be imprisoned not more than
10 years, fined in accordance with this title, or both.
(i)(1) \9\ A person who knowingly violates section 922(u)
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10
years, or both.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ So in original. Two subsecs. (i) have been enacted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed
as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the
field in which provisions of this subsection operate to the
exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall
any provision of this subsection be construed as invalidating
any provision of State law unless such provision is
inconsistent with any of the purposes of this subsection.
(i) \9\ A person who, in the course of a violation of
subsection (c), causes the death of a person through the use of
a firearm, shall--
(1) if the killing is a murder (as defined in section
1111), be punished by death or by imprisonment for any
term of years or for life; and
(2) if the killing is manslaughter (as defined in
section 1112), be punished as provided in that section.
(j) A person who, with intent to engage in or to promote
conduct that--
(1) is punishable under the Controlled Substances Act
(21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances
Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or the
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1901
et seq.);
(2) violates any law of a State relating to any
controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 802); or
(3) constitutes a crime of violence (as defined in
subsection (c)(3),\10\
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\10\ So in original. Probably should be subsection ``(c)(3)),''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
smuggles or knowingly brings into the United States a firearm,
or attempts to do so, shall be imprisoned not more than 10
years, fined under this title, or both.
(k) A person who steals any firearm which is moving as, or
is a part of, or which has moved in, interstate or foreign
commerce shall be imprisoned for not more than 10 years, fined
under this title, or both.
(l) A person who steals any firearm from a licensed
importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed
collector shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more
than 10 years, or both.
(m) A person who, with the intent to engage in conduct that
constitutes a violation of section 922(a)(1)(A), travels from
any State or foreign country into any other State and acquires,
or attempts to acquire, a firearm in such other State in
furtherance of such purpose shall be imprisoned for not more
than 10 years.
(n) A person who conspires to commit an offense under
subsection (c) shall be imprisoned for not more than 20 years,
fined under this title, or both; and if the firearm is a
machinegun or destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm
silencer or muffler, shall be imprisoned for any term of years
or life.
CHAPTER 45--FOREIGN RELATIONS
Sec. 970.\11\ Protection of property occupied by foreign governments
(a) Whoever willfully injures, damages, or destroys, or
attempts to injure, damage, or destroy, any property, real or
personal, located within the United States and belonging to or
utilized or occupied by any foreign government or international
organization, by a foreign official or official guest, shall be
fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
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\11\ Sec. 970 was enacted by the Act for the Protection of Foreign
Officials and Official Guests of the United States (Public Law 92-539;
86 Stat. 1070).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Whoever, willfully with intent to intimidate, coerce,
threaten, or harass--
(1) forcibly thrusts any part of himself or any
object within or upon that portion of any building or
premises located within the United States, which
portion is used or occupied for official business or
for diplomatic, consular, or residential purposes by--
(A) a foreign government, including such use
as a mission to an international organization;
(B) an international organization;
(C) a foreign official; or
(D) an official guest; or
(2) refuses to depart from such portion of such
building or premises after a request--
(A) by an employee of a foreign government or
of an international organization, if such
employee is authorized to make such request by
the senior official of the unit of such
government or organization which occupies such
portion of such building or premises;
(B) by a foreign official or any member of
the foreign official's staff who is authorized
by the foreign official to make such request;
(C) by an official guest or any member of the
official guest's staff who is authorized by the
official guest to make such request; or
(D) by any person present having law
enforcement powers;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than six
months, or both.
(c) For the purpose of this section ``foreign government'',
``foreign official'', ``international organization'', and
``official guest'' shall have the same meanings as those
provided in section 116(b) of this title.
CHAPTER 51--HOMICIDE
Sec. 1116.\12\ Murder or manslaughter of foreign officials, official
guests, or internationally protected persons
(a) Whoever kills or attempts to kill a foreign official,
official guest, or internationally protected person shall be
punished as provided under sections 1111, 1112, and 1113 of
this title, except that.\13\
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\12\ Sec. 1116 was enacted by the Act for the Protection of Foreign
Officials and Official Guests of the United States (Public Law 92-539;
86 Stat. 1070), and amended and restated by sec. 2 of Public Law 94-
467.
\13\ So in original. The phrase ``except that'' preceding the
period probably should not appear.
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(b) For the purposes of this section:
(1) ``Family'' includes (a) a spouse, parent, brother
or sister, child, or person to whom the foreign
official of internationally protected person stands in
loco parentis, or (b) any other person living in his
household and related to the foreign official or
internationally protected person by blood or marriage.
(2) ``Foreign government'' means the government of a
foreign country, irrespective of recognition by the
United States.
(3) ``Foreign official'' means--
(A) a Chief of State or the political
equivalent, President, Vice President, Prime
Minister, Ambassador, Foreign Minister, or
other officer of Cabinet rank or above of a
foreign government or the chief executive
officer of an international organization, or
any person who has previously served in such
capacity, and any member of his family, while
in the United States; and
(B) any person of a foreign nationality who
is duly notified to the United States as an
officer or employee of a foreign government or
international organization, and who is in the
United States on official business, and any
member of his family whose presence in the
United States is in connection with the
presence of such officer or employee.
(4) ``Internationally protected person'' means--
(A) a Chief of State or the political
equivalent, head of government, or Foreign
Minister whenever such person is in a country
other than his own and any member of his family
accompanying him; or
(B) any other representative, officer,
employee, or agent of the United States
Government, a foreign government, or
international organization who at the time and
place concerned is entitled pursuant to
international law to special protection against
attack upon his person, freedom, or dignity,
and any member of his family then forming part
of his household.
(5) ``International organization'' means a public
international organization designated as such pursuant
to section 1 of the International Organizations
Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. 288) or a public organization
created pursuant to treaty or other agreement under
international law as an instrument through or by which
two or more foreign governments engage in some aspect
of their conduct of international affairs.
(6) ``Official guest'' means a citizen or national of
a foreign country present in the United States as an
official guest of the Government of the United States
pursuant to designation as such by the Secretary of
State.
(7) \14\ ``National of the United States'' has the
meaning prescribed in section 101(a)(22) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Sec. 721(c)(1) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1298) added
para. (7). Sec. 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
defines the term as ``(A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a
person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent
allegiance to the United States.''.
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(c) If the victim of an offense under subsection (a) is an
internationally protected person outside the United States, the
United States may exercise jurisdiction over the offense if (1)
the victim is a representative, officer, employee, or agent of
the United States, (2) an offender is a national of the United
States, or (3) an offender is afterwards found in the United
States. As used in this subsection, the United States includes
all areas under the jurisdiction of the United States including
any of the places within the provisions of sections 5 and 7 of
this title and section 46501(2) of title 49.
(d) In the course of enforcement of this section and any
other sections prohibiting a conspiracy or attempt to violate
this section, the Attorney General may request assistance from
any Federal, State, or local agency, including the Army, Navy,
and Air Force, any statute, rule, or regulation to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Sec. 1117.\15\ Conspiracy to murder
If two or more persons conspire to violate section 1111,
1114, 1116, or 1119 of this title, and one or more of such
persons do any overt act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be punished by imprisonment for any term
of years or for life.
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\15\ Sec. 1117 was enacted by the Act for the Protection of Foreign
Officials and Official Guests of the United States (Public Law 92-539;
86 Stat. 1070).
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CHAPTER 55--KIDNAPPING
Sec. 1201.\16\ Kidnapping
(a) Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys,
kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or
reward or otherwise any person, except in the case of a minor
by the parent thereof, when--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Sec. 1201 was enacted by the Act for the Protection of Foreign
Officials and Official Guests of the United States (Public Law 92-539;
86 Stat. 1070).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) the person is willfully transported in interstate
or foreign commerce regardless of whether the person
was alive when transported across a State boundary if
the person was alive when the transportation began;
(2) any such act against the persons is done within
the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States;
(3) any such act against the person is done within
the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States
as defined in section 46501 of title 49;
(4) the person is a foreign official, an
internationally protected person, or an official guest
as those terms are defined in section 1116(b) of this
title; or
(5) the person is among those officers and employees
described in section 1114 of this title and any such
act against the person is done while the person is
engaged in, or on account of, the performance of
official duties;
shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for
life and, if the death of any person results, shall be punished
by death or life imprisonment.
(b) With respect to subsection (a)(1), above, the failure
to release the victim within twenty-four hours after he shall
have been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed,
kidnapped, abducted, or carried away shall create a rebuttable
presumption that such person has been transported in interstate
or foreign commerce. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence,
the fact that the presumption under this section has not yet
taken effect does not preclude a Federal investigation of a
possible violation of this section before the 24-hour period
has ended.\17\
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\17\ Last sentence added by sec. 702(c) of Public Law 105-314 (112
Stat. 2987).
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(c) If two or more persons conspire to violate this section
and one or more of such persons do any overt act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each shall be punished by
imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
(d) Whoever attempts to violate subsection (a) shall be
punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty years.
(e) If the victim of an offense under subsection (a) is an
internationally protected person outside the United States, the
United States may exercise jurisdiction over the offense if (1)
the victim is a representative, officer, employee, or agent of
the United States, (2) an offender is a national of the United
States, or (3) an offender is afterwards found in the United
States. As used in this subsection, the United States includes
all areas under the jurisdiction of the United States including
any of the places within the provisions of section 5 and 7 of
this title and section 46501(2) of title 49. For purposes of
this subsection, the term ``national of the United States'' has
the meaning prescribed in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
(f) In the course of enforcement of subsection (a)(4) and
any other sections prohibiting a conspiracy or attempt to
violate subsection (a)(4), the Attorney General may request
assistance from any Federal, State, or local agency, including
the Army, Navy, and Air Force, any statute, rule, or regulation
to the contrary notwithstanding.''.
(g) Special Rule for Certain Offenses Involving Children.--
(1) To whom applicable.--If--
(A) the victim of an offense under this
section has not attained the age of eighteen
years; and
(B) the offender--
(i) has attained such age; and
(ii) is not--
(I) a parent;
(II) a grandparent;
(III) a brother;
(IV) a sister;
(V) an aunt;
(VI) an uncle; or
(VII) an individual having
legal custody of the victim;
the sentence under this section for such offense shall be
subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection.
(2) Guidelines.--The United States Sentencing
Commission is directed to amend the existing guidelines
for the offense of ``kidnapping, abduction, or unlawful
restraint,'' by including the following additional
specific offense characteristics: If the victim was
intentionally maltreated (i.e., denied either food or
medical care) to a life-threatening degree, increase by
4 levels; if the victim was sexually exploited (i.e.,
abused, used involuntarily for pornographic purposes)
increase by 3 levels; if the victim was placed in the
care or custody of another person who does not have a
legal right to such care or custody of the child either
in exchange for money or other consideration, increase
by 3 levels; if the defendant allowed the child to be
subjected to any of the conduct specified in this
section by another person, then increase by 2 levels.
(h) As used in this section, the term ``parent'' does not
include a person whose parental rights with respect to the
victim of an offense under this section have been terminated by
a final court order.
CHAPTER 75--PASSPORTS AND VISAS
Sec. 1541. Issuance Without Authority.
Whoever, acting or claiming to act in any office or
capacity under the United States, or a State, without lawful
authority grants, issues, or verifies any passport or other
instrument in the nature of a passport to or for any person
whomsoever; or
Whoever, being a consular officer authorized to grant,
issue, or verify passports, knowingly and willfully grants,
issues, or verifies any such passport to or for any person not
owing allegiance, to the United States, whether a citizen or
not--
Shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than
25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of
international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this
title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a
drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this
title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such
offense, if the offense was not committed to facility such an
act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or
15 years (in the case of any other offense),\18\ or both.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Sec. 211(a)(2) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (division C of Public Law 104-208; 110 Stat.
3009) struck out ``imprisoned not more than ten years'' and inserted in
lieu thereof ``imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense was
committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined
in section 2331 of this title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed
to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of
this title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such
offense, if the offense was not committed to facility such an act of
international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in
the case of any other offense)''.
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For purposes of this section, the term ``State'' means a
State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any
commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.
Sec. 1542. False Statement in Application and Use of Passport.
Whoever willfully and knowingly makes any false statement
in an application for passport with intent to induce or secure
the issuance of a passport under the authority of the United
States, either for his own use or the use of another, contrary
to the laws regulating the issuance of passports or the rules
prescribed pursuant to such laws; or
Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use,
or furnishes to another for use any passport the issue of which
was secured in any way by reason of any false statement--
Shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than
25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of
international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this
title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a
drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this
title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such
offense, if the offense was not committed to facility such an
act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or
15 years (in the case of any other offense),\19\ or both.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Sec. 211(a)(2) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (division C of Public Law 104-208; 110 Stat.
3009) struck out ``imprisoned not more than ten years'' and inserted in
lieu thereof ``imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense was
committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined
in section 2331 of this title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed
to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of
this title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such
offense, if the offense was not committed to facility such an act of
international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in
the case of any other offense)''.
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Sec. 1543. Forgery or False Use of Passport.
Whoever falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, mutilates, or
alters any passport or instrument purporting to be a passport,
with intent that the same may be used; or
Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use,
or furnishes to another for use any such false, forged,
counterfeited, mutilated, or altered passport or instrument
purporting to be a passport, or any passport validly issued
which has become void by the occurrence of any condition
therein prescribed invalidating the same--
Shall be fined not under this title, imprisoned not more
than 25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an
act of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of
this title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to
facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section
929(a) of this title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or
second such offense, if the offense was not committed to
facility such an act of international terrorism or a drug
trafficking crime), or 15 years (in the case of any other
offense),\19\ or both.
Sec. 1544. Misuse of Passport.
Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use,
any passport issued or designed for the use of another; or
Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use,
any passport in violation of the conditions or restrictions
therein contained or of the rules prescribed pursuant to the
laws regulating the issuance of passports; or
Whoever willfully and knowingly furnishes, disposes of, or
delivers a passport to any person, for use by another than the
person for whose use it was originally issued and designed--
Shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than
25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of
international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this
title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a
drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this
title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such
offense, if the offense was not committed to facility such an
act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or
15 years (in the case of any other offense),\19\ or both.
Sec. 1545. Safe Conduct Violation.
Whoever violates any safe conduct or passport duly obtained
and issued under authority of the United States shall be fined
under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
Sec. 1546. Fraud and Misuse of Visas, Permits, and Other Documents.
(a) Whoever knowingly forges, counterfeits, alters, or
falsely makes any immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, permit,
border crossing card, alien registration receipt card, or other
document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or
as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United
States, or utters, uses, attempts to use, possesses, obtains,
accepts, or receives any such visa, permit, border crossing
card, alien registration receipt card, or other document
prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or as
evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States,
knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely
made, or to have been procured by means of any false claim or
statement, or to have been otherwise procured by fraud or
unlawfully obtained; or
Whoever, except under direction of the Attorney General or
the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
or other proper officer, knowingly possesses any blank permit,
or engraves, sells, brings into the United States, or has in
his control or possession any plate in the likeness of a plate
designed for the printing of permits, or makes any print,
photograph, or impression in the likeness of any immigrant or
nonimmigrant visa, permit or other document required for entry
into the United States, or has in his possession a distinctive
paper which has been adopted by the Attorney General or the
Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for
the printing of such visas, permits, or documents; or
Whoever, when applying for an immigrant or nonimmigrant
visa, permit, or other document required for entry into the
United States, or for admission to the United States personates
another, or falsely appears in the name of a deceased
individual, or evades or attempts to evade the immigration laws
by appearing under an assumed or fictitious name without
disclosing his true identity, or sells or otherwise disposes
of, or offers to sell or otherwise dispose of, or utters, such
visa, permit, or other document, to any person not authorized
by law to receive such document; or
Whoever knowingly makes under oath, or as permitted under
penalty of perjury under section 1746 of title 28, United
States Code, knowingly subscribes as true, any false statement
with respect to a material fact in any application, affidavit,
or other document required by the immigration laws or
regulations prescribed thereunder, or knowingly presents any
such application, affidavit, or other document which contains
any such false statement or which fails to contain any
reasonable basis in law or fact--
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of
international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this
title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a
drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this
title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such
offense, if the offense was not committed to facility such an
act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or
15 years (in the case of any other offense),\20\ or both.
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\20\ Sec. 211(a)(2) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (division C of Public Law 104-208; 110 Stat.
3009) struck out ``imprisoned not more than ten years'' and inserted in
lieu thereof ``imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense was
committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined
in section 2331 of this title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed
to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of
this title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such
offense, if the offense was not committed to facility such an act of
international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in
the case of any other offense)''.
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(b) Whoever uses--
(1) an identification document, knowing (or having
reason to know) that the document was not issued
lawfully for the use of the possessor,
(2) an identification document knowing (or having
reason to know) that the document is false, or
(3) a false attestation,
for the purpose of satisfying a requirement of section 274A(b)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, shall be fined under
this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
(c) This section does not prohibit any lawfully authorized
investigative, protective, or intelligence activity of a law
enforcement agency of the United States, a State, or a
subdivision of a State, or of an intelligence agency of the
United States, or any activity authorized under title V of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. For purposes of this
section, the term ``State'' means a State of the United States,
the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or
possession of the United States.
CHAPTER 111--SHIPPING
Sec. Sec. 2280. Violence against maritime navigation
(a) Offenses.--
(1) In general.--A person who unlawfully and
intentionally--
(A) seizes or exercises control over a ship
by force or threat thereof or any other form of
intimidation;
(B) performs an act of violence against a
person on board a ship if that act is likely to
endanger the safe navigation of that ship;
(C) destroys a ship or causes damage to a
ship or to its cargo which is likely to
endanger the safe navigation of that ship;
(D) places or causes to be placed on a ship,
by any means whatsoever, a device or substance
which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause
damage to that ship or its cargo which
endangers or is likely to endanger the safe
navigation of that ship;
(E) destroys or seriously damages maritime
navigational facilities or seriously interferes
with their operation, if such act is likely to
endanger the safe navigation of a ship;
(F) communicates information, knowing the
information to be false and under circumstances
in which such information may reasonably be
believed, thereby endangering the safe
navigation of a ship;
(G) injures or kills any person in connection
with the commission or the attempted commission
of any of the offenses set forth in
subparagraphs (A) through (F); or
(H) attempts to do any act prohibited under
subparagraphs (A) through (G),
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20
years,or both; and if the death of any person results from
conductprohibited by this paragraph, shall be punished by death
orimprisoned for any term of years or for life.
(2) Threat to navigation.--A person who threatens to
do any actprohibited under paragraph (1)(B), (C) or
(E), with apparentdetermination and will to carry the
threat into execution, if thethreatened act is likely
to endanger the safe navigation of the shipin question,
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not
morethan 5 years, or both.
(b) Jurisdiction.--There is jurisdiction over the activity
prohibited in subsection (a)--
(1) in the case of a covered ship, if--
(A) such activity is committed--
(i) against or on board a ship flying
the flag of the United States at the
time the prohibited activity is
committed;
(ii) in the United States and the
activity is not prohibited as a crime
by the State in which the activity
takes place; or
(iii) the activity takes place on a
ship flying the flag of a foreign
country or outside the United States,
by a national of the United States or
by a stateless person whose habitual
residence is in the United States;
(B) during the commission of such activity, a
national of the United States is seized,
threatened, injured or killed; or
(C) the offender is later found in the United
States after such activity is committed;
(2) in the case of a ship navigating or scheduled to
navigate solely within the territorial sea or internal
waters of a country other than the United States, if
the offender is later found in the United States after
such activity is committed; and
(3) in the case of any vessel, if such activity is
committed in an attempt to compel the United States to
do or abstain from doingany act.
(c) Bar To Prosecution.--It is a bar to Federal prosecution
under subsection (a) for conduct that occurred within the
United States that the conduct involved was during or in
relation to a labor dispute, and such conduct is prohibited as
a felony under the law of the State in which it was committed.
For purposes of this section, the term ``labor dispute'' has
the meaning set forth in section 2(c) \21\ of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. 113(c)).
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\21\ So in original. Probably should be section ``13(c)''.
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(d) Delivery of Suspected Offender.--The master of a
covered ship flying the flag of the United States who has
reasonable grounds to believe that there is on board that ship
any person who has committed an offense under Article 3 of the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation may deliver such person to the
authorities of a State Party to that Convention. Before
delivering such person to the authorities of another country,
the master shall notify in an appropriate manner the Attorney
General of the United States of the alleged offense and await
instructions from the Attorney General as to what action to
take. When delivering the person to a country which is a State
Party to the Convention, the master shall, whenever
practicable, and if possible before entering the territorial
sea of such country, notify the authorities of such country of
the master's intention to deliver such person and the reasons
therefor. If the master delivers such person, the master shall
furnish to the authorities of such country the evidence in the
master's possession that pertains to the alleged offense.
(e) Definitions.--In this section--
``covered ship'' means a ship that is navigating or
is scheduled to navigate into, through or from waters
beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a
single country or a lateral limit of that country's
territorial sea with an adjacent country.
``national of the United States'' has the meaning
stated in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
``territorial sea of the United States'' means all
waters extending seaward to 12 nautical miles from the
baselines of the United States determined in accordance
with international law.
``ship'' means a vessel of any type whatsoever not
permanently attached to the sea-bed, including
dynamically supported craft, submersibles or any other
floating craft, but does not include a warship, a ship
owned or operated by a government when being used as a
naval auxiliary or for customs or police purposes, or a
ship which has been withdrawn from navigation or laid
up.
``United States'', when used in a geographical sense,
includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and all
territories and possessions of the United States.
Sec. 2281. Violence against maritime fixed platforms
(a) Offenses.--
(1) In general.--A person who unlawfully and
intentionally--
(A) seizes or exercises control over a fixed
platform by force or threat thereof or any
other form of intimidation;
(B) performs an act of violence against a
person on board a fixed platform if that act is
likely to endanger its safety;
(C) destroys a fixed platform or causes
damage to it which is likely to endanger its
safety;
(D) places or causes to be placed on a fixed
platform, by any means whatsoever, a device or
substance which is likely to destroy that fixed
platform or likely to endanger its safety;
(E) injures or kills any person in connection
with the commission or the attempted commission
of any of the offenses set forth in
subparagraphs (A) through (D); or
(F) attempts to do anything prohibited under
subparagraphs (A) through (E),
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both; and if death results to any person from conduct
prohibited by this paragraph, shall be punished by death or
imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
(2) Threat to safety.--A person who threatens to do
anything prohibited under paragraph (1)(B) or (C), with
apparent determination and will to carry the threat
into execution, if the threatened act is likely to
endanger the safety of the fixed platform, shall be
fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5
years, or both.
(b) Jurisdiction.--There is jurisdiction over the activity
prohibited in subsection (a) if--
(1) such activity is committed against or on board a
fixed platform--
(A) that is located on the continental shelf
of the United States;
(B) that is located on the continental shelf
of another country, by a national of the United
States or by a stateless person whose habitual
residence is in the United States; or
(C) in an attempt to compel the United States
to do or abstain from doing any act;
(2) during the commission of such activity against or
on board a fixed platform located on a continental
shelf, a national of the United States is seized,
threatened, injured or killed; or
(3) such activity is committed against or on board a
fixed platform located outside the United States and
beyond the continental shelf of the United States and
the offender is later found in the United States.
(c) Bar To Prosecution.--It is a bar to Federal prosecution
under subsection (a) for conduct that occurred within the
United States that the conduct involved was during or in
relation to a labor dispute, and such conduct is prohibited as
a felony under the law of the State in which it was committed.
For purposes of this section, the term ``labor dispute'' has
the meaning set forth in section 2(c) \22\ of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. 113(c)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ So in original. Probably should be section ``13(c)''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(d) Definitions.--In this section--
``continental shelf'' means the sea-bed and subsoil
of the submarine areas that extend beyond a country's
territorial sea to the limits provided by customary
international law as reflected in Article 76 of the
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.
``fixed platform'' means an artificial island,
installation or structure permanently attached to the
sea-bed for the purpose of exploration or exploitation
of resources or for other economic purposes.
``national of the United States'' has the meaning
stated in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
``territorial sea of the United States'' means all
waters extending seaward to 12 nautical miles from the
baselines of the United States determined in accordance
with international law.
``United States'', when used in a geographical sense,
includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and all
territories and possessions of the United States.
CHAPTER 113B--TERRORISM \23\
Sec. 2331.\24\ Definitions
As used in this chapter--
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\23\ Sec. 250002(a) of Public Law 103-322 (108 Stat. 2082)
redesignated this chapter as chapter 113B from chapter 113A, and
inserted a new chapter 113A relating to telemarketing fraud.
\24\ Sec. 132 of Public Law 101-519 (104 Stat. 225) amended section
2331 of chapter 113A, title 18, U.S.C., redesignated it as section
2332, and added new secs. 2331, 2333 through 2338. Sec. 132(d) of that
Act further provided that ``This section and the amendments made by
this section shall apply to any pending case and any cause of action
arising on or after 3 years before the date of enactment of this
section.''.
However, sec. 402 of Public Law 102-27 (105 Stat. 155), as amended
by sec. 126 of Public Law 102-136 (105 Stat. 643), repealed the
amendments of Public Law 101-519, restoring sec. 2332 as sec. 2331.
Sec. 402 of Public Law 102-27, as amended, provided as follows:
``sec. 402. military construction.
``(a) In Public Law 101-519, the Military Construction
Appropriations Act, 1991, sections 131 and 132 are hereby repealed
effective November 5, 1990.
``(b) Effective November 5, 1990, chapter 113A of title 18, United
States Code, is amended to read as if section 132 of Public Law 101-519
[104 Stat. 2250] had not been enacted.''.
Subsequently, sec. 1003(a) of the Federal Courts Administration Act
of 1992 (Public Law 102-572; 106 Stat. 4521) redesignated sec. 2331 as
2332, and inserted new secs. 2331, 2333-2338, with such amendments
applicable ``to any pending case or any cause of action arising on or
after 4 years before the date of enactment of this Act'', pursuant to
sec. 1003(c) of Public Law 102-572 (106 Stat. 4524; 18 U.S.C. 2331
note).
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(1) the term ``international terrorism'' means
activities that--
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to
human life that are a violation of the criminal
laws of the United States or of any State, or
that would be a criminal violation if committed
within the jurisdiction of the United States or
of any State;
(B) appear to be intended--
(i) to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion;
or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a
government by assassination or
kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend
national boundaries in terms of the means by
which they are accomplished, the persons they
appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the
locale in which their perpetrators operate or
seek asylum;
(2) the term ``national of the United States'' has
the meaning given such term in section 101(a)(22) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act;
(3) the term ``person'' means any individual or
entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial
interest in property; and
(4) the term ``act of war'' means any act occurring
in the course of--
(A) declared war;
(B) armed conflict, whether or not war has
been declared, between two or more nations; or
(C) armed conflict between military forces of
any origin.
Sec. 2332.\25\ Criminal penalties
(a) Homicide.--Whoever kills a national of the United
States, while such national is outside the United States,
shall--
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\25\ This section was added as sec. 2331 by sec. 1202(a) of Public
Law 99-399 (100 Stat. 896), with a caption that read ``Terrorist acts
abroad against United States nationals''. Sec. 1003(a)(2) of Public Law
102-572 (106 Stat. 4521) redesignated sec. 2331 as 2332, struck out the
caption, and inserted in its place a caption that read ``Criminal
penalties'', with such amendment applicable ``to any pending case or
any cause of action arising on or after 4 years before the date of
enactment of this Act'', pursuant to sec. 1003(c) of Public Law 102-572
(106 Stat. 4524; 18 U.S.C. 2331 note).
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(1) if the killing is murder (as defined in section
1111(a), be fined under this title, punished by death
or imprisonment for any term of years or for life, or
both;
(2) if the killing is a voluntary manslaughter as
defined in section 1112(a) of this title, be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years,
or both; and
(3) if the killing is an involuntary manslaughter as
defined in section 1112(a) of this title, be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than three
years, or both.
(b) Attempt or Conspiracy With Respect to Homicide.--
Whoever outside the United States attempts to kill, or engages
in a conspiracy to kill, a national of the United States
shall--
(1) in the case of an attempt to commit a killing
that is a murder as defined in this chapter, be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years,
or both; and
(2) in the case of a conspiracy by two or more
persons to commit a killing that is a murder as defined
in section 1111(a) of this title, if one or more of
such persons do any overt act to effect the object of
the conspiracy, be fined under this title or imprisoned
for any term of years or for life, or both so fined and
so imprisoned.
(c) Other Conduct.--Whoever outside the United States
engages in physical violence--
(1) with intent to cause serious bodily injury to a
national of the United States; or
(2) with the result that serious bodily harm is
caused to a national of the United States;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both.
(d) \26\ Limitation on Prosecution.--No prosecution for any
offense described in this section shall be undertaken by the
United Stats except on written certification of the Attorney
General or the highest ranking subordinate of the Attorney
General with responsibility for criminal prosecutions that, in
the judgment of the certifying official, such offense was
intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a
government or a civilian population.
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\26\ Sec. 1003(a)(1) of Public Law 102-572 (106 Stat. 4521) struck
out subsec. (d), and redesignated subsec. (e) as (d), with such
amendment applicable ``to any pending case or any cause of action
arising on or after 4 years before the date of enactment of this Act'',
pursuant to sec. 1003(c) of Public Law 102-572 (106 Stat. 4524; 18
U.S.C. 2331 note). Subsec. (d) defined ``national of the United
States'' as having the meaning given in section 101(a)(22) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
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Sec. 2332a.\27\ Use of certain weapons of mass destruction
(a) \28\ Offense Against a National of the United States or
Within the United States.--A person who, without lawful
authority, uses, threatens, or attempts \29\ or conspires to
use, a weapon of mass destruction (other than a chemical weapon
as that term is defined in section 229F), including any
biological agent, toxin, or vector (as those terms are defined
in section 178)--\30\
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\27\ Sec. 60023(a) of Public Law 103-322 (108 Stat. 1980) added
sec. 2332a.
\28\ Sec. 725(1)(A) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1300) inserted
``Against a National of the United States or Within the United States''
after ``Offense'' in the subsec. heading.
\29\ Sec. 725(1)(B) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1300) struck
out ``uses, or attempts'' and inserted in lieu thereof ``, without
lawful authority, uses, threatens, or attempts''.
\30\ Sec. 511(c) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1284) added
``including any biological agent, toxin, or vector (as those terms are
defined in section 178)'' after ``destruction''.
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(1) against a national of the United States while
such national is outside of the United States;
(2) against any person within the United States, and
the results of such use affect interstate or foreign
commerce or, in the case of a threat, attempt, or
conspiracy, would have affected interstate or foreign
commerce; \31\ or
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\31\ Sec. 725(1)(C) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1300) added
``, and the results of such use affect interstate or foreign commerce
or, in the case of a threat, attempt, or conspiracy, would have
affected interstate or foreign commerce''.
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(3) against any property that is owned, leased or
used by the United States or by any department or
agency of the United States, whether the property is
within or outside of the United States,
shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, and if
death results, shall be imprisoned by death or imprisoned for
any term of years of for life.
(b) \32\ Offense by National of the United States Outside
of the United States.--Any national of the United States who,
without lawful authority, uses, or threatens, attempts, or
conspires to use, a weapon of mass destruction (other than a
chemical weapon (as that term is defined in section 229F))
outside of the United States shall be imprisoned for any term
of years or for life, and if death results, shall be punished
by death, or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
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\32\ Sec. 725(3) and (4) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1300)
redesignated subsec. (b) as subsec. (c), and added a new subsec. (b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) \32\ Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
(1) the term ``national of the United States'' has
the meaning given in section 101(a)(22) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22));
and
(2) the term ``weapon of mass destruction'' means--
(A) any destructive device as defined in
section 921 of this title;
(B) any weapon that is designed or intended to cause
death or serious bodily injury through the release,
dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous
chemicals, or their precursors;
(C) any weapon involving a disease organism;
or
(D) any weapon that is designed to release
radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous
to human life.
Sec. 2332b.\33\ Acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries
(a) Prohibited Acts.--
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\33\ Added by sec. 702(a) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1291).
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(1) Offenses.--Whoever, involving conduct
transcending national boundaries and in a circumstance
described in subsection (b)--
(A) kills, kidnaps, maims, commits an assault
resulting in serious bodily injury, or assaults
with a dangerous weapon any person within the
United States; or
(B) creates a substantial risk of serious
bodily injury to any other person by destroying
or damaging any structure, conveyance, or other
real or personal property within the United
States or by attempting or conspiring to
destroy or damage any structure, conveyance, or
other real or personal property within the
United States;
in violation of the laws of any State, or the United
States, shall be punished as prescribed in subsection
(c).
(2) Treatment of threats, attempts and
conspiracies.--Whoever threatens to commit an offense
under paragraph (1), or attempts or conspires to do so,
shall be punished under subsection (c).
(b) Jurisdictional Bases.--
(1) Circumstances.--The circumstances referred to in
subsection (a) are--
(A) the mail or any facility of interstate or
foreign commerce is used in furtherance of the
offense;
(B) the offense obstructs, delays, or affects
interstate or foreign commerce, or would have
so obstructed, delayed, or affected interstate
or foreign commerce if the offense had been
consummated;
(C) the victim, or intended victim, is the
United States Government, a member of the
uniformed services, or any official, officer,
employee, or agent of the legislative,
executive, or judicial branches, or of any
department or agency, of the United States;
(D) the structure, conveyance, or other real
or personal property is, in whole or in part,
owned, possessed, or leased to the United
States, or any department or agency of the
United States;
(E) the offense is committed in the
territorial sea (including the airspace above
and the seabed and subsoil below, and
artificial islands and fixed structures erected
thereon) of the United States; or
(F) the offense is committed within the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
of the United States.
(2) Co-conspirators and accessories after the fact.--
Jurisdiction shall exist over all principals and co-
conspirators of an offense under this section, and
accessories after the fact to any offense under this
section, if at least one of the circumstances described
in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (1) is
applicable to at least one offender.
(c) Penalties.--
(1) Penalties.--Whoever violates this section shall
be punished--
(A) for a killing, or if death results to any
person from any other conduct prohibited by
this section, by death, or by imprisonment for
any term of years or for life;
(B) for kidnapping, by imprisonment for any
term of years or for life;
(C) for maiming, by imprisonment for not more
than 35 years;
(D) for assault with a dangerous weapon or
assault resulting in serious bodily injury, by
imprisonment for not more than 30 years;
(E) for destroying or damaging any structure,
conveyance, or other real or personal property,
by imprisonment for not more than 25 years;
(F) for attempting or conspiring to commit an
offense, for any term of years up to the
maximum punishment that would have applied had
the offense been completed; and
(G) for threatening to commit an offense
under this section, by imprisonment for not
more than 10 years.
(2) Consecutive sentence.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the court shall not place on
probation any person convicted of a violation of this
section; nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed
under this section run concurrently with any other term
of imprisonment.
(d) Proof Requirements.--The following shall apply to
prosecutions under this section:
(1) Knowledge.--The prosecution is not required to
prove knowledge by any defendant of a jurisdictional
base alleged in the indictment.
(2) State law.--In a prosecution under this section
that is based upon the adoption of State law, only the
elements of the offense under State law, and not any
provisions pertaining to criminal procedure or
evidence, are adopted.
(e) Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.--There is
extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction--
(1) over any offense under subsection (a), including
any threat, attempt, or conspiracy to commit such
offense; and
(2) over conduct which, under section 3, renders any
person an accessory after the fact to an offense under
subsection (a).
(f) Investigative Authority.--In addition to any other
investigative authority with respect to violations of this
title, the Attorney General shall have primary investigative
responsibility for all Federal crimes of terrorism, and the
Secretary of the Treasury shall assist the Attorney General at
the request of the Attorney General. Nothing in this section
shall be construed to interfere with the authority of the
United States Secret Service under section 3056.
(g) Definitions.--As used in this section--
(1) the term ``conduct transcending national
boundaries'' means conduct occurring outside of the
United States in addition to the conduct occurring in
the United States;
(2) the term ``facility of interstate or foreign
commerce'' has the meaning given that term in section
1958(b)(2);
(3) the term ``serious bodily injury'' has the
meaning given that term in section 1365(g)(3);
(4) the term ``territorial sea of the United States''
means all waters extending seaward to 12 nautical miles
from the baselines of the United States, determined in
accordance with international law; and
(5) the term ``Federal crime of terrorism'' means an
offense that--
(A) is calculated to influence or affect the
conduct of government by intimidation or
coercion, or to retaliate against government
conduct; and
(B) is a violation of--
(i) section 32 (relating to
destruction of aircraft or aircraft
facilities), 37 (relating to violence
at international airports), 81
(relating to arson within special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction),
175 (relating to biological weapons),
351 (relating to congressional,
cabinet, and Supreme Court
assassination, kidnapping, and
assault), 831 (relating to nuclear
materials), 842 (m) or (n) (relating to
plastic explosives), 844(e) (relating
to certain bombings), 844 (f) or (i)
(relating to arson and bombing of
certain property),930(c),\34\ 956
(relating to conspiracy to injure
property of a foreign government), 1114
(relating to protection of officers and
employees of the United States), 1116
(relating to murder or manslaughter of
foreign officials, official guests, or
internationally protected persons),
1203 (relating to hostage taking), 1361
(relating to injury of Government
property or contracts), 1362 (relating
to destruction of communication lines,
stations, or systems), 1363 (relating
to injury to buildings or property
within special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States),
1366 (relating to destruction of an
energy facility), 1751 (relating to
Presidential and Presidential staff
assassination, kidnapping, and
assault), 1992,\34\ 2152 (relating to
injury of fortifications, harbor
defenses, or defensive sea areas), 2155
(relating to destruction of national
defense materials, premises, or
utilities), 2156 (relating to
production of defective national
defense materials, premises, or
utilities), 2280 (relating to violence
against maritime navigation), 2281
(relating to violence against maritime
fixed platforms), 2332 (relating to
certain homicides and other violence
against United States nationals
occurring outside of the United
States), 2332a (relating to use of
weapons of mass destruction), 2332b
(relating to acts of terrorism
transcending national boundaries),
2332c,\34\ 2339A (relating to providing
material support to terrorists), 2339B
(relating to providing material support
to terrorist organizations), or 2340A
(relating to torture);
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\34\ Sec. 601(s)(3) of Public Law 104-294 (110 Stat. 3502) inserted
reference to secs. 930(c), 1992, and 2332c.
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(ii) section 236 (relating to
sabotage of nuclear facilities or fuel)
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2284); or
(iii) section 46502 (relating to
aircraft piracy) or section 60123(b)
(relating to destruction of interstate
gas or hazardous liquid pipeline
facility) of title 49.
Sec. 2332c.\35\ Use of chemical weapons
(a) Prohibited Acts.--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Sec. 521(a) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1286) added sec.
2332c.
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(1) Offense.--A person shall be punished under
paragraph (2) if that person, without lawful authority,
uses, or attempts or conspires to use, a chemical
weapon against--
(A) a national of the United States while
such national is outside of the United States;
(B) any person within the United States; or
(C) any property that is owned, leased, or
used by the United States or by any department
or agency of the United States, whether the
property is within or outside of the United
States.
(2) Penalties.--A person who violates paragraph (1)--
(A) shall be imprisoned for any term of years
or for life; or
(B) if death results from that violation,
shall be punished by death or imprisoned for
any term of years or for life.
(b) Definitions.--As used in this section--
(1) the term ``national of the United States'' has
the same meaning as in section 101(a)(22) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22));
and
(2) the term ``chemical weapon'' means any weapon
that is designed or intended to cause widespread death
or serious bodily injury through the release,
dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous
chemicals or precursors of toxic or poisonous
chemicals.
Sec. 2332d.\36\ Financial transactions
(a) Offense.--Except as provided in regulations issued by
the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, whoever, being a United States person,
knowing or having reasonable cause to know that a country is
designated under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act
(50 U.S.C. App. 2405) as a country supporting international
terrorism, engages in a financial transaction with the
government of that country, shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Sec. 321(a) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1254) added sec.
2332d. Sec. 321(c) of that Act also provided that ``The amendments made
by this section shall become effective 120 days after the date of
enactment of this Act.'' [enactment date, April 24, 1996].
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(b) Definitions.--As used in this section--
(1) the term ``financial transaction'' has the same
meaning as in section 1956(c)(4); and
(2) the term ``United States person'' means any--
(A) United States citizen or national;
(B) permanent resident alien;
(C) juridical person organized under the laws
of the United States; or
(D) any person in the United States.
Sec. 2332e.\37\ Requests for military assistance to enforce prohibition
in certain emergencies
The Attorney General may request the Secretary of Defense
to provide assistance under section 382 of title 10 in support
of Department of Justice activities relating to the enforcement
of section 2332c of this title during an emergency situation
involving a chemical weapon of mass destruction. The authority
to make such a request may be exercised by another official of
the Department of Justice in accordance with section 382(f)(2)
of title 10.
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\37\ Sec. 1416(c)(2)(A) of Public Law 104-201 (110 Stat. 2723)
added this section as section 2332d to ``chapter 133B of title 18,
United States Code, that relates to terrorism after section 2332c''.
There is no chapter 133B; it is assumed the amendment is to chapter
113B. Sec. 605(q) of Public Law 104-294 (110 Stat. 3510) subsequently
redesignated the section as sec. 2332e and moved the section to follow
sec. 2332d.
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Sec. 2333.\24\ Civil remedies
(a) Action and Jurisdiction.--Any national of the United
States injured in his or her person, property, or business by
reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her
estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any
appropriate district court of the United States and shall
recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost
of the suit, including attorney's fees.
(b) Estoppel Under United States Law.--A final judgment or
decree rendered in favor of the United States in any criminal
proceeding under section 1116, 1201, 1203, or 2332 of this
title or section 46314, 46502, 46505, or 46506 of title 49 \38\
shall estop the defendant from denying the essential
allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil
proceeding under this section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Sec. 2(1) of Public Law 103-429 (108 Stat. 4377) struck out
``section 902(i), (k), (l), (n), or (r) of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 (49 U.S.C. App. 1472(i), (k), (l), (n), or (r))'' and inserted in
lieu thereof ``section 46314, 46502, 46505, or 46506 of title 49''.
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(c) Estoppel Under Foreign Law.--A final judgment or decree
rendered in favor of any foreign state in any criminal
proceeding shall, to the extent that such judgment or decree
may be accorded full faith and credit under the law of the
United States, estop the defendant from denying the essential
allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil
proceeding under this section.
Sec. 2334.\24\ Jurisdiction and venue
(a) General Venue.--Any civil action under section 2333 of
this title against any person may be instituted in the district
court of the United States for any district where any plaintiff
resides or where any defendant resides or is served, or has an
agent. Process in such a civil action may be served in any
district where the defendant resides, is found, or has an
agent.
(b) Special Maritime or Territorial Jurisdiction.--If the
actions giving rise to the claim occurred within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, as
defined in section 7 of this title, then any civil action under
section 2333 of this title against any person may be instituted
in the district court of the United States for any district in
which any plaintiff resides or the defendant resides, is
served, or has an agent.
(c) Service on Witnesses.--A witness in a civil action
brought under section 2333 of this title may be served in any
other district where the defendant resides, is found, or has an
agent.
(d) Convenience of the Forum.--The district court shall not
dismiss any action brought under section 2333 of this title on
the grounds of the inconvenience or inappropriateness of the
forum chosen, unless--
(1) the action may be maintained in a foreign court
that has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over
all the defendants;
(2) that foreign court is significantly more
convenient and appropriate; and
(3) that foreign court offers a remedy which is
substantially the same as the one available in the
courts of the United States.
Sec. 2335.\24\ Limitation of actions
(a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), a suit for
recovery of damages under section 2333 of this title shall not
be maintained unless commenced within 4 years after the date
the cause of action accrued.
(b) Calculation of Period.--The time of the absence of the
defendant from the United States or from any jurisdiction in
which the same or a similar action arising from the same facts
may be maintained by the plaintiff, or of any concealment of
the defendant's whereabouts, shall not be included in the 4-
year period set forth in subsection (a).
Sec. 2336.\24\ Other limitations
(a) Acts of War.--No action shall be maintained under
section 2333 of this title for injury or loss by reason of an
act of war.
(b) Limitation on Discovery.--If a party to an action under
section 2333 seeks to discover the investigative files of the
Department of Justice, the Assistant Attorney General, Deputy
Attorney General, or Attorney General may object on the ground
that compliance will interfere with a criminal investigation or
prosecution of the incident, or a national security operation
related to the incident, which is the subject of the civil
litigation. The court shall evaluate any such objections in
camera and shall stay the discovery if the court finds that
granting the discovery request will substantially interfere
with a criminal investigation or prosecution of the incident or
a national security operation related to the incident. The
court shall consider the likelihood of criminal prosecution by
the Government and other factors it deems to be appropriate. A
stay of discovery under this subsection shall constitute a bar
to the granting of a motion to dismiss under rules 12(b)(6) and
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If the court grants
a stay of discovery under this subsection, it may stay the
action in the interests of justice.
(c) Stay of Action for Civil Remedies.--(1) The Attorney
General may intervene in any civil action brought under section
2333 for the purpose of seeking a stay of the civil action. A
stay shall be granted if the court finds that the continuation
of the civil action will substantially interfere with a
criminal prosecution which involves the same subject matter and
in which an indictment has been returned, or interfere with
national security operations related to the terrorist incident
that is the subject of the civil action. A stay may be granted
for up to 6 months. The Attorney General may petition the court
for an extension of the stay for additional 6-month periods
until the criminal prosecution is completed or dismissed.
(2) In a proceeding under this subsection, the Attorney
General may request that any order issued by the court for
release to the parties and the public omit any reference to the
basis on which the stay was sought.
Sec. 2337.\24\ Suits against Government officials
No action shall be maintained under section 2333 of this
title against--
(1) the United States, an agency of the United
States, or an officer or employee of the United States
or any agency thereof acting within his or her official
capacity or under color of legal authority; or
(2) a foreign state, an agency of a foreign state, or
an officer or employee of a foreign state or an agency
thereof acting within his or her official capacity or
under color of legal authority.
Sec. 2338.\24\ Exclusive Federal jurisdiction
The district courts of the United States shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over an action brought under this
chapter.
Sec. 2339A.\39\ Providing material support to terrorists
(a) Offense.--Whoever, within the United States, provides
material support or resources or conceals or disguises the
nature, location, source, or ownership of material support or
resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in
preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of section 32,
37, 81, 175, 351, 831, 842 (m) or (n), 844 (f) or (i), 930(c),
956, 1114, 1116, 1203, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1366, 1751, 1992,
2155, 2156, 2280, 2281, 2332, 2332a, 2332b, 2332c, or 2340A of
this title or section 46502 of title 49, or in preparation for,
or in carrying out, the concealment or an escape from the
commission of any such violation, shall be fined under this
title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
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\39\ No sec. 2339 is enacted. Sec. 2339A was added by sec.
120005(a) of Public Law 103-322 (108 Stat. 2022), and amended and
restated by sec. 323 of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1255).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Definition.--In this section, the term ``material
support or resources'' means currency or other financial
securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses,
false documentation or identification, communications
equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives,
personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except
medicine or religious materials.
Sec. 2339B.\40\ Providing material support or resources to designated
foreign terrorist organizations
(a) Prohibited Activities.--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ Sec. 303(a) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1250) added sec.
2339B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Unlawful conduct.--Whoever, within the United
States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States, knowingly provides material support or
resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or
attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or
both.
(2) Financial institutions.--Except as authorized by
the Secretary, any financial institution that becomes
aware that it has possession of, or control over, any
funds in which a foreign terrorist organization, or its
agent, has an interest, shall--
(A) retain possession of, or maintain control
over, such funds; and
(B) report to the Secretary the existence of
such funds in accordance with regulations
issued by the Secretary.
(b) Civil Penalty.--Any financial institution that knowingly
fails to comply with subsection (a)(2) shall be subject to a
civil penalty in an amount that is the greater of--
(A) $50,000 per violation; or
(B) twice the amount of which the financial
institution was required under subsection
(a)(2) to retain possession or control.
(c) Injunction.--Whenever it appears to the Secretary or the
Attorney General that any person is engaged in, or is about to
engage in, any act that constitutes, or would constitute, a
violation of this section, the Attorney General may initiate
civil action in a district court of the United States to enjoin
such violation.
(d) Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.--There is extraterritorial
Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section.
(e) Investigations.--
(1) In general.--The Attorney General shall conduct
any investigation of a possible violation of this
section, or of any license, order, or regulation issued
pursuant to this section.
(2) Coordination with the department of the
treasury.--The Attorney General shall work in
coordination with the Secretary in investigations
relating to--
(A) the compliance or noncompliance by a
financial institution with the requirements of
subsection (a)(2); and
(B) civil penalty proceedings authorized
under subsection (b).
(3) Referral.--Any evidence of a criminal violation
of this section arising in the course of an
investigation by the Secretary or any other Federal
agency shall be referred immediately to the Attorney
General for further investigation. The Attorney General
shall timely notify the Secretary of any action taken
on referrals from the Secretary, and may refer
investigations to the Secretary for remedial licensing
or civil penalty action.
(f) Classified Information in Civil Proceedings Brought by
the United States.--
(1) Discovery of classified information by
defendants.--
(A) Request by united states.--In any civil
proceeding under this section, upon request
made ex parte and in writing by the United
States, a court, upon a sufficient showing, may
authorize the United States to--
(i) redact specified items of
classified information from documents
to be introduced into evidence or made
available to the defendant through
discovery under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure;
(ii) substitute a summary of the
information for such classified
documents; or
(iii) substitute a statement
admitting relevant facts that the
classified information would tend to
prove.
(B) Order granting request.--If the court
enters an order granting a request under this
paragraph, the entire text of the documents to
which the request relates shall be sealed and
preserved in the records of the court to be
made available to the appellate court in the
event of an appeal.
(C) Denial of request.--If the court enters
an order denying a request of the United States
under this paragraph, the United States may
take an immediate, interlocutory appeal in
accordance with paragraph (5). For purposes of
such an appeal, the entire text of the
documents to which the request relates,
together with any transcripts of arguments made
ex parte to the court in connection therewith,
shall be maintained under seal and delivered to
the appellate court.
(2) Introduction of classified information;
precautions by court.--
(A) Exhibits.--To prevent unnecessary or
inadvertent disclosure of classified
information in a civil proceeding brought by
the United States under this section, the
United States may petition the court ex parte
to admit, in lieu of classified writings,
recordings, or photographs, one or more of the
following:
(i) Copies of items from which
classified information has been
redacted.
(ii) Stipulations admitting relevant
facts that specific classified
information would tend to prove.
(iii) A declassified summary of the
specific classified information.
(B) Determination by court.--The court shall
grant a request under this paragraph if the
court finds that the redacted item,
stipulation, or summary is sufficient to allow
the defendant to prepare a defense.
(3) Taking of trial testimony.--
(A) Objection.--During the examination of a
witness in any civil proceeding brought by the
United States under this subsection, the United
States may object to any question or line of
inquiry that may require the witness to
disclose classified information not previously
found to be admissible.
(B) Action by court.--In determining whether
a response is admissible, the court shall take
precautions to guard against the compromise of
any classified information, including--
(i) permitting the United States to
provide the court, ex parte, with a
proffer of the witness's response to
the question or line of inquiry; and
(ii) requiring the defendant to
provide the court with a proffer of the
nature of the information that the
defendant seeks to elicit.
(C) Obligation of defendant.--In any civil
proceeding under this section, it shall be the
defendant's obligation to establish the
relevance and materiality of any classified
information sought to be introduced.
(4) Appeal.--If the court enters an order denying a
request of the United States under this subsection, the
United States may take an immediate interlocutory
appeal in accordance with paragraph (5).
(5) Interlocutory appeal.--
(A) Subject of appeal.--An interlocutory
appeal by the United States shall lie to a
court of appeals from a decision or order of a
district court--
(i) authorizing the disclosure of
classified information;
(ii) imposing sanctions for
nondisclosure of classified
information; or
(iii) refusing a protective order
sought by the United States to prevent
the disclosure of classified
information.
(B) Expedited consideration.--
(i) In general.--An appeal taken
pursuant to this paragraph, either
before or during trial, shall be
expedited by the court of appeals.
(ii) Appeals prior to trial.--If an
appeal is of an order made prior to
trial, an appeal shall be taken not
later than 10 days after the decision
or order appealed from, and the trial
shall not commence until the appeal is
resolved.
(iii) Appeals during trial.--If an
appeal is taken during trial, the trial
court shall adjourn the trial until the
appeal is resolved, and the court of
appeals--
(I) shall hear argument on
such appeal not later than 4
days after the adjournment of
the trial;
(II) may dispense with
written briefs other than the
supporting materials previously
submitted to the trial court;
(III) shall render its
decision not later than 4 days
after argument on appeal; and
(IV) may dispense with the
issuance of a written opinion
in rendering its decision.
(C) Effect of ruling.--An interlocutory
appeal and decision shall not affect the right
of the defendant, in a subsequent appeal from a
final judgment, to claim as error reversal by
the trial court on remand of a ruling appealed
from during trial.
(6) Construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall
prevent the United States from seeking protective
orders or asserting privileges ordinarily available to
the United States to protect against the disclosure of
classified information, including the invocation of the
military and State secrets privilege.
(g) Definitions.--As used in this section--
(1) the term ``classified information'' has the
meaning given that term in section 1(a) of the
Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.);
(2) the term ``financial institution'' has the same
meaning as in section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United
States Code;
(3) the term ``funds'' includes coin or currency of
the United States or any other country, traveler's
checks, personal checks, bank checks, money orders,
stocks, bonds, debentures, drafts, letters of credit,
any other negotiable instrument, and any electronic
representation of any of the foregoing;
(4) the term ``material support or resources'' has
the same meaning as in section 2339A;
(5) the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of the
Treasury; and
(6) the term ``terrorist organization'' means an
organization designated as a terrorist organization
under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.
PART II--CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 204--REWARDS FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING TERRORIST ACTS AND
ESPIONAGE
Sec. 3071. Information for which rewards authorized
(a) With respect to acts of terrorism primarily within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the Attorney
General may reward any individual who furnishes information--
(1) leading to the arrest or conviction, in any
country, of any individual or individuals for the
commission of an act of terrorism against a United
States person or United States property; or
(2) leading to the arrest or conviction, in any
country, of any individual or individuals for
conspiring or attempting to commit an act of terrorism
against a United States person or property; or
(3) leading to the prevention, frustration, or
favorable resolution of an act of terrorism against a
United States person or property.
(b) With respect to acts of espionage involving or directed
at the United States, the Attorney General may reward any
individual who furnished information--
(1) leading to the arrest or conviction, in any
country, of any individual or individuals for
commission of an act of espionage against the United
States;
(2) leading to arrest or conviction, in any country,
of any individual or individuals for conspiring or
attempting to commit an act of espionage against the
United States; or
(3) leading to the prevention or frustration of an
act of espionage against the United States.
Sec. 3072. Determination of entitlement; maximum amount; Presidential
approval; conclusiveness
The Attorney General shall determine whether an individual
furnishing information described in section 3071 is entitled to
a reward and the amount to be paid. A reward under this section
may be in an amount not to exceed $500,000. A reward of
$100,000 or more may not be made without the approval of the
President or the Attorney General personally. A determination
made by the Attorney General or the President under this
chapter shall be final and conclusive, and no court shall have
power or jurisdiction to review it.
Sec. 3073. Protection of identity
Any reward granted under this chapter shall be certified
for payment by the Attorney General. If it is determined that
the identity of the recipient of a reward or of the members of
the recipient's immediate family must be protected, the
Attorney General may take such measures in connection with the
payment of the reward as deemed necessary to effect such
protection.
Sec. 3074. Exception of governmental officials
No officer or employee of any governmental entity who,
while in the performance of his or her official duties,
furnishes the information described in section 3071 shall be
eligible for any monetary reward under this chapter.
Sec. 3075. Authorization for appropriations
There are authorized to be appropriated, without fiscal
year limitation, $5,000,000 for the purpose of this chapter.
Sec. 3076. Eligibility for witness security program
Any individual (and the immediate family of such
individual) who furnishes information which would justify a
reward by the Attorney General under this chapter or by the
Secretary of State under section 36 of the State Department
Basic Authorities Act of 1956 may, in the discretion of the
Attorney General, participate in the Attorney General's witness
security program authorized under chapter 224 of this title.
Sec. 3077. Definitions
As used in this chapter, the term--
(1) ``act of terrorism'' means an activity that--
(A) involves a violent act or an act
dangerous to human life that is a violation of
the criminal laws of the United States or of
any State, or that would be a criminal
violation if committed within the jurisdiction
of the United States; and
(B) appears to be intended--
(i) to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion;
or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a
government by assassination or
kidnapping;
(2) ``United States person'' means--
(A) a national of the United States as
defined in section 101(a)(22) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(22));
(B) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence in the United States as defined in
section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20));
(C) any person within the United States;
(D) any employee or contractor of the United
States Government, regardless of nationality,
who is the victim or intended victim of an act
of terrorism by virtue of that employment;
(E) a sole proprietorship, partnership,
company, or association composed principally of
nationals or permanent resident aliens of the
United States; and
(F) a corporation organized under the laws of
the United States, any State, the District of
Columbia, or any territory or possession of the
United States, and a foreign subsidiary of such
corporation;
(3) ``United States property'' means any real or
personal property which is within the United States or,
if outside the United States, the actual or beneficial
ownership of which rests in a United States person or
any Federal or State governmental entity of the United
States;
(4) ``United States'', when used in a geographical
sense, includes Puerto Rico and all territories and
possessions of the United States;
(5) ``State'' includes any State of the United
States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, and any other possession or territory of
the United States;
(6) ``government entity'' includes the Government of
the United States, any State or political subdivision
thereof, any foreign country, and any state,
provincial, municipal, or other political subdivision
of a foreign country;
(7) ``Attorney General'' means the Attorney General
of the United States or that official designated by the
Attorney General to perform the Attorney General's
responsibilities under this chapter; and
(8) ``act of espionage'' means an activity that is a
violation of--
(A) section 793, 794, or 798 of this title;
or
(B) section 4 of the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950.
CHAPTER 213--LIMITATIONS
Sec. 3286. Extension of statute of limitation for certain terrorism
offenses.
Notwithstanding section 3282, no person shall be
prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense involving a
violation of section 32 (aircraft destruction), section 36 \41\
(airport violence), section 112 (assaults upon diplomats),
section 351 (crimes against Congressmen or Cabinet officers),
section 1116 (crimes against diplomats), section 1203 (hostage
taking), section 1361 (willful injury to government property),
section 1751 (crimes against the President), section 2280
(maritime violence), section 2281 (maritime platform violence),
section 2331 (terrorist acts abroad against United States
nationals), section 2339 \42\ (use of weapons of mass
destruction), or section 2340A (torture) of this title or
section 46502, 46504, 46505, or 46506 of title 49, unless the
indictment is found or the information is instituted within 8
years after the offense was committed.
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\41\ So in original. Probably should be section ``37''.
\42\ So in original. Probably should be section ``2332a''.
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Sec. 3291. Nationality, citizenship and passports.
No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for
violation of any provision of sections 1423 to 1428, inclusive,
of chapter 69 and sections 1541 to 1544, inclusive, of chapter
75 of title 18 of the United States Code, or for conspiracy to
violate any of such sections, unless the indictment is found or
the information is instituted within ten years after the
commission of the offense.
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 228--DEATH SENTENCE
Sec. 3592. Mitigating and aggravating factors to be considered in
determining whether a sentence of death is
justified
(a) Mitigating Factors.--In determining whether a sentence
of death is to be imposed on a defendant, the finder of fact
shall consider any mitigating factor, including the following:
(1) Impaired capacity.--The defendant's capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct
or to conform conduct to the requirements of law was
significantly impaired, regardless of whether the
capacity was so impaired as to constitute a defense to
the charge.
(2) Duress.--The defendant was under unusual and
substantial duress, regardless of whether the duress
was of such a degree as to constitute a defense to the
charge.
(3) Minor participation.--The defendant is punishable
as a principal in the offense, which was committed by
another, but the defendant's participation was
relatively minor, regardless of whether the
participation was so minor as to constitute a defense
to the charge.
(4) Equally culpable defendants.--Another defendant
or defendants, equally culpable in the crime, will not
be punished by death.
(5) No prior criminal record.--The defendant did not
have a significant prior history of other criminal
conduct.
(6) Disturbance.--The defendant committed the offense
under severe mental or emotional disturbance.
(7) Victim's consent.--The victim consented to the
criminal conduct that resulted in the victim's death.
(8) Other factors.--Other factors in the defendant's
background, record, or character or any other
circumstance of the offense that mitigate against
imposition of the death sentence.
(b) Aggravating Factors for Espionage and Treason.--In
determining whether a sentence of death is justified for an
offense described in section 3591(a)(1), the jury, or if there
is no jury, the court, shall consider each of the following
aggravating factors for which notice has been given and
determine which, if any, exist:
(1) Prior espionage or treason offense.--The
defendant has previously been convicted of another
offense involving espionage or treason for which a
sentence of either life imprisonment or death was
authorized by law.
(2) Grave risk to national security.--In the
commission of the offense the defendant knowingly
created a grave risk of substantial danger to the
national security.
(3) Grave risk of death.--In the commission of the
offense the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of
death to another person.
The jury, or if there is no jury, the court, may consider
whether any other aggravating factor for which notice has been
given exists.
(c) Aggravating Factors for Homicide.--In determining
whether a sentence of death is justified for an offense
described in section 3591(a)(2), the jury, or if there is no
jury, the court, shall consider each of the following
aggravating factors for which notice has been given and
determine which, if any, exist:
(1) Death during commission of another crime.--The
death, or injury resulting in death, occurred during
the commission or attempted commission of, or during
the immediate flight from the commission of, an offense
under section 32 (destruction of aircraft or aircraft
facilities), section 33 (destruction of motor vehicles
or motor vehicle facilities), section 36 \43\ (violence
at international airports), section 351 (violence
against Members of Congress, Cabinet officers, or
Supreme Court Justices), an offense under section 751
(prisoners in custody of institution or officer),
section 794 (gathering or delivering defense
information to aid foreign government), section 844(d)
(transportation of explosives in interstate commerce
for certain purposes), section 844(f) (destruction of
Government property by explosives), section 1118
(prisoners serving life term), section 1201
(kidnapping), section 844(i) (destruction of property
affecting interstate commerce by explosives), section
1116 (killing or attempted killing of diplomats),
section 1203 (hostage taking), section 1992 (wrecking
trains), section 2280 (maritime violence), section 2281
(maritime platform violence), section 2332 (terrorist
acts abroad against United States nationals), section
2339 \44\ (use of weapons of mass destruction), or
section 2381 (treason) of this title, or section 46502
of title 49, United States Code (aircraft piracy).
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\43\ So in original. Probably should be section ``37''.
\44\ So in original. Probably should be section ``2332a''.
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(2) Previous conviction of violent felony involving
firearm.--For any offense, other than an offense for
which a sentence of death is sought on the basis of
section 924(c), the defendant has previously been
convicted of a Federal or State offense punishable by a
term of imprisonment of more than 1 year, involving the
use or attempted or threatened use of a firearm (as
defined in section 921) against another person.
(3) Previous conviction of offense for which a
sentence of death or life imprisonment was
authorized.--The defendant has previously been
convicted of another Federal or State offense resulting
in the death of a person, for which a sentence of life
imprisonment or a sentence of death was authorized by
statute.
(4) Previous conviction of other serious offenses.--
The defendant has previously been convicted of 2 or
more Federal or State offenses, punishable by a term of
imprisonment of more than 1 year, committed on
different occasions, involving the infliction of, or
attempted infliction of, serious bodily injury or death
upon another person.
(5) Grave risk of death to additional persons.--The
defendant, in the commission of the offense, or in
escaping apprehension for the violation of the offense,
knowingly created a grave risk of death to 1 or more
persons in addition to the victim of the offense.
(6) Heinous, cruel, or depraved manner of committing
offense.--The defendant committed the offense in an
especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner in that
it involved torture or serious physical abuse to the
victim.
(7) Procurement of offense by payment.--The defendant
procured the commission of the offense by payment, or
promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value.
(8) Pecuniary gain.--The defendant committed the
offense as consideration for the receipt, or in the
expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary
value.
(9) Substantial planning and premeditation.--The
defendant committed the offense after substantial
planning and premeditation to cause the death of a
person or commit an act of terrorism.
(10) Conviction for two felony drug offenses.--The
defendant has previously been convicted of 2 or more
State or Federal offenses punishable by a term of
imprisonment of more than one year, committed on
different occasions, involving the distribution of a
controlled substance.
(11) Vulnerability of victim.--The victim was
particularly vulnerable due to old age, youth, or
infirmity.
(12) Conviction for serious federal drug offenses.--
The defendant had previously been convicted of
violating title II or III of the Controlled Substances
Act for which a sentence of 5 or more years may be
imposed or had previously been convicted of engaging in
a continuing criminal enterprise.
(13) Continuing criminal enterprise involving drug
sales to minors.--The defendant committed the offense
in the course of engaging in a continuing criminal
enterprise in violation of section 408(c) of the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 848(c)), and that
violation involved the distribution of drugs to persons
under the age of 21 in violation of section 418 of that
Act (21 U.S.C. 859).
(14) High public officials.--The defendant committed
the offense against--
(A) the President of the United States, the
President-elect, the Vice President, the Vice
President-elect, the Vice President-designate,
or, if there is no Vice President, the officer
next in order of succession to the office of
the President of the United States, or any
person who is acting as President under the
Constitution and laws of the United States;
(B) a chief of state, head of government, or
the political equivalent, of a foreign nation;
(C) a foreign official listed in section
1116(b)(3)(A), if the official is in the United
States on official business; or
(D) a Federal public servant who is a judge,
a law enforcement officer, or an employee of a
United States penal or correctional
institution--
(i) while he or she is engaged in the
performance of his or her official
duties;
(ii) because of the performance of
his or her official duties; or
(iii) because of his or her status as
a public servant.
For purposes of this subparagraph, a ``law enforcement
officer'' is a public servant authorized by law or by a
Government agency or Congress to conduct or engage in
the prevention, investigation, or prosecution or
adjudication of an offense, and includes those engaged
in corrections, parole, or probation functions.
* * * * * * *
The jury, or if there is no jury, the court, may consider
whether any other aggravating factor for which notice has been
given exists.
* * * * * * *
4. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
Partial text of Title XII of Public Law 103-322 [H.R. 3355], 108 Stat.
1796 at 1959, 1975 and following, approved September 13, 1994
AN ACT To control and prevent crime.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as the 'Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994'.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XII--TERRORISM
* * * * * * *
SEC. 120004. SENTENCING GUIDELINES INCREASE FOR TERRORIST CRIMES.
The United States Sentencing Commission is directed to amend
its sentencing guidelines to provide an appropriate enhancement
for any felony, whether committed within or outside the United
States, that involves or is intended to promote international
terrorism, unless such involvement or intent is itself an
element of the crime.
5. Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of
the United States
Partial text of Public Law 92-539 [H.R. 15883], 86 Stat. 1070, approved
October 24, 1972
AN ACT To amend title 18, United States Code, to provide for expanded
protection of foreign officials, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
Note.--Sections 112, 970, 1117, and 1201 of 18 U.S.C.
which were enacted by this Act can be found in Section
C.3.
_______________________________________________________________________
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this
Act maybe cited as the ``Act for the Protection of Foreign
Officials and Official Guests of the United States''.
Sec. 2. The Congress recognizes that from the beginning of
our history as a nation, the police power to investigate,
prosecute, and punish common crimes such as murder, kidnapping,
and assault has resided in the several States, and that such
power should remain with the States.
The Congress finds, however, that harassment, intimidation,
obstruction, coercion, and acts of violence committed against
foreign officials or their family members in the United States
or against official guests of the United States adversely
affect the foreign relations of the United States.
Accordingly, this legislation is intended to afford the
United States jurisdiction concurrent with that of the several
States to proceed against those who by such acts interfere with
its conduct of foreign affairs.
* * * * * * *
6. Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989
Public Law 101-222 [H.R. 91], 103 Stat. 1892, approved December 12,
1989
AN ACT To prohibit exports of military equipment to countries
supporting international terrorism, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
Note.--The Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments
Act of 1989 consists of amendments to the Arms Export
Control Act, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the
Export Administration Act, and the Revised Statutes of
the United States (22 U.S.C. 1732), except for sec. 10
which provides as follows.
_______________________________________________________________________
SEC. 10.\1\ SELF-DEFENSE IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW.
The use by any government of armed force in the exercise of
individual or collective self-defense in accordance with
applicable international agreements and customary international
law shall not be considered an act of international terrorism
for purposes of the amendments made by this Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 22 U.S.C. 2371 note.
7. Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989
Partial text Public Law 101-298 [S. 993] 104 Stat. 201, approved May
22, 1990
AN ACT To implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction, by prohibiting
certain conduct relating to biological weapons, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.\1\
This Act may be cited as the `Biological Weapons Anti-
Terrorism Act of 1989'.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 18 U.S.C. 175 note.
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SEC. 2. PURPOSE AND INTENT.\2\
(a) Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 18 U.S.C. 175 note.
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(1) implement the Biological Weapons Convention, an
international agreement unanimously ratified by the
United States Senate in 1974 and signed by more than
100 other nations, including the Soviet Union; and
(2) protect the United States against the threat of
biological terrorism.
(b) Intent of Act.--Nothing in this Act is intended to
restrain or restrict peaceful scientific research or
development.
SEC. 3. TITLE 18 AMENDMENTS.\3\
In General.--Title 18, United States Code, is amended by
inserting after chapter 9 the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, as amended,
enacted a new chapter 10 to 18 U.S.C. relating to biological weapons
and to implement the Biological Weapons Convention. The text of this
chapter can be found in Section C.3.
* * * * * * *
8. 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism
Public Law 98-533 [H.R. 6311], 98 Stat. 2706, approved October 19,
1984, as amended
AN ACT To combat international terrorism.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
short title
Section 1. This Act may be cited as the ``1984 Act to
Combat International Terrorism''.
TITLE I--REWARDS FOR INFORMATION ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
authority of the attorney general
Sec. 101.\1\ (a) Title 18 of the United States Code is
amended by adding the following new chapter after chapter 203:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Sec. 101 enacted a new chapter 204 to 18 U.S.C. relating to
rewards for information concerining terrorist acts. The text of this
chapter can be found in Section C.3.
* * * * * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
increasing international cooperation to combat terrorism
Sec. 201. (a) The President is urged to seek more effective
international cooperation in combatting international
terrorism, including--
(1) severe punishment for acts of terrorism, which
endanger the lives of diplomatic staff, military
personnel, other government personnel, or private
citizens; and
(2) extradition of all terrorists and their
accomplices to the country where the terrorist incident
occurred or whose citizens were victims of the
incident.
(b) High priority should also be given to negotiations
leading to the establishment of a permanent international
working group which would combat international terrorism by--
(1) promoting international cooperation among
countries;
(2) developing new methods, procedures, and standards
to combat international terrorism;
(3) negotiating agreements for exchanges of
information and intelligence and for technical
assistance; and
(4) examining the use of diplomatic immunity and
diplomatic facilities to further international
terrorism.
This working group should have subgroups or appropriate
matters, including law enforcement and crisis management.
TITLE III--SECURITY OF UNITED STATES MISSIONS ABROAD
advisory panel on security of united states missions abroad
Sec. 301. In light of continued terrorist incidents and
given the ever increasing threat of international terrorism
directed at United States missions and diplomatic personnel
abroad, the Congress believes that it is imperative that the
Department of State review its approach to providing security
against international terrorism. Not later than February 1,
1985, the Secretary of State shall report to the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs \2\ of the House of Representatives on the findings and
recommendations of the Advisory Panel on Security of United
States Missions Abroad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided that
references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
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security enhancement at united states missions abroad
Sec. 302. (a) In addition to amounts otherwise authorized
to be appropriated, there are authorized to be appropriated,
without fiscal year limitation--
(1) $350,963,000 for the Department of State for
``Administration of Foreign Affairs'', and
(2) $5,315,000 for the United States Information
Agency,
which amounts shall be for security enhancement at United
States missions abroad.
(b) Not later than February 1, 1985, the Secretary of State
and the Director of the United States Information Agency shall
each report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs \2\ of the House of
Representatives on how their respective agencies have allocated
the funds authorized to be appropriated by this section.
state department basic authorities
Sec. 303.\3\ * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Sec. 303 amended sec. 2 of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956.
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danger pay
Sec. 304. In recognition of the current epidemic of
worldwide terrorist activity and the courage and sacrifice of
employees of United States agencies overseas, civilian as well
as military, it is the sense of Congress that the provisions of
section 5928 of title 5, United States Code, relating to the
payment of danger pay allowance, should be more extensively
utilized at United States missions abroad.
9. Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Title 28, United States Code--Judiciary and Judicial Procedure
Chapter 85--District Courts; Jurisdiction
Sec. 1330. Actions against foreign states
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
without regard to amount in controversy of any nonjury civil
action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of
this title as to any claim for relief in personae with respect
to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either
under sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable
international agreement.
(b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist
as to every claim for relief over which the district courts
have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been
made under section 1608 of this title.
(c) For purposes of subsection (b), an appearance by a
foreign state does not confer personal jurisdiction with
respect to any claim for relief not arising out of any
transaction or occurrence enumerated in sections 1605-1607 of
this title.
* * * * * * *
Chapter 97--JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF FOREIGN STATES
Sec.
1602. Findings and declaration of purpose.
1603. Definitions.
1604. Immunity of a foreign state from jurisdiction.
1605. General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign
state.
1606. Extent of liability.
1607. Counterclaims.
1608. Service; time to answer default.
1609. Immunity from attachment and execution of property of a foreign
state.
1610. Exceptions to the immunity from attachment or execution.
1611. Certain types of property immune from execution.
Sec. 1602. Findings and declaration of purpose
The Congress finds that the determination by United States
courts of the claims of foreign states to immunity from the
jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests of
justice and would protect the rights of both foreign states and
litigants in United States courts. Under international law,
states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts
insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their
commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of
judgments rendered against them in connection with their
commercial activities. Claims of foreign states to immunity
should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and
of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in
this chapter.
Sec. 1603. Definitions
For purposes of this chapter--
(a) A ``foreign state'', except as used in section
1608 of this title, includes a political subdivision of
a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state as defined in subsection (b).
(b) An ``agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state'' means any entity--
(1) which is a separate legal person,
corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or
political subdivision thereof, or a majority of
whose shares or other ownership interest is
owned by a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of
the United States as defined in section 1332
(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under
the laws of any third country.
(c) The ``United States'' includes all territory and
waters, continental or insular, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.
(d) A ``commercial activity'' means either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act. The commercial character of an
activity shall be determined by reference to the nature
of the course of conduct or particular transaction or
act, rather than by reference to its purpose.
(e) A ``commercial activity carried on in the United
States by a foreign state'' means commercial activity
carried on by such state and having substantial contact
with the United States.
Sec. 1604. Immunity of a foreign state from jurisdiction
Subject to existing international agreements to which the
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a
foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States and of the States except as
provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
Sec. 1605.\1\ General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a
foreign state
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in
any case--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Sec. 589 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (sec. 101(c) of title I of
Public Law 104-208; 110 Stat. 3009) provided the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``civil liability for acts of state sponsored terrorism
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Sec. 589. (a) an official, employee, or agent of a foreign state
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism designated under section
6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 while acting within the
scope of his or her office, employment, or agency shall be liable to a
United States national or the national's legal representative for
personal injury or death caused by acts of that official, employee, or
agent for which the courts of the United States may maintain
jurisdiction under section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code,
for money damages which may include economic damages, solatium, pain,
and suffering, and punitive damages if the acts were among those
described in section 1605(a)(7).
``(b) Provisions related to statute of limitations and limitations
on discovery that would apply to an action brought under 28 U.S.C.
1605(f) and (g) shall also apply to actions brought under this section.
No action shall be maintained under this action if an official,
employee, or agent of the United States, while acting within the scope
of his or her office, employment, or agency would not be liable for
such acts if carried out within the United States.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its
immunity either explicitly or by implication,
notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the
foreign state may purport to effect except in
accordance with the terms of the waiver;
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state; or upon an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory
of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States;
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of
international law are in issue and the property or any
property exchanged for such property is present in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state;
or that property or any property exchanged for such
property is owned or operated by an agency or
instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or
instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in
the United States;
(4) in which rights in property in the United States
acquired by succession or gift or rights in immovable
property situated in the United States are in issue;
(5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above,
in which money damages are sought against a foreign
state for personal injury or death, or damage to or
loss of property, occurring in the United States and
caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign
state or of any official or employee of that foreign
state while acting within the scope of his office or
employment; except this paragraph shall not apply to--
(A) any claim based upon the exercise on
performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function regardless of
whether the discretion be abused, or
(B) any claim arising out of malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with
contract rights;
(6) in which the action is brought, either to enforce
an agreement made by the foreign state with or for the
benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration all
or any difference which have arisen or which may arise
between the parties with respect to a defined legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a
subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration
under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an
award made pursuant to such an agreement to arbitrate,
if (A) the arbitration takes place or is intended to
take place in the United States, (B) the agreement or
award is or may be governed by a treaty or other
international agreement in force for the United States
calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards, (C) the underlying claim, save for the
agreement to arbitrate, could have been brought in a
United States court under this section or section 1607,
or (D) paragraph (1) of this subsection is otherwise
applicable; or
(7) not otherwise covered by paragraph (2), in which
money damages are sought against a foreign state for
personal injury or death that was caused by an act of
torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage,
hostage taking, or the provision of material support or
resources (as defined in section 2339A of title 18) for
such an act if such act or provision of material
support is engaged in by an official, employee, or
agent of such foreign state while acting within the
scope of his or her office, employment, or agency,
except that the court shall decline to hear a claim
under this paragraph--
(A) if the foreign state was not designated
as a state sponsor of terrorism under section
6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979
(50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)) or section 620A of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371)
at the time the act occurred, unless later so
designated as a result of such act; and
(B) even if the foreign state is or was so
designated, if--
(i) the act occurred in the foreign
state against which the claim has been
brought and the claimant has not
afforded the foreign state a reasonable
opportunity to arbitrate the claim in
accordance with accepted international
rules of arbitration; or
(ii) neither the claimant nor the
victim was \2\ a national of the United
States (as that term is defined in
section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act) when the act upon
which the claim is based occurred.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Public Law 105-11 (111 Stat. 22) inserted ``neither the
claimant nor the victim was'' in lieu of ``the claimant or victim was
not'' at this point.
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(b) A foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in any case in
which a suit in admiralty is brought to enforce a maritime lien
against a vessel or cargo of the foreign state, which maritime
lien is based upon a commercial activity of the foreign state:
Provided, That--
(1) notice of the suit is given by delivery of a copy
of the summons and of the complaint to the person, or
his agent, having possession of the vessel or cargo
against which the maritime lien is asserted; and if the
vessel or cargo is arrested pursuant to process
obtained on behalf of the party bringing the suit, the
service of process of arrest shall be deemed to
constitute valid delivery of such notice, but the party
bringing the suit shall be liable for any damages
sustained by the foreign state as a result of the
arrest if the party bringing the suit had actual or
constructive knowledge that the vessel or cargo of a
foreign state was involved; and \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Sec. 1(1) of Public Law 100-640 (102 Stat. 3333) inserted text
to this point from the semicolon, and struck out the following: ``but
such notice shall not be deemed to have been delivered, nor may it
thereafter be delivered, if the vessel or cargo is arrested pursuant to
process obtained on behalf of the party bringing the suit--unless the
party was unaware that the vessel or cargo of a foreign state was
involved, in which event the service of process of arrest shall be
deemed to constitute valid delivery of such notice; and''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) notice to the foreign state of the commencement
of suit as provided in section 1608 of this title is
initiated within ten days either of the delivery of
notice as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection
or, in the case of a party who was unaware that the
vessel or cargo of a foreign state was involved, of the
date such party determined the existence of the foreign
state's interest.
(c) Whenever notices is delivered under subsection (b)(1),
the suit to enforce a maritime lien shall be thereafter proceed
and shall be heard and determined according to the principles
of law and rules of practice of suits in rem whenever it
appears that, had the vessel been privately owned and
possessed, a suit in rem might have been maintained. A decree
against the foreign state may include costs of the suit and, if
the decree is for a money judgment, interest as ordered by the
court, except that the court may not award judgment against the
foreign state in an amount greater than the value of the vessel
or cargo upon which the maritime lien arose. Such value shall
be determined as of the time notice is served under subsection
(b)(1). Decrees shall be subject to appeal and revision as
provided in other cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
Nothing shall preclude the plaintiff in any proper case from
seeking relief in personam in the same action brought to
enforce a maritime lien as provided in this section.
(d) A foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in any action
brought to foreclose a preferred mortgage, as defined in the
Ship Mortgage Act, 1920 (46 U.S.C. 911 and following). Such
action shall be brought, heard, and determined in accordance
with the provisions of that Act and in accordance with the
principles of law and rules of practice of suits in rem,
whenever it appears that had the vessel been privately owned
and possessed a suit in rem might have been maintained.
(e) \4\ For purposes of paragraph (7) of subsection (a)--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Sec. 221(a)(2) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1241) added
subsecs. (e) through (g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) the terms ``torture'' and ``extrajudicial
killing'' have the meaning given those terms in section
3 of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991;
(2) the term ``hostage taking'' has the meaning given
that term in Article 1 of the International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages; and
(3) the term ``aircraft sabotage'' has the meaning
given that term in Article 1 of the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation.
(f) \4\ No action shall be maintained under subsection
(a)(7) unless the action is commenced not later than 10 years
after the date on which the cause of action arose. All
principles of equitable tolling, including the period during
which the foreign state was immune from suit, shall apply in
calculating this limitation period.
(g) \4\ Limitation on Discovery.--
(1) In general.--(A) Subject to paragraph (2), if an
action is filed that would otherwise be barred by
section 1604, but for subsection (a)(7), the court,
upon request of the Attorney General, shall stay any
request, demand, or order for discovery on the United
States that the Attorney General certifies would
significantly interfere with a criminal investigation
or prosecution, or a national security operation,
related to the incident that gave rise to the cause of
action, until such time as the Attorney General advises
the court that such request, demand, or order will no
longer so interfere.
(B) A stay under this paragraph shall be in effect
during the 12-month period beginning on the date on
which the court issues the order to stay discovery. The
court shall renew the order to stay discovery for
additional 12-month periods upon motion by the United
States if the Attorney General certifies that discovery
would significantly interfere with a criminal
investigation or prosecution, or a national security
operation, related to the incident that gave rise to
the cause of action.
(2) Sunset.--(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), no stay
shall be granted or continued in effect under paragraph
(1) after the date that is 10 years after the date on
which the incident that gave rise to the cause of
action occurred.
(B) After the period referred to in subparagraph (A),
the court, upon request of the Attorney General, may
stay any request, demand, or order for discovery on the
United States that the court finds a substantial
likelihood would--
(i) create a serious threat of death or
serious bodily injury to any person;
(ii) adversely affect the ability of the
United States to work in cooperation with
foreign and international law enforcement
agencies in investigating violations of United
States law; or
(iii) obstruct the criminal case related to
the incident that gave rise to the cause of
action or undermine the potential for a
conviction in such case.
(3) Evaluation of evidence.--The court's evaluation
of any request for a stay under this subsection filed
by the Attorney General shall be conducted ex parte and
in camera.
(4) Bar on motions to dismiss.--A stay of discovery
under this subsection shall constitute a bar to the
granting of a motion to dismiss under rules 12(b)(6)
and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(5) Construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall
prevent the United States from seeking protective
orders or asserting privileges ordinarily available to
the United States.
Sec. 1606. Extent of liability
As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign
state is not entitled to immunity under section 1605 or 1607 of
this chapter, the foreign state shall be liable in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances; but a foreign state except for an agency or
instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive
damages, except any action under section 1605(a)(7) or
1610(f);\5\ if, however, in any case wherein death was caused,
the law of the place where the action or omission occurred
provides, or has been construed to provide, for damages only
punitive in nature, the foreign state shall be liable for
actual or compensatory damages measured by the pecuniary
injuries resulting from such death which were incurred by the
persons for whose benefit the action was brought.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Sec. 117(b) of Public Law 105-277 (112 Stat. 2681-491) added
``, except any action under section 1605(a)(7) or 1610(f)''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 1607. Counterclaims
In any action brought by a foreign state, or in which a
foreign state intervenes, in a court of the United States or of
a State, the foreign state shall not be accorded immunity with
respect to any counterclaim--
(a) for which a foreign state would not be entitled
to immunity under section 1605 of this chapter had such
claim been brought in a separate action against the
foreign state; or
(b) arising out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the claim of the foreign
state; or
(c) to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek
relief exceeding in amount or differing in kind from
that sought by the foreign state.
Sec. 1608. Service; time to answer; default
(a) Service in the courts of the United States and of the
States shall be made upon a foreign state or political
subdivision of a foreign state:
(1) by delivery of a copy of the summons and
complaint in accordance with any special arrangement
for service between the plaintiff and the foreign state
or political subdivision; or
(2) if no special arrangement exists, by delivery of
a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance with
an applicable international convention on service of
judicial documents; or
(3) if service cannot be made under paragraph (1) or
(2), by sending a copy of the summons and complaint and
a notice of suit, together with a translation of each
into the official language of the foreign state, by any
form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be
addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to
the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the
foreign state concerned, or
(4) if service cannot be made within 30 days under
paragraph (3), by sending two copies of the summons and
complaint and a notice of suit, together with a
translation of each into the official language of the
foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a signed
receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of
the court to the Secretary of State in Washington,
District of Columbia, to the attention of the Director
of Special Consular Services--and the Secretary shall
transmit one copy of the papers through diplomatic
channels to the foreign state and shall send to the
clerk of the court a certified copy of the diplomatic
note indicating when the papers were transmitted.
As used in this subsection, a ``notice of suit'' shall mean a
notice addressed to a foreign state and in a form prescribed by
the Secretary of Safety regulation.
(b) Service in the courts of the United States and of the
States shall be made upon an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state:
(1) by delivery of a copy of the summons and
complaint in accordance with any special arrangement
for service between the plaintiff and the agency or
instrumentality; or
(2) if no special arrangement exists, by delivery of
a copy of the summons and complaint either to an
officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other
agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive
service or process in the United States; or in
accordance with an applicable international convention
or service on judicial document; or
(3) if service cannot be made under paragraph (1) or
(2), and if reasonably calculated to given actual
notice, by delivery of a copy of the summons and
complaint, together with a translation of each into the
official language of the foreign state--
(A) as directed by an authority of the
foreign state or political subdivision in
response to a letter rogatory or request or
(B) by any form of mail requiring a signed
receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the
clerk of the court to the agency or
instrumentality to be served, or
(C) as directed by order of the court
consistent with the law of the place where
service is to be made.
(c) Service shall be deemed to have been made--
(1) in the case of service under subsection (a)(4),
as of the date of transmittal indicated in the
certified copy of the diplomatic note; and
(2) in any other case under this section, as of the
date of receipt indicated in the certification, signed
and returned postal receipt, or other proof of service
applicable to the method of service employed.
(d) In any action brought in a court of the United States
or of a State, a foreign state, a political subdivision
thereof, or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state
shall serve an answer or other responsive pleading to the
complaint within sixty days after service has been made under
this section.
(e) No judgment by default shall be entered by a court of
the United States or of a State against a foreign state, a
political subdivision thereof, or an agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state, unless the claimant establishes his claim
or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. A
copy of any such default judgment shall be sent to the foreign
state or political subdivision in the manner prescribed for
service in this section
Sec. 1609. Immunity from attachment and execution of property of a
foreign state
Subject to existing international agreements to which the
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act
the property in the United States of a foreign state shall be
immune from attachment arrest and execution except as provided
in sections 1610 and 1611 of this chapter.
Sec. 1610. Exceptions to the immunity from attachment or execution
(a) The property in the United States of a foreign state,
as defined in section 1603(a) of this chapter, used for a
commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune
from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a
judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State
after the effective date of this Act, if--
(1) the foreign state has waived its immunity from
attachment in aid of execution or from execution either
explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any
withdrawal of the waiver the foreign state may purport
to effect except in accordance with the terms of the
waiver, or
(2) the property is or was used for the commercial
activity upon which the claim is based, or
(3) the execution relates to a judgment establishing
rights in property which has been taken in violation of
international law or which has been exchanged for
property taken in violation of international law, or
(4) the execution relates to a judgment establishing
rights in property--
(A) which is acquired by succession or gift,
or
(B) which is immovable and situated in the
United States: Provided, That such property is
not used for purposes of maintaining a
diplomatic or consular mission or the residence
of the Chief of such mission, or
(5) the property consists of any contractual
obligation or any proceeds from such a contractual
obligation to indemnify or hold harmless the foreign
state or its employees under a policy of automobile or
other liability or casualty insurance covering the
claim which merged into the judgment; or
(6) the judgment is based on an order confirming an
arbitral award rendered against the foreign state,
provided that attachment in aid of execution, or
execution, would not be inconsistent with any provision
in the arbitral agreement, or \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Sec. 221(b)(1) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1242) struck
out a period at the end of para. (6), inserted instead ``, or'', and
added a new para. (7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(7) \6\ the judgment relates to a claim for which the
foreign state is not immune under section 1605(a)(7),
regardless of whether the property is or was involved
with the act upon which the claim is based.
(b) In addition to subsection (a), any property in the
United States of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state engaged in commercial activity in the United States shall
not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from
execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the United
States or of a State after the effective date of this Act, if--
(1) the agency or instrumentality has waived its
immunity from attachment in aid execution or from
execution either explicitly or implicitly,
notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver the agency
or instrumentality may purport to effect except in
accordance with the terms of the waiver, or
(2) the judgment relates to a claim for which the
agency or instrumentality is not immune by virtue of
section 1605(a) (2), (3), (5), or (7) or 1605(b) of
this chapter, regardless of whether the property is or
was involved in the act upon which the claim is based.
(c) No attachment or execution referred to in subsections
(a) and (b) of this section shall be permitted until the court
has ordered such attachment and execution after having
determined that a reasonable period of time has elapsed
following the entry of judgment and the giving of any notice
required under section 1608(e) of this chapter.
(d) The property of a foreign state, as defined in section
1603(a) of this chapter, used for a commercial activity in the
United States, shall not be immune from attachment prior to the
entry of judgment in any action brought in a court of the
United States or of a State, or prior to the elapse of the
period of time provided in subsection (c) of this section if--
(1) the foreign state has explicitly waived its
immunity from attachment prior to judgment,
notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver the
foreign state may purport to effect except in
accordance with the terms of the waiver, and
(2) the purpose of the attachment is to secure
satisfaction of a judgment that has been or may
ultimately be entered against the foreign state, and
not to obtain jurisdiction.
(e) The vessels of a foreign state shall not be immune from
arrest in rem, interlocutory sale, and execution in actions
brought to foreclose a preferred mortgage as provided in
section 1605(d).
(f)(1)(A) \7\ Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
including but not limited to section 208(f) of the Foreign
Missions Act (22 U.S.C. 4308(f)), and except as provided in
subparagraph (B), any property with respect to which financial
transactions are prohibited or regulated pursuant to section
5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 5(b)),
section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2370(a)), sections 202 and 203 of the Inter-national Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1702), or any other
proclamation, order, regulation, or license issued pursuant
thereto, shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of
execution of any judgment relating to a claim for which a
foreign state (including any agency or instrumentality or such
state) claim-ing such property is not immune under section
1605(a)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Subsec. (f) was added by Public Law 105-277 (112 Stat. 2681-
491).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply if, at the time the
property is expropriated or seized by the foreign state, the
property has been held in title by a natural person or, if held
in trust, has been held for the benefit of a natural person or
persons.
(2)(A) At the request of any party in whose favor a
judgment has been issued with respect to a claim for which the
foreign state is not immune under section 1605(a)(7), the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State shall
fully, promptly, and effectively assist any judgment creditor
or any court that has issued any such judgment in identifying,
locating, and executing against the property of that foreign
state or any agency or instrumentality of such state.
(B) In providing such assistance, the Secretaries--
(i) may provide such information to the court under
seal;
and
(ii) shall provide the information in a manner
sufficient to allow the court to direct the United
States Marshall's office to promptly and effectively
execute against that property.
Sec. 1611. Certain types of property immune from execution
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this
chapter, the property of those organizations designated by the
President as being entitled to enjoy the privileges,
exemptions, and immunities provided by the International
Organizations Immunities Act shall not be subject to attachment
or any other judicial process impeding the disbursement of
funds to, or on the order of, a foreign state as the result of
an action brought in the courts of the United States or of the
States.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this
chapter, the property of a foreign state shall be immune from
attachment and from the execution, if--
(1) the property is that of a foreign central bank or
monetary authority held for its own account, unless
such bank or authority, or its parent foreign
government, has explicitly waived its immunity from
attachment in aid of execution, or from execution
notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the
bank, authority or government may purport to effect
except in accordance with the terms of the waiver; or
(2) the property is, or is intended to be, used in
connection with a military activity and
(A) is of a military character, or
(B) is under the control of a military
authority or defense agency.
(c) \8\ Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of
this chapter, the property of a foreign state shall be immune
from attachment and from execution in an action brought under
section 302 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 to the extent that the property is a
facility or installation used by an accredited diplomatic
mission for official purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Sec. 302(e) of Public Law 104-114 (110 Stat. 818) added subsec.
(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
=======================================================================
D. DEFENSE LEGISLATION
CONTENTS
Page
1. Armed Forces Legislation (Title 10, United State Code)
(partial text)............................................... 229
Subtitle A--General Military Law............................. 229
Part I--Organization and General Military Powers......... 229
Chapter 7--Boards, Councils, and Committees.......... 229
Section 182--Center for Excellence in Disaster
Management and Humanitarian Assistance......... 229
Chapter 18--Military Support for Civilian Law
Enforcement Agencies............................. 230
Section 374--Maintenance and Operation of
Equipment...................................... 230
Chapter 101--Training Generally...................... 231
Section 2011--Special Operations Forces--
Training....................................... 232
Chapter 134--Miscellaneous Administrative Provisions. 233
Section 2249a--Prohibition on Providing Financial
Assistance to Terrorist Countries.............. 233
Part IV--Service, Supply, and Procurement................ 233
Chapter 137--Procurement Generally................... 234
Section 2327--Contracts: Consideration of
National Security Objectives................... 234
Chapter 152--Issue of Supplies, Services, and
Facilities....................................... 235
Section 2576a--Excess Personal Property: Sale or
Donation for Law Enforcement Activities........ 235
2. Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261) (partial text)................ 237
Title V--Military Personnel Policy........................... 237
Section 531--Study of New Decorations for Injury or Death
in Line Of Duty...................................... 237
Title X--General Provisions.................................. 237
Section 1023--Department of Defense Counter-Drug
Activities in Transit Zone........................... 238
Title XIII--Cooperative Threat Reduction with States of the
Former Soviet Union...................................... 238
Section 1306--Cooperative Counter Proliferation Program.. 238
Title XIV--Domestic Preparedness for Defense Against Weapons
of Mass Destruction...................................... 240
3. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law
105-262) (partial text)...................................... 243
Title VIII--General Provisions............................... 243
Section 8129--[Obligating Funds for Counterterror
Technical Support]................................... 243
4. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998
(Public Law 105-85) (partial text)........................... 244
Title III--Operation and Maintenance......................... 244
Subtitle F--Other Matters................................ 244
Section 382--Center for Excellence in Disaster
Management and Humanitarian Assistance........... 244
Title X--General Provisions.................................. 244
Subtitle E--Matters Relating to Terrorism................ 244
5. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997
(Public Law 104-201) (partial text).......................... 248
Section 306--Availability of Additional Funds for
Antiterrorism Activities................................. 248
6. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995
(Public Law 103-337) (partial text).......................... 249
Title XIII--Matters Relating to Allies and Other Nations..... 249
Section 1324--Sense of Congress concerning the North
Korean Nuclear Weapons Development Program........... 249
Title XV--Arms Control Matters............................... 251
Section 1504--Amounts for Counter proliferation
Activities........................................... 251
7. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994
(Public Law 103-160) (partial text).......................... 252
Title VIII--Acquisition Policy, Acquisition Management, and
Related Matters.......................................... 252
Section 843--Reports by Defense Contractors of Dealings
with Terrorist Countries............................. 252
Title XVII--Chemical and Biological Weapons Defense.......... 253
Section 1704--Sense of Congress Concerning Federal
Emergency Planning for Response to Terrorist Threats. 253
8. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993
(Public Law 102-484) (partial text).......................... 254
Title XIV--Demilitarization of the Former Soviet Union....... 254
Section 1411--Demilitarization of the Independent States
of the Former Soviet Union........................... 254
Section 1412--Authority for Programs to Facilitate
Demilitarization..................................... 255
Title XV--Nonproliferation................................... 256
Section 1502--Sense of Congress.......................... 256
Section 1505--International Nonproliferation Initiative.. 257
Title XVI--Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992...... 258
Section 1604--Sanctions Against Certain Persons.......... 258
Section 1605--Sanctions Against Certain Foreign Countries 258
9. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987
(Public Law 99-661) (partial text)........................... 260
Title XIII--General Provisions............................... 260
Section 1353--Prompt Reporting of Intelligence on
Terrorist Threats.................................... 260
10. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-
145) (partial text).......................................... 261
Title XIV--General Provisions................................ 261
Section 1452--Sense of Congress Concerning Protection of
United States Military Personnel Against Terrorism... 261
Section 1453--Readiness of Special Operations Forces..... 261
11. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (Title 50, United States
Code) (partial text)......................................... 263
Chapter 15--Foreign Intelligence Surveillance................ 263
Subchapter I--Coordination for National Security......... 263
Section 402--National Security Council............... 263
Chapter 36--Foreign Intelligence Surveillance................ 264
Subchapter I--Electronic Surveillance.................... 264
Section 1801--Definitions............................ 264
Section 1841--Definitions............................ 265
Section 1842--Pen Registers and Trap and Trace
Devices for Foreign Intelligence and
International Terrorism Investigations........... 266
Section 1843--Authorization During Emergencies....... 268
Section 1844--Authorization During Time of War....... 269
Section 1845--Use of Information..................... 269
Section 1846--Congressional Oversight................ 271
Subchapter IV--Access to Certain Business Records for
Foreign Intelligence Purposes........................ 271
Section 1861--Definitions............................ 271
Section 1862--Access to Certain Business Records for
Foreign Intelligence and International Terrorism
Investigations................................... 272
Section 1863--Congressional Oversight................ 273
12. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public
Law 104-93) (partial text)................................... 274
Title III--General Provisions................................ 274
Section 310--Assistance to Foreign Countries............. 274
=======================================================================
1. Armed Forces Legislation
Partial text of Title 10, United States Code
* * * * * * *
Subtitle A--General Military Law
PART I--ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS
CHAPTER 7--BOARDS, COUNCILS, AND COMMITTEES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 182.\1\ Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and
Humanitarian Assistance
(a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Defense may operate a
Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian
Assistance (in this section referred to as the `Center').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Added by sec. 382(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85; 111 Stat. 1709).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Missions.--(1) The Center shall be used to provide and
facilitate education, training, and research in civil-military
operations, particularly operations that require international
disaster management and humanitarian assistance and operations
that require coordination between the Department of Defense and
other agencies.
(2) The Center shall be used to make available high-quality
disaster management and humanitarian assistance in response to
disasters.
(3) The Center shall be used to provide and facilitate
education, training, interagency coordination, and research on
the following additional matters:
(A) Management of the consequences of nuclear,
biological, and chemical events.
(B) Management of the consequences of terrorism.
(C) Appropriate roles for the reserve components in
the management of such consequences and in disaster
management andhumanitarian assistance in response to
natural disasters.
(D) Meeting requirements for information in
connection with regional and global disasters,
including the use of advanced communications technology
as a virtual library.
(E) Tropical medicine, particularly in relation to
the medical readiness requirements of the Department of
Defense.
(4) The Center shall develop a repository of disaster risk
indicators for the Asia-Pacific region.
(5) The Center shall perform such other missions as the
Secretary of Defense may specify.
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 18--MILITARY SUPPORT FOR CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 374. Maintenance and operation of equipment
(a) The Secretary of Defense may, in accordance with other
applicable law, make Department of Defense personnel available
for the maintenance of equipment for Federal, State, and local
civilian law enforcement officials, including equipment made
available under section 372 of this title.
(b)(1) Subject to paragraph (2) and in accordance with other
applicable law, the Secretary of Defense may, upon request from
the head of a Federal law enforcement agency, make Department
of Defense personnel available to operate equipment (including
equipment made available under section 372 of this title) with
respect to--
(A) a criminal violation of a provision of law
specified in paragraph (4)(A);
(B) assistance that such agency is authorized to
furnish to a State, local, or foreign government which
is involved in the enforcement of similar laws;
(C) \2\ a foreign or domestic counter-terrorism
operation;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Added by sec. 201 of Public Law 105-277 (112 Stat. 2681-567).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
or
(D) \2\ a rendition of a suspected terrorist from a
foreign country to the United States to stand trial.
(2) Department of Defense personnel made available to a
civilian law enforcement agency under this subsection may
operate equipment for the following purposes:
(A) Detection, monitoring, and communication of the
movement of air and sea traffic.
(B) Detection, monitoring, and communication of the
movement of surface traffic outside of the geographic
boundary of the United States and within the United
States not to exceed 25 miles of the boundary if the
initial detection occurred outside of the boundary.
(C) Aerial reconnaissance.
(D) Interception of vessels or aircraft detected
outside the land area of the United States for the
purposes of communicating with such vessels and
aircraft to direct such vessels and aircraft to go to a
location designated by appropriate civilian officials.
(E) Operation of equipment to facilitate
communications in connection with law enforcement
programs specified in paragraph (4)(A).
(F) Subject to joint approval by the Secretary of
Defense andthe Attorney General (and the Secretary of
State in the case of a law enforcement operation
outside of the land area of the United States)--
(i) the transportation of civilian law
enforcement personnel along with any other
civilian or military personnel who are
supporting, or conducting, a joint operation
with civilian law enforcement personnel;\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The text beginning with ``along with'' to this point, was added
by sec. 201 of Public Law 105-277 (112 Stat. 2681-567).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) the operation of a base of operations
for civilian law enforcement and supporting
personnel; and
(iii) \2\ the transportation of suspected
terrorists from foreign countries to the United
States for trial (so long as the requesting
Federal law enforcement agency provides all
security for such transportation and maintains
custody over the suspect through the duration
of the transportation).
(3) Department of Defense personnel made available to operate
equipment for the purpose stated in paragraph (2)(D) may
continue to operate such equipment into the land area of the
United States in cases involving the pursuit of vessels or
aircraft where the detection began outside such land area.
(4) In this subsection:
(A) The term ``Federal law enforcement agency'' means
a Federal agency with jurisdiction to enforce any of
the following:
(i) The Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.
801 et seq.) or the Controlled Substances
Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.).
(ii) Any of sections 274 through 278 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1324-
1328).
(iii) A law relating to the arrival or
departure of merchandise (as defined in section
401 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1401)
into or out of the customs territory of the
United States (as defined in general note 2 of
the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
States) or any other territory or possession of
the United States.
(iv) The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
(46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.).
(v) \2\ Any law, foreign or domestic,
prohibiting terrorist activities.
(B) The term ``land area of the United States''
includes the land area of any territory, commonwealth,
or possession of the United States.
(c) The Secretary of Defense may, in accordance with other
applicable law, make Department of Defense personnel available
to any Federal, State, or local civilian law enforcement agency
to operate equipment for purposes other than described in
subsection (b)(2) only to the extent that such support does not
involve direct participation by such personnel in a civilian
law enforcement operation unless such direct participation is
otherwise authorized by law.
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 101--TRAINING GENERALLY
* * * * * * *
Sec. 2011.\4\ Special operations forces: training with friendly foreign
forces
(a) Authority To Pay Training Expenses.--Under regulations
prescribed pursuant to subsection (c), the commander of the
special operations command established pursuant to section 167
of this title and the commander of any other unified or
specified combatant command may pay, or authorize payment for,
any of the following expenses:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Added by sec. 1052(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190; 105 Stat. 1470).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Expenses of training special operations forces
assigned to that command in conjunction with training,
and training with, armed forces and other security
forces of a friendly foreign country.
(2) Expenses of deploying such special operations
forces for that training.
(3) In the case of training in conjunction with a
friendly developing country, the incremental expenses
incurred by that country as the direct result of such
training.
(b) Purpose of Training.--The primary purpose of the training
for which payment may be made under subsection (a) shall be to
train the special operations forces of the combatant command.
(c) Regulations.--The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe
regulations for the administration of this section. The
regulations shall establish accounting procedures to ensure
that the expenditures pursuant to this section are appropriate.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``special operations forces'' includes
civil affairs forces and psychological operations
forces.
(2) The term ``incremental expenses'', with respect
to a developing country, means the reasonable and
proper cost of rations, fuel, training ammunition,
transportation, and other goods and services consumed
by such country, except that the term does not include
pay, allowances, and other normal costs of such
country's personnel.
(e) Reports.--Not later than April 1 of each year, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report
regarding training during the preceding fiscal year for which
expenses were paid under this section. Each report shall
specify the following:
(1) All countries in which that training was
conducted.
(2) The type of training conducted, including whether
such training was related to counter-narcotics or
counter-terrorism activities, the duration of that
training, the number of members of the armed forces
involved, and expenses paid.
(3) The extent of participation by foreign military
forces, including the number and service affiliation of
foreign military personnel involved and physical and
financial contribution of each host nation to the
training effort.
(4) The relationship of that training to other
overseas training programs conducted by the armed
forces, such as military exercise programs sponsored by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, military exercise programs
sponsored by a combatant command, and military training
activities sponsored by a military department
(including deployments for training, short duration
exercises, and other similar unit training events).
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 134--MISCELLANEOUS ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
Subchapter I--Miscellaneous Authorities, Prohibitions, and Limitations
on the Use of Appropriated Funds
* * * * * * *
Sec. 2249a.\5\ Prohibition on providing financial assistance to
terrorist countries
(a) Prohibition.--Funds available to the Department of
Defense may not be obligated or expended to provide financial
assistance to--
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\5\ Added by sec. 1341(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106; 110 Stat. 485).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) any country with respect to which the Secretary
of State has made a determination under section
6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50
App. 2405(j));
(2) any country identified in the latest report
submitted to Congress under section 140 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989
(22 U.S.C. 2656f), as providing significant support for
international terrorism; or
(3) any other country that, as determined by the
President--
(A) grants sanctuary from prosecution to any
individual or group that has committed an act
of international terrorism; or
(B) otherwise supports international
terrorism.
(b) Waiver.--(1) The President may waive the application of
subsection (a) to a country if the President determines--
(A) that it is in the national security interests of
the United States to do so; or
(B) that the waiver should be granted for
humanitarian reasons.
(2) The President shall--
(A) notify the Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on National Security and the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives
at least 15 days before the waiver takes effect; and
(B) publish a notice of the waiver in the Federal
Register.
(c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``international
terrorism'' has the meaning given that term in section 140(d)
of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988
and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f(d)).
PART IV--SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 137--PROCUREMENT GENERALLY
* * * * * * *
Sec. 2327.\6\ Contracts: consideration of national security objectives
(a) Disclosure of Ownership or Control by a Foreign
Government.--The head of an agency shall require a firm or a
subsidiary of a firm that submits a bid or proposal in response
to a solicitation issued by the Department of Defense to
disclose in that bid or proposal any significant interest in
such firm or subsidiary (or, in the case of a subsidiary, in
the firm that owns the subsidiary) that is owned or controlled
(whether directly or indirectly) by a foreign government or an
agent or instrumentality of a foreign government, if such
foreign government is the government of a country that the
Secretary of State determines under section 6(j)(1)(A) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 2405(j)(1)(A)) has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See also sec. 843 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1720), requiring
reports by defense contractors of dealings with terrorist countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Prohibition of Entering Into Contracts Against the
Interests of the United States.--Except as provided in
subsection (c), the head of an agency may not enter into a
contract with a firm or a subsidiary of a firm if--
(1) a foreign government owns or controls (whether
directly or indirectly) a significant interest in such
firm or subsidiary (or, in case of a subsidiary, in the
firm that owns the subsidiary); and
(2) such foreign government is the government of a
country that the Secretary of State determines under
section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of
1797 (50 U.S.C. 2405(j)(1)(A)) has repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism.
(c) Waiver.--(1)(A) If the Secretary of Defense determines
under paragraph (2) that entering into a contract with a firm
or a subsidiary of a firm described in subsection (b) is not
inconsistent with the national security objectives of the
United States, the head of an agency may enter into a contract
with such firm or subsidiary after the date on which such head
of an agency submits to Congress a report on the contract.
(B) A report under subparagraph (A) shall include the
following:
(i) The identify of the foreign government concerned.
(ii) The nature of the contract.
(iii) The extent of ownership or control of the firm
or subsidiary concerned (or, if appropriate in the case
of a subsidiary, of the firm that owns the subsidiary)
by the foreign government concerned or the agency or
instrumentality of such foreign government.
(iv) The reasons for entering into the contract.
(C) After the head of an agency submits a report to
Congress under subparagraph (A) with respect to a firm or a
subsidiary, such head of an agency is not required to submit a
report before entering into any subsequent contract with such
firm or subsidiary unless the information required to be
included in such report under subparagraph (B) has materially
changed since the submission of the previous report.
(2) Upon the request of the head of an agency, the
Secretary of Defense shall determine whether entering into a
contract with a firm or subsidiary described in subsection (b)
is inconsistent with the national security objectives of the
United States. In making such a determination, the Secretary of
Defense shall consider the following:
(A) The relationship of the United States with the
foreign government concerned.
(B) The obligations of the United States under
international agreements.
(C) The extent of the ownership or control of the
firm or subsidiary (or, if appropriate in the case of a
subsidiary, of the firm that owns the subsidiary) by
the foreign government or an agent or instrumentality
of the foreign government.
(D) Whether payments made, or information made
available, to the firm or subsidiary under the contract
could be used for purposes hostile to the interests of
the United States.
(d) Applicability.--(1) This section does not apply to a
contract for an amount less than $100,000.
(2) This section does not apply to the Coast Guard or the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
(e) Regulations.--The Secretary of Defense, after
consultation with the Secretary of State, shall prescribe
regulations to carry out this section. Such regulations shall
include a definition of the term ``significant interest.''
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 152--ISSUE OF SUPPLIES, SERVICES, AND FACILITIES
* * * * * * *
Subchapter II--Issue of Serviceable Material Other Than to the Armed
Forces
* * * * * * *
Sec. 2576a.\7\ Excess personal property: sale or donation for law
enforcement activities
(a) Transfer Authorized.--(1) Notwithstanding any other
provision of law and subject to subsection (b), the Secretary
of Defense may transfer to Federal and State agencies personal
property of the Department of Defense, including small arms and
ammunition, that the Secretary determines is--
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\7\ Sec. 1033(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2640) added sec. 2576a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(A) suitable for use by the agencies in law
enforcement activities, including counter-drug and
counter-terrorism activities; and
(B) excess to the needs of the Department of Defense.
(2) The Secretary shall carry out this section in
consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of
National Drug Control Policy.
(b) Conditions for Transfer.--The Secretary of Defense may
transfer personal property under this section only if--
(1) the property is drawn from existing stocks of the
Department of Defense;
(2) the recipient accepts the property on an as-is,
where-is basis;
(3) the transfer is made without the expenditure of
any funds available to the Department of Defense for
the procurement of defense equipment; and
(4) all costs incurred subsequent to the transfer of
the property are borne or reimbursed by the recipient.
(c) Consideration.--Subject to subsection (b)(4), the
Secretary may transfer personal property under this section
without charge to the recipient agency.
(d) Preference for Certain Transfers.--In considering
applications for the transfer of personal property under this
section, the Secretary shall give a preference to those
applications indicating that the transferred property will be
used in the counter-drug or counter-terrorism activities of the
recipient agency.
* * * * * * *
2. Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1999
Partial text of Public Law 105-261 [H.R. 3616], 112 Stat. 1920,
approved October 17, 1998
AN ACT to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1999 for military
activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and
for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for
other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of American in Congress assembled,
* * * * * * *
TITLE V--MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY
* * * * * * *
Subtitle D--Decorations, Awards, and Commendations
SEC. 531. STUDY OF NEW DECORATIONS FOR INJURY OR DEATH IN LINE OF DUTY.
(a) Study of Need and Criteria for New Decoration.--(1) The
Secretary of Defense shall carry out a study of the need for,
and the the appropriate criteria for, two possible new
decorations.
(2) The first such decoration would, if implemented, be
awarded to members of the Armed Forces who, while serving under
competent authority in any capacity with the Armed Forces, are
killed or injured in the line of duty as a result of noncombat
circumstances occurring--
(A) as a result of an international terrorist attack
against the United States or a foreign nation friendly
to the United States;
(B) while engaged in, training for, or traveling to
or from a peacetime or contingency operation; or
(C) while engaged in, training for, or traveling to
or from service outside the territory of the United
States as part of a peacekeeping force.
(3) The second such decoration would, if implemented, be
awarded to civilian nationals of the United States who, while
serving under competent authority in any capacity with the
Armed Forces, are killed or injured in the line of duty under
circumstances which, if they were members of the Armed Forces,
would qualify them for award of the Purple Heart or the medal
described in paragraph (2).
* * * * * * *
TITLE X--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle C--Counter-Drug Activities and Other Assistance for Civilian
Law Enforcement
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1023. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTER-DRUG ACTIVITIES IN TRANSIT
ZONE.
* * * * * * *
(d) Resulting Availability of Funds for
Counterproliferation and Counterterrorism Activities.--(1) In
light of subsection (c), of the amount authorized to be
appropriated pursuant to section 301(5) for the Special
Operations Command, $4,500,000 shall be available for the
purpose of increased training and related operations in support
of the activities of the Special Operations Command regarding
counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
counterterrorism.
(2) The amount made available under this subsection is in
addition to other funds authorized to be appropriated under
section 301(5) for the Special Operations Command for such
purpose.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XIII--COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION WITH STATES OF THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1306. COOPERATIVE COUNTER PROLIFERATION PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated in section 1302 (other than the amounts authorized
to be appropriated in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of that
section) and subject to the limitations in that section and
subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense may provide a country
of the former Soviet Union with emergency assistance for
removing or obtaining from that country--
(1) weapons of mass destruction; or
(2) materials, equipment, or technology related to
the development or delivery of weapons of mass
destruction.
(b) Certification Required.--(1) The Secretary may not
provide assistance under subsection (a) until 15 days after the
date that the Secretary submits to the congressional defense
committees a certification in writing that the weapons,
materials, equipment, or technology described in that
subsection meet each of the following requirements:
(A) The weapons, materials, equipment, or technology
are at risk of being sold or otherwise transferred to a
restricted foreign state or entity.
(B) The transfer of the weapons, materials,
equipment, or technology would pose a significant near-
term threat to the national security interests of the
United States or would significantly advance a foreign
country's weapon program that threatens the national
security interests of the United States.
(C) Other options for securing or otherwise
preventing the transfer of the weapons, materials,
equipment, or technology have been considered and
rejected as ineffective or inadequate.
(2) The 15-day notice requirement in paragraph (1) may be
waived if the Secretary determines that compliance with the
requirement would compromise the national security interests of
the United States. In such case, the Secretary shall promptly
notify the congressional defense committees of the
circumstances regarding such determination in advance of
providing assistance under subsection (a) and shall submit the
certification required not later than 30 days after providing
such assistance.
(c) Content of Certifications.--Each certification required
under subsection (b) shall contain information on the following
with respect to the assistance being provided:
(1) The specific assistance provided and the purposes
for which the assistance is being provided.
(2) The sources of funds for the assistance.
(3) Whether any assistance is being provided by any
other Federal department or agency.
(4) The options considered and rejected for
preventing the transfer of the weapons, materials,
equipment, or technology, as described in subsection
(b)(1)(C).
(5) Whether funding was requested by the Secretary
from other Federal departments or agencies.
(6) Any additional information that the Secretary
determines is relevant to the assistance being
provided.
(d) Additional Sources of Funding.--The Secretary may
request assistance and accept funds from other Federal
departments or agencies in carrying out this section.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``restricted foreign state or entity'',
with respect to weapons, materials, equipment, or
technology covered by a certification or notification
of the Secretary of Defense under subsection (b),
means--
(A) any foreign country the government of
which has repeatedly provided support for acts
of international terrorism, as determined by
the Secretary of State under section 620A of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2371); or
(B) any foreign state or entity that the
Secretary of Defense determines would
constitute a military threat to the United
States, its allies, or interests, if that
foreign state or entity were to possess the
weapons, materials, equipment, or technology.
(2) The term ``weapons of mass destruction'' has the
meaning given that term in section 1403(1) of the
Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996
(title XIV of Public Law 104-201; 50 U.S.C. 2302(1)).
* * * * * * *
TITLE XIV--DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS FOR DEFENSE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION
Sec. 1401. Short title.
Sec. 1402. Domestic preparedness for response to threats of
terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.
Sec. 1403. Report on domestic emergency preparedness.
Sec. 1404. Threat and risk assessments.
Sec. 1405. Advisory panel to assess domestic response
capabilities for terrorism involving weapons of mass
destruction.
SEC. 1401.\1\ SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Defense Against Weapons of
Mass Destruction Act of 1998''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 50 U.S.C. 2301 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 1402.\1\ DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS FOR RESPONSE TO THREATS OF
TERRORIST USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
(a) Enhanced Response Capability.--In light of the
continuing potential for terrorist use of weapons of mass
destruction against the United States and the need to develop a
more fully coordinated response to that threat on the part of
Federal, State, and local agencies, the President shall act to
increase the effectiveness at the Federal, State, and local
level of the domestic emergency preparedness program for
response to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass
destruction by utilizing the President's existing authorities
to develop an integrated program that builds upon the program
established under the Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act of 1996 (title XIV of Public Law 104-201; 110
Stat. 2714; 50 U.S.C. 2301 et seq.).
(b) Report.--Not later than January 31, 1999, the President
shall submit to Congress a report containing information on the
actions taken at the Federal, State, and local level to develop
an integrated program to prevent and respond to terrorist
incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.
SEC. 1403.\2\ REPORT ON DOMESTIC EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS.
* * * * * * *
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\2\ 50 USC 2301 note. Sec. 1403 amended sec. 1051 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85; 111
Stat. 1889; 31 U.S.C. 1113 note).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 1404.\1\ THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENTS.
(a) Requirement To Develop Methodologies.--The Attorney
General, in consultation with the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and representatives of appropriate
Federal, State, and local agencies, shall develop and test
methodologies for assessing the threat and risk of terrorist
employment of weapons of mass destruction against cities and
other local areas. The results of the tests may be used to
determine the training and equipment requirements under the
program developed under section 1402. The methodologies
required by this subsection shall be developed using cities or
local areas selected by the Attorney General, acting in
consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and appropriate representatives of Federal,
State, and local agencies.
(b) Required Completion Date.--The requirements in
subsection (a) shall be completed not later than 1 year after
the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 1405.\1\ ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES
FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION.
(a) Requirement for Panel.--The Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of
Energy, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the
Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall
enter into a contract with a federally funded research and
development center to establish a panel to assess the
capabilities for domestic response to terrorism involving
weapons of mass destruction.
(b) Composition of Panel; Selection.--(1) The panel shall
be composed of members who shall be private citizens of the
United States with knowledge and expertise in emergency
response matters.
(2) Members of the panel shall be selected by the federally
funded research and development center in accordance with the
terms of the contract established pursuant to subsection (a).
(c) Procedures for Panel.--The federally funded research
and development center shall be responsible for establishing
appropriate procedures for the panel, including procedures for
selection of a panel chairman.
(d) Duties of Panel.--The panel shall--
(1) assess Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic
preparedness for incidents involving weapons of mass
destruction;
(2) assess the progress of Federal training programs
for local emergency responses to incidents involving
weapons of mass destruction;
(3) assess deficiencies in programs for response to
incidents involving weapons of mass destruction,
including a review of unfunded communications,
equipment, and planning requirements, and the needs of
maritime regions;
(4) recommend strategies for ensuring effective
coordination with respect to Federal agency weapons of
mass destruction response efforts, and for ensuring
fully effective local response capabilities for weapons
of mass destruction incidents; and
(5) assess the appropriate roles of State and local
government in funding effective local response
capabilities.
(e) Deadline To Enter Into Contract.--The Secretary of
Defense shall enter into the contract required under subsection
(a) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(f) Deadline for Selection of Panel Members.--Selection of
panel members shall be made not later than 30 days after the
date on which the Secretary enters into the contract required
by subsection (a).
(g) Initial Meeting of the Panel.--The panel shall conduct
its first meeting not later than 30 days after the date that
all the selections to the panel have been made.
(h) Reports.--(1) Not later than 6 months after the date of
the first meeting of the panel, the panel shall submit to the
President and to Congress an initial report setting forth its
findings, conclusions, and recommendations for improving
Federal, State, and local domestic emergency preparedness to
respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.
(2) Not later than December 15 of each year, beginning in
1999 and ending in 2001, the panel shall submit to the
President and to the Congress a report setting forth its
findings, conclusions, and recommendations for improving
Federal, State, and local domestic emergency preparedness to
respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.
(i) Cooperation of Other Agencies.--(1) The panel may
secure directly from the Department of Defense, the Department
of Energy, the Department of Health and Human Services, the
Department of Justice, and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, or any other Federal department or agency information
that the panel considers necessary for the panel to carry out
its duties.
(2) The Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, and any other official of the United States shall
provide the panel with full and timely cooperation in carrying
out its duties under this section.
(j) Funding.--The Secretary of Defense shall provide the
funds necessary for the panel to carry out its duties from the
funds available to the Department of Defense for weapons of
mass destruction preparedness initiatives.
(k) Compensation of Panel Members.--(1) Members of the
panel shall serve without pay by reason of their work on the
panel.
(2) Members of the panel shall be allowed travel expenses,
including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized
for employees of agencies under subchapter 57 of title 5,
United States Code, while away from their homes or regular
place of business in performance of services for the panel.
(l) Termination of the Panel.--The panel shall terminate
three years after the date of the appointment of the member
selected as chairman of the panel.
(m) Definition.--In this section, the term ``weapon of mass
destruction'' has the meaning given that term in section
1403(1) of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act
of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 2302(1)).
3. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999
Partial text of Public Law 105-262 [H.R. 4103], 112 Stat. 2279 at 2335,
approved October 17, 1998
AN ACT Making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the
fiscal year ending September 30, 1999, and for other purposes
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of American in Congress assembled,
* * * * * * *
TITLE VIII--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 8129. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
Secretary of Defense shall obligate the funds provided for
Counterterror Technical Support in the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1998 (under title IV of Public Law 105-56)
for the projects and in the amounts provided for in House
Report 105-265 of the House of Representatives, One Hundred
Fifth Congress, First Session: Provided, That the funds
available for the Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis Project should
be executed through cooperation with the Office of National
Drug Control Policy.
* * * * * * *
4. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998
Partial text of Public Law 105-85 [H.R. 1119], 112 Stat. 1920, approved
November 18, 1997
AN ACT to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1998 for military
activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and
for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for
other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of American in Congress assembled,
* * * * * * *
DIVISION A--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
* * * * * * *
Subtitle F--Other Matters
* * * * * * *
SEC. 382. CENTER FOR EXCELLENCE IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE.
(a) Establishment and Operation of Center.--(1) Chapter 7
of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
end the following new section: \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Sec. 382 added a new Sec. 182 to 10 U.S.C. See D.1, this
section for text.
* * * * * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TITLE X--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle E--Matters Relating to Terrorism
SEC. 1051.\2\ OVERSIGHT OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND ANTITERRORISM
ACTIVITIES; REPORT.
(a) Oversight of Counterterrorism and Antiterrorism
Activities.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget shall--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 31 U.S.C. 1113 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) establish a reporting system for executive
agencies with respect to the budget and expenditure of
funds by such agencies for the purpose of carrying out
counterterrorism and antiterrorism programs and
activities; and
(2) using such reporting system, collect information
on--
(A) the budget and expenditure of funds by
executive agencies during the current fiscal
year for purposes of carrying out
counterterrorism and antiterrorism programs and
activities; and
(B) the specific programs and activities for
which such funds were expended.
(b) Report.--Not later that March 1 of each year, the
President shall submit to Congress a report in classified and
unclassified form (using the information described in
subsection (a)(2)) describing, for each executive agency and
for the executive branch as a whole, the following:
(1) The amounts proposed to be expended for
counterterrorism and antiterrorism programs and
activities for the fiscal year beginning in the
calendar year in which the report is submitted.
(2) The amounts proposed to be expended for
counterterrorism and antiterrorism programs and
activities for the fiscal year in which the report is
submitted and the amounts that have already been
expended for such programs and activities for that
fiscal year.
(3) The specific counterterrorism and antiterrorism
programs and activities being implemented, any
priorities with respect to such programs and
activities, and whether there has been any duplication
of efforts in implementing such programs and
activities.
(c) \3\ Annex on Domestic Emergency Preparedness
Program.--As part of the annual report submitted to Congress
under subsection (b), the President shall include an annex
which provides the following information on the domestic
emergency preparedness program for response to terrorist
incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (as established
under section 1402 of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act of 1998):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Subsec. (c) was added by sec. 1403 of the Strom Thurmond
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law
105-261; 112 Stat. 2168; 50 U.S.C. 2301 note).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Information on program responsibilities for each
participating Federal department, agency, and bureau.
(2) A summary of program activities performed during
the preceding fiscal year for each participating
Federal department, agency, and bureau.
(3) A summary of program obligations and expenditures
during the preceding fiscal year for each participating
Federal department, agency, and bureau.
(4) A summary of the program plan and budget for the
current fiscal year for each participating Federal
department, agency, and bureau.
(5) The program budget request for the following
fiscal year for each participating Federal department,
agency, and bureau.
(6) Recommendations for improving Federal, State, and
local domestic emergency preparedness to respond to
incidents involving weapons of mass destruction that
have been made by the advisory panel to assess the
capabilities of domestic response to terrorism
involving weapons of mass destruction (as established
under section 1405 of the Defense Against Weapons of
Mass Destruction Act of 1998), and actions taken as a
result of such recommendations.
(7) Additional program measures and legislative
authority for which congressional action may be
required.
SEC. 1052.\4\ PROVISION OF ADEQUATE TROOP PROTECTION EQUIPMENT FOR
ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN PEACE OPERATIONS;
REPORT ON ANTITERRORISM ACTIVITIES AND PROTECTION
OF PERSONNEL.
(a) Protection of Personnel.--The Secretary of Defense
shall take appropriate actions to ensure that units of the
Armed Forces engaged in a peace operation are provided adequate
troop protection equipment for that operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ 10 USC 113 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Specific Actions.--In taking actions under subsection
(a), the Secretary shall--
(1) identify the additional troop protection
equipment, if any, required to equip a division (or the
equivalent of a division) with adequate troop
protection equipment for peace operations; and
(2) establish procedures to facilitate the exchange
or transfer of troop protection equipment among units
of the Armed Forces.
(c) Designation of Responsible Official.--The Secretary
of Defense shall designate an official within the Department of
Defense to be responsible for--
(1) ensuring the appropriate allocation of troop
protection equipment among the units of the Armed
Forces engaged in peace operations; and
(2) monitoring the availability, status or condition,
and location of such equipment.
(d) Troop Protection Equipment Defined.--In this section,
the term ``troop protection equipment'' means the equipment
required by units of the Armed Forces to defend against any
hostile threat that is likely during a peace operation,
including an attack by a hostile crowd, small arms fire, mines,
and a terrorist bombing attack.
(e) Report on Antiterrorism Activities of the Department
of Defense and Protection of Personnel.--Not later than 120
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
of Defense shall submit to Congress a report, in classified and
unclassified form, on antiterrorism activities of the
Department of Defense and the actions taken by the Secretary
under subsections (a), (b), and (c). The report shall include
the following:
(1) A description of the programs designed to carry
out antiterrorism activities of the Department of
Defense, any deficiencies in those programs, and any
actions taken by the Secretary to improve
implementation of such programs.
(2) An assessment of the current policies and
practices of the Department of Defense with respect to
the protection of members of the Armed Forces overseas
against terrorist attack, including any modifications
to such policies or practices that are proposed or
implemented as a result of the assessment.
(3) An assessment of the procedures of the Department
of Defense for determining accountability, if any, in
the command structure of the Armed Forces in instances
in which a terrorist attack results in the loss of life
at an overseas military installation or facility.
(4) A detailed description of the roles of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the military
departments, and the combatant commanders in providing
guidance and support with respect to the protection of
members of the Armed Forces deployed overseas against
terrorist attack (both before and after the November
1995 bombing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia) and how these
roles have changed since the June 25, 1996, terrorist
bombing at Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.
(5) A description of the actions taken by the
Secretary of Defense under subsections (a), (b), and
(c) to provide adequate troop protection equipment for
units of the Armed Forces engaged in a peace operation.
5. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997
Partial text of Public Law 104-201 [H.R. 3230], 110 Stat. 2422,
approved September 23, 1996
AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1997 for military
activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and
for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for
other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997''.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 306. AVAILABILITY OF ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR ANTITERRORISM
ACTIVITIES.
Of the amount authorized to be appropriated pursuant to
section 301 for operation and maintenance, $14,000,000 shall be
available to the Secretary of Defense for activities designed
to meet the antiterrorism responsibilities of the Department of
Defense, including activities related to intelligence support,
physical security measures, and education and training
regarding antiterrorism. The amount made available by this
section is in addition to amounts otherwise made available by
this Act for antiterrorism activities.
* * * * * * *
6. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995
Partial text of Public Law 103-337 [S. 2182], 108 Stat. 2663, approved
October 5, 1994, as amended
AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for military
activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and
for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for
other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995''.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XIII--MATTERS RELATING TO ALLIES AND OTHER NATIONS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle C--Matters Relating to Specific Countries
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1324. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR
WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Between 1950 and 1953, the United States led a
military coalition that successfully repelled an
invasion of the Republic of Korea by North Korea, at a
cost of more than 54,000 American lives.
(2) The United States and the Republic of Korea
ratified a Mutual Security Treaty in 1954 that commits
the United States to helping the Republic of Korea
defend itself against external aggression.
(3) Approximately 37,000 United States military
personnel are presently stationed in the Republic of
Korea.
(4) The United States and the Republic of Korea have
regularly conducted joint military exercises, including
``Team Spirit'' exercises.
(5) North Korea has built up an armed force nearly
twice the size of that in the Republic of Korea and has
not renounced the use of force, terrorism, and
subversion in its attempts to subdue and subjugate the
Republic of Korea.
(6) Although North Korea signed the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1985, it has
impeded the international inspection of its nuclear
facilities that is required of all signatories of that
Treaty.
(7) North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic
missile programs represent a grave threat to the
security of the Korean peninsula and the entire world.
(8) Efforts in recent years by the United States to
reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula have included--
(A) the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons
from the territory of the Republic of Korea and
a reduction in the number of United States
military personnel stationed there;
(B) the postponement of the 1994 Team Spirit
exercises;
(C) the establishment of direct diplomatic
contacts with the North Korean government; and
(D) the offer of expanded diplomatic and
economic contacts with North Korea.
(9) Weapons-grade plutonium can be extracted from the
fuel rods removed from North Korea's principal reactor
at Yongbyon.
(10) International inspectors were not permitted to
examine and test in a timely manner spent fuel rods
removed from North Korea's principal nuclear reactor at
Yongbyon, as required to ensure compliance with North
Korea's obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
(11) Diplomacy concerning the North Korean nuclear
program has clearly reached a crucial stage, the
unsatisfactory resolution of which would place the
international nonproliferation regime in jeopardy and
threaten the peace and security of the Korean
peninsula, the Northeast Asia region, and, by
extension, the rest of the world.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the announced freeze on the North Korean nuclear
program should remain in place until internationally
agreed-upon safeguards of any North Korean civilian
nuclear program can be made fully effective;
(2) the North Korean government should take a further
step toward verified cooperation with the international
nonproliferation regime by--
(A) permitting the unfettered international
inspection and testing of the spent fuel rods
removed from North Korea's nuclear reactor at
the Yongbyon nuclear complex, followed by
adequate international supervision of the
transfer of all spent fuel rods from the
Yongbyon complex and their disposal in another
country; and
(B) accepting a comprehensive inspection
process as required by the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
(3) a resolution of the inspection controversy at the
Yongbyon complex that allows for anything less than the
full international inspection of facilities in that
complex required by North Korea's obligations under the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty--
(A) would be unsatisfactory; and
(B) should prompt the Government of the
United States to take such action as would
indicate the severity with which the United
States views this provocation against
international norms; and
(4) such action should include (but not necessarily
be limited to)--
(A) the seeking of international sanctions
against North Korea; and
(B) the rescheduling of the Team Spirit
exercises for 1994.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XV--ARMS CONTROL MATTERS
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1504. AMOUNTS FOR COUNTERPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES.
* * * * * * *
(e) Use of Funds for Technology Development.--(1) Of the
funds authorized to be appropriated by section 201(4) for
counterproliferation technology projects--
(A) up to $5,000,000 shall be available for a program
to detect, locate, and disarm weapons of mass
destruction that are hidden by a hostile state or
terrorist or terrorist group in a confined area outside
the United States; and
(B) * * *
(2) The Secretary of Defense shall make funds available for
the program referred to in paragraph (1)(A) in a manner that,
to the maximum extent practicable, ensures the effective use of
existing resources of the national weapons laboratories.
* * * * * * *
7. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994
Partial text of Public Law 103-160 [H.R. 2401], 107 Stat. 1547,
approved November 30, 1993, as amended
AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1994 for military
activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and
for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for
other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994''.
* * * * * * *
TITLE VIII--ACQUISITION POLICY, ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT, AND RELATED
MATTERS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle E--Other Matters
* * * * * * *
SEC. 843.\1\ REPORTS BY DEFENSE CONTRACTORS OF DEALINGS WITH TERRORIST
COUNTRIES.
(a) Report Requirement.--(1) Whenever the Secretary of
Defense proposes to enter into a contract with any person for
an amount in excess of $5,000,000 for the provision of goods or
services to the Department of Defense, the Secretary shall
require that person--
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\1\ 10 U.S.C. 2327 note.
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(A) before entering into the contract, to report to
the Secretary each commercial transaction which that
person has conducted with the government of any
terrorist country during the preceding three years or
the period since the effective date of this section,
whichever is shorter; and
(B) to report to the Secretary each such commercial
transaction which that person conducts during the
course of the contract (but not after the date
specified in subsection (h)) with the government of any
terrorist country.
(2) The requirement contained in paragraph (1)(B) shall be
included in the contract with the Department of Defense.
(b) Regulations.--The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out this section.
(c) Annual Report to Congress.--The Secretary of Defense
shall submit to the Congress each year by December 1 a report
setting forth those persons conducting commercial transactions
with terrorist countries that are included in the reports made
pursuant to subsection (a) during the preceding fiscal year,
the terrorist countries with which those transactions were
conducted, and the nature of those transactions. The version of
the report made available for public release shall exclude
information exempt from public disclosure under section 552 of
title 5, United States Code (commonly known as the Freedom of
Information Act).
(d) Liability.--This section shall not be interpreted as
imposing any liability on a person for failure to comply with
the reporting requirement of subsection (a) if the failure to
comply is caused solely by an act or omission of a third party.
(e) Person Defined.--For purposes of this section, the term
``person'' means a corporate or other business entity proposing
to enter or entering into a contract covered by this section.
The term does not include an affiliate or subsidiary of the
entity.
(f) Terrorist Country Defined.--A country shall be
considered to be a terrorist country for purposes of a contract
covered by this section if the Secretary of State has
determined pursuant to law, as of the date that is 60 days
before the date on which the contract is signed, that the
government of that country is a government that has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism.
(g) Effective Date.--This section shall apply with respect
to contracts entered into after the expiration of the 90-day
period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, or
after the expiration of the 30-day period beginning on the date
of publication in the Federal Register of the final regulations
referred to in subsection (b), whichever is earlier.
(h) Termination.--This section expires on September 30,
1996.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XVII--CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DEFENSE
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1704.\2\ SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING FEDERAL EMERGENCY PLANNING
FOR RESPONSE TO TERRORIST THREATS.
It is the sense of Congress that the President should
strengthen Federal interagency emergency planning by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency and other appropriate
Federal, State, and local agencies for development of a
capability for early detection and warning of and response to--
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\2\ 50 U.S.C. 1522 note.
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(1) potential terrorist use of chemical or biological
agents or weapons; and
(2) emergencies or natural disasters involving
industrial chemicals or the widespread outbreak of
disease.
8. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993
Partial text of Public Law 102-484 [H.R. 5006], 106 Stat. 2315,
approved October 23, 1992, as amended
AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1993 for military
activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and
for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, to
provide for defense conversion, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993''.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XIV--DEMILITARIZATION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
Subtitle A--Short Title
SEC. 1401.\1\ SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Former Soviet Union
Demilitarization Act of 1992''.
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\1\ 22 U.S.C. 5901 note.
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Subtitle B--Findings and Program Authority
SEC. 1411.\2\ DEMILITARIZATION OF THE INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION.
The Congress finds that it is in the national security
interest of the United States--
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\2\ 22 U.S.C. 5901.
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(1) to facilitate, on a priority basis--
(A) the transportation, storage,
safeguarding, and destruction of nuclear and
other weapons of the independent states of the
former Soviet Union, including the safe and
secure storage of fissile materials,
dismantlement of missiles and launchers, and
the elimination of chemical and biological
weapons capabilities;
(B) the prevention of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their
components and destabilizing conventional
weapons of the independent states of the former
Soviet Union, and the establishment of
verifiable safeguards against the proliferation
of such weapons;
(C) the prevention of diversion of weapons-
related scientific expertise of the former
Soviet Union to terrorist groups or third
countries; and
(D) other efforts designed to reduce the
military threat from the former Soviet Union;
(2) to support the demilitarization of the massive
defense-related industry and equipment of the
independent states of the former Soviet Union and
conversion of such industry and equipment to civilian
purposes and uses; and
(3) to expand military-to-military contacts between
the United States and the independent states of the
former Soviet Union.
SEC. 1412.\3\ AUTHORITY FOR PROGRAMS TO FACILITATE DEMILITARIZATION.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the President is authorized, in accordance with this
title, to establish and conduct programs described in
subsection (b) to assist the demilitarization of the
independent states of the former Soviet Union.
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\3\ 22 U.S.C. 5902.
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(b) Types of Programs.--The programs referred to in
subsection (a) are limited to--
(1) transporting, storing, safeguarding, and
destroying nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of the
independent states of the former Soviet Union, as
described in section 212(b) of the Soviet Nuclear
Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (title II of Public Law
102-228);
(2) establishing verifiable safeguards against the
proliferation of such weapons and their components;
(3) preventing diversion of weapons-related
scientific expertise of the former Soviet Union to
terrorist groups or third countries;
(4) facilitating the demilitarization of the defense
industries of the former Soviet Union and the
conversion of military technologies and capabilities
into civilian activities;
(5) establishing science and technology centers in
the independent states of the former Soviet Union for
the purpose of engaging weapons scientists, engineers,
and other experts previously involved with nuclear,
chemical, and other weapons in productive, nonmilitary
undertakings; and
(6) expanding military-to-military contacts between
the United States and the independent states of the
former Soviet Union.
(c) United States Participation.--The programs described in
subsection (b) should, to the extent feasible, draw upon United
States technology and expertise, especially from the United
States private sector.
(d) Restrictions.--United States assistance authorized by
subsection (a) may not be provided unless the President
certifies to the Congress, on an annual basis, that the
proposed recipient country is committed to--
(1) making a substantial investment of its resources
for dismantling or destroying such weapons of mass
destruction, if such recipient has an obligation under
a treaty or other agreement to destroy or dismantle any
such weapons;
(2) forgoing any military modernization program that
exceeds legitimate defense requirements and forgoing
the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass
destruction;
(3) forgoing any use in new nuclear weapons of
fissionable or other components of destroyed nuclear
weapons;
(4) facilitating United States verification of any
weapons destruction carried out under this title or
section 212 of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act
of 1991 (title II of Public Law 102-228);
(5) complying with all relevant arms control
agreements; and
(6) observing internationally recognized human
rights, including the protection of minorities.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XV--NONPROLIFERATION
SEC. 1501. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Weapons of Mass
Destruction Control Act of 1992''.
SEC. 1502. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of the Congress that--
(1) the proliferation (A) of nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons (hereinafter in this title referred to
as ``weapons of mass destruction'') and related
technology and knowledge and (B) of missile delivery
systems remains one of the most serious threats to
international peace and the national security of the
United States in the post-cold war era;
(2) the proliferation of nuclear weapons, given the
extraordinary lethality of those weapons, is of
particularly serious concern;
(3) the nonproliferation policy of the United States
should continue to seek to limit both the supply of and
demand for weapons of mass destruction and to reduce
the existing threat from proliferation of such weapons;
(4) substantial funding of nonproliferation
activities by the United States is essential to
controlling the proliferation of all weapons of mass
destruction, especially nuclear weapons and missile
delivery systems;
(5) the President's nonproliferation policy statement
of June 1992, and his September 10, 1992, initiative to
increase funding for nonproliferation activities in the
Department of Energy are praiseworthy;
(6) the Congress is committed to cooperating with the
President in carrying out an effective policy designed
to control the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction;
(7) the President should identify a full range of
appropriate, high priority nonproliferation activities
that can be undertaken by the United States and should
include requests for full funding for those activities
in the budget submission for fiscal year 1994;
(8) the Department of Defense and the Department of
Energy have unique expertise that can further enhance
the effectiveness of international nonproliferation
activities;
(9) under the guidance of the President, the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy should
continue to actively assist in United States
nonproliferation activities and in formulating and
executing United States nonproliferation policy,
emphasizing activities such as improved capabilities
(A) to detect and monitor proliferation, (B) to respond
to terrorism, theft, and accidents involving weapons of
mass destruction, and (C) to assist with interdiction
and destruction of weapons of mass destruction and
related weapons material; and
(10) in a manner consistent with United States
nonproliferation policy, the Department of Defense and
the Department of Energy should continue to maintain
and to improve their capabilities to identify, monitor,
and respond to proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and missile delivery systems.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1505.\4\ INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE.
(a) Assistance for International Nonproliferation
Activities.--Subject to the limitations and requirements
provided in this section, the Secretary of Defense, under the
guidance of the President, may provide assistance to support
international nonproliferation activities.
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\4\ 22 U.S.C. 5859a.
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(b) Activities for Which Assistance May Be Provided.--
Activities for which assistance may be provided under this
section are activities such as the following:
(1) Activities carried out by international
organizations that are designed to ensure more
effective safeguards against proliferation and more
effective verification of compliance with international
agreements on nonproliferation.
(2) Activities of the Department of Defense in
support of the United Nations Special Commission on
Iraq.
(3) Collaborative international nuclear security and
nuclear safety projects to combat the threat of nuclear
theft, terrorism, or accidents, including joint
emergency response exercises, technical assistance, and
training.
(4) Efforts to improve international cooperative
monitoring of nuclear, biological, chemical, and
missile proliferation through technical projects and
improved information sharing.
(c) Form of Assistance.--(1) Assistance under this section
may include funds and in-kind contributions of supplies,
equipment, personnel, training, and other forms of assistance.
(2) Assistance under this section may be provided to
international organizations in the form of funds only if the
amount in the ``Contributions to International Organizations''
account of the Department of State is insufficient or otherwise
unavailable to meet the United States fair share of assessments
for international nuclear nonproliferation activities.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XVI--IRAN-IRAQ ARMS NON-PROLIFERATION ACT OF 1992 \5\
SEC. 1601. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act of 1992''.
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\5\ 50 U.S.C. 1701 note.
* * * * * * *
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SEC. 1604. SANCTIONS AGAINST CERTAIN PERSONS.
(a) Prohibition.--If any person transfers or retransfers
goods or technology so as to contribute knowingly and
materially to the efforts by Iran or Iraq (or any agency or
instrumentality of either such country) to acquire chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons or to acquire destabilizing
numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons, then the
sanctions described in subsection (b) shall be imposed.
(b) Mandatory Sanctions.--The sanctions to be imposed
pursuant to subsection (a) are as follows:
(1) Procurement sanction.--For a period of two years,
the United States Government shall not procure, or
enter into any contract for the procurement of, any
goods or services from the sanctioned person.
(2) Export sanction.--For a period of two years, the
United States Government shall not issue any license
for any export by or to the sanctioned person.
SEC. 1605. SANCTIONS AGAINST CERTAIN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
(a) Prohibition.--If the President determines that the
government of any foreign country transfers or retransfers
goods or technology so as to contribute knowingly and
materially to the efforts by Iran or Iraq (or any agency or
instrumentality of either such country) to acquire chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons or to acquire destabilizing
numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons, then--
(1) the sanctions described in subsection (b) shall
be imposed on such country; and
(2) in addition, the President may apply, in the
discretion of the President, the sanction described in
subsection (c).
(b) Mandatory Sanctions.--Except as provided in paragraph
(2), the sanctions to be imposed pursuant to subsection (a)(1)
are as follows:
(1) Suspension of united states assistance.--The
United States Government shall suspend, for a period of
one year, United States assistance to the sanctioned
country.
(2) Multilateral development bank assistance.--The
Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United
States Executive Director to each appropriate
international financial institution to oppose, and vote
against, for a period of one year, the extension by
such institution of any loan or financial or technical
assistance to the sanctioned country.
(3) Suspension of codevelopment or coproduction
agreements.--The United States shall suspend, for a
period of one year, compliance with its obligations
under any memorandum of understanding with the
sanctioned country for the codevelopment or
coproduction of any item on the United States Munitions
List (established under section 38 of the Arms Export
Control Act), including any obligation for
implementation of the memorandum of understanding
through the sale to the sanctioned country of technical
data or assistance or the licensing for export to the
sanctioned country of any component part.
(4) Suspension of military and dual-use technical
exchange agreements.--The United States shall suspend,
for a period of one year, compliance with its
obligations under any technical exchange agreement
involving military and dual-use technology between the
United States and the sanctioned country that does not
directly contribute to the security of the United
States, and no military or dual-use technology may be
exported from the United States to the sanctioned
country pursuant to that agreement during that period.
(5) United states munitions list.--No item on the
United States Munitions List (established pursuant to
section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act) may be
exported to the sanctioned country for a period of one
year.
(c) Discretionary Sanction.--The sanction referred to in
subsection (a)(2) is as follows:
(1) Use of authorities of international emergency
economic powers act.--Except as provided in paragraph
(2), the President may exercise, in accordance with the
provisions of that Act, the authorities of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act with
respect to the sanctioned country.
(2) Exception.--Paragraph (1) does not apply with
respect to urgent humanitarian assistance.
9. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987
Partial text of Public Law 99-661 [S. 2638], 100 Stat. 3816, approved
November 14, 1986, as amended
AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1987 for military
activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and
for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, to
improve the defense acquisition process, and for other purposes
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of American in Congress assembled,
* * * * * * *
TITLE XIII--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
Part F--Miscellaneous
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1353. PROMPT REPORTING OF INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST THREATS
(a) In General.--(1) Subject to subsection (b), the
Secretary of Defense shall instruct all appropriate officials
of the Department of Defense to take such action as may be
necessary to ensure that all credible, time-sensitive
intelligence received by or otherwise available to United
States officials concerning potential terrorist threats to--
(A) United States citizens or facilities (including
citizens and facilities overseas); or
(B) any other potential target for terrorist
activities designated by the Secretary,
is reported promptly to the headquarters or office of the
Department of Defense concerned.
* * * * * * *
10. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986
Partial text of Public Law 99-145 [S. 1160], 99 Stat. 583, approved
November 8, 1985, as amended
AN ACT To authorize appropriations for military functions of the
Department of Defense and to prescribe military personnel levels for
the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1986, to revise and improve
military compensation programs, to improve defense procurement
procedures, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1986 for
national security programs of the Department of Energy, and for other
purposes
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
* * * * * * *
TITLE XIV--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
Part E--Miscellaneous Provisions
SEC. 1452. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES
MILITARY PERSONNEL AGAINST TERRORISM
(a) Finding.--The Congress finds that the protection of
members of the Armed Forces against terrorist activity is among
the highest national security concerns of the United States.
(b) Sense of Congress.--Therefore, it is the sense of
Congress that--
(1) the President should be supported in the vigorous
exercise of his powers as Commander-in-Chief to protect
members of the Armed Forces against terrorist activity;
and
(2) such exercise of power should include the use of
such measures as may be appropriate and consistent with
law.
SEC. 1453. READINESS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
(a) Congressional Findings.--The Congress finds that--
(1) the first duty of the Government is to provide
for the common defense, including safeguarding the
peace, safety, and security of the citizens of the
United States;
(2) the incidence of terrorist, guerrilla, and other
violent threats to citizens and property of the United
States has rapidly increased;
(3) the special operations forces of the Armed Forces
provide the United States with immediate and primary
capability to respond to terrorism; and
(4) the special operations forces are the military
mainstay of the United States for the purposes of
nation-building and training friendly foreign forces in
order to preclude deployment or combat involving the
conventional or strategic forces of the United States.
(b) Sense of the Congress.--In view of the findings in
subsection (a), it is the sense of the Congress that--
(1) the revitalization of the capability of the
special operations forces of the Armed Forces should be
pursued as a matter of the highest priority;
(2) personnel and other resources allocations should
reflect the priority referred to in paragraph (1);
(3) the political and military sensitivity and the
importance to national security of the special
operations forces require that the Office of the
Secretary of Defense should improve its management
supervision of such forces in all aspects of the
special operations mission area;
(4) the joint command and control of the special
operations forces must permit direct and immediate
access by the President and Secretary of Defense; and
(5) the commanders-in-chief of the unified commands
should have available, within their operational areas
of responsibility, sufficient special operations assets
to execute the operations plans for which they are
responsible or to support additional contingency
operations directed from the national level.
* * * * * * *
11. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance \1\
Title 50, United States Code--War and National Defense
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 15--NATIONAL SECURITY
SUBCHAPTER I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
Sec. 402. National Security Council
* * * * * * *
(i) \2\ Committee on Transnational Threats
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Enacted on October 25, 1978, in sec. 101 and following of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-511; 92
Stat. 1783).
\2\ Added by sec. 804 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-293; 110 Stat. 3476).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) There is established within the National Security
Council a committee to be known as the Committee on
Transnational Threats (in this subsection referred to as the
``Committee'').
(2) The Committee shall include the following members:
(A) The Director of Central Intelligence.
(B) The Secretary of State.
(C) The Secretary of Defense.
(D) The Attorney General.
(E) The Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, who shall serve as the chairperson of
the Committee.
(F) Such other members as the President may
designate.
(3) The function of the Committee shall be to coordinate
and direct the activities of the United States Government
relating to combatting transnational threats.
(4) In carrying out its function, the Committee shall--
(A) identify transnational threats;
(B) develop strategies to enable the United States
Government to respond to transnational threats
identified under subparagraph (A);
(C) monitor implementation of such strategies;
(D) make recommendations as to appropriate responses
to specific transnational threats;
(E) assist in the resolution of operational and
policy differences among Federal departments and
agencies in their responses to transnational threats;
(F) develop policies and procedures to ensure the
effective sharing of information about transnational
threats among Federal departments and agencies,
including law enforcement agencies and the elements of
the intelligence community; and
(G) develop guidelines to enhance and improve the
coordination of activities of Federal law enforcement
agencies and elements of the intelligence community
outside the United States with respect to transnational
threats.
(5) For purposes of this subsection, the term
``transnational threat'' means the following:
(A) Any transnational activity (including
international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the
delivery systems for such weapons, and organized crime)
that threatens the national security of the United
States.
(B) Any individual or group that engages in an
activity referred to in subparagraph (A).
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 36--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
SUBCHAPTER I--ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
Sec. 1801. Definitions
As used in this subchapter:
(a) ``Foreign power'' means--
* * * * * * *
(4) a group engaged in international
terrorism \3\ or activities in preparation
therefor;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Note use of the term ``terrorism'' as defined in sec. 1801(c)
for purposes of this chapter. The term ``terrorism'' appears in the
chapter in sec. 1801(a)(4).
* * * * * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) ``Agent of a foreign power'' means--
(1) * * *
(2) any person who--
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine
intelligence gathering activities for
or on behalf of a foreign power, which
activities involve or may involve a
violation of the criminal statutes of
the United States;
(B) pursuant to the direction of an
intelligence service or network of a
foreign power, knowingly engages in any
other clandestine intelligence
activities for or on behalf of such
foreign power, which activities involve
or are about to involve a violation of
the criminal statutes of the United
States;
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or
international terrorism, or activities
that are in preparation therefore, or
on behalf of a foreign power, or
(D) knowingly aids or abets any
person in the conduct of activities
described in subparagraph (A), (B), or
(C) or knowingly conspires with any
person to engage in activities
described in subparagraph (A),(B), or
(C).
(c) ``International terrorism'' means \3\ activities
that--
(1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to
human life that are a violation of the criminal
laws of the United States or of any State, or
that would be a criminal violation if committed
within the jurisdiction of the United States or
any State;
(2) appear to be intended--
(A) to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population;
(B) to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion;
or
(C) to effect the conduct of a
government by assassination or
kidnapping; and
(3) occur totally outside the United States,
or transcend national boundaries in terms of
the means by which they are accomplished, the
persons they appear intended to coerce or
intimidate, or the locale in which their
perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
(d) * * *
(e) ``Foreign intelligence information'' means--
(1) information that relates to, and if
concerning a United States person is necessary
to, the ability of the United States to protect
against--
(A) actual or potential attack or
other grave hostile acts of a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power;
(B) sabotage or international
terrorism by a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power; or
(C) clandestine intelligence
activities by an intelligence service
or network of a foreign power or by an
agent of a foreign power; or
(2) information with respect to a foreign
power or foreign territory that relates to, and
if concerning a United States person is
necessary to--
(A) the national defense or the
security of the United States; or
(B) the conduct of the foreign
affairs of the United States.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1841.\4\ Definitions
As used in this subchapter:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Added by sec. 601 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-272; 112 Stat. 2404).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) The terms ``foreign power'', ``agent of a foreign
power'', ``international terrorism'', ``foreign
intelligence information'', ``Attorney General'',
``United States person'', ``United States'',
``person'', and ``State'' shall have the same meanings
as in section 1801 of this title.
(2) The terms ``pen register'' and ``trap and trace
device'' have the meanings given such terms in section
3127 of title 18.
(3) The term ``aggrieved person'' means any person--
(A) whose telephone line was subject to the
installation or use of a pen register or trap
and trace device authorized by subchapter IV of
this chapter; or
(B) whose communication instrument or device
was subject to the use of a pen register or
trap and trace device authorized by subchapter
IV to capture incoming electronic or other
communications impulses.
Sec. 1842.\4\ Pen registers and trap and trace devices for foreign
intelligence and international terrorism
investigations
(a)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
Attorney General or a designated attorney for the Government
may make an application for an order or an extension of an
order authorizing or approving the installation and use of a
pen register or trap and trace device for any investigation to
gather foreign intelligence information or information
concerning international terrorism which is being conducted by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation under such guidelines as
the Attorney General approves pursuant to Executive Order No.
12333, or a successor order.
(2) The authority under paragraph (1) is in addition to the
authorityunder subchapter I of this chapter to conduct the
electronic surveillance referred to in that paragraph.
(b) Each application under this section shall be in writing
under oath or affirmation to--
(1) a judge of the court established by section 1803
of this title; or
(2) a United States Magistrate Judge under chapter 43
of title 28, United States Code, who is publicly
designated by the Chief Justice of the United States to
have the power to hear applications for and grant
orders approving the installation and use of a pen
register or trap and trace device on behalf of a judge
of that court.
(c) Each application under this section shall require the
approval of the Attorney General, or a designated attorney for
the Government, and shall include--
(1) the identity of the Federal officer seeking to
use the pen register or trap and trace device covered
by the application;
(2) a certification by the applicant that the
information likely to be obtained is relevant to an
ongoing foreign intelligence or international terrorism
investigation being conducted by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation under guidelines approved by the Attorney
General; and
(3) information which demonstrates that there is
reason to believe that the telephone line to which the
pen register or trap and trace device is to be
attached, or the communication instrument or device to
be covered by the pen register or trap and trace
device, has been or is about to be used in
communication with--
(A) an individual who is engaging or has
engaged in international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities that
involve or may involve a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States; or
(B) a foreign power or agent of a foreign
power under circumstances giving reason to
believe that the communication concerns or
concerned international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities that
involve or may involve a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States.
(d)(1) Upon an application made pursuant to this section,
the judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as
modified, approving the installation and use of a pen register
or trap and trace device if the judge finds that the
application satisfies the requirements of this section.
(2) An order issued under this section--
(A) shall specify--
(i) the identity, if known, of the person who
is the subject of the foreign intelligence or
international terrorism investigation;
(ii) in the case of an application for the
installation and use of a pen register or trap
and trace device with respect to a telephone
line--
(I) the identity, if known, of the
person to whom is leased or in whose
name the telephone line is listed; and
(II) the number and, if known,
physical location of the telephone
line; and
(iii) in the case of an application for the
use of a pen register or trap and trace device
with respect to a communication instrument or
device not covered by clause (ii)--
(I) the identity, if known, of the
person who owns or leases the
instrument or device or in whose name
the instrument or device is listed; and
(II) the number of the instrument or
device; and
(B) shall direct that--
(i) upon request of the applicant, the
provider of a wire or electronic communication
service, landlord, custodian, or other person
shall furnish any information, facilities, or
technical assistance necessary to accomplish
the installation and operation of the pen
register or trap and trace device in such a
manner as will protect its secrecy and produce
a minimum amount of interference with the
services that such provider, landlord,
custodian, or other person is providing the
person concerned;
(ii) such provider, landlord, custodian, or
other person--
(I) shall not disclose the existence
of the investigation or of the pen
register or trap and trace device to
any person unless or until ordered by
the court; and
(II) shall maintain, under security
procedures approved by the Attorney
General and the Director of Central
Intelligence pursuant to section
1805(b)(2)(C) of this title, any
records concerning the pen register or
trap and trace device or the aid
furnished; and
(iii) the applicant shall compensate
such provider, landlord, custodian, or
other person for reasonable expenses
incurred by such provider, landlord,
custodian, or other person in providing
such information, facilities, or
technical assistance.
(e) An order issued under this section shall authorize the
installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device
for a period not to exceed 90 days. Extensions of such an order
may be granted, but only upon an application for an order under
this section and upon the judicial finding required by
subsection (d). The period of extension shall be for a period
not to exceed 90 days.
(f) No cause of action shall lie in any court against any
provider of a wire or electronic communication service,
landlord, custodian, or other person (including any officer,
employee, agent, or other specified person thereof) that
furnishes any information, facilities, or technical assistance
under subsection (d) in accordance with the terms of a court
under this section.
(g) Unless otherwise ordered by the judge, the results of a
pen register or trap and trace device shall be furnished at
reasonable intervals during regular business hours for the
duration of the order to the authorized Government official or
officials.
Sec. 1843.\4\ Authorization during emergencies
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter,
when the Attorney General makes a determination described in
subsection (b), the Attorney General may authorize the
installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device
on an emergency basis to gather foreign intelligence
information or information concerning international terrorism
if--
(1) a judge referred to in section 1842(b) of this
title is informed by the Attorney General or his
designee at the time of such authorization that the
decision has been made to install and use the pen
register or trap and trace device, as the case may be,
on an emergency basis; and
(2) an application in accordance with section
1842(a)(1) of this title is made to such judge as soon
as practicable, but not more than 48 hours, after the
Attorney General authorizes the installation and use of
the pen register or trap and trace device, as the case
may be, under this section.
(b) A determination under this subsection is a reasonable
determination by the Attorney General that--
(1) an emergency requires the installation and use of
a pen register or trap and trace device to obtain
foreign intelligence information or information
concerning international terrorism before an order
authorizing the installation and use of the pen
register or trap and trace device, as the case may be,
can with due diligence be obtained under section 1842
of this title; and
(2) the factual basis for issuance of an order under
such section 1842(c) of this title to approve the
installation and use of the pen register or trap and
trace device, as the case may be, exists.
(c)(1) In the absence of an order applied for under
subsection (a)(2) approving the installation and use of a pen
register or trap and trace device authorized under this
section, the installation and use of the pen register or trap
and trace device, as the case may be, shall terminate at the
earlier of--
(A) when the information sought is obtained;
(B) when the application for the order is denied
under section 1842 of this title; or
(C) 48 hours after the time of the authorization by
the Attorney General.
(2) In the event that an application for an order applied
for under subsection (a)(2) is denied, or in any other case
where the installation and use of a pen register or trap and
trace device under this section is terminated and no order
under section 1842(b)(2) of this title is issued approving the
installation and use of the pen register or trap and trace
device, as the case may be, no information obtained or evidence
derived from the use of the pen register or trap and trace
device, as the case may be, shall be received in evidence or
otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding
in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency,
regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of
the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof,
and no information concerning any United States person acquired
from the use of the pen register or trap and trace device, as
the case may be, shall subsequently be used or disclosed in any
other manner by Federal officers or employees without the
consent of such person, except with the approval of the
Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of death
or serious bodily harm to any person.
Sec. 1844.\4\ Authorization during time of war
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President,
through the Attorney General, may authorize the use of a pen
register or trap and trace device without a court order under
this subchapter to acquire foreign intelligence information for
a period not to exceed 15 calendar days following a declaration
of war by Congress.
Sec. 1845.\4\ Use of information
(a)(1) Information acquired from the use of a pen register
or trap and trace device installed pursuant to this subchapter
concerning any United States person may be used and disclosed
by Federal officers and employees without the consent of the
United States person only in accordance with the provisions of
this section.
(2) No information acquired from a pen register or trap and
trace device installed and used pursuant to this subchapter may
be used or disclosed by Federal officers or employees except
for lawful purposes.
(b) No information acquired pursuant to this subchapter
shall be disclosed for law enforcement purposes unless such
disclosure is accompanied by a statement that such information,
or any information derived therefrom, may only be used in a
criminal proceeding with the advance authorization of the
Attorney General.
(c) Whenever the United States intends to enter into
evidence or otherwise use or disclose in any trial, hearing, or
other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer,
agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United
States against an aggrieved person any information obtained or
derived from the use of a pen register or trap and trace device
pursuant to this subchapter, the United States shall, before
the trial, hearing, or the other proceeding or at a reasonable
time before an effort to so disclose or so use that information
or submit it in evidence, notify the aggrieved person and the
court or other authority in which the information is to be
disclosed or used that the United States intends to so disclose
or so use such information.
(d) Whenever any State or political subdivision thereof
intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose in
any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court,
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other
authority of the State or political subdivision thereof against
an aggrieved person any information obtained or derived from
the use of a pen register or trap and trace device pursuant to
this subchapter, the State or political subdivision thereof
shall notify the aggrieved person, the court or other authority
in which the information is to be disclosed or used, and the
Attorney General that the State or political subdivision
thereof intends to so disclose or so use such information.
(e)(1) Any aggrieved person against whom evidence obtained
or derived from the use of a pen register or trap and trace
device is to be, or has been, introduced or otherwise used or
disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or
before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body,
or other authority of the United States, or a State or
political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the
evidence obtained or derived from the use of the pen register
or trap and trace device, as the case may be, on the grounds
that--
(A) the information was unlawfully acquired; or
(B) the use of the pen register or trap and trace
device, as the case may be, was not made in conformity
with an order of authorization or approval under this
subchapter.
(2) A motion under paragraph (1) shall be made before the
trial, hearing, or other proceeding unless there was no
opportunity to make such a motion or the aggrieved person
concerned was not aware of the grounds of the motion.
(f)(1) Whenever a court or other authority is notified
pursuant to subsection (c) or (d), whenever a motion is made
pursuant to subsection (e), or whenever any motion or request
is made by an aggrieved person pursuant to any other statute or
rule of the United States or any State before any court or
other authority of the United States or any State to discover
or obtain applications or orders or other materials relating to
the use of a pen register or trap and trace device authorized
by this subchapter IV of this chapter or to discover, obtain,
or suppress evidence or information obtained or derived from
the use of a pen register or trap and trace device authorized
by subchapter IV of the chapter, the United States district
court or, where the motion is made before another authority,
the United States district court in the same district as the
authority shall, notwithstanding any other provision of law and
if the Attorney General files an affidavit under oath that
disclosure or any adversary hearing would harm the national
security of the United States, review in camera and ex parte
the application, order, and such other materials relating to
the use of the pen register or trap and trace device, as the
case may be, as may be necessary to determine whether the use
of the pen register or trap and trace device, as the case may
be, was lawfully authorized and conducted.
(2) In making a determination under paragraph (1), the
court may disclose to the aggrieved person, under appropriate
security procedures and protective orders, portions of the
application, order, or other materials relating to the use of
the pen register or trap and trace device, as the case may be,
or may require the Attorney General to provide to the aggrieved
person a summary of such materials, only where such disclosure
is necessary to make an accurate determination of the legality
of the use of the pen register or trap and trace device, as the
case may be.
(g)(1) If the United States district court determines
pursuant to subsection (f) that the use of a pen register or
trap and trace device was not lawfully authorized or conducted,
the court may, in accordance with the requirements of law,
suppress the evidence which was unlawfully obtained or derived
from the use of the pen register or trap and trace device, as
the case may be, or otherwise grant the motion of the aggrieved
person.
(2) If the court determines that the use of the pen
register or trap and trace device, as the case may be, was
lawfully authorized or conducted, it may deny the motion of the
aggrieved person except to the extent that due process requires
discovery or disclosure.
(h) Orders granting motions or requests under subsection
(g), decisions under this section that the use of a pen
register or trap and trace device was not lawfully authorized
or conducted, and orders of the United States district court
requiring review or granting disclosure of applications,
orders, or other materials relating to the installation and use
of a pen register or trap and trace device shall be final
orders and binding upon all courts of the United States and the
several States except a United States Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court.
Sec. 1846.\4\ Congressional oversight
(a) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall fully
inform the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate concerning all uses of pen registers
and trap and trace devices pursuant to this subchapter.
(b) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall also
provide to the committees referred to in subsection (a) and to
the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives
and the Senate a report setting forth with respect to the
preceding 6-month period--
(1) the total number of applications made for orders
approving the use of pen registers or trap and trace
devices under this subchapter; and
(2) the total number of such orders either granted,
modified, or denied.
SUBCHAPTER IV--ACCESS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
Sec. 1861.\5\ Definitions
As used in this subchapter:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Added by sec. 602 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-272; 112 Stat. 2410).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) The terms ``foreign power'', ``agent of a foreign
power'', ``foreign intelligence information'',
``international terrorism'', and ``Attorney General''
shall have the same meanings as in section 1801 of this
title.
(2) The term ``common carrier'' means any person or
entity transporting people or property by land, rail,
water, or air for compensation.
(3) The term ``physical storage facility'' means any
business or entity that provides space for the storage
of goods or materials, or services related to the
storage of goods or materials, to the public or any
segment thereof.
(4) The term ``public accommodation facility'' means
any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment that
provides lodging to transient guests.
(5) The term ``vehicle rental facility'' means any
person or entity that provides vehicles for rent,
lease, loan, or other similar use to the public or any
segment thereof.
Sec. 1862.\5\ Access to certain business records for foreign
intelligence andinternational terrorism
investigations
(a) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or
a designee of the Director (whose rank shall be no lower than
Assistant Special Agent in Charge) may make an application for
an order authorizing a common carrier, public accommodation
facility, physical storage facility, or vehicle rental facility
to release records in its possession for an investigation to
gather foreign intelligence information or an investigation
concerning international terrorism which investigation is being
conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under such
guidelines as the Attorney General approves pursuant to
Executive Order No. 12333, or a successor order.
(b) Each application under this section--
(1) shall be made to--
(A) a judge of the court established by
section 1803(a) of this title; or
(B) a United States Magistrate Judge under
chapter 43 of title 28, United States Code, who
is publicly designated by the Chief Justice of
the United States to have the power to hear
applications and grant orders for the release
of records under this section on behalf of a
judge of that court; and
(2) shall specify that--
(A) the records concerned are sought for an
investigation described in subsection (a); and
(B) there are specific and articulable facts
giving reason to believe that the person to
whom the records pertain is a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power.
(c)(1) Upon application made pursuant to this section, the
judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as
modified, approving the release of records if the judge finds
that the application satisfies the requirements of this
section.
(2) An order under this subsection shall not disclose that
it is issued for purposes of an investigation described in sub-
section (a).
(d)(1) Any common carrier, public accommodation facility,
physical storage facility, or vehicle rental facility shall
comply with an order under subsection (c).
(2) No common carrier, public accommodation facility,
physical storage facility, or vehicle rental facility, or
officer, employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose to any
person (other than those officers, agents, or employees of such
common carrier, public accommodation facility, physical storage
facility, or vehicle rental facility necessary to fulfill the
requirement to disclose information to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation under this section) that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has sought or obtained records pursuant to an
order under this section.
Sec. 1863.\5\ Congressional oversight
(a) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall fully
inform the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate concerning all requests for records
under this subchapter.
(b) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall
provide to the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives and the Senate a report setting forth with
respect to the preceding 6-month period--
(1) the total number of applications made for orders
approving requests for records under this subchapter;
and
(2) the total number of such orders either granted,
modified, or denied.
12. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996
Partial text of Public Law 104-93 [H.R. 1655], 109 Stat. 961, approved
January 6, 1996
AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1996 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996''.
(b) Table of Contents.--* * *
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
SEC. 310. ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds
authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used to
provide assistance to a foreign country for counterterrorism
efforts if--
(1) such assistance is provided for the purpose of
protecting the property of the United States Government
or the life and property of any United States citizen,
or furthering the apprehension of any individual
involved in any act of terrorism against such property
or persons; and
(2) the Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives are notified not later than 15
days prior to the provision of such assistance.
* * * * * * *
=======================================================================
E. TRADE AND FINANCIAL LEGISLATION
CONTENTS
Page
1. Trade Act of 1974, as amended (Public Law 93-618) (partial
text)........................................................ 277
Section 502--Beneficiary Developing Country................ 277
2. Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (Public Law 96-
72) (partial text)........................................... 282
Section 3(8)--Declaration of Policy........................ 282
Section 6(a)--Foreign Policy Controls: Authority........... 282
Section 6(f)--Foreign Policy Controls: Consultation with
the Congress........................................... 283
Section 6(j)--Foreign Policy Controls: Countries Supporting
International Terrorism................................ 285
Section 6(1)--Foreign Policy Controls: Missile Technology.. 287
Section 11C--Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation
Sanctions: Imposition of Sanctions..................... 287
Section 14--Annual Report.................................. 288
3. Trade Expansion Act of 1969, as amended (Public Law 87-794)
(partial text)............................................... 291
Section 232--Safeguarding National Security................ 291
Section 233 --Import Sanctions for Export Violations....... 294
4. Trading With The Enemy Act, as amended (Public Law 65-91)
(partial text)............................................... 295
Section 5(b)--[Presidential Authority]..................... 295
5. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, as amended
(Public Law 95-223) (partial text)........................... 298
Title II--International Emergency Economic Powers.......... 298
6. Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended (Public Law 79-
173) (partial text).......................................... 303
Section 2(b)(1)--[U.S. Policy]............................ 303
7. Internal Revenue Code........................................ 308
a. Federal Income Tax Forgiveness for U.S. Military and
Civilian Employees Killed Overseas (Title 26, United
States Code)........................................... 308
Section 692(c)--Certain Military or Civilian
Employees of the United States Dying as a Result
of Injuries Sustained Overseas................... 308
b. Denial of Foreign Tax Credit (Title 26, United States
Code).................................................. 310
Section 901(j)--Denial of Foreign Tax Credit, etc.,
with Respect to Certain Foreign Countries........ 310
8. Bretton Woods Agreements Act Amendments, 1978, as amended
(Public Law 95-435) (partial text)........................... 312
Section 6--[Instructions from the Secretary of State]...... 312
9. International Financial Institutions Act, as amended (Public
Law 95-118) (partial text)................................... 313
Title VII--Human Rights.................................... 313
10. Inter-American Development Bank Act, as amended (Public Law
86-147) (partial text)....................................... 315
Section 37--[Authorization to Contribute to the
Multilateral Investment Fund].......................... 315
=======================================================================
1. Trade Act of 1974, as amended
Partial text of Public Law 93-618 [H.R. 10710], 88 Stat. 1978, approved
January 3, 1975, as amended
AN ACT To promote the development of an open, nondiscriminatory, and
fair world economic system, to stimulate fair and free competition
between the United States and foreign nations, to foster the economic
growth of, and full employment in, the United States, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this
Act, with the following table of contents, may be cited as the
``Trade Act of 1974''.\1\
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\1\ 19 U.S.C. 2101.
\2\ Sec. 1952(a) of the GSP Renewal Act of 1996 (in subtitle J of
title I of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996; Public Law
104-188; 110 Stat. 1917) amended and restated title V in its entirety,
applicable after October 1, 1996.
* * * * * * *
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TITLE V--GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES \2\
* * * * * * *
SEC. 502.\3\ DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
(a) Authority To Designate Countries.--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ 19 U.S.C. 2462.
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(1) Beneficiary developing countries.--The President
is authorized to designate countries as beneficiary
developing countries for purposes of this title.
(2) Least-developed beneficiary developing
countries.--The President is authorized to designate
any beneficiary developing country as a least-developed
beneficiary developing country for purposes of this
title, based on the considerations in section 501 and
subsection (c) of this section.
(b) Countries Ineligible for Designation.--
(1) Specific countries.--The following countries may
not be designated as beneficiary developing countries
for purposes of this title:
(A) Australia.
(B) Canada.
(C) European Union member states.
(D) Iceland.
(E) Japan.
(F) Monaco.
(G) New Zealand.
(H) Norway.
(I) Switzerland.
(2) Other bases for ineligibility.--The President
shall not designate any country a beneficiary
developing country under this title if any of the
following applies:
(A) Such country is a Communist country,
unless--
(i) the products of such country
receive nondiscriminatory treatment,
(ii) such country is a WTO Member (as
such term is defined in section 2(10)
of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act)
(19 U.S.C. 3501(10)) and a member of
the International Monetary Fund, and
(iii) such country is not dominated
or controlled by international
communism.
(B) Such country is a party to an arrangement
of countries and participates in any action
pursuant to such arrangement, the effect of
which is--
(i) to withhold supplies of vital
commodity resources from international
trade or to raise the price of such
commodities to an unreasonable level,
and
(ii) to cause serious disruption of
the world economy.
(C) Such country affords preferential
treatment to the products of a developed
country, other than the United States, which
has, or is likely to have, a significant
adverse effect on United States commerce.
(D)(i) Such country--
(I) has nationalized, expropriated,
or otherwise seized ownership or
control of property, including patents,
trademarks, or copyrights, owned by a
United States citizen or by a
corporation, partnership, or
association which is 50 percent or more
beneficially owned by United States
citizens,
(II) has taken steps to repudiate or
nullify an existing contract or
agreement with a United States citizen
or a corporation, partnership, or
association which is 50 percent or more
beneficially owned by United States
citizens, the effect of which is to
nationalize, expropriate, or otherwise
seize ownership or control of property,
including patents, trademarks, or
copyrights, so owned, or
(III) has imposed or enforced taxes
or other exactions, restrictive
maintenance or operational conditions,
or other measures with respect to
property, including patents,
trademarks, or copyrights, so owned,
the effect of which is to nationalize,
expropriate, or otherwise seize
ownership or control of such property,
unless clause (ii) applies.
(ii) This clause applies if the President
determines that--
(I) prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation has been or is being made
to the citizen, corporation,
partnership, or association referred to
in clause (i),
(II) good faith negotiations to
provide prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation under the applicable
provisions of international law are in
progress, or the country described in
clause (i) is otherwise taking steps to
discharge its obligations under
international law with respect to such
citizen, corporation, partnership, or
association, or
(III) a dispute involving such
citizen, corporation, partnership, or
association over compensation for such
a seizure has been submitted to
arbitration under the provisions of the
Convention for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes, or in another
mutually agreed upon forum,
and the President promptly furnishes a copy of
such determination to the Senate and House of
Representatives.
(E) Such country fails to act in good faith
in recognizing as binding or in enforcing
arbitral awards in favor of United States
citizens or a corporation, partnership, or
association which is 50 percent or more
beneficially owned by United States citizens,
which have been made by arbitrators appointed
for each case or by permanent arbitral bodies
to which the parties involved have submitted
their dispute.
(F) \4\ Such country aids or abets, by
granting sanctuary from prosecution to, any
individual or group which has committed an act
of international terrorism or the Secretary of
State makes a determination with respect to
such country under section 6(j)(1)(A) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979.
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\4\ Sec. 35(a) of Public Law 104-295 (110 Stat. 3538) amended and
restated subpara. (F), effective October 1, 1996. It formerly read as
follows: ``Such country aids or abets, by granting sanctuary from
prosecution to, any individual or group which has committed an act of
international terrorism.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(G) Such country has not taken or is not
taking steps to afford internationally
recognized worker rights to workers in the
country (including any designated zone in that
country).
Subparagraphs (D), (E), (F), and (G) shall not prevent
the designation of any country as a beneficiary
developing country under this title if the President
determines that such designation will be in the
national economic interest of the United States and
reports such determination to the Congress with the
reasons therefor.
(c) Factors Affecting Country Designation.--In determining
whether to designate any country as a beneficiary developing
country under this title, the President shall take into
account--
(1) an expression by such country of its desire to be
so designated;
(2) the level of economic development of such
country, including its per capita gross national
product, the living standards of its inhabitants, and
any other economic factors which the President deems
appropriate;
(3) whether or not other major developed countries
are extending generalized preferential tariff treatment
to such country;
(4) the extent to which such country has assured the
United States that it will provide equitable and
reasonable access to the markets and basic commodity
resources of such country and the extent to which such
country has assured the United States that it will
refrain from engaging in unreasonable export practices;
(5) the extent to which such country is providing
adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property rights;
(6) the extent to which such country has taken action
to--
(A) reduce trade distorting investment
practices and policies (including export
performance requirements); and
(B) reduce or eliminate barriers to trade in
services; and
(7) whether or not such country has taken or is
taking steps to afford to workers in that country
(including any designated zone in that country)
internationally recognized worker rights.
(d) Withdrawal, Suspension, or Limitation of Country
Designation.--
(1) In general.--The President may withdraw, suspend,
or limit the application of the duty-free treatment
accorded under this title with respect to any country.
In taking any action under this subsection, the
President shall consider the factors set forth in
section 501 and subsection (c) of this section.
(2) Changed circumstances.--The President shall,
after complying with the requirements of subsection
(f)(2), withdraw or suspend the designation of any
country as a beneficiary developing country if, after
such designation, the President determines that as the
result of changed circumstances such country would be
barred from designation as a beneficiary developing
country under subsection (b)(2). Such country shall
cease to be a beneficiary developing country on the day
on which the President issues an Executive order or
Presidential proclamation revoking the designation of
such country under this title.
(3) Advice to congress.--The President shall, as
necessary, advise the Congress on the application of
section 501 and subsection (c) of this section, and the
actions the President has taken to withdraw, to
suspend, or to limit the application of duty-free
treatment with respect to any country which has failed
to adequately take the actions described in subsection
(c).
(e) Mandatory Graduation of Beneficiary Developing
Countries.--If the President determines that a beneficiary
developing country has become a ``high income'' country, as
defined by the official statistics of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, then the President shall
terminate the designation of such country as a beneficiary
developing country for purposes of this title, effective on
January 1 of the second year following the year in which such
determination is made.
(f) Congressional Notification.--
(1) Notification of designation.--
(A) In general.--Before the President
designates any country as a beneficiary
developing country under this title, the
President shall notify the Congress of the
President's intention to make such designation,
together with the considerations entering into
such decision.
(B) Designation as least-developed
beneficiary developing country.--At least 60
days before the President designates any
country as a least-developed beneficiary
developing country, the President shall notify
the Congress of the President's intention to
make such designation.
(2) Notification of termination.--If the President
has designated any country as a beneficiary developing
country under this title, the President shall not
terminate such designation unless, at least 60 days
before such termination, the President has notified the
Congress and has notified such country of the
President's intention to terminate such designation,
together with the considerations entering into such
decision.
* * * * * * *
2. Export Administration Act of 1979 \1\
Partial text of Public Law 96-72 [S. 737], 93 Stat. 503, approved
September 29, 1979, as amended
Note.--The Export Administration Act of 1979 replaced
the Export Administration Act of 1969, as amended,
which expired on September 30, 1979. The Export
Administration Act of 1979 was comprehensively amended
by the Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985
[Public Law 99-64; 99 Stat. 120].
AN ACT To provide authority to regulate exports, to improve the
efficiency of export regulation, and to minimize interference with the
ability to engage in commerce.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
short title
Section 1.\1\ This Act may be cited as the ``Export
Administration Act of 1979''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 note.
* * * * * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
declaration of policy
Sec. 3.\2\ The Congress makes the following declarations:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 50 U.S.C. app. 2402.
* * * * * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(8) It is the policy of the United States to use
export controls to encourage other countries to take
immediate steps to prevent the use of their territories
or resources to aid, encourage, or give sanctuary to
those persons involved in directing, supporting, or
participating in acts of international terrorism. To
achieve this objective, the President shall make
reasonable and prompt efforts to secure the removal or
reduction of such assistance to international
terrorists through international cooperation and
agreement before imposing export controls.
* * * * * * *
foreign policy controls
Sec. 6.\3\ (a) Authority.--(1) In order to carry out the
policy set forth in paragraph (2)(B), (7), (8), or (13) of
section 3 of this Act, the President may prohibit or curtail
the exportation of any goods, technology, or other information
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or exported by
any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to
the extent necessary to further significantly the foreign
policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared
international obligations. The authority granted by this
subsection shall be exercised by the Secretary, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
United States Trade Representative, and such other departments
and agencies as the Secretary considers appropriate, and shall
be implemented by means of export licenses issued by the
Secretary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ 50 U.S.C. app. 2405.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Any export control imposed under this section shall
apply to any transaction or activity undertaken with the intent
to evade that export control, even if that export control would
not otherwise apply to that transaction or activity.
(3) Export controls maintained for foreign policy purposes
shall expire on December 31, 1979, or one year after
imposition, whichever is later, unless extended by the
President in accordance with subsections (b) and (f). Any such
extension and any subsequent extension shall not be for a
period of more than a year.
(4) Whenever the Secretary denies any export license under
this subsection, the Secretary shall specify in the notice to
the applicant of the denial of such license that the license
was denied under the authority contained in this subsection,
and the reasons for such denial, with reference to the criteria
set forth in subsection (b) of this section. The Secretary
shall also include in such notice what, if any, modifications
in or restrictions on the goods or technology for which the
license was sought would allow such export to be compatible
with controls implemented under this section, or the Secretary
shall indicate in such notice which officers and employees of
the Department of Commerce who are familiar with the
application will be made reasonably available to the applicant
for consultation with regard to such modifications or
restrictions, if appropriate.
(5) In accordance with the provisions of section 10 of this
Act, the Secretary of State shall have the right to review any
export license application under this section which the
Secretary of State requests to review.
(6) Before imposing, expanding, or extending export controls
under this section on exports to a country which can use goods,
technology, or information available from foreign sources and
so incur little or no economic costs as a result of the
controls, the President should, through diplomatic means,
employ alternatives to export controls which offer
opportunities of distinguishing the United States from, and
expressing the displeasure of the United States with, the
specific actions of that country in response to which the
controls are proposed. Such alternatives include private
discussions with foreign leaders, public statements in
situations where private diplomacy is unavailable or not
effective, withdrawal of ambassadors, and reduction of the size
of the diplomatic staff that the country involved is permitted
to have in the United States.
* * * * * * *
(f) Consultation With the Congress.--(1) The president may
impose or expand export controls under this section, or extend
such controls as required by subsection (a)(3) of this section,
only after consultation with the Congress, including the
Committee on Foreign Affairs \4\ of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs of the Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided that
references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) The President may not impose, expand, or extend export
controls under this section until the President has submitted
to the Congress a report--
(A) specifying the purpose of the controls;
(B) specifying the determinations of the President
(or, in the case of those export controls described in
subsection (b)(2), the considerations of the President)
with respect to each of the criteria set forth in
subsection (b)(1), the bases for such determinations
(or considerations), and any possible adverse foreign
policy consequences of the controls;
(C) describing the nature, the subjects, and the
results of, or the plans for, the consultation with
industry pursuant to subsection (c) and with other
countries pursuant to subsection (d);
(D) specifying the nature and results of any
alternative means attempted under subsection (e), or
the reasons for imposing, expanding, or extending the
controls without attempting any such alternative means;
and
(E) describing the availability from other countries
of goods or technology comparable to the goods or
technology subject to the proposed export controls, and
describing the nature and results of the efforts made
pursuant to subsection (h) to secure the cooperation of
foreign governments in controlling the foreign
availability of such comparable goods or technology.
Such report shall also indicate how such controls will further
significantly the foreign policy of the United States or will
further its declared international obligations.
(3) To the extent necessary to further the effectiveness of
the export controls portions of a report required by paragraph
(2) may be submitted to the Congress on a classified basis, and
shall be subject to the provisions of section 12(c) of this
Act.\5\
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\5\ Sec. 128(c) of Public Law 104-316 (110 Stat. 3841) struck out a
sentence at this point that read as follows:``Each such report shall,
at the same time it is submitted to the Congress, also be submitted to
the General Accounting Office for the purpose of assessing the report's
full compliance with the intent of this subsection.''.
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(4) In the case of export controls under this section which
prohibit or curtail the export of any agricultural commodity, a
report submitted pursuant to paragraph (2) shall be deemed to
be the report required by section 7(g)(3)(A) of this Act.
(5) In addition to any written report required, under this
section, the Secretary, not less frequently than annually,
shall present in oral testimony before the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs \6\ of the House of
Representatives a report on policies and actions taken by the
Government to carry out the provisions of this section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided that
references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
* * * * * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(j) \7\ Countries Supporting International Terrorism.--(1)
A validated license shall be required for the export of goods
or technology to a country if the Secretary of State has made
the following determinations:
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\7\ In Department of State Public Notice 1878 of August 12, 1993,
(58 F.R. 52523), the Secretary of State stated: ``In accordance with
section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)),
I hereby determine that Sudan is a country which has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism. The list of 6(j)
countries as of this time therefore includes Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.''.
Sec. 4 of Public Law 101-222 (103 Stat. 1897) amended and restated
sec. 6(j).
Title V of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1999 (sec. 101(d) of Division A of Public
Law 105-277; 112 Stat. 2681) provided the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``prohibition on bilateral assistance to terrorist countries
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Sec. 528. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds
appropriated for bilateral assistance under any heading of this Act and
funds appropriated under any such heading in a provision of law enacted
prior to enactment of this Act, shall not be made available to any
country which the President determines--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``(1) grants sanctuary from prosecution to any individual or
group which has committed an act of international terrorism, or
``(2) otherwise supports international terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``(b) The President may waive the application of subsection (a) to
a country if the President determines that national security or
humanitarian reasons justify such waiver. The President shall publish
each waiver in the Federal Register and, at least fifteen days before
the waiver takes effect, shall notify the Committees on Appropriations
of the waiver (including the justification for the waiver) in
accordance with the regular notification procedures of the Committees
on Appropriations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * * * *
``prohibition on assistance to foreign governments that export lethal
military equipment to countries supporting international terrorism
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Sec. 551. (a) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made
available by this Act may be available to any foreign government which
provides lethal military equipment to a country the government of which
the Secretary of State has determined is a terrorist government for
purposes of section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act or any other
comparable provision of law. The prohibition under this section with
respect to a foreign government shall terminate 12 months after that
government ceases to provide such military equipment. This section
applies with respect to lethal military equipment provided under a
contract entered into after October 1, 1997.
``(b) Assistance restricted by subsection (a) or any other similar
provision of law, may be furnished if the President determines that
furnishing such assistance is important to the national interests of
the United States.
``(c) Whenever the waiver of subsection (b) is exercised, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report with respect to the furnishing of such assistance. Any such
report shall include a detailed explanation of the assistance to be
provided, including the estimated dollar amount of such assistance, and
an explanation of how the assistance furthers United States national
interests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(A) The government of such country has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism.
(B) The export of such goods or technology could make
a significant contribution to the military potential of
such country, including its military logistics
capability, or could enhance the ability of such
country to support acts of international terrorism.
(2) The Secretary and the Secretary of State shall notify
the Committee on Foreign Affairs \6\ of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate at least 30 days before issuing any validated license
required by paragraph (1).
(3) Each determination of the Secretary of State under
paragraph (1)(A), including each determination in effect on the
date of the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Arms Export
Amendments Act of 1989, shall be published in the Federal
Register.
(4) A determination made by the Secretary of State under
paragraph (1)(A) may not be rescinded unless the President
submits to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
chairman of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate--
(A) before the proposed rescission would take effect,
a report certifying that--
(i) there has been a fundamental change in
the leadership and policies of the government
of the country concerned;
(ii) that government is not supporting acts
of international terrorism; and
(iii) that government has provided assurances
that it will not support acts of international
terrorism in the future; or
(B) at least 45 days before the proposed rescission
would take effect, a report justifying the rescission
and certifying that--
(i) the government concerned has not provided
any support for international terrorism during
the preceding 6-month period; and
(ii) the government concerned has provided
assurances that it will not support acts of
international terrorism in the future.
(5) \8\ The Secretary and the Secretary of State shall
include in the notification required by paragraph (2)--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Sec. 736 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 506) added para.
(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(A) a detailed description of the goods or
services to be offered, including a brief
description of the capabilities of any article
for which a license to export is sought;
(B) the reasons why the foreign country or
international organization to which the export
or transfer is proposed to be made needs the
goods or services which are the subject of such
export or transfer and a description of the
manner in which such country or organization
intends to use such articles, services, or
design and construction services;
(C) the reasons why the proposed export or
transfer is in the national interest of the
United States;
(D) an analysis of the impact of the proposed
export or transfer on the military capabilities
of the foreign country or international
organization to which such export or transfer
would be made;
(E) an analysis of the manner in which the
proposed export would affect the relative
military strengths of countries in the region
to which the goods or services which are the
subject of such export would be delivered and
whether other countries in the region have
comparable kinds and amounts of articles,
services, or design and construction services;
and
(F) an analysis of the impact of the proposed
export or transfer on the United States
relations with the countries in the region to
which the goods or services which are the
subject of such export would be delivered.
* * * * * * *
(l) Missile Technology.--
(1) Determination of controlled items.--The
Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other
appropriate departments and agencies--
(A) shall establish and maintain, as part of
the control list established under this
section, a list of all dual use goods and
technology on the MTCR Annex; and
(B) may include, as part of the control list
established under this section, goods and
technology that would provide a direct and
immediate impact on the development of missile
delivery systems and are not included in the
MTCR Annex but which the United States is
proposing to the other MTCR adherents to have
included in the MTCR Annex.
(2) Requirement of individual validated licenses.--
The Secretary shall require an individual validated
license for--
(A) any export of goods or technology on the
list established under paragraph (1) to any
country; and
(B) any export of goods or technology that
the exporter knows is destined for a project or
facility for the design, development, or
manufacture of a missile in a country that is
not an MTCR adherent.
(3) Policy of denial of licenses.--(A) Licenses under
paragraph (2) should in general be denied if the
ultimate consignee of the goods or technology is a
facility in a country that is not an adherent to the
Missile technology Control regime and the facility is
designed to develop or build missiles.
(B) Licenses under paragraph (2) shall be denied if
the ultimate consignee of the goods or technology is a
facility in a country the government of which has been
determined under subsection (j) to have repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism.
* * * * * * *
chemical and biological weapons proliferation sanctions
Sec. 11C.\9\ (a) Imposition of Sanctions.--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ 50 U.S.C. app. 2410c. Sec. 505(a) of the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (title V
of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993;
Public Law 102-138; 105 Stat. 724) added sec. 11C. Subsequently, sec.
309(a) of Public Law 102-182 (105 Stat. 1258) repealed title V of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 and all
the amendments therein, including this new sec. 11C.
However, sec. 305(a) of Public Law 102-182 (105 Stat. 1247) amended
this Act by inserting a new sec. 11C at this point.
Executive Order 12851 of June 11, 1993 (58 F.R. 33181) delegated
the authority in sec. 11C to the Secretary of State with the following
exceptions:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--sec. 11C(c)(1)(A), pursuant to a determination made by the
Secretary of State under sec. 81(a)(1) of the AECA or sec.
11C(a)(1) of this Act, as well as the authority and duties
provided for in section 81(c)(2) of the AECA and section
11C(c)(2) of this Act--Secretary of Defense;
--sec. 11C(c)(1)(B), pursuant to a determination made by the
Secretary of State under sec. 81(a)(1) of the AECA, or sec.
11C(a)(1) of this Act, and the obligation to implement the
exceptions provided for in sec. 81(c)(2) of the AECA or sec.
11C(c)(2) of this Act, insofar as the exceptions affect imports
of goods into the U.S.,--Secretary of the Treasury.
(1) Determination by the president.--Except as
provided in subsection (b)(2), the President shall
impose both of the sanctions described in subsection
(c) if the President determines that a foreign person,
on or after the date of the enactment of this
section,\10\ has knowingly and materially contributed--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Sec. 309(b)(1) of Public Law 102-182 (105 Stat. 1258) deemed
this date of enactment to be the date of enactment of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law
102-138), October 28, 1991.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(A) through the export from the United States
of any goods or technology that are subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States under
this Act, or
(B) through the export from any other country
of any goods or technology that would be, if
they were United States goods or technology,
subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States under this Act, to the efforts by any
foreign country, project, or entity described
in paragraph (2) to use, develop, produce,
stockpile, or otherwise acquire chemical or
biological weapons.
(2) Countries, projects, or entities receiving
assistance.--Paragraph (1) applies in the case of--
* * * * * * *
(B) any foreign country whose government is
determined for purposes of section 6(j) of this
Act to be a government that has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international
terrorism; or
* * * * * * *
annual report
Sec. 14.\11\ (a) Contents.--Not later than December 31 of
each year, the Secretary shall submit to the Congress a report
on the administration of this Act during the preceding fiscal
year. All agencies shall cooperate fully with the Secretary in
providing information for such report. Such report shall
include detailed information with respect to--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ 50 U.S.C. app. 2413.
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(1) the implementation of the policies set forth in
section 3;
(2) general licensing activities under sections 5, 6,
and 7, and any changes in the exercise of the
authorities contained in sections 5(a), 6(a), and 7(a);
(3) the results of the review of United States policy
toward individual countries pursuant to section 5(b);
(4) the results, in as much detail as may be included
consistent with the national security and the need to
maintain the confidentiality of proprietary
information, of the actions, including reviews and
revisions of export controls maintained for national
security purposes, required by section 5(c)(3);
(5) actions taken to carry our section 5(d);
(6) changes in categories of items under export
control referred to in section 5(e);
(7) determinations of foreign availability made under
section 5(f), the criteria used to make such
determinations, the removal of any export controls
under such section, and any evidence demonstrating a
need to impose export controls for national security
purposes notwithstanding foreign availability;
(8) actions taken in compliance with section 5(f)(6);
(9) the operation of the indexing system under
section 5(g);
(10) consultations with the technical advisory
committees established pursuant to section 5(h), the
use made of the advice rendered by such committees, and
the contributions of such committees toward
implementing the policies set forth in this Act;
(11) the effectiveness of export controls imposed
under section 6 in furthering the foreign policy of the
United States;
(12) export controls and monitoring under section 7;
(13) the information contained in the reports
required by section 7(b)(2), together with an analysis
of--
(A) the impact on the economy and world trade
of shortages or increased prices for
commodities subject to monitoring under this
Act or section 812 of the Agricultural Act of
1970;
(B) the worldwide supply of such commodities;
and
(C) actions being taken by other countries in
response to such shortages or increased prices;
(14) actions taken by the President and the Secretary
to carry out the antiboycott policies set forth in
section 3(5) of this Act;
(15) organizational and procedural changes undertaken
in furtherance of the policies set forth in this Act,
including changes to increase the efficiency of the
export licensing process and to fulfill the
requirements of section 10, including an accounting of
appeals received, court orders issued, and actions
taken pursuant thereto under subsection (j) of such
section;
(16) delegations of authority by the President as
provided in section 4(e) of this Act;
(17) efforts to keep the business sector of the
Nation informed with respect to policies and procedures
adopted under this Act;
(18) any reviews undertaken in furtherance of the
policies of this Act, including the results of the
review required by section 12(d), and any action taken,
on the basis of the review required by section 12(e),
to simplify regulations issued under this Act;
(19) violations under section 11 and enforcement
activities under section 12; and
(20) the issuance of regulations under the authority
of this Act, including an explanation of each case in
which regulations were not issued in accordance with
the first sentence of section 13(b).
(b) Report on Certain Export Controls.--To the extent that
the President determines that the policies set forth in section
3 of this Act require the control of the export of goods and
technology other than those subject to multilateral controls,
or require more stringent controls than the multilateral
controls, the President shall include in each annual report the
reasons for the need to impose, or to continue to impose, such
controls and the estimated domestic economic impact on the
various industries affected by such controls.
(c) Report on Negotiations.--The President shall include in
each annual report a detailed report on the progress of the
negotiations required by section 5(i), until such negotiations
are concluded.
(d) Report on Exports to Controlled Countries.--The
Secretary shall include in each annual report a detailed report
which lists every license for exports to controlled countries
which was approved under this Act during the preceding fiscal
year. Such report shall specify to whom the license was
granted, the type of goods or technology exported, and the
country receiving the goods or technology. The information
required by this subsection shall be subject to the provisions
of section 12(c) of this Act.
(e) Report on Domestic Economic Impact of Exports to
Controlled Countries.--The Secretary shall include in each
annual report a detailed description of the extent of injury to
United States industry and the extent of job displacement
caused by United States exports of goods and technology to
controlled countries. The annual report shall also include a
full analysis of the consequences of exports of turnkey plants
and manufacturing facilities to controlled countries which are
used by such countries to produce goods for export to the
United States or to compete with United States products in
export markets.
(f) Annual Report of the President.--The President shall
submit an annual report to the Congress estimating the
additional defense expenditures of the United States arising
from illegal technology transfers, focusing on estimated
defense costs arising from illegal technology transfers that
resulted in a serious adverse impact on the strategic balance
of forces. These estimates shall be based on assessment by the
intelligence community of any technology transfers that
resulted in such serious adverse impact. This report may have a
classified annex covering any information of a sensitive
nature.
* * * * * * *
3. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended
Partial text of Public Law 87-794 [H.R. 11970], 76 Stat. 872, approved
October 11, 1962, as amended
TITLE I--SHORT TITLE AND PURPOSES
SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Trade Expansion Act of
1962''.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 232.\1\ SAFEGUARDING NATIONAL SECURITY.
(a) No action shall be taken pursuant to section 201(a) or
pursuant to section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to decrease
or eliminate the duty or other import restriction on any
article if the President determines that such reduction or
elimination would threaten to impair the national security.
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\1\ 19 U.S.C. 1862.
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(b) \2\ (1)(A) Upon request of the head of any department or
agency, upon application of an interested party, or upon his
own motion, the Secretary of Commerce (hereafter in this
section referred to as the `Secretary') shall immediately
initiate an appropriate investigation to determine the effects
on the national security of imports of the article which is the
subject of such request, application, or motion.
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\2\ Former subsec. (b), as amended by sec. 127(d) of Public Law 93-
618 (88 Stat. 1978 at 1993), was struck out by sec. 1501(a)(3) of
Public Law 100-418 (102 Stat. 1257) which added new subsecs. (b) and
(c).
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(B) The Secretary shall immediately provide notice to the
Secretary of Defense of any investigation initiated under this
section.
(2)(A) In the course of any investigation conducted under
this subsection, the Secretary shall--
(i) consult with the Secretary of Defense regarding
the methodological and policy questions raised in any
investigation initiated under paragraph (1),
(ii) seek information and advice from, and consult
with, appropriate officers of the United States, and
(iii) if it is appropriate and after reasonable
notice, hold public hearings or otherwise afford
interested parties an opportunity to present
information and advice relevant to such investigation.
(B) Upon the request of the Secretary, the Secretary of
Defense shall provide the Secretary an assessment of the
defense requirements of any article that is the subject of an
investigation conducted under this section.
(3)(A) By no later than the date that is 270 days after the
date on which an investigation is initiated under paragraph (1)
with respect to any article, the Secretary shall submit to the
President a report on the findings of such investigation with
respect to the effect of the importation of such article in
such quantities or under such circumstances upon the national
security and, based on such findings, the recommendations of
the Secretary for action or inaction under this section. If the
Secretary finds that such article is being imported into the
United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as
to threaten to impair the national security, the Secretary
shall so advise the President in such report.
(B) Any portion of the report submitted by the Secretary
under subparagraph (A) which does not contain classified
information or proprietary information shall be published in
the Federal Register.
(4) The Secretary shall prescribe such procedural regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
subsection.
(c) \2\ (1)(A) Within 90 days after receiving a report
submitted under subsection (b)(3)(A) in which the Secretary
finds that an article is being imported into the United States
in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten
to impair the national security, the President shall--
(i) determine whether the President concurs with the
finding of the Secretary, and
(ii) if the President concurs, determine the nature
and duration of the action that, in the judgment of the
President, must be taken to adjust the imports of the
article and its derivatives so that such imports will
not threaten to impair the national security.
(B) If the President determines under subparagraph (A) to
take action to adjust imports of an article and its
derivatives, the President shall implement that action by no
later than the date that is 15 days after the day on which the
President determines to take action under subparagraph (A).
(2) By no later than the date that is 30 days after the date
on which the President makes any determinations under paragraph
(1), the President shall submit to the Congress a written
statement of the reasons why the President has decided to take
action, or refused to take action, under paragraph (1). Such
statement shall be included in the report published under
subsection (e).
(3)(A) If--
(i) the action taken by the President under paragraph
(1) is the negotiation of an agreement which limits or
restricts the importation into, or the exportation to,
the United States of the article that threatens to
impair national security, and
(ii) either--
(I) no such agreement is entered into before
the date that is 180 days after the date on
which the President makes the determination
under paragraph (1)(A) to take such action, or
(II) such an agreement that has been entered
into is not being carried out or is ineffective
in eliminating the threat to the national
security posed by imports of such article,
the President shall take such other actions as the President
deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article so that
such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.
The President shall publish in the Federal Register notice of
any additional actions being taken under this section by reason
of this subparagraph.
(B) If--
(i) clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A) apply,
and
(ii) the President determines not to take any
additional actions under this subsection,
the President shall publish in the Federal Register such
determination and the reasons on which such determination is
based.
(d) \3\ For the purposes of this section, the Secretary and
the President shall, in the light of the requirements of
national security and without excluding other relevant factors,
give consideration to domestic production needed for projected
national defense requirements, the capacity of domestic
industries to meet such requirements, existing and anticipated
availabilities of the human resources, products, raw materials,
and other supplies and services essential to the national
defense, the requirements of growth of such industries and such
supplies and services including the investment, exploration,
and development necessary to assure such growth, and the
importation of goods in terms of their quantities,
availabilities, character, and use of those affect such
industries and the capacity of the United States to meet
national security requirements. In the administration of this
section, the Secretary and the President shall further
recognize the close relation of the economic welfare of the
Nation to our national security, and shall take into
consideration the impact of foreign competition on the economic
welfare of individual domestic industries; and any substantial
unemployment, decrease in revenues of government, loss of
skills or investment, or other serious effects resulting from
the displacement of any domestic products by excessive imports
shall be considered, without excluding other factors, in
determining whether such weakening of our internal economy may
impair the national security.
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\3\ Subsec. (d) was redesignated from subsec. (c) by sec. 1501(a)
of Public Law 100-418 (102 Stat. 1257).
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(d) \4\ (1) Upon the disposition of each request,
application, or motion under subsection (b), the Secretary
shall submit to the Congress, and publish in the Federal
Register, a report on such disposition.
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\4\ This second subsec. (d) was redesignated as subsec. (e) by sec.
1501(a)(2) of Public Law 100-418 (102 Stat. 1257). Subsequently, sec.
1501(b)(1) of that Act amended subsec. ``(e)'' to read as subsec.
``(d)''. This subsec. should probably read ``(e)''. This subsec.
previously read as follows:
``(d) A report shall be made and published upon the disposition of
each request, application, or motion under subsection (b). The
Secretary shall publish procedural regulations to give effect to the
authority conferred on him by subsection (b).''.
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(2) The President shall submit to the Congress an annual
report on the operation of the provisions of this section.
(f) \5\ (1) An action taken by the President under
subsection (c) \5\ to adjust imports of petroleum or petroleum
products shall cease to have force and effect upon the
enactment of a disapproval resolution, provided for in
paragraph (2), relating to that action.
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\5\ Subsec. (f), previously added as subsec. (e) by sec. 402 of the
Windfall Profit Tax Act (Public Law 96-223; 94 Stat. 301), was amended
by sec. 1501(a)(2) of Public Law 100-418 (102 Stat. 1257) which
substituted ``subsection (c)'' lieu of ``subsection (b)'' each place it
appeared, and redesignated subsec. (e) as subsec. (f).
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(2)(A) This paragraph is enacted by the Congress--
(i) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the
House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively,
and as such is deemed a part of the rules of each
House, respectively, but applicable only with respect
to the procedures to be followed in that House in the
case of disapproval resolutions and such procedures
supersede other rules only to the extent that they are
inconsistent therewith; and
(ii) with the full recognition of the constitutional
right of either House to change the rules (so far as
relating to the procedure of that House) at any time,
in the same manner, and to the same extent as any other
rule of that House.
(B) For purposes of this subsection, the term ``disapproval
resolution'' means only a joint resolution of either House of
Congress the matter after resolving clause of which is as
follows: ``That the Congress disapproves the action taken under
section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 with respect to
petroleum imports under ......................... dated
.........................'', the first blank space being filled
with the number of the proclamation, Executive order, or other
Executive act issued under the authority of subsection (c) \5\
of such section 232 for purposes of adjusting imports of
petroleum or petroleum products and the second blank being
filled with the appropriate date.
(C)(i) All disapproval resolutions introduced in the House
of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on Ways
and Means and all disapproved resolutions introduced in the
Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Finance.
(ii) No amendment to a disapproval resolution shall be in
order in either the House of Representatives or the Senate, and
no motion to suspend the application of this clause shall be in
order in either House nor shall it be in order in either House
for the Presiding Officer to entertain a request to suspend the
application of this clause by unanimous consent.
SEC. 233.\6\ IMPORT SANCTIONS FOR EXPORT VIOLATIONS.
Any person who violates any national security export
control imposed under section 5 of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2404), or any regulation, order, or
license issued under that section, may be subject to such
controls on the importing of goods or technology into the
United States as the President may prescribe.
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\6\ 19 U.S.C. 1864. Sec. 233 was added by sec. 121 of the Export
Administration Amendments Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-43; 99 Stat. 154).
Subsequently, sec. 233 was amended by sec. 2447(a) of Public Law 100-
418 (102 Stat. 1370) which struck out the ``(a)'' preceding ``Any
person'' and deleted subsec. (b). Subsec. (b) previously read as
follows:
``(b) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, any
person who violates any regulation issued under a multilateral
agreement, formal or informal, to control exports for national security
purposes, to which the United States is a party, may be subject to such
controls on the importing of goods or technology into the United States
as the President may prescribe, but only if--
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``(1) negotiations with the government or governments, party
to the multilateral agreement, with jurisdiction over the
violation have been conducted and been unsuccessful in
restoring compliance with the regulation involved;
``(2) the President, after the failure of such negotiations,
has notified the government or governments described in
paragraph (1) and the other parties to the multilateral
agreement that the United States proposes to subject the person
committing the violation to specific controls on the importing
of goods or technology into the United States upon the
expiration of 60 days from the date of such notification; and
``(3) a majority of the parties to the multilateral agreement
(other than the United States), before the end of that 60-day
period, have expressed to the President concurrence in the
proposed import controls or have abstained from stating a
position with respect to the proposed controls.''.
* * * * * * *
4. Trading With the Enemy Act, as amended
Partial text of Public Law 65-91 [H.R. 4960], 40 Stat. 411, approved
October 6, 1917, as amended
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That \1\
this Act shall be known as the ``Trading with the enemy \2\
Act''.
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\1\ 50 U.S.C. app. 1.
\2\ So in original.
* * * * * * *
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Sec. 5. (a) * * *
(b) \3\ (1) During the time of war,\4\ the President may
through any agency that he may designate, and under such rules
and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions,
licenses, or otherwise--
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\3\ 50 U.S.C. app. 5(b). Subsec. (b), which is also classified to
12 U.S.C. 95a (Banks and Banking) was amended and restated by sec. 301
of Public Law 77-354 (55 Stat. 839).
\4\ The words ``or during any other period of national emergency
declared by the President'', which previously appeared at this point,
were struck out by sec. 101(a) of Public Law 95-223 (91 Stat. 1625).
Sec. 101 (b) and (c) of the same Act further stipulated:
``(b) Notwithstanding the amendment made by subsection (a), the
authorities conferred upon the President by section 5(b) of the Trading
With the Enemy Act, which were being exercised with respect to a
country on July 1, 1977, as a result of a national emergency declared
by the President before such date, may continue to be exercised with
respect to such country, except that, unless extended the exercise of
such authorities shall terminate (subject to the savings provisions of
the second sentence of section 101(a) of the National Emergencies Act)
at the end of the two-year period beginning on the date of enactment of
the National Emergencies Act. The President may extend the exercise of
such authorities for one-year periods upon a determination of each such
extension that the exercise of such authorities with respect to such
country for another year is in the national interest of the United
States.
``(c) The termination and extension provisions of subsection (b) of
this section supersede the provisions of section 101(a) and of title II
of the National Emergencies Act to the extent that the provisions of
subsection (b) of this section are inconsistent with those
provisions.''.
Each year since 1977, the President has utilized authority granted
his office pursuant to the National Emergencies Act to extend certain
authorities being exercised prior to July 1, 1977, under sec. 5(b) of
the Trading with the Enemy Act. The most recent action, Presidential
Determination 97-32 of September 12, 1997 (62 F.R. 48729), extended
until September 14, 1998, the exercise of those authorities with
respect to countries affected by the Foreign Assets Control Regulations
(31 CFR Part 500), the Transaction Control Regulations (31 CFR Part
505), and the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (31 CFR Part 515).
Previous extensions have been issued as a memorandum of September
8, 1978 (43 F.R. 40449); memorandum of September 12, 1979 (44 F.R.
553153); memorandum of September 8, 1980 (45 F.R. 59549); memorandum of
September 10, 1981 (46 F.R. 45321); memorandum of September 8, 1982 (47
F.R. 39797); memorandum of September 7, 1983 (48 F.R. 40695);
memorandum of September 11, 1984 (49 F.R. 35927); memorandum of
September 5, 1985 (5 F.R. 36563); memorandum of August 20, 1986 (51
F.R. 30201); memorandum of August 27, 1987 (52 F.R. 33397);
Presidential Determination No. 88-22 of September 8, 1988 (53 F.R.
35289); Presidential Determination No. 89-25 of August 28, 1989 (54
F.R. 37089); Presidential Determination No. 90-38 of September 5, 1990
(55 F.R. 37309); Presidential Determination No. 91-52 of September 13,
1991 (56 F.R. 48415); Presidential Determination No. 92-45 of August
28, 1992 (57 F.R. 43125); Presidential Determination No. 93-38 of
September 13, 1993 (58 F.R. 51209); Presidential Determination No. 94-
46 of September 8, 1994 (59 F.R. 47229); Presidential Determination No.
95-41 of September 8, 1995 (60 F.R. 47659); and Presidential
Determination No. 96-43 of August 27, 1996 (61 F.R. 46529).
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(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit, any
transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit
or payments between, by, through, or to any banking
institution, and the importing, exporting, hoarding,
melting, or earmarking of gold or silver coin or
bullion, currency or securities, and
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel,
nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition,
holding, withholding, use, transfer withdrawal,
transportation, importation or exportation of, or
dealing in or exercising any right, power, or privilege
with respect to, or transactions involving, any
property in which any foreign country or a national
thereof has any interest,
by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States; and any property or interest
of any foreign country or national thereof shall vest, when,
as, and upon the terms, directed by the President in such
agency or person as may be designated from time to time by the
President, and upon such terms and conditions as the President
may prescribe such interest or property shall be held, used,
administered, liquidated, sold, otherwise dealt with in the
interest of and for the benefit of the United States and such
designated agency or person may perform any and all acts
incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these
purposes; and the President shall, in the manner hereinabove
provided, require any person to keep a full record of, and to
furnish under oath, in the form of reports or otherwise,
complete information relative to any act or transaction
referred to in this subdivision either before, during, or after
the completion thereof, or relative to any interest in foreign
property, or relative to any property in which any foreign
country or any national thereof has or has had any interest, or
as may be otherwise necessary to enforce the provisions of this
subdivision, and in any case in which a report could be
required, the President may, in the manner hereinabove
provided, require the production, or if necessary to the
national security or defense, the seizure, of any books of
account, records, contracts, letters, memoranda, or other
papers, in the custody or control of such person.\5\
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\5\ The words ``; and the President may, in the manner hereinabove
provided, take other or further measures not inconsistent herewith for
the enforcement of this subdivision'', which previously appeared at
this point, were struck out by sec. 102(2) of Public Law 95-223 (91
Stat. 1625).
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(2) Any payment, conveyance, transfer, assignment, or
delivery of property or interest therein, made to or for the
account of the United States, or as otherwise directed,
pursuant to this subdivision or any rule, regulation,
instruction, or direction issued hereunder shall to the extent
thereof be a full acquittance and discharge for all purposes of
the obligation of the person making the same; and no person
shall be held liable in any court for or in respect to anything
done or omitted in good faith in connection with the
administration of, or in pursuance of and in reliance on, this
subdivision, or any rule, regulation, instruction, or direction
issued hereunder.
(3) As used in this subdivision the term ``United States''
means the United States and any place subject to the
jurisdiction thereof: \6\ Provided, however, That the foregoing
shall not be construed as a limitation upon the power of the
President, which is hereby conferred, to prescribe from time to
time, definitions, not inconsistent with the purposes of this
subdivision, for any or all of the terms used in this
subdivision.\7\ As used in this subdivision the term ``person''
means an individual, partnership, association, or corporation.
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\6\ Words ``including the Philippine Islands, and the several
courts of first instance of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands
shall have jurisdiction in all cases, civil or criminal, arising under
this subdivision in the Philippine Islands and concurrent jurisdiction
with the district courts of the United States of all cases, civil or
criminal, arising upon the high seas'' immediately preceding the
proviso in subsec. (b)(3) of this section, have been omitted on the
authority of 1946 Proclamation No. 2695, which is set out as a note
under section 1394 of Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, and
in which the President proclaimed the independence of the Philippines.
\7\ Sec. 103(b) of Public Law 95-223 (91 Stat. 1626) struck out the
following sentence which previously appeared at this point:
``Whoever willfully violates any of the provisions of this
subdivision or of any license, order, rule or regulation issued
thereunder, shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, or,
if a natural person, may be imprisoned for not more than ten years, or
both; and any officer, director, or agent of any corporation who
knowingly participates in such violation may be punished by a like
fine, imprisonment, or both.''.
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(4) \8\ The authority granted to the President by this
section does not include the authority to regulate or prohibit,
directly or indirectly, the importation from any country, or
the exportation to any country, whether commercial or
otherwise, regardless of format or medium of transmission, of
any information or informational materials, including but not
limited to, publications, films, posters, phonograph records,
photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD
ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds. The exports exempted from
regulation or prohibition by this paragraph do not include
those which are otherwise controlled for export under section 5
of the Export Administration Act of 1979, or under section 6 of
that Act to the extent that such controls promote the
nonproliferation or antiterrorism policies of the United
States, or with respect to which acts are prohibited by chapter
37 of title 18, United States Code.
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\8\ Sec. 525(b)(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 474), amended
and restated para. (4). Sec. 525(b)(2) of that Act further provided:
``(2) The authorities conferred upon the President by section 5(b)
of the Trading With the Enemy Act, which were being exercised with
respect to a country on July 1, 1977, as a result of a national
emergency declared by the President before such date, and are being
exercised on the date of the enactment of this Act, do not include the
authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly, any activity
which, under section 5(b)(4) of the Trading With the Enemy Act, as
amended by paragraph (1) of this subsection, may not be regulated or
prohibited.''.
Sec. 525(a) of that Act, furthermore, stated the following:
``(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that the
President should not restrict travel or exchanges for informational,
educational, religious, cultural, or humanitarian purposes or for
public performances or exhibitions, between the United States and any
other country.''.
* * * * * * *
5. International Emergency Economic Powers Act
Title II of Public Law 95-223 [H.R. 7738], 91 Stat. 1625, approved
December 28, 1977, as amended
AN ACT With respect to the powers of the President in time of war or
national emergency.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS
short title
Sec. 201.\1\ This title may be cited as the ``International
Emergency Economic Powers Act''.
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\1\ 50 U.S.C. 1701 note.
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situations in which authorities may be exercised
Sec. 202.\2\ (a) Any authority granted to the President by
section 203 may be exercised to deal with any unusual and
extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or
substantial part outside the United States, to the national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if
the President declares a national emergency with respect to
such threat.
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\2\ 50 U.S.C. 1701. Relating to Presidential authority and
relations with Iraq, see sec. 1458 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Public Law 101-510; 104 Stat.
1697); the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (secs. 586-586J of Public Law
101-513; 104 Stat. 2047).
See also title XVI of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1993 (Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992) (Public
Law 102-484; 106 Stat. 2571).
See also sec. 533 of the Foreign Relations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (sec. 101(c) of title I of
Public Law 104-208; 110 Stat. 3009), relating to compliance with United
Nations sanctions against Iraq, Serbia and Montenegro, in U.S.
Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Legislation on
Foreign Relations Through 1996, (Washington, G.P.O., 1997), volume I-A.
See also sec. 1511 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1839), relating to
sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, in U.S. Congress. House.
Committee on International Relations. Legislation on Foreign Relations
Through 1996, (Washington, G.P.O., 1997), volume I-B.
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(b) The authorities granted to the President by section 203
may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary
threat with respect to which a national emergency has been
declared for purposes of this title and may not be exercised
for any other purpose. Any exercise of such authorities to deal
with any new threat shall be based on a new declaration of
national emergency which must be with respect to such threat.
grants of authorities
Sec. 203.\3\ (a)(1) At the times and to the extent
specified in section 202, the President may, under such
regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions,
licenses, or otherwise--
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\3\ 50 U.S.C. 1702.
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(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit--
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfer of credit or payments between,
by, through, or to any banking institution, to
the extent that such transfers or payments
involve any interest of any foreign country or
a national thereof,
(iii) the importing or exporting of currency
or securities; and
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel,
nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition,
holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal,
transportation, importation or exportation of, or
dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or
privilege with respect to, or transactions involving,
any property in which any foreign country or a national
thereof has any interest; by any person, or with
respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States.
(2) In exercising the authorities granted by paragraph (1),
the President may require any person to keep a full record of,
and to furnish under oath, in the form of reports or otherwise,
complete information relative to any act or transaction
referred to in paragraph (1) either before, during, or after
the completion thereof, or relative to any interest in foreign
property, or relative to any property in which any foreign
country or any national thereof has or has had any interest, or
as may be otherwise necessary to enforce the provisions of such
paragraph. In any case in which a report by a person could be
required under this paragraph, the President may require the
production of any books of account, records, contracts,
letters, memorandums, or other papers, in the custody or
control of such person.
(3) Compliance with any regulation, instruction, or
direction issued under this title shall to the extent thereof
be a full acquittance and discharge for all purposes of the
obligations of the person making the same. No person shall be
held liable in any court for or with respect to anything done
or omitted in good faith in connection with the administration
of, or pursuant to and in reliance on, this title, or any
regulation, instruction, or direction issued under this title.
(b) The authority granted to the President by this section
does not include the authority to regulate or prohibit,
directly or indirectly--
(1) any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other
personal communication, which does not involve a
transfer of anything of value; \4\
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\4\ Sec. 203(b) was amended by sec. 2502(b)(1) of Public Law 100-
418 (102 Stat. 1371) which struck out ``or'' in par. (1); struck out
the period and inserted ``; or'' in par. (2) and added new par. (3).
Sec. 2502(b)(2) of that Act also stated that:
``(2) The amendments made by paragraph (1) apply to actions taken
by the President under section 203 of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act before the date of the enactment of this Act which
are in effect on such date of enactment, and to actions taken under
such section on or after such date of enactment.''.
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(2) donations, by persons subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States, of articles, such as food,
clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to relieve
human suffering, except to the extent that the
President determines that such donations (A) would
seriously impair his ability to deal with any national
emergency, declared under section 202 of this title,
(B) or in response to coercion against the proposed
recipient or donor, or (C) would endanger Armed Forces
of the United States which are engaged in hostilities
or are in a situation where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.
(3) \5\ the importation from any country, or the
exportation to any country, whether commercial or
otherwise, regardless of format or medium of
transmission, of any information or informational
materials, including but not limited to, publications,
films, posters, phonograph records, photographs,
microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs,
artworks, and news wire feeds. The exports exempted
from regulation or prohibition by this paragraph do not
include those which are otherwise controlled for export
under section 5 of the Export Administration Act of
1979, or under section 6 of such Act to the extent that
such controls promote the nonproliferation or
antiterrorism policies of the United States, or with
respect to which acts are prohibited by chapter 37 of
title 18, United States Code; or
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\5\ Sec. 525(c)(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 474) struck
out para. (3) and inserted new paras. (3) and (4). Paragraph (3)
formerly read as follows:
``(3) the importation from any country, or the exportation to any
country, whether commercial or otherwise, of publications, films,
posters, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche,
tapes, or other informational materials, which are not otherwise
controlled for export under section 5 of the Export Administration Act
of 1979 or with respect to which no acts are prohibited by chapter 37
of title 18, United States Code.''.
Sec. 525(c)(2) and (3) of that Act further provided the following:
``(2) The amendments made by paragraph (1) to section 203(b)(3) of
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act apply to actions taken
by the President under section 203 of such Act before the date of
enactment of this Act which are in effect on such date and to actions
taken under such section on or after such date.
``(3) Section 203(b)(4) of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (as added by paragraph (1)) shall not apply to restrictions
on the transactions and activities described in section 203(b)(4) in
force on the date of enactment of this Act, with respect to countries
embargoed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act on the
date of enactment of this Act.''.
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(4) \5\ any transactions ordinarily incident to
travel to or from any country, including importation of
accompanied baggage for personal use, maintenance
within any country including payment of living expenses
and acquisition of goods or services for personal use,
and arrangement or facilitation of such travel
including nonscheduled air, sea, or land voyages.
consultation and reports
Sec. 204.\6\ (a) The President, in every possible instance,
shall consult with the Congress before exercising any of the
authorities granted by this title and shall consult regularly
with the Congress so long as such authorities are exercised.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ 50 U.S.C. 1703.
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(b) Whenever the President exercises any of the authorities
granted by this title, he shall immediately transmit to the
Congress a report specifying--
(1) the circumstances which necessitate such exercise
of authority;
(2) why the President believes those circumstances
constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat, which
has its source in whole or substantial part outside the
United States, to the national security, foreign
policy, or economy of the United States;
(3) the authorities to be exercised and the actions
to be taken in the exercise of those authorities to
deal with those circumstances;
(4) why the President believes such actions are
necessary to deal with those circumstances; and
(5) any foreign countries with respect to which such
actions are to be taken and why such actions are to be
taken with respect to those countries.
(c) At least once during each succeeding six-month period
after transmitting a report pursuant to subsection (b) with
respect to an exercise of authorities under this title, the
President shall report to the Congress with respect to the
actions taken, since the last such report, in the exercise of
such authorities, and with respect to any changes which have
occurred concerning any information previously furnished
pursuant to paragraphs (1) through (5) of subsection (b).
(d) The requirements of this section are supplemental to
those contained in title IV of the National Emergencies Act.
authority to issue regulations
Sec. 205.\7\ The President may issue such regulations,
including regulations prescribing definitions, as may be
necessary for the exercise of the authorities granted by this
title.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ 50 U.S.C. 1704.
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penalties
Sec. 206.\8\ (a) A civil penalty of not to exceed $10,000
\9\ may be imposed on any person who violates any license,
order or regulation issued under this title.
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\8\ 50 U.S.C. 1705.
\9\ Sec. 629 of the Treasury, Postal Service, and General
Government Appropriations Act, 1993 (Public Law 102-393; 106 Stat.
1773) struck out ``$10,000'' and inserted in lieu thereof ``$50,000''.
Sec. 9155 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1993 (Public
Law 102-396; 106 Stat. 1943), however, struck out ``$50,000'' and
inserted in lieu thereof ``$10,000''.
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(b) Whoever willfully violates any license, order, or
regulation issued under this title shall, upon conviction, be
fined not more than $50,000, or, if a natural person, may be
imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both; and any
officer, director, or agent of any corporation who knowingly
participates in such violation may be punished by a like fine,
imprisonment, or both.
savings provision
Sec. 207.\10\ (a)(1) Except as provided in subsection (b),
notwithstanding the termination pursuant to the National
Emergencies Act of a national emergency declared for purposes
of this title, any authorities granted by this title, which are
exercised on the date of such termination on the basis of such
national emergency to prohibit transactions involving property
in which a foreign country or national thereof has any
interest, may continue to be so exercised to prohibit
transactions involving that property if the President
determines that the continuation of such prohibition with
respect to that property is necessary on account of claims
involving such country of its nationals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ 50 U.S.C. 1706.
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(2) Notwithstanding the termination of the authorities
described in section 101(b) of this Act, any such authorities,
which are exercised with respect to a country on the date of
such termination to prohibit transactions involving any
property in which such country or any national thereof has any
interest, may continue to be exercised to prohibit transactions
involving that property if the President determines that the
continuation of such prohibition with respect to that property
is necessary on account of claims involving such country or its
nationals.
(b) The authorities described in subsection (a)(1) may not
continue to be exercised under this section if the national
emergency is terminated by the Congress by concurrent
resolution pursuant to section 202 of the National Emergencies
Act and if the Congress specifies in such concurrent resolution
that such authorities may not continue to be exercised under
this section.
(c)(1) The provisions of this section are supplemental to
the savings provisions of paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of
section 101(a) and of paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of section
202(a) of the National Emergencies Act.
(2) The provisions of this section supersede the
termination provisions of section 101(a) and of title II of the
National Emergencies Act to the extent that the provisions of
this section are inconsistent with these provisions.
(d) If the President uses the authority of this section to
continue prohibitions on transactions involving foreign
property interests, he shall report to the Congress every six
months on the use of such authority.
Sec. 208.\11\ If any provision of this Act is held invalid,
the remainder of the Act shall not be affected thereby.
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\11\ 50 U.S.C. 1701 note.
6. Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended
Partial text of Public Law 79-173 [H.R. 3771], 59 Stat. 526, approved
July 31, 1945, as amended
AN ACT To provide for increasing the lending authority of the Export-
Import Bank of the United States, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this
Act may be cited as the ``Export-Import Bank Act of 1945.''
Sec. 2. * * *
(b)(1) (A) It is the policy of the United States to foster
expansion of exports of manufactured goods, agricultural
products, and other goods and services, thereby contributing to
the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and
real income to the increased development of the productive
resources of the United States. To meet this objective in all
its programs, the Export-Import Bank is directed, in the
exercise of its functions, to provide guarantees, insurance,
and extensions of credit at rates and on terms and other
conditions which are fully competitive with the Government-
supported rates and terms and other conditions available for
the financing of exports of goods and services from the
principal countries whose exporters compete with United States
exporters. The Bank shall, in cooperation with the export
financing instrumentalities of other governments, seek to
minimize competition in Government-supported export financing
and shall, in cooperation with other appropriate United States
Government agencies, seek to reach international agreements to
reduce government subsidized export financing. The Bank shall,
on a annual basis, report to the appropriate committees of
Congress its actions in complying with these directives. In
this report the Bank shall include a survey of all other major
export-financing facilities available from other governments
and government-related agencies through which foreign exporters
compete with United States exporters and indicate in specific
terms the ways in which the Bank's rates, terms, and other
conditions compare with those offered from such other
governments directly or indirectly. Further the Bank shall at
the same time survey a representative number of United States
exporters and United States commercial lending institutions
which provide export credit to determine their experience in
meeting financial competition from other countries whose
exporters compete with United States exporters. The results of
this survey shall be included as part of the annual report \1\
required by this subparagraph. The Bank shall include in the
annual report a description of its role in the implementation
of the strategic plan prepared by the Trade Promotion
Coordinating Committee in accordance with section 2312 of the
Export Enhancement Act of 1988.\2\
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\1\ So in original. Should read ``an''. This requirement was
altered from a semiannual report to an annual report by sec. 210 of
Public Law 96-470 (94 Stat. 2245).
\2\ Sec. 121(a)(2) of the Export Enhancement Act of 1992 (Public
Law 102-429; 106 Stat. 2198) struck out ``The Bank shall also include
in the annual report a description of each loan by the Bank involving
the export of any product or service related to the production,
refining, or transportation of any type of energy or the development of
any energy resources with a statement assessing the impact, if any, on
the availability of such products, services, or energy supplies thus
developed for use within the United States.'', and inserted in lieu
thereof ``The Bank shall include in the annual report a description of
its role in the implementation of the strategic plan prepared by the
Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee in accordance with section 2312
of the Export Enhancement Act of 1988.''.
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(B) It is further the policy of the United States that
loans made by the Bank in all its programs shall bear interest
at rates determined by the Board of Directors, consistent with
the Bank's mandate to support United States exports at rates
and on terms and conditions which are fully competitive with
exports of other countries, and consistent with international
agreements. For the purpose of the preceding sentence, rates
and terms and conditions need not be identical in all respects
to those offered by foreign countries, but should be
established so that the effect of such rates, terms, and
conditions for all the Bank's programs, including those for
small businesses and for medium-term financing, will be to
neutralize the effect of such foreign credit on international
sales competition. The Bank shall consider its average cost of
money as one factor in its determination of interest rates,
where such consideration does not impair the Bank's primary
function of expanding United States exports through fully
competitive financing. The Bank may not impose a credit
application fee unless (i) the fee is competitive with the
average fee charged by the Bank's primary foreign competitors,
and (ii) the borrower or the exporter is given the option of
paying the fee at the outset of the loan or over the life of
the loan and the present value of the fee determined under
either such option is the same amount. It is also the policy of
the United States that the Bank in the exercise of its
functions should supplement and encourage, and not compete
with, private capital; that the Bank, in determining whether to
provide support for a transaction under the loan, guarantee, or
insurance program, or any combination thereof, shall consider
the need to involve private capital in support of United States
exports as well as the cost of the transaction as calculated in
accordance with the requirements of the Federal Credit Reform
Act of 1990; \3\ that the Bank shall accord equal opportunity
to export agents and managers, independent export firms, export
trading companies, and small commercial banks in the
formulation and implementation of its programs; that the Bank
should give emphasis to assisting new and small business
entrants in the agricultural export market, and shall, in
cooperation with other relevant Government agencies, including
the Commodity Credit Corporation, develop a program of
education to increase awareness of export opportunities among
small agribusinesses and cooperatives, that loans, so far as
possible consistent with the carrying out of the purposes of
subsection (a) of this section, shall generally be for specific
purposes, and, in the judgment of the Board of Directors, offer
reasonable assurance of repayment; and that in authorizing any
loan or guarantee, the Board of Directors shall take into
account any serious adverse effect of such loan or guarantee on
the competitive position of United States industry, the
availability of materials which are in short supply in the
United States, and employment in the United States, and shall
give particular emphasis to the objective of strengthening the
competitive position of United States exporters and thereby of
expanding total United States exports. Only in cases where the
President determines that such action would be in the national
interest where such action would clearly and importantly
advance United States policy in such areas as international
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, environmental protection and
human rights, should the Export-Import Bank deny applications
for credit for nonfinancial or noncommercial considerations.\4\
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\3\ Sec. 104 of the Export Enhancement Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-
429; 106 Stat. 2189) added this clause.
\4\ Popularly referred to as the Chafee amendment. Sec. 1904 of
Public Law 95-630 (92 Stat. 3724) struck out a phrase concerning human
rights, which had been added by sec. 2 of Public Law 95-143 (91 Stat.
1210), and substituted the words to this point beginning with ``and
shall give particular emphasis to''.
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(C) Consistent with the policy of section 501 of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and section 119 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Board of Directors shall
name an officer of the Bank whose duties shall include advising
the President of the Bank on ways or promoting the export of
goods and services to be used in the development, production,
and distribution of nonnuclear renewable energy resources,
disseminating information concerning export opportunities and
the availability of Bank support for such activities, and
acting as a liaison between the Bank and the Department of
Commerce and other appropriate departments and agencies.
(D) (i) It is further the policy of the United States to
foster the delivery of United States services in international
commerce. In exercising its powers and functions, the Bank
shall give full and equal consideration to making loans and
providing guarantees for the export of services (independently,
or in conjunction with the export of manufactured goods,
equipment, hardware or other capital goods) consistent with the
Bank's policy to neutralize foreign subsidized credit
competition and to supplement the private capital market.
(ii) The Bank shall include in its annual report a summary
of its programs regarding the export of services.
(E) (i)(I) It is further the policy of the United States to
encourage the participation of small business in international
commerce.
(II) In exercising its authority, the Bank shall develop a
program which gives fair consideration to making loans and
providing guarantees for the export of goods and services by
small businesses.
(ii) It is further the policy of the United States that the
Bank shall give due recognition to the policy stated in section
2(a) of the Small Business Act that ``the Government should
aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the
interests of small business concerns in order to preserve free
competitive enterprise''.
(iii) In furtherance of this policy, the Board of Directors
shall designate an officer of the Bank who--
(I) shall be responsible to the President of the Bank
for all matters concerning or affecting small business
concerns; and
(II) among other duties, shall be responsible for
advising small business concerns of the opportunities
for small business concerns in the functions of the
Bank and for maintaining liaison with the Small
Business Administration and other departments and
agencies in matters affecting small business concerns.)
(iv) The Director appointed to represent the interests of
small business under section 3(c) of this Act shall ensure that
the Bank carries out its responsibilities under clauses (ii)
and (iii) of this subparagraph and that the Bank's financial
and other resources are, to the maximum extent possible,
appropriately used for small business needs.
(v) To assure that the purposes of clauses (i) and (ii) of
this subparagraph are carried out, the Bank shall make
available, from the aggregate loan, guarantee, and insurance
authority available to it, an amount to finance exports
directly by small business concerns (as defined under section 3
of the Small Business Act) which shall be not less than 10
percent of such authority for each fiscal year.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Sec. 121(a)(3) of the Export Enhancement Act of 1992 (Public
Law 102-429; 106 Stat. 2198) struck out ``not less than--(I) 6 per
centum of such authority for fiscal year 1984; (II) 8 per centum of
such authority for fiscal year 1985; and (III) 10 per centum of such
authority for fiscal year 1986 and thereafter.'', and inserted in lieu
thereof ``not less than 10 percent of such authority for each fiscal
year.''.
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(vi) The Bank shall utilize the amount set-aside pursuant
to clause (v) of this subparagraph to offer financing for small
business exports on terms which are fully competitive with
regard to interest rates and with regard to the portion of
financing which may be provided, guaranteed, or insured.
Financing under this clause (vi) shall be available without
regard to whether financing for the particular transaction was
disapproved by any other Federal agency.
(vii)(I) The Bank shall utilize a part of the amount set
aside pursuant to clause (v) to provide lines of credit or
guarantees to consortia of small or medium size banks, export
trading companies, State export finance agencies, export
financing cooperatives, small business investment companies (as
defined in section 103 of the Small Business Investment Act of
1958), or other financing institutions or entities in order to
finance small business exports.
(II) Financing under this clause (vii) shall be made
available only where the consortia or the participating
institutions agree to undertake processing, servicing, and
credit evaluation functions in connection with such financing.
(III) To the maximum extent practicable, the Bank shall
delegate to the consortia the authority to approve financing
under this clause (vii).
(IV) In the administration of the program under this clause
(vii), the Bank shall provide appropriate technical assistance
to participating consortia and may require such consortia
periodically to furnish information to the Bank regarding the
number and amount of loans made and the creditworthiness of the
borrowers.
(viii) In order to assure that the policy stated in clause
(i) is carried out, the Bank shall promote small business
exports and its small business export financing programs in
cooperation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Office of
International Trade of the Small Business Administration, and
the private sector, particularly small business organizations,
State agencies, chambers of commerce, banking organizations,
export management companies, export trading companies and
private industry.
(ix) The Bank shall provide, through creditworthy trade
associations, export trading companies, State export finance
companies, export finance cooperatives, and other multiple-
exporter organizations, medium-term risk protection coverage
for the members and clients of such organizations. Such
coverage shall be made available to each such organization
under a single risk protection policy covering its members or
clients. Nothing in this provision shall be interpreted as
limiting the Bank's authority to deny support for specific
transactions or to disapprove a request by such an organization
to participate in such coverage.
(F) Consistent with international agreements, the Bank
shall urge the Foreign Credit Insurance Association to provide
coverage against 100 per centum of any loss with respect to
exports having a value of less than $100,000.
(G) Participation in or access to long-, medium-, and
short-term financing, guarantees, and insurance provided by the
Bank shall not be denied solely because the entity seeking
participation or access is not a bank or is not a United States
person.
(H) \6\ (i) It is further the policy of the United States
to foster the development of democratic institutions and market
economies in countries seeking such development, and to assist
the export of high technology items to such countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Sec. 114 of the Export Enhancement Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-
429; 106 Stat. 2195) added subpar. (H).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) In exercising its authority, the Bank shall develop a
program for providing guarantees and insurance with respect to
the export of high technology items to countries making the
transition to market based economies, including eligible East
European countries (within the meaning of section 4 of the
Support For East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989).
(iii) As part of the ongoing marketing and outreach efforts
of the Bank, the Bank shall, to the maximum extent practicable,
inform high technology companies, particularly small business
concerns (as such term is defined in section 3 of the Small
Business Act), about the programs of the Bank for United States
companies interested in exporting high technology goods to
countries making the transition to market based economies,
including any eligible East European country (within the
meaning of section 4 of the Support For East European Democracy
(SEED) Act of 1989).
(iv) In carrying out clause (iii), the Bank shall--
(I) work with other agencies involved in export
promotion and finance; and
(II) invite State and local governments, trade
centers, commercial banks, and other appropriate public
and private organizations to serve as intermediaries
for the outreach efforts.
7. Internal Revenue Code
a. Federal Income Tax Forgiveness for U.S. Military and Civilian
Employees Killed Overseas
Partial text of Title 26, United States Code--Internal Revenue Code
Subtitle A--Income Taxes
CHAPTER 1--NORMAL TAXES AND SURTAXES
Subchapter J--Estates, Trusts, Beneficiaries, and Decedents
Part II--Income in Respect of Decedents
* * * * * * *
Sec. 692. Income taxes on members of Armed Forces on death
* * * * * * *
(c) Certain military or civilian employees of the United
States dying as a result of injuries sustained overseas
(1) In general
In the case of any individual who dies while a
military or civilian employee of the United States, if
such death occurs as a result of wounds or injury which
was incurred while the individual was a military or
civilian employee of the United States and which was
incurred outside the United States in a terroristic or
military action, any tax imposed by this subtitle shall
not apply--
(A) with respect to the taxable year in which
falls the date of his death, and
(B) with respect to any prior taxable year in
the period beginning with the last taxable year
ending before the taxable year in which the
wounds or injury were incurred.
(2) Terroristic or military action
For purposes of paragraph (1), the term ``terroristic
or military action'' means--
(A) any terroristic activity which a
preponderance of the evidence indicates was
directed against the United States or any of
its allies, and
(B) any military action involving the Armed
Forces of the United States and resulting from
violence or aggression against the United
States or any of its allies (or threat
thereof).
For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term
``military action'' does not include training
exercises.
(3) Treatment of multinational forces
For purposes of paragraph (2), any multinational
force in which the United States is participating shall
be treated as an ally of the United States.
b. Denial of Foreign Tax Credit
Partial text of Title 26, United States Code--Internal Revenue Code
Subtitle A--Income Taxes
CHAPTER 1--NORMAL TAXES AND SURTAXES
Subchapter N--Tax Based on Income From Sources Within or Without the
United States
Part III--Income from Sources Within or Without the United States
subpart a--foreign tax credit
Sec. 901. Taxes of foreign countries and of possessions of United
States
* * * * * * *
(j) Denial of foreign tax credit, etc., with respect to
certain foreign countries
(1) In general
Notwithstanding any other provision of this part--
(A) no credit shall be allowed under
subsection (a) for any income, war profits, or
excess profits taxes paid or accrued (or deemed
paid under section 902 or 960) to any country
if such taxes are with respect to income
attributable to a period during which this
subsection applies to such country, and
(B) subsections (a), (b), and (c) of section
904 and sections 902 and 960 shall be applied
separately with respect to income attributable
to such a period from sources within such
country.
(2) Countries to which subsection applies
(A) In general
This subsection shall apply to any foreign
country--
(i) the government of which the
United States does not recognize,
unless such government is otherwise
eligible to purchase defense articles
or services under the Arms Export
Control Act,
(ii) with respect to which the United
States has severed diplomatic
relations,
(iii) with respect to which the
United States has not severed
diplomatic relations but does not
conduct such relations, or
(iv) which the Secretary of State
has, pursuant to section 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979, as
amended, designated as a foreign
country which repeatedly provides
support for acts of international
terrorisms.
(B) Period for which subsection applies
This subsection shall apply to any foreign
country described in subparagraph (A) during
the period--
(i) beginning on the later of--
(I) January 1, 1987, or
(II) 6 months after such
country becomes a country
described in subparagraph (A),
and
(ii) ending on the date the Secretary
of State certifies to the Secretary of
the Treasury that such country is no
longer described in subparagraph (A).
8. Bretton Woods Agreements Act Amendments, 1978
Partial text of Public Law 95-435 [H.R. 9214], 92 Stat. 1051, approved
October 10, 1978, as amended
AN ACT To amend the Bretton Woods Agreements Act to authorize the
United States to participate in the Supplementary Financing Facility of
the International Monetary Fund.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 6.\1\ The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the
Executive Director of the United States to the International
Monetary Fund to work in opposition to any extension of
financial or technical assistance by the Supplemental Financing
Facility or by any other agency or facility of such Fund to any
country the government of which--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 22 U.S.C. 286e-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) permits entry into the territory of such country
to any person who has committed an act of international
terrorism, including any act of aircraft hijacking, or
otherwise supports, encourages, or harbors such person;
or
(2) fails to take appropriate measures to prevent any
such person from committing any such act outside the
territory of such country.
* * * * * * *
9. International Financial Institutions Act
Partial text of Public Law 95-118 [H.R. 5262], 91 Stat. 1067, approved
October 3, 1977, as amended
_______________________________________________________________________
Note.--Except for the provisions noted below, this
Act consists of amendments to the Bretton Woods
Agreements Act, International Finance Corporation Act,
International Development Association Act, Asian
Development Bank Act, African Development Fund Act, and
the Inter-American Development Bank Act.
_______________________________________________________________________
AN ACT To provide for increased participation by the United States in
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the
International Development Association, the International Finance
Corporation, the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Development Fund,
and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
short title
Section 1. This Act may be cited as the International
Financial Institutions Act.
* * * * * * *
TITLE VII--HUMAN RIGHTS
Sec. 701.\1\ (a) \2\ The United States Government, in
connection with its voice and vote in the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, the International
Development Association, the International Finance Corporation,
the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development
Fund, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank,
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the
International Monetary Fund,\3\ shall advance the cause of
human rights, including by seeking to channel assistance toward
countries other than those whose governments engage in--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 22 U.S.C. 262d. Section 701 was invoked in sec. 586G(a)(5) of
the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990, as contained in the Foreign Operations,
Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991 (Public
Law 101-513; 104 Stat. 1979 at 2052).
See also secs. 568, 576, and 579 in Title V of the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
1997 (sec. 101(c) of title I of Public Law 104-208; 110 Stat. 3009).
\2\ Sec. 823(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 512), provided the
following:
``(a) In General.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the
United States executive director to each of the international financial
institutions described in section 701(a) of the International Financial
Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262d(a)) to use the voice and vote of the
United States to oppose any use of the institution's funds to promote
the acquisition of unsafeguarded special nuclear material or the
development, stockpiling, or use of any nuclear explosive device by any
non-nuclear-weapon state.''.
See also amendment and note at subsec. (b)(3) of this section.
\3\ Reference to the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and the International Monetary Fund was added by sec.
1008(a) of the FREEDOM Support Act (Public Law 102-511; 106 Stat.
3361).
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(1) a pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights, such as torture or cruel,
inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment,
prolonged detention without charges, or other flagrant
denial to life, liberty, and the security of person; or
(2) provide refuge to individuals committing acts of
international terrorism by hijacking aircraft.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XVI--HUMAN WELFARE
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1621.\4\ OPPOSITION TO ASSISTANCE BY INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS TO TERRORIST STATES.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall
instruct the United States executive director of each
international financial institution to use the voice and vote
of the United States to oppose any loan or other use of the
funds of the respective institution to or for a country for
which the Secretary of State has made a determination under
section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50
U.S.C. App. 2405(j)) or section 620A of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ 22 U.S.C. 262p-4q. Added by sec. 327 of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132; 110 Stat.
1257), resulting in two ``Sec. 1621''.
Similar language had previously been adopted in annual foreign
assistance appropriations acts since FY 1988.
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(b) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term
``international financial institution'' includes--
(1) the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, the International Development Association,
and the International Monetary Fund;
(2) wherever applicable, the Inter-American Bank, the
Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, the African Development
Bank, and the African Development Fund; and
(3) any similar institution established after the
date of enactment of this section.
10. Inter-American Development Bank Act, as amended
Partial text of Public Law 86-147 [S. 1928], 73 Stat. 299, approved
August 7, 1959, as amended
AN ACT To provide for the participation of the United States in the
Inter-American Development Bank.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
short title
Section 1. This Act may be cited as the ``Inter-American
Development Bank Act''.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 37.\1\ (a) The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized
to contribute, and to make payment of, $500,000,000 to the
Multilateral Investment Fund established pursuant to the
agreements of February 11, 1992: Provided, That such funds
shall only be disbursed from the Fund to countries that have
governments that are democratically elected, that do not harbor
or sponsor international terrorists; that do not fail to
cooperate in narcotics matters; and that do not engage in a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 22 U.S.C. 283z-9. Added by sec. 594(b) of the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
1993 (Public Law 102-391; 106 Stat. 1693).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated without
fiscal year limitation $500,000,000 for the contribution
authorized in subsection (a).\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Appropriations for U.S. contributions authorized in sec. 36(b)
have been provided in the following amounts and Public Laws: fiscal
year 1993--$90 million (Public Law 102-391); fiscal year 1994--$75
million (Public Law 103-87); fiscal year 1995--75 million (Public Law
103-306); fiscal year 1996--75 million (Public Law 104-107); fiscal
year 1997--53.75 million (Public Law 104-208).
* * * * * * *
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=======================================================================
F. AVIATION SECURITY
CONTENTS
Page
1. Aviation Programs (Title 49, United State Code) (partial text) 319
Subtitle VII--Aviation Programs............................ 319
2. Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-
264) (partial text).......................................... 343
3. Crimes and Criminal Procedures (Title 18, United States Code). 348
Chapter 2--Aircraft and Motor Vehicles..................... 348
Section 32--Destruction of Aircraft or Aircraft
Facilities....................................... 348
Section 37--Violence at International Airports....... 349
4. Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, as amended (Public
Law 101-604) (partial text).................................. 351
5. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985
(Public Law 99-83) (partial text)............................ 358
Title V--International Terrorism and Foreign Airport
Security............................................... 358
=======================================================================
1. Aviation Programs
Partial text of Title 49, United States Code--Transportation
Note.--Public Law 103-272 (108 Stat. 745) repealed
several Public Laws relating to transportation,
aviation, and airport security, and consolidated their
substance into 49 U.S.C.
SUBTITLE VII--AVIATION PROGRAMS
PART A--AIR COMMERCE AND SAFETY
subpart i--general
CHAPTER 401--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 40106. Emergency powers
(a) Deviations From Regulations.--Appropriate military
authority may authorize aircraft of the armed forces of the
United States to deviate from air traffic regulations
prescribed under section 40103(b)(1) and (2) of this title when
the authority decides the deviation is essential to the
national defense because of a military emergency or urgent
military necessity. The authority shall--
(1) give the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration prior notice of the deviation at the
earliest practicable time; and
(2) to the extent time and circumstances allow, make
every reasonable effort to consult with the
Administrator and arrange for the deviation in advance
on a mutually agreeable basis.
(b) Suspension of Authority.--(1) When the President
decides that the government of a foreign country is acting
inconsistently with the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft or that the government of a
foreign country allows territory under its jurisdiction to be
used as a base of operations or training of, or as a sanctuary
for, or arms, aids, or abets, a terrorist organization that
knowingly uses the unlawful seizure, or the threat of an
unlawful seizure, of an aircraft as an instrument of policy,
the President may suspend the authority of--
(A) an air carrier or foreign air carrier to provide
foreign air transportation to an from that foreign
country;
(B) a person to operate aircraft in foreign air
commerce to and from that foreign country;
(C) a foreign air carrier to provide foreign air
transportation between the United states and another
country that maintains air service with the foreign
country; and
(D) a foreign person to operate aircraft in foreign
air commerce between the United States and another
country that maintains air service with the foreign
country.
(2) The President may act under this subsection without
notice or a hearing. The suspension remains in effect for as
long as the President decides is necessary to ensure the
security of aircraft against unlawful seizure. Notwithstanding
section 40105(b) of this title, the authority of the President
to suspend rights under this subsection is a condition to a
certificate of public convenience and necessity, air carrier
operating certificate, foreign air carrier or foreign aircraft
permit, or foreign air carrier operating specification issued
by the Secretary of Transportation under this part.
(3) An air carrier or foreign air carrier may not provide
foreign air transportation, and a person may not operate
aircraft in foreign air commerce, in violation of a suspension
of authority under this subsection.
* * * * * * *
subpart iii--safety
CHAPTER 449--SECURITY
subchapter i--requirements
Sec. 44901. Screening passengers and property
(a) General Requirements.--The Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration shall prescribe regulations requiring
screening of all passengers and property that will be carried
in a cabin of an aircraft in air transportation or intrastate
air transportation. The screening must take place before
boarding and be carried out by a weapon-detecting facility or
procedure used or operated by an employee or agent of an air
carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier.
(b) Amending Regulations.--Notwithstanding subsection (a)
of this section, the Administrator may amend a regulation
prescribed under subsection (a) to require screening only to
ensure security against criminal violence and aircraft piracy
in air transportation and intrastate air transportation.
(c) Exemptions and Advising Congress on Regulations.--The
Administrator--
(1) may exempt from this section air transportation
operations, except scheduled passenger operations of an
air carrier providing air transportation under a
certificate issued under section 41102 of this title or
a permit issued under section 41302 of this title; and
(2) shall advise Congress of a regulation to be
prescribed under this section at least 30 days before
the effective date of the regulation, unless the
Administrator decides an emergency exists requiring the
regulation to become effective in fewer than 30 days
and notifies Congress of that decision.
Sec. 44902. Refusal to transport passengers and property
(a) Mandatory Refusal.--The Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration shall prescribe regulations requiring
an air carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier
to refuse to transport--
(1) a passenger who does not consent to a search
under section 44901(a) of this title establishing
whether the passenger is carrying unlawfully a
dangerous weapon, explosive, or other destructive
substance; or
(2) property of a passenger who does not consent to a
search of the property establishing whether the
property unlawfully contains a dangerous weapon,
explosive, or other destructive substance.
(b) Permissive Refusal.--Subject to regulations of the
Administrator, an air carrier, intrastate air carrier, or
foreign air carrier may refuse to transport a passenger or
property the carrier decides is, or might be, inimical to
safety.
(c) Agreeing to Consent to Search.--An agreement to carry
passengers or property in air transportation or intrastate air
transportation by an air carrier, intrastate air carrier, or
foreign air carrier is deemed to include an agreement that the
passenger or property will not be carried if consent to search
the passenger or property for a purpose referred to in this
section is not given.
Sec. 44903. Air transportation security
(a) Definition.--In this section, ``law enforcement
personnel'' means individuals--
(1) authorized to carry and use firearms;
(2) vested with the degree of the police power of
arrest the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration considers necessary to carry out this
section; and
(3) identifiable by appropriate indicia of authority.
(b) Protection Against Violence and Piracy.--The
Administrator shall prescribe regulations to protect passengers
and property on an aircraft operating in air transportation or
intrastate air transportation against an act of criminal
violence or aircraft piracy. When prescribing a regulation
under this subsection, the Administrator shall--
(1) consult with the Secretary of Transportation, the
Attorney General, the heads of other departments,
agencies, and instrumentalities of the United States
Government, and State and local authorities;
(2) consider whether a proposed regulation is
consistent with--
(A) protecting passengers; and
(B) the public interest in promoting air
transportation and intrastate air
transportation;
(3) to the maximum extent practicable, require a
uniform procedure for searching and detaining
passengers and property to ensure--
(A) their safety; and
(B) courteous and efficient treatment by an
air carrier, an agent or employee of an air
carrier, and Government, State, and local law
enforcement personnel carrying out this
section; and
(4) consider the extent to which a proposed
regulation will carry out this section.
(c) Security Programs.--(1) The Administrator shall
prescribe regulations under subsection (b) of this section that
require each operator of an airport regularly serving an air
carrier holding a certificate issued by the Secretary of
Transportation to establish an air transportation security
program that provides a law enforcement presence and capability
at each of those airports that is adequate to ensure the safety
of passengers. The regulations shall authorize the operator to
use the services of qualified State, local, and private law
enforcement personnel. When the Administrator decides, after
being notified by an operator in the form the Administrator
prescribes, that not enough qualified State, local, and private
law enforcement personnel are available to carry out subsection
(b), the Administrator may authorize the operator to use, on a
reimbursable basis, personnel employed by the Administrator, or
by another department, agency, or instrumentality of the
Government with the consent of the head of the department,
agency, or instrumentality, to supplement State, local, and
private law enforcement personnel. When deciding whether
additional personnel are needed, the Administrator shall
consider the number of passengers boarded at the airport, the
extent of anticipated risk of criminal violence or aircraft
piracy at the airport or to the air carrier aircraft operations
at the airport, and the availability of qualified State or
local law enforcement personnel at the airport.
(2)(A) The Administrator may approve a security program of
an airport operator, or an amendment in an existing program,
that incorporates a security program of an airport tenant
(except an air carrier separately complying with part 108 or
129 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations) having access to
a secured area of the airport, if the program or amendment
incorporates--
(i) the measures the tenant will use, within the
tenant's leased areas or areas designated for the
tenant's exclusive use under an agreement with the
airport operator, to carry out the security
requirements imposed by the Administrator on the
airport operator under the access control system
requirements of section 107.14 of title 14, Code of
Federal Regulations, or under other requirements of
part 107 of title 14; and
(ii) the methods the airport operator will use to
monitor and audit the tenant's compliance with the
security requirements and provides that the tenant will
be required to pay monetary penalties to the airport
operator if the tenant fails to carry out a security
requirement under a contractual provision or
requirement imposed by the airport operator.
(B) If the Administrator approves a program or amendment
described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the airport
operator may not be found to be in violation of a requirement
of this subsection or subsection (b) of this section when the
airport operator demonstrates that the tenant or an employee,
permittee, or invitee of the tenant is responsible for the
violation and that the airport operator has complied with all
measures in its security program for securing compliance with
its security program by the tenant.
(d) Authorizing Individuals To Carry Firearms and Make
Arrests.--With the approval of the Attorney General and the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Transportation may
authorize an individual who carries out air transportation
security duties--
(1) to carry firearms; and
(2) to make arrests without warrant for an offense
against the United States committed in the presence of
the individual or for a felony under the laws of the
United States, if the individual reasonably believes
the individual to be arrested has committed or is
committing a felony.
(e) Exclusive Responsibility Over Passenger Safety.--The
Administrator has the exclusive responsibility to direct law
enforcement activity related to the safety of passengers on an
aircraft involved in an offense under section 46502 of this
title from the moment all external doors of the aircraft are
closed following boarding until those doors are opened to allow
passengers to leave the aircraft. When requested by the
Administrator, other departments, agencies, and
instrumentalities of the Government shall provide assistance
necessary to carry out this subsection.
Sec. 44904. Domestic air transportation system security
(a) Assessing Threats.--The Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration and the Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation jointly shall assess current and potential
threats to the domestic air transportation system. The
assessment shall include consideration of the extent to which
there are individuals with the capability and intent to carry
out terrorist or related unlawful acts against that system and
the ways in which those individuals might carry out those acts.
The Administrator and the Director jointly shall decide on and
carry out the most effective method for continuous analysis and
monitoring of security threats to that system.
(b) Assessing Security.--In coordination with the Director,
the Administrator shall carry out periodic threat and
vulnerability assessments on security at each airport that is
part of the domestic air transportation system. Each assessment
shall include consideration of--
(1) the adequacy of security procedures related to
the handling and transportation of checked baggage and
cargo;
(2) space requirements for security personnel and
equipment;
(3) separation of screened and unscreened passengers,
baggage, and cargo;
(4) separation of the controlled and uncontrolled
areas of airport facilities; and
(5) coordination of the activities of security
personnel of the Administration, the United States
Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, and air carriers, and of other law enforcement
personnel.
(c) Improving Security.--The Administrator shall take
necessary actions to improve domestic air transportation
security by correcting any deficiencies in that security
discovered in the assessments, analyses, and monitoring carried
out under this section.
Sec. 44905. Information about threats to civil aviation
(a) Providing Information.--Under guidelines the Secretary
of Transportation prescribes, an air carrier, airport operator,
ticket agent, or individual employed by an air carrier, airport
operator, or ticket agent, receiving information (except a
communication directed by the United States Government) about a
threat to civil aviation shall provide the information promptly
to the Secretary.
(b) Flight Cancellation.--If a decision is made that a
particular threat cannot be addressed in a way adequate to
ensure, to the extent feasible, the safety of passengers and
crew of a particular flight or series of flights, the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall
cancel the flight or series of flights.
(c) Guidelines on Public Notice.--(1) The President shall
develop guidelines for ensuring that public notice is provided
in appropriate cases about threats to civil aviation. The
guidelines shall identify officials responsible for--
(A) deciding, on a case-by-case basis, if public
notice of a threat is in the best interest of the
United States and the traveling public;
(B) ensuring that public notice is provided in a
timely and effective way, including the use of a toll-
free telephone number; and
(C) canceling the departure of a flight or series of
flights under subsection (b) of this section.
(2) The guidelines shall provide for consideration of--
(A) the specificity of the threat;
(B) the credibility of intelligence information
related to the threat;
(C) the ability to counter the threat effectively;
(D) the protection of intelligence information
sources and methods;
(E) cancellation, by an air carrier or the
Administrator, of a flight or series of flights instead
of public notice;
(F) the ability of passengers and crew to take steps
to reduce the risk to their safety after receiving
public notice of a threat; and
(G) other factors the Administrator considers
appropriate.
(d) Guidelines on Notice to Crews.--The Administrator shall
develop guidelines for ensuring that notice in appropriate
cases of threats to the security of an air carrier flight is
provided to the flight crew and cabin crew of that flight.
(e) Limitation on Notice to Selective Travelers.--Notice of
a threat to civil aviation may be provided to selective
potential travelers only if the threat applies only to those
travelers.
(f) Restricting Access to Information.--In cooperation with
the departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the
Government that collect, receive, and analyze intelligence
information related to aviation security, the Administrator
shall develop procedures to minimize the number of individuals
who have access to information about threats. However, a
restriction on access to that information may be imposed only
if the restriction does not diminish the ability of the
Government to carry out its duties and powers related to
aviation security effectively, including providing notice to
the public and flight and cabin crews under this section.
(g) Distribution of Guidelines.--The guidelines developed
under this section shall be distributed for use by appropriate
officials of the Department of Transportation, the Department
of State, the Department of Justice, and air carriers.
Sec. 44906.\1\ Foreign air carrier security programs
The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
shall continue in effect the requirement of section 129.25 of
title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, that a foreign air
carrier must adopt and use a security program approved by the
Administrator. The Administrator shall not approve a security
program of a foreign air carrier under section 129.25, or any
successor regulation, unless the security program requires the
foreign air carrier in its operations to and from airports in
the United States to adhere to the identical security measures
that the Administrator requires air carriers serving the same
airports to adhere to. The foregoing requirement shall not be
interpreted to limit the ability of the Administrator to impose
additional security measures on a foreign air carrier or an air
carrier when the Administrator determines that a specific
threat warrants such additional measures. The Administrator
shall prescribe regulations to carry out this section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Sec. 322 of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1254) amended and
restated sec. 44906.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. Sec. 44907. Security standards at foreign airports
(a) Assessment.--(1) At intervals the Secretary of
Transportation considers necessary, the Secretary shall assess
the effectiveness of the security measures maintained at--
(A) a foreign airport--
(i) served by an air carrier;
(ii) from which a foreign air carrier serves
the United States; or
(iii) that poses a high risk of introducing
danger to international air travel; and
(B) other foreign airports the Secretary considers
appropriate.
(2) The Secretary of Transportation shall conduct an
assessment under paragraph (1) of this subsection--
(A) in consultation with appropriate aeronautic
authorities of the government of a foreign country
concerned and each air carrier serving the foreign
airport for which the Secretary is conducting the
assessment;
(B) to establish the extent to which a foreign
airport effectively maintains and carries out security
measures; and
(C) by using a standard that will result in an
analysis of the security measures at the airport based
at least on the standards and appropriate recommended
practices contained in Annex 17 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation in effect on the date of
the assessment.
(3) Each report to Congress required under section 44938(b)
of this title shall contain a summary of the assessments
conducted under this subsection.
(b) Consultation.--In carrying out subsection (a) of this
section, the Secretary of Transportation shall consult with the
Secretary of State--
(1) on the terrorist threat that exists in each
country; and
(2) to establish which foreign airports are not under
the de facto control of the government of the foreign
country in which they are located and pose a high risk
of introducing danger to international air travel.
(c) Notifying Foreign Authorities.--When the Secretary of
Transportation, after conducting an assessment under subsection
(a) of this section, decides that an airport does not maintain
and carry out effective security measures, the Secretary of
Transportation, after advising the Secretary of State, shall
notify the appropriate authorities of the government of the
foreign country of the decision and recommend the steps
necessary to bring the security measures in use at the airport
up to the standard used by the Secretary of Transportation in
making the assessment.
(d) Actions When Airports Not Maintaining and Carrying Out
Effective Security Measures.--(1) When the Secretary of
Transportation decides under this section that an airport does
not maintain and carry out effective security measures--
(A) the Secretary of Transportation shall--
(i) publish the identity of the airport in
the Federal Register;
(ii) have the identity of the airport posted
and displayed prominently at all United States
airports at which scheduled air carrier
operations are provided regularly; and
(iii) notify the news media of the identity
of the airport;
(B) each air carrier and foreign air carrier
providing transportation between the United States and
the airport shall provide written notice of the
decision, on or with the ticket, to each passenger
buying a ticket for transportation between the United
States and the airport;
(C) notwithstanding section 40105(b) of this title,
the Secretary of Transportation, after consulting with
the appropriate aeronautic authorities of the foreign
country concerned and each air carrier serving the
airport and with the approval of the Secretary of
State, may withhold, revoke, or prescribe conditions on
the operating authority of an air carrier or foreign
air carrier that uses that airport to provide foreign
air transportation; and
(D) the President may prohibit an air carrier or
foreign air carrier from providing transportation
between the United States and any other foreign airport
that is served by aircraft flying to or from the
airport with respect to which a decision is made under
this section.
(2)(A) Paragraph (1) of this subsection becomes effective--
(i) 90 days after the government of a foreign country
is notified under subsection (c) of this section if the
Secretary of Transportation finds that the government
has not brought the security measures at the airport up
to the standard the Secretary used in making an
assessment under subsection (a) of this section; or
(ii) immediately on the decision of the Secretary of
Transportation under subsection (c) of this section if
the Secretary of Transportation decides, after
consulting with the Secretary of State, that a
condition exists that threatens the safety or security
of passengers, aircraft, or crew traveling to or from
the airport.
(B) The Secretary of Transportation immediately shall
notify the Secretary of State of a decision under subparagraph
(A)(ii) of this paragraph so that the Secretary of State may
issue a travel advisory required under section 44908(a) of this
title.
(3) The Secretary of Transportation promptly shall submit
to Congress a report (and classified annex if necessary) on
action taken under paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection,
including information on attempts made to obtain the
cooperation of the government of a foreign country in meeting
the standard the Secretary used in assessing the airport under
subsection (a) of this section.
(4) An action required under paragraph (1)(A) and (B) of
this subsection is no longer required only if the Secretary of
Transportation, in consultation with the Secretary of State,
decides that effective security measures are maintained and
carried out at the airport. The Secretary of Transportation
shall notify Congress when the action is no longer required to
be taken.
(e) Suspensions.--Notwithstanding sections 40105(b) and
40106(b) of this title, the Secretary of Transportation, with
the approval of the Secretary of State and without notice or a
hearing, shall suspend the right of an air carrier or foreign
air carrier to provide foreign air transportation, and the
right of a person to operate aircraft in foreign air commerce,
to or from a foreign airport when the Secretary of
Transportation decides that--
(1) a condition exists that threatens the safety or
security of passengers, aircraft, or crew traveling to
or from that airport; and
(2) the public interest requires an immediate
suspension of transportation between the United States
and that airport.
(f) Condition of Carrier Authority.--This section is a
condition to authority the Secretary of Transportation grants
under this part to an air carrier or foreign air carrier.
Sec. 44908. Travel advisory and suspension of foreign assistance
(a) Travel Advisories.--On being notified by the Secretary
of Transportation that the Secretary of Transportation has
decided under section 44907(d)(2)(A)(ii) of this title that a
condition exists that threatens the safety or security of
passengers, aircraft, or crew traveling to or from a foreign
airport that the Secretary of Transportation has decided under
section 44907 of this title does not maintain and carry out
effective security measures, the Secretary of State--
(1) immediately shall issue a travel advisory for
that airport;
(2) shall publish the advisory in the Federal
Register; and
(3) shall publicize the advisory widely.
(b) Suspended Assistance.--The President shall suspend
assistance provided under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) or the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) to a country in which is located an
airport with respect to which section 44907(d)(1) of this title
becomes effective if the Secretary of State decides the country
is a high terrorist threat country. The President may waive
this subsection if the President decides, and reports to
Congress, that the waiver is required because of national
security interests or a humanitarian emergency.
(c) Actions No Longer Required.--An action required under
this section is no longer required only if the Secretary of
Transportation has made a decision as provided under section
44907(d)(4) of this title. The Secretary shall notify Congress
when the action is no longer required to be taken.
Sec. 44910. Agreements on aircraft sabotage, aircraft hijacking, and
airport security
The Secretary of State shall seek multilateral and
bilateral agreement on strengthening enforcement measures and
standards for compliance related to aircraft sabotage, aircraft
hijacking, and airport security.
Sec. 44911. Intelligence
(a) Definition.--In this section, ``intelligence
community'' means the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the following units of the United States
Government:
(1) the Department of State.
(2) the Department of Defense.
(3) the Department of the Treasury.
(4) the Department of Energy.
(5) the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
(6) the Central Intelligence Agency.
(7) the National Security Agency.
(8) the Defense Intelligence Agency.
(9) the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) the Drug Enforcement Administration.
(b) Policies and Procedures on Report Availability.--The
head of each unit in the intelligence community shall prescribe
policies and procedures to ensure that intelligence reports
about international terrorism are made available, as
appropriate, to the heads of other units in the intelligence
community, the Secretary of Transportation, and the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
(c) Unit for Strategic Planning on Terrorism.--The heads of
the units in the intelligence community shall consider placing
greater emphasis on strategic intelligence efforts by
establishing a unit for strategic planning on terrorism.
(d) Designation of Intelligence Officer.--At the request of
the Secretary, the Director of Central Intelligence shall
designate at least one intelligence officer of the Central
Intelligence Agency to serve in a senior position in the Office
of the Secretary.
(e) Written Working Agreements.--The heads of units in the
intelligence community, the Secretary, and the Administrator
shall review and, as appropriate, revise written working
agreements between the intelligence community and the
Administrator.
Sec. 44912. Research and development
(a) Program Requirement.--(1) The Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration shall establish and carry out a
program to accelerate and expand the research, development, and
implementation of technologies and procedures to counteract
terrorist acts against civil aviation. The program shall
provide for developing and having in place, not later than
November 16, 1993, new equipment and procedures necessary to
meet the technological challenges presented by terrorism. The
program shall include research on, and development of,
technological improvements and ways to enhance human
performance.
(2) In designing and carrying out the program established
under this subsection, the Administrator shall--
(A) consult and coordinate activities with other
departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the
United States Government doing similar research;
(B) identify departments, agencies, and
instrumentalities that would benefit from that
research; and
(C) seek cost-sharing agreements with those
departments, agencies, and instrumentalities.
(3) In carrying out the program established under this
subsection, the Administrator shall review and consider the
annual reports the Secretary of Transportation submits to
Congress on transportation security and intelligence.
(4) The Administrator may--
(A) make grants to institutions of higher learning
and other appropriate research facilities with
demonstrated ability to carry out research described in
paragraph (1) of this subsection, and fix the amounts
and terms of the grants; and
(B) make cooperative agreements with governmental
authorities the Administrator decides are appropriate.
(b) Review of Threats.--(1) The Administrator shall
complete an intensive review of threats to civil aviation, with
particular focus on--
(A) explosive material that presents the most
significant threat to civil aircraft;
(B) the minimum amounts, configurations, and types of
explosive material that can cause, or would reasonably
be expected to cause, catastrophic damage to commercial
aircraft in service and expected to be in service in
the 10-year period beginning on November 16, 1990;
(C) the amounts, configurations, and types of
explosive material that can be detected reliably by
existing, or reasonably anticipated, near-term
explosive detection technologies;
(D) the feasibility of using various ways to minimize
damage caused by explosive material that cannot be
detected reliably by existing, or reasonably
anticipated, near-term explosive detection
technologies;
(E) the ability to screen passengers, carry-on
baggage, checked baggage, and cargo; and
(F) the technologies that might be used in the future
to attempt to destroy or otherwise threaten commercial
aircraft and the way in which those technologies can be
countered effectively.
(2) The Administrator shall use the results of the review
under this subsection to develop the focus and priorities of
the program established under subsection (a) of this section.
(c) Scientific Advisory Panel.--The Administrator shall
establish a scientific advisory panel, as a subcommittee of the
Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee, to
review, comment on, advise on the progress of, and recommend
modifications in, the program established under subsection (a)
of this section, including the need for long-range research
programs to detect and prevent catastrophic damage to
commercial aircraft by the next generation of terrorist
weapons. The panel shall consist of individuals with scientific
and technical expertise in--
(1) the development and testing of effective
explosive detection systems;
(2) aircraft structure and experimentation to decide
on the type and minimum weights of explosives that an
effective technology must be capable of detecting;
(3) technologies involved in minimizing airframe
damage to aircraft from explosives; and
(4) other scientific and technical areas the
Administrator considers appropriate.
Sec. 44913. Explosive detection
(a) Deployment and Purchase of Equipment.--(1) A deployment
or purchase of explosive detection equipment under section
108.7(b)(8) or 108.20 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations,
or similar regulation is required only if the Administrator of
the Federal Aviation Administration certifies that the
equipment alone, or as part of an integrated system, can detect
under realistic air carrier operating conditions the amounts,
configurations, and types of explosive material that would
likely be used to cause catastrophic damage to commercial
aircraft. The Administrator shall base the certification on the
results of tests conducted under protocols developed in
consultation with expert scientists outside of the
Administration. Those tests shall be completed not later than
April 16, 1992.
(2) Before completion of the tests described in paragraph
(1) of this subsection, but not later than April 16, 1992, the
Administrator may require deployment of explosive detection
equipment described in paragraph (1) if the Administrator
decides that deployment will enhance aviation security
significantly. In making that decision, the Administrator shall
consider factors such as the ability of the equipment alone, or
as part of an integrated system, to detect under realistic air
carrier operating conditions the amounts, configurations, and
types of explosive material that would likely be used to cause
catastrophic damage to commercial aircraft. The Administrator
shall notify the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure \2\ of the House of
Representatives of a deployment decision made under this
paragraph.
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\2\ Sec. 5(9) of Public Law 104-287 (110 Stat. 3389) struck out
``Public Works and Transportation'' and inserted in lieu thereof
``Transportation and Infrastructure''.
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(3) \3\ Until such time as the Administrator determines
that equipment certified under paragraph (1) is commercially
available and has successfully completed operational testing as
provided in paragraph (1), the Administrator shall facilitate
the deployment of such approved commercially available
explosive detection devices as the Administrator determines
will enhance aviation security significantly. The Administrator
shall require that equipment deployed under this paragraph be
replaced by equipment certified under paragraph (1) when
equipment certified under paragraph (1) becomes commercially
available. The Administrator is authorized , based on
operational considerations at individual airports, to waive the
required installation of commercially available equipment under
paragraph (1) in the interests of aviation security. The
Administrator may permit the requirements of this paragraph to
be met at airports by the deployment of dogs or other
appropriate animals to supplement equipment for screening
passengers, baggage, mail, or cargo for explosives or weapons.
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\3\ Sec. 305(a) of Public Law 104-264 (110 Stat. 3252) redesignated
para. (3) as para. (4), and added a new para. (3).
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(4) \3\ This subsection does not prohibit the Administrator
from purchasing or deploying explosive detection equipment
described in paragraph (1) of this subsection.
(b) Grants.--The Secretary of Transportation may provide
grants to continue the Explosive Detection K-9 Team Training
Program to detect explosives at airports and on aircraft.
Sec. 44914. Airport construction guidelines
In consultation with air carriers, airport authorities, and
others the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
considers appropriate, the Administrator shall develop
guidelines for airport design and construction to allow for
maximum security enhancement. In developing the guidelines, the
Administrator shall consider the results of the assessment
carried out under section 44904(a) of this title.
Sec. 44915. Exemptions
The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
may exempt from sections 44901, 44903(a)-(c) and (e), 44906,
44935, and 44936 of this title airports in Alaska served only
by air carriers that--
(1) hold certificates issued under section 41102 of
this title;
(2) operate aircraft with certificates for a maximum
gross takeoff weight of less than 12,500 pounds; and
(3) board passengers, or load property intended to be
carried in an aircraft cabin, that will be screened
under section 44901 of this title at another airport in
Alaska before the passengers board, or the property is
loaded on, an aircraft for a place outside Alaska.
Sec. 44916.\4\ Assessments and evaluations
(a) Periodic Assessments.--The Administrator shall require
each air carrier and airport (including the airport owner or
operator in cooperation with the air carriers and vendors
serving each airport) that provides for intrastate, interstate,
or foreign air transportation to conduct periodic vulnerability
assessments of the security systems of that air carrier or
airport, respectively. The Administration shall perform
periodic audits of such assessments.
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\4\ Sec. 312(a) of Public Law 104-264 (110 Stat. 3254) added sec.
44916.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Investigations.--The Administrator shall conduct
periodic and unannounced inspections of security systems of
airports and air carriers to determine the effectiveness and
vulnerabilities of such systems. To the extent allowable by
law, the Administrator may provide for anonymous tests of those
security systems.
subchapter ii--administration and personnel
Sec. 44931. Director of Intelligence and Security
(a) Organization.--There is in the Office of the Secretary
of Transportation a Director of Intelligence and Security. The
Director reports directly to the Secretary.
(b) Duties and Powers.--The Director shall--
(1) receive, assess, and distribute intelligence
information related to long-term transportation
security;
(2) develop policies, strategies, and plans for
dealing with threats to transportation security;
(3) make other plans related to transportation
security, including coordinating countermeasures with
appropriate departments, agencies, and
instrumentalities of the United States Government;
(4) serve as the primary liaison of the Secretary to
the intelligence and law enforcement communities; and
(5) carry out other duties and powers the Secretary
decides are necessary to ensure, to the extent
possible, the security of the traveling public.
Sec. 44932. Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security
(a) Organization.--There is an Assistant Administrator for
Civil Aviation Security. The Assistant Administrator reports
directly to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration and is subject to the authority of the
Administrator.
(b) Duties and Powers.--The Assistant Administrator shall--
(1) on a day-to-day basis, manage and provide
operational guidance to the field security resources of
the Administration, including Federal Security Managers
as provided by section 44933 of this title;
(2) enforce security-related requirements;
(3) identify the research and development
requirements of security-related activities;
(4) inspect security systems;
(5) report information to the Director of
Intelligence and Security that may be necessary to
allow the Director to carry out assigned duties and
powers;
(6) assess threats to civil aviation; and
(7) carry out other duties and powers the
Administrator considers appropriate.
(c) Review and Development of Ways To Strengthen
Security.--The Assistant Administrator shall review and, as
necessary, develop ways to strengthen air transportation
security, including ways--
(1) to strengthen controls over checked baggage in
air transportation, including ways to ensure baggage
reconciliation and inspection of items in passenger
baggage that could potentially contain explosive
devices;
(2) to strengthen control over individuals having
access to aircraft;
(3) to improve testing of security systems;
(4) to ensure the use of the best available x-ray
equipment for air transportation security purposes; and
(5) to strengthen preflight screening of passengers.
Sec. 44933. Federal Security Managers
(a) Establishment, Designation, and Stationing.--The
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall
establish the position of Federal Security Manager at each
airport in the United States at which the Administrator decides
a Manager is necessary for air transportation security. The
Administrator shall designate individuals as Managers for, and
station those Managers at, those airports. The Administrator
may designate a current field employee of the Administration as
a Manager. A Manager reports directly to the Assistant
Administrator for Civil Aviation Security. The Administrator
shall station an individual as Manager at each airport in the
United States that the Secretary of Transportation designates
as a category X airport.
(b) Duties and Powers.--The Manager at each airport shall--
(1) receive intelligence information related to
aviation security;
(2) ensure, and assist in, the development of a
comprehensive security plan for the airport that--
(A) establishes the responsibilities of each
air carrier and airport operator for air
transportation security at the airport; and
(B) includes measures to be taken during
periods of normal airport operations and during
periods when the Manager decides that there is
a need for additional airport security, and
identifies the individuals responsible for
carrying out those measures;
(3) oversee and enforce the carrying out by air
carriers and airport operators of United States
Government security requirements, including the
security plan under clause (2) of this subsection;
(4) serve as the on-site coordinator of the
Administrator's response to terrorist incidents and
threats at the airport;
(5) coordinate the day-to-day Government aviation
security activities at the airport;
(6) coordinate efforts related to aviation security
with local law enforcement; and
(7) coordinate activities with other Managers.
(c) Limitation.--A Civil Aviation Security Field Officer
may not be assigned security duties and powers at an airport
having a Manager.
Sec. 44934. Foreign Security Liaison Officers
(a) Establishment, Designation, and Stationing.--The
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall
establish the position of Foreign Security Liaison Officer for
each airport outside the United States at which the
Administrator decides an Officer is necessary for air
transportation security. In coordination with the Secretary of
State, the Administrator shall designate an Officer for each of
those airports. In coordination with the Secretary, the
Administrator shall designate an Officer for each of those
airports where extraordinary security measures are in place.
The Secretary shall give high priority to stationing those
Officers.
(b) Duties and Powers.--An Officer reports directly to the
Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security. The
Officer at each airport shall--
(1) serve as the liaison of the Assistant
Administrator to foreign security authorities
(including governments of foreign countries and foreign
airport authorities) in carrying out United States
Government security requirements at that airport; and
(2) to the extent practicable, carry out duties and
powers referred to in section 44933(b) of this title.
(c) Coordination of Activities.--The activities of each
Officer shall be coordinated with the chief of the diplomatic
mission of the United States to which the Officer is assigned.
Activities of an Officer under this section shall be consistent
with the duties and powers of the Secretary and the chief of
mission to a foreign country under section 103 of the Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 (22 U.S.C.
4802) and section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22
U.S.C. 3927).
Sec. 44935. Employment standards and training
(a) Employment Standards.--The Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration shall prescribe standards for the
employment and continued employment of, and contracting for,
air carrier personnel and, as appropriate, airport security
personnel. The standards shall include--
(1) minimum training requirements for new employees;
(2) retraining requirements;
(3) minimum staffing levels;
(4) minimum language skills; and
(5) minimum education levels for employees, when
appropriate.
(b) Review and Recommendations.--In coordination with air
carriers, airport operators, and other interested persons, the
Administrator shall review issues related to human performance
in the aviation security system to maximize that performance.
When the review is completed, the Administrator shall recommend
guidelines and prescribe appropriate changes in existing
procedures to improve that performance.
(c) Security Program Training, Standards, and
Qualifications.--(1) The Administrator--
(A) may train individuals employed to carry out a
security program under section 44903(c) of this title;
and
(B) shall prescribe uniform training standards and
uniform minimum qualifications for individuals eligible
for that training.
(2) The Administrator may authorize reimbursement for
travel, transportation, and subsistence expenses for security
training of non-United States Government domestic and foreign
individuals whose services will contribute significantly to
carrying out civil aviation security programs. To the extent
practicable, air travel reimbursed under this paragraph shall
be on air carriers.
(d) Education and Training Standards for Security
Coordinators, Supervisory Personnel, and Pilots.--(1) The
Administrator shall prescribe standards for educating and
training--
(A) ground security coordinators;
(B) security supervisory personnel; and
(C) airline pilots as in-flight security
coordinators.
(2) The standards shall include initial training,
retraining, and continuing education requirements and methods.
Those requirements and methods shall be used annually to
measure the performance of ground security coordinators and
security supervisory personnel.
Sec. 44936. Employment investigations and restrictions
(a) Employment Investigation Requirement.--(1)(A) \5\ The
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall
require by regulation that an employment investigation,
including a criminal history record check, shall be conducted,
as the Administrator decides is necessary to ensure air
transportation security, of each individual employed in, or
applying for, a position in which the individual has unescorted
access, or may permit other individuals to have unescorted
access, to--
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\5\ Sec. 304(a) of Public Law 104-264 (110 Stat. 3251) redesignated
subparas. (A) and (B) as clauses (i) and (ii), added new subpara.
designation (A) in para. (1), and added a new subparas. (B), (C), and
(D).
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(i) aircraft of an air carrier or foreign air
carrier; or
(ii) a secured area of an airport in the United
States the Administrator designates that serves an air
carrier or foreign air carrier.
(B) The Administrator shall require by regulation that an
employment investigation (including a criminal history record
check in any case described in subparagraph (C)) be conducted
for--
(i) individuals who will be responsible for screening
passengers or property under section 44901 of this
title;
(ii) supervisors of the individuals described in
clause (i); and
(iii) such other individuals who exercise security
functions associated with baggage or cargo, as the
Administrator determines is necessary to ensure air
transportation security.
(C) Under the regulations issued under subparagraph (B), a
criminal history record check shall be conducted in any case in
which--
(i) an employment investigation reveals a gap in
employment of 12 months or more that the individual who
is the subject of the investigation does not
satisfactorily account for;
(ii) such individual is unable to support statements
made on the application of such individual;
(iii) there are significant inconsistencies in the
information provided on the application of such
individual; or
(iv) information becomes available during the
employment investigation indicating a possible
conviction for one of the crimes listed in subsection
(b)(1)(B).
(D) If an individual requires a criminal history record
check under subparagraph (C), the individual may be employed as
a screener until the check is completed if the individual is
subject to supervision.
(2) An air carrier, foreign air carrier, or airport
operator that employs, or authorizes or makes a contract for
the services of, an individual in a position described in
paragraph (1) of this subsection shall ensure that the
investigation the Administrator requires is conducted.
(3) \6\ The Administrator shall provide for the periodic
audit of the effectiveness of criminal history record checks
conducted under paragraph (1) of this subsection.
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\6\ Sec. 306 of Public Law 104-264 (110 Stat. 3252) added para.
(3).
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(b) Prohibited Employment.--(1) Except as provided in
paragraph (3) of this subsection, an air carrier, foreign air
carrier, or airport operator may not employ, or authorize or
make a contract for the services of, an individual in a
position described in subsection (a)(1) of this section if--
(A) the investigation of the individual required
under this section has not been conducted; or
(B) the results of that investigation establish that,
in the 10-year period ending on the date of the
investigation, the individual was convicted of--
(i) a crime referred to in section 46306,
46308, 46312, 46314, or 46315 or chapter 465 of
this title or section 32 of title 18;
(ii) murder;
(iii) assault with intent to murder;
(iv) espionage;
(v) sedition;
(vi) treason;
(vii) rape;
(viii) kidnapping;
(ix) unlawful possession, sale, distribution,
or manufacture of an explosive or weapon;
(x) extortion;
(xi) armed robbery;
(xii) distribution of, or intent to
distribute, a controlled substance; or
(xiii) conspiracy to commit any of the acts
referred to in clauses (i)-(xii) of this
paragraph.
(2) The Administrator may specify other factors that are
sufficient to prohibit the employment of an individual in a
position described in subsection (a)(1) of this section.
(3) An air carrier, foreign air carrier, or airport
operator may employ, or authorize or contract for the services
of, an individual in a position described in subsection (a)(1)
of this section without carrying out the investigation required
under this section, if the Administrator approves a plan to
employ the individual that provides alternate security
arrangements.
(c) Fingerprinting and Record Check Information.--(1) If
the Administrator requires an identification and criminal
history record check, to be conducted by the Attorney General,
as part of an investigation under this section, the
Administrator shall designate an individual to obtain
fingerprints and submit those fingerprints to the Attorney
General. The Attorney General may make the results of a check
available to an individual the Administrator designates. Before
designating an individual to obtain and submit fingerprints or
receive results of a check, the Administrator shall consult
with the Attorney General.
(2) The Administrator shall prescribe regulations on--
(A) procedures for taking fingerprints; and
(B) requirements for using information received from
the Attorney General under paragraph (1) of this
subsection--
(i) to limit the dissemination of the
information; and
(ii) to ensure that the information is used
only to carry out this section.
(3) If an identification and criminal history record check
is conducted as part of an investigation of an individual under
this section, the individual--
(A) shall receive a copy of any record received from
the Attorney General; and
(B) may complete and correct the information
contained in the check before a final employment
decision is made based on the check.
(d) Fees and Charges.--The Administrator and the Attorney
General shall establish reasonable fees and charges to pay
expenses incurred in carrying out this section. The employer of
the individual being investigated shall pay the costs of a
record check of the individual. Money collected under this
section shall be credited to the account in the Treasury from
which the expenses were incurred and are available to the
Administrator and the Attorney General for those expenses.
(e) When Investigation or Record Check Not Required.--This
section does not require an investigation or record check when
the investigation or record check is prohibited by a law of a
foreign country.
(f) \7\ Records of Employment of Pilot Applicants.--
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\7\ Sec. 502(a) of Public Law 104-264 (110 Stat. 3259) added
subsecs. (f) through (h).
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(1) In general.--Before hiring an individual as a
pilot, an air carrier shall request and receive the
following information:
(A) FAA records.--From the Administrator of
the Federal Aviation Administration, records
pertaining to the individual that are
maintained by the Administrator concerning--
(i) current airman certificates
(including airman medical certificates)
and associated type ratings, including
any limitations to those certificates
and ratings; and
(ii) summaries of legal enforcement
actions resulting in a finding by the
Administrator of a violation of this
title or a regulation prescribed or
order issued under this title that was
not subsequently overturned.
(B) Air carrier and other records.--From any
air carrier or other person that has employed
the individual at any time during the 5-year
period preceding the date of the employment
application of the individual, or from the
trustee in bankruptcy for such air carrier or
person--
(i) records pertaining to the
individual that are maintained by an
air carrier (other than records
relating to flight time, duty time, or
rest time) under regulations set forth
in--
(I) section 121.683 of title
14, Code of Federal
Regulations;
(II) paragraph (A) of section
VI, appendix I, part 121 of
such title;
(III) paragraph (A) of
section IV, appendix J, part
121 of such title;
(IV) section 125.401 of such
title; and
(V) section 135.63(a)(4) of
such title; and
(ii) other records pertaining to the
individual that are maintained by the
air carrier or person concerning--
(I) the training,
qualifications, proficiency, or
professional competence of the
individual, including comments
and evaluations made by a check
airman designated in accordance
with section 121.411, 125.295,
or 135.337 of such title;
(II) any disciplinary action
taken with respect to the
individual that was not
subsequently overturned; and
(III) any release from
employment or resignation,
termination, or
disqualification with respect
to employment.
(C) National driver register records.--In
accordance with section 30305(b)(7), from the
chief driver licensing official of a State,
information concerning the motor vehicle
driving record of the individual.
(2) Written consent; release from liability.--An air
carrier making a request for records under paragraph
(1)--
(A) shall be required to obtain written
consent to the release of those records from
the individual that is the subject of the
records requested; and
(B) may, notwithstanding any other provision
of law or agreement to the contrary, require
the individual who is the subject of the
records to request to execute a release from
liability for any claim arising from the
furnishing of such records to or the use of
such records by such air carrier (other than a
claim arising from furnishing information known
to be false and maintained in violation of a
criminal statute).
(3) 5-year reporting period.--A person shall not
furnish a record in response to a request made under
paragraph (1) if the record was entered more than 5
years before the date of the request, unless the
information concerns a revocation or suspension of an
airman certificate or motor vehicle license that is in
effect on the date of the request.
(4) Requirement to maintain records.--The
Administrator shall maintain pilot records described in
paragraph (1)(A) for a period of at least 5 years.
(5) Receipt of consent; provision of information.--A
person shall not furnish a record in response to a
request made under paragraph (1) without first
obtaining a copy of the written consent of the
individual who is the subject of the records requested.
A person who receives a request for records under this
paragraph shall furnish a copy of all of such requested
records maintained by the person not later than 30 days
after receiving the request.
(6) Right to receive notice and copy of any record
furnished.--A person who receives a request for records
under paragraph (1) shall provide to the individual who
is the subject of the records--
(A) on or before the 20th day following the
date of receipt of the request, written notice
of the request and of the individual's right to
receive a copy of such records; and
(B) in accordance with paragraph (10), a copy
of such records, if requested by the
individual.
(7) Reasonable charges for processing requests and
furnishing copies.--A person who receives a request
under paragraph (1) or (6) may establish a reasonable
charge for the cost of processing the request and
furnishing copies of the requested records.
(8) Standard forms.--The Administrator shall
promulgate--
(A) standard forms that may be used by an air
carrier to request records under paragraph (1);
and
(B) standard forms that may be used by an air
carrier to--
(i) obtain the written consent of the
individual who is the subject of a
request under paragraph (1); and
(ii) inform the individual of--
(I) the request; and
(II) the individual right of
that individual to receive a
copy of any records furnished
in response to the request.
(9) Right to correct inaccuracies.--An air carrier
that maintains or requests and receives the records of
an individual under paragraph (1) shall provide the
individual with a reasonable opportunity to submit
written comments to correct any inaccuracies contained
in the records before making a final hiring decision
with respect to the individual.
(10) Right of pilot to review certain records.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law or
agreement, an air carrier shall, upon written request
from a pilot employed by such carrier, make available,
within a reasonable time of the request, to the pilot
for review, any and all employment records referred to
in paragraph (1)(B) (i) or (ii) pertaining to the
employment of the pilot.
(11) Privacy protections.--An air carrier that
receives the records of an individual under paragraph
(1) may use such records only to assess the
qualifications of the individual in deciding whether or
not to hire the individual as a pilot. The air carrier
shall take such actions as may be necessary to protect
the privacy of the pilot and the confidentiality of the
records, including ensuring that information contained
in the records is not divulged to any individual that
is not directly involved in the hiring decision.
(12) Periodic review.--Not later than 18 months after
the date of the enactment of the Pilot Records
Improvement Act of 1996, and at least once every 3
years thereafter, the Administrator shall transmit to
Congress a statement that contains, taking into account
recent developments in the aviation industry--
(A) recommendations by the Administrator
concerning proposed changes to Federal Aviation
Administration records, air carrier records,
and other records required to be furnished
under subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph
(1); or
(B) reasons why the Administrator does not
recommend any proposed changes to the records
referred to in subparagraph (A).
(13) Regulations.--The Administrator may prescribe
such regulations as may be necessary--
(A) to protect--
(i) the personal privacy of any
individual whose records are requested
under paragraph (1); and
(ii) the confidentiality of those
records;
(B) to preclude the further dissemination of
records received under paragraph (1) by the
person who requested those records; and
(C) to ensure prompt compliance with any
request made under paragraph (1).
(g) Limitation on Liability; Preemption of State Law.--
(1) Limitation on liability.--No action or proceeding
may be brought by or on behalf of an individual who has
applied for or is seeking a position with an air
carrier as a pilot and who has signed a release from
liability, as provided for under paragraph (2),
against--
(A) the air carrier requesting the records of
that individual under subsection (f)(1);
(B) a person who has complied with such
request;
(C) a person who has entered information
contained in the individual's records; or
(D) an agent or employee of a person
described in subparagraph (A) or (B);
in the nature of an action for defamation, invasion of
privacy, negligence, interference with contract, or
otherwise, or under any Federal or State law with
respect to the furnishing or use of such records in
accordance with subsection (f).
(2) Preemption.--No State or political subdivision
thereof may enact, prescribe, issue, continue in
effect, or enforce any law (including any regulation,
standard, or other provision having the force and
effect of law) that prohibits, penalizes, or imposes
liability for furnishing or using records in accordance
with subsection (f).
(3) Provision of knowingly false information.--
Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply with respect to
a person who furnishes information in response to a
request made under subsection (f)(1), that--
(A) the person knows is false; and
(B) was maintained in violation of a criminal
statute of the United States.
(h) Limitation of Statutory Construction.--Nothing in
subsection (f) shall be construed as precluding the
availability of the records of a pilot in an investigation or
other proceeding concerning an accident or incident conducted
by the Administrator, the National Transportation Safety Board,
or a court.
Sec. 44937. Prohibition on transferring duties and powers
Except as specifically provided by law, the Administrator
of the Federal Aviation Administration may not transfer a duty
or power under section 44903(a), (b), (c), or (e), 44906,\8\
44912, 44935, 44936, or 44938(b)(3) of this title to another
department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States
Government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Sec. 6(57) of Public Law 103-429 (108 Stat. 4385) struck out
``44906(a) or (b)'' and inserted in lieu thereof ``44906''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 44938. Reports
(a) Transportation Security.--Not later than March 31 \9\
of each year, the Secretary of Transportation shall submit to
Congress a report on transportation security with
recommendations the Secretary considers appropriate. The report
shall be prepared in conjunction with the biennial \10\ report
the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
submits under subsection (b) of this section in each year the
Administrator submits the biennial report,\10\ but may not
duplicate the information submitted under subsection (b) or
section 44907(a)(3) of this title. The Secretary may submit the
report in classified and unclassified parts. The report shall
include--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Sec. 502 of Public Law 103-305 (108 Stat. 1595) struck out
``December 31'' and inserted ``March 31''.
\10\ Sec. 1502 of Public Law 105-362 (112 Stat. 3295) struck out
``annual'' and inserted ``biennial''; inserted ``in each year the
Administrator submits the biennial report''; struck out ``annually''
and inserted ``biennially''; and struck out subsection (c). Subsec. (c)
formerly required the submission of an annual report on the
implementation of section 44904 of this title.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) an assessment of trends and developments in
terrorist activities, methods, and other threats to
transportation;
(2) an evaluation of deployment of explosive
detection devices;
(3) recommendations for research, engineering, and
development activities related to transportation
security, except research engineering and development
activities related to aviation security to the extent
those activities are covered by the national aviation
research plan required under section 44501(c) of this
title;
(4) identification and evaluation of cooperative
efforts with other departments, agencies, and
instrumentalities of the United States Government;
(5) an evaluation of cooperation with foreign
transportation and security authorities;
(6) the status of the extent to which the
recommendations of the President's Commission on
Aviation Security and Terrorism have been carried out
and the reasons for any delay in carrying out those
recommendations;
(7) a summary of the activities of the Director of
Intelligence and Security in the 12-month period ending
on the date of the report;
(8) financial and staffing requirements of the
Director;
(9) an assessment of financial and staffing
requirements, and attainment of existing staffing
goals, for carrying out duties and powers of the
Administrator related to security; and
(10) appropriate legislative and regulatory
recommendations.
(b) Screening and Foreign Air Carrier and Airport
Security.--The Administrator shall submit biennially \10\ to
Congress a report--
(1) on the effectiveness of procedures under section
44901 of this title;
(2) that includes a summary of the assessments
conducted under section 44907(a)(1) and (2) of this
title; and
(3) that includes an assessment of the steps being
taken, and the progress being made, in ensuring
compliance with section 44906 of this title for each
foreign air carrier security program at airports
outside the United States--
(A) at which the Administrator decides that
Foreign Security Liaison Officers are necessary
for air transportation security; and
(B) for which extraordinary security measures
are in place.
(c) \10\* * *
2. Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996
Partial text of Public Law 104-264, [H.R. 3539], 110 Stat. 3213,
approved October 9, 1996
AN ACT To amend title 49, United States Code, to reauthorize programs
of the Federal Aviation Administration, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Federal
Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996''.
(b) Table of Contents.--
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--AVIATION SECURITY
Sec. 301. Report including proposed legislation on funding for airport
security.
Sec. 302. Certification of screening companies.
Sec. 303. Weapons and explosive detection study.
Sec. 304. Requirement for criminal history records checks.
Sec. 305. Interim deployment of commercially available explosive
detection equipment.
Sec. 306. Audit of performance of background checks for certain
personnel.
Sec. 307. Passenger profiling.
Sec. 308. Authority to use certain funds for airport security programs
and activities.
Sec. 309. Development of aviation security liaison agreement.
Sec. 310. Regular joint threat assessments.
Sec. 311. Baggage match report.
Sec. 312. Enhanced security programs.
Sec. 313. Report on air cargo.
Sec. 314. Sense of the Senate regarding acts of international
terrorism.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 49, UNITED STATES CODE.
Except as otherwise specifically provided, whenever in this
Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an
amendment to, or repeal of, a section or other provision of
law, the reference shall be considered to be made to a section
or other provision of title 49, United States Code.
SEC. 3. APPLICABILITY.
(a) In General.--Except as otherwise specifically provided,
this Act and the amendments made by this Act apply only to
fiscal years beginning after September 30, 1996.
(b) Limitation on Statutory Construction.--Nothing in this
Act or any amendment made by this Act shall be construed as
affecting funds made available for a fiscal year ending before
October 1, 1996.
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--AVIATION SECURITY
SEC. 301. REPORT INCLUDING PROPOSED LEGISLATION ON FUNDING FOR AIRPORT
SECURITY.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration, in cooperation with other appropriate
persons, shall conduct a study and submit to Congress a report
on whether, and if so how, to transfer certain responsibilities
of air carriers under Federal law for security activities
conducted onsite at commercial service airports to airport
operators or to the Federal Government or to provide for shared
responsibilities between air carriers and airport operators or
the Federal Government.
(b) Contents of Report.--The report submitted under this
section shall--
(1) examine potential sources of Federal and non-
Federal revenue that may be used to fund security
activities, including providing grants from funds
received as fees collected under a fee system
established under subtitle C of title II of this Act
and the amendments made by that subtitle; and
(2) provide legislative proposals, if necessary, for
accomplishing the transfer of responsibilities referred
to in subsection (a).
SEC. 302. CERTIFICATION OF SCREENING COMPANIES.
The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration is
directed to certify companies providing security screening and
to improve the training and testing of security screeners
through development of uniform performance standards for
providing security screening services.
SEC. 303. WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVE DETECTION STUDY.
(a) In General.--The Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration shall enter into an arrangement with the
Director of the National Academy of Sciences (or if the
National Academy of Sciences is not available, the head of
another equivalent entity) to conduct a study in accordance to
this section.
(b) Panel of Experts.--
(1) In general.--In carrying out a study under this
section, the Director of the National Academy of
Sciences (or the head of another equivalent entity)
shall establish a panel (hereinafter in this section
referred to as the ``panel'').
(2) Expertise.--Each member of the panel shall have
expertise in weapons and explosive detection
technology, security, air carrier and airport
operations, or another appropriate area. The Director
of the National Academy of Sciences (or the head of
another equivalent entity) shall ensure that the panel
has an appropriate number of representatives of the
areas specified in the preceding sentence.
(c) Study.--The panel, in consultation with the National
Science and Technology Council, representatives of appropriate
Federal agencies, and appropriate members of the private
sector, shall--
(1) assess the weapons and explosive detection
technologies that are available at the time of the
study that are capable of being effectively deployed in
commercial aviation;
(2) determine how the technologies referred to in
paragraph (1) may more effectively be used for
promotion and improvement of security at airport and
aviation facilities and other secured areas;
(3) assess the cost and advisability of requiring
hardened cargo containers as a way to enhance aviation
security and reduce the required sensitivity of bomb
detection equipment; and
(4) on the basis of the assessments and
determinations made under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3),
identify the most promising technologies for the
improvement of the efficiency and cost- effectiveness
of weapons and explosive detection.
(d) Cooperation.--The National Science and Technology
Council shall take such actions as may be necessary to
facilitate, to the maximum extent practicable and upon request
of the Director of the National Academy of Sciences (or the
head of another equivalent entity), the cooperation of
representatives of appropriate Federal agencies, as provided
for in subsection (c), in providing the panel, for the study
under this section--
(1) expertise; and
(2) to the extent allowable by law, resources and
facilities.
(e) Reports.--The Director of the National Academy of
Sciences (or the head of another equivalent entity) shall,
pursuant to an arrangement entered into under subsection (a),
submit to the Administrator such reports as the Administrator
considers to be appropriate. Upon receipt of a report under
this subsection, the Administrator shall submit a copy of the
report to the appropriate committees of Congress.
(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 1997 through 2001
such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.
SEC. 304. REQUIREMENT FOR CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS CHECKS.
* * * * * * *
(b) Applicability.--The amendment made by subsection (a)(3)
shall apply to individuals hired to perform functions described
in section 44936(a)(1)(B) of title 49, United States Code,
after the date of the enactment of this Act; except that the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration may, as
the Administrator determines to be appropriate, require such
employment investigations or criminal history records checks
for individuals performing those functions on the date of the
enactment of this Act.
SEC. 305. INTERIM DEPLOYMENT OF COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE EXPLOSIVE
DETECTION EQUIPMENT.
* * * * * * *
(b) Agreements.--The Administrator is authorized to use
noncompetitive or cooperative agreements with air carriers and
airport authorities that provide for the Administrator to
purchase and assist in installing advanced security equipment
for the use of such entities.
SEC. 306. AUDIT OF PERFORMANCE OF BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR CERTAIN
PERSONNEL.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 307. PASSENGER PROFILING.
The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration,
the Secretary of Transportation, the intelligence community,
and the law enforcement community should continue to assist air
carriers in developing computer-assisted passenger profiling
programs and other appropriate passenger profiling programs
which should be used in conjunction with other security
measures and technologies.
SEC. 308. AUTHORITY TO USE CERTAIN FUNDS FOR AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAMS
AND ACTIVITIES.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, funds referred to in subsection (b) may be used for the
improvement of facilities and the purchase and deployment of
equipment to enhance and ensure the safety and security of
passengers and other persons involved in air travel.
(b) Covered Funds.--The following funds may be used under
subsection (a):
(1) Project grants made under subchapter I of chapter
471 of title 49, United States Code.
(2) Passenger facility fees collected under section
40117 of title 49, United States Code.
SEC. 309. DEVELOPMENT OF AVIATION SECURITY LIAISON AGREEMENT.
The Secretary of Transportation and the Attorney General,
acting through the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, shall enter into an interagency agreement
providing for the establishment of an aviation security liaison
at existing appropriate Federal agencies' field offices in or
near cities served by a designated high-risk airport.
SEC. 310. REGULAR JOINT THREAT ASSESSMENTS.
The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall
carry out joint threat and vulnerability assessments on
security every 3 years, or more frequently, as necessary, at
each airport determined to be high risk.
SEC. 311. BAGGAGE MATCH REPORT.
(a) Report.--If a bag match pilot program is carried out as
recommended by the White House Conference on Aviation Safety
and Security, not later than the 30th day following the date of
completion of the pilot program, the Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration shall submit to Congress a
report on the safety, effectiveness, and operational
effectiveness of the pilot program. The report shall also
assess the extent to which implementation of baggage match
requirements (coupled with the best available technologies and
methodologies, such as passenger profiling) enhance domestic
aviation security.
(b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate
that the Administrator should work with airports and air
carriers to develop, to the extent feasible, effective domestic
bag matching proposals.
SEC. 312. ENHANCED SECURITY PROGRAMS.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 313. REPORT ON AIR CARGO.
(a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation shall
transmit to Congress a report on any changes recommended and
implemented as a result of the White House Commission on
Aviation Safety and Security to enhance and supplement
screening and inspection of cargo, mail, and company-shipped
materials transported in air commerce.
(b) Contents.--The report shall include--
(1) an assessment of the effectiveness of the changes
referred to in subsection (a);
(2) an assessment of the oversight by the Federal
Aviation Administration of inspections of shipments of
mail and cargo by domestic and foreign air carriers;
(3) an assessment of the need for additional security
measures with respect to such inspections;
(4) an assessment of the adequacy of inspection and
screening of cargo on passenger air carriers; and
(5) any additional recommendations, and if necessary
any legislative proposals, necessary to carry out
additional changes.
(c) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate
that the inspection of cargo, mail, and company-shipped
materials can be enhanced.
SEC. 314. SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM.
(a) Findings.--The Senate finds that--
(1) there has been an intensification in the
oppression and disregard for human life among nations
that are willing to export terrorism;
(2) there has been an increase in attempts by
criminal terrorists to murder airline passengers
through the destruction of civilian airliners and the
deliberate fear and death inflicted through bombings of
buildings and the kidnapping of tourists and Americans
residing abroad; and
(3) information widely available demonstrates that a
significant portion of international terrorist activity
is state-sponsored, -organized, -condoned, or -
directed.
(b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate
that if evidence establishes beyond a clear and reasonable
doubt that any act of hostility towards any United States
citizen was an act of international terrorism sponsored,
organized, condoned, or directed by any nation, a state of war
should be considered to exist or to have existed between the
United States and that nation, beginning as of the moment that
the act of aggression occurs.
3. Crimes and Criminal Procedure
Partial text of Title 18, United States Code--Crimes and Criminal
Procedure
PART I--CRIMES
CHAPTER 2--AIRCRAFT AND MOTOR VEHICLES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 32. Destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities
(a) Whoever willfully--
(1) sets fire to, damages, destroys, disables, or
wrecks any aircraft in the special aircraft
jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft
used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or
foreign air commerce;
(2) places or causes to be placed a destructive
device or substance in, upon, or in proximity to, or
otherwise makes or causes to be made unworkable or
unusable or hazardous to work or use, any such
aircraft, or any part or other materials used or
intended to be used in connection with the operation of
such aircraft, if such placing or causing to be placed
or such making or causing to be made is likely to
endanger the safety of any such aircraft;
(3) sets fire to, damages, destroys, or disables any
air navigation facility, or interferes by force or
violence with the operation of such facility, if such
fire, damaging, destroying, disabling, or interfering
is likely to endanger the safety of any such aircraft
in flight;
(4) with the intent to damage, destroy, or disable
any such aircraft, sets fire to, damages, destroys, or
disables or places a destructive device or substance
in, upon, or in proximity to, any appliance or
structure, ramp, landing area, property, machine, or
apparatus, or any facility or other material used, or
intended to be used, in connection with the operation,
maintenance, loading, unloading or storage of any such
aircraft or any cargo carried or intended to be carried
on any such aircraft;
(5) performs an act of violence against or
incapacitates any individual on any such aircraft, if
such act of violence or incapacitation is likely to
endanger the safety of such aircraft;
(6) communicates information, knowing the information
to be false and under circumstances in which such
information may reasonably be believed, thereby
endangering the safety of any such aircraft in flight;
or
(7) attempts to do anything prohibited under
paragraphs (1) through (6) of this subsection;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
twenty years or both.
(b) Whoever willfully--
(1) performs an act of violence against any
individual on board any civil aircraft registered in a
country other than the United States while such
aircraft is in flight, if such act is likely to
endanger the safety of that aircraft;
(2) destroys a civil aircraft registered in a country
other than the United States while such aircraft is in
service or causes damage to such an aircraft which
renders that aircraft incapable of flight or which is
likely to endanger that aircraft's safety in flight;
(3) places or causes to be placed on a civil aircraft
registered in a country other than the United States
while such aircraft is in service, a device or
substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or
to cause damage to that aircraft which renders that
aircraft incapable of flight or which is likely to
endanger that aircraft's safety in flight; or(4)
attempts to commit an offense described in paragraphs
(1) through (3) of this subsection;
shall, if the offender is later found in the United States, be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both. There is jurisdiction over an offense under
this subsection if a national of the United States was on
board, or would have been on board, the aircraft; an offender
is a national of the United States; or an offender is
afterwards found in the United Sates. For purposes of this
subsection, the term ``national of the United States'' has the
meaning prescribed in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.
(c) Whoever willfully imparts or conveys any threat to do
an act which would violate any of paragraphs (1) through (5) of
subsection (a) or any of paragraphs (1) through (3) of
subsection (b) of this section, with an apparent determination
and will to carry the threat into execution shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 37. Violence at international airports
(a) Offense.--A person who unlawfully and intentionally,
using any device, substance, or weapon--
(1) performs an act of violence against a person at
an airport serving international civil aviation that
causes or is likely to cause serious bodily injury (as
defined in section 1365 of this title) or death; or
(2) destroys or seriously damages the facilities of
an airport serving international civil aviation or a
civil aircraft not in service located thereon or
disrupts the services of the airport,
if such an act endangers or is likely to endanger safety at
that airport, or attempts to do such an act, shall be fined
under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both;
and if the death of any person results from conduct prohibited
by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned
for any term of years or for life.
(b) Jurisdiction.--There is jurisdiction over the
prohibited activity in subsection (a) if--
(1) the prohibited activity takes place in the United
States; or
(2) the prohibited activity takes place outside the
United States and the offender is later found in the
United States.
(c) Bar to prosecution.--It is a bar to Federal prosecution
under subsection (a) for conduct that occurred within the
United States that the conduct involved was during or in
relation to a labor dispute, and such conduct is prohibited as
a felony under the law of the State in which it was committed.
For purposes of this section, the term ``labor dispute'' has
the meaning set forth in section 2(c) \1\ of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. 113(c)), and the term
``State'' means a State of the United States, the District of
Colombia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the
United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ So in original. Probably should be section ``13(c).''
4. Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990
Partial text of Public Law 101-604 [H.R. 5732], 104 Stat. 3066,
approved November 16, 1990, as amended
AN ACT To promote and strengthen aviation security, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1.\1\ SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Aviation
Security Improvement Act of 1990''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 49 U.S.C. app. 1301 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Table of Contents.--* * *
SEC. 2.\2\ FINDINGS.
Congress finds that--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 22 U.S.C. 5501 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) the safety and security of passengers of United
States air carriers against terrorist threats should be
given the highest priority by the United States
Government;
(2) the report of the President's Commission on
Aviation Security and Terrorism, dated May 15, 1990,
found that current aviation security systems are
inadequate to provide such protection;
(3) the United States Government should immediately
take steps to ensure fuller compliance with existing
laws and regulations relating to aviation security;
(4) the United States Government should work through
the International Civil Aviation Organization and
directly with foreign governments to enhance aviation
security of foreign carriers and at foreign airports;
(5) the United States Government should ensure that
enhanced security measures are fully implemented by
both United States and foreign air carriers;
(6) all nations belonging to the Summit Seven should
promptly amend the Bonn Declaration to extend sanctions
for all terrorist acts, including attacks against
airports and air carrier ticket offices;
(7) the United States Government, in bilateral
negotiations with foreign governments, should emphasize
upgrading international aviation security objectives;
(8) the United States Government should have in place
a mechanism by which the Government notifies the
public, on a case-by-case basis and through the
application of a uniform national standard, of certain
credible threats to civil aviation security;
(9) the United States Government has a special
obligation to United States victims of acts of
terrorism directed against this Nation and should
provide prompt assistance to the families of such
victims and assure that fair and prompt compensation is
provided to such victims and their families;
(10) the United States should work with other nations
to treat as outlaws state sponsors of terrorism,
isolating such sponsors politically, economically, and
militarily;
(11) the United States must develop a clear
understanding that state-sponsored terrorism threatens
United States values and interests, and that active
measures are needed to counter more effectively the
terrorist threat; and
(12) the United States must have the national will to
take every feasible action to prevent, counter, and
respond to terrorist activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Sec. 7(b) of Public Law 103-272 (108 Stat. 1398) repealed sec.
101(a) and (b), secs. 102 through 111, sec. 203(a) through (c). See 49
U.S.C. relating to aviation security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TITLE I--AVIATION SECURITY \3\
TITLE II--UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO TERRORISM AFFECTING AMERICANS
ABROAD
SEC. 201.\4\ INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING AVIATION SECURITY.
(a) United States Policy.--It is the policy of the United
States--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ 22 U.S.C. 5501.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) to seek bilateral agreements to achieve United
States aviation security objectives with foreign
governments;
(2) to continue to press vigorously for security
improvements through the Foreign Airport Security Act
and the foreign airport assessment program; and
(3) to continue to work through the International
Civil Aviation Organization to improve aviation
security internationally.
(b) Negotiations for Aviation Security.--(1) The Department
of State, in consultation with the Department of
Transportation, shall be responsible for negotiating requisite
aviation security agreements with foreign governments
concerning the implementation of United States rules and
regulations which affect the foreign operations of United
States air carriers, foreign air carriers, and foreign
international airports. The Secretary of State is directed to
enter, expeditiously, into negotiations for bilateral and
multilateral agreements--
(A) for enhanced aviation security objectives;
(B) to implement the Foreign Airport Security Act and
the foreign airport assessment program to the fullest
extent practicable; and
(C) to achieve improved availability of passenger
manifest information.
(2) A principal objective of bilateral and multilateral
negotiations with foreign governments and the International
Civil Aviation Organization shall be improved availability of
passenger manifest information.
SEC. 202.\5\ COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM.
The Coordinator for Counterterrorism shall be responsible
for the coordination of international aviation security for the
Department of State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ 22 U.S.C. 5502.
* * * * * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 204.\6\ DEPARTMENT OF STATE NOTIFICATION OF FAMILIES OF VICTIMS.
(a) Department of State Policy.--It is the policy of the
Department of State pursuant to section 43 of the State
Department Basic Authorities Act to directly and promptly
notify the families of victims of aviation disasters abroad
concerning citizens of the United States directly affected by
such a disaster, including timely written notice. The Secretary
of State shall ensure that such notification by the Department
of State is carried out notwithstanding notification by any
other person.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ 22 U.S.C. 5503.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Department of State Guidelines.--Not later than 60 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
State shall issue such regulations, guidelines, and circulars
as are necessary to ensure that the policy under subsection (a)
is fully implemented.
SEC. 205.\7\ DESIGNATION OF STATE DEPARTMENT-FAMILY LIAISON AND TOLL-
FREE FAMILY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM.
(a) Designation of State Department-Family Liaison.--Not
later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Secretary of State shall issue such rules and guidelines as
are necessary to provide that in the event of an aviation
disaster directly involving United States citizens abroad, if
possible, the Department of State will assign a specific
individual, and an alternate, as the Department of State
liaison for the family of each such citizen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ 22 U.S.C. 5504.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Toll-Free Communications System.--In the establishment
of the Department of State toll-free communications system to
facilitate inquiries concerning the affect of any disaster
abroad on United States citizens residing or traveling abroad,
the Secretary of State shall ensure that a toll-free telephone
number is reserved for the exclusive use of the families of
citizens who have been determined to be directly involved in
any such disaster.
SEC. 206.\8\ DISASTER TRAINING FOR STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL.
(a) Additional Training.--The Secretary of State shall
institute a supplemental program of training in disaster
management for all consular officers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ 22 U.S.C. 5505.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Training Improvements.--
(1) In expanding the training program under
subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall consult
with death and bereavement counselors concerning the
particular demands posed by aviation tragedies and
terrorist activities.
(2) In providing such additional training under
subsection (a) the Secretary of State shall consider
supplementing the current training program through--
(A) providing specialized training to create
a team of ``disaster specialists'' to deploy
immediately in a crisis; or
(B) securing outside experts to be brought in
during the initial phases to assist consular
personnel.
SEC. 207.\9\ DEPARTMENT OF STATE RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROCEDURES AT
INTERNATIONAL DISASTER SITE.
(a) Dispatch of Senior State Department Official to Site.--
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of State shall issue such rules and
guidelines as are necessary to provide that in the event of an
international disaster, particularly an aviation tragedy,
directly involving significant numbers of United States
citizens abroad not less than one senior officer from the
Bureau of Consular Affairs of the Department of State shall be
dispatched to the site of such disaster.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ 22 U.S.C. 5506.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Criteria for Department of State Staffing at Disaster
Site.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Secretary of State shall promulgate criteria
for Department of State staffing of disaster sites abroad. Such
criteria shall define responsibility for staffing decisions and
shall consider the deployment of crisis teams under subsection
(d). The Secretary of State shall promptly issue such rules and
guidelines as are necessary to implement criteria developed
pursuant to this subsection.
(c) State Department Ombudsman.--Not later than 60 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
State shall issue such rules and guidelines as are necessary to
provide that in the event of an international aviation disaster
involving significant numbers of United States citizens abroad
not less than one officer or employee of the Department of
State shall be dispatched to the disaster site to provide on-
site assistance to families who may visit the site and to act
as an ombudsman in matters involving the foreign local
government authorities and social service agencies.
(d) Crisis Teams.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall
promulgate procedures for the deployment of a ``crisis team'',
which may include public affairs, forensic, and bereavement
experts, to the site of any international disaster involving
United States citizens abroad to augment in-country Embassy and
consulate staff. The Secretary of State shall promptly issue
such rules and guidelines as are necessary to implement
procedures developed pursuant to this subsection.
SEC. 208.\10\ RECOVERY AND DISPOSITION OF REMAINS AND PERSONAL EFFECTS.
It is the policy of the Department of State (pursuant to
section 43 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act) to
provide liaison with foreign governments and persons and with
United States air carriers concerning arrangements for the
preparation and transport to the United States of the remains
of citizens who die abroad, as well as the disposition of
personal effects. The Secretary of State shall ensure that
regulations and guidelines of the Department of State reflect
such policy and that such assistance is rendered to the
families of United States citizens who are killed in terrorist
incidents and disasters abroad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ 22 U.S.C. 5507.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 209.\11\ ASSESSMENT OF LOCKERBIE EXPERIENCE.
(a) Assessment.--The Secretary of State shall compile an
assessment of the Department of State response to the Pan
American Airways Flight 103 aviation disaster over Lockerbie,
Scotland, on December 21, 1988.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ 22 U.S.C. 5508.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Guidelines.--The Secretary of State shall establish,
based on the assessment compiled under subsection (a) and other
relevant factors, guidelines for future Department of State
responses to comparable disasters and shall distribute such
guidelines to all United States diplomatic and consular posts
abroad.
SEC. 210.\12\ OFFICIAL DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECOGNITION.
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State shall promulgate guidelines
for appropriate ceremonies or other official expressions of
respect and support for the families of United States citizens
who are killed through acts of terrorism abroad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ 22 U.S.C. 5509.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 211.\13\ UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF
TERRORISM.
(a) Compensation.--The President shall submit to the
Congress, not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, recommendations on whether or not
legislation should be enacted to authorize the United States to
provide monetary and tax relief as compensation to United
States citizens who are victims of terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ 22 U.S.C. 5510.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Board.--The President may establish a board to develop
criteria for compensation and to recommend changes to existing
laws to establish a single comprehensive approach to victim
compensation for terrorist acts.
(c) Income Tax Benefit for Victims of Lockerbie
Terrorism.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), in the
case of any individual whose death was a direct result
of the Pan American Airways Flight 103 terrorist
disaster over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21,
1988, any tax imposed by subtitle A of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 shall not apply--
(A) with respect to the taxable year which
includes December 21, 1988, and
(B) with respect to the prior taxable year.
(2) Limitation.--In no case may the tax benefit
pursuant to paragraph (1) for any taxable year, for any
individual, exceed an amount equal to 28 percent of the
annual rate of basic pay at Level V of the Executive
Schedule of the United States as of December 21, 1988.
SEC. 212.\14\ OVERSEAS SECURITY ELECTRONIC BULLETIN BOARD.
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State shall issue such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to establish, under the Bureau
of Consular Affairs, an electronic bulletin board accessible to
the general public. Such bulletin board shall contain all
information, updated daily, which is available on the Overseas
Security Electronic Bulletin Board of the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ 22 U.S.C. 5511.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 213. ANTITERRORISM ASSISTANCE.
(a) Aviation Security.--In addition to amounts otherwise
authorized to be appropriated, there are authorized to be
appropriated $7,000,000 for fiscal year 1991 for aviation
security assistance under chapter 8 of part II of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa et seq.), relating to
antiterrorism assistance.
(b) \15\ Training Services.-- * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Sec. 213(b) amended sec. 573(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa2). For text, see U.S. Congress. House.
Committee on International Relations. Legislation on Foreign Relations
Through 1996, (Washington, G.P.O., 1997), vol. I-A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 214.\16\ ANTITERRORISM MEASURES.
(a) Guidelines for International Aviation Travelers.--For
the purpose of notifying the public, the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall
develop and publish guidelines for thwarting efforts by
international terrorists to enlist the unwitting assistance of
international aviation travelers in terrorist activities.
Notices concerning such guidelines shall be posted and
prominently displayed domestically and abroad in international
airports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ 22 U.S.C. 5512.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Development of International Standards.--The Secretary
of State and the Secretary of Transportation in all appropriate
fora, particularly talks and meetings related to international
civil aviation, shall enter into negotiations with other
nations for the establishment of international standards
regarding guidelines for thwarting efforts by international
terrorists to enlist the unwitting assistance of international
aviation travelers in terrorist activities.
(c) Publication of Rewards for Terrorism-Related
Information.--For the purpose of notifying the public, the
Secretary of State shall publish the availability of United
States Government rewards for information on international
terrorist-related activities, including rewards available under
section 36(a) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of
1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708(a)) and chapter 204 of title 18, United
States Code. To the extent appropriate and feasible, notices
making such publication shall be posted and prominently
displayed domestically and abroad in international airports.
(d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the Secretary of Transportation should take appropriate
measures to utilize and train properly the officers and
employees of other United States Government agencies who have
functions at international airports in the United States and
abroad in the detection of explosives and firearms which could
be a threat to international civil aviation.
SEC. 215.\17\ PROPOSAL FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION ORGANIZATION.
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Transportation, shall propose to the International
Civil Aviation Organization the establishment of a
comprehensive aviation security program which shall include (1)
training for airport security personnel, (2) grants for
security equipment acquisition for certain nations, and (3)
expansion of the appropriate utilization of canine teams in the
detection of explosive devices in all airport areas, including
use in passenger screening areas and nonpublic baggage assembly
and processing areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ 22 U.S.C. 5513.
5. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985
Partial text of Title V of Public Law 99-83 [S. 960], 99 Stat. 190,
approved August 8, 1985, as amended
AN ACT To authorize international development and security assistance
programs and Peace Corps programs for fiscal years 1986 and 1987, and
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1985''.
* * * * * * *
TITLE V--INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND FOREIGN AIRPORT SECURITY
* * * * * * *
Part B--Foreign Airport Security
SEC. 551. SECURITY STANDARDS FOR FOREIGN AIR TRANSPORTATION.
(a) \1\ Security at Foreign Airports.--* * * [Repealed--
1994]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Sec. 7(b) of Public Law 103-272 (108 Stat. 1379) repealed sec.
551(a) and (b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Conforming Amendments.--* * * [Repealed--1994]
(c) Closing of Beirut International Airport.--It is the
sense of the Congress that the President is urged and
encouraged to take all appropriate steps to carry forward his
announced policy of seeking the effective closing of the
international airport in Beirut, Lebanon, at least until such
time as the Government of Lebanon has instituted measures and
procedures designed to prevent the use of that airport by
aircraft hijackers and other terrorists in attacking civilian
airlines or their passengers, hijacking their aircraft, or
taking or holding their passengers hostage.
SEC. 552.\2\ TRAVEL ADVISORY AND SUSPENSION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. * *
* [REPEALED--1994]
SEC. 553.\2\ UNITED STATES AIRMARSHAL PROGRAM. * * * [REPEALED--1994]
SEC. 554. ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
STANDARDS.
The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Transportation,
jointly, shall call on the member countries of the
International Civil Aviation Organization to enforce that
Organization's existing standards and to support United States
actions enforcing such standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Sec. 7(b) of Public Law 103-272 (108 Stat. 1379) repealed secs.
552, 553, and 556. See 49 U.S.C. relating to aviation security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 555. INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION BOYCOTT OF COUNTRIES SUPPORTING
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.
It is the sense of the Congress that the President--
(1) should call for an international civil aviation
boycott with respect to those countries which the
President determines--
(A) grant sanctuary from prosecution to any
individual or group which has committed an act
of international terrorism, or
(B) otherwise support international
terrorism; and
(2) should take steps, both bilateral and
multilateral, to achieve a total international civil
aviation boycott with respect to those countries.
SEC. 556.\2\ MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO
AIRCRAFT SABOTAGE, AIRCRAFT HIJACKING, AND AIRPORT
SECURITY. * * * [REPEALED--1994]
SEC. 557. RESEARCH ON AIRPORT SECURITY TECHNIQUES FOR DETECTING
EXPLOSIVES.
In order to improve security at international airports,
there are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of
Transportation from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (in
addition to amounts otherwise available for such purpose)
$5,000,000, without fiscal year limitation, to be used for
research on and the development of airport security devices or
techniques for detecting explosives.
* * * * * * *
=======================================================================
G. OTHER LEGISLATION
CONTENTS
Page
1. The Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (Public Law
82-414)...................................................... 363
Title I--General........................................... 363
Definitions.......................................... 363
Section 101(a)(15)(S)--[Immigrant Defined]........... 363
Title II--Immigration...................................... 364
Chapter 2--Qualifications for Admission of Aliens;
Travel Control of Citizens and Aliens............ 364
Section 212(a)(3)(B)--Classes of Aliens
Ineligible for Visas or Admission: Terrorist
Activities..................................... 364
Admission of Nonimmigrants........................... 366
Section 214(k)(5)--[Annual Report of the Attorney
General]....................................... 366
Section 219--Designation of Foreign Terrorist
Organizations.................................. 366
Chapter 4--Provisions Relating to Entry and Exclusion 369
Section 237(a)(4)(b)--Classes of Deportable
Aliens: Terrorist Activities................... 369
Title V--Alien Terrorist Removal Procedures................ 369
2. Middle East Activities........................................ 374
a. Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1995 (Public Law
104-99)................................................ 374
Title VI............................................. 374
b. Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1994, as amended
(Public Law 103-236)................................... 381
Title V, Part E...................................... 381
c. PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 1989 (Public Law 101-
246)................................................... 385
Title VIII........................................... 385
d. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-204)......... 390
Title X.............................................. 390
3. National Emergencies Act, as amended (Public Law 94-412)...... 393
4. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (Public
Law 105-277) (partial text).................................. 398
Title III--Inspections............................... 398
Section 303(b)(3)--Authority to Conduct
Inspections: Objections to Individuals Serving
as Inspectors.................................. 398
=======================================================================
1. The Immigration and Nationality Act
Partial text of Public Law 82-414 [H.R. 5678], 66 Stat. 163, approved
June 27, 1952, as amended
TITLE I--GENERAL
definitions
Sec. 101.\1\ (a) As used in this Act--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 8 U.S.C. 1101.
* * * * * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(15) The term ``immigrant'' means every alien except
an alien who is within one of the following classes of
nonimmigrant aliens--
* * * * * * *
(S) subject to section 214(k), an alien--
(i) who the Attorney General
determines--
(I) is in possession of
critical reliable information
concerning a criminal
organization or enterprise;
(II) is willing to supply or
has supplied such information
to Federal or State law
enforcement authorities or a
Federal or State court; and
(III) whose presence in the
United States the Attorney
General determines is essential
to the success of an authorized
criminal investigation or the
successful prosecution of an
individual involved in the
criminal organization or
enterprise; or
(ii) who the Secretary of State and
the Attorney General jointly
determine--
(I) is in possession of
critical reliable information
concerning a terrorist
organization, enterprise, or
operation;
(II) is willing to supply or
has supplied such information
to Federal law enforcement
authorities or a Federal court;
(III) will be or has been
placed in danger as a result of
providing such information; and
(IV) is eligible to receive a
reward under section 36(a) of
the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956,
and, if the Attorney General (or with respect to
clause (ii), the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General jointly) considers it to be appropriate, the
spouse, married and unmarried sons and daughters, and
parents of an alien described in clause (i) or (ii) if
accompanying, or following to join, the alien.
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--IMMIGRATION
* * * * * * *
Chapter 2--Qualifications for Admission of Aliens; Travel Control of
Citizens and Aliens
* * * * * * *
general classes of aliens ineligible to receive visas and ineligible
for admission; waivers of inadmissibility
Sec. 212.\2\ (a) Classes of Aliens Ineligible for Visas or
Admissions.--Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens
who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are
ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to
the United States:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 8 U.S.C. 1182.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1)-(2) * * *
(3) Security and related grounds.--* * *
(B) Terrorist activities.--
(i) In general.--Any alien who--
(I) has engaged in a
terrorist activity,
(II) a consular officer or
the Attorney General knows, or
has reasonable ground to
believe, is likely to engage
after entry in any terrorist
activity (as defined in clause
(iii)),
(III) has, under
circumstances indicating an
intention to cause death or
serious bodily harm, incited
terrorist activity,
(IV) is a representative (as
defined in clause (iv)) of a
foreign terrorist organization,
as designated by the Secretary
under section 219 which the
alien knows or should have
known is a terrorist
organization, or
(V) is a member of a foreign
terrorist organization, as
designated by the Secretary
under section 219,
is inadmissible. An alien who is an officer,
official, representative, or spokesman of the
Palestine Liberation Organization is
considered, for purposes of this Act, to be
engaged in a terrorist activity.
(ii) Terrorist activity defined.--As
used in this Act, the term ``terrorist
activity'' means any activity which is
unlawful under the laws of the place
where it is committed (or which, if
committed in the United States, would
be unlawful under the laws of the
United States or any State) and which
involves any of the following:
(I) The highjacking or
sabotage of any conveyance
(including an aircraft, vessel,
or vehicle).
(II) The seizing or
detaining, and threatening to
kill, injure, or continue to
detain, another individual in
order to compel a third person
(including a governmental
organization) to do or abstain
from doing any act as an
explicit or implicit condition
for the release of the
individual seized or detained.
(III) A violent attack upon
an internationally protected
person (as defined in section
1116(b)(4) of title 18, United
States Code) or upon the
liberty of such a person.
(IV) An assassination.
(V) The use of any--
(a) biological agent,
chemical agent, or
nuclear weapon or
device, or
(b) explosive or
firearm (other than for
mere personal monetary
gain),
with intent to endanger,
directly or indirectly, the
safety of one or more
individuals or to cause
substantial damage to property.
(VI) A threat, attempt, or
conspiracy to do any of the
foregoing.
(iii) Engage in terrorist activity
defined.--As used in this Act, the term
``engage in terrorist activity'' means
to commit, in an individual capacity or
as a member of an organization, an act
of terrorist activity or an act which
the actor knows, or reasonably should
know, affords material support to any
individual, organization, or government
in conducting a terrorist activity at
any time, including any of the
following acts:
(I) The preparation or
planning of a terrorist
activity.
(II) The gathering of
information on potential
targets for terrorist activity.
(III) The providing of any
type of material support,
including a safe house,
transportation, communications,
funds, false documentation or
identification, weapons,
explosives, or training, to any
individual the actor knows or
has reason to believe has
committed or plans to commit a
terrorist activity.
(IV) The soliciting of funds
or other things of value for
terrorist activity or for any
terrorist organization.
(V) The solicitation of any
individual for membership in a
terrorist organization,
terrorist government, or to
engage in a terrorist activity.
(iv) Representative defined.--As used
in this paragraph, the term
``representative'' includes an officer,
official, or spokesman of an
organization, and any person who
directs, counsels, commands, or induces
an organization or its members to
engage in terrorist activity.
* * * * * * *
Admission of nonimmigrants
Sec. 214.\3\ (a)-(j) * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ 8 U.S.C. 1184.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(k) \4\(1) The number of aliens who may be provided a
visa as nonimmigrants under section 101(a)(15)(S)(i) in
any fiscal year may not exceed 200. The number of
aliens who may be provided a visa as nonimmigrants
under section 101(a)(15)(S)(ii) in any fiscal year may
not exceed 50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Sec. 220(b) of Public Law 103-416 (108 Stat. 4319) added
subsec. (k).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) No alien may be admitted into the United States
as such a nonimmigrant more than 5 years after the date
of the enactment of this subsection.
(3) The period of admission of an alien as such a
nonimmigrant may not exceed 3 years. Such period may
not be extended by the Attorney General.
(4) * * *
(5) The Attorney General shall submit a report
annually to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House
of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary
of the Senate concerning--
(A) the number of such nonimmigrants
admitted;
(B) the number of successful criminal
prosecutions or investigationsresulting from
cooperation of such aliens;
(C) the number of terrorist acts prevented or
frustrated resulting from cooperation of such
aliens;
(D) the number of such nonimmigrants whose
admission or cooperation has not resulted in
successful criminal prosecution or
investigation or the prevention or frustration
of a terrorist act; and
(E) the number of such nonimmigrants who have
failed to report quarterly (as required under
paragraph (4)) or who have been convicted of
crimes in the United States after the date of
their admission as such a
nonimmigrant.Restrictions on waiver.--* * *
* * * * * * *
SEC. 219.\5\ DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) Designation.--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ 8 U.S.C. 1189. Added by sec. 302(a) of Public Law 104-132 (110
Stat. 1248).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) In general.--The Secretary is authorized to
designate an organization as a foreign terrorist
organization in accordance with this subsection if the
Secretary finds that--
(A) the organization is a foreign
organization;
(B) the organization engages in terrorist
activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B));
and
(C) the terrorist activity of the
organization threatens the security of United
States nationals or the national security of
the United States.
(2) Procedure.--
(A) Notice.--Seven days before making a
designation under this subsection, the
Secretary shall, by classified communication--
(i) notify the Speaker and Minority
Leader of the House of Representatives,
the President pro tempore, Majority
Leader, and Minority Leader of the
Senate, and the members of the relevant
committees, in writing, of the intent
to designate a foreign organization
under this subsection, together with
the findings made under paragraph (1)
with respect to that organization, and
the factual basis therefor; and
(ii) seven days after such
notification, publish the designation
in the Federal Register.
(B) Effect of designation.--
(i) For purposes of section 2339B of
title 18, United States Code, a
designation under this subsection shall
take effect upon publication under
subparagraph (A).
(ii) Any designation under this
subsection shall cease to have effect
upon an Act of Congress disapproving
such designation.
(C) Freezing of assets.--Upon notification
under paragraph (2), the Secretary of the
Treasury may require United States financial
institutions possessing or controlling any
assets of any foreign organization included in
the notification to block all financial
transactions involving those assets until
further directive from either the Secretary of
the Treasury, Act of Congress, or order of
court.
(3) Record.--
(A) In general.--In making a designation
under this subsection, the Secretary shall
create an administrative record.
(B) Classified information.--The Secretary
may consider classified information in making a
designation under this subsection. Classified
information shall not be subject to disclosure
for such time as it remains classified, except
that such information may be disclosed to a
court ex parte and in camera for purposes of
judicial review under subsection (c).
(4) Period of designation.--
(A) In general.--Subject to paragraphs (5)
and (6), a designation under this subsection
shall be effective for all purposes for a
period of 2 years beginning on the effective
date of the designation under paragraph (2)(B).
(B) Redesignation.--The Secretary may
redesignate a foreign organization as a foreign
terrorist organization for an additional 2-year
period at the end of the 2-year period referred
to in subparagraph (A) (but not sooner than 60
days prior to the termination of such period)
upon a finding that the relevant circumstances
described in paragraph (1) still exist. The
procedural requirements of paragraphs (2) and
(3) shall apply to a redesignation under this
subparagraph.
(5) Revocation by act of congress.--The Congress, by
an Act of Congress, may block or revoke a designation
made under paragraph (1).
(6) Revocation based on change in circumstances.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary may revoke a
designation made under paragraph (1) if the
Secretary finds that--
(i) the circumstances that were the
basis for the designation have changed
in such a manner as to warrant
revocation of the designation; or
(ii) the national security of the
United States warrants a revocation of
the designation.
(B) Procedure.--The procedural requirements
of paragraphs (2) through (4) shall apply to a
revocation under this paragraph.
(7) Effect of revocation.--The revocation of a
designation under paragraph (5) or (6) shall not affect
any action or proceeding based on conduct committed
prior to the effective date of such revocation.
(8) Use of designation in trial or hearing.--If a
designation under this subsection has become effective
under paragraph (1)(B), a defendant in a criminal
action shall not be permitted to raise any question
concerning the validity of the issuance of such
designation as a defense or an objection at any trial
or hearing.
(b) Judicial Review of Designation.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after
publication of the designation in the Federal Register,
an organization designated as a foreign terrorist
organization may seek judicial review of the
designation in the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit.
(2) Basis of review.--Review under this subsection
shall be based solely upon the administrative record,
except that the Government may submit, for ex parte and
in camera review, classified information used in making
the designation.
(3) Scope of review.--The Court shall hold unlawful
and set aside a designation the court finds to be--
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power,
privilege, or immunity; or
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitation, or short of statutory
right.
(D) lacking substantial support in the
administrative record taken as a whole or in
classified information submitted to the court
under paragraph (2), or
(E) not in accord with the procedures
required by law.
(4) Judicial review invoked.--The pendency of an
action for judicial review of a designation shall not
affect the application of this section, unless the
court issues a final order setting aside the
designation.
(c) Definitions.--As used in this section--
(1) the term ``classified information'' has the
meaning given that term in section 1(a) of the
Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.);
(2) the term ``national security'' means the national
defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of
the United States;
(3) the term ``relevant committees'' means the
Committees on the Judiciary, Intelligence, and Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committees on the
Judiciary, Intelligence, and International Relations of
the House of Representatives; and
(4) the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Attorney General.
* * * * * * *
Chapter 4--Provisions Relating to Entry and Exclusion
* * * * * * *
general classes of deportable aliens
Sec. 237.\6\ (a) Classes of Deportable Aliens.--Any alien
(including an alien crewman) in and admitted to the United
States shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be
removed if the alien is within one or more of the following
classes of deportable aliens:
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\6\ 8 U.S.C. 1227; redesignated from sec. 241 (8 U.S.C. 1251) by
sec. 305(a)(2) of Public Law 104-208 (110 Stat. 3009), effective on the
first day of the first month beginning more than 180 days after
September 30, 1996.
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(1) Inadmissible at time of entry or of adjustment of
status or violates status.--* * *
(2) Criminal offenses.--* * *
(3) Failure to register and falsification of
documents.--* * *
(4) Security and related grounds.--
(A) In general.--* * *
(B) Terrorist activities.--Any alien who has
engaged, or at any time after admission engages
in any terrorist activity (as defined in
section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)) is deportable.
* * * * * * *
TITLE V--ALIEN TERRORIST REMOVAL PROCEDURES \7\
SEC. 501.\8\ DEFINITIONS.
As used in this title--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Sec. 401(a) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1258) added title
V.
\8\ 8 U.S.C. 1531.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) the term ``alien terrorist'' means any alien
described in section 241(a)(4)(B);
(2) the term ``classified information'' has the same
meaning as in section 1(a) of the Classified
Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.);
(3) the term ``national security'' has the same
meaning as in section 1(b) of the Classified
Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.);
(4) the term ``removal court'' means the court
described in section 502;
(5) the term ``removal hearing'' means the hearing
described in section 504; and
(6) the term ``removal proceeding'' means a
proceeding under this title.
(7) the term ``special attorney'' means an attorney
who is on the panel established under section 502(e).
SEC. 502.\9\ ESTABLISHMENT OF REMOVAL COURT.
(a) Designation of Judges.--* * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ 8 U.S.C. 1532.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Terms.--* * *
(c) Chief Judge.--* * *
(d) Expeditious and Confidential Nature of Proceedings.--*
* *
(e) Establishment of Panel of Special Attorneys.--* * *
SEC. 503.\10\ REMOVAL COURT PROCEDURE.
(a) Application.--
(1) In general.--In any case in which the Attorney
General has classified information that an alien is an
alien terrorist, the Attorney General may seek removal
of the alien under this title by filing an application
with the removal court that contains--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ 8 U.S.C. 1533.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(A) the identity of the attorney in the
Department of Justice making the application;
(B) a certification by the Attorney General
or the Deputy Attorney General that the
application satisfies the criteria and
requirements of this section;
(C) the identity of the alien for whom
authorization for the removal proceeding is
sought; and
(D) a statement of the facts and
circumstances relied on by the Department of
Justice to establish probable cause that--
(i) the alien is an alien terrorist;
(ii) the alien is physically present
in the United States; and
(iii) with respect to such alien,
removal under title II would pose a
risk to the national security of the
United States.
(2) Filing.--* * *
(b) Right To Dismiss.--The Attorney General may dismiss a
removal action under this title at any stage of the proceeding.
(c) Consideration of Application.--
(1) Basis for decision.--In determining whether to
grant an application under this section, a single judge
of the removal court may consider, ex parte and in
camera, in addition to the information contained in the
application--
(A) other information, including classified
information, presented under oath or
affirmation; and
(B) testimony received in any hearing on the
application, of which a verbatim record shall
be kept.
(2) Approval of order.--The judge shall issue an
order granting the application, if the judge finds that
there is probable cause to believe that--
(A) the alien who is the subject of the
application has been correctly identified and
is an alien terrorist present in the United
States; and
(B) removal under title II would pose a risk
to the national security of the United States.
(3) Denial of order.--If the judge denies the order
requested in the application, the judge shall prepare a
written statement of the reasons for the denial, taking
all necessary precautions not to disclose any
classified information contained in the Government's
application.
(d) Exclusive Provisions.--If an order is issued under this
section granting an application, the rights of the alien
regarding removal and expulsion shall be governed solely by
this title, and except as they are specifically referenced in
this title, no other provisions of this Act shall be
applicable.
SEC. 504.\11\ REMOVAL HEARING.
(a) In General.--
(1) Expeditious hearing.--In any case in which an
application for an order is approved under section
503(c)(2), a removal hearing shall be conducted under
this section as expeditiously as practicable for the
purpose of determining whether the alien to whom the
order pertains should be removed from the United States
on the grounds that the alien is an alien terrorist.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ 8 U.S.C. 1534.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Public hearing.--The removal hearing shall be
open to the public.
(b) Notice.--* * *
(c) Rights in Hearing.--* * *
(d) Subpoenas.--* * *
(e) Discovery.--* * *
(f) Arguments.--* * *
(g) Burden of Proof.--In the hearing, it is the
Government's burden to prove, by the preponderance of the
evidence, that the alien is subject to removal because the
alien is an alien terrorist.
(h) Rules of Evidence.--The Federal Rules of Evidence shall
not apply in a removal hearing.
(i) Determination of Deportation.--If the judge, after
considering the evidence on the record as a whole, finds that
the Government has met its burden, the judge shall order the
alien removed and detained pending removal from the United
States. If the alien was released pending the removal hearing,
the judge shall order the Attorney General to take the alien
into custody.
(j) Written Order.--At the time of issuing a decision as to
whether the alien shall be removed, the judge shall prepare a
written order containing a statement of facts found and
conclusions of law. Any portion of the order that would reveal
the substance or source of information received in camera and
ex parte pursuant to subsection (e) shall not be made available
to the alien or the public.
(k) No Right to Ancillary Relief.--* * *
SEC. 505.\12\ APPEALS.
(a) Appeal of Denial of Application for Removal
Proceedings.--* * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ 8 U.S.C. 1535.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Appeal of Determination Regarding Summary of Classified
Information.--* * *
(c) Appeal of Decision in Hearing.--* * *
(d) Certiorari.--* * *
(e) Appeal of Detention Order.--* * *
SEC. 506.\13\ CUSTODY AND RELEASE PENDING REMOVAL HEARING.
(a) Upon Filing Application.--* * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ 8 U.S.C. 1536.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Conditional Release if Order Denied and Review
Sought.--* * *
SEC. 507.\14\ CUSTODY AND RELEASE AFTER REMOVAL HEARING.
(a) Release.--* * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ 8 U.S.C. 1537.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Custody and Removal.--
(1) Custody.--If the judge decides that an alien
shall be removed, the alien shall be detained pending
the outcome of any appeal. After the conclusion of any
judicial review thereof which affirms the removal
order, the Attorney General shall retain the alien in
custody and remove the alien to a country specified
under paragraph (2).
(2) Removal.--
(A) In general.--The removal of an alien
shall be to any country which the alien shall
designate if such designation does not, in the
judgment of the Attorney General, in
consultation with the Secretary of State,
impair the obligation of the United States
under any treaty (including a treaty pertaining
to extradition) or otherwise adversely affect
the foreign policy of the United States.
(B) Alternate countries.--If the alien
refuses to designate a country to which the
alien wishes to be removed or if the Attorney
General, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, determines that removal of the alien to
the country so designated would impair a treaty
obligation or adversely affect United States
foreign policy, the Attorney General shall
cause the alien to be removed to any country
willing to receive such alien.
(C) Continued detention.--If no country is
willing to receive such an alien, the Attorney
General may, notwithstanding any other
provision of law, retain the alien in custody.
The Attorney General, in coordination with the
Secretary of State, shall make periodic efforts
to reach agreement with other countries to
accept such an alien and at least every 6
months shall provide to the attorney
representing the alien at the removal hearing a
written report on the Attorney General's
efforts. Any alien in custody pursuant to this
subparagraph shall be released from custody
solely at the discretion of the Attorney
General and subject to such conditions as the
Attorney General shall deem appropriate.
(D) Fingerprinting.--Before an alien is
removed from the United States pursuant to this
subsection, or pursuant to an order of removal
because such alien is inadmissible under
section 212(a)(3)(B), the alien shall be
photographed and fingerprinted, and shall be
advised of the provisions of section 276(b).
(c) Continued Detention Pending Trial.--
(1) Delay in removal.--* * *The Attorney General may
hold in abeyance the removal of an alien who has been
ordered removed, pursuant to this title, to allow the
trial of such alien on any Federal or State criminal
charge and the service of any sentence of confinement
resulting from such a trial.
(2) Maintenance of custody.--Pending the commencement
of any service of a sentence of confinement by an alien
described in paragraph (1), such an alien shall remain
in the custody of the Attorney General, unless the
Attorney General determines that temporary release of
the alien to the custody of State authorities for
confinement in a State facility is appropriate and
would not endanger national security or public safety.
(3) Subsequent removal.--Following the completion of
a sentence of confinement by an alien described in
paragraph (1), or following the completion of State
criminal proceedings which do not result in a sentence
of confinement of an alien released to the custody of
State authorities pursuant to paragraph (2), such an
alien shall be returned to the custody of the Attorney
General who shall proceed to the removal of the alien
under this title.
(d) Application of Certain Provisions Relating to Escape of
Prisoners.--* * *
(e) Rights of Aliens in Custody.--* * *
2. Middle East Activities
a. Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1995
Title VI of Public Law 104-99 [Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1996, H.R. 1868, enacted by
reference in sec. 301 of Public Law 104-99; H.R. 2880], 110 Stat. 26,
approved January 26, 1996; enacted again as Public Law 104-107 [H.R.
1868], 110 Stat. 704, approved February 12, 1996
TITLE VI--MIDDLE EAST PEACE FACILITATION ACT OF 1995
short title
Sec. 601. This title may be cited as the ``Middle East
Peace Facilitation Act of 1995''.
findings
Sec. 602. The Congress finds that--
(1) the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereafter
the ``P.L.O.'') has recognized the State of Israel's
right to exist in peace and security, accepted United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338,
committed itself to the peace process and peaceful
coexistence with Israel, free from violence and all
other acts which endanger peace and stability, and
assumed responsibility over all P.L.O. elements and
personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent
violations, and discipline violators;
(2) Israel has recognized the P.L.O. as the
representative of the Palestinian people;
(3) Israel and the P.L.O. signed a Declaration of
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements
(hereafter the ``Declaration of Principles'') on
September 13, 1993 at the White House;
(4) Israel and the P.L.O. signed an Agreement on the
Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (hereafter the ``Gaza-
Jericho Agreement'') on May 4, 1994 which established a
Palestinian Authority for the Gaza and Jericho areas;
(5) Israel and the P.L.O. signed an Agreement on
Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities
(hereafter the ``Early Empowerment Agreement'') on
August 29, 1994 which provided for the transfer to the
Palestinian Authority of certain powers and
responsibilities in the West Bank outside of the
Jericho Area;
(6) under the terms of the Israeli-Palestinian
Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza (hereafter
the ``Interim Agreement) signed on September 28, 1995,
the Declaration of Principles, the Gaza-Jericho
Agreement and the Early Empowerment Agreement, the
powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian
Authority are to be assumed by an elected Palestinian
Council with jurisdiction in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip in accordance with the Interim Agreement;
(7) permanent status negotiations relating to the
West Bank and Gaza Strip are scheduled to begin by May
1996;
(8) the Congress has, since the conclusion of the
Declaration of Principles and the P.L.O.'s renunciation
of terrorism, provided authorities to the President to
suspend certain statutory restrictions relating to the
P.L.O., subject to Presidential certifications that the
P.L.O. has continued to abide by commitments made in
and in connection with or resulting from the good faith
implementation of, the Declaration of Principles;
(9) the P.L.O. commitments relevant to Presidential
certifications have included commitments to renounce
and condemn terrorism, to submit to the Palestinian
National Council for former approval the necessary
changes to those articles of the Palestinian Covenant
which call for Israel's destruction, and to prevent
acts of terrorism and hostilities against Israel; and
(10) the United States is resolute in its
determination to ensure that in providing assistance to
Palestinians living under the jurisdiction of the
Palestinian Authority or elsewhere, the beneficiaries
of such assistance shall be held to the same standard
of financial accountability and management control as
any other recipient of United States assistance.
sense of congress
Sec. 603. It is the sense of the Congress that the P.L.O.
must do far more to demonstrate an irrevocable denunciation of
terrorism and ensure a peaceful settlement of the Middle East
dispute, and in particular it must--
(1) submit to the Palestinian National Council for
formal approval the necessary changes to those articles
of the Palestinian National Covenant which call for
Israel's destruction;
(2) make greater efforts to pre-empt acts of terror,
discipline violators and contribute to stemming the
violence that has resulted in the deaths of over 140
Israeli and United States citizens since the signing of
the Declaration of Principles;
(3) prohibit participation in its activities and in
the Palestinian Authority and its successors by any
groups or individuals which continue to promote and
commit acts of terrorism;
(4) cease all anti-Israel rhetoric, which potentially
undermines the peace process;
(5) confiscate all unlicensed weapons;
(6) transfer and cooperate in transfer proceedings
relating to any person accused by Israel to acts of
terrorism; and
(7) respect civil liberties, human rights and
democratic norms.
authority to suspend certain provisions
Sec. 604. (a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b),
beginning on the date of enactment of this Act and for eighteen
months thereafter, the President may suspend for a period of
not more than 6 months at a time any provision of law specified
in subsection (d). Any such suspension shall cease to be
effective after 6 months, or at such earlier date as the
President may specify.
(b) Conditions.--
(1) \1\ Consultations.--Prior to each exercise of the
authority provided in subsection (a) or certification
pursuant to subsection (c), the President shall consult
with the relevant congressional committees. The
President may not exercise that authority or make such
certification until 30 days after a written policy
justification is submitted to the relevant
congressional committees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Responsibilities delegated to the President in para. (1) and
(5) of subsec. (b) were redelegated by the President to the Secretary
of State in a Presidential memorandum of February 29, 1996 (61 F.R.
9889).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Presidential Certification.--The President may
exercise the authority provided in subsection (a) only
if the President certifies to the relevant
congressional committees each time he exercises such
authority that--
(A) it is in the national interest of the
United States to exercise such authority;
(B) the P.L.O., the Palestinian Authority,
and successor entities are complying with all
the commitments described in paragraph (4); and
(C) funds provided pursuant to the exercise
of this authority and the authorities under
section 583(a) of Public Law 103-236 and
section 3(a) of Public Law 103-125 have been
used for the purposes for which they were
intended.
(3) Requirement for continuing p.l.o. compliance.--
(A) The President shall ensure that P.L.O. performance
is continuously monitored and if the President at any
time determines that the P.L.O. has not continued to
comply with all the commitments described in paragraph
(4), he shall so notify the relevant congressional
committees and any suspension under subsection (a) of a
provision of law specified in subsection (d) shall
cease to be effective.
(B) Beginning six months after the date of enactment
of this Act, if the President on the basis of the
continuous monitoring of the P.L.O.'s performance
determines that the P.L.O. is not complying with the
requirements described in subsection (c), he shall so
notify the relevant congressional committees and no
assistance shall be provided pursuant to the exercise
by the President of the authority provided by
subsection (a) until such time as the President makes
the certification provided for in subsection (c).
(4) P.L.O. commitments described.--The commitments
referred to in paragraphs (2)(B) and (3)(A) are the
commitments made by the P.L.O--
(A) in its letter of September 9, 1993, to
the Prime Minister of Israel; in its letter of
September 9, 1993, to the Foreign Minister of
Norway to--
(i) recognize the right of the State
of Israel to exist in peace and
security;
(ii) accept United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338;
(iii) renounce the use of terrorism
and other acts of violence;
(iv) assume responsibility over all
P.L.O. elements and personnel in order
to assure their compliance, prevent
violations and discipline violators;
(v) call upon the Palestinian people
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to take
part in the steps leading to the
normalization of life, rejecting
violence and terrorism, and
contributing to peace and stability;
and
(vi) submit to the Palestine National
Council for formal approval the
necessary changes to the Palestinian
National Covenant eliminating calls for
Israel's destruction, and
(B) in, and resulting from, the good faith
implementation of the Declaration of
Principles, including good faith implementation
of subsequent agreements with Israel, with
particular attention to the objective of
preventing terrorism, as reflected in the
provisions of the Interim Agreement
concerning--
(i) prevention of acts of terrorism
and legal measures against terrorists,
including the arrest and prosecution of
individuals suspected of perpetrating
acts of violence and terror;
(ii) abstention from and prevention
of incitement, including hostile
propaganda;
(iii) operation of armed forces other
than the Palestinian Police;
(iv) possession, manufacture, sale,
acquisition or importation of weapons;
(v) employment of police who have
been convicted of serious crimes or
have been found to be actively involved
in terrorist activities subsequent to
their employment;
(vi) transfers to Israel of
individuals suspected of, charged with,
or convicted of an offense that falls
within Israeli criminal jurisdiction;
(vii) cooperation with the government
of Israel in criminal matters,
including cooperation in the conduct of
investigations; and
(viii) exercise of powers and
responsibilities under the agreement
with due regard to internationally
accepted norms and principles of human
rights and the rule of law.
(5) \1\ Policy justification.--As part of the
President's written policy justification to be
submitted to the relevant Congressional Committees
pursuant to paragraph (1), the President will report
on--
(A) the manner in which the P.L.O. has
complied with the commitments specified in
paragraph (4), including responses to
individual acts of terrorism and violence,
actions to discipline perpetrators of terror
and violence, and actions to preempt acts of
terror and violence;
(B) the extent to which the P.L.O. has
fulfilled the requirements specified in
subsection (c);
(C) actions that the P.L.O. has taken with
regard to the Arab League boycott of Israel;
(D) the status and activities of the P.L.O.
office in the United States;
(E) all United States assistance which
benefits, directly or indirectly, the projects,
programs, or activities of the Palestinian
Authority in Gaza, Jericho, or any other area
it may control, since September 13, 1993,
including--
(i) the obligation and disbursal of
such assistance, by project, activity,
and date, as well as by prime
contractor and all subcontractors;
(ii) the organizations or individuals
responsible for the receipt and
obligation of such assistance;
(iii) the intended beneficiaries of
such assistance; and
(iv) the amount of international
donor funds that benefit the P.L.O. or
the Palestinian Authority in Gaza,
Jericho, or any other area the P.L.O.
or the Palestinian Authority may
control, and to which the United States
is a contributor; and
(F) statements by senior officials of the
P.L.O., the Palestinian Authority, and
successor entities that question the right of
Israel to exist or urge armed conflict with or
terrorism against Israel or its citizens,
including an assessment of the degree to which
such statements reflect official policy of the
P.L.O., the Palestinian Authority, or successor
entities.
(c) Requirement for Continued Provision of Assistance.--Six
months after the enactment of this Act, United States
assistance shall not be provided pursuant to the exercise by
the President of the authority provided by subsection (a),
unless and until the President determines and so certifies to
the Congress that--
(1) if the Palestinian Council has been elected and
assumed its responsibilities, it has, within 2 months,
effectively disavowed and thereby nullified the
articles of the Palestine National Covenant which call
for Israel's destruction, unless the necessary changes
to the Covenant have already been approved by the
Palestine National Council;
(2) the P.L.O., the Palestinian Authority, and
successor entities have exercised their authority
resolutely to establish the necessary enforcement
institutions; including laws, police, and a judicial
system, for apprehending, transferring, prosecuting,
convicting, and imprisoning terrorists;
(3) the P.L.O., has limited participation in the
Palestinian Authority and its successors to individuals
and groups that neither engage in nor practice
terrorism or violence in the implementation of their
political goals;
(4) the P.L.O., the Palestinian Authority, and
successor entities have not provided any financial or
material assistance or training to any group, whether
or not affiliated with the P.L.O., to carry out actions
inconsistent with the Declaration of Principles,
particularly acts of terrorism against Israel;
(5) the P.L.O., the Palestinian Authority, or
successor entities have cooperated in good faith with
Israeli authorities in--
(A) the preemption of acts of terrorism;
(B) the apprehension, trial, and punishment
of individuals who have planned or committed
terrorist acts subject to the jurisdiction of
the Palestinian Authority or any successor
entity; and
(C) the apprehension of and transfer to
Israeli authorities of individuals suspected
of, charged with, or convicted of, planning or
committing terrorist acts subject to Israeli
jurisdiction in accordance with the specific
provisions of the Interim Agreement;
(6) the P.L.O., the Palestinian Authority, and
successor entities have exercised their authority
resolutely to enact and implement laws requiring the
disarming of civilians not specifically licensed to
possess or carry weapons;
(7) the P.L.O., the Palestinian Authority, and
successor entities have not funded, either partially or
wholly, or have ceased funding, either partially or
wholly, any office, or other presence of the
Palestinian Authority in Jerusalem unless established
by specific agreement between Israel and the P.L.O.,
the Palestinian Authority, or successor entities;
(8) the P.L.O., the Palestinian Authority, and
successor entities are cooperating fully with the
Government of the United States on the provision of
information on United States nationals known to have
been held at any time by the P.L.O. or factions
thereof; and
(9) the P.L.O., the Palestinian Authority, and
successor entities have not, without the agreement of
the Government of Israel, taken any steps that will
change the status of Jerusalem or the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, pending the outcome of the permanent status
negotiations.
(d) \2\ Provisions That May Be Suspended.--The provisions
that may be suspended under the authority of subsection (a) are
the following:
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\2\ In a memoranda for the Secretary of State, the President has
certified that it is in the national interests to suspend the
application of these provisions of law. (Presidential Determination No.
96-20 of April 1, 1996; 61 F.R. 26019).
This certification was extended in Presidential Determination No.
96-32 of June 14, 1996 (61 F.R. 32629); Presidential Determination No.
96-41 of August 12, 1996 (61 F.R. 43137); and Presidential
Determination No. 97-17 of February 21, 1997 (62 F.R. 9903).
This most recent determination extends the suspension through
August 12, 1997.
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(1) Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2227) as it applies with respect to the
P.L.O. or entities associated with it.
(2) Section 114 of the Department of State
Authorization Act, fiscal years 1984 and 1985 (22
U.S.C. 287e note) as it applies with respect to the
P.L.O. or entities associated with it.
(3) Section 1003 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, fiscal years 1988 and 1989 (22
U.S.C. 5202).
(4) Section 37 of the Bretton Woods Agreement Act (22
U.S.C. 286W) as it applies on the granting to the
P.L.O. of observer status or other official status at
any meeting sponsored by or associated with the
International Monetary Fund. As used in this paragraph,
the term ``other official status'' does not include
membership in the International Monetary Fund.
(e) Definitions.--As used in this title:
(1) Relevant Congressional Committees.--The term
``relevant congressional committees'' mean--
(A) the Committee on International Relations,
the Committee on Banking and Financial
Services, and the Committee on Appropriations
of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
(2) United States Assistance.--The term ``United
States assistance'' means any form of grant, loan, loan
guarantee, credit, insurance, in kind assistance, or
any other form of assistance.
transition provision
Sec. 605. (a) In General.--Section 583(a) of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public
Law 103-236) is amended by striking ``November 1, 1995'' and
inserting ``January 1, 1996''.
(b) Consultation.--For purposes of any exercise of the
authority provided in section 583(a) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-
236) prior to November 15, 1995, the written policy
justification dated June 1, 1995, and submitted to the Congress
in accordance with section 583(b)(1) of such Act, and the
consultations associated with such policy justification, shall
be deemed to satisfy the requirements of section 583(b)(1) of
such Act.
reporting requirement
Sec. 606. Section 804(b) of the P.L.O. Commitments
Compliance Act of 1989 (title VIII of Public Law 101-246) is
amended--
(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by
striking ``section (3)(b)(1) of the Middle East Peace
Facilitation Act of 1994'' and inserting ``section
604(b)(1) of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of
1995''; and
(2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``section (4)(a) of
the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1994 (Oslo
commitments)'' and inserting ``section 604(b)(4) of the
Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1995''.
b. Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1994
Title V, Part E of Public Law 103-236 [Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995; H.R. 2333], 108 Stat. 488, approved
April 23, 1994, as amended
PART E--MIDDLE EAST PEACE FACILITATION
SEC. 581. SHORT TITLE.
This part may be cited as the ``Middle East Peace
Facilitation Act of 1994''.
SEC. 582. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds that--
(1) the Palestine Liberation Organization has
recognized the State of Israel's right to exist in
peace and security; accepted United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338; committed itself to
the peace process and peaceful coexistence with Israel,
free from violence and all other acts which endanger
peace and stability; and assumed responsibility over
all Palestine Liberation Organization elements and
personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent
violations, and discipline violators;
(2) Israel has recognized the Palestine Liberation
Organization as the representative of the Palestinian
people;
(3) Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization
signed a Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements on September 13, 1993, at the
White House;
(4) the United States has resumed a bilateral
dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization;
and
(5) in order to implement the Declaration of
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements and
facilitate the Middle East peace process, the President
has requested flexibility to suspend certain provisions
of law pertaining to the Palestine Liberation
Organization.
SEC. 583. AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS.
(a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), beginning July
1, 1994, the President may suspend for a period of not more
than 6 months any provision of law specified in subsection (c).
The President may continue the suspension for a period or
periods of not more than 6 months until March 31, 1996,\1\ if,
before each such period, the President satisfies the
requirements of subsection (b). Any suspension shall cease to
be effective after 6 months, or at such earlier date as the
President may specify.
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\1\ Sec. 1 of Public Law 104-17 (109 Stat. 191) extended this
authority from July 1, 1995 to August 15, 1995. Further extensions were
provided in Public Law 104-22 (109 Stat. 260)--extending to October 1,
1995; Public Law 104-30 (109 Stat. 277)--extending to November 1, 1995;
Public Law 104-47 (109 Stat. 423)--extending to December 31, 1995; and
Public Law 104-89 (109 Stat. 960)--extending to March 31, 1996. The
latter extensions further provided the following, with appropriate
dates adjusted:
``(b) Consultation.--For purposes of any exercise of the authority
provided in section 583(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236) prior to January 10,
1996, the written policy justification dated December 1, 1995, and
submitted to the Congress in accordance with section 583(b)(1) of such
Act, shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements of section 583(b)(1)
of such Act.''.
Sec. 605(a) Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1996 (Public Law 104-107; 110 Stat. 760),
struck out ``November 1, 1995'' and inserted in lieu thereof ``January
1, 1996'', an amendment already similarly provided in Public Law 104-47
and further amended by Public Law 104-89.
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(b) Conditions.--
(1) \2\ Consultation.--Prior to each exercise of the
authority provided in subsection (a), the President
shall consult with the relevant congressional
committees. The President may not exercise that
authority until 30 days after a written policy
justification is submitted to the relevant
congressional committees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ In a July 26, 1994, memorandum the President delegated
responsibility of fulfilling functions in subsec. (b)(1) and (b)(6) to
the Secretary of State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Presidential certification.--The President may
exercise the authority provided in subsection (a) only
if the President certifies to the relevant
congressional committees each time he exercises such
authority that--
(A) it is in the national interest of the
United States to exercise such authority; and
(B) the Palestine Liberation Organization
continues to abide by all the commitments
described in paragraph (4).
(3) Requirement for continuing plo compliance.--Any
suspension under subsection (a) of a provision of law
specified in subsection (c) shall cease to be effective
if the President certifies to the relevant
congressional committees that the Palestine Liberation
Organization has not continued to abide by all the
commitments described in paragraph (4).
(4) PLO commitments described.--The commitments
referred to in paragraphs (2) and (3) are the
commitments made by the Palestine Liberation
Organization--
(A) in its letter of September 9, 1993, to
the Prime Minister of Israel; in its letter of
September 9, 1993, to the Foreign Minister of
Norway to--
(i) recognize the right of the State
of Israel to exist in peace and
security;
(ii) accept United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338;
(iii) renounce the use of terrorism
and other acts of violence;
(iv) assume responsibility over all
PLO elements and personnel in order to
assure their compliance, prevent
violations and discipline violators;
(v) call upon the Palestinian people
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to take
part in the steps leading to the
normalization of life, rejecting
violence and terrorism, and
contributing to peace and stability;
and
(vi) submit to the Palestine National
Council for formal approval the
necessary changes to the Palestinian
National Covenant eliminating calls for
Israel's destruction, and
(B) in, and resulting from, the good faith
implementation of, the Declaration of
Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements signed on September 13, 1993.
(5) Expectation of congress regarding any extension
of presidential authority.--The Congress expects that
any extension of the authority provided to the
President in subsection (a) will be conditional on the
Palestine Liberation Organization--
(A) renouncing the Arab League boycott of
Israel;
(B) urging the nations of the Arab League to
end the Arab League boycott of Israel;
(C) cooperating with efforts undertaken by
the President of the United States to end the
Arab League boycott of Israel; \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Sec. 565A of Public Law 103-306 (108 Stat. 1650) struck out
``and'' at the end of subpar. (C); struck out the period at the end of
subpar. (D) and inserted in lieu thereof ``; and''; and added subpar.
(E).
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(D) condemning individual acts of terrorism
and violence; and \3\
(E) \3\ amending its National Covenant to
eliminate all references calling for the
destruction of Israel.
(6) Reporting requirement.--As part of the
President's written policy justification referred to in
paragraph (1), the President will report on the PLO's
response to individual acts of terrorism and violence,
as well as its actions concerning the Arab League
boycott of Israel as enumerated in paragraph (5) and on
the status of the PLO office in the United States as
enumerated in subsection (c)(3).
(c) \4\ Provisions That May Be Suspended.--The provisions
that may be suspended under the authority of subsection (a) are
the following:
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\4\ In memoranda for the Secretary of State, the President has
certified that it is in the national interests to suspend the
application of these provisions of law. Presidential Determination No.
94-13 of January 14, 1994 (59 F.R. 4777).
This certification was extended in Presidential Determination No.
94-30 of June 30, 1994 (59 F.R. 35607); Presidential Determination No.
95-12 of December 31, 1994 (60 F.R. 2673); Presidential Determination
No. 95-31 of July 2, 1995 (60 F.R. 35827); Presidential Determination
No. 95-36 of August 14, 1995 (60 F.R. 44725); Presidential
Determination No. 95-50 of September 30, 1995 (60 F.R. 53093;
Presidential Determination No. 96-5 of November 13, 1995 (60 F.R.
57821); Presidential Determination No. 96-8 of January 4, 1996 (61 F.R.
2889); Presidential Determination No. 96-20 of April 1, 1996 (61 F.R.
26019); Presidential Determination No. 96-32 of June 14, 1996 (61 F.R.
32629); Presidential Determination No. 96-41 of August 12, 1996 (61
F.R. 43137); andPresidential Determination No. 97-17 of February 21,
1997 (62 F.R. 9903).
This most recent determination extends the suspension through
August 12, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2227) as it applies with respect to the
Palestine Liberation Organization or entities
associated with it.
(2) Section 114 of the Department of State
Authorization Act, Fiscal years 1984 and 1985 (22
U.S.C. 287e note) as it applies with respect to the
Palestine Liberation Organization or entities
associated with it.
(3) Section 1003 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal years 1988 and 1989 (22
U.S.C. 5202).
(4) Section 37 of the Bretton Woods Agreement Act (22
U.S.C. 286w) as it applies to the granting to the
Palestine Liberation Organization of observer status or
other official status at any meeting sponsored by or
associated with the International Monetary Fund. As
used in this paragraph, the term ``other official
status'' does not include membership in the
International Monetary Fund.
(d) Relevant Congressional Committees Defined.--As used in
this section, the term ``relevant congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives; \5\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Sec. 1(a)(2) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided that
references to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs of
the House of Representatives shall be treated as referring to the
Committee on Banking and Financial Services of the House of
Representatives. Sec. 1(a)(5) of that Act provided that references to
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives shall
be treated as referring to the Committee on International Relations of
the House of Representatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
c. PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 1989
Title VIII of Public Law 101-246 [Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991; H.R. 3792], 104 Stat. 15 at 76, approved
February 16, 1990, as amended
AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 for
the Department of State, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
* * * * * * *
TITLE VIII-PLO COMMITMENTS COMPLIANCE ACT OF 1989 \1\
SEC. 801. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``PLO Commitments Compliance
Act of 1989''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ On March 14, 1990, the President designated and empowered ``the
Secretary of State to perform, without the approval, ratification, or
other approval of the President, the functions of the President set
forth in Title VIII of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1990 and 1991; Public Law 101-246.'' (55 F.R. 11131).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 802. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds that--
(1) United States policy regarding contacts with the
Palestine Liberation Organization (including its
Executive Committee, the Palestine National Council,
and any constituent groups related thereto (hereafter
in this title referred to as the ``PLO'')) set forth in
the Memorandum of Agreement between the United States
and Israel, dated September 1, 1975, stated that the
United States ``will not recognize or negotiate with
the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the
PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does
not accept United Nations Security Council Resolutions
242 and 338'';
(2) section 1302 of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 2151
note; Public Law 99-83), effective October 1, 1985,
stated that ``no officer or employee of the United
States Government and no agent or other individual
acting on behalf of the United States Government shall
negotiate with the PLO or any representatives thereof
(except in emergency or humanitarian situations) unless
and until the PLO recognizes Israel's right to exist,
accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242
and 338, and renounces the use of terrorism'';
(3) the Department of State statement of November 26,
1988, found that ``the United States Government has
convincing evidence that PLO elements have engaged in
terrorism against Americans and others'' and that ``Mr.
[Yasser] Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, knows of,
condones, and lends support to such acts; he therefore
is an accessory to such terrorism'';
(4) Secretary of State Shultz declared on December
14, 1988, that ``the [PLO] today issued a statement in
which it accepted United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338, recognized Israel's right to
exist in peace and security, and renounced terrorism.
As a result, the United States is prepared for a
substantive dialogue with PLO representatives'';
(5) President Ronald Reagan, subsequent to the
decision to open a United States-PLO dialogue, stated
that the PLO ``must demonstrate that its renunciation
of terrorism is pervasive and permanent'' and if the
PLO reneges on its commitments, the United States
``will certainly break off communications'';
(6) since the United States agreed to enter into a
dialogue with the PLO, there have been several
attempted incursions into Israel by the following PLO-
affiliated groups: the Popular Struggle Front, the
Palestine Liberation Front, the Democratic Front for
the Liberation of Palestine, and the Islamic Jihad
group;
(7) Yasser Arafat has not renounced any of these
incidents, that he has threatened ``ten bullets in the
chest'' to those Palestinians who advocate a cessation
of the unrest, and that his principal deputy, Abu Iyad,
as well as other senior Al-Fatah figures, have been
quoted as saying that the PLO recognition of Israel and
renunciation of terrorism is merely tactical and that a
Palestinian state is but the first step in the
``liberation of Palestine'';
(8) \2\ the President, following an attempted
terrorist attack upon a Tel Aviv beach on May 30, 1990,
suspended the United States dialogue with the PLO;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Sec. 524(7) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 473), added paras.
(8) and (9).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(9) \2\ the President resumed the United States
dialogue with the PLO in response to the commitments
made by the PLO in letters to the Prime Minister of
Israel and the Foreign Minister of Norway of September
9, 1993; and
(10) \3\ that the United States should regularly
evaluate the PLO's compliance with the commitments made
by Yasser Arafat on behalf of the PLO in Geneva on
December 14, 1988 and on September 9, 1993.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Sec. 524(5) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 473), redesignated
former para. (8) as para. (10).
\4\ Sec. 524(4) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 473), inserted ``and
on September 9, 1993''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 803. POLICY.
(a) In General.--The Congress reiterates long-standing
United States policy that any dialogue with the PLO be
contingent upon the PLO's recognition of Israel's right to
exist, its acceptance of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338, and its abstention from and
renunciation of all acts of terrorism.
(b) Policy Toward Implementation of PLO Commitments.--It is
the sense of the Congress that the United States, in any
discussions with the PLO, should seek--
(1) the prevention of terrorism and other violent
activity by the PLO or any of its factions; and
(2) the implementation of concrete steps by the PLO
consistent with its commitments to recognize Israel and
renounce terrorism, including concrete actions that
will further the peace process such as--
(A) disbanding units which have been involved
in terrorism;
(B) publicly condemning all acts of
terrorism;
(C) ceasing the intimidation of Palestinians
who advocate a cessation of or who do not
support the unrest;
(D) calling on the Arab states to recognize
Israel and to end their economic boycott of
Israel; and
(E) amending the PLO's Covenant to remove
provisions which undermine Israel's legitimacy
and which call for Israel's destruction.
(c) Policy Toward Recent Armed Incursions Into Israel By
PLO-Affiliated Groups.--During the next round of talks with the
PLO, should such talks occur after the date of enactment of
this Act, the representative of the United States should obtain
from the representative of the PLO a full accounting of the
following attempted incursions into Israel which occurred after
Yasser Arafat's statement of December 14, 1988:
(1) On December 26, 1988, an attempted armed
infiltration into Israel by boat by four members of the
PLO-affiliated Popular Struggle Front.
(2) On December 28, 1988, an attempted armed
infiltration into Israel by three members of the PLO-
affiliated Palestine Liberation Front.
(3) On January 24, 1989, an unprovoked attack on an
Israeli patrol in Southern Lebanon by the PLO-
affiliated Palestine Liberation Front.
(4) On February 5, 1989, an attempted armed
infiltration into Israel by nine members of the PLO-
affiliated Palestine Liberation Front and Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine.
(5) On February 23, 1989, an attempted attack on
targets in Israel by members of the PLO-affiliated
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
(6) On February 27, 1989, a PLO-affiliated Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine ambush of a pro-
Israeli Southern Lebanese army vehicle.
(7) On March 2, 1989, an attempted armed infiltration
into Israel by four members of the PLO-affiliated
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine headed
for the civilian town of Zarit.
(8) On March 13, 1989, an attempted armed
infiltration into Israel by three members of the PLO-
aligned Palestine Liberation Front.
(9) On March 15, 1989, an attempted attack on Israel
through Gaza by two members of the Islamic Jihad group.
SEC. 804. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
(a) Report on Armed Incursions.--In the event that talks
are held with the PLO after the date of enactment of this Act,
the Secretary of State, shall, within 30 days after the next
round of such talks, report to the Chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs \5\ of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives any accounting provided by the
representative of the PLO of the incidents described in section
803(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ As enrolled. Should read ``Committee on Foreign Relations''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Report on Compliance With Commitments.--In conjunction
with each written policy justification required under section
583(b)(1) of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1994 \6\
or every 180 days,,\7\ the President shall submit to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report, in
unclassified form to the maximum extent practicable, regarding
progress toward the achievement of the measures described in
section 803(b). Such report shall include--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Sec. 1(kk)(10 of Public Law 103-415 (108 Stat. 4303) struck out
``section (3)(b)(1) of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1994''
and inserted in lieu thereof ``section 583(b)(1) of the Middle East
Peace Facilitation Act of 1994''.
\7\ Sec. 524(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 473), struck out
``Beginning 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and every
120 days thereafter in which the dialogue between the United States and
the PLO has not been discontinued'' and inserted in lieu thereof ``In
conjunction with each written policy justification required under
section (3)(b)(1) of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1994 or
every 180 days,'' [resulting in a double comma].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) a description of actions or statements by the PLO
as an organization, its Chairman, members of its
Executive Committee, members of the Palestine National
Council, or any constituent groups related thereto, as
they relate to the Geneva commitments of December 1988
and each of the commitments described in section 584(a)
of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1994 \8\
(Oslo commitments),\9\ including actions or statements
that contend that the declared ``Palestinian state''
encompasses all of Israel;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Sec. 1(kk)(2) of Public Law 103-415 (108 Stat. 4303) struck out
``section (4)(a) of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1994''
and inserted in lieu thereof ``section 584(a) of the Middle East Peace
Facilitation Act of 1994''.
\9\ Sec. 524(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 473), struck out
``regarding [the] cessation of terrorism and recognition of Israel's
right to exist'' and inserted in lieu thereof ``and each of the
commitments described in section (4)(A) of the Middle East Peace
Facilitation Act of 1994 (Oslo commitments)''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) a description of the steps, if any, taken by the
PLO to evict or otherwise discipline individuals or
groups taking actions inconsistent with the Geneva and
Oslo \10\ commitments;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Sec. 524(3) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 473), inserted ``and
Oslo'' after ``Geneva''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) a statement of whether the PLO, in accordance
with procedures in Article 33 of the Palestinian
National Covenant, has repealed provisions in that
Covenant which call for Israel's destruction;
(4) a statement of whether the PLO has repudiated its
``strategy of stages'' whereby it seeks to use a
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza as the
first step in the total elimination of the state of
Israel;
(5) a statement of whether the PLO has called on any
Arab state to recognize and enter direct negotiations
with Israel or to end its economic boycott of Israel;
(6) a statement of whether ``Force 17'' and the
``Hawari Group'', units directed by Yasser Arafat that
have carried out terrorist attacks, have been disbanded
and not reconstituted under different names;
(7) a statement of whether the following PLO
constituent groups conduct or participate in terrorist
or other violent activities: the Fatah; the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine; the Democratic
Front for the Liberation of Palestine; the Arab
Liberation Front; the Palestine Liberation Front;
(8) a statement of the PLO's position on the unrest
in the West Bank and Gaza, and whether the PLO
threatens, through violence or other intimidation
measures, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza who
advocate a cessation of or who do not support the
unrest, and who might be receptive to taking part in
elections there;
(9) a statement of the position of the PLO regarding
the prosecution and extradition, if so requested, of
known terrorists such as Abu Abbas, who directed the
Achille Lauro hijacking during which Leon Klinghoffer
was murdered, and Muhammed Rashid, implicated in the
1982 bombing of a PanAm jet and the 1986 bombing of a
TWA jet in which four Americans were killed; \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Sec. 574 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1995 (Public Law 103-306; 108
Stat. 1653), replaced ``; and'' in para. (9) with a semicolon; struck
out the period at the end of para. (10) and inserted in lieu thereof
``; and''; and added a new para. (11).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(10) a statement of the position of the PLO on
providing compensation to the American victims or the
families of American victims of PLO terrorism; and \11\
(11) \11\ measures taken by the PLO to prevent acts
of terrorism, crime and hostilities and to legally
punish offenders, as called for in the Gaza-Jericho
agreement of May 4, 1994.
(c) Report on Policies of Arab States.--Not more than 30
days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
State shall prepare and submit to the Congress a report
concerning the policies of Arab states toward the Middle East
peace process, including progress toward--
(1) public recognition of Israel's right to exist in
peace and security;
(2) ending the Arab economic boycott of Israel; and
(3) ending efforts to expel Israel from international
organizations or denying participation in the
activities of such organizations.
d. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987
Title X of Public Law 100-204 [Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989; H.R. 1777], 101 Stat. 1406, approved
December 22, 1987
AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 for
the Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency, the Voice of
America, the Board for International Broadcasting, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
* * * * * * *
TITLE X--ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 1987
SEC. 1001. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Anti-Terrorism Act of
1987''.
SEC. 1002.\1\ FINDINGS; DETERMINATIONS.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 22 U.S.C. 5201.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Middle East terrorism accounted for 60 percent of
total international terrorism in 1985;
(2) the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereafter
in this title referred to as the ``PLO'') was directly
responsible for the murder of an American citizen on
the Achille Lauro cruise liner in 1985, and a member of
the PLO's Executive Committee is under indictment in
the United States for the murder of that American
citizen;
(3) the head of the PLO has been implicated in the
murder of a United States Ambassador overseas;
(4) the PLO and its constituent groups have taken
credit for, and been implicated in, the murders of
dozens of American citizens abroad;
(5) the PLO covenant specifically states that ``armed
struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine, thus it
is an overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase'';
(6) the PLO rededicated itself to the ``continuing
struggle in all its armed forms'' at the Palestine
National Council meeting in April 1987; and
(7) the Attorney General has stated that ``various
elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization and
its allies and affiliates are in the thick of
international terror''.
(b) Determinations.--Therefore, the Congress determines that
the PLO and its affiliates are a terrorist organization and a
threat to the interests of the United States, its allies, and
to international law and should not benefit from operating in
the United States.
SEC. 1003.\2\ PROHIBITIONS REGARDING THE PLO.
It shall be unlawful, if the purpose be to further the
interests of the Palestine Liberation Organization or any of
its constituent groups, any successor to any of those, or any
agents thereof, on or after the effective date of this title--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 22 U.S.C. 5202. In a memorandum for the Secretary of State,
issued on January 14, 1994, the President, pursuant to the authority
stated in the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1993 (Public Law
103-125):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``(A) certif[ied] that it is in the national interest to
suspend the application of the following provisions of law
until July 1, 1994:
``(1) Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2227), as it applies with respect to
the Palestine Liberation Organization or entities
associated with it;
``(2) Section 114 of the Department of State
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (22
U.S.C. 287e note), as it applies with respect to the
Palestine Liberation Organization or entities
associated with it;
``(3) Section 1003 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22
U.S.C. 5202); and
``(4) Section 37 of the Bretton Woods Agreement [sic]
Act (22 U.S.C. 286w), as it applies to the granting of
the Palestine Liberation Organization of observer
status or other official status at any meeting
sponsored by or associated with the International
Monetary Fund.
``(B) certif[ied] that the Palestine Liberation Organization
continues to abide by its commitments: in its letter of
September 9, 1993, to the Prime Minister of Israel; in its
letter of September 9, 1993, to the Foreign Minister of Norway;
and in, and resulting from the implementation of the
Declaration of Principles on interim self-government
arrangements signed on September 13, 1993.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``II. Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 516 of the
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, Public Law 103-87, I hereby determine that the
suspension of section 516(a) of that Act with respect to the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO), programs for the PLO, and programs for
the benefit of entities associated with it, which accept the
commitments made by the PLO on September 9, 1993, is in the national
interest.'' (Presidential Determination No. 94-13 of January 14, 1994;
59 F.R. 4777).
This certification was extended in Presidential Determination No.
94-30 of June 30, 1994 (59 F.R. 35607); Presidential Determination No.
95-12 of December 31, 1994 (60 F.R. 2673); Presidential Determination
No. 95-31 of July 2, 1995 (60 F.R. 35827); Presidential Determination
No. 95-36 of August 14, 1995 (60 F.R. 44725); Presidential
Determination No. 95-50 of September 30, 1995 (60 F.R. 53093;
Presidential Determination No. 96-5 of November 13, 1995 (60 F.R.
57821); Presidential Determination No. 96-8 of January 4, 1996 (61 F.R.
2889); Presidential Determination No. 96-20 of April 1, 1996 (61 F.R.
26019); Presidential Determination No. 96-32 of June 14, 1996 (61 F.R.
32629); Presidential Determination No. 96-41 of August 12, 1996 (61
F.R. 43137); andPresidential Determination No. 97-17 of February 21,
1997 (62 F.R. 9903).
This most recent determination extends the suspension through
August 12, 1997.
Sec. 583(c) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 490), authorized the
suspension of provisions in this section when certain conditions were
met. See particularly sec. 583(a) of that Act.
Pursuant to the authority vested in the President under section
540(d) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-277), the provisions
of sec. 1003 of this Act were waived until October 21, 1999 in
Presidential Determination No. 99-25 of May 24, 1999 (64 F.R. 29537).
The provisions of this section were previously waived in Presidential
Determination No. 99-5 of November 25, 1998 (63 F.R. 68145);
Presidential Determination No. 98-29 of June 3, 1998 (63 F.R. 32711);
and in Presidential Determination No. 98-8 of December 5, 1997 (64 F.R.
29537).
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(1) to receive anything of value except informational
material from the PLO or any of its constituent groups,
any successor thereto, or any agents thereof;
(2) to expend funds from the PLO or any of its
constituent groups, any successor thereto, or any
agents thereof; or
(3) notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, to establish or maintain an office,
headquarters, premises, or other facilities or
establishments within the jurisdiction of the United
States at the behest or direction of, or with funds
provided by the Palestine Liberation Organization or
any of its constituent groups, any successor to any of
those, or any agents thereof.
SEC. 1004.\3\ ENFORCEMENT.
(a) Attorney General.--The Attorney General shall take the
necessary steps and institute the necessary legal action to
effectuate the policies and provisions of this title.
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\3\ 22 U.S.C. 5203.
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(b) Relief.--Any district court of the United States for a
district in which a violation of this title occurs shall have
authority, upon petition of relief by the Attorney General, to
grant injunctive and such other equitable relief as it shall
deem necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
SEC. 1005. EFFECTIVE DATE.
(a) Effective Date.--Provisions of this title shall take
effect 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act.
(b) Termination.--The provisions of this title shall cease to
have effect if the President certifies in writing to the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House that the Palestine Liberation Organization, its agents,
or constituent groups thereof no longer practice or support
terrorist actions anywhere in the world.
3. National Emergencies Act, as amended
Public Law 94-412 [H.R. 3884], 90 Stat. 1255, approved September 14,
1976; Public Law 95-223 [International Emergency Economic Powers Act,
H.R. 7738], 91 Stat. 1625, approved December 28, 1977; and by Public
Law 99-93 [Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and
1987; H.R. 2068], 99 Stat. 448, approved August 16, 1985
AN ACT To terminate certain authorities with respect to national
emergencies still in effect, and to provide for orderly implementation
and termination of future national emergencies.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this
Act may be cited as the ``National Emergencies Act''.
TITLE I--TERMINATING EXISTING DECLARED EMERGENCIES
Sec. 101.\1\ (a) All powers and authorities possessed by
the President, any other officer or employee of the Federal
Government, or any executive agency, as defined in section 105
of title 5, United States Code, as a result of the existence of
this Act are terminated two years from the date of such
enactment. Such termination shall not affect--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 50 U.S.C. 1601.
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(1) any action taken or proceeding pending not
finally concluded or determined on such date;
(2) any action or proceeding based on any act
committed prior to such date; or
(3) any rights or duties that matured or penalties
that were incurred prior to such date.
(b) For the purpose of this section, the words ``any
national emergency in effect'' means a general declaration of
emergency made by the President.
TITLE II--DECLARATIONS OF FUTURE NATIONAL EMERGENCIES
Sec. 201.\2\ (a) With respect to Acts of Congress
authorizing the exercise, during the period of a national
emergency, of any special or extraordinary power, the President
is authorized to declare such national emergency. Such
proclamation shall immediately be transmitted to the Congress
and published in the Federal Register.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 50 U.S.C. 1621.
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(b) Any provisions of law conferring powers and authorities
to be exercised during a national emergency shall be effective
and remain in effect (1) only when the President (in accordance
with subsection (a) of this section), specifically declares a
national emergency, and (2) only in accordance with this Act.
No law enacted after the date of enactment of this Act shall
supersede this title unless it does so in specific terms,
referring to this title, and declaring that the new law
supersedes the provisions of this title.
Sec. 202.\3\ (a) Any national emergency declared by the
President in accordance with this title shall terminate if--
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\3\ 50 U.S.C. 1622. References to a ``joint'' resolution instead of
a ``concurrent'' resolution in this section were added by sec. 801 of
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987
(Public Law 99-93; 99 Stat. 448).
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(1) there is enacted into law a joint resolution
terminating the emergency; or
(2) the President issues a proclamation terminating
the emergency.
Any national emergency declared by the President shall be
terminated on the date specified in any joint resolution
referred to in clause (1) or on the date specified in a
proclamation by the President terminating the emergency as
provided in clause (2) of this subsection, whichever date is
earlier, and any powers or authorities exercised by reason of
said emergency shall cease to be exercised after such specified
date, except that such termination shall not affect--
(A) any action taken or proceeding pending not
finally concluded or determined on such date;
(B) any action or proceeding based on any act
committed prior to such date; or
(C) any rights or duties that matured or penalties
that were incurred prior to such date.
(b) Not later than six months after a national emergency is
declared, and not later than the end of each six-month period
thereafter that such emergency continues, each House of
Congress shall meet to consider a vote on a joint resolution to
determine whether that emergency shall be terminated.
(c)(1) A joint resolution to terminate a national emergency
declared by the President shall be referred to the appropriate
committee of the House of Representatives or the Senate, as the
case may be. One such joint resolution shall be reported out by
such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen
calendar days after the day on which such resolution is
referred to such committee, unless such House shall otherwise
determine by the yeas and nays.
(2) Any joint resolution so reported shall become the
pending business of the House in question (in the case of the
Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the
proponents and the opponents) and shall be voted on within
three calendar days after the day on which such resolution is
reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas
and nays.
(3) Such a joint resolution passed by one House shall be
referred to the appropriate committee of the other House and
shall be reported out by such committee together with its
recommendations within fifteen calendar days after the day on
which such resolution is referred to such committee and shall
thereupon become the pending business of such House and shall
be voted upon within three calendar days after the day on which
such resolution is reported, unless such House shall otherwise
determine by yeas and nays.
(4) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses
of Congress with respect to a joint resolution passed by both
Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee
of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such
joint resolution within six calendar days after the day on
which managers on the part of the Senate and the House have
been appointed. Notwithstanding any rule in either House
concerning the printing of conference reports or concerning any
delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall
be acted on by both Houses not later than six calendar days
after the conference report is filed in the House in which such
report is filed first. In the event the conferees are unable to
agree within forty-eight hours, they shall report back to their
respective houses in disagreement.
(5) Paragraphs (1)-(4) of this subsection, subsection (b)
of this section, and section 502(b) of this Act are enacted by
Congress--
(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively,
and as such they are deemed a part of the rules of each
House, respectively, but applicable only with respect
to the procedure to be followed in the House in the
case of resolutions described by this subsection; and
they supersede other rules only to the extent that they
are inconsistent therewith; with
(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right
of either House to change the rules (so far as relating
to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the
same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of
any other rule of that House.
(d) Any national emergency declared by the President in
accordance with this title, and not otherwise previously
terminated, shall terminate on the anniversary of the
declaration of that emergency if, within the ninety-day period
prior to each anniversary date, the President does not publish
in the Federal Register and transmit to the Congress a notice
stating that such emergency is to continue in effect after such
anniversary.
TITLE III--EXERCISE OF EMERGENCY POWERS AND AUTHORITIES
Sec. 301.\4\ When the President declares a national
emergency, no powers or authorities made available by statute
for use in the event of an emergency shall be exercised unless
and until the President specifies the provisions of law under
which he proposes that he, or other officers will act. Such
specification may be made either in the declaration of a
national emergency, or by one or more contemporaneous or
subsequent Executive orders published in the Federal Register
and transmitted to the Congress.
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\4\ 50 U.S.C. 1631.
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TITLE IV--ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT
Sec. 401.\5\ (a) When the President declares a national
emergency, or Congress declares war, the President shall be
responsible for maintaining a file and index of all significant
orders of the President, including Executive orders and
proclamations, and each Executive agency shall maintain a file
and index of all rules and regulations, issued during such
emergency or war issued pursuant to such declarations.
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\5\ 50 U.S.C. 1641.
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(b) All such significant orders of the President, including
Executive orders, and such rules and regulations shall be
transmitted to the Congress promptly under means to assure
confidentiality where appropriate.
(c) When the President declares a national emergency or
Congress declares war, the President shall transmit to
Congress, within ninety days after the end of each six-month
period after such declarations, a report on the total
expenditures incurred by the United States Government during
such six-month period which are directly attributable to the
exercise of powers and authorities conferred by such
declaration. Not later than ninety days after the termination
of each such emergency or war, the President shall transmit a
final report on all such expenditures.
TITLE V--REPEAL AND CONTINUATION OF CERTAIN EMERGENCY POWER AND OTHER
STATUTES
Sec. 501. (a) Section 349(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 148(a)) is amended--
(1) at the end of paragraph (9), by striking out ``;
or'' and inserting in lieu thereof a period; and
(2) by striking out paragraph (10).
(b) Section 2667(b) of title 10 of the United States Code
is amended--
(1) by inserting ``and'' at the end of paragraph (3);
(2) by striking out paragraph (4); and
(3) by redesignating paragraph (5) and (4).
(c) The joint resolution entitled ``Joint resolution to
authorize the temporary continuation of regulation of consumer
credit'', approved August 8, 1947 (12 U.S.C. 249), is repealed.
(d) Section 5(m) of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of
1933 as amended (16 U.S.C. 831d(m)) is repealed.
(e) Section 1383 of title 18, United States Code, is
repealed.
(f) Section 6 of the Act entitled ``An Act to amend the
Public Health Service Act is regard to certain matters of
personnel and administration, and for other purposes'',
approved February 28, 1948, is amended by striking out
subsections (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) (42 U.S.C. 211b).
(g) Section 9 of the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 (50
U.S.C. App. 1742) is repealed.
(h) This section shall not affect--
(1) any action taken or proceeding pending not
finally concluded or determined at the time of repeal;
(2) any action or proceeding based on any act
committed prior to repeal; or
(3) any rights or duties that matured or penalties
that were incurred prior to repeal;
Sec. 502.\6\ (a) The provisions of this Act shall not apply
to the following provisions of law, the powers and authorities
conferred thereby, and actions taken thereunder:
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\6\ 50 U.S.C. 1651.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) * * * [Repealed--1977] \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Paragraph (1), which contained a reference to sec. 5(b) of the
Trading With the Enemy Act, was repealed by sec. 101(d) of Public Law
95-223 (91 Stat. 1625).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Act of April 28, 1942 (40 U.S.C. 278b);
(3) Act of June 30, 1949 (41 U.S.C. 252);
(4) Section 3477 of the Revised Statutes, as amended
(31 U.S.C. 203);
(5) Section 3737 of the Revised Statutes, as amended
(41 U.S.C. 15);
(6) Public Law 85-804 (Act of Aug. 28, 1958, 72 Stat.
972; 50 U.S.C. 1431-1435);
(7) Section 2304(a)(1) of title 10, United States
Code;
(8) Section 3313, 6386(c), and 8313 of title 10,
United States Code.
(b) Each committee of the House of Representatives and the
Senate having jurisdiction with respect to any provision of law
referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall make a
complete study and investigation concerning that provision of
law and make a report, including any recommendations and
proposed revisions such committee may have, to its respective
House of Congress within two hundred and seventy days after the
date of enactment of this Act.
4. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998.
Partial text of Division I of Public Law 105-277 [Omnibus Consolidated
and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999;
H.R. 4328], 112 Stat. 2681-856 at 872, approved October 21, 1998
DIVISION I--CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
SECTION 1. \1\ SHORT TITLE.
This Division may be cited as the ``Chemical Weapons
Convention Implementation Act of 1998''.
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\1\ 22 USC 6701 note.
* * * * * * *
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TITLE III--INSPECTIONS
* * * * * * *
SEC. 303. \2\ AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT INSPECTIONS.
(a) Prohibition.--* * *
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\2\ 22 USC 6723.
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(b) Authority.--
(1) Technical secretariat inspection teams.--* * *
(2) United states government representatives.--* * *
(3) Objections to individuals serving as
inspectors.--
(A) In general.--In deciding whether to
exercise the right of the United States under
the Convention to object to an individual
serving as an inspector, the President shall
give great weight to his reasonable belief
that--
(i) such individual is or has been a
member of, or a participant in, any
group or organization that has engaged
in, or attempted or conspired to engage
in, or aided or abetted in the
commission of, any terrorist act or
activity;
(ii) such individual has committed
any act or activity which would be a
felony under the laws of the United
States; or
(iii) the participation of such
individual as a member of an inspection
team would pose a risk to the national
security or economic well-being of the
United States. * * *
=======================================================================
H. EXECUTIVE ORDERS
CONTENTS
Page
1. Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with the
Taliban (Executive Order 13129, July 4, 1999)................ 401
2. Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting
Transactions with Sudan (Executive Order 13067, November 3,
1997)........................................................ 404
3. Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Iran
(Executive Order 13059, August 19, 1997)..................... 406
4. Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Iran
(Executive Order 12959, May 6, 1995)......................... 410
5. Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the
Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources (Executive Order
12957, March 15, 1995)....................................... 412
6. Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to
Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process (Executive Order 12947,
January 24, 1995)............................................ 413
7. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Executive Order
12938, November 14, 1994).................................... 416
8. Continuation of Export Control Regulations (Executive Order
12924, August 19, 1994)...................................... 421
9. Barring Overflight, Takeoff, and Landing of Aircraft, Flying
to or from Libya (Executive Order 12801, April 15, 1992)..... 423
10. Victims of Terrorism Compensation (Executive Order 12598,
June 17, 1987)............................................... 425
11. Blocking Libyan Government Property in the United States or
Held by U.S. Persons (Executive Order 12544, January 8, 1986) 426
12. Prohibiting Trade and Certain Transactions Involving Libya
(Executive Order 12543, January 7, 1986)..................... 427
13. Imports of Refined Petroleum Products from Libya (Executive
Order 12538, November 15, 1985).............................. 429
14. Revocation of Prohibitions Against Transactions Involving
Iran (Executive Order 12282, January 19, 1981)............... 430
15. Hostage Relief Act of 1980--Delegation of Authority
(Executive Order 12268, January 15, 1981).................... 431
16. Administration of the Export Administration Act of 1969, as
amended (Executive Order 12002, July 7, 1977)................ 432
=======================================================================
1. Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with the Taliban
Executive Order 13129, July 4, 1999, 64 F.R. 36759
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America,
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)(``IEEPA''), the National Emergencies Act
(50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United
States Code,
I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of
America, find that the actions and policies of the Taliban in
Afghanistan, in allowing territory under its control in
Afghanistan to be used as a safe haven and base of operations
for Usama bin Ladin and the Al-Qaida organization who have
committed and threaten to continue to commit acts of violence
against the United States and its nationals, constitute an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and
foreign policy of the United States, and hereby declare a
national emergency to deal with that threat.
I hereby order:
Section 1. Except to the extent provided in section 203(b)
of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in regulations, orders,
directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this
order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any
license or permit granted prior to the effective date:
(a) all property and interests in property of the Taliban;
and
(b) all property and interests in property of persons
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General:
(i) to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on
behalf of, the Taliban; or
(ii) to provide financial, material, or technological
support for, or services in support of, any of the foregoing,
that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the
United States, or that are or hereafter come within the
possession or control of United States persons, are blocked.
Sec. 2. Except to the extent provided in section 203(b) of
IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in regulations, orders,
directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this
order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any
license or permit granted prior to the effective date:
(a) any transaction or dealing by United States persons or
within the United States in property or interests in property
blocked pursuant to this order is prohibited, including the
making or receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or
services to or for the benefit of the Taliban or persons
designated pursuant to this order;
(b) the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply,
directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United
States person, wherever located, of any goods, software,
technology (including technical data), or services to the
territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban or to the
Taliban or persons designated pursuant to this order is
prohibited;
(c) the importation into the United States of any goods,
software, technology, or services owned or controlled by the
Taliban or persons designated pursuant to this order or from
the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban is
prohibited;
(d) any transaction by any United States person or within
the United States that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of
evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the
prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited; and
(e) any conspiracy formed to violate any of the
prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.
Sec. 3. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with
the Secretary of State, is hereby directed to authorize
commercial sales of agricultural commodities and products,
medicine, and medical equipment for civilian end use in the
territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban under
appropriate safeguards to prevent diversion to military,
paramilitary, or terrorist end users or end use or to political
end use.
Sec. 4. For the purposes of this order:
(a) the term ``person'' means an individual or entity;
(b) the term ``entity'' means a partnership, association,
corporation, or other organization, group, or subgroup;
(c) the term ``the Taliban'' means the political/military
entity headquartered in Kandahar, Afghanistan that as of the
date of this order exercises de facto control over the
territory of Afghanistan described in paragraph (d) of this
section, its agencies and instrumentalities, and the Taliban
leaders listed in the Annex to this order or designated by the
Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Attorney General. The Taliban is also known as
the ``Taleban,'' ``Islamic Movement of Taliban,'' ``the Taliban
Islamic Movement,'' ``Talibano Islami Tahrik,'' and ``Tahrike
Islami'a Taliban";
(d) the term ``territory of Afghanistan controlled by the
Taliban'' means the territory referred to as the ``Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan,'' known in Pashtun as ``de Afghanistan
Islami Emarat'' or in Dari as ``Emarat Islami-e Afghanistan,''
including the following provinces of the country of
Afghanistan: Kandahar, Farah, Helmund, Nimruz, Herat, Badghis,
Ghowr, Oruzghon, Zabol, Paktiha, Ghazni, Nangarhar, Lowgar,
Vardan, Faryab, Jowlan, Balkh, and Paktika. The Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, is
hereby authorized to modify the description of the term
``territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban";
(e) the term ``United States person'' means any United
States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized
under the laws of the United States (including foreign
branches), or any person in the United States.
Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with
the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, is hereby
authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of
rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to me
by IEEPA as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this
order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of
these functions to other officers and agencies of the United
States Government. All agencies of the United States Government
are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within
their authority to carry out the provisions of this order.
Sec. 6. Nothing contained in this order shall create any
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any
party against the United States, its agencies or
instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other
person.
Sec. 7. (a) This order is effective at 12:01 a.m. Eastern
Daylight Time on July 6, 1999.
(b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and
published in the Federal Register.
2. Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions
With Sudan
Executive Order 13067, November 3, 1997, 62 F.R. 59989
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America,
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States
Code;
I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of
America, find that the policies and actions of the Government
of Sudan, including continued support for international
terrorism; ongoing efforts to destabilize neighboring
governments; and the prevalence of human rights violations,
including slavery and the denial of religious freedom,
constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national
security and foreign policy of the United States, and hereby
declare a national emergency to deal with that threat. I hereby
order:
Section 1. Except to the extent provided in section 203(b)
of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in regulations, orders,
directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this
order, all property and interests in property of the Government
of Sudan that are in the United States, that hereafter come
within the United States, or that hereafter come within the
possession or control of United States persons, including their
overseas branches, are blocked.
Sec. 2. The following are prohibited, except to the extent
provided in section 203(b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in
regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued
pursuant to this order:
(a) the importation into the United States of any goods or
services of Sudanese origin, other than information or
informational materials;
(b) the exportation or reexportation, directly or
indirectly, to Sudan of any goods, technology (including
technical data, software, or other information), or services
from the United States or by a United States person, wherever
located, or requiring the issuance of a license by a Federal
agency, except for donations of articles intended to relieve
human suffering, such as food, clothing, and medicine;
(c) the facilitation by a United States person, including
but not limited to brokering activities, of the exportation or
reexportation of goods, technology, or services from Sudan to
any destination, or to Sudan from any location;
(d) the performance by any United States person of any
contract, including a financing contract, in support of an
industrial, commercial, public utility, or governmental project
in Sudan;
(e) the grant or extension of credits or loans by any
United States person to the Government of Sudan;
(f) any transaction by a United States person relating to
transportation of cargo to or from Sudan; the provision of
transportation of cargo to or from the United States by any
Sudanese person or any vessel or aircraft of Sudanese
registration; or the sale in the United States by any person
holding authority under subtitle 7 of title 49, United States
Code, of any transportation of cargo by air that includes any
stop in Sudan; and
(g) any transaction by any United States person or within
the United States that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of
evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the
prohibitions set forth in this order.
Sec. 3. Nothing in this order shall prohibit:
(a) transactions for the conduct of the official business
of the Federal Government or the United Nations by employees
thereof; or
(b) transactions in Sudan for journalistic activity by
persons regularly employed in such capacity by a news-gathering
organization.
Sec. 4. For the purposes of this order:
(a) the term ``person'' means an individual or entity;
(b) the term ``entity'' means a partnership, association,
trust, joint venture, corporation, or other organization;
(c) the term ``United States person'' means any United
States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized
under the laws of the United States (including foreign
branches), or any person in the United States; and
(d) the term ``Government of Sudan'' includes the
Government of Sudan, its agencies, instrumentalities and
controlled entities, and the Central Bank of Sudan.
Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with
the Secretary of State and, as appropriate, other agencies, is
hereby authorized to take such actions, including the
promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers
granted to me by IEEPA, as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may
redelegate any of these functions to other officers and
agencies of the United States Government. All agencies of the
United States Government are hereby directed to take all
appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the
provisions of this order.
Sec. 6. Nothing contained in this order shall create any
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any
party against the United States, its agencies or
instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other
person.
Sec. 7. (a) This order shall take effect at 12:01 a.m.
eastern standard time on November 4, 1997, except that trade
transactions under contracts in force as of the effective date
of this order may be performed pursuant to their terms through
12:01 a.m. eastern standard time on December 4, 1997, and
letters of credit and other financing agreements for such
underlying trade transactions may be performed pursuant to
their terms.
(b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and
published in the Federal Register.
3. Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Iran
Executive Order 13059, August 19, 1997, 62 F.R. 44531
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America,
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (``IEEPA''), the National Emergencies Act
(50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 505 of the International
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C.
2349aa-9) (``ISDCA''), and section 301 of title 3, United
States Code,
I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of
America, in order to clarify the steps taken in Executive
Orders 12957 of March 15, 1995, and 12959 of May 6, 1995, to
deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States
declared in Executive Order 12957 in response to the actions
and policies of the Government of Iran, hereby order:
Section 1. Except to the extent provided in section 3 of
this order or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses
issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract
entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order, the importation into the United
States of any goods or services of Iranian origin or owned or
controlled by the Government of Iran, other than information or
informational materials within the meaning of section 203(b)(3)
of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3)), is hereby prohibited.
Sec. 2. Except to the extent provided in section 3 of this
order, in section 203(b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)), or in
regulations, orders, directives, or licenses issued pursuant to
this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or
any license or permit granted prior to the effective date of
this order, the following are prohibited:
(a) the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply,
directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United
States person, wherever located, of any goods, technology, or
services to Iran or the Government of Iran, including the
exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply of any goods,
technology, or services to a person in a third country
undertaken with knowledge or reason to know that:
(i) such goods, technology, or services are intended
specifically for supply, transshipment, or
reexportation, directly or indirectly, to Iran or the
Government of Iran; or
(ii) such goods, technology, or services are intended
specifically for use in the production of, for
commingling with, or for incorporation into goods,
technology, or services to be directly or indirectly
supplied, transshipped, or reexported exclusively or
predominantly to Iran or the Government of Iran;
(b) the reexportation from a third country, directly or
indirectly, by a person other than a United States person of
any goods, technology, or services that have been exported from
the United States, if:
(i) undertaken with knowledge or reason to know that
the reexportation is intended specifically for Iran or
the Government of Iran, and
(ii) the exportation of such goods, technology, or
services to Iran from the United States was subject to
export license application requirements under any
United States regulations in effect on May 6, 1995, or
thereafter is made subject to such requirements imposed
independently of the actions taken pursuant to the
national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957;
provided, however, that this prohibition shall not
apply to those goods or that technology subject to
export license application requirements if such goods
or technology have been:
(A) substantially transformed into a foreign-
made product outside the United States; or
(B) incorporated into a foreign-made product
outside the United States if the aggregate
value of such controlled United States goods
and technology constitutes less than 10 percent
of the total value of the foreign-made product
to be exported from a third country;
(c) any new investment by a United States person in Iran or
in property, including entities, owned or controlled by the
Government of Iran;
(d) any transaction or dealing by a United States person,
wherever located, including purchasing, selling, transporting,
swapping, brokering, approving, financing, facilitating, or
guaranteeing, in or related to:
(i) goods or services of Iranian origin or owned or
controlled by the Government of Iran; or
(ii) goods, technology, or services for exportation,
reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly,
to Iran or the Government of Iran;
(e) any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by
a United States person, wherever located, of a transaction by a
foreign person where the transaction by that foreign person
would be prohibited by this order if performed by a United
States person or within the United States; and
(f) any transaction by a United States person or within the
United States that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of
evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the
prohibitions set forth in this order.
Sec. 3. Specific licenses issued pursuant to Executive
Orders 12613 (of October 29, 1987), 12957, or 12959 continue in
effect in accordance with their terms except to the extent
revoked, amended, or modified by the Secretary of the Treasury.
General licenses, regulations, orders, and directives issued
pursuant to those orders continue in effect in accordance with
their terms except to the extent inconsistent with this order
or to the extent revoked, amended, or modified by the Secretary
of the Treasury.
Sec. 4. For the purposes of this order:
(a) the term ``person'' means an individual or entity;
(b) the term ``entity'' means a partnership, association,
trust, joint venture, corporation, or other organization;
(c) the term ``United States person'' means any United
States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized
under the laws of the United States (including foreign
branches), or any person in the United States;
(d) the term ``Iran'' means the territory of Iran and any
other territory or marine area, including the exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf, over which the Government
of Iran claims sovereignty, sovereign rights, or jurisdiction,
provided that the Government of Iran exercises partial or total
de facto control over the area or derives a benefit from
economic activity in the area pursuant to international
arrangements;
(e) the term ``Government of Iran'' includes the Government
of Iran, any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, and any person owned or controlled by, or acting for
or on behalf of, the Government of Iran;
(f) the term ``new investment'' means:
(i) a commitment or contribution of funds or other
assets; or
(ii) a loan or other extension of credit, made after
the effective date of Executive Order 12957 as to
transactions prohibited by that order, or otherwise
made after the effective date of Executive Order 12959.
Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with
the Secretary of State and, as appropriate, other agencies, is
hereby authorized to take such actions, including the
promulgation of rules and regulations, the requirement of
reports, including reports by United States persons on oil and
related transactions engaged in by their foreign affiliates
with Iran or the Government of Iran, and to employ all powers
granted to me by IEEPA and the ISDCA as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the
Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other
officers and agencies of the United States Government. All
agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed to
take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry
out the provisions of this order.
Sec. 6. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury may authorize the
exportation or reexportation to Iran or the Government of Iran
of any goods, technology, or services also subject to export
license application requirements of another agency of the
United States Government only if authorization by that agency
of the exportation or reexportation to Iran would be permitted
by law.
(b) Nothing contained in this order shall be construed to
supersede the requirements established under any other
provision of law or to relieve a person from any requirement to
obtain a license or other authorization from another department
or agency of the United States Government in compliance with
applicable laws and regulations subject to the jurisdiction of
that department or agency.
Sec. 7. The provisions of this order consolidate the
provisions of Executive Orders 12613, 12957, and 12959.
Executive Order 12613 and subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), and
(f) of section 1 of Executive Order 12959 are hereby revoked
with respect to transactions occurring after the effective date
of this order. The revocation of those provisions shall not
alter their applicability to any transaction or violation
occurring before the effective date of this order, nor shall it
affect the applicability of any rule, regulation, order,
license, or other form of administrative action previously
taken pursuant to Executive Orders 12613 or 12959.
Sec. 8. Nothing contained in this order shall create any
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any
party against the United States, its agencies or
instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other
person.
Sec. 9. The measures taken pursuant to this order are in
response to actions of the Government of Iran occurring after
the conclusion of the 1981 Algiers Accords, and are intended
solely as a response to those later actions.
Sec. 10. (a) This order is effective at 12:01 a.m. eastern
daylight time on August 20, 1997.
(b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and
published in the Federal Register.
4. Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect To Iran
Executive Order 12959, May 8, 1995, 60 F.R. 24757; as amended by
Executive Order 13059, August 19, 1997, 62 F.R. 44531
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America,
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (Ieepa), the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 505 of the International Security
and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9)
(Isdca), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,
I, William J. Clinton, President of the United States of
America, in order to take steps with respect to Iran in
addition to those set forth in Executive Order No. 12957 of
March 15, 1995, to deal with the unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of
the United States referred to in that order, hereby order:
Section 1. The following are prohibited, except to the
extent provided in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses
that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted
prior to the effective date of this order:
Subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), and (f) of section 1 were
revoked by E.O. 13059 of August 19, 1997.
(e) any new investment by a United States person in Iran or
in property (including entities) owned or controlled by the
Government of Iran; and,
(g) any transaction by any United States person or within
the United States that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of
evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the
prohibitions set forth in this order.
Sec. 2. For the purposes of this order:
(a) the term ``person'' means an individual or entity;
(b) the term ``entity'' means a partnership, association,
trust, joint venture, corporation, or other organization;
(c) the term ``United States person'' means any United
States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized
under the laws of the United States (including foreign
branches), or any person in the United States;
(d) the term ``Iran'' means the territory of Iran and any
other territory or marine area, including the exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf, over which the Government
of Iran claims sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction,
provided that the Government of Iran exercises partial or total
de facto control over the area or derives a benefit from
economic activity in the area pursuant to international
arrangements; and
(e) the term ``new investment'' means (i) a commitment or
contribution of funds or other assets, or (ii) a loan or other
extension of credit.
Sec. 3. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with
the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such
actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations,
the requirement of reports, including reports by United States
persons on oil transactions engaged in by their foreign
affiliates with Iran or the Government of Iran, and to employ
all powers granted to the President by Ieepa and Isdca as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The
Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions
to other officers and agencies of the United States Government.
All agencies of the United States Government are hereby
directed to take all appropriate measures within their
authority to carry out the provisions of this order.
Sec. 4. The Secretary of the Treasury may not authorize the
exportation or reexportation to Iran, the Government of Iran,
or an entity owned or controlled by the Government of Iran of
any goods, technology, or services subject to export license
application requirements of another agency of the United States
Government, if authorization of the exportation or
reexportation by that agency would be prohibited by law.
Sec. 5. Sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 12613 of
October 29, 1987, and sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No.
12957 of March 15, 1995, are hereby revoked to the extent
inconsistent with this order. Otherwise, the provisions of this
order supplement the provisions of Executive Orders No. 12613
and 12957.
Sec. 6. Nothing contained in this order shall create any
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any
party against the United States, its agencies or instrumen-
talities, its officers or employees, or any other person.
Sec. 7. The measures taken pursuant to this order are in
response to actions of the Government of Iran occurring after
the conclusion of the 1981 Algiers Accords, and are intended
solely as a response to those later actions.
Sec. 8. (a) This order is effective at 12:01 a.m., eastern
daylight time, on May 7, 1995, except that (i) section 1(b),
(c), and (d) of this order shall not apply until 12:01 a.m.,
eastern daylight time, on June 6, 1995, to trade transactions
under contracts in force as of the date of this order if such
transactions are authorized pursuant to Federal regulations in
force immediately prior to the date of this order (``existing
trade contracts''), and (ii) letters of credit and other
financing agreements with respect to existing trade contracts
may be performed pursuant to their terms with respect to
underlying trade transactions occurring prior to 12:01 a.m.,
eastern daylight time, on June 6, 1995.
(b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress.
5. Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the Development of
Iranian Petroleum Resources
Executive Order 12957, March 15, 1995, 60 F.R. 14615; as amended by
Executive Order 12959, May 6, 1995, 60 F.R. 24757
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America,
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,
I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of
America, find that the actions and policies of the Government
of Iran constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United
States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with
that threat.
I hereby order:
Sections 1 and 2 were revoked by E.O. 12959 of May 6, 1995,
sec. 5.
Sec. 3. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with
the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such
actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations,
and to employ all powers granted to me by the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act as may be necessary to carry out
the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may
redelegate any of these functions to other officers and
agencies of the United States Government. All agencies of the
United States Government are hereby directed to take all
appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the
provisions of this order.
Sec. 4. Nothing contained in this order shall create any
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any
party against the United States, its agencies or
instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other
person.
Sec. 5. (a) This order is effective at 12:01 a.m., eastern
standard time, on March 16, 1995.
(b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress.
6. Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the
Middle East Peace Process
Executive Order 12947, January 24, 1995, 60 F.R. 7059; as amended by
Executive Order 13099, August 20, 1998, 63 F.R. 45167
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America,
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (Ieepa), the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States
Code,
I, William J. Clinton, President of the United States of
America, find that grave acts of violence committed by foreign
terrorists that disrupt the Middle East peace process
constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and
hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.
I hereby order:
Section 1. Except to the extent provided in section
203(b)(3) and (4) of Ieepa (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3) and (4)) and
in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be
issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract
entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date:
(a) all property and interests in property of:
(i) the persons listed in the Annex to this order;
(ii) foreign persons designated by the Secretary of
State, in coordination with the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Attorney General, because they are
found:
(A) to have committed, or to pose a
significant risk of committing, acts of
violence that have the purpose or effect of
disrupting the Middle East peace process, or
(B) to assist in, sponsor, or provide
financial, material, or technological support
for, or services in support of, such acts of
violence; and
(iii) persons determined by the Secretary of the
Treasury, in coordination with the Secretary of State
and the Attorney General, to be owned or controlled by,
or to act for or on behalf of, any of the foregoing
persons, that are in the United States, that hereafter
come within the United States, or that hereafter come
within the possession or control of United States
persons, are blocked;
(b) any transaction or dealing by United States persons or
within the United States in property or interests in property
of the persons designated in or pursuant to this order is
prohibited, including the making or receiving of any
contribution of funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit
of such persons;
(c) any transaction by any United States person or within
the United States that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of
evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the
prohibitions set forth in this order, is prohibited.
Sec. 2. For the purposes of this order:
(a) the term ``person'' means an individual or entity;
(b) the term ``entity'' means a partnership, association,
corporation, or other organization, group, or subgroup;
(c) the term ``United States person'' means any United
States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized
under the laws of the United States (including foreign
branches), or any person in the United States; and
(d) the term ``foreign person'' means any citizen or
national of a foreign state (including any such individual who
is also a citizen or national of the United States) or any
entity not organized solely under the laws of the United States
or existing solely in the United States, but does not include a
foreignstate.
Sec. 3. I hereby determine that the making of donations of
the type specified in section 203(b)(2)(A) of Ieepa (50 U.S.C.
1702(b)(2)(A)) by United States persons to persons designated
in or pursuant to this order would seriously impair my ability
to deal with the national emergency declared in this order, and
hereby prohibit such donations as provided by section 1 of this
order.
Sec. 4. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
with the Secretary of State and, as appropriate, the Attorney
General, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including
the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all
powers granted to me by Ieepa as may be necessary to carry out
the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may
redelegate any of these functions to other officers and
agencies of the United States Government. All agencies of the
United States Government are hereby directed to take all
appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the
provisions of this order.
(b) Any investigation emanating from a possible violation
of this order, or of any license, order, or regulation issued
pursuant to this order, shall first be coordinated with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (Fbi), and any matter involving
evidence of a criminal violation shall be referred to the Fbi
for further investigation. The Fbi shall timely notify the
Department of the Treasury of any action it takes on such
referrals.
Sec. 5. Nothing contained in this order shall create any
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any
party against the United States, its agencies or
instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other
person.
Sec. 6. (a) This order is effective at 12:01 a.m., eastern
standard time on January 24, 1995.
(b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress.
Annex
terrorists who threaten to disrupt the middle east peace process
Abu Hafs al-Masri
Abu Nidal Organization (Ano)
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Dflp)
Hizballah
Islamic Army (a.k.a. Al-Qaida, Islamic Salvation Foundation,
The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places,
The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and
Crusaders, and The Group for the Preservation of the
Holy Sites)
Islamic Gama'at (Ig)
Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)
Jihad
Kach
Kahane Chai
Palestinian Islamic Jihad-Shiqaqi faction (Pij)
Palestine Liberation Front-Abu Abbas faction (Plf-Abu Abbas)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Pflp)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
(Pflp-Gc)
Rifa'i Ahmad Taha Musa
Usama bin Muhammad bin Awad bin Ladin (a.k.a. Usama bin Ladin)
7. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Executive Order 12938, November 14, 1994, 59 F.R. 59099, 50 U.S.C. 1701
note; as amended by Executive Order 13094, July 28, 1998, 63 F.R.
40803; and by Executive Order 13128, June 25, 1999, 64 F.R. 34703
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America,
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1601 et seq.), the Arms Export Control Act, as amended (22
U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), Executive Orders Nos. 12851 and 12924,
and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,
I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of
America, find that the proliferation of nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass destruction'') and of
the means of delivering such weapons, constitutes an unusual
and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign
policy, and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a
national emergency to deal with that threat.\1\
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\1\ The President continued this national emergency in notice of
November 8, 1995 (60 F.R. 57137); in notice of November 12, 1996 (61
F.R. 58309); in notice of November 12, 1997 (62 F.R. 60993); and in
notice of November 12, 1998 (63 F.R. 63589).
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Accordingly, I hereby order:
Section 1. International Negotiations. It is the policy of
the United States to lead and seek multilaterally coordinated
efforts with other countries to control the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering such
weapons. Accordingly, the Secretary of State shall cooperate in
and lead multilateral efforts to stop the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
Sec. 2. Imposition of Controls. As provided herein, the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce shall use
their respective authorities, including the Arms Export Control
Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, to
control any exports, to the extent they are not already
controlled by the Department of Energy and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, that either Secretary determines would
assist a country in acquiring the capability to develop,
produce, stockpile, deliver, or use weapons of mass destruction
or their means of delivery. The Secretary of State shall pursue
early negotiations with foreign governments to adopt effective
measures comparable to those imposed under this order.
Sec. 3. Department of Commerce Controls. (a) The Secretary
of Commerce shall prohibit the export of any goods, technology,
or services subject to the Secretary's export jurisdiction that
the Secretary of Commerce determines, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other
appropriate officials, would assist a foreign country in
acquiring the capability to develop, produce, stockpile,
deliver, or use weapons of mass destruction or their means of
delivery. The Secretary of State shall pursue early
negotiations with foreign governments to adopt effective
measures comparable to those imposed under this section.
(b) Subsection (a) of this section will not apply to
exports relating to a particular category of weapons of mass
destruction (i.e., nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons) if
their destination is a country with whose government the United
States has entered into a bilateral or multilateral arrangement
for the control of that category of weapons of mass
destruction-related goods (including delivery systems) and
technology, or maintains domestic export controls comparable to
controls that are imposed by the United States with respect to
that category of goods and technology, or that are otherwise
deemed adequate by the Secretary of State.
(c) The Secretary of Commerce shall require validated
licenses to implement this order and shall coordinate any
license applications with the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Defense.
(d) The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, shall take such actions, including the
promulgation of rules, regulations, and amendments thereto, as
may be necessary to continue to regulate the activities of
United States persons in order to prevent their participation
in activities that could contribute to the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery, as
provided in the Export Administration Regulations, set forth in
Title 15, Chapter VII, Subchapter C, of the Code of Federal
Regulations, Parts 768 to 799 inclusive.
(e) \2\ The Secretary of Commerce shall impose and enforce
such restrictions on the importation of chemicals into the
United States as may be necessary to carry out the requirements
of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction.
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\2\ Subsection (e) was added by Executive Order 13128, June 25,
1999 (64 F.R. 34703).
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Sec. 4.\3\ Measures Against Foreign Persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Section 4 was revised by Executive Order 13094, July 28, 1998
(63 F.R. 40803).
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(a) Determination by Secretary of State; Imposition of
Measures. Except to the extent provided in section 203(b) of
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1702(b)), where applicable, if the Secretary of State
determines that a foreign person, on or after November 16,
1990, the effective date of Executive Order 12735, the
predecessor order to Executive Order 12938, has materially
contributed or attempted to contribute materially to the
efforts of any foreign country, project, or entity of
proliferation concern to use, acquire, design, develop,
produce, or stockpile weapons of mass destruction or missiles
capable of delivering such weapons, the measures set forth in
subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section shall be imposed
on that foreign person to the extent determined by the
Secretary of State in consultation with the implementing agency
and other relevant agencies. Nothing in this section is
intended to preclude the imposition on that foreign person of
other measures or sanctions available under this order or under
other authorities.
(b) Procurement Ban. No department or agency of the United
States Government may procure, or enter into any contract for
the procurement of, any goods, technology, or services from any
foreign person described in subsection (a) of this section.
(c) Assistance Ban. No department or agency of the United
States Government may provide any assistance to any foreign
person described in subsection (a) of this section, and no such
foreign person shall be eligible to participate in any
assistance program of the United States Government.
(d) Import Ban. The Secretary of the Treasury shall
prohibit the importation into the United States of goods,
technology, or services produced or provided by any foreign
person described in subsection (a) of this section, other than
information or informational materials within the meaning of
section 203(b)(3) of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3)).
(e) Termination. Measures pursuant to this section may be
terminated against a foreign person if the Secretary of State
determines that there is reliable evidence that such foreign
person has ceased all activities referred to in subsection (a)
of this section.
(f) Exceptions. Departments and agencies of the United
States Government, acting in consultation with the Secretary of
State, may, by license, regulation, order, directive,
exception, or otherwise, provide for:
(i) Procurement contracts necessary to meet U.S.
operational military requirements or requirements under
defense production agreements; intelligence
requirements; sole source suppliers, spare parts,
components, routine servicing and maintenance of
products for the United States Government; and medical
and humanitarian items; and
(ii) Performance pursuant to contracts in force on the
effective date of this order under appropriate
circumstances.''
Sec. 5. Sanctions Against Foreign Countries. (a) In
addition to the sanctions imposed on foreign countries as
provided in the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and
Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, sanctions also shall be
imposed on a foreign country as specified in subsection (b) of
this section, if the Secretary of State determines that the
foreign country has, on or after the effective date of this
order or its predecessor, Executive Order No. 12735 of November
16, 1990, (1) used chemical or biological weapons in violation
of international law; (2) made substantial preparations to use
chemical or biological weapons in violation of international
law; or (3) developed, produced, stockpiled, or otherwise
acquired chemical or biological weapons in violation of
international law.
(b) The following sanctions shall be imposed on any foreign
country identified in subsection (a)(1) of this section unless
the Secretary of State determines, on grounds of significant
foreign policy or national security, that any individual
sanction should not be applied. The sanctions specified in this
section may be made applicable to the countries identified in
subsections (a)(2) or (a)(3) when the Secretary of State
determines that such action will further the objectives of this
order pertaining to proliferation. The sanctions specified in
subsection (b)(2) below shall be imposed with the concurrence
of the Secretary of the Treasury.
(1) Foreign Assistance. No assistance shall be
provided to that country under the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, or any successor act, or the Arms Export
Control Act, other than assistance that is intended to
benefit the people of that country directly and that is
not channeled through governmental agencies or entities
of that country.
(2) Multilateral Development Bank Assistance. The
United States shall oppose any loan or financial or
technical assistance to that country by international
financial institutions in accordance with section 701
of the International Financial Institutions Act (22
U.S.C. 262d).
(3) Denial of Credit or Other Financial Assistance.
The United States shall deny to that country any credit
or financial assistance by any department, agency, or
instrumentality of the United States Government.
(4) Prohibition of Arms Sales. The United States
Government shall not, under the Arms Export Control
Act, sell to that country any defense articles or
defense services or issue any license for the export of
items on the United States Munitions List.
(5) Export of National Security-Sensitive Goods and
Technology. No exports shall be permitted of any goods
or technologies controlled for national security
reasons under the Export Administration Regulations.
(6) Further Export Restrictions. The Secretary of
Commerce shall prohibit or otherwise substantially
restrict exports to that country of goods, technology,
and services (excluding agricultural commodities and
products otherwise subject to control).
(7) Import Restrictions. Restrictions shall be
imposed on the importation into the United States of
articles (that may include petroleum or any petroleum
product) that are the growth, product, or manufacture
of that country.
(8) Landing Rights. At the earliest practicable date,
the Secretary of State shall terminate, in a manner
consistent with international law, the authority of any
air carrier that is controlled in fact by the
government of that country to engage in air
transportation (as defined in section 101(10) of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. App. 1301(10)).
Sec. 6. Duration. Any sanctions imposed pursuant to
sections 4 or 5 of this order shall remain in force until the
Secretary of State determines that lifting any sanction is in
the foreign policy or national security interests of the United
States or, as to sanctions under section 4 of this order, until
the Secretary has made the determination under section 4(e).
Sec. 7. Implementation. The Secretary of State, the
Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce are
hereby authorized and directed to take such actions, including
the promulgation of rules and regulations, as may be necessary
to carry out the purposes of this order. These actions, and in
particular those in sections 4 and 5 of this order, shall be
made in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and, as
appropriate, other agency heads and shall be implemented in
accordance with procedures established pursuant to Executive
Order No. 12851. The Secretary concerned may redelegate any of
these functions to other officers in agencies of the Federal
Government. All heads of departments and agencies of the United
States Government are directed to take all appropriate measures
within their authority to carry out the provisions of this
order, including the suspension or termination of licenses or
other authorizations.
Sec. 8. Preservation of Authorities. Nothing in this order
is intended to affect the continued effectiveness of any rules,
regulations, orders licenses, or other forms of administrative
action issued, taken, or continued in effect heretofore or
hereafter under the authority of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, the Export Administration Act, the Arms
Export Control Act, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act,
Executive Order No. 12730 of September 30, 1990, Executive
Order No. 12735 of November 16, 1990, Executive Order No. 12924
of August 18, 1994, and Executive Order No. 12930 of September
29, 1994.
Sec. 9. Judicial Review. This order is not intended to
create, nor does it create, any right or benefit, substantive
or procedural, enforceable at law by party against the United
States, its agencies, officers, or any other person.
Sec. 10. Revocation of Executive Orders Nos. 12735 and
12930. Executive Orders No. 12735 of November 16, 1990, and
Executive Order No. 12930 of September 29, 1994, are hereby
revoked.
Sec. 11. Effective Date. This order is effective
immediately.
This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and
published in the Federal Register.
8. Continuation of Export Control Regulations
Executive Order 12924,\1\ August 19, 1994, 59 F.R. 43437
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America,
including but not limited to section 203 of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (``Act'') (50 U.S.C. 1702), I,
WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of America,
find that the unrestricted access of foreign parties to U.S.
goods, technology, and technical data and the existence of
certain boycott practices of foreign nations, in light of the
expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended
(50 U.S.C. 2401 et seq.), constitute an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy,
and economy of the United States and hereby declare a national
emergency with respect to that threat.
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\1\ The Export Administration Act of 1979 expired on September 30,
1990. To continue export control regulations governed by the Act, the
President issued Executive Order 12730 (September 30, 1990; 55 F.R.
40373), which in turn was extended by a Presidential notice on
September 26, 1991 (56 F.R. 49385), and further extended on September
25, 1992 (57 F.R. 44649).
Sec. 2 of Public Law 103-10 (107 Stat. 40) renewed the authority of
the Act through June 30, 1994, effective March 27, 1993, and authorized
funds for fiscal years 1993 and 1994. Executive Order 12730
subsequently was rescinded by sec. 1 of Executive Order 12867 of
September 30, 1993 (58 F.R. 51747).
On the day the Act was once again set to expire, June 30, 1994, the
President issued Executive Order 12923 (59 F.R. 34551) to continue the
provisions of the Act and provisions for its for administration.
Subsequently, Public Law 103-277 (108 Stat. 1407; enacted July 5, 1994)
renewed the authority of the Export Administration Act through August
20, 1994. Near that expiration, the President issued Executive Order
12924 (August 19, 1994; 59 F.R. 43437) to continue the authorities in
the Act.
Executive Order 12924 has been continued beyond August 19, 1995, by
a notice of August 15, 1995 (60 F.R. 42767); beyond August 19, 1996, by
a notice of August 14, 1996 (61 F.R. 42527); and beyond August 19,
1997, by a notice of August 13, 1997 (62 F.R. 43629).
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Accordingly, in order (a) to exercise the necessary
vigilance over exports and activities affecting the national
security of the United States; (b) to further significantly the
foreign policy of the United States, including its policy with
respect to cooperation by U.S. persons with certain foreign
boycott activities, and to fulfill its international
responsibilities; and (c) to protect the domestic economy from
the excessive drain of scarce materials and reduce the serious
economic impact of foreign demand, it is hereby ordered as
follows:
Section 1. To the extent permitted by law, the provisions
of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, and the
provisions for administration of the Export Administration Act
of 1979, as amended, shall be carried out under this order so
as to continue in full force and effect and amend, as
necessary, the export control system heretofore maintained by
the Export Administration regulations issued under the Export
Administration Act of 1979, as amended. The delegations of
authority set forth in Executive Order No. 12002 of July 7,
1977, as amended, by Executive Order No. 12755 of March 12,
1991; Executive Order No. 12214 of May 2, 1980; Executive Order
No. 12735 of November 16, 1990; and Executive Order 12851 of
June 11, 1993, shall be incorporated in this order and shall
apply to the exercise of authorities under this order.
Sec. 2. All rules and regulations issued or continued in
effect by the Secretary of Commerce under the authority of the
Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, including those
published in Title 15, Subtitle B, Chapter VII, Subchapter C,
of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 768 to 799, and all
orders, regulations, licenses, and other forms of
administrative action issued, taken, or continued in effect
pursuant thereto, shall, until amended or revoked by the
Secretary of Commerce, remain in full force and effect as if
issued or taken pursuant to this order, except that the
provisions of sections 203(b)(2) and 206 of the Act (50 U.S.C.
1702(b)(2) and 1705) shall control over any inconsistent
provisions in the regulations. Nothing in this section shall
affect the continued applicability of administrative sanctions
provided for by the regulations described above.
Sec. 3. Provisions for administration of section 38(e) of
the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(e)) may be made and
shall continue in full force and effect until amended or
revoked under the authority of section 203 of the Act (50
U.S.C. 1702). To the extent permitted by law, this order also
shall constitute authority for the issuance and continuation in
full force and effect of all rules and regulations by the
President or his delegate, and all orders, licenses, and other
forms of administrative actions issued, taken, or continued in
effect pursuant thereto, relating to the administration of
section 38(e).
Sec. 4. Executive Order 12923 of June 30, 1994, is revoked,
and that declaration of emergency is rescinded. The revocation
of Executive Order No. 12923 shall not affect any violation of
any rules, regulations, orders, licenses, and other forms of
administrative action under that order that occurred during the
order was in effect.
Sec. 5. This order shall be effective as of midnight
between August 20, 1994 and August 21, 1994, and shall remain
in effect until terminated.
9. Barring Overflight, Takeoff, and Landing of Aircraft Flying To or
From Libya
Executive Order 12801, April 15, 1992, 57 F.R. 14319, 50 U.S.C. 1701
note
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America,
including the International Emergency Economic Power Act (50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1601 et seq.), section 1114 of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, as amended (49 U.S.C. App. 1514), section 5 of the United
Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c),
and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, in view
of United Nations Security Council Resolutions No. 731 of
January 21, 1992, and 748 of March 31, 1992,\1\ and in order to
take additional steps with respect to Libya's continued support
for international terrorism and the national emergency declared
in Executive Order No. 12543 of January 7, 1986, it is hereby
ordered that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 731 of January
21, 1992, in part, reaffirmed earlier resolutions calling for
international aviation security, condemned the downing of Pan Am flight
103 and UTA flight 772, and called on the Government of Libya to
provide full and effective responses toward the elimination of
international terrorism. United Nations Security Council Resolution No.
748 of March 31, 1992, in part, reaffirmed Resolution 731, expressed
conviction in the role of involved States and the international
community in the suppression of international terrorism. Resolution
731, furthermore, called on the international community to impose
economic and diplomatic sanctions against Libya on April 15, 1992, if
Libya failed to provide documentation relating to the downing of Pan Am
flight 103 and UTA flight 772, and further failed to commit itself to
the cessation of international terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 1. Except to the extent provided in regulations,
orders, directives, authorizations, or licenses that may
hereafter be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed
by any international agreement or any contract entered into or
any license or permit granted before the effective date of this
order, the granting of permission to any aircraft to take off
from, land in, or overfly the United States, if the aircraft,
as part of the same flight or as a continuation of that flight,
is destined to land in or has taken off from the territory of
Libya, is hereby prohibited.
Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with
the Secretary of Transportation, is hereby authorized to take
such actions, including the promulgation of rules and
regulations, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
section 1 of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may
redelegate the authority set forth in this order to other
officers in the Department of the Treasury and may confer or
impose such authority upon any other officer of the United
States, with the consent of the head of the department or
agency within which such officer is serving. All executive
branch agencies of the Federal Government hereby affected are
directed to consult as appropriate on the implementation of
this order and to take all necessary measures within their
authority to carry out the provisions of this order, including
the suspension or termination of licenses or other
authorizations in effect as of the date of this order.
Sec. 3. Nothing contained in this order shall confer any
substantive or procedural right or privilege on any person or
organization, enforceable against the United States, its
agencies or instrumentalities, its officers, or its employees.
Sec. 4. This order is effective 11:59 p.m. eastern daylight
time, April 15, 1992.
Sec. 5. This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and
published in the Federal Register.
10. Victims of Terrorism Compensation
Executive Order 12598, June 17, 1987, 52 F.R. 23421
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and laws of the United States of America,
including Title VIII of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and
Antiterrorism, Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-399, 100 Stat. 853)
(``the Act''), and in order to provide for the implementation
of that Act, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. The functions vested in the President by that
part of section 803(a) of the Act to be codified at 5 U.S.C.
5569 are delegated to the Secretary of State.
Sec. 2. The functions vested in the President by that part
of section 803(a) of the Act to be codified at 5 U.S.C. 5570
are delegated to the Secretary of State, to be exercised in
consultation with the Secretary of Labor.
Sec. 3. The functions vested in the President by section
805(a) (to be codified at 37 U.S.C. 559), section 806(c) (to be
codified at 10 U.S.C. 1095), and section 806(d) (to be codified
at 10 U.S.C. 2181-2185) are delegated to the Secretary of
Defense.
Sec. 4. The functions vested in the President by section
806(b) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 1051), are delegated to the
Secretary of Defense, to be exercised in consultation with the
Secretary of Labor.
Sec. 5. The Secretaries of State and Defense shall consult
with each other and with the heads of other appropriated
Executive departments and agencies in carrying out their
functions under this Order.
Sec. 6. Executive Order No. 12576 of December 2, 1986, is
hereby superseded.
11. Blocking Libyan Government Property in the United States or Held by
U.S. Persons
Executive Order 12544, January 8, 1986, 51 F.R. 1235, 50 U.S.C. 1701
note
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, including the
International Emergency Economic Power Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et
seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)
and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, in order
to take steps with respect to Libya additional to those set
forth in Executive Order No. 12543 of January 7, 1986, to deal
with the threat to the national security and foreign policy of
the United States referred to in that Order.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Since 1986, the President has continued this national
emergency. The most recent continuation of the national emergency with
respect to Libya was declared in notice of December 30, 1998 (64 F.R.
383). Previous continuations were declared in notices dated December
23, 1986 (51 F.R. 46849); December 15, 1987 (52 F.R. 47891); December
28, 1988 (53 F.R. 52971); January 4, 1990 (55 F.R. 589); January 2,
1991 (56 F.R. 447); December 26, 1991 (56 F.R. 67465); December 14,
1992 (57 F.R. 59895); December 2, 1993 (58 F.R. 64361); December 22,
1994 (59 F.R. 67119); January 3, 1996 (61 F.R. 383); January 2, 1997
(62 F.R. 587); and January 2, 1998 (63 F.R. 653).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I, RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States, hereby
order blocked all property and interests in property of the
Government of Libya, its agencies, instrumentalities and
controlled entities and the Central Bank of Libya that are in
the United States, that hereafter come within the United States
or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control
of U.S. persons, including overseas branches of U.S. persons.
The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, is authorized to employ all powers granted
to me by the International Emergency Economics Power Act, 50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq., to carry out the provisions of this Order.
This Order is effective immediately and shall be
transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal
Register.
12. Prohibiting Trade and Certain Transactions Involving Libya
Executive Order 12543, January 7, 1986, 51 F.R. 875, 50 U.S.C. 1701
note
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and laws of the United States of America,
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1601 et seq.), sections 504 and 505 of the International
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (Public Law
99-83), section 1114 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as
amended (49 U.S.C. 1514), and section 301 of title 3 of the
United States Code.
I, RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States of
America, find that the policies and actions of the Government
of Libya constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security and foreign policy of the United States and
hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that
threat.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Since 1986, the President has continued this national
emergency. The most recent continuation of the national emergency with
respect to Libya was declared in notice of December 30, 1998 (64 F.R.
383). Previous continuations were declared in notice of December 23,
1986 (51 F.R. 46849); by the notice dated December 15, 1987 (52 F.R.
47891); by notice of December 28, 1988 (53 F.R. 52971); by notice of
Jan. 4, 1990 (55 F.R. 589); by notice of January 2, 1991 (56 F.R. 447);
by notice of December 26, 1991 (56 F.R. 67465); by notice of December
14, 1992 (57 F.R. 59895); by notice of December 2, 1993 (58 F.R.
64361); by notice of December 22, 1994 (59 F.R. 67119); by notice of
January 3, 1996 (61 F.R. 383); by notice of January 2, 1997 (62 F.R.
587); and by notice of January 2, 1998 (63 F.R. 653).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I hereby order:
Section 1. The following are prohibited, except to the
extent provided in regulations which may hereafter be issued
pursuant to this Order:
(a) The import into the United States of any goods or
services of Libyan origin, other than publications and
materials imported for news publications or news broadcast
dissemination;
(b) The export to Libya of any goods, technology (including
technical data or other information) or services from the
United States, except publications and donations of articles
intended to relieve human suffering, such as food, clothing,
medicine and medical supplies intended strictly for medical
purposes;
(c) Any transaction by a United States person relating to
transportation to or from Libya; the provision of
transportation to or from the United States by any Libyan
person or any vessel or aircraft of Libyan registration; or the
sale in the United States by any person holding authority under
the Federal Aviation Act of any transportation by air which
includes any stop in Libya;
(d) The purchase by any United States person of goods for
export from Libya to any country;
(e) The performance by any United States person of any
contract in support of an industrial or other commercial or
governmental project in Libya;
(f) The grant or extension of credits or loans by any
United States person to the Government of Libya, its
instrumentalities and controlled entities;
(g) Any transaction by a United States person relating to
travel by any United States citizen or permanent resident alien
to Libya, or to activities by any such person within Libya,
after the date of this Order, other than transactions necessary
to effect such person's departure from Libya, to perform acts
permitted until February 1, 1986, by Section 3 of this Order,
or travel for journalistic activity by persons regularly
employed in such capacity by a newsgathering organization; and
(h) Any transaction by any United States person which
evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or avoiding,
any of the prohibitions set forth in this Order.
For purposes of this Order, the term ``United States
person'' means any United States citizen, permanent resident
alien, juridical person organized under the laws of the United
States or any person in the United States.
Sec. 2. In light of the prohibition in Section 1(a) of this
Order, section 251 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as
amended (19 U.S.C. 1881), and section 126 of the Trade Act of
1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2136) will have no effect with
respect of Libya.
Sec. 3. This Order is effective immediately, except that
the prohibitions set forth in Section 1 (a), (b), (c), (d) and
(e) shall apply as of 12:01 a.m. Eastern Standard Time,
February 1, 1986.
Sec. 4. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such
actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations,
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Order.
Such actions may include prohibiting or regulating payments or
transfers of any property or any transactions involving the
transfer of anything of economic value by any United States
person to the Government of Libya, its instrumentalities and
controlled entities, or to any Libyan national or entity owned
or controlled, directly or indirectly, by Libya or Libyan
nationals. The Secretary may redelegate any of these functions
to other officers and agencies of the Federal government. All
agencies of the United States government are directed to take
all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out
the provisions of this Order, including the suspension or
termination of licenses or other authorizations in effect as of
the date of this Order.
Sec. 5.This Order shall be transmitted to the Congress and
published in the Federal Register.
13. Imports of Refined Petroleum Products From Libya
Executive Order 12538, November 15, 1985, 50 F.R. 47527, 19 U.S.C. 1862
note
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, including Section
504 of the International Security and Development Cooperation
Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-83), and considering that the Libyan
government actively pursues terrorism as an instrument of state
policy and that Libya has developed significant capability to
export petroleum products and thereby circumvent the
prohibition imposed by Proclamation No. 4907 of March 10, 1982
and retained in Proclamation No. 5141 of December 22, 1983 on
the importation of Libyan crude oil, it is ordered as follows:
Section 1. (a) No petroleum product refined in Libya
(except petroleum product loaded aboard maritime vessels at any
time prior to two days after the effective date of this
Executive Order) may be imported into the United States, its
territories or possessions.
(b) For the purposes of this Executive Order, the
prohibition on importation of petroleum products refined in
Libya shall apply to petroleum products which are currently
classifiable under Item Numbers: 475.05; 475.10; 475.15;
475.25; 475.30; 475.35; 475.45; 475.65; 475.70 of the Tariff
Schedules of the United States (19 U.S.C. 1202).
Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury may issue such
rulings and instructions, or, following consultation with the
Secretaries of State and Energy, such regulations as he deems
necessary to implement this Order.
Sec. 3. This Order shall be effective immediately.
14. Revocation of Prohibitions Against Transactions Involving Iran
Executive Order 12282, January 19, 1981, 46 F.R. 7925
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States, including
Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701), Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States
Code, Section 1732 of Title 22 of the United States Code, and
Section 301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1631),
in view of the continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to
the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United
States upon which I based my declarations of national emergency
in Executive Order 12170, issued November 14, 1979, and in
Executive Order 12211, issued April 17, 1980, in order to
implement agreements with the Government of Iran, as reflected
in Declarations of the Government of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria dated January 19, 1981, relating to the
release of U.S. diplomats and nationals being held as hostage
and to the resolution of claims of United States nationals
against Iran, and to begin the process of normalization of
relations between the United States and Iran, it is hereby
ordered that as of the effective date of this Order.
1-101. The prohibitions contained in Executive Order 12205
of April 7, 1980, and Executive Order 12211 of April 17, 1980,
and Proclamation 4702 of November 12, 1979, are hereby revoked.
1-102. The Secretary of the Treasury is delegated and
authorized to exercise all functions vested in the President by
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.) to carry out the purpose of this Order.
1-103. This Order shall be effective immediately.
15. Hostage Relief Act of 1980--Delegation of Authority
Executive Order 12268, January 15, 1981, 46 F.R. 4671, 5 U.S.C. 5561
note
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States of America,
including the Hostage Relief Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-449, 94
Stat. 1967, 5 U.S.C. 5561 note) and Section 301 of Title 3 of
the United States Code, and in order to provide for the
implementation of that Act, it is hereby ordered as follows:
1-101. The functions vested in the President by Sections
103, 104, 105 and 301 of the Hostage Relief Act of 1980 (5
U.S.C. 5561 note) are delegated to the Secretary of State.
1-102. The Secretary of State shall consult with the heads
of appropriate Executive agencies in carrying out the functions
in Sections 103, 104, and 105 of the Act.
16. Administration of the Export Administration Act of 1969, as amended
\1\
Executive Order 12002, July 7, 1977, 42 F.R. 35623; as amended by
Executive Order 12755, March 12, 1991, 56 F.R. 11057
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution
and statutes of the United States of America, including Export
Administration Act of 1969, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2401, et
seq.), and as President of the United States of America, it is
hereby ordered as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ When the Export Administration Act of 1969 expired on Sept. 30,
1979, it was replaced by the Export Administration Act of 1979. Sec. 21
of the 1979 Act provided that all orders (which would include this
executive order) issued under the 1969 Act and which were in force on
the effective date of the 1979 Act, would continue in effect until
modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked. Executive Order 12214 was
issued on May 2, 1980, providing for the administration of the Export
Administration Act of 1979. However, the new Executive Order stated
that it did not supersede or otherwise affect Executive Order 12002.
Authority of the Export Administration Act of 1979 expired on
September 30, 1990, pursuant to sec. 20 of that Act. Executive Order
12730 of September 30, 1990, provided for the continuation of export
control regulations until passage of an extension of the 1979 Act.
Public Law 103-10 (107 Stat. 40; March 27, 1993) renewed the authority
of the Act through June 30, 1994, effective March 27, 1993, and
authorized funds for fiscal years 1993 and 1994. Executive Order 12730
subsequently was rescinded by sec. 1 of Executive Order 12867 of
September 30, 1993 (58 F.R. 51747).
On the day the Act was once again set to expire, June 30, 1994, the
President issued Executive Order 12923 (59 F.R. 34551) to continue the
provisions of the Act and provisions for its for administration.
Subsequently, Public Law 103-277 (108 Stat. 1407; enacted July 5, 1994)
renewed the authority of the Export Administration Act through August
20, 1994. Near that expiration, the President issued Executive Order
12924 (August 19, 1994; 59 F.R. 43437) to continue the authorities in
the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 1. Except as provided in Section 2, the power,
authority, and discretion conferred upon the President by the
provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1969, as amended
(50 U.S.C. App. 2401, et seq.) hereinafter referred to as the
Act, are delegated to the Secretary of Commerce, with the power
of successive redelegation.
Sec. 2. (a) The power, authority and discretion conferred
upon the President in Sections 4(h) and 4(l) of the Act are
retained by the President.
(b) The power, authority and discretion conferred upon the
President in Section 3(8) of the Act, which directs that every
reasonable effort be made to secure the removal of reduction of
assistance by foreign countries to international terrorists
through cooperation and agreement, are delegated to the
Secretary of State, with the power of successive redelegation.
Sec. 3.\2\ The Export Administration Review Board,
hereinafter referred to as the Board, which was established by
Executive Order No. 11533 of June 4, 1970, as amended, is
hereby continued. The Board shall continue to have as its
members, the Secretary of Commerce, who shall be Chairman of
the Board, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of
Defense. The Secretary of Energy and the Director of the United
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency shall be members of
the Board, and shall participate in meetings that consider
issues involving nonproliferation of armaments and other issues
within their respective statutory and policy-making
authorities. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Director of Central Intelligence shall be non-voting members of
the Board. No alternate Board members shall be designated, but
the acting head or deputy head of any department or agency may
serve in lieu of the head of the concerned department or
agency. The Board may invite the heads of other United States
Government departments or agencies, other than the agencies
represented by Board members, to participate in the activities
of the Board when matters of interest to such departments or
agencies are under consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Sec. 1 of Executive Order 12755 of March 12, 1991 (56 F.R.
11057) amended and restated sec. 3.
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Sec. 4. The Secretary of Commerce may from time to time
refer to the Board such particular export license matters,
involving questions of national security or other major policy
issues, as the Secretary shall select. The Secretary of
Commerce shall also refer to the Board any other such export
license matter, upon the request of any other member of the
Board or of the head of any other United States Government
department or agency having any interest in such matter. The
Board shall consider the matters so referred to it, giving due
consideration to the foreign policy of the United States, the
national security, concerns about the nonproliferation of
armaments,\3\ and the domestic economy, and shall make
recommendation thereon to the Secretary of Commerce.
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\3\ Sec. 2 of Executive Order 12755 of March 12, 1991 (56 F.R.
11057) added ``concerns about the nonproliferation of armaments,''.
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Sec. 5. The President may at any time (a) prescribe rules
and regulations applicable to the power, authority, and
discretion referred to in this Order, and (b) communicate to
the Secretary of Commerce such specific directives applicable
thereto as the President shall determine. The Secretary of
Commerce shall from time to time report to the President upon
the administration of the Act and, as the Secretary deems
necessary, may refer to the President recommendations made by
the Board under Section 4 of this Order. Neither the provisions
of this section nor those of Section 4 shall be construed as
limiting the provisions of Section 1 of this Order.
Sec. 6. All delegations, rules, regulations, orders,
licenses, and other forms of administrative action made,
issued, or otherwise taken under, or continued in existence by,
the Executive orders revoked in Section 7 of this Order, and
not revoked administratively or legislatively, shall remain in
full force and effect under this Order until amended, or
terminated by proper authority. The revocations in Section 7 of
this Order shall not affect any violation of any rules,
regulations, orders, licenses or other forms of administrative
action under those Orders during the period those Orders were
in effect.
Sec. 7. Executive Order No. 11533 of June 4, 1970,
Executive Order No. 11683 of August 29, 1972, Executive Order
No. 11798 of August 14, 1974, Executive Order No. 11818 of
November 5, 1974, Executive Order No. 11907 of March 1, 1976,
and Executive Order No. 11940 of September 30, 1976, are hereby
revoked.
=======================================================================
I. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS
CONTENTS
Page
1. Department of State:.......................................... 437
a. Protection of Foreign Dignitaries and Other Official
Personnel (22 CFR Part 2).............................. 437
b. Hostage Relief Assistance (22 CFR Part 191)............. 440
c. Victims of Terrorism Compensation (22 CFR Part 192)..... 450
d. Benefits for Hostages in Iraq, Kuwait, or Lebanon (22
CFR Part 193).......................................... 465
2. Department of the Treasury.................................... 468
a. Terrorism List Government Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR
Part 596).............................................. 468
b. Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations
(31 CFR Part 597)...................................... 475
3. Federal Aviation Administration:.............................. 489
a. Airport Security (14 CFR Part 107)...................... 489
b. Airplane Operator Security (14 CFR Part 108)............ 505
c. Operations: Foreign Air Carriers and Foreign Operators
of U.S.-Registered Aircraft Engaged in Common Carriage
(14 CFR Part 129)...................................... 524
=======================================================================
1. Department of State
a. Protection of Foreign Dignitaries and Other Official Personnel
Department of State Regulations, 22 CFR Part 2
SUBCHAPTER A--GENERAL
Part 2--Protection of Foreign Dignitaries and Other Official Personnel
Sec. 2.1 Designation of personnel to carry firearms and exercise
appropriate power of arrest.
(a) The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security is
authorized to designate certain employees of the Department of
State and the Foreign Service, as well as employees of other
departments and agencies detailed to and under the supervision
and control of the Department of State, as Security Officers,
as follows.
(1) Persons so designated shall be authorized to carry
firearms when engaged in the performance of the duties
prescribed in section (1) of the act of June 28, 1955, 69 Stat.
188, as amended. No person shall be so designated unless he has
either qualified in the use of firearms in accordance with
standards established by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Security, or in accordance with standards established
by the department or agency from which he is detailed.
(2) Persons so designated shall also be authorized, when
engaged in the performance of duties prescribed in section (1)
of the act of June 28, 1955, 69 Stat. 188, as amended, to
arrest without warrant and deliver into custody any person
violating the provisions of section 111 or 112 of Title 18,
United States Code, in their presence or if they have
reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed or is committing such felony.
(b) When the Under Secretary of State for Management
determines that it is necessary, persons designated under
paragraph (a) of this section shall be authorized to provide
protection to an individual who has been designated by the
President to serve as Secretary of State, prior to his
appointment, or to a departing Secretary of State. In providing
such protection, they are authorized to exercise the
authorities described in paragraphs (a) (1) and (2) of this
section. Such protection shall be for the period or periods
determined necessary by the Under Secretary of State for
Management, except that in the case of a departing Secretary of
State, the period of protection under this paragraph shall in
no event exceed 30 calendar days from the date of termination
of that individual's incumbency as Secretary of State.
(c) When the Under Secretary of State for Management
determines that it is necessary, persons designated under
paragraph (a) of this section shall be authorized to provide
protection to a departing United States Representative to the
United Nations. In providing such protection, they are
authorized to exercise the authorities described in paragraphs
(a) (1) and (2) of this section. Such protection shall be for
the period or periods determined necessary by the Under
Secretary of State for Management, except that the period of
protection under this paragraph shall in no event exceed 30
calendar days from the date of termination of that individual's
incumbency as United States Representative to the United
Nations.
Sec. 2.2 Purpose.
Section 1116(b)(2) of Title 18 of the United States Code,
as added by Pub. L. 92-539, An Act for the Protection of
Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States (86
Stat. 1071), defines the term ``foreign official'' for purposes
of that Act as ``any person of a foreign nationality who is
duly notified to the United States as an officer or employee of
a foreign government or international organization, and who is
in the United States on official business, and any member of
his family whose presence in the United States is in connection
with the presence of such officer or employee.'' Section
1116(c)(4) of the same Act defines the term ``official guest''
for the purposes of that Act as ``a citizen or national of a
foreign country present in the United States as an official
guest of the Government of the United States pursuant to
designation as such by the Secretary of State.'' It is the
purpose of this regulation to specify the officer of the
Department of State who shall be responsible for receiving
notification of foreign officials under the Act and determining
whether persons are ``duly notified'' to the United States and
who shall be responsible for processing official guest
designations by the Secretary of State.
Sec. 2.3 Notification of foreign officials.
(a) Any notification of a foreign official for purposes of
section 1116(b)(2) of Title 18 of the United States Code shall
be directed by the foreign government or international
organization concerned to the Chief of Protocol, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. For persons normally accredited
to the United States in diplomatic or consular capacities and
also for persons normally accredited to the United Nations and
other international organizations and in turn notified to the
Department of State, the procedure for placing a person in the
statutory category of being ``duly notified to the United
States'' shall be the current procedure for accreditation, with
notification in turn when applicable. The Chief of the Office
of Protocol will place on the roster of persons ``duly notified
to the United States'' the names of all persons currently
accredited and, when applicable, notified in turn, and will
maintain the roster as part of the official files of the
Department of State adding to and deleting therefrom as changes
in accreditations occur.
(b) For those persons not normally accredited, the Chief of
Protocol shall determine upon receipt of notification, by
letter from the foreign government or international
organization concerned, whether any person who is the subject
of such a notification has been duly notified under the Act.
Any inquiries by law enforcement officers or other persons as
to whether a person has been duly notified shall be directed to
the Chief of Protocol. The determination of the Chief of
Protocol that a person has been duly notified is final.
Sec. 2.4 Designation of official guests.
The Chief of Protocol shall also maintain a roster of
persons designated by the Secretary of State as official
guests. Any inquiries by law enforcement officers or other
persons as to whether a person has been so designated shall be
directed to the Chief of Protocol. The designation of a person
as an official guest is final. Pursuant to section 2658 of
Title 22 of the U.S.C., the authority of the Secretary of State
to perform the function of designation of official guests is
hereby delegated to the Chief of Protocol.
Sec. 2.5 Records.
The Chief of Protocol shall maintain as a part of the
official files of the Department of State a cumulative roster
of all persons who have been duly notified as foreign officials
or designated as official guests under this part. The roster
will reflect the name, position, nationality, and foreign
government or international organization concerned or purpose
of visit as an official guest and reflect the date the person
was accorded recognition as being ``duly notified to the United
States'' or designated as an official guest and the date, if
any, of termination of such status.
b. Hostage Relief Assistance
Department of State Regulations, 22 CFR Part 191
SUBCHAPTER T--HOSTAGE RELIEF
Part 191--Hostage Relief Assistance
Subpart A--General
Sec. 191.1 Declaration of hostile action.
(a) The Secretary of State from time to time shall declare
when and where individuals in the civil or uniformed services
of the United States, or a citizen or resident alien of the
United States rendering personal services to the United States
abroad similar to the service of a civil officer or employee of
the United States, have been placed in captive status because
of hostile action abroad directed against the United States and
occurring or continuing between November 4, 1979, and such date
as may be declared by the President under section 101(2)(A) of
the Hostage Relief Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-449, hereafter ``the
Act'') or January 1, 1983, whichever is later. Each such
declaration shall be published in the Federal Register
(b) The Secretary of State upon his or her own initiative,
or upon application under Sec. 191.2 shall determine which
individuals in captive status as so declared shall be
considered hostages eligible for benefits under the Act. The
Secretary shall also determine who is eligible under the Act
for benefits as a member of a family or household of a hostage.
The determination of the Secretary shall be final, but any
interested person may request reconsideration on the basis of
information not considered at the time of original
determination. The criteria for determination are set forth in
sections 101 and 205 of the Act, and in these regulations.
Sec. 191.2 Application for determination of eligibility.
(a) Any person who believes that they or other persons
known to them are either hostages as defined in the Act, or
members of the family or household of hostages as defined in
Sec. 191.3(a)(1), or a child eligible for benefits under
subpart D, may apply for benefits under this subchapter for
themselves, or on behalf of others entitled thereto.
(b) The application shall be in writing, should contain all
identifying and other pertinent data available to the person
applying about the person or persons claimed to be eligible,
and should be addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State for
Administration, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
Applications may be filed at any time after publication of a
declaration under Sec. 191.1(a) in the Federal Register, and
during the period of its validity, or within 60 days after
release from captivity. Later filing may be considered when in
the opinion of the Secretary of State there is good cause for
the late filing.
Sec. 191.3 Definitions.
When used in this subchapter, unless otherwise specified,
the terms--
(a) Family Member means (1) a spouse, (2) an unmarried
dependent child including a step-child or adopted child, (3) a
person designated in official records or determined by the
agency head or designee thereof to be a dependent, or (4) other
persons such as parents, parents-in-law, persons who stand in
the place of a spouse or parents, or other members of a
household when fully justified by the circumstances of the
hostage situation, as determined by the Secretary of State.
(b) Agency head means the head of an agency as defined in
the Act (or successor agency) employing an individual
determined to be an American hostage. The Secretary of State is
the agency head with respect to any hostage not employed by an
agency.
(c) Principal means the hostage whose captivity forms the
basis for benefits under this subchapter for a family member.
Sec. 191.4 Notification of eligible persons.
The Assistant Secretary of State for Administration shall
be responsible for notifying each individual determined to be
eligible for benefits under the Act or, if that person is not
available, a representative or Family Member of the hostage.
Sec. 191.5 Relationships among agencies.
(a) The Assistant Secretary of State for Administration
shall promptly inform the head of any agency whenever an
employee (including a member of the Armed Forces) in that
agency, or Family Member of such employee, is determined to be
eligible for benefits under this subchapter.
(b) In accordance with inter-agency agreements between the
Department of State and relevant agencies--
(1) The Veterans Administration will periodically bill the
Department of State for expenses it pays for each eligible
person under subpart D of this subchapter plus the
administrative costs of carrying out its responsibilities under
this part.
(2) The Department of State will, on a periodic basis,
determine the cost for services and benefits it provides to all
eligible persons under this subchapter and bill each agency for
the costs attributable to Principals (and Family Members) in or
acting on behalf of the agency plus a proportionate share of
related administrative expenses.
Sec. 191.6 Effective date.
This regulation is effective as of November 4, 1979.
Reimbursement may be made for expenses approved under this
subchapter for services rendered on or after such date.
Subpart B--Application of Soldiers' and Sailor's Civil Relief Act
Sec. 191.10 Eligibility for benefits.
A person designated as a hostage under subpart A of this
subchapter, other than a member of the Armed Forces covered by
the provisions of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
of 1940, shall be eligible for benefits under this part.
Sec. 191.11 Applicable benefits.
(a) Eligible persons are entitled to the benefits provided
by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50
U.S.C. App. 501, et seq.), including the benefits provided by
section 701 (50 U.S.C. App. 591) notwithstanding paragraph (c)
thereof, but excluding the benefits provided by sections 104,
105, 106, 400 through 408, 501 through 512, and 514 (50 U.S.C.
App. 514, 515, 516, 540 through 548, 561 through 572, and 574).
(b) In applying such Act for purposes of this section--
(1) The term ``person in the military service'' is deemed
to include any such American hostage;
(2) The term ``period of military service'' is deemed to
include the period during which such American hostage is in a
captive status;
(3) References therein to the Secretary of the Army, the
Secretary of the Navy, the Adjutant General of the Army, the
Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Commandant, United States
Marine Corps, or other officials of government are deemed to be
references to the Secretary of State; and
(4) The term ``dependents'' shall, to the extent
permissible by law, be construed to include ``Family Members''
as defined in section 101 of the Hostage Relief Act.
Sec. 191.12 Description of benefits.
The following material is included to assist persons
affected, by providing a brief description of some of the
provisions of the Civil Relief Act. Note that not all of the
sections applicable to hostages have been included here.
References to sections herein are references to the Civil
Relief Act of 1940, as amended, followed by references in
parentheses to the same section in the United States Code.
(a) Guarantors, endorsers. Section 103 (50 U.S.C. App. 513)
provides that whenever a hostage is granted relief from the
enforcement of an obligation, a court, in its discretion, may
grant the same relief to guarantors and endorsers of the
obligation. Amendments extend relief to accommodation makers
and others primarily or secondarily liable on an obligation,
and to sureties on a criminal bail bond. They provide, on
certain conditions, that the benefits of the section with
reference to persons primarily or secondarily liable on an
obligation may be waived in writing.
(b) Written Agreements. Section 107 (50 U.S.C. App. 517)
provides that nothing contained in the Act shall prevent
hostages from making certain arrangements with respect to their
contracts and obligations, but requires that such arrangements
be in writing.
(c) Protection in Court. Section 200 (50 U.S.C. App. 520)
provides that if a hostage is made defendant in a court action
and is unable to appear in court, the court shall appoint an
attorney to represent the hostage and protect the hostage's
interests. Further, if a judgment is rendered against the
hostage, an opportunity to reopen the case and present a
defense, if meritorious, may be permitted within 90 days after
release.
(d) Court Postponement. Section 201 (50 U.S.C. App. 521)
authorizes a court to postpone any court proceedings if a
hostage is a party thereto and is unable to participate by
reason of being a captive.
(e) Relief Against Penalties. Section 202 (50 U.S.C. App.
522) provides for relief against fines or penalties when a
court proceeding involving a hostage is postponed, or when the
fine or penalties are incurred for failure to perform any
obligation. In the latter case, relief depends upon whether the
hostage's ability to pay or perform is materially affected by
being held captive.
(f) Postponement of Action. Section 203 (50 U.S.C. App.
523) authorizes a court to postpone or vacate the execution of
any judgment, attachment or garnishment.
(g) Period of Postponement. Section 204 (50 U.S.C. App.
524) authorizes a court to postpone proceedings for the period
of captivity, and for 3 months thereafter, or any part thereof.
(h) Extended Time Limits. Section 205 (50 U.S.C. App. 525)
excludes the period of captivity from computing time under
existing or future statutes of limitation. Amendments extend
relief to include actions before administrative agencies, and
provide that the period of captivity shall not be included in
the period for redemption of real property sold to enforce any
obligation, tax, or assessment. Section 207 excludes
application of section 205 to any period of limitation
prescribed by or under the internal revenue laws of the United
States.
(i) Interest Rates. Section 206 (50 U.S.C. App. 526)
provides that interest on the obligations of hostages shall not
exceed a specified per centum per annum, unless the court
determines that ability to pay greater interest is not affected
by being held captive.
(j) Misuse of Benefits. Section 600 (50 U.S.C. App. 580)
provides against transfers made with intent to delay the just
enforcement of a civil right by taking advantage of the Act.
(k) Further Relief. Section 700 (50 U.S.C. App. 590)
provides that a person, during a period of captivity or 6
months thereafter, may apply to a court for relief with respect
to obligations incurred prior to captivity, or any tax or
assessment whether falling due prior to or during the period of
captivity. The court may, on certain conditions, stay the
enforcement of such obligations.
(l) Stay of Eviction. Section 300 (50 U.S.C. App. 530)
provides that a hostage's dependents shall not be evicted from
their dwelling if the rental is $ 150 or less per month, except
upon leave of a court. If it is proved that inability to pay
rent is a result of being in captivity, the court is authorized
to stay eviction proceedings for not longer than 3 months. An
amendment extends relief to owners of the premises with respect
to payments on mortgage and taxes.
(m) Contract and Mortgage Obligations. As provided by
sections 301 and 302 of the Act (50 U.S.C. App. 531 and 532),
as amended, contracts for the purchase of real and personal
property, which originated prior to the period of captivity,
may not be rescinded, terminated, or foreclosed, or the
property repossessed, except as provided in section 107 (50
U.S.C. App. 517), unless by an order of a court. The mentioned
sections give the court wide discretionary powers to make such
disposition of the particular case as may be equitable in order
to conserve the interests of both the hostage and the creditor.
The cited sections further provide that the court may stay the
proceedings for the period of captivity and 3 months
thereafter, if in its opinion the ability of the hostage to
perform the obligation is materially affected by reason of
captivity. Section 303 (50 U.S.C. App. 533) provides that the
court may appoint appraisers and, based upon their report,
order such sum as may be just, if any, paid to hostages or
their dependents, as a condition to foreclosing a mortgage,
resuming possession of property, and rescinding or terminating
a contract.
(n) Termination of a Lease. Section 304 (50 U.S.C. App.
534) provides, in general, that a lease covering premises
occupied for dwelling, business, or agricultural purpose,
executed by persons who subsequently become hostages, may be
terminated by a notice in writing given to the lessor, subject
to such action as may be taken by a court on application of the
lessor. Termination of a lease providing for monthly payment of
rent shall not be effective until 30 days after the first date
on which the next rental payment is due, and, in the case of
other leases, on the last day of the month following the month
when the notice is served.
(o) Assignment of Life Insurance Policy. Section 305 (50
U.S.C. App. 535) provides that the assignee of a life insurance
policy assigned as security, other than the insurer in
connection with a policy loan, except upon certain conditions,
shall not exercise any right with respect to the assignment
during the period of captivity of the insured and one year
thereafter, unless upon order of a court.
(p) Storage Lien. Section 305 (50 U.S.C. App. 535) provides
that a lien for storage of personal property may not be
foreclosed except upon court order. The court may stay
proceedings or make other just disposition.
(q) Extension of Benefits to Dependents. Section 306 (50
U.S.C. App. 536) extends the benefits to section 300 through
305 to dependents of a hostage.
(r) Real and Personal Property Taxes. Section 500 (50
U.S.C. App. 560) forbids sale of property, except upon court
leave, to enforce collection of taxes or assessments (other
than taxes on income) on personal property or real property
owned and occupied by the hostage or dependents thereof at the
commencement of captivity and still occupied by the hostage's
dependents or employees. The court may stay proceedings for a
period not more than 6 months after termination of captivity.
When by law such property may be sold to enforce collection,
the hostage will have the right to redeem it within 6 months
after termination of captivity. Unpaid taxes or assessments
bear interest at 6 percent.
(s) Income Taxes. Section 513 provides for deferment of
payment of income taxes. However, section 204 of the Hostage
Relief Act of 1980 provides for deferment and certain other
relief, and should be referred to in order to determine
statutory tax benefits in addition to those in section 513 of
the Civil Relief Act.
(t) Certification of Hostage. Section 601 provides that a
certificate signed by the agency head shall be prima facie
evidence that the person named has been a hostage during the
period specified in the certification.
(u) Interlocutory Orders. Section 602 (50 U.S.C. App. 582)
provides that a court may revoke an interlocutory order it has
issued pursuant to any provision of the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act of 1940.
(v) Power of Attorney. Section 701 (50 U.S.C. App. 591)
provides that certain powers of attorney executed by a hostage
which expire by their terms after the person was captured shall
be automatically extended for the period of captivity.
Exceptions are made with respect to powers of attorney which by
their terms clearly indicate they are to expire on the date
specified irrespective of hostage status. (Section 701 applies
to American hostages notwithstanding paragraph (c) thereof
which states that it applies only to powers of attorney issued
during the ``Vietnam era''.)
Sec. 191.13 Administration of benefits.
(a) The Assistant Secretary of State for Administration
will issue certifications or other documents when required for
purposes of the Civil Relief Act.
(b) The Assistant Secretary of State shall whenever
possible promptly inform the chief legal officer of each State
in which hostages maintain residence of all persons determined
to be hostages eligible for assistance under this subpart.
Subpart C--Medical Benefits
Sec. 191.20 Eligibility for benefits.
A person designated as a hostage or Family Member of a
hostage under subpart A of this subchapter shall be eligible
for benefits under this subpart.
Sec. 191.21 Applicable benefits.
A person eligible for benefits under this part shall be
eligible for authorized medical and health care at U.S.
Government expense, and for payment of other authorized
expenses related to such care or for obtaining such care for
any illness or injury which is determined by the Secretary of
State to be caused or materially aggravated by the hostage
situation, to the extent that such care may not--
(a) Be provided or paid for under any other Government
health or medical program, including, but not limited to, the
programs administered by the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of Labor and the Administrator of Veterans Affairs;
or
(b) Be entitled to reimbursement by any private or
Government health insurance or comparable plan.
Sec. 191.22 Administration of benefits.
(a) An eligible person, who desires medical or health care
under this subpart or any person acting on behalf thereof,
shall submit an application to the Office of Medical Services,
Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520 (hereafter referred
to as the ``Office''). The applicant shall supply all relevant
information, including insurance information, requested by the
Director of the Office. An eligible person may also submit
claims to the Office for payment for emergency care when there
is not time to obtain prior authorization as prescribed by this
paragraph, and for payment for care received prior to or
ongoing on the effective date of these regulations.
(b) The Office shall evaluate all requests for care and
claims for reimbursement and determine, on behalf of the
Secretary of State, whether the care in question is authorized
under Sec. 191.21 of this subpart. The Office will authorize
care, or payment for care when it determines the criteria of
such section are met. Authorization shall include a
determination as to the necessity and reasonableness of medical
or health care.
(c) The Office will refer applicants eligible for benefits
under other Government health programs to the Government agency
administering those programs. Any portion of authorized care
not provided or paid for under another Government program will
be reimbursed under this subpart.
(d) Eligible persons may obtain authorized care from any
licensed facility or health care provider of their choice
approved by the Office. To the extent possible, the Office will
attempt to arrange for authorized care to be provided in a
Government facility at no cost to the patient.
(e) Authorized care provided by a private facility or
health care provider will be paid or reimbursed under this
subpart to the extent that the Office determines that costs do
not exceed reasonable and customary charges for similar care in
the locality.
(f) All bills for authorized medical or health care covered
by insurance shall be submitted to the patient's insurance
carrier for payment prior to submission to the Office for
payment of the balance authorized by this part. The Office will
request the health care providers to bill the insurance carrier
and the Department of State for authorized care, rather than
the patient.
(g) Eligible persons will be reimbursed by the Office for
authorized travel to obtain an evaluation of their claim under
paragraph (b) of this section and for other authorized travel
to obtain medical or health care authorized by this subpart.
Sec. 191.23 Disputes.
Any dispute between the Office and eligible persons
concerning (a) whether medical or health care is required in a
given case, (b) whether required care is incident to the
hostage taking, or (c) whether the cost for any authorized care
is reasonable and customary, shall be referred to the Medical
Director, Department of State and the Foreign Service for a
determination. If the person bringing the claim is not
satisfied with the decision of the Medical Director, the
dispute shall be referred to a medical board composed of three
physicians, one appointed by the Medical Director, one by the
eligible person and the third by the first two members. A
majority decision by the board shall be binding on all parties.
Subpart D--Educational Benefits
Sec. 191.30 Eligibility for benefits.
(a) A spouse or unmarried dependent child aged 18 or above
of a hostage as determined under Subpart A of this subchapter
shall be eligible for benefits under Sec. 191.31 of this
subpart. (Certain limitations apply, however, to persons
eligible for direct assistance through other programs of the
Veterans Administration under Chapter 35 of Title 38, United
States Code).
(b) A Principal (see definition in Sec. 191.3) designated
as a hostage under Subpart A of this subchapter, who intends to
change jobs or careers because of the hostage experience and
who desires additional training for this purpose, shall be
eligible for benefits under Sec. 191.32 of this part unless
such person is eligible for comparable benefits under Title 38
of the United States Code as determined by the Administrator of
the Veterans Administration.
Sec. 191.31 Applicable family benefits.
(a) An eligible spouse or child shall be paid (by
advancement or reimbursement) for expenses incurred for
subsistence, tuition, fees, supplies, books, and equipment, and
other educational expenses, while attending an educational or
training institution approved in accordance with procedures
established by the Veterans Administration, which shall be
comparable to procedures established pursuant to Chapters 35
and 36 of Title 38 U.S.C.
(b) Except as provide in paragraph (c) or (d) of this
section), payments shall be available under this subsection for
an eligible spouse or child for education or training which
occurs--
(1) 90 days after the Principal is placed in a captive
status, and
(i) Through the end of any semester or quarter which begins
before the date on which the Principal ceases to be in a
captive status, or
(ii) If the educational or training institution is not
operated on a semester or quarter system, the earlier of the
end of any course which began before such date or the end of
the twelve-week period following that date.
(c) In special circumstances and within the limitation of
Sec. 191.34, the Secretary of State may, under the criteria and
procedures set forth in Sec. 191.33, approve payments for
education or training under this subsection which occurs after
the date determined under paragraph (b) of thissection.
(d) In the event a Principal dies and the death is
determined by the Secretary of State to be incident to that
individual being a hostage, payments shall be available under
this subsection for education or training of a spouse or child
of the Principal which occurs after the date of death, up to
the maximum that may be authorized under Sec. 191.34.
Sec. 191.32 Applicable benefits for hostages.
(a) When authorized by the Secretary of State a Principal,
following released from captivity, shall be paid (by
advancement or reimbursement) for expenses incurred for
subsistence, tuition, fees, supplies, books and equipment, and
other educational expenses, while attending an educational or
training institution approved in accordance with procedures
established by the Veterans Administration comparable to
procedures established pursuant to Chapters 35 and 36 of Title
38 U.S.C. Payments shall be available under this subsection for
education or training which occurs on or before--
(1) The end of any semester or quarter (as appropriate)
which begins before the date which is 10 years after the day on
which the Principal ceases to be in a captive status, or
(2) If the educational or training institution is not
operated on a semester or quarter system, the earlier of the
end of any course which began before such date or the end of
the twelve-week period following that date.
(b) A person eligible for benefits under this subsection
shall not be required to separate from Government service in
order to undertake the training or education, but while in
Government service, may only receive such training or education
during off-duty hours or during periods of approved leave.
Sec. 191.33 Administration of benefits.
(a) Any person desiring benefits under this part shall
apply in writing to the Assistant Secretary of State for
Administration, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
The application shall specify the benefits desired and the
basis of eligibility for those benefits. The Secretary of State
shall make determinations of eligibility for benefits under
this part, and shall forward approved applications to the
Veterans Administration and advise the applicant of the name
and address of the office in the Veterans Administration that
will counsel the eligible persons on how to obtain the benefits
that have been approved. Persons whose applications are
disapproved shall be advised of the reasons for the
disapproval.
(b) The Veterans Administration shall provide the same
level and kind of assistance, including payments (by
advancement or reimbursement) for authorized expenses up to the
same maximum amounts, to spouses and children of hostages, and
to Principals following their release from captivity as it does
to eligible spouses and children of veterans and to eligible
veterans, respectively, under Chapters 35 and 36 of Title 38,
United States Code. The Veterans Administration shall,
following consultation with the Secretary of State and under
procedures it has established to administer section 1724 of
Title 38, United States Code, discontinue assistance for any
individual whose conduct or progress is unsatisfactory under
standards consistent with those established pursuant to such
section 1724.
(c) An Advisory Board shall be established to advise on
eligibility for benefits under paragraphs (c) and (d) of
Sec. Sec. 191.31 and 191.32. The Board shall be composed of the
Assistant Secretary of State for Administration as Chairperson,
the Director of the Office of Medical Services of the
Department of State, the Executive Director of the regional
bureau of the Department of State in whose region the relevant
hostile action occurred, the Director of Personnel or other
designee of the applicable employing agency, and a
representative of the Veterans Administration designated by the
Administrator.
(d) If an application is received from a spouse or child
for extended training under Sec. 191.31(c), the Secretary of
Administration shall determine with the advice of the Advisory
Board whether the Principal, following release from captivity,
is incapacitated by the hostage experience to the extent that
(1) he or she has not returned to full-time active duty and is
unlikely to be able to resume the normal duties of his or her
position or career, or (2) in the event of a separation from
Government service, a comparable position or career, for at
least six months from the date the Principal is released from
captivity. If the Secretary makes such a determination, he or
she may approve, within the limits of Sec. 191.34, an
application under Sec. 191.31(c) for up to one year of
education or training. If the Principal remains incapacitated,
the Secretary may approve additional training or education up
to the maximum authorized under Sec. 191.34.
Sec. 191.34 Maximum limitation on benefits.
(a) In no event may assistance be provided under this
subpart for any individual for a period in excess of 45 months,
or the equivalent thereof in part-time education or training.
(b) The eligibility of a spouse for benefits under
paragraph (c) or (d) of Sec. 191.31 shall expire on a date
which is 10 years after the date of the release of the hostage,
or the death of the hostage, respectively. The eligibility of a
dependent child for benefits under such paragraphs (c) and (d)
shall expire on the 26th birthday of such child or on such
later date as determined by the Administrator of the Veterans
Administration, as would be applicable if section 1712 of Title
38, United States Code, were applicable.
c. Victims of Terrorism Compensation
Department of State Regulations, 22 CFR Part 192
Part 192--Victims of Terrorism Compensation
Subpart A--General
Sec. 192.1 Declarations of hostile action.
(a)(1) The Secretary of State shall declare when and where
individuals in the Civil Service of the United States,
including members of the Foreign Service and foreign service
nationals, or a citizen, national or resident alien of the
United States rendering personal services to the United States
similar to the service of an individual in the Civil Service,
have been placed in captive status commencing on or after
November 4, 1979, for purposes of Sec. 192.11(b) or January 21,
1981, for all other purposes under this part, which arises
because of hostile action abroad and is a result of the
individual's relationship with the U.S. Government as provided
in the Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act, codified in 5
U.S.C. 5569 and 5570 and Executive Order 12598.
(2) The Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Labor, shall also declare when and where
individuals in the Civil Service of the United States including
members of the Foreign Service and foreign service nationals,
including individuals rendering personal services to the United
States similar to the service of an individual in the Civil
Service, and family members of these individuals are eligible
to receive compensation for disability or death occurring after
January 21, 1981. Such determination shall be based on the
decision by the Secretary of State that the disability or death
was caused by hostile action abroad and was a result of the
individual's relationship with the Government.
(3) Declarations of hostile action in domestic situations
shall be made by the Secretary of State in consultation with
the Attorney General of the United States and the head of the
employing agency or agencies.
(b) The Secretary of State for actions abroad, or Agency
Head for domestic actions, upon his or her own initiative, or
upon application under Sec. 192.2 shall determine which
individuals in captive or missing status as so declared shall
be considered captives eligible for benefits under the Act. The
Secretary or Agency Head shall also determine who is eligible
under the Act for benefits as a member of a family or household
of a captive. The determination of the Secretary or Agency Head
shall be final for purposes of determining captive status and
cash payments, and not subject to judicial review, but any
interested person may request reconsideration on the basis of
information not considered at the time of original
determination. The criteria for determination are set forth in
sections 5569 and 5570 of Title 5 of U.S.C., and in these
regulations.
Sec. 192.2 Application for determination of eligibility.
(a) Any person who believes that that person or other
persons known to that person are either captives as defined in
5 U.S.C. 5569(a)(1), individuals who have suffered disability
or death caused by hostile action which was a result of the
individual's relationship with the U.S. Government, members of
the family or household of such individuals as defined in
Sec. 192.3(a)(1), or a child eligible for benefits under
subchapter D, may apply for benefits under this subchapter for
that person, or on behalf of others entitled thereto.
(b) The application in connection with hostile action
abroad shall be in writing, shall contain all identifying and
other pertinent data available to the person applying about the
person or persons claimed to be eligible, and shall be
addressed to the Director General of the Foreign Service,
Department of State, Washington, DC 20520. Applications may be
filed within 60 days after the latest of: a declaration under
Sec. 192.1(a), the hostile action, or release from captivity.
Later filing may be considered when in the opinion of the
Secretary of State there is good cause for the late filing.
Applications in connection with hostile action in domestic
situations shall conform to these same requirements and be
filed with the Agency Head.
Sec. 192.3 Definitions.
When used in this subchapter, unless otherwise specified,
the terms--
(a) Secretary of State includes any person to whom the
Secretary of State has delegated the responsibilities of
carrying out this subpart.
(b) Family Member means a dependent of a captive and any
individual other than a dependent who is a member of such
person's family or household and shall include the following:
(1) A spouse, (2) an unmarried dependent child including a
step-child or adopted child under 21 years of age, (3) a person
designated in official records or determined by the agency head
or designee thereof to be dependent, and (4) other persons such
as parents, non-dependent children, parents-in-law, persons who
stand in the place of a spouse or parents, or other members of
the family or household of a captive or employee, as determined
by the Agency head concerned.
(c) Agency Head means the head of an Executive Agency of
the U.S. Federal Government employing an individual affected by
hostile action as covered by these regulations. The Secretary
of State is the agency head for actions abroad with respect to
any such individual not employed by an agency.
(d) Captive means any individual in a captive status
commencing while such individual is in the Civil Service or a
citizen, national or resident alien of the United States
rendering personal service to the United States similar to the
service of an individual in the Civil Service (other than as a
member of the uniformed services).
(e) Captive Status means a missing status which, as
determined under Sec. 192.1, arises because of a hostile action
and is a result of the individual's relationship with the
Government.
(f) Principal means the person whose captivity, death or
disability forms the basis for benefits for that individual or
for a family member under this subchapter.
(g) Individual rendering personal services to the United
States similar to the service of an individual in the Civil
Service includes contract employees and other individuals
fitting that description.
(h) Pay and Allowances has the meaning set forth in 5
U.S.C. 5561(6):
(1) Basic pay;
(2) Special pay;
(3) Incentive pay;
(4) Basic allowances for quarters;
(5) Basic allowance for subsistence; and
(6) Station per diem allowances for not more than 90 days.
(i) Child means a dependent as defined in paragraph (b)(2)
of this section.
Sec. 192.4 Notification of eligible persons.
The Director General of the Foreign Service for the
Department of State, or other Agency Head in domestic
situations, shall be responsible for notifying each individual
determined to be eligible for benefits under the Act, or if
that person is not available, a representative or family member
of the eligible individual.
Sec. 192.5 Relationships among agencies.
(a) To assist in ensuring that eligible persons receive
compensation, each Agency Head shall notify the Director
General of the Foreign Service of the Department of State of
any incident which he or she believes may be appropriately
declared a hostile action under Sec. 192.1.
(b) The Director General of the Foreign Service for the
Department of State shall promptly inform the head of any
agency whenever an employee of that agency, or Family Member of
such employee, is determined to be eligible for benefits under
this subchapter in connection with hostile action.
(c) In accordance with inter-agency agreements between the
Department of State and relevant agencies--
(1) The Department of Veterans Affairs will periodically
bill the Department of State for expenses it pays for each
eligible person under subpart E of this subchapter plus the
administrative costs of carrying out its responsibilities under
this part.
(2) The Department of State will, on a periodic basis,
determine the cost for services and benefits it provides to all
eligible persons under this subchapter, and bill each agency
for the medical service costs (in connection with hostile
action abroad) and educational benefits attributable to
Principals and Family Members, plus a proportionate share of
related administrative expenses.
Subpart B--Payment of Salary and Other Benefits for Captive Situations
Sec. 192.10 Eligibility for benefits.
A person designated as a captive under subpart A of this
subchapter shall be eligible for benefits under this subpart.
Sec. 192.11 Applicable benefits.
(a) Captives are entitled to receive or have credited to
their account, for the period in captive status, the same pay
and allowances to which they were entitled at the beginning of
that period or to which they may have become entitled
thereafter.
(b) A person designated as a captive (or a family member of
a principal) under subpart A of this subchapter whose captivity
commenced on or after November 4, 1979, is also entitled to
receive a cash payment from the captive's employing agency, for
each day held captive, in an amount equal to but not less than
one-half of the amount of the world-wide average per diem rate
established under 5 U.S.C. 5702.
Sec. 192.12 Administration of benefits.
(a) The amount deducted from the pay and allowances of
captives must be recorded in the individual accounts of the
agency concerned. A Treasury designated account, set up on the
books of the agency concerned, may be utilized by the head of
an agency to report the net amount of pay, allowances and
interest credited to captives pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 5569(b).
Interest payments under this section shall be paid out of funds
available for salaries and expenses of the agency. Interest
shall be computed at a rate for any calendar quarter equal to
the average rate paid on United States Treasury bills with 3-
month maturities issued during the preceding calendar quarter,
with quarterly compounding.
(b) Cash payments to captives for each day of captivity
shall be made by the head of an agency before the end of the
one-year period beginning on the date on which the captive
status terminates. In the event the captive dies in captivity
or prior to payment of these benefits, payment shall be made to
the eligible survivors under Sec. 192.51(c) or the estate. A
payment under this subchapter may be deferred or denied by the
head of an agency pending determination of an offense committed
by the captive under the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 8312.
Subpart C--Application of Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act to
Captive Situations
Sec. 192.20 Eligibility for benefits.
A person designated as a captive under subpart A of this
subchapter, shall be eligible for benefits under this part.
Sec. 192.21 Applicable benefits.
(a) Eligible persons are entitled to the benefits provided
by the Soldiers' and Sailors' CivilRelief Act of 1940 (50
U.S.C. App. 501, et seq.), including the benefits provided by
section 701 (50 U.S.C. App 591) notwithstanding paragraph (c)
thereof, but excluding the benefits provided by sections 104,
105, 106, 400 through 408, 501 through 512, and 514 (50 U.S.C.
App. 514, 515, 516, 540through 548, 561 through 572, and 574).
(b) In applying such Act for purposes of this section--
(1) The term ``person in the military service'' is deemed
to include any such captive;
(2) The term ``period of military service'' is deemed to
include the period during which such captive is in a captive
status;
(3) References therein to the Secretary of the Army, the
Secretary of the Navy, the Adjutant General of the Army, the
Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Commandant, United States
Marine Corps, or other officials of government are deemed, in
the case of any captive, to be references to the Secretary of
State; and
(4) The term ``dependents'' shall, to the extent
permissible by law, be construed to include ``Family Members''
as defined in Sec. 192.3 of these regulations.
Sec. 192.22 Description of benefits.
The following material is included to assist persons
affected, by providing a brief description of some of the
provisions of the Civil Relief Act. Note that not all of the
sections applicable to captives have been included here.
References to sections herein are references to the Civil
Relief Act of 1940, as amended, followed by references in
parentheses to the same section in the United States Code.
(a) Guarantors, endorsers. Section 103 (50 U.S.C. App 513)
provides that whenever a captive is granted relief from the
enforcement of an obligation, a court, in its discretion, may
grant the same relief to guarantors and endorsers of the
obligation. Amendments extend relief to accommodation makers
and others primarily or secondarily liable on an obligation,
and to sureties on a criminal bail bond. They provide, on
certain conditions, that the benefits of the section with
reference to persons primarily or secondarily liable on an
obligation may be waived in writing.
(b) Written Agreements. Section 107 (50 U.S.C. App. 517)
provides that nothing contained in the Act shall prevent
captives from making certain arrangements with respect to their
contracts and obligations, but requires that such arrangements
be in writing.
(c) Protection in Court. Section 200 (50 U.S.C. App. 517)
provides that if a captive is made a defendant in a court
action and is unable to appear in court, the court shall
appoint an attorney to represent the captive and protect the
captive's interests. Further, if a judgment is rendered against
the captive, an opportunity to reopen the case and present a
defense, if meritorious, may be permitted within 90-days after
release.
(d) Court Postponement. Section 201 (50 U.S.C. App. 521)
authorizes a court to postpone any court proceedings if a
captive is a party thereto and is unable to participate by
reason of being a captive.
(e) Relief Against Penalties. Section 202 (50 U.S.C. App.
522) provides for relief against fines or penalties when a
court proceeding involving a captive is postponed, or when the
fine or penalties are incurred for failure to perform any
obligation. In the latter case, relief depends upon whether the
captive's ability to pay or perform is materially affected by
being held captive.
(f) Postponement of Action. Section 203 (50 U.S.C. App.
523) authorizes a court to postpone or vacate the execution of
any judgment, attachment or garnishment.
(g) Period of Postponement. Section 204 (50 U.S.C. App.
524) authorizes a court to postpone proceedings for the period
of captivity and for 3 months thereafter, or any part thereof.
(h) Extended Time Limits. Section 205 (50 U.S.C. App. 525)
excludes the period of captivity from computing time under
existing or future statutes of limitation. Amendments extend
relief to include actions before administrative agencies, and
provide that the period of captivity shall not be included in
the period for redemption of real property sold to enforce any
obligation, tax, or assessment. Section 207 excludes
application of section 205 to any period of limitation
prescribed by or under the internal revenue laws of the United
States.
(i) Interest Rates. Section 206 (50 U.S.C. App. 526)
provides that interest on the obligations of captives shall not
exceed a specified per centum per annum, unless the court
determines that ability to pay greater interest is not affected
by being held captive.
(j) Misuse of Benefits. Section 600 (50 U.S.C. App. 580)
provides against transfers made with intent to delay the just
enforcement of a civil right by taking advantage of the Act.
(k) Further Relief. Section 700 (50 U.S.C. App. 590)
provides that a person, during a period of captivity or 6
months thereafter, may apply to a court for relief with respect
to obligations incurred prior to captivity, or any tax or
assessment whether falling due prior to or during the period of
captivity. The court may, on certain conditions, stay the
enforcement of such obligations.
(l) Stay of Eviction. Section 300 (50 U.S.C. App. 530)
provides that a captive's dependents shall not be evicted from
their dwelling if the rental is minimal, except upon leave of a
court. If it is proved that inability to pay rent is a result
of being in captivity, the court is authorized to stay eviction
proceedings for not longer than 3 months. An amendment extends
relief to owners of the premises with respect to payment on
mortgage and taxes.
(m) Contract and Mortgage Obligations. As provided by
sections 301 and 302 of the Act (50 U.S.C. App. 531 and 532),
as amended, contracts for the purchase of real and personal
property, which originated prior to the period of captivity,
may not be rescinded, terminated, or foreclosed, or the
property repossessed, except as provided in section 107 (50
U.S.C. App. 517), unless by an order of a court. The mentioned
sections give the court wide discretionary powers to make such
disposition of the particular case as may be equitable in order
to conserve the interests of both the captive and the creditor.
The cited sections further provide that the court may stay the
proceedings for the period of captivity and 3 months
thereafter, if in its opinion the ability of the captive to
perform the obligation is materially affected by reason of
captivity. Section 303 (50 U.S.C. App. 533) provides that the
court may appoint appraisers and, based upon their report,
order such sum as may be just, if any, paid to captives or
their dependents, as a condition to foreclosing a mortgage,
resuming possession of property, and rescinding or terminating
a contract.
(n) Termination of a Lease. Section 304 (50 U.S.C. App.
534) provides, in general, that a lease covering premises
occupied for dwelling, business, or agricultural purpose,
executed by persons who subsequently become captives, may be
terminated by a notice in writing given to the lessor, subject
to such action as may be taken by a court on application of the
lessor. Termination of a lease providing for monthly payment of
rent shall not be effective until 30 days after the first date
on which the next rental payment is due, and, in the case of
other leases, on the last day of the month following the month
when the notice is served.
(o) Assignment of Life Insurance Policy. Section 305 (50
U.S.C. App. 535) provides that the assignee of a life insurance
policy assigned as security, other that the insurer in
connection with a policy loan, except upon certain conditions,
shall not exercise any right with respect to the assignment
during period of captivity of the insured and one year
thereafter, unless upon order of a court.
(p) Storage Lien. Section 305 (50 U.S.C. App. 535) provides
that a lien for storage of personal property may not be
foreclosed except upon court order. The court may stay
proceedings or make other just disposition.
(q) Extension of Benefits to Dependents. Section 306 (50
U.S.C. App. 536) extends the benefits to section 300 through
305 to dependents of a captive.
(r) Real and Personal Property Taxes. Section 500 (50
U.S.C. App. 560) forbids sale of property, except upon court
leave, to enforce collection of taxes or assessments (other
than taxes on income) on personal property or real property
owned and occupied by the captive or dependents thereof at the
commencement of captivity and still occupied by the captive's
dependents or employees. The court may stay proceedings for a
period not more than 6 months after termination of captivity.
When by law such property may be sold to enforce collection,
the captive will have the right to redeem it within 6 months
after termination of captivity. Unpaid taxes or assessments
bear interest at 6 percent.
(s) Income Taxes. Section 513 provides for deferment of
payment of income taxes.
(t) Certification of Captive. Section 601 provides that a
certificate signed by the agency head shall be prima facie
evidence that the person named has been a captive during the
period specified in the certification.
(u) Interlocutory Orders. Section 602 (50 U.S.C. App. 582)
provides that a court may revoke an interlocutory order it has
issued pursuant to any provision of the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act of 1940.
(v) Power of Attorney. Section 701 (50 U.S.C. App. 591)
provides that certain powers of attorney executed by a captive
which expire by their terms after the person was captured shall
be automatically extended for the period of captivity.
Exceptions are made with respect to powers of attorney which by
their terms clearly indicate they are to expire on the date
specified irrespective of captive status. (Section 701 applies
to American captives notwithstanding paragraph (c) thereof
which states that it applies only to powers of attorney issued
during the ``Vietnam era'').
Sec. 192.23 Administration of benefits.
(a) The Director General of the Department of State or
Agency Head will issue certifications or other documents when
required for purposes of the Civil Relief Act.
(b) The Director General of the Department of State or
Agency Head shall whenever possible promptly inform the chief
legal officer of each U.S. State in which captives maintain
residence of all persons determined to be captives eligible for
assistance under this subpart.
Subpart D--Medical Benefits For Captive Situations
Sec. 192.30 Eligibility for benefits.
A person designated as a captive or family member of a
captive under subpart A of this subchapter, shall be eligible
for benefits under this subpart.
Sec. 192.31 Applicable benefits.
A person eligible for benefits under this part shall be
eligible for authorized physical and mental health care at U.S.
Government expense (through either or advancement or
reimbursement), and for payment of other authorized expenses
related to such care or for obtaining such care for any illness
or injury, to the extent, as determined by the Secretary of
State or Agency Head, that such care is incident to an
individual being held captive and is not covered by--
(a) Any other Government health or medical program,
including, but not limited to, the programs administered by the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary
of Veteran Affairs; or
(b) Reimbursement by any private or Government health
insurance or comparable plan. In the case of coverage by a
private or Government health insurance plan, that carrier will
be designated as the primary carrier, and benefits under this
subpart will serve only to supplement expenses not paid by the
primary carrier.
Sec. 192.32 Administration of benefits.
(a) (1) A person eligible due to hostile action abroad, who
desires medical or health care under this subpart or any person
acting on behalf thereof, shall submit an application to the
Office of Medical Services, Department of State, Washington, DC
20520 (hereafter referred to as the ``Office''). That office
will handle and process medical applications and claims using
the criteria in this subpart. Persons eligible in connection
with domestic situations shall make application with the Agency
Head, and the Agency Head shall apply the following procedures
in a similar manner in administering medical benefits in
domestic situations involving the respective agency.
(2) The applicant shall supply all relevant information,
including insurance information, requested by the Director of
the Office. An eligible person may also submit claims to the
Office for payment for emergency care when there is not time to
obtain prior authorization as prescribed by this paragraph.
(b) The Office shall evaluate all requests for care and
claims for reimbursement and determine, on behalf of the
Secretary of State, whether the care in question is authorized
under Sec. 192.31 of this subpart. The Office will authorize
care or payment of care, when it determines the criteria of
Sec. 192.31 are met. Authorization shall include a
determination as to the necessity and reasonableness of medical
or health care.
(c) The Office will refer applicants eligible for benefits
under other Government health programs to the Government agency
administering those programs. Any portion of authorized care
not provided or paid for under another Government program or
private insurance will be reimbursed under this subpart,
subject to a determination of the reasonableness of charges.
Such determination shall be made by applying the fee schedule
established by the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
(OWCP), Department of Labor, which is used in paying medical
benefits for work-related injuries to employees who are fully
covered by OWCP.
(d) Eligible persons may obtain authorized care from any
licensed facility or health care provider of their choice
approved by the Office. To the extent possible, the Office will
attempt to arrange for authorized care to be provided in a
Government facility at no cost to the patient.
(e) Authorized care provided by a private facility or
health care provider will be paid or reimbursed under this
subpart to the extent that the Office determines that costs do
not exceed reasonable and customary charges for similar care in
the locality.
(f) All bills for authorized medical or health care covered
by insurance shall be submitted to the patient's insurance
carrier for payment prior to submission to the Office for
payment of the balance authorized by this part. The Office will
request the health care providers to bill the insurance carrier
and the Department of State for authorized care, rather than
the patient.
(g) Eligible persons will be reimbursed by the Office for
authorized travel to obtain an evaluation of their claim under
paragraph (b) of this section and for other authorized travel
to obtain medical or health care authorized by this subpart.
Sec. 192.33 Dispute.
Any dispute between the Office and eligible persons
concerning whether medical or health care is required in a
given case, whether required care is incident to the captivity,
or whether the cost for any authorized care is reasonable and
customary, shall be referred to the Medical Director,
Department of State, for a determination. If the person
bringing the claim is not satisfied with the decision of the
Medical Director, the dispute shall be referred to a medical
board composed of three physicians, one appointed by the
Medical Director, one by the eligible person and the third by
the first two members. A majority decision by the board shall
be binding on all parties.
Subpart E--Educational Benefits for Captive Situations
Sec. 192.40 Eligibility for benefits.
(a) A spouse or unmarried dependent child (including an
unmarried dependent stepchild or adopted child) under 21 years
of age of a captive as determined under subpart A of the
subchapter shall be eligible for benefits under 192.41 of this
subpart. (Certain limitations apply, however, to persons
eligible for direct assistance through other programs of the
Department of Veterans' Affairs under Chapter 35 of Title 38,
United States Code).
(b) A Principal designated as a captive under subpart A of
this subchapter, who intends to change jobs or careers because
of the captive experience and who desires additional training
for this purpose, shall be eligible for benefits under
Sec. 192.42 of this part, unless the Secretary of the
Department of Veterans' Affairs determines that such person is
eligible to receive educational assistance for the additional
training under either chapters 30, 32, 34, or 35, title 38
U.S.C.
Sec. 192.41 Applicable family benefits.
(a) An eligible spouse or child shall be paid (by
advancement or reimbursement) for expenses incurred for
subsistence, tuition, fees, supplies, books and equipment, and
other educational expenses while attending an educational or
training institution approved in accordance with procedures
established by the Department of Veterans' Affairs, which shall
be comparable to procedures established pursuant to Chapters 35
and 36 of Title 38 U.S.C.
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (c) or (d) of this
section, payments shall be available under this subsection for
an eligible spouse or child for educational training which
occurs--
(1) 90 days after the Principal is placed in a captive
status, and
(i) Through the end of any semester or quarter which begins
before the date on which the Principal ceases to be in a
captive status, or
(ii) If the educational or training institution is not
operated on a semester or quarter system, the earlier of the
end of any course which began before such date or the end of
the sixteen-week period following that date.
(c) In special circumstances and within the limitation of
Sec. 192.44, the Secretary of State, under the criteria and
procedures set forth in Sec. 192.43, may approve payments for
education or training under this subsection which occurs after
the date determined under paragraph (b) of this section.
(d) In the event a Principal dies and the death is
determined by the Agency Head to be incident to that individual
being a captive, payments shall be available under this
subsection for education or training of a spouse or child of
the Principal which occurs after the date of death, up to the
maximum that may be authorized under Sec. 192.44.
(e) Family benefits under this subsection shall not be
available for any spouse or child who is eligible for
assistance under Chapter 35 of Title 38 U.S.C., or similar
assistance under any other law.
Sec. 192.42 Applicable benefits for captives.
(a) When authorized by the Agency Head, a Principal,
following release from captivity, may be paid (by advancement
or reimbursement) for expenses incurred for subsistence,
tuition, fees, supplies, books and equipment, and other
educational expenses while attending an educational or training
institution approved in accordance with procedures established
pursuant to Chapter 35 and 36 of Title 38 U.S.C. Payments shall
be available under this subsection for education or training
which occurs on or before--
(1) The end of any semester or quarter (as appropriate)
which begins before the date which is 10 years after the day on
which the Principal ceases to be in a captive status, or
(2) If the educational or training institution is not
operated on a semester or quarter system, the earlier of the
end of any course which began before such date or the end of
the sixteen-week period following that date.
(b) A person eligible for benefits under this subsection
shall not be required to separate from Government service in
order to undertake the training or education. However, no
educational assistance allowance shall be paid to any eligible
person who is attending a course of education or training paid
for under the Government Employees' Training Act and whose full
salary is being paid to such person while so training.
Sec. 192.43 Administration of benefits.
(a) Any person desiring benefits under this part, shall
apply in writing to the Director General of the Foreign
Service, Department of State, Washington, DC 20502. The
application shall specify the benefits desired and the basis of
eligibility for those benefits. The Director General of the
Foreign Service, on behalf of the Secretary of State, shall
make determinations of eligibility for benefits under this
part, and shall forward certified applications to the
Department of Veterans' Affairs and advise the applicant of the
name and address of the office in the Department of Veterans'
Affairs that will counsel the eligible persons on how to obtain
the benefits that have been approved. Persons whose
applications are disapproved shall be advised in writing of the
reason for the disapproval. Applications for foreign service
nationals and their dependents shall be made with the Office of
Foreign Service National Personnel, Department of State. That
office will handle the administrative details and benefits
using the criteria specified in this subchapter.
(b) The Department of Veterans' Affairs shall provide the
same level and kind of assistance, including payments (by
advancement or reimbursement) for authorized expenses up to the
same maximum amounts, to spouses and children of captives, and
to Principals following their release from captivity as it does
to eligible spouses and children of veterans and to eligible
veterans, respectively, under Chapters 35 and 36 of Title 38
U.S.C. The Department of Veterans' Affairs shall, under
procedures it has established to administer section 1724 of
Title 38, U.S.C., discontinue assistance for any individual
whose conduct or progress is unsatisfactory under standards
consistent with those established pursuant to such section
1724.
(c) An Advisory Board shall be established to advise on
eligibility for benefits under paragraphs (c) and (d) of
Sec. 192.41. The Board shall be composed of the Under Secretary
of State for Management as Chair, the Director of the Office of
Medical Services of the Department of State, the Executive
Director of the regional bureau of the Department of State in
whose region the relevant hostile action occurred, the Director
of Personnel or other designee of the applicable employing
agency, and a representative of the Department of Veterans'
Affairs designated by the Secretary.
(d) If an application is received from a spouse or child
for extended training under Sec. 192.41(c), the Director
General of the Foreign Service of the Department of State shall
determine with the advice of the Advisory Board whether the
Principal, following release from captivity, is incapacitated
by the captive experience--
(1) To the extent that he or she has not returned to full-
time active duty and is unlikely to be able to resume the
normal duties of his or her position or career, or
(2) In the event of a separation from Government service,
that the Principal is unable to assume a comparable position or
career, for at least six months from the date of release from
captivity. If the Secretary makes such a determination, he or
she may approve, within the limits of Sec. 192.44, an
application under Sec. 192.41(c) for up to one year of
education or training. If the Principal remains incapacitated,
the Secretary may approve additional training or education up
to the maximum authorized under 192.44.
Sec. 192.44 Maximum limitation on benefits.
(a) In no event may assistance be provided under this
subpart for any individual for a period in excess of 45 months,
or the equivalent thereof in part-time education or training.
(b) The eligibility of a spouse for benefits under
paragraph (c) or (d) of Sec. 192.41 shall expire on a date
which is 10 years after the date of the release of the captive
or the death of the captive while in captivity, respectively.
The eligibility of a dependent child for benefits under
Sec. 192.41 (c) and (d) shall expire on the 21st birthday of
such child.
Subpart F--Compensation for Disability or Death
Sec. 192.50 Eligibility for benefits.
(a) (1) The Federal Employees' Compensation Act (5 U.S.C.
8101 et seq.) provides for medical coverage and the payment of
compensation for wage loss and for permanent impairment of
specified members and functions of the body incurred by
employees as a result of an injury sustained while in the
performance of their duties to the United States. The Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP), Department of Labor,
administers the program. All individuals employed by the U.S.
Government as defined by 5 U.S.C. 8101(1) are eligible to apply
for wage-loss and medical benefits under the FECA. Family
members of such employees may apply for death benefits. An
application must be made with OWCP by such individual or on
behalf of such individuals, prior to the determination of
eligibility or payment of any benefits under this subpart.
(2) In the case of foreign service national employees
covered for work related injury or death under the local
compensation plan established pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 3968, such
applications should be filed with the organizational authority
in the country of employment which provides such coverage.
Benefit levels payable to foreign service national employees
under this subpart shall be no less than comparable benefits
payable to U.S. citizen employees under FECA. Eligibility
determination and payment of supplemental benefits, if any, is
the responsibility of the Director General of the Foreign
Service for the State Department.
(b) Any death or disability benefit payment made under this
section shall be reduced by the amount of any other death or
disability benefits funded in whole or in part by the United
States, except that the amount shall not be reduced below zero.
The cash payment under Sec. 192.11(b) of subpart B is excluded
from the offset requirement.
(c) Compensation under this section may include payment
(whether advancement or reimbursement) for any medical or
health expenses relating to the death or disability involved to
the extent that such expenses are not covered under subpart D
of these regulations. Procedures of subpart D of these
regulations shall apply in making such determinations.
Sec. 192.51 Death benefit.
(a) The Secretary of State or Agency Head may provide for
payment, by the employing agency, of a death benefit to the
surviving dependents of any eligible individual under
Sec. 192.1(a) who dies as a result of injuries caused by
hostile action whose death was the result of the individual's
relationship with the Government.
(b) The death benefit payment for an employee shall be
equal to one year's salary at the time of death. Such death
benefit is subject to the offset provisions under
Sec. 192.50(b) including the Federal Employees' Compensation
Act. The death benefit for an employee's spouse and other
eligible individuals under Sec. 192.1(b) of subpart A shall be
equal to one year's salary of theprincipal at the time of
death.
(c) A death benefit payment for an adult under this section
shall be made as follows:
(1) First, to the widow or widower.
(2) Second, to the dependent child, or children in equal
shares, if there is no widow or widower.
(3) Third, to the dependent parent, or dependent parents in
equal shares, if there is no widow, widower, or dependent
child.
(4) Fourth, to adult, non-dependent children in equal
shares.
If there is no survivor entitled to payment under this
paragraph (c), no payment shall be made.
(d) A death benefit payment for a child under this section
shall be made as follows: To the surviving parents or legal
guardian. If there are no surviving parents or legal guardian,
no payment shall be made.
(e) As used in this section--each of the terms ``widow'',
``widower'', and ``parent'' shall have the same meaning given
such term by section 8101 of title 5, U.S.C.; ``child'' has the
meaning given in Sec. 192.3(b)(2).
Sec. 192.52 Disability benefits.
(a) Principals who qualify for benefits under Sec. 192.1
and are employees of the U.S. Government are considered for
disability payments under programs administered by the Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP), Department of Labor,
or in the case of foreign service national employees, the
programs may be administered by either OWCP or the
organizational authority in the country of employment which
provides similar coverage under the local compensation plan
established pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 3968. Normal filing
procedures as specified by either OWCP or the local
organizational authority which provides such coverage should be
followed in determining eligibility. Duplicate benefits may not
be received from both OWCP and the local organizational
authority for the same claim. Additional benefits to persons
qualifying for full FECA or similar benefits would not normally
be payable under this subpart, except to foreign service
national employees whose benefit levels are below comparable
benefits payable to U.S. citizen employees under FECA. Foreign
service national employees whose benefit levels are below
comparable benefits payable to U.S. citizens under FECA may
receive benefits under this subpart so that total benefits
received are comparable to the benefits payable to U.S. citizen
employees under FECA.
(b) Family members who do not qualify for either OWCP
benefits or benefits from the organizational authority in the
country of employment which provides similar coverage, and
anyone eligible under Sec. 192.1(a) who does not qualify for
full benefits from OWCP, must file an application for
disability benefits with the Office of Medical Services,
Department of State, for a determination of eligibility under
this subpart, if connected with hostile action abroad.
Applications made in connection with hostile action in domestic
situations will be directed to the Agency Head. Such
applications for disability payments will be considered using
the same criteria for determination as established by OWCP.
(c) Family members who are determined to be disabled by the
Office of Medical Services, or Agency Head using the OWCP
criteria, are eligible to receive a lump-sum payment based on
the following guidelines:
(1) Permanent total disability rate. A lump-sum payment
equal to two year's salary of the Principal at the time of the
qualifying incident.
(2) Temporary total disability rate. A lump-sum payment
computed at 662/3 percent of the monthly
pay rate of the Principal for each month of temporary total
disability, not to exceed one year's salary of the Principal.
(3) Partial disability rate. A lump-sum payment authorized
in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 8106, equal to 662/
3 percent of the difference between the monthly pay
at the time of the qualifying incident and the monthly wage-
earning capacity of the family member after the beginning of
the partial disability, not to exceed one year's salary of the
Principal. For family members with no wage-earning history, a
lump-sum payment equal to 662/3 percent
of the difference between the estimated monthly wage-earning
capacity of the family member at the time of the qualifying
incident and the monthly wage-earning capacity after the
beginning of the partial disability, not to exceed one year's
salary of the Principal may be authorized, using the criteria
established by OWCP for such determination.
(4) Special loss schedule. In addition to the temporary
disability benefits payable in accordance with this subsection,
if there is permanent disability involving the loss, or loss of
use, of a member or function of the body or involving
disfigurement, a lump-sum payment may be authorized at the rate
of 25 percent of the payment authorized in accordance with the
schedule and procedures in 5 U.S.C. 8107 and 20 CFR 10.304. The
Director General of the Foreign Service of State or the Agency
Head, may at their discretion, authorize payments under this
subpart in addition to payments for those organs and members of
the body specified in 5 U.S.C. 8107 and in 20 CFR 10.304. The
provisions of 20 CFR part 10, subpart D, which prevent the
payment of disability compensation and scheduled compensation
simultaneously, shall not apply to these regulations.
Cash payments under this subpart are the responsibility of
the employing agency.
d. Benefits for Hostages in Iraq, Kuwait, or Lebanon
Department of State Regulations, 22 CFR Part 193
Part 193--Benefits for Hostages in Iraq, Kuwait, or Lebanon
Sec. 193.1 Determination of hostage status.
(a) The Secretary of State shall, upon his or her own
initiative or upon application under Sec. 193.3, notify the
appropriate federal authorities, in classified or unclassified
form as he or she determines to be necessary in the best
interests of the affected individuals, the names of persons
whom he or she determines to be in a hostage status within the
meaning of subsection 599C)(d) of Public Law No. 101-513.
(b) In the case of Iraq and Kuwait, hostage status may be
accorded to United States nationals, or family members of
United States nationals,
(1) who are or who have been in a hostage status as defined
in paragraph (b)(2) of this section in Iraq or Kuwait at any
time during the period beginning on August 2, 1990 and
terminating on the date on which United States economic
sanctions are lifted, and
(2) who are being or who have been held in custody by
governmental or military authorities of such country or who are
taking or have taken refuge in the country in fear of being
taken into such custody (including residing in any diplomatic
mission or consular post in that country.)
(c) In the case of Lebanon, hostage status may be accorded
to United States nationals, which, for purposes of this
paragraph, includes lawful permanent residents of the United
States, who have been forcibly detained, held hostage, or
interned for any period of time after June 1, 1982, by any
government (including the agents thereof) or group in Lebanon
for the purpose of coercing the United States or any other
government.
(d) Determinations of the Secretary regarding questions of
eligibility status under 599C of the Act shall be final, but
interested persons may request administrative reconsideration
on the basis of information which was not considered at the
time of the original determination. The criteria for such
determinations are those which are prescribed in the Act and in
these regulations.
(e) Eligibility determinations made under these regulations
shall not be deemed to confer federal employment status for any
purpose.
(f) Eligibility for benefits shall be subject to the
availability of funds under subsection 599C(e) of the Act.
Sec. 193.2 Definitions.
(a) For purposes of eligibility, the term covered family
members shall be defined as prescribed by the Office of
Personnel Management in accordance with 5 CFR Sec. 890.1202.
(b) The term United States economic sanctions against Iraq
means the exercise of authorities under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act by the President with respect to
financial transactions with Iraq.
(c) The term United States national means any individual
who is a citizen of the United States or who, though not a
citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the
United States.
(d) The term lawful permanent resident means any individual
who has been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing
permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance
with the immigration laws, such status not having changed.
Sec. 193.3 Applications.
(a) Individuals who claim any eligibility under section
599C of the Act may apply for benefits in accordance with the
procedures described herein. Family members may submit
applications on behalf of persons who are unable to do so by
reason of their hostage status.
(b) All applications for benefits \1\ shall be attested to
by a declaration under penalty of perjury as prescribed in
section 1746 of title 28 of the United States Code.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Application form may be obtained from the Office of Citizens
Consular Services, Department of State, Washington, DC 20520.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) Applications shall contain all identifying and other
data to support the claim, including, where appropriate, copies
of relevant documents respecting status, salary, and health and
life insurance coverage.
(d) All applications shall be mailed to: Kuwait/Iraq/
Lebanon Hostage Benefits Program, room 4817, Department of
State, Washington, DC 20520-4818.
(e) Applications should be filed as quickly as possible,
because benefits are available only until the funds allocated
under the Act have been spent. When funds have been expended,
the Department will publish a notice in the Federal Register so
stating.
(f) The Department of State may require of applicants such
additional verification of hostage status and other pertinent
information as it deems necessary.
Sec. 193.4 Consideration and denial of claims: Notification of
determinations.
(a) No application under this subpart may be denied by the
Department except upon the written concurrence of the Assistant
Legal Adviser for Consular Affairs.
(b) All applications shall be considered, evaluated, and/or
prepared by the Federal Benefits Section of the Office of
Overseas Citizens Consular Services. All federal agencies or
other interested persons should contact the office at the
address listed in Sec. 193.3(d).
(c) The Department of State shall, where possible, notify
individuals in writing of their eligibility for benefits under
the Act, or ineligibility therefor, within thirty days of the
Department's decision.
2. Department of the Treasury
a. Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations
31 CFR Part 596; Authority--18 U.S.C. 2332d; 31 U.S.C. 321(b); Source--
61 FR 43463, August 23, 1996, unless otherwise noted.
Subpart A--Relation of This Part to Other Laws and Regulations
Sec. 596.101 Relation of this part to other laws and regulations.
(a) This part is separate from, and independent of, the
other parts of this chapter with the exception of part 501 of
this chapter, the recordkeeping and reporting requirements and
license application and other procedures of which apply to this
part. Differing foreign policy and national security contexts
may result in differing interpretations of similar language
among the parts of this chapter. Except as otherwise authorized
in this part, no license or authorization contained in or
issued pursuant to those other parts authorizes any transaction
prohibited by this part. Except as otherwise authorized in this
part, no license or authorization contained in or issued
pursuant to any other provision of law or regulation authorizes
any transaction prohibited by this part. See Sec. 596.503.
(b) No license or authorization contained in or issued
pursuant to this part relieves the involved parties from
complying with any other applicable laws or regulations.
[62 FR 45112; August 11, 1997]
Subpart B--Prohibitions
Sec. 596.201 Prohibited financial transactions.
Except as authorized by regulations, orders, directives,
rulings, instructions, licenses, or otherwise, no United States
person, knowing or having reasonable cause to know that a
country is designated under section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2405, as a country
supporting international terrorism, shall engage in a financial
transaction with the government of that country. Countries
designated under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act
as of the effective date of this part are listed in the
following schedule.
schedule
Cuba.
Iran.
Iraq.
Libya.
North Korea.
Sudan.
Syria.
Sec. 596.202 Evasions; attempts; conspiracies.
Any transaction for the purpose of, or which has the effect
of, evading or avoiding, or which facilitates the evasion or
avoidance of, any of the prohibitions set forth in this part,
is hereby prohibited. Any attempt to violate the prohibitions
set forth in this part is hereby prohibited. Any conspiracy
formed for the purpose of engaging in a transaction prohibited
by this part is hereby prohibited.
Subpart C--General Definitions
Sec. 596.301 Donation.
The term donation means a transfer made in the form of a
gift or charitable contribution.
Sec. 596.302 Effective date.
The term effective date refers to the effective date of the
applicable prohibitions and directives contained in this part
which is 12:01 a.m. EDT, August 22, 1996.
Sec. 596.303 Financial institution.
The term financial institution shall have the definition
given that term in 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2) or the regulations
promulgated thereunder, as from time to time amended.
Note: The breadth of the definition precludes its
reproduction in this section.
Sec. 596.304 Financial transaction.
The term financial transaction shall have the meaning set
forth in 18 U.S.C. 1956(c)(4), as from time to time amended. As
of the effective date, this term includes:
(a) A transaction which in any way or degree affects
interstate or foreign commerce;
(1) Involving the movement of funds by wire
or other means; or
(2) Involving one or more monetary
instruments; or
(3) Involving the transfer of title to any
real property, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft; or
(b) A transaction involving the use of a financial
institution which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce in any way
or degree.
Sec. 596.305 General license.
The term general license means any license or authorization
the terms of which are set forth in this part.
Sec. 596.306 License.
Except as otherwise specified, the term license means any
license or authorization contained in or issued pursuant to
this part.
Sec. 596.307 Monetary instruments.
The term monetary instruments shall have the meaning set
forth in 18 U.S.C. 1956(c)(5), as from time to time amended. As
of the effective date, this term includes coin or currency of
the United States or of any other country, travelers' checks,
personal checks, bank checks, and money orders, or investment
securities or negotiable instruments, in bearer form or
otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery.
Sec. 596.308 Person; entity.
(a) The term person means an individual or entity.
(b) The term entity means a partnership, association,
corporation, or other organization.
Sec. 596.309 Specific license.
The term specific license means any license or
authorization not set forth in this part but issued pursuant to
this part.
Sec. 596.310 Terrorism List Government.
The term Terrorism List Government includes:
(a) The government of a country designated under
section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, as well
as any political subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including the central bank of
such a country;
(b) Any entity owned or controlled by such a
government.
Sec. 596.311 Transaction.
The term transaction shall have the meaning set forth in 18
U.S.C. 1956(c)(3), as from time to time amended. As of the
effective date, this term includes a purchase, sale, loan,
pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or other disposition, and
with respect to a financial institution includes a deposit,
withdrawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of currency,
loan, extension of credit, purchase or sale of any stock, bond,
certificate of deposit, or other monetary instrument, use of a
safe deposit box, or any other payment, transfer, or delivery
by, through, or to a financial institution, by whatever means
effected.
Sec. 596.312 United States.
The term United States means the United States, including
its territories and possessions.
Sec. 596.313 United States person.
The term United States person means any United States
citizen or national, permanent resident alien, juridical person
organized under the laws of the United States, or any person in
the United States.
Subpart D--Interpretations
Sec. 596.401 Reference to amended sections.
Except as otherwise specified, reference to any section of
this part or to any regulation, ruling, order, instruction,
direction, or license issued pursuant to this part refers to
the same as currently amended.
Sec. 596.402 Effect of amendment.
Any amendment, modification, or revocation of any section
of this part or of any order, regulation, ruling, instruction,
or license issued by or under the direction of the Director of
the Office of Foreign Assets Control does not, unless otherwise
specifically provided, affect any act done or omitted to be
done, or any civil or criminal suit or proceeding commenced or
pending prior to such amendment, modification, or revocation.
All penalties, forfeitures, and liabilities under any such
order, regulation, ruling, instruction, or license continue and
may be enforced as if such amendment, modification, or
revocation had not been made.
Sec. 596.403 Transactions incidental to a licensed transaction.
Any transaction ordinarily incident to a licensed
transaction and necessary to give effect thereto is also
authorized.
Sec. 596.404 Financial transactions transferred through a bank of a
Terrorism List Government.
For the purposes of this part only, a financial transaction
not originated by a Terrorism List Government, but transferred
to the United States through a bank owned or controlled by a
Terrorism List Government, shall not be deemed a financial
transaction with the government of a country supporting
international terrorism pursuant to Sec. 596.201.
Subpart E--Licenses, Authorizations and Statements of Licensing Policy
Sec. 596.501 Effect of license or authorization.
(a) No license or other authorization contained in this
part, or otherwise issued by or under the direction of the
Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, authorizes or
validates any transaction effected prior to the issuance of the
license, unless specifically provided in such license or other
authorization.
(b) No regulation, ruling, instruction, or license
authorizes a transaction prohibited under this part unless the
regulation, ruling, instruction, or license is issued by the
Office of Foreign Assets Control and specifically refers to a
part in 31 CFR chapter V. No regulation, ruling, instruction,
or license referring to this part authorizes any transactions
prohibited by any provision of this chapter unless the
regulation, ruling, instruction or license specifically refers
to such provision.
(c) Any regulation, ruling, instruction or license
authorizing any transaction otherwise prohibited under this
part has the effect of removing a prohibition or prohibitions
contained in this part from the transaction, but only to the
extent specifically stated by its terms. Unless the regulation,
ruling, instruction or license otherwise specifies, such an
authorization does not create any right, duty, obligation,
claim, or interest in, or with respect to, any property which
would not otherwise exist under ordinary principles of law.
Sec. 596.502 Exclusion from licenses and authorizations.
The Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control
reserves the right to exclude any person, property, or
transaction from the operation of any license, or from the
privileges therein conferred, or to restrict the applicability
thereof with respect to particular persons, property,
transactions, or classes thereof. Such action is binding upon
all persons receiving actual or constructive notice of such
exclusion or restriction.
Sec. 596.503 Financial transactions with a Terrorism List Government
otherwise subject to 31 CFR chapter V.
United States persons are authorized to engage in financial
transactions with a Terrorism List Government that is subject
to regulations contained in parts of 31 CFR chapter V other
than this part to the extent and subject to the conditions
stated in such other parts, or in any regulations, orders,
directives, rulings, instructions, or licenses issued pursuant
thereto.
Sec. 596.504 Certain financial transactions with Terrorism List
Governments authorized.
(a) United States persons are authorized to engage in all
financial transactions with a Terrorism List Government that is
not otherwise subject to 31 CFR chapter V, except for a
transfer from a Terrorism List Government:
(1) Constituting a donation to a United States
person; or
(2) With respect to which the United States person
knows (including knowledge based on advice from an
agent of the United States Government), or has
reasonable cause to believe, that the transfer poses a
risk of furthering terrorist acts in the United States.
(b) Nothing in this section authorizes the return of a
transfer prohibited by paragraph (a)(2) of this section.
Sec. 596.505 Certain transactions related to stipends and scholarships
authorized.
(a) United States persons are authorized to engage in all
financial transactions with respect to stipends and
scholarships covering tuition and related educational, living
and travel expenses provided by the Government of Syria to
Syrian nationals or the Government of Sudan to Sudanese
nationals who are enrolled as students in an accredited
educational institution in the United States. Representations
made by an accredited educational institution concerning the
status of a student maybe relied upon in determining the
applicability of this section.
(b) Nothing in this section authorizes a transaction
prohibited by Sec. 596.504(a)(2).
[61 FR 67944, Dec. 26, 1996]
Subpart F--Reports
Sec. 596.601 Records and reports.
For provisions relating to records and reports, see subpart
C of part 501 of this chapter.
[62 FR 45112; August 11, 1997]
Subpart G--Penalties
Sec. 596.701 Penalties.
Attention is directed to 18 U.S.C. 2332d, as added by
Public Law 104-132, section 321, which provides that, except as
provided in regulations issued by the Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, a United
States person, knowing or having reasonable cause to know that
a country is designated under section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2405, as a country
supporting international terrorism, engages in a financial
transaction with the government of that country, shall be fined
under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned for not more
than 10 years, or both.
Subpart H--Procedures
Sec. 596.801 Procedures.
For license application procedures and procedures relating
to amendments, modifications, or revocations of licenses;
administrative decisions; rulemaking; and requests for
documents pursuant to the Freedom of Information and Privacy
Acts (5 U.S.C. 552 and 552a), see subpart D of part 501 of this
chapter.
[62 FR 45112; August 11, 1997]
Sec. 596.802 Delegation by the Secretary of the Treasury.
Any action which the Secretary of the Treasury is
authorized to take pursuant to section 321 of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214, 1254 (18 U.S.C. 2332d), may be taken by the
Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, or by any other
person to whom the Secretary of the Treasury has delegated
authority so to act.
[62 FR 45112 removed Sec. Sec. 596.802-4 and 596.806, and
redesignated Sec. 596.805 as Sec. 506.802; August 11, 1997.]
Subpart I--Paperwork Reduction Act
Sec. 596.901 Paperwork Reduction Act notice.
For approval by the Office of Management and Budget
(``OMB'') under the Paperwork Reduction Act of information
collections relating to recordkeeping and reporting
requirements, to licensing procedures (including those pursuant
to statements of licensing policy), and to other procedures,
see Sec. 501.901 of this chapter. An agency may not conduct or
sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a
collection of information unless it displays a valid control
number assigned by OMB.
[62 FR 45112; August 11, 1997]
Appendices to Chapter V
Notes: The alphabetical lists below provide the following
information (to the extent known) concerning blocked persons,
specially designated nationals, specially designated
terrorists, specially designated narcotics traffickers and
blocked vessels.
For blocked individuals: name and title (known aliases),
address, (other identifying information), (the notation
``individual''), [sanctions program under which the individual
is blocked].
For blocked entities: name (known former or alternate
names), address, [sanctions program under which the entity is
blocked].
For blocked vessels: name, sanctions program under which
the vessel is blocked, registration of vessel, type, size in
dead weight and/or gross tons, call sign, vessel owner, and
alternate names.
Abbreviations: ``a.k.a.'' means ``also known as'';
``f.k.a.'' means ``formerly known as''; ``n.k.a.'' means ``now
known as''; ``DOB'' means ``date of birth''; ``DWT'' means
``Deadweight''; ``FRY (S&M)'' means ``Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)''; ``GRT'' means ``Gross
Registered Tonnage''; ``POB'' means ``place of birth'';
``SRBH'' refers to the suspended sanctions against the Bosnian
Serbs.
Reference to regulatory parts in chapter V: * * * \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For complete text of appendices, see 31 CFR Part 596 as
prepared by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, published by the
National Archives, and occasionally updated in the Federal Register.
b. Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations
31 CFR Part 597; Authority--31 U.S.C. 321(b); Public Law 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214, 1248-53 (8 U.S.C. 1189, 18 U.S.C. 2339B); Source--62 FR
52493, October 8, 1997, unless otherwise noted.
Subpart A--Relation of This Part to Other Laws and Regulations
Sec. Sec. 597.101 Relation of this part to other laws and regulations.
(a) This part is separate from, and independent of, the
other parts of this chapter, with the exception of part 501 of
this chapter, the recordkeeping and reporting requirements and
license application and other procedures of which apply to this
part. Differing statutory authority and foreign policy and
national security contexts may result in differing
interpretations of similar language among the parts of this
chapter. No license or authorization contained in or issued
pursuant to those other parts authorizes any transaction
prohibited by this part. No license or authorization contained
in or issued pursuant to any other provision of law or
regulation authorizes any transaction prohibited by this part.
(b) No license or authorization contained in or issued
pursuant to this part relieves the involved parties from
complying with any other applicable laws or regulations. This
part does not implement, construe, or limit the scope of any
other part of this chapter, including (but not limited to) the
Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, part 595 of this chapter, and
does not excuse any person from complying with any other part
of this chapter, including (but not limited to) part 595 of
this chapter.
(c) This part does not implement, construe, or limit the
scope of any criminal statute, including (but not limited to)
18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1) and 2339A, and does not excuse any person
from complying with any criminal statute, including (but not
limited to) 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2339A.
Subpart B--Prohibitions
Sec. 597.201 Prohibited transactions involving blocked assets or funds
of foreign terrorist organizations or their agents.
(a) Upon notification to Congress of the Secretary of
State's intent to designate an organization as a foreign
terrorist organization pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1189(a), until the
publication in the Federal Register as described in paragraph
(c) of this section, any U.S. financial institution receiving
notice from the Secretary of the Treasury by means of order,
directive, instruction, regulation, ruling, license, or
otherwise shall, except as otherwise provided in such notice,
block all financial transactions involving any assets of such
organization within the possession or control of such U.S.
financial institution until further directive from the
Secretary of the Treasury, Act of Congress, or order of court.
(b) Except as otherwise authorized by order, directive,
instruction, regulation, ruling, license, or otherwise, from
and after the designation of an organization as a foreign
terrorist organization pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1189(a), any U.S.
financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession
of or control over any funds in which the designated foreign
terrorist organization or its agent has an interest shall:
(1) Retain possession of or maintain control over
such funds; and
(2) Report to the Secretary of the Treasury the
existence of such funds in accordance with Sec. 501.603
of this chapter.
(c) Publication in the Federal Register of the designation
of an organization as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. 1189(a) shall be deemed to constitute a further
directive from the Secretary of the Treasury for purposes of
paragraph (a) of this section, and shall require the actions
contained in paragraph (b) of this section.
(d) The requirements of paragraph (b) of this section shall
remain in effect until the effective date of an administrative,
judicial, or legislative revocation of the designation of an
organization as a foreign terrorist organization, or until the
designation lapses, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1189.
(e) When a transaction results in the blocking of funds at
a financial institution pursuant to this section and a party to
the transaction believes the funds have been blocked due to
mistaken identity, that party may seek to have such funds
unblocked pursuant to the administrative procedures set forth
in Sec. 501.806 of this chapter. Requests for the unblocking of
funds pursuant to Sec. 501.806 must be submitted to the
attention of the Compliance Programs Division.
Sec. 597.202 Effect of transfers violating the provisions of this part.
(a) Any transfer after the effective date which is in
violation of Sec. 597.201 or any other provision of this part
or of any regulation, order, directive, ruling, instruction,
license, or other authorization hereunder and involves any
funds or assets held in the name of a foreign terrorist
organization or its agent or in which a foreign terrorist
organization or its agent has or has had an interest since such
date, is null and void and shall not be the basis for the
assertion or recognition of any interest in or right, remedy,
power or privilege with respect to such funds or assets.
(b) No transfer before the effective date shall be the
basis for the assertion or recognition of any right, remedy,
power, or privilege with respect to, or interest in, any funds
or assets held in the name of a foreign terrorist organization
or its agent or in which a foreign terrorist organization or
its agent has an interest, or has had an interest since such
date, unless the financial institution with whom such funds or
assets are held or maintained, prior to such date, had written
notice of the transfer or by any written evidence had
recognized such transfer.
(c) Unless otherwise provided, an appropriate license or
other authorization issued by or pursuant to the direction or
authorization of the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets
Control before, during, or after a transfer shall validate such
transfer or render it enforceable to the same extent that it
would be valid or enforceable but for the provisions of this
part, and any regulation, order, directive, ruling,
instruction, or license issued hereunder.
(d) Transfers of funds or assets which otherwise would be
null and void or unenforceable by virtue of the provisions of
this section shall not be deemed to be null and void or
unenforceable as to any financial institution with whom such
funds or assets were held or maintained (and as to such
financial institution only) in cases in which such financial
institution is able to establish to the satisfaction of the
Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control each of the
following:
(1) Such transfer did not represent a willful
violation of the provisions of this part by the
financial institution with whom such funds or assets
were held or maintained;
(2) The financial institution with which such funds
or assets were held or maintained did not have
reasonable cause to know or suspect, in view of all the
facts and circumstances known or available to such
institution, that such transfer required a license or
authorization by or pursuant to this part and was not
so licensed or authorized, or if a license or
authorization did purport to cover the transfer, that
such license or authorization had been obtained by
misrepresentation of a third party or the withholding
of material facts or was otherwise fraudulently
obtained; and
(3) The financial institution with which such funds
or assets were held or maintained filed with the Office
of Foreign Assets Control a report setting forth in
full the circumstances relating to such transfer
promptly upon discovery that:
(i) Such transfer was in violation of the
provisions of this part or any regulation,
ruling, instruction, license, or other
direction or authorization hereunder; or
(ii) Such transfer was not licensed or
authorized by the Director of the Office of
Foreign Assets Control; or
(iii) If a license did purport to cover the
transfer, such license had been obtained by
misrepresentation of a third party or the
withholding of material facts or was otherwise
fraudulently obtained.
Note to paragraph (d): The filing of a report in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph (d)(3) of this section shall
not be deemed evidence that the terms of paragraphs (d)(1) and
(2) of this section have been satisfied.
(e) Except for exercises of judicial authority pursuant to
8 U.S.C. 1189(b), unless licensed or authorized pursuant to
this part, any attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution,
garnishment, or other judicial process is null and void with
respect to any funds or assets which, on or since the effective
date, were in the possession or control of a U.S. financial
institution and were held in the name of a foreign terrorist
organization or its agent or in which there existed an interest
of a foreign terrorist organization or its agent.
Sec. 597.203 Holding of funds in interest-bearing accounts; investment
and reinvestment.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, or
as otherwise directed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control,
any U.S. financial institution holding funds subject to
Sec. 597.201(b) shall hold or place such funds in a blocked
interest-bearing account which is in the name of the foreign
terrorist organization or its agent and which is located in the
United States.
(b)(1) For purposes of this section, the term interest-
bearing account means a blocked account:
(i) in a federally-insured U.S. bank, thrift
institution, or credit union, provided the funds are
earning interest at rates which are commercially
reasonable for the amount of funds in the account or
certificate of deposit; or
(ii) with a broker or dealer registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, provided the funds are invested
in a money market fund or in U.S. Treasury Bills.
(2) Funds held or placed in a blocked interest-bearing
account pursuant to this paragraph may not be invested in
instruments the maturity of which exceeds 180 days. If interest
is credited to a separate blocked account or sub-account, the
name of the account party on each account must be the same and
must clearly indicate the foreign terrorist organization or
agent having an interest in the accounts.
(c) Blocked funds held as of the effective date in the form
of stocks, bonds, debentures, letters of credit, or instruments
which cannot be negotiated for the purpose of placing the funds
in a blocked interest-bearing account pursuant to paragraph (a)
may continue to be held in the form of the existing security or
instrument until liquidation or maturity, provided that any
dividends, interest income, or other proceeds derived therefrom
are paid into a blocked interest-bearing account in accordance
with the requirements of this section.
(d) Funds subject to this section may not be held,
invested, or reinvested in a manner in which an immediate
financial or economic benefit or access accrues to the foreign
terrorist organization or its agent.
Sec. 597.204 Evasions; attempts; conspiracies.
Any transaction for the purpose of, or which has the effect
of, evading or avoiding, or which facilitates the evasion or
avoidance of, any of the prohibitions set forth in this part,
is hereby prohibited. Any attempt to violate the prohibitions
set forth in this part is hereby prohibited. Any conspiracy
formed for the purpose of engaging in a transaction prohibited
by this part is hereby prohibited.
Subpart C--General Definitions
Sec. 597.301 Agent.
(a) The term agent means:
(1) Any person owned or controlled by a foreign
terrorist organization; or
(2) Any person to the extent that such person is, or
has been, or to the extent that there is reasonable
cause to believe that such person is, or has been,
since the effective date, acting or purporting to act
directly or indirectly on behalf of a foreign terrorist
organization.
(b) The term agent includes, but is not limited to, any
person determined by the Director of the Office of Foreign
Assets Control to be an agent as defined in paragraph (a) of
this section.
Note to Sec. 597.301: Please refer to the appendices at the
end of this chapter for listings of persons designated as
foreign terrorist organizations or their agents. Section
501.807 of this chapter sets forth the procedures to be
followed by a person seeking administrative reconsideration of
a designation as an agent, or who wishes to assert that the
circumstances resulting in the designation as an agent are no
longer applicable.
Sec. 597.302 Assets.
The term assets includes, but is not limited to, money,
checks, drafts, bullion, bank deposits, savings accounts,
debts, indebtedness, obligations, notes, guarantees,
debentures, stocks, bonds, coupons, any other financial
instruments, bankers acceptances, mortgages, pledges, liens or
other rights in the nature of security, warehouse receipts,
bills of lading, trust receipts, bills of sale, any other
evidences of title, ownership or indebtedness, letters of
credit and any documents relating to any rights or obligations
thereunder, powers of attorney, goods, wares, merchandise,
chattels, stocks on hand, ships, goods on ships, real estate
mortgages, deeds of trust, vendors' sales agreements, land
contracts, leaseholds, ground rents, real estate and any other
interest therein, options, negotiable instruments, trade
acceptances, royalties, book accounts, accounts payable,
judgments, patents, trademarks or copyrights, insurance
policies, safe deposit boxes and their contents, annuities,
pooling agreements, services of any nature whatsoever,
contracts of any nature whatsoever, and any other property,
real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible, or interest
or interests therein, present, future or contingent.
Sec. 597.303 Blocked account; blocked funds.
The terms blocked account and blocked funds shall mean any
account or funds subject to the prohibitions in Sec. 597.201
held in the name of a foreign terrorist organization or its
agent or in which a foreign terrorist organization or its agent
has an interest, and with respect to which payments, transfers,
exportations, withdrawals, or other dealings may not be made or
effected except pursuant to an authorization or license from
the Office of Foreign Assets Control authorizing such action.
Sec. 597.304 Designation.
The term designation includes both the designation and
redesignation of a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to 8
U.S.C. 1189.
Sec. 597.305 Effective date.
Except as that term is used in Sec. 597.201(d), the term
effective date refers to the effective date of the applicable
prohibitions and directives contained in this part which is
October 6, 1997, or, in the case of foreign terrorist
organizations designated after that date and their agents, the
earlier of the date on which a financial institution receives
actual or constructive notice of such designation or of the
Secretary of Treasury's exercise of his authority to block
financial transactions pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1189(a)(2)(C) and
Sec. 597.201(a).
Sec. 597.306 Entity.
The term entity includes a partnership, association,
corporation, or other organization, group, or subgroup.
Sec. 597.307 Financial institution.
The term financial institution shall have the definition
given that term in 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2) as from time to time
amended, notwithstanding the definition of that term in 31 CFR
part 103.
Note: The breadth of the statutory definition of financial
institution precludes its reproduction in this section. Among
the types of businesses covered are insured banks (as defined
in 12 U.S.C. 1813(h)), commercial banks or trust companies,
private bankers, agencies or branches of a foreign bank in the
United States, insured institutions (as defined in 12 U.S.C.
1724(a)), thrift institutions, brokers or dealers registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission under 15 U.S.C. 78a
et seq., securities or commodities brokers and dealers,
investment bankers or investment companies, currency exchanges,
issuers, redeemers, or cashiers of traveler's checks, checks,
money orders, or similar instruments, credit card system
operators, insurance companies, dealers in precious metals,
stones or jewels, pawnbrokers, loan or finance companies,
travel agencies, licensed senders of money, telegraph
companies, businesses engaged in vehicle sales, including
automobile, airplane or boat sales, persons involved in real
estate closings and settlements, the United States Postal
Service, a casino, gambling casino, or gaming establishment
with an annual gaming revenue of more than $1,000,000 as
further described in 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2), or agencies of the
United States Government or of a State or local government
carrying out a duty or power of any of the businesses described
in 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2).
Sec. 597.308 Financial transaction.
The term financial transaction means a transaction
involving the transfer or movement of funds, whether by wire or
other means.
Sec. 597.309 Foreign terrorist organization.
The term foreign terrorist organization means an
organization designated or redesignated as a foreign terrorist
organization, or with respect to which the Secretary of State
has notified Congress of the intention to designate as a
foreign terrorist organization, under 8 U.S.C. 1189(a).
Sec. 597.310 Funds.
The term funds includes coin or currency of the United
States or any other country, traveler's checks, personal
checks, bank checks, money orders, stocks, bonds, debentures,
drafts, letters of credit, any other negotiable instrument, and
any electronic representation of any of the foregoing. An
electronic representation of any of the foregoing includes any
form of digital or electronic cash, coin, or currency in use
currently or placed in use in the future.
Sec. 597.311 General license.
The term general license means any license or authorization
the terms of which are set forth in this part.
Sec. 597.312 Interest.
Except as otherwise provided in this part, the term
interest when used with respect to funds or assets (e.g., ``an
interest in funds'') means an interest of any nature
whatsoever, direct or indirect.
Sec. 597.313 License.
Except as otherwise specified, the term license means any
license or authorization contained in or issued pursuant to
this part.
Sec. 597.314 Person.
The term person means an individual or entity.
Sec. 597.315 Specific license.
The term specific license means any license or
authorization not set forth in this part but issued pursuant to
this part.
Sec. 597.316 Transaction.
The term transaction shall have the meaning set forth in 18
U.S.C. 1956(c)(3), as from time to time amended. As of the
effective date, this term includes a purchase, sale, loan,
pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or other disposition of any
asset, and with respect to a financial institution includes a
deposit, withdrawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of
currency, loan, extension of credit, purchase or sale of any
stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary
instrument, use of a safe deposit box, or any other payment,
transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial
institution, by whatever means effected.
Sec. 597.317 Transfer.
The term transfer means any actual or purported act or
transaction, whether or not evidenced by writing, and whether
or not done or performed within the United States, the purpose,
intent, or effect of which is to create, surrender, release,
convey, transfer, or alter, directly or indirectly, any right,
remedy, power, privilege, or interest with respect to any
property and, without limitation upon the foregoing, shall
include the making, execution, or delivery of any assignment,
power, conveyance, check, declaration, deed, deed of trust,
power of attorney, power of appointment, bill of sale,
mortgage, receipt, agreement, contract, certificate, gift,
sale, affidavit, or statement; the making of any payment; the
setting off of any obligation or credit; the appointment of any
agent, trustee, or fiduciary; the creation or transfer of any
lien; the issuance, docketing, filing, or levy of or under any
judgment, decree, attachment, injunction, execution, or other
judicial or administrative process or order, or the service of
any garnishment; the acquisition of any interest of any nature
whatsoever by reason of a judgment or decree of any foreign
country; the fulfillment of any condition; the exercise of any
power of appointment, power of attorney, or other power; or the
acquisition, disposition, transportation, importation,
exportation, or withdrawal of any security.
Sec. 597.318 United States.
The term United States means the United States, its
territories, states, commonwealths, districts, and possessions,
and all areas under the jurisdiction or authority thereof.
Sec. 597.319 U.S. financial institution.
The term U.S. financial institution means:
(a) Any financial institution organized under the
laws of the United States, including such financial
institution's foreign branches;
(b) Any financial institution operating or doing
business in the United States; or
(c) Those branches, offices and agencies of foreign
financial institutions which are located in the United
States, but not such foreign financial institutions'
other foreign branches, offices, or agencies.
Subpart D--Interpretations
Sec. 597.401 Reference to amended sections.
Except as otherwise specified, reference to any section of
this part or to any regulation, ruling, order, instruction,
direction, or license issued pursuant to this part shall be
deemed to refer to the same as currently amended.
Sec. 597.402 Effect of amendment.
Any amendment, modification, or revocation of any section
of this part or of any order, regulation, ruling, instruction,
or license issued by or under the direction of the Director of
the Office of Foreign Assets Control shall not, unless
otherwise specifically provided, be deemed to affect any act
done or omitted to be done, or any civil or criminal suit or
proceeding commenced or pending prior to such amendment,
modification, or revocation. All penalties, forfeitures, and
liabilities under any such order, regulation, ruling,
instruction, or license shall continue and may be enforced as
if such amendment, modification, or revocation had not been
made.
Sec. 597.403 Termination and acquisition of an interest in blocked
funds.
(a) Whenever a transaction licensed or authorized by or
pursuant to this part results in the transfer of funds
(including any interest in funds) away from a foreign terrorist
organization or its agent, such funds shall no longer be deemed
to be funds in which the foreign terrorist organization or its
agent has or has had an interest, or which are held in the name
of a foreign terrorist organization or its agent, unless there
exists in the funds another interest of a foreign terrorist
organization or its agent, the transfer of which has not been
effected pursuant to license or other authorization.
(b) Unless otherwise specifically provided in a license or
authorization issued pursuant to this part, if funds (including
any interest in funds) are or at any time since the effective
date have been held by a foreign terrorist organization or its
agent, or at any time thereafter are transferred or attempted
to be transferred to a foreign terrorist organization or its
agent, including by the making of any contribution to or for
the benefit of a foreign terrorist organization or its agent,
such funds shall be deemed to be funds in which there exists an
interest of the foreign terrorist organization or its agent.
Sec. 597.404 Setoffs prohibited.
A setoff against blocked funds (including a blocked
account) by a U.S. financial institution is a prohibited
transaction under Sec. 597.201 if effected after the effective
date.
Sec. 597.405 Transactions incidental to a licensed transaction.
Any transaction ordinarily incident to a licensed
transaction and necessary to give effect thereto is also
authorized, except a transaction by an unlicensed, foreign
terrorist organization or its agent or involving a debit to a
blocked account or a transfer of blocked funds not explicitly
authorized within the terms of the license.
Sec. 597.406 Offshore transactions.
The prohibitions contained in Sec. 597.201 apply to
transactions by U.S. financial institutions in locations
outside the United States with respect to funds or assets which
the U.S. financial institution knows, or becomes aware, are
held in the name of a foreign terrorist organization or its
agent, or in which the U.S. financial institution knows, or
becomes aware that, a foreign terrorist organization or its
agent has or has had an interest since the effective date.
Subpart E--Licenses, Authorizations, and Statements of Licensing Policy
Sec. 597.501 Effect of license or authorization.
(a) No license or other authorization contained in this
part, or otherwise issued by or under the direction of the
Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, shall be
deemed to authorize or validate any transaction effected prior
to the issuance of the license, unless specifically provided in
such license or authorization.
(b) No regulation, ruling, instruction, or license
authorizes any transaction prohibited under this part unless
the regulation, ruling, instruction, or license is issued by
the Office of Foreign Assets Control and specifically refers to
this part. No regulation, ruling, instruction, or license
referring to this part shall be deemed to authorize any
transaction prohibited by any provision of this chapter unless
the regulation, ruling, instruction or license specifically
refers to such provision.
(c) Any regulation, ruling, instruction, or license
authorizing any transaction otherwise prohibited under this
part has the effect of removing a prohibition or prohibitions
contained in this part from the transaction, but only to the
extent specifically stated by its terms. Unless the regulation,
ruling, instruction, or license otherwise specifies, such an
authorization does not create any right, duty, obligation,
claim, or interest in, or with respect to, any property which
would not otherwise exist under ordinary principles of law.
Sec. 597.502 Exclusion from licenses and authorizations.
The Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control
reserves the right to exclude any person, property, or
transaction from the operation of any license, or from the
privileges therein conferred, or to restrict the applicability
thereof with respect to particular persons, property,
transactions, or classes thereof. Such action shall be binding
upon all persons receiving actual or constructive notice of
such exclusion or restriction.
Sec. 597.503 Payments and transfers to blocked accounts in U.S.
financial institutions.
(a) Any payment of funds or transfer of credit or other
financial or economic resources or assets by a financial
institution into a blocked account in a U.S. financial
institution is authorized, provided that a transfer from a
blocked account pursuant to this authorization may only be made
to another blocked account held in the same name on the books
of the same U.S. financial institution.
(b) This section does not authorize any transfer from a
blocked account within the United States to an account held
outside the United States.
Note to Sec. 597.503: Please refer to Sec. Sec. 501.603 and
597.601 of this chapter for mandatory reporting requirements
regarding financial transfers.
Sec. 597.504 Entries in certain accounts for normal service charges
authorized.
(a) U.S. financial institutions are hereby authorized to
debit any blocked account with such U.S. financial institution
in payment or reimbursement for normal service charges owed to
such U.S. financial institution by the owner of such blocked
account.
(b) As used in this section, the term normal service charge
shall include charges in payment or reimbursement for interest
due; cable, telegraph, or telephone charges; postage costs;
custody fees; small adjustment charges to correct bookkeeping
errors; and, but not by way of limitation, minimum balance
charges, notary and protest fees, and charges for reference
books, photostats, credit reports, transcripts of statements,
registered mail insurance, stationery and supplies, check
books, and other similar items.
Sec. 597.505 Payment for certain legal services.
Specific licenses may be issued, on a case-by-case basis,
authorizing receipt of payment of professional fees and
reimbursement of incurred expenses through a U.S. financial
institution for the following legal services by U.S. persons:
(a) Provision of legal advice and counseling to a
foreign terrorist organization or an agent thereof on
the requirements of and compliance with the laws of any
jurisdiction within the United States, provided that
such advice and counseling is not provided to
facilitate transactions in violation of any of the
prohibitions of this part;
(b) Representation of a foreign terrorist
organization or an agent thereof when named as a
defendant in or otherwise made a party to domestic U.S.
legal, arbitration, or administrative proceedings;
(c) Initiation and conduct of domestic U.S. legal,
arbitration, or administrative proceedings on behalf of
a foreign terrorist organization or an agent thereof;
(d) Representation of a foreign terrorist
organization or an agent thereof before any federal or
state agency with respect to the imposition,
administration, or enforcement of U.S. sanctions
against a foreign terrorist organization or an agent
thereof;
(e) Provision of legal services to a foreign
terrorist organization or an agent thereof in any other
context in which prevailing U.S. law requires access to
legal counsel at public expense; and
(f) Representation of a foreign terrorist
organization seeking judicial review of a designation
before the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
1189(b)(1).
Subpart F--Reports
Sec. 597.601 Records and reports.
For provisions relating to records and reports, see subpart
C of part 501 of this chapter; provided, however, that all of
the powers afforded the Director pursuant to the first 3
sentences of Sec. 501.602 of this chapter may also be exercised
by the Attorney General in conducting administrative
investigations pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2339B(e); provided
further, that the investigative authority of the Director
pursuant to Sec. 501.602 of this chapter shall be exercised in
accordance with 18 U.S.C. 2339B(e); and provided further, that
for purposes of this part no person other than a U.S. financial
institution and its directors, officers, employees, and agents
shall be required to maintain records or to file any reports or
furnish any information under Sec. Sec. 501.601, 501.602, or
501.603 of this chapter.
Subpart G--Penalties
Sec. 597.701 Penalties.
(a) Attention is directed to 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1), as
added by Public Law 104-132, 110 Stat. 1250-1253, section 303,
which provides that whoever, within the United States or
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, knowingly
provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined
under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned for not more
than 10 years, or both.
(b) Attention is directed to 18 U.S.C. 2339B(b), as added
by Public Law 104-132, 110 Stat. 1250-1253, section 303, which
provides that, except as authorized by the Secretary of the
Treasury, any financial institution that knowingly fails to
retain possession of or maintain control over funds in which a
foreign terrorist organization or its agent has an interest, or
to report the existence of such funds in accordance with these
regulations, shall be subject to a civil penalty in an amount
that is the greater of $50,000 per violation, or twice the
amount of which the financial institution was required to
retain possession or control.
(c) Attention is directed to 18 U.S.C. 1001, which provides
that whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of
the United States, knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals
or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact,
or makes any materially false, fictitious or fraudulent
statement or representation, or makes or uses any false writing
or document knowing the same to contain any materially false,
fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined
under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than
5 years, or both.
(d) Conduct covered by this part may also be subject to
relevant provisions of other applicable laws.
Sec. 597.702 Prepenalty notice.
(a) When required. If the Director of the Office of Foreign
Assets Control has reasonable cause to believe that there has
occurred a violation of any provision of this part or a
violation of the provisions of any license, ruling, regulation,
order, direction or instruction issued by or pursuant to the
direction or authorization of the Secretary of the Treasury
pursuant to this part, and the Director, acting in coordination
with the Attorney General, determines that civil penalty
proceedings are warranted, the Director shall issue to the
person concerned a notice of intent to impose a monetary
penalty. The prepenalty notice shall be issued whether or not
another agency has taken any action with respect to this
matter.
(b) Contents.--(1) Facts of violation. The prepenalty
notice shall describe the violation, specify the laws and
regulations allegedly violated, and state the amount of the
proposed monetary penalty.
(2) Right to respond. The prepenalty notice also shall
inform the respondent of respondent's right to respond within
30 days of mailing of the notice as to why a monetary penalty
should not be imposed, or, if imposed, why it should be in a
lesser amount than proposed.
Sec. 597.703 Response to prepenalty notice.
(a) Time within which to respond. The respondent shall have
30 days from the date of mailing of the prepenalty notice to
respond in writing to the Director of the Office of Foreign
Assets Control.
(b) Form and contents of written response. The written
response need not be in any particular form, but shall contain
information sufficient to indicate that it is in response to
the prepenalty notice. It should respond to the allegations in
the prepenalty notice and set forth the reasons why the
respondent believes the penalty should not be imposed or, if
imposed, why it should be in a lesser amount than proposed.
(c) Informal settlement. In addition or as an alternative
to a written response to a prepenalty notice pursuant to this
section, the respondent or respondent's representative may
contact the Office of Foreign Assets Control as advised in the
prepenalty notice to propose the settlement of allegations
contained in the prepenalty notice and related matters. In the
event of settlement at the prepenalty stage, the prepenalty
notice will be withdrawn, the respondent is not required to
take a written position on allegations contained in the
prepenalty notice, and the Office of Foreign Assets Control
will make no final determination as to whether a violation
occurred. The amount accepted in settlement of allegations in a
prepenalty notice may vary from the civil penalty that might
finally be imposed in the event of a formal determination of
violation. In the event no settlement is reached, the 30-day
period specified in paragraph (a) of this section for written
response to the prepenalty notice remains in effect unless
additional time is granted by the Office of Foreign Assets
Control.
Sec. 597.704 Penalty notice.
(a) No violation. If, after considering any written
response to the prepenalty notice and any relevant facts, the
Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control determines
that there was no violation by the respondent, the Director
promptly shall notify the respondent in writing of that
determination and that no monetary penalty will be imposed.
(b) Violation. (1) If, after considering any written
response to the prepenalty notice and any relevant facts, the
Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control determines
that there was a violation by the respondent, the Director
promptly shall issue a written notice of the imposition of the
monetary penalty on the respondent. The issuance of a written
notice of the imposition of a monetary penalty shall constitute
final agency action.
(2) The penalty notice shall inform the respondent that
payment of the assessed penalty must be made within 30 days of
the mailing of the penalty notice.
(3) The penalty notice shall inform the respondent of the
requirement to furnish respondent's taxpayer identification
number pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 7701 and that the Department
intends to use such number for the purposes of collecting and
reporting on any delinquent penalty amount in the event of a
failure to pay the penalty imposed.
Sec. 597.705 Administrative collection; referral to United States
Department of Justice.
In the event that the respondent does not pay the penalty
imposed pursuant to this part or make payment arrangements
acceptable to the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets
Control within 30 days of the mailing of the written notice of
the imposition of the penalty, the matter may be referred for
administrative collection measures by the Department of the
Treasury or to the United States Department of Justice for
appropriate action to recover the penalty in a civil suit in a
Federal district court.
Subpart H--Procedures
Sec. 597.801 Procedures.
For license application procedures and procedures relating
to amendments, modifications, or revocations of licenses;
administrative decisions; rulemaking; and requests for
documents pursuant to the Freedom of Information and Privacy
Acts (5 U.S.C. 552 and 552a), see subpart D of part 501 of this
chapter.
Sec. 597.802 Delegation by the Secretary of the Treasury.
Any action which the Secretary of the Treasury is
authorized to take pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1189 or 18 U.S.C.
2339B, as added by Public Law 104-132, 110 Stat. 1248-1253,
sections 302 and 303, may be taken by the Director of the
Office of Foreign Assets Control, or by any other person to
whom the Secretary of the Treasury has delegated authority so
to act.
Subpart I--Paperwork Reduction Act
Sec. 597.901 Paperwork Reduction Act notice.
For approval by the Office of Management and Budget
(``OMB'') under the Paperwork Reduction Act of information
collections relating to recordkeeping and reporting
requirements, to licensing procedures (including those pursuant
to statements of licensing policy), and to other procedures,
see Sec. 501.901 of this chapter. An agency may not conduct or
sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a
collection of information unless it displays a valid control
number assigned by OMB.
3. Federal Aviation Administration
a. Airport Security
Federal Aviation Administration Regulations, 14 CFR Part 107
Part 107--Airport Security
Sec. 107.1 Applicability and definitions.
(a) This part prescribes aviation security rules
governing--
(1) The operation of each airport regularly serving the
scheduled passenger operations of a certificate holder required
to have a security program by Sec. 108.5(a) of this chapter;
(2) The operation of each airport regularly serving
scheduled passenger operations of a foreign air carrier
required to have a security program by Sec. 129.25 of this
chapter; and
(3) Each person who is in or entering a sterile area on an
airport described in paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this
section.
(b) For purposes of this part--
(1) Airport operator means a person who operates an airport
regularly serving scheduled passenger operations of a
certificate holder or a foreign air carrier required to have a
security program by Sec. 108.5(a) or Sec. 129.25 of this
chapter;
(2) Air Operations Area means a portion of an airport
designed and used for landing, taking off, or surface
maneuvering of airplanes;
(3) Exclusive area means that part of an air operations
area for which an air carrier has agreed in writing with the
airport operator to exercise exclusive security responsibility
under an approved security program or a security program used
in accordance with Sec. 129.25;
(4) Law enforcement officer means an individual who meets
the requirements of Sec. 107.17; and
(5) Sterile area means an area to which access is
controlled by the inspection of persons and property in
accordance with an approved security program or a security
program used in accordance with Sec. 129.25.
Sec. 107.3 Security program
(a) No airport operator may operate an airport subject to
this part unless it adopts and carries out a security program
that--
(1) Provides for the safety of persons and property
traveling in air transportation and intrastate air
transportation against acts of criminal violence and aircraft
piracy;
(2) Is in writing and signed by the airport operator or any
person to whom the airport operator has delegated authority in
this matter;
(3) Includes the items listed in paragraph (b), (f), or (g)
of this section, as appropriate; and
(4) Has been approved by the Director of Civil Aviation
Security.
(b) For each airport subject to this part regularly serving
scheduled passenger operations conducted in airplanes having a
passenger seating configuration (as defined in Sec. 108.3 of
this section of this chapter) of more than 60 seats, the
security program required by paragraph (a) of this section must
include at least the following:
(1) A description of each air operations area, including
its dimensions, boundaries, and pertinent features.
(2) A description of each area on or adjacent to, the
airport which affects the security of any air operations area.
(3) A description of each exclusive area, including its
dimensions, boundaries, and pertinent features, and the terms
of the agreement establishing the area.
(4) The procedures, and a description of the facilities and
equipment, used to perform the control functions specified in
Sec. 107.13(a) by the airport operator and by each air carrier
having security responsibility over an exclusive area.
(5) The procedures each air carrier having security
responsibility over an exclusive area will use to notify the
airport operator when the procedures, facilities, and equipment
it uses are not adequate to perform the control functions
described in Sec. 107.13(a).
(6) A description of the alternate security procedures, if
any, that the airport operator intends to use in emergencies
and other unusual conditions.
(7) A description of the law enforcement support necessary
to comply with Sec. 107.15.
(8) A description of the training program for law
enforcement officers required by Sec. 107.17.
(9) A description of the system for maintaining the records
described in Sec. 107.23.
(c) The airport operator may comply with paragraph (b),
(f), or (g) of this section by including in the security
program as an appendix any document which contains the
information required by paragraph (b), (f), or (g) of this
section.
(d) Each airport operator shall maintain at least one
complete copy of its approved security program at its principal
operations office, and shall make it available for inspection
upon the request of any Civil Aviation Security Special Agent.
(e) Each airport operator shall restrict the distribution,
disclosure, and availability of information contained in the
security program to those persons with an operational need-to-
know and shall refer requests for such information by other
than those persons to the Director of Civil Aviation Security
of the FAA.
(f) For each airport subject to this part regularly serving
scheduled passenger operations conducted in airplanes having a
passenger seating configuration (as defined in Sec. 10.3 of
this chapter) of more than 30 but less than 61 seats, the
security program required by paragraph (a) of this section must
include at least the following:
(1) A description of the law enforcement support necessary
to comply with Sec. 107.15(b), and the procedures which the
airport operator has arranged to be used by the certificate
holder or foreign air carrier to summon that support.
(2) A description of the training program for law
enforcement officers required by Sec. 107.17.
(3) A description of the system for maintaining the records
described in Sec. 107.23.
(g) For each airport subject to this part where the
certificate holder or foreign air carrier is required to
conduct passenger screening under a security program required
by Sec. 108.5(a) (2) or (3) or Sec. 129.25(b) (2) or (3) of
this chapter, or conducts screening under a security program
being carried out pursuant to Sec. 108.5(b), as appropriate,
the security program required by paragraph (a) of this section
must include at least the following:
(1) A description of the law enforcement support necessary
to comply with Sec. 107.15.
(2) A description of the training program for law
enforcement officers required by Sec. 107.17.
(3) A description of the system for maintaining the records
described in Sec. 107.23.
Sec. 107.5 Approval of security program
(a) Unless a shorter period is allowed by the Director of
Civil Aviation Security, each airport operator seeking initial
approval of a security program for an airport subject to this
part shall submit the proposed program to the Director of Civil
Aviation Security at least 90 days before any scheduled
passenger operations are expected to begin by any certificate
holder or permit holder to whom Sec. 121.538 or Sec. 129.25 of
this chapter applies.
(b) Within 30 days after receipt of a proposed security
program, the Director of Civil Aviation Security either
approves the program or gives the airport operator written
notice to modify the program to make it conform to the
applicable requirements of this part.
(c) After receipt of a notice to modify, the airport
operator may either submit a modified security program or
petition the Administrator to reconsider the notice to modify.
A petition for reconsideration must be filed with the Director
of Civil Aviation Security.
(d) Upon receipt of a petition for reconsideration, the
Director of Civil Aviation Security reconsiders the notice to
modify and either amends or withdraws the notice or transmits
the petition, together with any pertinent information, to the
Administrator for consideration.
(e) After review of a petition for reconsideration, the
Administrator disposes of the petition by either directing the
Director of Civil Aviation Security to withdraw or amend the
notice to modify, or by affirming the notice to modify.
Sec. 107.7 Changed conditions affecting security
(a) After approval of the security program, the airport
operator shall follow the procedures prescribed in paragraph
(b) of this section whenever it determines that any of the
following changed conditions has occurred:
(1) Any description of an airport area set out in the
security program in accordance with Sec. 107.3(b) (1), (2), or
(3) is no longer accurate.
(2) The procedures included, and the facilities and
equipment described, in the security program in accordance with
Sec. 107.3(b) (4) and (5) are not adequate for the control
functions described in Sec. 107.13(a).
(3) The airport operator changes any alternate security
procedures described in the security program in accordance with
Sec. 107.3(b)(6).
(4) The law enforcement support described in the security
program in accordance with Sec. 107.3 (b)(7), (f)(1), or (g)(1)
is not adequate to comply with Sec. 107.15.
(5) Any changes to the designation of the Airport Security
Coordinator (ASC) required under Sec. 107.29.
(b) Whenever a changed condition described in paragraph (a)
of this section occurs, the airport operator shall--
(1) Immediately notify the FAA security office having
jurisdiction over the airport of the changed condition, and
identify each interim measure being taken to maintain adequate
security until an appropriate amendment to the security program
is approved; and
(2) Within 30 days after notifying the FAA in accordance
with paragraph (b)(1) of this section, submit for approval in
accordance with Sec. 107.9 an amendment to the security program
to bring it into compliance with this part.
Sec. 107.9 Amendment of security program by airport operator
(a) An airport operator requesting approval of a proposed
amendment to the security program shall submit the request to
the Director of Civil Aviation Security. Unless a shorter
period is allowed by the Director of Civil Aviation Security,
the request must be submitted at least 30 days before the
proposed effective date.
(b) Within 15 days after receipt of a proposed amendment,
the Director of Civil Aviation Security issues to the airport
operator, in writing, either an approval or a denial of the
request.
(c) An amendment to a security program is approved if the
Director of Civil Aviation Security determines that--
(1) Safety and the public interest will allow it, and
(2) The proposed amendment provides the level of security
required by Sec. 107.3.
(d) After denial of a request for an amendment the airport
operator may petition the Administrator to reconsider the
denial. A petition for reconsideration must be filed with the
Director of Civil Aviation Security.
(e) Upon receipt of a petition for reconsideration the
Director of Civil Aviation Security reconsiders the denial and
either approves the proposed amendment or transmits the
petition, together with any pertinent information, to the
Administrator for consideration.
(f) After review of a petition for reconsideration, the
Administrator disposes of the petition by either directing the
Director of Civil Aviation Security to approve the proposed
amendment or affirming the denial.
Sec. 107.11 Amendment of security program by FAA
(a) The Administrator or Director of Civil Aviation
Security may amend an approved security program for an airport,
if it is determined that safety and the public interest require
the amendment.
(b) Except in an emergency as provided in paragraph (f) of
this section, when the Administrator or the Director of Civil
Aviation Security proposes to amend a security program, a
notice of the proposed amendment is issued to the airport
operator, in writing, fixing a period of not less than 30 days
within which the airport operator may submit written
information, views, and arguments on the amendment. After
considering all relevant material, including that submitted by
the airport operator, the Administrator or the Director of
Civil Aviation Security either rescinds the notice or notifies
the airport operator in writing of any amendment adopted,
specifying an effective date not less than 30 days after
receipt of the notice of amendment by the airport operator.
(c) After receipt of a notice of amendment from a Director
of Civil Aviation Security, the airport operator may petition
the Administrator to reconsider the amendment. A petition for
reconsideration must be filed with the Director of Civil
Aviation Security. Except in an emergency as provided in
paragraph (f) of this section, a petition for reconsideration
stays the amendment until the Administrator takes final action
on the petition.
(d) Upon receipt of a petition for reconsideration, the
Director of Civil Aviation Security reconsiders the amendment
and either rescinds or modifies the amendment or transmits the
petition, together with any pertinent information, to the
Administrator for consideration.
(e) After review of a petition for reconsideration, the
Administrator disposes of the petition by directing the
Director of Civil Aviation Security to rescind the notice of
amendment or to issue the amendment as proposed or in modified
form.
(f) If the Administrator or the Director of Civil Aviation
Security finds that there is an emergency requiring immediate
action that makes the procedure in paragraph (b) of this
section impracticable or contrary to the public interest, an
amendment may be issued effective without stay on the date the
airport operator receives notice of it. In such a case, the
Administrator or the Director of Civil Aviation Security
incorporates in the notice of the amendment the finding,
including a brief statement of the reasons for the emergency
and the need for emergency action.
Sec. 107.13 Security of air operations area
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section,
each operator of an airport serving scheduled passenger
operations where the certificate holder or foreign air carrier
is required to conduct passenger screening under a program
required by Sec. 108.5(a)(1) or Sec. 129.25(b)(1) of this
chapter as appropriate shall use the procedures included, and
the facilities and equipment described, in its approved
security program, to perform the following control functions:
(1) Controlling access to each air operations area,
including methods for preventing the entry of unauthorized
persons and ground vehicles.
(2) Controlling movement of persons and ground vehicles
within each air operations area, including, when appropriate,
requirements for the display of identification.
(3) Promptly detecting and taking action to control each
penetration, or attempted penetration, of an air operations
area by a person whose entry is not authorized in accordance
with the security program.
(b) An airport operator need not comply with paragraph (a)
of this section with respect to an air carrier's exclusive
area, if the airport operator's security program contains--
(1) Procedures, and a description of the facilities and
equipment, used by the air carrier to perform the control
functions described in paragraph (a) of this section; and
(2) Procedures by which the air carrier will notify the
airport operator when its procedures, facilities, and equipment
are not adequate to perform the control functions described in
paragraph (a) of this section.
Sec. 107.14 Access control system
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section,
each operator of an airport regularly serving scheduled
passenger operations conducted in airplanes having a passenger
seating configuration (as defined in Sec. 108.3 of this
chapter) of more than 60 seats shall submit to the Director of
Civil Aviation Security, for approval and inclusion in its
approved security program, an amendment to provide for a
system, method, or procedure which meets the requirements
specified in this paragraph for controlling access to secured
areas of the airport. The system, method, or procedure shall
ensure that only those persons authorized to have access to
secured areas by the airport operator's security program are
able to obtain that access and shall specifically provide a
means to ensure that such access is denied immediately at the
access point or points to individuals whose authority to have
access changes. The system, method, or procedure shall provide
a means to differentiate between persons authorized to have
access to only a particular portion of the secured areas and
persons authorized to have access only to other portions or to
the entire secured area. The system, method, or procedure shall
be capable of limiting an individual's access by time and date.
(b) The Director of Civil Aviation Security will approve an
amendment to an airport operator's security program that
provides for the use of an alternative system, method, or
procedure if, in the Director's judgment, the alternative would
provide an overall level of security equal to that which would
be provided by the system, method, or procedure described in
paragraph (a) of this section.
(c) Each airport operator shall submit the amendment to its
approved security program required by paragraph (a) or (b) of
this section according to the following schedule:
(1) By August 8, 1989, or by 6 months after becoming
subject to this section, whichever is later, for airports where
at least 25 million persons are screened annually or airports
that have been designated by the Director of Civil Aviation
Security. The amendment shall specify that the system, method,
or procedure must be fully operational within 18 months after
the date on which an airport operator's amendment to its
approved security program is approved by the Director of Civil
Aviation Security.
(2) By August 8, 1989, or by 6 months after becoming
subject to this section, whichever is later, for airports where
more than 2 million persons are screened annually. The
amendment shall specify that the system, method, or procedure
must be fully operational within 24 months after the date on
which an airport operator's amendment to its approved security
program is approved by the Director of Civil Aviation Security.
(3) By February 8, 1990, or by 12 months after becoming
subject to this section, whichever is later, for airports where
at least 500,000 but not more than 2 million persons are
screened annually. The amendment shall specify that the system,
method, or procedure must be fully operational within 30 months
after the date on which an airport operator's amendment to its
approved security program is approved by the Director of Civil
Aviation Security.
(4) By February 8, 1990, or by 12 months after becoming
subject to this section, whichever is later, for airports where
less than 500,000 persons are screened annually. The amendment
shall specify that the system, method, or procedure must be
fully operational within 30 months after the date on which an
airport operator's amendment to its approved security program
is approved by the Director of Civil Aviation Security.
(d) Notwithstanding paragraph (c) of this section, an
airport operator of a newly constructed airport commencing
initial operation after December 31, 1990, as an airport
subject to paragraph (a) of this section, shall include as part
of its original airport security program to be submitted to the
FAA for approval a fully operational system, method, or
procedure in accordance with this section.
Sec. 107.15 Law enforcement support
(a) Each airport operator shall provide law enforcement
officers in the number and in a manner adequate to support--
(1) Its security program; and
(2) Each passenger screening system required by part 108 or
Sec. 129.25 of this chapter.
(b) For scheduled or public charter passenger operations
with airplanes having a passenger seating configuration (as
defined in Sec. 108.3 of this chapter) of more than 30 but less
than 61 seats for which a passenger screening system is not
required, each airport operator shall ensure that law
enforcement officers are available and committed to respond to
an incident at the request of a certificate holder or foreign
air carrier and shall ensure that the request procedures are
provided to the certificate holder or foreign air carrier.
Sec. 107.17 Law enforcement officers
(a) No airport operator may use, or arrange for response
by, any person as a required law enforcement officer unless,
while on duty on the airport, the officer--
(1) Has the arrest, authority described in paragraph (b) of
this section;
(2) Is readily identifiable by uniform and displays or
carries a badge or other indicia of authority;
(3) Is armed with a firearm and authorized to use it; and
(4) Has completed a training program that meets the
requirements in paragraph (c) of this section.
(b) The law enforcement officer must, while on duty on the
airport, have the authority to arrest, with or without a
warrant, for the following violations of the criminal laws of
the State and local jurisdictions in which the airport is
located:
(1) A crime committed in the officer's presence.
(2) A felony, when the officer has reason to believe that
the suspect has committed it.
(c) The training program required by paragraph (a)(4) of
this section must provide training in the subjects specified in
paragraph (d) of this section and either--
(1) Meet the training standards, if any, prescribed by
either the State or the local jurisdiction in which the airport
is located, for law enforcement officers performing comparable
functions; or
(2) If the State and local jurisdictions in which the
airport is located do not prescribe training standards for
officers performing comparable functions, be acceptable to the
Administrator.
(d) The training program required by paragraph (a)(4) of
this section must include training in--
(1) The use of firearms;
(2) The courteous and efficient treatment of persons
subject to inspection, detention, search, arrest, and other
aviation security activities;
(3) The responsibilities of a law enforcement officer under
the airport operator's approved security program; and
(4) Any other subject the Administrator determines is
necessary.
Sec. 107.19 Use of federal law enforcement officers
(a) Whenever State, local, and private law enforcement
officers who meet the requirements of Sec. 107.17 are not
available in sufficient numbers to meet the requirements of
Sec. 107.15, the airport operator may request that the
Administrator authorize it to use Federal law enforcement
officers.
(b) Each request for the use of Federal law enforcement
officers must be accompanied by the following information:
(1) The number of passengers enplaned at the airport during
the preceding calendar year and the current calendar year as of
the date of the request.
(2) The anticipated risk of criminal violence and aircraft
piracy at the airport and to the air carrier aircraft
operations at the airport.
(3) A copy of that portion of the airport operator's
security program which describes the law enforcement support
necessary to comply with Sec. 107.15.
(4) The availability of State, local, and private law
enforcement officers who meet the requirements of Sec. 107.17,
including a description of the airport operator's efforts to
obtain law enforcement support from State, local, and private
agencies and the responses of those agencies.
(5) The airport operator's estimate of the number of
Federal law enforcement officers needed to supplement available
officers and the period of time for which they are needed.
(6) A statement acknowledging responsibility for providing
reimbursement for the cost of providing Federal law enforcement
officers.
(7) Any other information the Administrator considers
necessary.
(c) In response to a request submitted in accordance with
this section, the Administrator may authorize, on a
reimbursable basis, the use of law enforcement officers
employed by the FAA or by any other Federal agency, with the
consent of the head of that agency.
Sec. 107.20 Submission to screening
No person may enter a sterile area without submitting to
the screening of his or her person and property in accordance
with the procedures being applied to control access to that
area under Sec. 108.9 or Sec. 129.25 of this chapter.
Sec. 107.21 Carriage of an explosive, incendiary, or deadly or
dangerous weapon
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, no
person may have an explosive, incendiary, or deadly or
dangerous weapon on or about the individual's person or
accessible property--
(1) When performance has begun of the inspection of the
individual's person or accessible property before entering a
sterile area; and
(2) When entering or in a sterile area.
(b) The provisions of this section with respect to firearms
do not apply to the following:
(1) Law enforcement officers required to carry a firearm by
this part while on duty on the airport.
(2) Persons authorized to carry a firearm in accordance
with Sec. 108.11 or Sec. 129.27.
(3) Persons authorized to carry a firearm in a sterile area
under an approved security program or a security program used
in accordance with Sec. 129.25.
Sec. 107.23 Records
(a) Each airport operator shall ensure that--
(1) A record is made of each law enforcement action taken
in furtherance of this part;
(2) The record is maintained for a minimum of 90 days; and
(3) It is made available to the administrator upon request.
(b) Data developed in response to paragraph (a) of this
section must include at least the following:
(1) The number and type of firearms, explosives, and
incendiaries discovered during any passenger screening process,
and the method of detection of each.
(2) The number of acts and attempted acts of air piracy.
(3) The number of bomb threats received, real and simulated
bombs found, and actual bombings on the airport.
(4) The number of detentions and arrests, and the immediate
disposition of each person detained or arrested.
Sec. 107.25 Airport identification media
(a) As used in this section, security identification
display area means any area identified in the airport security
program as requiring each person to continuously display on
their outermost garment, an airport-approved identification
medium unless under airport-approved escort.
(b) After January 1, 1992, an airport operator may not
issue to any person any identification media that provides
unescorted access to any security identification display area
unless the person has successfully completed training in
accordance with an FAA-approved curriculum specified in the
security program.
(c) By October 1, 1992, not less than 50 percent of all
individuals possessing airport-issued identification that
provides unescorted access to any security identification
display area at that airport shall have been trained in
accordance with an FAA-approved curriculum specified in the
security program.
(d) After May 1, 1993, an airport operator may not permit
any person to possess any airport-issued identification medium
that provides unescorted access to any security identification
display area at that airport unless the person has successfully
completed FAA-approved training in accordance with a curriculum
specified in the security program.
(e) The curriculum specified in the security program shall
detail the methods of instruction, provide attendees the
opportunity to ask questions, and include at least the
following topics:
(1) Control, use, and display of airport-approved
identification or access media;
(2) Challenge procedures and the law enforcement response
which supports the challenge procedure;
(3) Restrictions on divulging information concerning an act
of unlawful interference with civil aviation if such
information is likely to jeopardize the safety of domestic or
international aviation;
(4) Non-disclosure of information regarding the airport
security system or any airport tenant's security systems; and
(5) Any other topics deemed necessary by the Assistant
Administrator for Civil Aviation Security.
(f) No person may use any airport-approved identification
medium that provides unescorted access to any security
identification display area to gain such access unless that
medium was issued to that person by the appropriate airport
authority or other entity whose identification is approved by
the airport operator.
(g) The airport operator shall maintain a record of all
training given to each person under this section until 180 days
after the termination of that person's unescorted access
privileges.
Sec. 107.27 Evidence of compliance
On request of the Assistant Administrator for Civil
Aviation Security, each airport operator shall provide evidence
of compliance with this part and its approved security program.
Sec. 107.29 Airport security coordinator
Each airport operator shall designate an Airport Security
Coordinator (ASC) in its security program. The designation
shall include the name of the ASC, and a description of the
means by which to contact the ASC on a 24-hour basis. The ASC
shall serve as the airport operator's primary contact for
security-related activities and communications with FAA, as set
forth in the security program.
Sec. 107.31 Employment history, verification and criminal history
records checks.
(a) Scope. On or after January 31, 1996, this section
applies to all airport operators; airport users; individuals
currently having unescorted access to a security identification
display area (SIDA) that is identified by Sec. 107.25; all
individuals seeking authorization for, or seeking the authority
to authorize others to have, unescorted access to the SIDA; and
each airport user and air carrier making a certification to an
airport operator pursuant to paragraph (n) of this section. An
airport user, for the purposes of Sec. 107.31 only, is any
person making a certification under this section other than an
air carrier subject to Sec. 108.33.
(b) Employment history investigations required. Except as
provided in paragraph (m) of this section, each airport
operator must ensure that no individual is granted
authorization for, or is granted authority to authorize others
to have, unescorted access to the SIDA unless the following
requirements are met:
(1) The individual has satisfactorily undergone Part 1 of
an employment history investigation. Part 1 consists of a
review of the previous 10 years of employment history and
verification of the 5 employment years preceding the date the
appropriate investigation is initiated as provided in paragraph
(c) of this section; and
(2) If required by paragraph (c)(5) of this section, the
individual has satisfied Part 2 of the employment history
investigation. Part 2 is the process to determine if the
individual has a criminal record. To satisfy Part 2 of the
investigation the criminal record check must not disclose that
the individual has been convicted or found not guilty by reason
of insanity, in any jurisdiction, during the 10 years ending on
the date of such investigation, of any of the crimes listed
below:
(i) Forgery of certificates, false marking of aircraft, and
other aircraft registration violation, 49 U.S.C. 46306;
(ii) Interference with air navigation, 49 U.S.C. 46308;
(iii) Improper transportation of a hazardous material, 49
U.S.C. 46312;
(iv) Aircraft piracy, 49 U.S.C. 46502;
(v) Interference with flightcrew members or flight
attendants, 49 U.S.C. 46504;
(vi) Commission of certain crimes aboard aircraft in
flight, 49 U.S.C. 46506;
(vii) Carrying a weapon or explosive aboard aircraft, 49
U.S.C. 46505;
(viii) Conveying false information and threats, 49 U.S.C.
46507;
(ix) Aircraft piracy outside the special aircraft
jurisdiction of the United States, 49 U.S.C. 46502(b);
(x) Lighting violations involving transporting controlled
substances, 49 U.S.C. 46315;
(xi) Unlawful entry into an aircraft or airport area that
serves air carriers or foreign air carriers contrary to
established security requirements, 49 U.S.C. 46314;
(xii) Destruction of an aircraft or aircraft facility, 18
U.S.C. 32;
(xiii) Murder;
(xiv) Assault with intent to murder;
(xv) Espionage;
(xvi) Sedition;
(xvii) Kidnapping or hostage taking;
(xviii) Treason;
(xix) Rape or aggravated sexual abuse;
(xx) Unlawful possession, use, sale, distribution, or
manufacture of an explosive or weapon;
(xxi) Extortion;
(xxii) Armed robbery;
(xxiii) Distribution of, or intent to distribute, a
controlled substance;
(xxiv) Felony arson; or
(xxv) Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the
aforementioned criminal acts.
(c) Investigative steps. Part 1 of the employment history
investigation must be completed on all persons listed in
paragraph (a) of this section. If required by paragraph (c)(5)
of this section, Part 2 of the employment history investigation
must also be completed on all persons listed in paragraph (a)
of this section.
(1) The individual must provide the following information
on an application form:
(i) The individual's full name, including any aliases or
nicknames.
(ii) The dates, names, phone numbers, and addresses of
previous employers, with explanations for any gaps in
employment of more than 12 consecutive months, during the
previous 10-year period.
(iii) Any convictions during the previous 10-year period of
the crimes listed in paragraph (b)(2) of this section.
(2) The airport operator or the airport user must include
on the application form a notification that the individual will
be subject to an employment history verification and possibly a
criminal records check.
(3) The airport operator or the airport user must verify
the identity of the individual through the presentation of two
forms of identification, one of which must bear the
individual's photograph.
(4) The airport operator or the airport user must verify
the information on the most recent 5 years of employment
history required under paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section.
Information must be verified in writing, by documentation, by
telephone, or in person.
(5) If one or more of the conditions (triggers) listed in
Sec. 107.31(c)(5)(i) through (iv) exist, the employment history
investigation must not be considered complete unless Part 2 is
accomplished. Only the airport operator may initiate Part 2 for
airport users under this section. Part 2 consists of a
comparison of the individual's fingerprints against the
fingerprint files of known criminals maintained by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The comparison of the
individual's fingerprints must be processed through the FAA.
The airport operator may request a check of the individual's
fingerprint-based criminal record only if one or more of the
following conditions exist:
(i) The individual does not satisfactorily account for a
period of unemployment of 12 consecutive months or more during
the previous 10- year period.
(ii) The individual is unable to support statements made on
the application form.
(iii) There are significant inconsistencies in the
information provided on the application.
(iv) Information becomes available to the airport operator
or the airport user during the investigation indicating a
possible conviction for one of the crimes listed in paragraph
(b)(2) of this section.
(d) Individual notification. Prior to commencing the
criminal records check, the airport operator must notify the
affected individual and identify the Airport Security
Coordinator as a contact for follow- up. An individual, who
chooses not to submit fingerprints, after having met a
requirement for Part 2 of the employment investigation, may not
be granted unescorted access privilege.
(e) Fingerprint processing. If a fingerprint comparison is
necessary under paragraph (c)(5) of this section to complete
the employment history investigation the airport operator must
collect and process fingerprints in the following manner:
(1) One set of legible and classifiable fingerprints must
be recorded on fingerprint cards approved by the FBI, and
distributed by the FAA for this purpose.
(2) The fingerprints must be obtained from the individual
under direct observation by the airport operator or a law
enforcement officer. Individuals submitting their fingerprints
may not take possession of their fingerprint card after they
have been fingerprinted.
(3) The identity of the individual must be verified at the
time fingerprints are obtained. The individual must present two
forms of identification, one of which must bear the
individual's photograph.
(4) The fingerprint card must be forwarded to the FAA at
the location specified by the Administrator.
(5) Fees for the processing of the criminal record checks
are due upon application. Airport operators must submit payment
through corporate check, cashier's check, or money order made
payable to ``U.S. FAA,'' at the designated rate for each
fingerprint card. Combined payment for multiple applications is
acceptable. The designated rate for processing the fingerprint
cards is available from the local FAA security office.
(f) Determinaiton of arrest status. In conducting the
criminal record checks required by this section, the airport
operator must not consider the employment history investigation
complete unless it investigates arrest information for the
crimes listed in paragraph (b)(2) of this section for which no
disposition has been recorded and makes a determination that
the arrest did not result in a disqualifying conviction.
(g) Availability and correction of FBI records and
notification of disqualification. (1) At the time Part 2 is
initiated and the fingerprints are collected, the airport
operator must notify the individual that a copy of the criminal
record received from the FBI will be made available to the
individual if requested in writing. When requested in writing,
the airport operator must make available to the individual a
copy of any criminal record received from the FBI.
(2) Prior to making a final decision to deny authorization
to an individual described in paragraph (a) of this section,
the airport operator must advise the individual that the FBI
criminal record discloses information that would disqualify
him/her from receiving unescorted access and provide the
individual with a copy of the FBI record if it has been
requested.
(3) The airport operator must notify an individual that a
final decision has been made to grant or deny authority for
unescorted access.
(h) Corrective action by the individual. The individual may
contact the local jurisdiction responsible for the information
and the FBI to complete or correct the information contained in
his/her record before any final decision is made, subject to
the following conditions:
(1) Within 30 days after being advised that the criminal
record received from the FBI discloses disqualifying
information, the individual must notify the airport operator,
in writing, of his/her intent to correct any information
believed to be inaccurate.
(i) Upon notification by an individual that the record has
been corrected, the airport operator must obtain a copy of the
revised FBI record prior to making a final determination.
(2) If no notification is received within 30 days, the
airport operator may make a final determination.
(i) Limits on dissemination of results. Criminal record
information provided by the FBI must be used solely for the
purposes of this section, and no person may disseminate the
results of a criminal record check to anyone other than:
(1) The individual to whom the record pertains or that
individual's authorized representative;
(2) Airport officials with a need to know; and
(3) Others designated by the Administrator.
(j) Employment status while awaiting criminal record
checks. Individuals who have submitted their fingerprints and
are awaiting FBI results may perform work within the SIDA when
under escort by someone who has unescorted SIDA access
privileges.
(k) Recordkeeping. (1) Except when the airport operator has
received a certification under paragraph (n)(1) of this
section, the airport operator must physically maintain and
control the Part 1 employment history investigation file until
180 days after the termination of the individual's authority
for unescorted access. The Part 1, employment history
investigation file, must consist of the following:
(i) The application;
(ii) The employment verification information obtained by
the employer;
(iii) The names of those from whom the employment
verification information was obtained;
(iv) The date and the method of how the contact was made;
and
(v) Any other information as required by the Administrator.
(2) The airport operator must physically maintain, control
and when appropriate destroy Part 2, the criminal record, for
each individual for whom a fingerprint comparison has been
completed. Part 2 must be maintained for 180 days after the
termination of the individual's authority for unescorted
access. Only direct airport operator employees may carry out
this criminal record file responsibility. The Part 2 criminal
record file must consist of the following:
(i) The criminal record received from the FBI as a result
of an individual's fingerprint comparison; or
(ii) Information that the check was completed and no record
exists.
(3) The files required by this section must be maintained
in a manner that is acceptable to the Administrator and in a
manner that protects the confidentiality of the individual.
(l) Continuing responsibilities. (1) Any individual
authorized to have unescorted access privileges or who may
authorize others to have unescorted access, who is subsequently
convicted of any of the crimes listed in paragraph (b)(2) of
this section must, within 24 hours, report the conviction to
the airport operator and surrender the SIDA access medium to
the issuer.
(2) If information becomes available to the airport
operator or the airport user indicating that an individual with
unescorted access has a possible conviction for one of the
disqualifying crimes in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, the
airport operator must determine the status of the conviction.
If a disqualifying conviction is confirmed the airport operator
must withdraw any authority granted under this section.
(m) Exceptions. Notwithstanding the requirements of this
section, an airport operator may authorize the following
individuals to have unescorted access, or to authorize others
to have unescorted access to the SIDA:
(1) An employee of the Federal government or a state or
local government (including a law enforcement officer) who, as
a condition of employment, has been subjected to an employment
investigation which includes a criminal record check.
(2) A crewmember of a foreign air carrier covered by an
alternate security arrangement in the foreign air carrier's
approved security program.
(3) An individual who has been continuously employed in a
position requiring unescorted access by another airport
operator, airport user or air carrier.
(4) Those persons who have received access to a U.S.
Customs secured area prior to November 23, 1998.
(n) Investigations by air carriers and airport users. An
airport operator is in compliance with its obligation under
paragraph (b) of this section, as applicable, when the airport
operator accepts for each individual seeking unescorted access
one of the following:
(1) Certification from an air carrier subject to Sec.
108.33 of this chapter indicating it has complied with Secs.
108.33 of this chapter for the air carrier's employees and
contractors seeking unescorted access; or
(2) Certification from an airport user indicating it has
complied with and will continue to comply with the provisions
listed in paragraph (p) of this section. The certification must
include the name of each individual for whom the airport user
has conducted an employment history investigation.
(o) Airport operator responsibility. The airport operator
must:
(1) Prior to the acceptance of a certification from the
airport user, the airport operator must conduct a preliminary
review of the file for each individual listed on the
certification to determine that Part 1 has been completed.
(2) Designate the airport security coordinator (ASC), in
the security program, to be responsible for reviewing the
results of the airport employees' and airport users' employment
history investigations and for destroying the criminal record
files when their maintenance is no longer required by paragraph
(k)(2) of this section;
(3) Designate the ASC, in the security program, to serve as
the contact to receive notification from individuals applying
for unescorted access of their intent to seek correction of
their FBI criminal record; and
(4) Audit the employment history investigations performed
by the airport operator in accordance with this section and
those investigations conducted by the airport users made by
certification under paragraph (n)(2). The audit program must be
set forth in the airport security program.
(p) Airport user responsibility.
(1) The airport user is responsible for reporting to the
airport operator information, as it becomes available, which
indicates an individual with unescorted access may have a
conviction for one of the disqualifying crimes in paragraph
(b)(2) of this section; and
(2) If the airport user offers certification to the airport
operator under paragraph (n)(2) of this section, the airport
user must for each individual for whom a certification is made:
(i) Conduct the employment history investigation, Part 1,
in compliance with paragraph (c) of this section. The airport
user must report to the airport operator if one of the
conditions in paragraph (C)(5) of this section exist;
(ii) Maintain and control Part 1 of the employment history
investigation file in compliance with paragraph (k) of this
section, unless the airport operator decides to maintain and
control Part 1 of the employment history investigation file;
(iii) Provide the airport operator and the FAA with access
to each completed Part 1 employee history investigative file of
those individuals listed on the certification; and
(iv) Provide either the name or title of the individual
acting as custodian of the files, and the address of the
location and the phone number at the location where the
investigative files are maintained.
[Doc. No. 28859, 63 FR 51218, Sept. 24, 1998; 63 FR 60448, Nov.
9, 1998]
b. Airplane Operator Security
Federal Aviation Administration Regulations, 14 CFR Part 108
Part 108--Airplane Operator Security
Sec. 108.1 Applicability.
(a) This part prescribes aviation security rules
governing--
(1) The operations of holders of FAA air carrier operating
certificates or operating certificates engaging in scheduled
passenger operations or public charter passenger operations;
(2) Each person aboard an airplane operated by a
certificate holder described in paragraph (a)(1) of this
section; and
(3) Each person on an airport at which the operations
described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section are conducted.
(4) Each certificate holder who receives a Security
Directive or Information Circular and each person who receives
information from a Security Directive or an Information
Circular issued by the Director of Civil Aviation Security.
(5) Each person who files an application or makes entries
into any record or report that is kept, made or used to show
compliance under this part, or to exercise any privileges under
this part.
(b) This part does not apply to helicopter or to all-cargo
operations.
Sec. 108.3 Definitions.
The following are definitions of terms used in this part:
(a) Certificate holder means a person holding an FAA operating
certificate when that person engages in scheduled passenger or
public charter passenger operations or both.
(b) Passenger seating configuration means the total number
of seats for which the aircraft is type certificated that can
be made available for passenger use aboard a flight and
includes that seat in certain airplanes which may be used by a
representative of the Administrator to conduct flight checks
but is available for revenue purposes on other occasions.
(c) Private charter means any charter for which the
charterer engages the total capacity of an airplane for the
carriage of: (1) Passengers in civil or military air movements
conducted under contract with the Government of the United
States of the Government of a foreign country; or
(2) Passengers invited by the charterer, the cost of which
is borne entirely by the charterer and not directly or
indirectly by the individual passengers.
(d) Public charter means any charter that is not a private
charter.
(e) Scheduled passenger operations means holding out to the
public of air transportation service for passengers from
identified air terminals at a set time announced by timetable
or schedule published in a newspaper, magazine, or other
advertising medium.
(f) Sterile area means an area to which access is
controlled by the inspection of persons and property in
accordance with an approved security program or a security
program used in accordance with Sec. 129.25.
Sec. Sec. 108.4 Falsification.
No person may make, or cause to be made, any of the
following:
(a) Any fraudulent or intentionally false statement in any
application for any security program, access medium, or
identification medium, or any amendment thereto, under this
part.
(b) Any fraudulent or intentionally false entry in any
record or report that is kept, made, or used to show compliance
with this part, or to exercise any privileges under this part.
(c) Any reproduction or alteration, for fraudulent purpose,
of any report, record, security program, access medium, or
identification medium issued under this part.
Sec. 108.5 Security program: Adoption and implementation.
(a) Each certificate holder shall adopt and carry out a
security program that meets the requirements of Sec. 108.7 for
each of the following scheduled or public charter passenger
operations: (1) Each operation with an airplane having a
passenger seating configuration of more than 60 seats.
(2) Each operation that provides deplaned passengers
access, that is not otherwise controlled by a certificate
holder using an approved security program or a foreign air
carrier using a security program required by Sec. 129.25, to a
sterile area.
(3) Each operation with an airplane having a passenger
seating configuration of more than 30 but less than 61 seats;
except that those parts of the program effecting compliance
with the requirements listed in Sec. 108.7(b) (1), (2), and (4)
need only be implemented when the Director of Civil Aviation
Security or a designate of the Director notifies the
certificate holder in writing that a security threat exists
with respect to the operation.
(b) Each certificate holder that has obtained FAA approval
for a security program for operations not listed in paragraph
(a) of this section shall carry out the provisions of that
program.
Sec. 108.7 Security program: Form, content, and availability.
(a) Each security program required by Sec. 108.5 shall--
(1) Provide for the safety of persons and property
traveling in air transportation and intrastate air
transportation against acts of criminal violence and air
piracy;
(2) Be in writing and signed by the certificate holder or
any person delegated authority in this matter;
(3) Include the items listed in paragraph (b) of this
section, as required by Sec. 108.5; and
(4) Be approved by the Administrator.
(b) Each security program required by Sec. 108.5 must
include the following, as required by that section:
(1) The procedures and a description of the facilities and
equipment used to perform the screening functions specified in
Sec. 108.9.
(2) The procedures and a description of the facilities and
equipment used to perform the airplane and facilities control
functions specified in Sec. 108.13.
(3) The procedures used to comply with the applicable
requirements of Sec. 108.15 regarding law enforcement officers.
(4) The procedures used to comply with the requirements of
Sec. 108.17 regarding the use of X-ray systems.
(5) The procedures used to comply with the requirements of
Sec. 108.19 regarding bomb and air piracy threats.
(6) The procedures used to comply with the applicable
requirements of Sec. 108.10.
(7) The curriculum used to accomplish the training required
by Sec. 108.23.
(8) The procedures and a description of the facilities and
equipment used to comply with the requirements of Sec. 108.20
regarding explosives detection systems.
(c) Each certificate holder having an approved security
program shall--
(1) Maintain at least one complete copy of the approved
security program at its principal business office;
(2) Maintain a complete copy or the pertinent portions of
its approved security program or appropriate implementing
instructions at each airport where security screening is being
conducted;
(3) Make these documents available for inspection upon
request of any Civil Aviation Security Inspector;
(4) Restrict the availability of information contained in
the security program to those persons with an operational need-
to-know; and
(5) Refer requests for such information by other persons to
the Director of Civil Aviation Security of the FAA.
Sec. 108.9 Screening of passengers and property.
(a) Each certificate holder required to conduct screening
under a security program shall use the procedures included, and
the facilities and equipment described, in its approved
security program to prevent or deter the carriage aboard
airplanes of any explosive, incendiary, or a deadly or
dangerous weapon on or about each individual's person or
accessible property, and the carriage of any explosive or
incendiary in checked baggage.
(b) Each certificate holder required to conduct screening
under a security program shall refuse to transport--
(1) Any person who does not consent to a search of his or
her person in accordance with the screening system prescribed
in paragraph (a) of this section; and
(2) Any property of any person who does not consent to a
search or inspection of that property in accordance with the
screening system prescribed by paragraph (a) of this section.
(c) Except as provided by its approved security program,
each certificate holder required to conduct screening under a
security program shall use the procedures included, and the
facilities and equipment described, in its approved security
program for detecting explosives, incendiaries, and deadly or
dangerous weapons to inspect each person entering a sterile
area at each preboarding screening checkpoint in the United
States for which it is responsible, and to inspect all
accessible property under that person's control.
(d) Each certificate holder shall staff its security
screening checkpoints with supervisory and non-supervisory
personnel in accordance with the standards specified in its
security program.
Sec. 108.10 Prevention and management of hijackings and sabotage
attempts.
(a) Each certificate holder shall--
(1) Provide and use a Security Coordinator on the ground
and in flight for each international and domestic flight, as
required by its approved security program; and
(2) Designate the pilot in command as the inflight Security
Coordinator for each flight, as required by its approved
security program.
(b) Ground Security Coordinator. Each ground Security
Coordinator shall carry out the ground Security Coordinator
duties specified in the certificate holder's approved security
program.
(c) Inflight Security Coordinator. The pilot in command of
each flight shall carry out the inflight Security Coordinator
duties specified in the certificate holder's approved security
program.
Sec. 108.11 Carriage of weapons.
(a) No certificate holder required to conduct screening
under a security program may permit any person to have, nor may
any person have, on or about his or her person or property, a
deadly or dangerous weapon, either concealed or unconcealed,
accessible to him or her while aboard an airplane for which
screening is required unless:
(1) The person having the weapon is--
(i) An official or employee of the United States, or a
State or political subdivision of a State, or of a municipality
who is authorized by his or her agency to have the weapon; or
(ii) Authorized to have the weapon by the certificate
holder and the Administrator and has successfully completed a
course of training in the use of firearms acceptable to the
Administrator.
(2) The person having the weapon needs to have the weapon
accessible in connection with the performance of his or her
duty from the time he or she would otherwise check it in
accordance with paragraph (d) of this section until the time it
would be returned after deplaning.
(3) The certificate holder is notified--
(i) Of the flight on which the armed person intends to have
the weapon accessible to him or her at least 1 hour, or in an
emergency as soon as practicable, before departure; and
(ii) When the armed person is other than an employee or
official of the United States, that there is a need for the
weapon to be accessible to the armed person in connection with
the performance of that person's duty from the time he or she
would otherwise check it in accordance with paragraph (d) of
this section until the time it would be returned to him or her
after deplaning.
(4) The armed person identifies himself or herself to the
certificate holder by presenting credentials that include his
or her clear, full-face picture, his or her signature, and the
signature of the authorizing official of his or her service or
the official seal of his or her service. A badge, shield, or
similar may not be used as the sole means of identification.
(5) The certificate holder--
(i) Ensures that the armed person is familiar with its
procedures for carrying a deadly or dangerous weapon aboard its
airplane before the time the person boards the airplane;
(ii) Ensures that the identity of the armed person is known
to each law enforcement officer and each employee of the
certificate holder responsible for security during the boarding
of the airplane; and
(iii) Notifies the pilot in command, other appropriate
crewmembers, and any other person authorized to have a weapon
accessible to him or her aboard the airplane of the location of
each authorized armed person aboard the airplane.
(b) No person may, while on board an airplane operated by a
certificate holder for which screening is not conducted, carry
on or about that person a deadly or dangerous weapon, either
concealed or unconcealed. This paragraph does not apply to--
(1) Officials or employees of a municipality or a State, or
of the United States, who are authorized to carry arms; or
(2) Crewmembers and other persons authorized by the
certificate holder to carry arms.
(c) No certificate holder may knowingly permit any person
to transport, nor may any person transport or tender for
transport, any explosive, incendiary or a loaded firearm in
checked baggage aboard an airplane. For the purpose of this
section, a loaded firearm means a firearm which has a live
round of ammunition, cartridge, detonator, or powder in the
chamber or in a clip, magazine, or cylinder inserted in it.
(d) No certificate holder may knowingly permit any person
to transport, nor may any person transport or tender for
transport, any unloaded firearm in checked baggage aboard an
airplane unless--
(1) The passenger declares to the certificate holder,
either orally or in writing before checking the baggage, that
any firearm carried in the baggage is unloaded;
(2) The firearm is carried in a container the certificate
holder considers appropriate for air transportation;
(3) When the firearm is other than a shotgun, rifle, or
other firearm normally fired from the shoulder position, the
baggage in which it is carried is locked, and only the
passenger checking the baggage retains the key or combination;
and
(4) The baggage containing the firearm is carried in an
area, other than the flightcrew compartment, that is
inaccessible to passengers.
(e) No certificate holder may serve any alcoholic beverage
to a person having a deadly or dangerous weapon accessible to
him or her nor may such person drink any alcoholic beverage
while aboard an airplane operated by the certificate holder.
(f) Paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) of this section do not
apply to the carriage of firearms aboard air carrier flights
conducted for the military forces of the Government of the
United States when the total cabin load of the airplane is
under exclusive use by those military forces if the following
conditions are met:
(1) No firearm is loaded and all bolts to such firearms are
locked in the open position; and
(2) The certificate holder is notified by the unit
commander or officer in charge of the flight before boarding
that weapons will be carried aboard the aircraft.
Sec. 108.13 Security of airplanes and facilities.
Each certificate holder required to conduct screening under
a security program shall use the procedures included, and the
facilities and equipment described, in its approved security
program to perform the following control functions with respect
to each airplane operation for which screening is required:
(a) Prohibit unauthorized access to the airplane.
(b) Ensure that baggage carried in the airplane is checked
in by a responsible agent and that identification is obtained
from persons, other than known shippers, shipping goods or
cargo aboard the airplane.
(c) Ensure that cargo and checked baggage carried aboard
the airplane is handled in a manner that prohibits unauthorized
access.
(d) Conduct a security inspection of the airplane before
placing it in service and after it has been left unattended.
Sec. 108.14 Transportation of Federal Air Marshals.
(a) Each certificate holder shall carry Federal Air
Marshals, in the number and manner specified by the
Administrator, on each scheduled and public charter passenger
operation designated by the Administrator.
(b) Each Federal Air Marshal shall be carried on a first
priority basis and without charge while on official duty,
including repositioning flights.
(c) Each certificate holder shall assign the specific seat
requested by a Federal Air Marshal who is on official duty.
Sec. 108.15 Law enforcement officers.
(a) At airports within the United States not governed by
part 107 of this chapter, each certificate holder engaging in
scheduled passenger or public charter passenger operations
shall--
(1) If security screening is required for a public charter
operation by Sec. 108.5(a), or for a scheduled passenger
operation by Sec. 108.5(b) provide for law enforcement officers
meeting the qualifications and standards, and in the number and
manner specified, in part 107; and
(2) When using airplanes with a passenger seating
configuration of 31 through 60 seats in a public charter
operation for which screening is not required, arrange for law
enforcement officers meeting the qualifications and standards
specified in part 107 to be available to respond to an
incident, and provide to its employees, including crewmembers,
as appropriate, current information with respect to procedures
for obtaining law enforcement assistance at that airport.
(b) At airports governed by part 107 of this chapter, each
certificate holder engaging in scheduled or public charter
passenger operations, when using airplanes with a passenger
seating configuration of 31 through 60 seats for which
screening is not required, shall arrange for law enforcement
officers meeting the qualifications and standards specified in
part 107 to be available to respond to an incident and provide
its employees, including crewmembers, as appropriate, current
information with respect to procedures for obtaining this law
enforcement assistance at that airport.
Sec. 108.17 Use of X-ray systems.
(a) No certificate holder may use an X-ray system within
the United States to inspect carry-on or checked articles
unless specifically authorized under a security program
required by Sec. 108.5 of this part or use such a system
contrary to its approved security program. The Administrator
authorizes certificate holders to use X-ray systems for
inspecting carry-on or checked articles under an approved
security program if the certificate holder shows that--
(1) For a system manufactured before April 25, 1974, it
meets either the guidelines issued by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) and published in the Federal Register (38 FR
21442, August 8, 1973); or the performance standards for
cabinet X-ray systems designed primarily for the inspection of
carry-on baggage issued by the FDA and published in 21 CFR
1020.40 (39 FR 12985, April 10, 1974);
(2) For a system manufactured after April 24, 1974, it
meets the standards for cabinet X-ray systems designed
primarily for the inspection of carry-on baggage issued by the
FDA and published in 21 CFR 1020.40 (39 FR 12985, April 10,
1974);
(3) A program for initial and recurrent training of
operators of the system is established, which includes training
in radiation safety, the efficient use of X-ray systems, and
the identification of weapons and other dangerous articles;
(4) Procedures are established to ensure that each operator
of the system is provided with an individual personnel
dosimeter (such as a film badge or thermoluminescent
dosimeter). Each dosimeter used shall be evaluated at the end
of each calendar month, and records of operator duty time and
the results of dosimeter evaluations shall be maintained by the
certificate holder; and
(5) The system meets the imaging requirements set forth in
an approved Air Carrier Security Program using the step wedge
specified in American Society for Testing and Materials
Standard F792-82.
(b) No certificate holder may use an X-ray system within
the United States unless within the preceding 12 calendar
months a radiation survey has been conducted which shows that
the system meets the applicable performance standards in 21 CFR
1020.40 or guidelines published by the FDA in the Federal
Register of August 8, 1973 (38 FR 21442).
(c) No certificate holder may use an X-ray system after the
system is initially installed or after it has been moved from
one location to another, unless a radiation survey is conducted
which shows that the system meets the applicable performance
standards in 21 CFR 1020.40 or guidelines published by the FDA
in the Federal Register of August 8, 1973 (38 FR 21442) except
that a radiation survey is not required for an X-ray system
that is moved to another location if the certificate holder
shows that the system is so designed that it can be moved
without altering its performance.
(d) No certificate holder may use an X-ray system that is
not in full compliance with any defect notice or modification
order issued for that system by the FDA, unless that
Administration has advised the FAA that the defect or failure
to comply does not create a significant risk or injury,
including genetic injury, to any person.
(e) No certificate holder may use an X-ray system to
inspect carry-on or checked articles unless a sign is posted in
a conspicuous place at the screening station and on the X-ray
system which notifies passengers that such items are being
inspected by an X-ray and advises them to remove all X-ray,
scientific, and high-speed film from carry-on and checked
articles before inspection. This sign shall also advise
passengers that they may request that an inspection be made of
their photographic equipment and film packages without exposure
to an X-ray system. If the X-ray system exposes any carry-on or
checked articles to more than 1 milliroentgen during the
inspection, the certificate holder shall post a sign which
advises passengers to remove film of all kinds from their
articles before inspection. If requested by passengers, their
photographic equipment and film packages shall be inspected
without exposure to an X-ray system.
(f) Each certificate holder shall maintain at least one
copy of the results of the most recent radiation survey
conducted under paragraph (b) or (c) of this section and shall
make it available for inspection upon request by the
Administrator at each of the following locations:
(1) The certificate holder's principal business office; and
(2) The place where the X-ray system is in operation.
(g) The American Society for Testing and Materials Standard
F792-82, ``Design and Use of Ionizing Radiation Equipment for
the Detection of Items Prohibited in Controlled Access Areas,''
described in this section is incorporated by reference herein
and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All
persons affected by these amendments may obtain copies of the
standard from the American Society for testing and Materials,
1916 Race Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103. In addition, a copy
of the standard may be examined at the FAA Rules Docket, Docket
No. 24115, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC,
weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 8:30 a.m. and 5 p.m.
(h) Each certificate holder shall comply with X-ray
operator duty time limitations specified in its security
program.
Sec. 108.18 Security Directives and Information Circulars.
(a) Each certificate holder required to have an approved
security program for passenger operations shall comply with
each Security Directive issued to the certificate holder by the
Director of Civil Aviation Security, or by any person to whom
the Director has delegated the authority to issue Security
Directives, within the time prescribed in the Security
Directive for compliance.
(b) Each certificate holder who receives a Security
Directive shall--
(1) Not later than 24 hours after delivery by the FAA or
within the time prescribed in the Security Directive,
acknowledge receipt of the Security Directive;
(2) Not later than 72 hours after delivery by the FAA or
within the time prescribed in the Security Directive, specify
the method by which the certificate holder has implemented the
measures in the Security Directive; and
(3) Ensure that information regarding the Security
Directive and measures implemented in response to the Security
Directive are distributed to specified personnel as prescribed
in the Security Directive and to other personnel with an
operational need to know.
(c) In the event that the certificate holder is unable to
implement the measures contained in the Security Directive, the
certificate holder shall submit proposed alternative measures,
and the basis for submitting the alternative measures, to the
Director of Civil Aviation Security for approval. The
certificate holder shall submit proposed alternative measures
within the time prescribed in the Security Directive. The
certificate holder shall implement any alternative measures
approved by the Director of Civil Aviation Security.
(d) Each certificate holder who receives a Security
Directive or Information Circular and each person who receives
information from a Security Directive or Information Circular
shall--
(1) Restrict the availability of the Security Directive or
Information Circular and information contained in the Security
Directive or the Information Circular to those persons with an
operational need to know; and
(2) Refuse to release the Security Directive or Information
Circular and information regarding the Security Directive or
Information Circular to persons other than those with an
operational need to know without the prior written consent of
the Director of Civil Aviation Security.
(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under
control number 2120-0098)
Sec. 108.19 Security threats and procedures.
(a) Upon receipt of a specific and credible threat to the
security of a flight, the certificate holder shall--
(1) Immediately notify the ground and in-flight security
coordinators of the threat, any evaluation thereof, and any
countermeasures to be applied; and
(2) Ensure that the in-flight security coordinator notifies
the flight and cabin crewmembers of the threat, any evaluation
thereof, and any countermeasures to be applied.
(b) Upon receipt of a bomb threat against a specific
airplane, each certificate holder shall attempt to determine
whether or not any explosive or incendiary is aboard the
airplane involved by doing the following:
(1) Conducting a security inspection on the ground before
the next flight or, if the airplane is in flight, immediately
after its next landing.
(2) If the airplane is being operated on the ground,
advising the pilot in command to immediately submit the
airplane for a security inspection.
(3) If the airplane is in flight, immediately advising the
pilot in command of all pertinent information available so that
necessary emergency action can be taken.
(c) Immediately upon receiving information that an act or
suspected act of air piracy has been committed, the certificate
holder shall notify the Administrator. If the airplane is in
airspace under other than United States jurisdiction, the
certificate holder shall also notify the appropriate
authorities of the State in whose territory the airplane is
located and, if the airplane is in flight, the appropriate
authorities of the State in whose territory the airplane is to
land. Notification of the appropriate air traffic controlling
authority is sufficient action to meet this requirement.
Sec. 108.20 Use of Explosives Detection Systems.
When the Administrator shall require by amendment under
Sec. 108.25, each certificate holder required to conduct
screening under a security program shall use an explosive
detection system that has been approved by the Administrator to
screen checked baggage on international flights in accordance
with the certificate holder's security program.
Sec. 108.21 Carriage of passengers under the control of armed law
enforcement escorts.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, no
certificate holder required to conduct screening under a
security program may carry a passenger in the custody of an
armed law enforcement escort aboard an airplane for which
screening is required unless--
(1) The armed law enforcement escort is an official or
employee of the United States, of a State or political
subdivision of a State, or a municipality who is required by
appropriate authority to maintain custody and control over an
individual aboard an airplane;
(2) The certificate holder is notified by the responsible
government entity at least 1 hour, or in case of emergency as
soon as possible, before departure--
(i) Of the identity of the passenger to be carried and the
flight on which it is proposed to carry the passenger; and
(ii) Whether or not the passenger is considered to be in a
maximum risk category;
(3) If the passenger is considered to be in a maximum risk
category, that the passenger is under the control of at least
two armed law enforcement escorts and no other passengers are
under the control of those two law enforcement escorts;
(4) No more than one passenger who the certificate holder
has been notified is in a maximum risk category is carried on
the airplane;
(5) If the passenger is not considered to be in a maximum
risk category, the passenger is under the control of at least
one armed law enforcement escort, and no more than two of these
persons are carried under the control of any one law
enforcement escort;
(6) The certificate holder is assured, prior to departure,
by each law enforcement escort that--
(i) The officer is equipped with adequate restraining
devices to be used in the event restraint of any passenger
under the control of the escort becomes necessary; and
(ii) Each passenger under the control of the escort has
been searched and does not have on or about his or her person
or property anything that can be used as a deadly or dangerous
weapon;
(7) Each passenger under the control of a law enforcement
escort is--
(i) Boarded before any other passengers when boarding at
the airport where the flight originates and deplaned at the
destination after all other deplaning passengers have deplaned;
(ii) Seated in the rear-most passenger seat when boarding
at the airport where the flight originates; and
(iii) Seated in a seat that is neither located in any
lounge area nor located next to or directly across from any
exit; and
(8) A law enforcement escort having control of a passenger
is seated between the passenger and any aisle.
(b) No certificate holder operating an airplane under
paragraph (a) of this section may--
(1) Serve food beverage or provide metal eating utensils to
a passenger under the control of a law enforcement escort while
aboard the airplane unless authorized to do so by the law
enforcement escort.
(2) Serve a law enforcement escort or the passenger under
the control of the escort any alcoholic beverages while aboard
the airplane.
(c) Each law enforcement escort carried under the
provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall, at all
times, accompany the passenger under the control of the escort
and keep the passenger under surveillance while aboard the
airplane.
(d) No law enforcement escort carried under paragraph (b)
of this section or any passenger under the control of the
escort may drink alcoholic beverages while aboard the airplane.
(e) This section does not apply to the carriage of
passengers under voluntary protective escort.
Sec. 108.23 Training.
(a) No certificate holder may use any person as a Security
Coordinator unless, within the preceding 12 calendar months,
that person has satisfactorily completed the security training
as specified in the certificate holder's approved security
program.
(b) No certificate holder may use any person as a
crewmember on any domestic or international flight unless
within the preceding 12 calendar months or within the time
period specified in an Advanced Qualification Program approved
under SFAR 58 that person has satisfactorily completed the
security training required by Sec. 121.417(b)(3)(v) or
Sec. 135.331(b)(3)(v) of this chapter and as specified in the
certificate holder's approved security program. With respect to
training conducted under Sec. 121.417 or Sec. 135.331, whenever
a crewmember who is required to take recurrent training
completes the training in the calendar month before or the
calendar month after the calendar month in which that training
is required, he is considered to have completed the training in
the calendar month in which it was required.
Sec. 108.25 Approval of security programs and amendments.
(a) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, each
certificate holder required to have a security program for a
passenger operation shall submit its proposed security program
to the Administrator for approval at least 90 days before the
date of the intended passenger operations. Within 30 days after
receiving the program, the Administrator either approves the
program or notifies the certificate holder to modify the
program to comply with the applicable requirements of this
part. The certificate holder may petition the Administrator to
reconsider the notice to modify within 30 days after receiving
the notice, and, except in the case of an emergency requiring
immediate action in the interest of safety, the filing of the
petition stays the notice pending a decision by the
Administrator.
(b) The Administrator may amend an approved security
program if it is determined that safety and the public interest
require the amendment, as follows:
(1) The Administrator notifies the certificate holder, in
writing, of the proposed amendment, fixing a period of not less
than 30 days within which it may submit written information,
views, and arguments on the amendment.
(2) After considering all relevant material, the
Administrator notifies the certificate holder of any amendment
adopted or rescinds the notice. The amendment becomes effective
not less than 30 days after the certificate holder receives the
notice, unless the certificate holder petitions the
Administrator to reconsider the amendment, in which case the
effective date is stayed by the Administrator.
(3) If the Administrator finds that there is an emergency
requiring immediate action with respect to safety in air
transportation or in air commerce that makes the procedure in
this paragraph impracticable or contrary to the public
interest, the Administrator may issue an amendment, effective
without stay, on the date the certificate holder receives
notice of it. In such a case, the Administrator incorporates
the findings, and a brief statement of the reasons for it, in
the notice of the amendment to be adopted.
(c) A certificate holder may submit a request to the
Administrator to amend its program. The application must be
filed with the Administrator at least 30 days before the date
it proposes for the amendment to become effective, unless a
shorter period is allowed by the Administrator. Within 15 days
after receiving a proposed amendment, the Administrator either
approves or denies the request. Within 30 days after receiving
from the Administrator a notice of refusal to approve the
application for amendment, the applicant may petition the
Administrator to reconsider the refusal to amend.
Sec. 108.27 Evidence of compliance.
On request of the Administrator, each certificate holder
shall provide evidence of compliance with this part and its
approved security program.
Sec. 108.29 Standards for security oversight.
(a) Each certificate holder shall ensure that:
(1) Each person performing a security-related function for
the certificate holder has knowledge of the provisions of this
part 108, applicable Security Directives and Information
Circulars promulgated pursuant to Sec. 108.18, and the
certificate holder's security program to the extent that the
performance of the function imposes a need to know.
(2) Daily, a Ground Security Coordinator at each airport:
(i) Reviews all security-related functions for
effectiveness and compliance with this part, the certificate
holder's security program, and applicable Security Directives;
and
(ii) Immediately initiates corrective action for each
instance of noncompliance with this part, the certificate
holder's security program, and applicable Security Directives.
(b) The requirements prescribed in paragraph (a) of this
section apply to all security-related functions performed for
the certificate holder whether by a direct employee or a
contractor employee.
Sec. 108.31 Employment standards for screening personnel.
(a) No certificate holder shall use any person to perform
any screening function, unless that person has:
(1) A high school diploma, a General Equivalency Diploma,
or a combination of education and experience which the
certificate holder has determined to have equipped the person
to perform the duties of the position;
(2) Basic aptitudes and physical abilities including color
perception, visual and aural acuity, physical coordination, and
motor skills to the following standards:
(i) Screeners operating X-ray equipment must be able to
distinguish on the X-ray monitor the appropriate imaging
standard specified in the certificate holder's security
program. Wherever the X-ray system displays colors, the
operator must be able to perceive each color;
(ii) Screeners operating any screening equipment must be
able to distinguish each color displayed on every type of
screening equipment and explain what each color signifies;
(iii) Screeners must be able to hear and respond to the
spoken voice and to audible alarms generated by screening
equipment in an active checkpoint environment;
(iv) Screeners performing physical searches or other
related operations must be able to efficiently and thoroughly
manipulate and handle such baggage, containers, and other
objects subjects to security processing; and
(v) Screeners who perform pat-downs or hand-held metal
detector searches of persons must have sufficient dexterity and
capability to conduct those procedures on all parts of the
persons' bodies.
(3) The ability to read, speak, and write English well
enough to:
(i) Carry out written and oral instructions regarding the
proper performance of screening duties;
(ii) Read English language identification media,
credentials, airline tickets, and labels on items normally
encountered in the screening process;
(iii) Provide direction to and understand and answer
questions from English-speaking persons undergoing screening;
and
(iv) Write incident reports and statements and log entries
into security records in the English language.
(4) Satisfactorily completed all initial, recurrent, and
appropriate specialized training required by the certificate
holder's security program.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a)(4) of
this section, the certificate holder may use a person during
the on-the-job portion of training to perform security
functions provided that the person is closely supervised and
does not make independent judgments as to whether persons or
property may enter a sterile area or aircraft without further
inspection.
(c) No certificate holder shall use a person to perform a
screening function after that person has failed an operational
test related to that function until that person has
successfully completed the remedial training specified in the
certificate holder's security program.
(d) Each certificate holder shall ensure that a Ground
Security Coordinator conducts and documents an annual
evaluation of each person assigned screening duties and may
continue that person's employment in a screening capacity only
upon the determination by that Ground Security Coordinator that
the person:
(1) Has not suffered a significant dimunition of any
physical ability required to perform a screening function since
the last evaluation of those abilities;
(2) Has a satisfactory record of performance and attention
to duty; and
(3) Demonstrates the current knowledge and skills necessary
to courteously, vigilantly, and effectively perform screening
functions.
(e) Paragraphs (a) through (d) of this section do not apply
to those screening functions conducted outside the United
States over which the certificate holder does not have
operational control.
(f) At locations outside the United States where the
certificate holder has operational control over a screening
function, the certificate holder may use screeners who do not
meet the requirements of paragraph (a)(3) of this section,
provided that at least one representative of the certificate
holder who has the ability to functionally read and speak
English is present while the certificate holder's passengers
are undergoing security processing.
Sec. 108.33 Employment history, verification and criminal history
records checks.
(a) Scope. The following persons are within the scope of
this section:
(1) Each employee or contractor employee covered under a
certification made to an airport operator, pursuant to Sec.
107.31(n) of this chapter, made on or after November 23, 1998.
(2) Each individual issued air carrier identification media
that one or more airports accepts as airport approved media for
unescorted access within a security identification display area
(SIDA) as described in Sec. 107.25 of this chapter.
(3) Each individual assigned, after November 23, 1998, to
perform the following functions:
(i) Screen passengers or property that will be carried in a
cabin of an aircraft of an air carrier required to screen
passengers under this part.
(ii) Serve as an immediate supervisor (checkpoint security
supervisor (CSS)), or the next supervisory level (shift or site
supervisor), to those individuals described in paragraph
(a)(3)(i) of this section.
(b) Employment history investigations required. Each air
carrier must ensure that, for each individual described in
paragraph (a) of this section, the following requirements are
met:
(1) The individual has satisfactorily undergone Part 1 of
an employment history investigation. Part 1 consists of a
review of the previous 10 years of employment history and
verifications of the 5 employment years preceding the date the
employment history investigation is initiated as provided in
paragraph (c) of this section; and
(2) If required by paragraph (c)(5) of this section, the
individual has satisfied Part 2 of the employment history
investigation. Part 2 is the process to determine if the
individual has a criminal record. To satisfy Part 2 of the
investigation the criminal records check must not disclose that
the individual has been convicted or found not guilty by reason
of insanity, in any jurisdiction, during the 10 years ending on
the date of such investigation, of any of the crimes listed
below:
(i) Forgery of certificates, false marking of aircraft, and
other aircraft registration violation, 49 U.S.C. 46306;
(ii) Interference with air navigation, 49 U.S.C. 46308;
(iii) Improper transportation of a hazardous material, 49
U.S.C. 46312;
(iv) Aircraft piracy, 49 U.S.C. 46502;
(v) Interference with flightcrew members or flight
attendants, 49 U.S.C. 46504;
(vi) Commission of certain crimes aboard aircraft in
flight, 49 U.S.C. 46506;
(vii) Carrying a weapon or explosive aboard aircraft, 49
U.S.C. 46505;
(viii) Conveying false information and threats, 49 U.S.C.
46507;
(ix) Aircraft piracy outside the special aircraft
jurisdiction of the United States, 49 U.S.C. 46502(b);
(x) Lighting violations involving transporting controlled
substances, 49 U.S.C. 46315;
(xi) Unlawful entry into an aircraft or airport area that
serves air carriers or foreign air carriers contrary to
established security requirements, 49 U.S.C. 46314;
(xii) Destruction of an aircraft or aircraft facility, 18
U.S.C. 32;
(xiii) Murder;
(xiv) Assault with intent to murder;
(xv) Espionage;
(xvi) Sedition;
(xvii) Kidnapping or hostage taking;
(xviii) Treason;
(xix) Rape or aggravated sexual abuse;
(xx) Unlawful possession, use, sale, distribution, or
manufacture of an explosive or weapon;
(xxi) Extortion;
(xxii) Armed robbery;
(xxiii) Distribution of, or intent to distribute, a
controlled substance;
(xxiv) Felony arson; or
(xxv) Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the
aforementioned criminal acts.
(c) Investigative steps. Part 1 of the employment history
investigations must be completed on all persons described in
paragraph (a) of this section. If required by paragraph (c)(5)
of this section, Part 2 of the employment history investigation
must also be completed on all persons listed in paragraph (a)
of this section.
(1) The individual must provide the following information
on an application:
(i) The individual's full name, including any aliases or
nicknames;
(ii) The dates, names, phone numbers, and addresses of
previous employers, with explanations for any gaps in
employment of more than 12 consecutive months, during the
previous 10-year period;
(iii) Any convictions during the previous 10-year period of
the crimes listed in paragraph (b)(2) of this section.
(2) The air carrier must include on the application form a
notification that the individual will be subject to an
employment history verification and possibly a criminal records
check.
(3) The air carrier must verify the identity of the
individual through the presentation of two forms of
identification, one of which must bear the individual's
photograph.
(4) The air carrier must verify the information on the most
recent 5 years of employment history required under paragraph
(c)(1)(ii) of this section. Information must be verified in
writing, by documentation, by telephone, or in person.
(5) If one or more of the conditions (triggers) listed in
Sec. 108.33(c)(5) (i) through (iv) exist, the employment
history investigation must not be considered complete unless
Part 2 is accomplished. Only the air carrier may initiate Part
2. Part 2 consists of a comparison of the individual's
fingerprints against the fingerprint files of known criminals
maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The
comparison of the individual's fingerprints must be processed
through the FAA. The air carrier may request a check of the
individual's fingerprint- based criminal record only if one or
more of the following conditions exist:
(i) The individual does not satisfactorily account for a
period of unemployment of 12 consecutive months or more during
the previous 10- year period.
(ii) The individual is unable to support statements made on
the application form.
(iii) There are significant inconsistencies in the
information provided on the application.
(iv) Information becomes available to the air carrier
during the investigation indicating a possible conviction for
one of the crimes listed in paragraph (b)(2) of this section.
(d) Individual notification. Prior to commencing the
criminal records check, the air carrier must notify the
affected individuals and identify a point of contact for
follow-up. An individual who chooses not to submit fingerprints
may not be granted unescorted access privilege and may not be
allowed to hold screener or screener supervisory positions.
(e) Fingerprint processing. If a fingerprint comparison is
necessary under paragraph (c)(5) of this section to complete
the employment history investigation the air carrier must
collect and process fingerprints in the following manner:
(1) One set of legible and classifiable fingerprints must
be recorded on fingerprint cards approved by the FBI and
distributed by the FAA for this purpose.
(2) The fingerprints must be obtained from the individual
under direct observation by the air carrier or a law
enforcement officer. Individuals submitting their fingerprints
must not take possession of their fingerprint card after they
have been fingerprinted.
(3) The identify of the individual must be verified at the
time fingerprints are obtained. The individual must present two
forms of identification, one of which must bear the
individual's photograph.
(4) The fingerprint card must be forwarded to FAA at the
location specified by the Administrator.
(5) Fees for the processing of the criminal records checks
are due upon application. Air carriers must submit payment
through corporate check, cashier's check, or money order made
payable to ``U.S. FAA,'' at the designated rate for each
fingerprint card. Combined payment for multiple applications is
acceptable. The designated rate for processing the fingerprint
cards is available from the local FAA security office.
(f) Determination of arrest status. In conducting the
criminal record checks required by this section, the air
carrier must not consider the employment history investigation
complete unless it investigates arrest information for the
crimes listed in paragraph (b)(2) of this section for which no
disposition has been recorded and makes a determination that
the arrest did not result in a disqualifying conviction.
(g) Availability and correction of FBI records and
notification of disqualification. (1) At the time Part 2 is
initiated and the fingerprints are collected, the air carrier
must notify the individual that a copy of the criminal record
received from the FBI will be made available to the individual
if requested in writing. When requested in writing, the air
carrier must make available to the individual a copy of any
criminal record received from the FBI.
(2) Prior to making a final decision to deny authorization
to an individual described in paragraph (a) of this section,
the air carrier must advise the individual that the FBI
criminal record discloses information that would disqualify
him/her from positions covered under this rule and provide him/
her with a copy of their FBI record if requested.
(3) The air carrier must notify an individual that a final
decision has been made to forward or not forward a letter of
certification for unescorted access to the airport operator, or
to grant or deny the individual authority to perform screening
functions listed under paragraph (a)(3) of this section.
(h) Corrective action by the individual. The individual may
contact the local jurisdiction responsible for the information
and the FBI to complete or correct the information contained in
his/her record before the air carrier makes any decision to
withhold his/her name from a certification, or not grant
authorization to perform screening functions subject to the
following conditions:
(1) Within 30 days after being advised that the criminal
record received from the FBI discloses disqualifying
information, the individual must notify the air carrier, in
writing, of his/her intent to correct any information believed
to be inaccurate.
(2) Upon notification by an individual that the record has
been corrected, the air carrier must obtain a copy of the
revised FBI record prior to making a final determination.
(3) If no notification is received within 30 days, the air
carrier may make a final determination.
(i) Limits on dissemination of results. Criminal record
information provided by the FBI must be used solely for the
purposes of this section, and no person may disseminate the
results of a criminal record check to anyone other than:
(1) The individual to whom the record pertains or that
individual's authorized representative;
(2) Air carrier officials with a need to know; and
(3) Others designated by the Administrator.
(j) Employment status while awaiting criminal record
checks. Individuals who have submitted their fingerprints and
are awaiting FBI results may perform work details under the
following conditions:
(1) Those seeking unescorted access to the SIDA must be
escorted by someone who has unescorted SIDA access privileges;
(2) Those applicants seeking positions covered under
paragraphs (a)(3) and (a)(4) of this section, may not exercise
any independent judgments regarding those functions.
(k) Recordkeeping. (1) The air carrier must physically
maintain and control Part 1 employment history investigation
file until 180 days after the termination of the individual's
authority for unescorted access or termination from positions
covered under paragraph (a)(3) of this section. Part 1 of the
employment history investigation, completed on screening
personnel must be maintained at the airport where they perform
screening functions. Part 1 of the employment history
investigation file must consist of the following:
(i) The application;
(ii) The employment verification information obtained by
the employer;
(iii) the names of those from whom the employment
verification information was obtained;
(iv) The date and the method of how the contact was made;
and
(v) Any other information as required by the Administrator.
(2) The air carrier must physically maintain, control and
when appropriate destroy Part 2, the criminal record file, for
each individual for whom a fingerprint comparison has been
made. Part 2 must be maintained for 180 days after the
termination of the individual's authority for unescorted access
or after the individual ceases to perform screening functions.
Only direct air carrier employees may carry out Part 2
responsibilities. Part 2 must consist of the following:
(i) The results of the record check; or
(ii) Certification from the air carrier that the check was
completed and did not uncover a disqualifying conviction.
(3) The files required by this paragraph must be maintained
in a manner that is acceptable to the Administrator and in a
manner that protects the confidentiality of the individual.
(l) Continuing responsibilities. (1) Any individual
authorized to have unescorted access privilege to the SIDA or
who performs functions covered under paragraph (a)(3) of this
section, who is subsequently convicted of any of the crimes
listed in paragraph (b)(2) of this section must, within 24
hours, report the conviction to the air carrier and surrender
the SIDA access medium or any employment related identification
medium to the issuer.
(2) If information becomes available to the air carrier
indicating that an individual has a possible conviction for one
of the disqualifying crimes in paragraph (b)(2) of this
section, the air carrier must determine the status of the
conviction and, if the conviction is confirmed:
(i) Immediately revoke access authorization for unescorted
access to the SIDA; or
(ii) Immediately remove the individual from screening
functions covered under paragraph (a)(3) of this section.
(m) Air carrier responsibility. The air carrier must:
(1) Designate an individual(s), in the security program, to
be responsible for maintaining and controlling the employment
history investigation for those whom the air carrier has made a
certification to an airport operator under Sec. 107.31(n)(1) of
this chapter and for destroying the criminal record files when
their maintenance is no longer required by paragraph (k)(2) of
this section.
(2) Designate individual(s), in the security program, to
maintain and control Part 1 of the employment history
investigations of screeners whose files must be maintained at
the location or station where the screener is performing his or
her duties.
(3) Designate individual(s), in the security program, to
serve as the contact to receive notification from an individual
applying for either unescorted access or those seeking to
perform screening functions of his or her intent to seek
correction of his or her criminal record with the FBI.
(4) Designate an individual(s), in the security program, to
maintain and control Part 2 of the employment history
investigation file for all employees, contractors, or others
who undergo a fingerprint comparison at the request of the air
carrier.
(5) Audit the employment history investigations performed
in accordance with this section. The audit process must be set
forth in the air carrier approved security program.
[Doc. No. 28859, 63 FR 51220, Sept. 24, 1998; 63 FR 60448, Nov.
9, 1998]
c. Operations: Foreign Air Carriers and Foreign Operators of U.S.-
Registered Aircraft Engaged in Common Carriage
Federal Aviation Administration Regulations, 14 CFR Part 129
Part 129--Operations: Foreign Air Carriers and Foreign Operators of
U.S.-Registered Aircraft Engaged in Common Carriage
special federal aviation regulation no. 38-2
Sec. 129.1 Applicability.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section,
this part prescribes rules governing the operation within the
United States of each foreign air carrier holding a permit
issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board or the Department of
Transportation under section 402 of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 (49 U.S.C. 1372) or other appropriate economic or
exemption authority issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board or
the Department of Transportation.
(b) Section 129.14 also applies to U.S.-registered aircraft
operated in common carriage by a foreign person or foreign air
carrier solely outside the United States. For the purpose of
this part, a foreign person is any person, not a citizen for
the United States, who operates a U.S.-registered aircraft in
common carriage solely outside the United States.
Sec. 129.11 Operations specifications.
(a) Each foreign air carrier shall conduct its operations
within the United States in accordance with operations
specifications issued by the Administrator under this part and
in accordance with the Standards and Recommended Practices
contained in part I (International Commercial Air Transport) of
Annex 6 (Operation of Aircraft) to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation Organization. Operations
specifications shall include:
(1) Airports to be used;
(2) Routes or airways to be flown, and
(3) Such operations rules and practices as are necessary to
prevent collisions between foreign aircraft and other aircraft.
(4) Registration marketings of each U.S.-registered
aircraft.
(b) An application for the issue or amendment of operations
specifications must be submitted in duplicate, at least 30 days
before beginning operations in the United States, to the Flight
Standards District Office in the area where the applicant's
principal business office is located or to the Regional Flight
Standards Division Manager having jurisdiction over the area to
be served by the operations. If a military airport of the
United States is to be used as a regular, alternate, refueling,
or provisional airport, the applicant must obtain written
permission to do so from the Washington Headquarters of the
military organization concerned and submit two copies of that
written permission with his application. Detailed requirements
governing applications for the issue or amendment of operations
specifications are contained in Appendix A.
(c) No person operating under this part may operate or list
on its operations specifications any airplane listed on
operations specifications issued under part 125.
Sec. 129.13 Airworthiness and registration certificates.
(a) No foreign air carrier may operate any aircraft within
the United States unless that aircraft carries current
registration and airworthiness certificates issued or validated
by the country of registry and displays the nationality and
registration markings of that country.
(b) No foreign air carrier may operate a foreign aircraft
within the United States except in accordance with the
limitations on maximum certificated weights prescribed for that
aircraft and that operation by the country of manufacture of
the aircraft.
Sec. 129.14 Maintenance program and minimum equipment list requirements
for U.S.-registered aircraft.
(a) Each foreign air carrier and each foreign person
operating a U.S.-registered aircraft within or outside the
United States in common carriage shall ensure that each
aircraft is maintained in accordance with a program approved by
the Administrator.
(b) No foreign air carrier or foreign person may operate a
U.S.-registered aircraft with inoperable instruments or
equipment unless the following conditions are met:
(1) A master minimum equipment list exists for the aircraft
type.
(2) The foreign operator submits for review and approval
its aircraft minimum equipment list based on the master minimum
equipment list, to the FAA Flight Standards District Office
having geographic responsibility for the operator. The foreign
operator must show, before minimum equipment list approval can
be obtained, that the maintenance procedures used under its
maintenance program are adequate to support the use of its
minimum equipment list.
(3) For leased aircraft maintained and operated under a
U.S. operator's continuous airworthiness maintenance program
and FAA-approved minimum equipment list, the foreign operator
submits the U.S. operator's approved continuous airworthiness
maintenance program and approved aircraft minimum equipment
list to the FAA office prescribed in paragraph (b)(2) of this
section for review and evaluation. The foreign operator must
show that it is capable of operating under the lessor's
approved maintenance program and that it is also capable of
meeting the maintenance and operational requirements specified
in the lessor's approved minimum equipment list.
(4) The FAA letter of authorization permitting the operator
to use an approved minimum equipment list is carried aboard the
aircraft. The minimum equipment list and the letter of
authorization constitute a supplemental type certificate for
the aircraft.
(5) The approved minimum equipment list provides for the
operation of the aircraft with certain instruments and
equipment in an inoperable condition.
(6) The aircraft records available to the pilot must
include an entry describing the inoperable instruments and
equipment.
(7) The aircraft is operated under all applicable
conditions and limitations contained in the minimum equipment
list and the letter authorizing the use of the list.
Sec. 129.15 Flight crewmember certificates.
No person may act as a flight crewmember unless he holds a
current certificate or license issued or validated by the
country in which that aircraft is registered, showing his
ability to perform his duties connected with operating that
aircraft.
Sec. 129.17 Radio equipment.
(a) Subject to the applicable laws and regulations
governing ownership and operation of radio equipment, each
foreign air carrier shall equip its aircraft with such radio
equipment as is necessary to properly use the air navigation
facilities, and to maintain communications with ground
stations, along or adjacent to their routes in the United
States.
(b) Whenever VOR navigational equipment is required by
paragraph (a) of this section, at least one distance measuring
equipment unit (DME), capable of receiving and indicating
distance information from the VORTAC facilities to be used,
must be installed on each airplane when operated at or above
24,000 feet MSL within the 50 states, and the District of
Columbia.
Sec. 129.18 Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System.
(a) After December 30, 1993, no foreign air carrier may
operate in the United States a turbine powered airplane that
has a maximum passenger seating configuration, excluding any
pilot seat, of more than 30 seats unless it is equipped with--
(1) A TCAS II traffic alert and collision avoidance system
capable of coordinating with TCAS units that meet the
specifications of TSO C-119, and
(2) The appropriate class of Mode S transponder.
(b) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, after
December 31, 1995, no foreign air carrier may operate in the
United States a turbine powered airplane that has a passenger
seat configuration, excluding any pilot seat, of 10 to 30 seats
unless it is equipped with an approved traffic alert and
collision avoidance system. If a TCAS II system is installed,
it must be capable of coordinating with TCAS units that meet
TSO C-119.
Sec. 129.19 Air traffic rules and procedures.
(a) Each pilot must be familiar with the applicable rules,
the navigational and communications facilities, and the air
traffic control and other procedures, of the areas to be
traversed by him within the United States.
(b) Each foreign air carrier shall establish procedures to
assure that each of its pilots has the knowledge required by
paragraph (a) of this section and shall check the ability of
each of its pilots to operate safely according to applicable
rules and procedures.
(c) Each foreign air carrier shall conform to the
practices, procedures, and other requirements prescribed by the
Administrator for U.S. air carriers for the areas to be
operated in.
Sec. 129.20 Digital flight data recorders.
No person may operate an aircraft under this part that is
registered in the United States unless it is equipped with one
or more approved flight recorders that use a digital method of
recording and storing data and a method of readily retrieving
that data from the storage medium. The flight data recorder
must record the parameters that would be required to be
recorded if the aircraft were operated under part 121, 125, or
135 of this chapter, and must be installed by the compliance
times required by those parts, as applicable to the aircraft.
Sec. 129.21 Control of traffic.
(a) Subject to applicable immigration laws and regulations,
each foreign air carrier shall furnish the ground personnel
necessary to provide for two-way voice communication between
its aircraft and ground stations, at places where the
Administrator finds that voice communication is necessary and
that communications cannot be maintained in a language with
which ground station operators are familiar.
(b) Each person furnished by a foreign air carrier under
paragraph (a) of this section must be able to speak both
English and the language necessary to maintain communications
with the aircraft concerned, and shall assist ground personnel
in directing traffic.
Sec. 129.23 Transport category cargo service airplanes: Increased zero
fuel and landing weights.
(a) Notwithstanding the applicable structural provisions of
the transport category airworthiness regulations, but subject
to paragraphs (b) through (g) of this section, a foreign air
carrier may operate (for cargo service only) any of the
following transport category airplanes (certificated under part
4b of the Civil Air Regulations effective before March 13,
1956) at increased zero fuel and landing weights--
(1) DC-6A, DC-6B, DC-7B, and DC-7C; and
(2) L-1049 B, C, D, E, F, G, and H, and the L-1649A when
modified in accordance with supplemental type certificate SA 4-
1402.
(b) The zero fuel weight (maximum weight of the airplane
with no disposable fuel and oil) and the structural landing
weight may be increased beyond the maximum approved in full
compliance with applicable rules only if the Administrator
finds that--
(1) The increase is not likely to reduce seriously the
structural strength;
(2) The probability of sudden fatigue failure is not
noticeably increased;
(3) The flutter, deformation, and vibration characteristics
do not fall below those required by applicable regulations; and
(4) All other applicable weight limitations will be met.
(c) No zero fuel weight may be increased by more than five
percent, and the increase in the structural landing weight may
not exceed the amount, in pounds, of the increase in zero fuel
weight.
(d) Each airplane must be inspected in accordance with the
approved special inspection procedures, for operations at
increased weights, established and issued by the manufacturer
of the type of airplane.
(e) A foreign air carrier may not operate an airplane under
this section unless the country of registry requires the
airplane to be operated in accordance with the passenger-
carrying transport category performance operating limitations
in part 121 or the equivalent.
(f) The Airplane Flight Manual for each airplane operated
under this section must be appropriately revised to include the
operating limitations and information needed for operation at
the increased weights.
(g) Each airplane operated at an increased weight under
this section must, before it is used in passenger service, be
inspected under the special inspection procedures for return to
passenger service established and issued by the manufacturer
and approved by the Administrator.
Sec. 129.25 Airplane security.
(a) The following are definitions of terms used in this
section:
(1) Approved security program means a security program
required by part 108 of this title approved by the
Administrator.
(2) Certificate holder means a person holding an FAA air
carrier operating certificate or operating certificate when
that person engages in scheduled passenger or public charter
operations, or both.
(3) Passenger seating configuration means the total number
of seats for which the aircraft is type certificated that can
be made available for passenger use aboard a flight and
includes that seat in certain airplanes which may be used by a
representative of the Administrator to conduct flight checks
but is available for revenue purposes on other occasions.
(4) Private charter means any charter for which the
charterer engages the total capacity of an airplane for the
carriage only of:
(i) Passengers in civil or military air movements conducted
under contract with the Government of the United States or the
Government of a foreign country; or
(ii) Passengers invited by the charterer, the cost of which
is borne entirely by the charterer and not directly or
indirectly by the individual passengers.
(5) Public charter means any charter that is not a private
charter.
(6) Scheduled passenger operations means holding out to the
public of air transportation service for passengers from
identified air terminals at a set time announced by timetable
or schedule published in a newspaper, magazine, or other
advertising medium.
(7) Sterile area means an area to which access is
controlled by the inspection of persons and property in
accordance with an approved security program or a security
program used in accordance with Sec. 129.25.
(b) Each foreign air carrier landing or taking off in the
United States shall adopt and use a security program, for each
scheduled and public charter passenger operation, that meets
the requirements of--
(1) Paragraph (c) of this section for each operation with
an airplane having a passenger seating configuration of more
than 60 seats;
(2) Paragraph (c) of this section for each operation that
will provide deplaned passengers access, that is not controlled
by a certificate holder using an approved security program or a
foreign air carrier using a security program required by this
section, to a sterile area;
(3) Paragraph (c) of this section for each operation with
an airplane having a passenger seating configuration of more
than 30 seats but less than 61 seats for which the FAA has
notified the foreign air carrier that a threat exists; and
(4) Paragraph (d) of this section for each operation with
an airplane having a passenger seating configuration of more
than 30 seats but less than 61 seats, when the the Director of
Civil Aviation Security or a designate of the Director has not
notified the foreign air carrier in writing that a threat
exists with respect to that operation.
(c) Each security program required by paragraph (b) (1),
(2), or (3) of this section shall be designed to--
(1) Prevent or deter the carriage aboard airplanes of any
explosive, incendiary device or a deadly or dangerous weapon on
or about each individual's person or accessible property,
except as provided in Sec. 129.27 of this part, through
screening by weapon-detecting procedures or facilities;
(2) Prohibit unauthorized access to airplanes;
(3) Ensure that baggage is accepted by a responsible agent
of the foreign air carrier; and
(4) Prevent cargo and checked baggage from being loaded
aboard its airplanes unless handled in accordance with the
foreign air carrier's security procedures.
(d) Each security program required by paragraph (b)(4) of
this section shall include the procedures used to comply with
the applicable requirements of paragraphs (h)(2) and (i) of
this section regarding law enforcement officers.
(e) Each foreign air carrier required to adopt and use a
security program pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section
shall have a security program acceptable to the Administrator.
A foreign air carrier's security program is acceptable only if
the Administrator finds that the security program provides
passengers a level of protection similar to the level of
protection provided by U.S. air carriers serving the same
airports. Foreign air carriers shall employ procedures
equivalent to those required of U.S. air carriers serving the
same airport if the Administrator determines that such
procedures are necessary to provide passengers a similar level
of protection. The following procedures apply for acceptance of
a security program by the Administrator:
(1) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, each
foreign air carrier required to have a security program by
paragraph (b) of this section shall submit its program to the
Administrator at least 90 days before the intended date of
passenger operations. The proposed security program must be in
English unless the Administrator requests that the proposed
program be submitted in the official language of the foreign
air carrier's country. The Administrator will notify the
foreign air carrier of the security program's acceptability, or
the need to modify the proposed security program for it to be
acceptable under this part, within 30 days after receiving the
proposed security program. The foreign air carrier may petition
the Administrator to reconsider the notice to modify the
security program within 30 days after receiving a notice to
modify.
(2) In the case of a security program previously found to
be acceptable pursuant to this section, the Administrator may
subsequently amend the security program in the interest of
safety in air transportation or in air commerce and in the
public interest within a specified period of time. In making
such an amendment, the following procedures apply:
(i) The Administrator notifies the foreign air carrier, in
writing, of a proposed amendment, fixing a period of not less
than 45 days within which the foreign air carrier may submit
written information, views, and arguments on the proposed
amendment.
(ii) At the end of the comment period, after considering
all relevant material, the Administrator notifies the foreign
air carrier of any amendment to be adopted and the effective
date, or rescinds the notice of proposed amendment. The foreign
air carrier may petition the Administrator to reconsider the
amendment, in which case the effective date of the amendment is
stayed until the Administrator reconsiders the matter.
(3) If the Administrator finds that there is an emergency
requiring immediate action with respect to safety in air
transportation or in air commerce that makes the procedures in
paragraph (e)(2) of this section impractical or contrary to the
public interest, the Administrator may issue an amendment to
the foreign air carrier security program, effective without
stay on the date the foreign air carrier receives notice of it.
In such a case, the Administrator incorporates in the notice of
amendment the finding and a brief statement of the reasons for
the amendment.
(4) A foreign air carrier may submit a request to the
Administrator to amend its security program. The requested
amendment must be filed with the Administrator at least 45 days
before the date the foreign carrier proposes that the amendment
would become effective, unless a shorter period is allowed by
the Administrator. Within 30 days after receiving the requested
amendment, the Administrator will notify the foreign air
carrier whether the amendment is acceptable. The foreign air
carrier may petition the Administrator to reconsider a notice
of unacceptability of the requested amendment within 45 days
after receiving notice of unacceptability.
(5) Each foreign air carrier required to use a security
program by paragraph (b) of this section shall, upon request of
the Administrator and in accordance with the applicable law,
provide information regarding the implementation and operation
of its security program.
(f) No foreign air carrier may land or take off an airplane
in the United States, in passenger operations, after receiving
a bomb or air piracy threat against that airplane, unless the
following actions are taken:
(1) If the airplane is on the ground when a bomb threat is
received and the next scheduled flight of the threatened
airplane is to or from a place in the United States, the
foreign air carrier ensures that the pilot in command is
advised to submit the airplane immediately for a security
inspection and an inspection of the airplane is conducted
before the next flight.
(2) If the airplane is in flight to a place in the United
States when a bomb threat is received, the foreign air carrier
ensures that the pilot in command is advised immediately to
take the emergency action necessary under the circumstances and
a security inspection of the airplane is conducted immediately
after the next landing.
(3) If information is received of a bomb or air piracy
threat against an airplane engaged in an operation specified in
paragraph (f)(1) or (f)(2) of this section, the foreign air
carrier ensures that notification of the threat is given to the
appropriate authorities of the State in whose territory the
airplane is located or, if in flight, the appropriate
authorities of the State in whose territory the airplane is to
land.
(g) Each foreign air carrier conducting an operation for
which a security program is required by paragraph (b) (1), (2),
or (3) of this section shall refuse to transport--
(1) Any person who does not consent to a search of his or
her person in accordance with the security program; and
(2) Any property of any person who does not consent to a
search or inspection of that property in accordance with the
security program.
(h) At airports within the United States not governed by
part 107 of this chapter, each foreign air carrier engaging in
public charter passenger operations shall--
(1) When using a screening system required by paragraph (b)
of this section, provide for law enforcement officers meeting
the qualifications and standards, and in the number and manner,
specified in part 107; and
(2) When using an airplane having a passenger seating
configuration of more than 30 but less than 61 seats for which
a screening system is not required by paragraph (b) of this
section, arrange for law enforcement officers meeting the
qualifications and standards specified in part 107 to be
available to respond to an incident and provide to appropriate
employees, including crewmembers, current information with
respect to procedures for obtaining law enforcement assistance
at that airport.
(i) At airports governed by part 107 of this chapter, each
foreign air carrier engaging in scheduled passenger operations
or public charter passenger operations when using an airplane
with a passenger seating configuration of more than 30 but less
than 61 seats for which a screening system is not required by
paragraph (b) of this section shall arrange for law enforcement
officers meeting the qualifications and standards specified in
part 107 to be available to respond to an incident and provide
to appropriate employees, including crewmembers, current
information with respect to procedures for obtaining law
enforcement assistance at that airport.
(j) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, each
foreign air carrier required to conduct screening under this
part shall use procedures, facilities, and equipment for
detecting explosives, incendiaries, and deadly or dangerous
weapons to inspect each person entering a sterile area at each
preboarding screening checkpoint in the United States for which
it is responsible, and to inspect all accessible property under
that person's control.
Sec. 129.26 Use of X-ray system.
(a) No foreign air carrier may use an X-ray system in the
United States to inspect carry-on and checked articles unless:
(1) For a system manufactured prior to April 25, 1974, it
meets either the guidelines issued by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare and published in the Federal Register (38 FR 21442,
August 8, 1973); or the performance standards for cabinet X-ray
systems designed primarily for the inspection of carry-on
baggage issued by the FDA and published in 21 CFR 1020.40 (39
FR 12985, April 10, 1974);
(2) For a system manufactured after April 24, 1974, it
meets the standards for cabinet X-ray systems designed
primarily for the inspection of carry-on baggage issued by the
FDA and published in 21 CFR 1020.40 (39 FR 12985, April 10,
1974);
(3) A program for initial and recurrent training of
operators of the system has been established, which includes
training in radiation safety, the efficient use of X-ray
systems, and the identification of weapons and other dangerous
articles;
(4) Procedures have been established to ensure that such
operator of the system will be provided with an individual
personnel dosimeter (such as a film badge or thermoluminescent
dosimeter). Each dosimeter used will be evaluated at the end of
each calendar month, and records of operator duty time and the
results of dosimeter evaluations will be maintained by the
foreign air carrier; and
(5) The system meets the imaging requirements set forth in
an accepted Foreign Air Carrier Security Program using the step
wedge specified in American Society for Testing and Materials
Standard F792-82.
(b) No foreign air carrier may use an X-ray system as
specified in paragraph (a) of this section--
(1) Unless within the preceding 12 calendar months a
radiation survey has been conducted which shows that the system
meets the applicable performance standards in 21 CFR 1020.40 or
guidelines published by the Food and Drug Administration in the
Federal Register of August 8, 1973 (38 FR 21442);
(2) After the system is initially installed or after it has
been moved from one location to another, unless a radiation
survey is conducted which shows that the system meets the
applicable performance standards in 21 CFR 1020.40 or
guidelines published by the Food and Drug Administration in the
Federal Register on August 8, 1973 (38 FR 21442); except that a
radiation survey is not required for an X-ray system that is
moved to another location, if the foreign air carrier shows
that the system is so designed that it can be moved without
altering its performance:
(3) That is not in full compliance with any defect notice
or modification order issued for that system by the Food and
Drug Administration, Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, unless that Administration has advised the FAA that
the defect or failure to comply is not such as to create a
significant risk or injury, including genetic injury, to any
person; and
(4) Unless a sign is posted in a conspicuous place at the
screening station and on the X-ray system which notifies
passengers that carry-on and checked articles are being
inspected by an X-ray system and advises them to remove all X-
ray, scientific, and high-speed film from their carry-on and
checked articles before inspection. This sign shall also advise
passengers that they may request an inspection to be made of
their photographic equipment and film packages without exposure
to an X-ray system. If the X-ray system exposes any carry-on or
checked articles to more than 1 milliroentgen during the
inspection, the foreign air carrier shall post a sign which
advises passengers to remove film of all kinds from their
articles before inspection. If requested by passengers, their
photographic equipment and film packages shall be inspected
without exposure to an X-ray system.
(c) Each foreign air carrier shall maintain at least one
copy of the results of the most recent radiation survey
conducted under paragraph (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this section at
the place where the X-ray system is in operation and shall make
it available for inspection upon request by the Administrator.
(d) The American Society for Testing and Materials Standard
F792-82, ``Design and Use of Ionizing Radiation Equipment for
the Detection of Items Prohibited in Controlled Access Areas,''
described in this section is incorporated by reference herein
and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All
persons affected by these amendments may obtain copies of the
standard from the American Society for Testing and Materials,
1916 Race Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103. In addition, a copy
of the standard may be examined at the FAA Rules Docket, Docket
No. 24115, 800 Independence Avenue ST., Washington, DC,
weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 8:30 a.m. and 5 p.m.
Sec. 129.27 Prohibition against carriage of weapons.
(a) No person may, while on board an aircraft being
operated by a foreign air carrier in the United States, carry
on or about his person a deadly or dangerous weapon, either
concealed or unconcealed. This paragraph does not apply to--
(1) Officials or employees of the state of registry of the
aircraft who are authorized by that state to carry arms; and
(2) Crewmembers and other persons authorized by the foreign
air carrier to carry arms.
(b) No foreign air carrier may knowingly permit any
passenger to carry, nor may any passenger carry, while aboard
an aircraft being operated in the United States by that
carrier, in checked baggage, a deadly or dangerous weapon,
unless:
(1) The passenger has notified the foreign air carrier
before checking the baggage that the weapon is in the baggage;
and
(2) The baggage is carried in an area inaccessible to
passengers.
Sec. 129.29 Prohibition against smoking.
No person may smoke and no operator shall permit smoking in
the passenger cabin or lavatory during any scheduled airline
flight segment in air transportation or intrastate air
transportation which is:
(a) Between any two points within Puerto Rico, the United
States Virgin Islands, the District of Columbia, or any State
of the United States (other than Alaska or Hawaii) or between
any two points in any one of the above-mentioned jurisdictions
(other than Alaska or Hawaii);
(b) Within the State of Alaska or within the State of
Hawaii; or
(c) Scheduled in the current Worldwide or North American
Edition of the Official Airline Guide for 6 hours or less in
duration and between any point listed in paragraph (a) of this
section and any point in Alaska or Hawaii, or between any point
in Alaska and any point in Hawaii.
Sec. 129.31 Airplant security.
Each foreign air carrier required to adopt and use a
security program under Sec. 129.25(b) shall--
(a) Restrict the distribution, disclosure, and availability
of sensitive security information, as defined in part 191 of
this chapter, to persons with a need-to-know; and
(b) Refer requests for sensitive security information by
other persons to the Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation
Security.
Appendix A to Part 129--Application for Operations Specifications by
Foreign Air Carriers
(a) General. Each application must be executed by an
authorized officer or employee of the applicant having
knowledge of the matter set forth therein, and must have
attached thereto two copies of the appropriate written
authority issued to that officer or employee by the applicant.
Negotiations for permission to use airports under U.S. military
jurisdiction is effected through the respective embassy of the
foreign government and the United States Department of State.
(b) Format of application. The following outline must be
followed in completing the information to be submitted in the
application.
Application for Foreign Air Carrier Operations Specifications
(outline)
In accordance with the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49
U.S.C. 1372) and part 129 of the Federal Air Regulations,
application is hereby made for the issuance of Foreign
Operations Specifications.
Give exact name and full post office address of applicant.
Give the name, title, and post office address (within the
United States if possible) of the official or employee to whom
correspondence in regard to the application is to be addressed.
Unless otherwise specified, the applicant must submit the
following information only with respect to those parts of his
proposed operations that will be conducted within the United
States.
Section I. Operations. State whether the operation proposed
is day or night, visual flight rules, instrument flight rules,
or a particular combination thereof.
Sec. II. Operational plans. State the route by which entry
will be made into the United States, and the route to be flown
therein.
Sec. III. A. Route. Submit a map suitable for aerial
navigation upon which is indicated the exact geographical track
of the proposed route from the last point of foreign departure
to the United States terminal, showing the regular terminal,
and alternate airports, and radio navigational facilities. This
material will be indicated in a manner that will facilitate
identification. The applicant may use any method that will
clearly distinguish the information, such as different colors,
different types of lines, etc. For example, if different colors
are used, the identification will be accomplished as follows:
1. Regular route: Black.
2. Regular terminal airport: Green circle.
3. Alternate airports: Orange circle.
4. The location of radio navigational facilities which will
be used in connection with the proposed operation, indicating
the type of facility to be used, such as radio range ADF, VOR,
etc.
B. Airports. Submit the following information with regard
to each regular terminal and alternate to be used in the
conduct of the proposed operation:
1. Name of airport or landing area.
2. Location (direction distance to and name of nearest city
or town).
Sec. IV. Radio facilities: Communications. List all ground
radio communication facilities to be used by the applicant in
the conduct of the proposed operations within the United States
and over that portion of the route between the last point of
foreign departure and the United States.
Sec. V. Aircraft. Submit the following information in
regard to each type and model aircraft to be used.
A. Aircraft.
1. Manufacturer and model number.
2. State of origin.
3. Single-engine or multiengine. If multiengine, indicate
number of engines.
4. What is the maximum takeoff and landing weight to be
used for each type of aircraft?
5. Registration markings of each U.S.-registered aircraft.
B. Aircraft Radio. List aircraft radio equipment necessary
for instrument operation within the United States.
C. Licensing. State name of country by whom aircraft are
certificated.
Sec. VI. Airmen. List the following information with
respect to airmen to be employed in the proposed operation
within the United States.
A. State the type and class of certificate held by each
flight crewmember.
B. State whether or not pilot personnel have received
training in the use of navigational facilities necessary for en
route operation and instrument letdowns along or adjacent to
the route to be flown within the United States.
C. State whether or not personnel are familiar with those
parts of the Federal Air Regulations pertaining to the conduct
of foreign air carrier operations within the United States.
D. State whether pilot personnel are able to speak and
understand the English language to a degree necessary to enable
them to properly communicate with Airport Traffic Control
Towers and Airway Radio Communication Stations using
radiotelephone communications.
Sec. VII. Dispatchers.
A. Describe briefly the dispatch organization which you
propose to set up for air carrier operations within the United
States.
B. State whether or not the dispatching personnel are
familiar with the rules and regulations prescribed by the
Federal Air Regulations governing air carrier operations.
C. Are dispatching personnel able to read and write the
English language to a degree necessary to properly dispatch
flights within the United States?
D. Are dispatching personnel certificated by the country of
origin?
Sec. VIII. Additional Data.
A. Furnish such additional information and substantiating
data as may serve to expedite the issuance of the operations
specifications.
B. Each application shall be concluded with a statement as
follows:
I certify that the above statements are true.
Signed this ________ day of ________________________ 19
____
________________________ (Name of Applicant)
By __________________________________________
(Name of person duly authorized to execute this application
on behalf of the applicant.)
=======================================================================
J. OTHER EXECUTIVE BRANCH DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS
CONTENTS
Page
1. Office of the President....................................... 539
a. Presidential Decision Directives--PDD................... 539
(1) Establishing the Office of the National
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure
Protection and Counter-Terrorism (PDD-62) (fact
sheet)........................................... 539
(2) U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (PDD-39)
(declassified parts and FEMA abstract)........... 541
b. Terrorism Incident Annex to the Federal Response Plan
Implementing PDD-39.................................... 549
c. Comprehensive Readiness Program for Countering
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (House
Document 105-79)....................................... 562
d. National Emergencies.................................... 616
(1) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning the
National Emergency with Respect to the Afghan
Taliban (Under Executive Order 13129 of July 6,
1999)............................................ 616
(2) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning the
National Emergency with Respect to Sudan (Under
Executive Order 13067 of November 3, 1997)....... 619
(3) Continuation of the National Emergency with
Respect to Sudan (Under Executive Order 13067)... 622
(4) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning the
National Emergency with Respect to Iran (Under
Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995)......... 624
(5) Continuation of the National Emergency with
Respect to Iran (Under Executive Order 12957).... 629
(6) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning the
National Emergency with Respect to Terrorists Who
Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process
(Under Executive Order 12947 of January 23, 1995) 631
(7) Report to Congress on an Amendment to Executive
Order 12947, Responding to the Worldwide Threat
Posed by Foreign Terrorists Who Threaten to
Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process............ 635
(8) Continuation of the National Emergency with
Respect to Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the
Middle East Peace Process (Under Executive Order
12947)........................................... 637
(9) Report and Notice to Congress on the Continuation
of the National Emergency with Respect to Weapons
of Mass Destruction (Under Executive Order 12938
of November 14, 1994)............................ 639
(10) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning
the National Emergency with Respect to Iraq
(Under Executive Order 12722 of August 2, 1990).. 647
(11) Continuation of the National Emergency with
Respect to Iraq (Under Executive Order 12722).... 652
(12) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning
the National Emergency with Respect to Libya
(Under Executive Order 12543 of January 7, 1986 ) 654
(13) Continuation of the National Emergency with
Respect to Libya (Under Executive Order 12543)... 657
(14) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning
the National Emergency with Respect to Iran
(Under Executive Order 12170 of November 14, 1979
)................................................ 659
(15) Continuation of the National Emergency with
Respect to Iran (Under Executive Order 12170).... 661
2. Office of the Vice President.................................. 663
a. Report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety
and Security, February 12, 1997........................ 663
b. Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on
Combatting Terrorism, February, 1986................... 719
3. Department of State........................................... 755
a. Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998...................... 755
b. Antiterrorism Assistance Program: Annual Report--Fiscal
Year 1997.............................................. 841
c. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, October 8, 1997........ 852
d. Report to the Congress Concerning the Administration's
Comprehensive Counterterrorism Strategy: Agency
Resource Requirements, April 29, 1997 (unclassified
excerpts).............................................. 855
e. P.L.O. Commitments Compliance Act: Report to Congress,
November 20, 1997...................................... 861
f. Report on Rewards for Information Relating to
International Narco-Terrorism, June 20, 1994........... 878
g. Determination on Sudan (Public Notice 1878, Oct. 7,
1993).................................................. 880
h. Counter-Terrorism Rewards Program....................... 881
4. Department of Defense......................................... 886
a. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Reserve Component
Integration Plan, January 1998......................... 886
b. Combating Terrorism: Status of DoD Efforts to Protect
Its Forces Overseas, July 21, 1997..................... 929
c. Domestic Preparedness Program in the Defense Against
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report to Congress, May 1,
1997................................................... 930
d. Protection of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad: Report to the
President, September 15, 1996.......................... 959
5. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration--1999
Report on Foreign Policy Export Controls..................... 977
6. Department of Treasury........................................ 1016
a. Terrorist Assets Report--1999........................... 1016
b. Office of Foreign Assets Control:....................... 1024
(1) Terrorism: What You Need to Know About U.S.
Sanctions.......................................... 1024
(2) Cuba: What You Need to Know About the U.S. Embargo. 1050
(3) Iran: What You Need to Know About U.S. Economic
Sanctions.......................................... 1061
(4) Iraq: What You Need to Know About the U.S. Embargo. 1071
(5) Libya: What You Need to Know About the U.S. Embargo 1077
(6) North Korea: What You Need to Know About the U.S.
Embargo............................................ 1082
(7) Sudan: What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions.. 1087
(8) Taliban: What You Need to Know About the U.S.
Embargo............................................ 1091
7. Department of Transportation.................................. 1094
a. Federal Aviation Administration......................... 1094
(1) Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation, 1998
(partial text)................................... 1094
(2) Study and Report to Congress on Civil Aviation
Security Responsibility and Funding, December
1998............................................. 1119
(3) Report to Congress--Aviation Security: Aircraft
Hardening Program, December 1998................. 1161
(4) Annual Report to Congress on Civil Aviation
Security, 1997................................... 1168
b. Office of Inspector General Audit Report--Security for
Passenger Terminals and Vessels, U.S. Coast Guard,
September 1998......................................... 1191
c. White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security--
The DOT Status Report, February 1998 (partial text).... 1199
d. Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No. 3-96--
Security for Passenger Vessels and Passenger Terminals. 1222
=======================================================================
1. Office of the President
a. Presidential Decision Directives--PDD
(1) Establishing the Office of the National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism (PDD-62)
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
May 22, 1998
Fact Sheet
Combating Terrorism: Presidential Decision Directive 62
Since he took office, President Clinton has made the fight
against terrorism a top national security objective. The
President has worked to deepen our cooperation with our friends
and allies abroad, strengthened law enforcement's
counterterrorism tools and improved security on airplanes and
at airports. These efforts have paid off as major terrorist
attacks have been foiled and more terrorists have been
apprehended, tried and given severe prison terms.
Yet America's unrivaled military superiority means that
potential enemies--whether nations or terrorist groups--that
choose to attack us will be more likely to resort to terror
instead of conventional military assault. Moreover, easier
access to sophisticated technology means that the destructive
power available to terrorists is greater than ever. Adversaries
may thus be tempted to use unconventional tools, such as
weapons of mass destruction, to target our cities and disrupt
the operations of our government. They may try to attack our
economy and critical infrastructure using advanced computer
technology.
President Clinton is determined that in the coming century,
we will be capable of deterring and preventing such terrorist
attacks. The President is convinced that we must also have the
ability to limit the damage and manage the consequences should
such an attack occur.
To meet these challenges, President Clinton signed
Presidential Decision Directive 62. This Directive creates a
new and more systematic approach to fighting the terrorist
threat of the next century. It reinforces the mission of the
many U.S. agencies charged with roles in defeating terrorism;
it also codifies and clarifies their activities in the wide
range of U.S. counter-terrorism programs, from apprehension and
prosecution of terrorists to increasing transportation
security, enhancing response capabilities and protecting the
computer-based systems that lie at the heart of America's
economy. The Directive will help achieve the President's goal
of ensuring that we meet the threat of terrorism in the 21st
century with the same rigor that we have met military threats
in this century.
The National Coordinator
To achieve this new level of integration in the fight
against terror, PDD-62 establishes the Office of the National
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and
Counter-Terrorism. The National Coordinator will oversee the
broad variety of relevant polices and programs including such
areas as counter-terrorism, protection of critical
infrastructure, preparedness and consequence management for
weapons of mass destruction. The National Coordinator will work
within the National Security Council, report to the President
through the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs and produce for him an annual Security Preparedness
Report. The National Coordinator will also provide advice
regarding budgets for counter-terror programs and lead in the
development of guidelines that might be needed for crisis
management.
(2) U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (PDD-39)
Partial text of a declassified copy of Presidential Decision Directive
(PDD) 39 as released by the National Security Council, January 24, 1997
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
june 21, 1995
[Classified text omitted]
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
AGENCY
SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (U)
It is the policy of the United States to deter, defeat and
respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory
and against our citizens, or facilities, whether they occur
domestically, in international waters or airspace or on foreign
territory. The United States regards all such terrorism as a
potential threat to national security as well as a criminal act
and will apply all appropriate means to combat it. In doing so,
the U.S. shall pursue vigorously efforts to deter and preempt,
apprehend and prosecute, or assist other governments to
prosecute, individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate
such attacks. (U)
We shall work closely with friendly governments in carrying
out our counterterrorism policy and will support Allied and
friendly governments in combating terrorist threats against
them. (U)
Furthermore, the United States shall seek to identify
groups or states that sponsor or support such terrorists,
isolate them and extract a heavy price for their actions. (U)
It is the policy of the United States not to make
concessions to terrorists. (U)
To ensure that the United States is prepared to combat
domestic and international terrorism in all its forms, I direct
the following steps be taken. (U)
1. Reducing our Vulnerabilities
The United States shall reduce its vulnerabilities to
terrorism, at home and abroad.
It shall be the responsibility of all Department and Agency
heads to ensure that their personnel and facilities, and the
people and facilities under their jurisdiction, are fully
protected against terrorism. With regard to ensuring security:
--The Attorney General, as the chief law enforcement officer,
shall chair a Cabinet Committee to review the
vulnerability to terrorism of government facilities in
the United States and critical national infrastructure
and make recommendations to me and the appropriate
Cabinet member or Agency head;
--The Director, FBI, as head of the investigative agency for
terrorism, shall reduce vulnerabilities by an expanded
program of counterterrorism;
--The Secretary of State shall reduce vulnerabilities
affecting the security of all personnel and facilities
at non-military U.S. Government installations abroad
and affecting the general safety of American citizens
abroad);
--The Secretary of Defense shall reduce vulnerabilities
affecting the security of all U.S. military personnel
(except those assigned to diplomatic missions) and
facilities);
--The Secretary of Transportation shall reduce
vulnerabilities affecting the security of all airports
in the U.S. and all aircraft and passengers and all
maritime shipping under U.S. flag or registration or
operating within the territory of the United States and
shall coordinate security measures for rail, highway,
mass transit and pipeline facilities);
--The Secretary of State and the Attorney General, in
addition to the latter's overall responsibilities as
the chief law enforcement official, shall use all legal
means available to exclude from the United States
persons who pose a terrorist threat and deport or
otherwise remove from the United States any such
aliens;
--The Secretary of the Treasury shall reduce vulnerabilities
by preventing unlawful traffic in firearms and
explosives, by protecting the President and other
officials against terrorist attack and through
enforcement of laws controlling movement of assets, and
export from or import into the United States of goods
and services, subject to jurisdiction of the Department
of the Treasury;
--The Director, Central Intelligence shall lead the efforts
of the Intelligence Community to reduce U.S.
vulnerabilities to international terrorism through an
aggressive program of foreign intelligence collection,
analysis, counterintelligence and covert action in
accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 and
E.O. 12333. (U)
2. Deterring Terrorism
The United States shall seek to deter terrorism through a
clear public position that our policies will not be affected by
terrorist acts and that we will act vigorously to deal with
terrorists and their sponsors. Our actions will reduce the
capabilities and support available to terrorists. (U)
[Classified text omitted]
Within the United States, we shall vigorously apply U.S.
laws and seek new legislation to prevent terrorist groups from
operating in the United States or using it as a base for
recruitment, training, fund raising or other related
activities. (U)
Return of Indicted Terrorists to the U.S. for
Prosecution: We shall vigorously apply extraterritorial
statutes to counter acts of terrorism and apprehend
terrorists outside of the United States. When
terrorists wanted for violation of U.S. law are at
large overseas, their return for prosecution shall be a
matter of the highest priority and shall be a
continuing central issue in bilateral relations with
any state that harbors or assists them. Where we do not
have adequate arrangements, the Departments of State
and Justice shall work to resolve the problem, where
possible and appropriate, through negotiation and
conclusion of new extradition treaties. (U)
[Classified text omitted]
State Support and Sponsorship: Foreign governments
assist terrorists in a variety of ways. (U)
[Classified text omitted]
C. Enhancing Counterterrorism Capabilities: The Secretaries
of State, Defense, Treasury, Energy and Transportation, the
Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Director, FBI shall ensure that their organizations'
counterterrorism capabilities within their present areas of
responsibility are well managed, funded and exercised. (U)
[Classified text omitted]
3. Responding to Terrorism
We shall have the ability to respond rapidly and decisively
to terrorism directed against us wherever it occurs, to protect
Americans, arrest or defeat the perpetrators, respond with all
appropriate instruments against the sponsoring organizations
and governments and provide recovery relief to victims, as
permitted by law. (U)
[Classified text omitted]
D. Lead Agency Responsibilities: This directive validates
and reaffirms existing lead agency responsibilities for all
facets of the United States counterterrorism effort. Lead
agencies are those that have the most direct role in and
responsibility for implementation of U.S. counterterrorism
policy, as set forth in this Directive. Lead agencies will
normally be designated as follows: (U)
The Department of State is the lead agency for
international terrorist incidents that take place outside of
U.S. territory, other than incidents on U.S. flag vessels in
international waters. The State Department shall act through
U.S. ambassadors as the on-scene coordinators for the U.S.
Government. Once military force has been directed, however, the
National Command Authority shall exercise control of the U.S.
military force. (U)
* * * * * * *
F. Interagency Support: To ensure that the full range of
necessary expertise and capabilities are available to the on-
scene coordinator, there shall be a rapidly deployable
interagency Emergency Support Team (EST). The State Department
shall be responsible for leading and managing the Foreign
Emergency Support Team (FEST) in foreign incidents. The FBI
shall be responsible for the Domestic Emergency Support Team
(DEST) in domestic incidents. The DEST shall consist only of
those agencies needed to respond to the specific requirements
of the incident. Membership in the two teams shall include
modules for specific types of incidents such as nuclear,
biological or chemical threats. The Defense Department shall
provide timely transportation for ESTs. (U)
G. Transportation-related terrorism: The Federal Aviation
Administration has exclusive responsibility in instances of air
piracy for the coordination of any law enforcement activity
affecting the safety of persons aboard aircraft within the
special aircraft jurisdiction of the UPS. as defined in public
law. The Department of Justice, acting through the FBI, shall
establish and maintain procedures, in coordination with the
Departments of State, Defense, and Transportation, to ensure
the efficient resolution of terrorist hijackings. These
procedures shall be based on the principle of lead agency
responsibility for command, control and rules of engagement.
(U)
H. Consequence Management: The Director of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency shall ensure that the Federal
Response Plan is adequate to respond to the consequences of
terrorism directed against large populations in the United
States, including terrorism involving weapons of mass
destruction.
FEMA shall ensure that States' response plans are adequate
and their capabilities are tested. The State Department shall
develop a plan with the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
and DOD to Provide assistance to foreign populations so
victimized. (U)
[Classified text omitted]
K. Costs: Agencies directed to participate in the
resolution of terrorist incidents or conduct of
counterterrorist operations shall bear the costs of their
participation, unless otherwise directed by me. (U)
4. Weapons of Mass Destruction
The United States shall give the highest priority to
developing effective capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat
and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological or chemical
(NBC) materials or weapons use by terrorists. (U)
The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by a
terrorist group, through theft or manufacture, is unacceptable.
There is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of
this capability or removing this capability from terrorist
groups potentially opposed to the U.S. (U)
[Classified text omitted]
Attachment Tab A Interagency Groups
[Classified text omitted]
Unclassified FEMA Abstract on PDD-39 \1\
Appendix C to a hearing on security in cyberspace held by the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee, June 5, 1996
SECURITY IN CYBERSPACE
U.S. SENATE
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
(Minority Staff Statement)
june 5, 1996
APPENDIX C
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
March 8, 1996
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Document from the Web site of the Federation of American
Scientists at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39--fema.htm.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN F. SOPKO
Minority Deputy Chief Counsel
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
SUBJECT: Senator Nunn's Request for Copy of FEMA Abstract on
PDD-39
Pursuant to Senator Nunn's request, enclosed for your
information is a copy of the NSC approved unclassified FEMA
abstract on PDD-39.
All requests for copies of, access to or information about
Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) should be sent directly
to the National Security Council.
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A--Unclassified FEMA Abstract on PDD-39
cc: Ms. Catherine H. Light Director
Office of National Security Coordination Federal Emergency
Management Agency
U.S. POLICY ON COUNTERTERRORISM
1. General. Terrorism is both a threat to our national
security as well as a criminal act. The Administration has
stated that it is the policy of the United States to use all
appropriate means to deter, defeat and respond to all terrorist
attacks on our territory and resources, both people and
facilities, wherever they occur. In support of these efforts,
the United States will:
Employ efforts to deter, preempt, apprehend and
prosecute terrorists.
Work closely with other governments to carry out our
counterterrorism policy and combat terrorist threats
against them.
Identify sponsors of terrorists, isolate them, and
ensure they pay for their actions.
Make no concessions to terrorists
2. Measures to Combat Terrorism. To ensure that the United
States is prepared to combat terrorism in all its forms, a
number of measures have been directed. These include reducing
vulnerabilities to terrorism, deterring and responding to
terrorist acts, and having capabilities to prevent and manage
the consequences of terrorist use of nuclear, biological and
chemical (NBC) weapons, including those of mass destruction.
a. Reduce Vulnerabilities. In order to reduce our
vulnerabilities to terrorism, both at home and abroad, all
department/agency heads have been directed to ensure that their
personnel and facilities are fully protected against terrorism.
Specific efforts that will be conducted to ensure our security
against terrorist acts include the following:
Review the vulnerability of government facilities
and critical national infrastructure.
Expand the program of counterterrorism.
Reduce vulnerabilities affecting civilian personnel/
facilities abroad and military personnel/facilities.
Reduce vulnerabilities affecting U.S. airports,
aircraft/passengers and shipping, and provide
appropriate security measures for other modes of
transportation.
Exclude/deport persons who pose a terrorist threat
Prevent unlawful traffic in firearms and explosives,
and protect the President and other officials against
terrorist attack.
Reduce U.S. vulnerabilities to international
terrorism through intelligence collection/analysis,
counterintelligence and covert action.
b. Deter. To deter terrorism, it is necessary to provide a
clear public position that our policies will not be affected by
terrorist acts and we will vigorously deal with terrorist/
sponsors to reduce terrorist capabilities and support. In this
regard, we must make it clear that we will not allow terrorism
to succeed and that the pursuit, arrest, and prosecution of
terrorists is of the highest priority. Our goals include the
disruption of terrorist-sponsored activity including
termination of financial support, arrest and punishment of
terrorists as criminals, application of U.S. laws and new
legislation to prevent terrorist groups from operating in the
United States, and application of extraterritorial statutes to
counter acts of terrorism and apprehend terrorists outside of
the United States. Return of terrorists overseas, who are
wanted for violation of U.S. law, is of the highest priority
and a central issue in bilateral relations with any state that
harbors or assists them.
c. Respond. To respond to terrorism, we must have a rapid
and decisive capability to protect Americans, defeat or arrest
terrorists, respond against terrorist sponsors, and provide
relief to the victims of terrorists. The goal during the
immediate response phase of an incident is to terminate
terrorist attacks so that the terrorists do not accomplish
their objectives or maintain their freedom, while seeking to
minimize damage and loss of life and provide emergency
assistance. After an incident has occurred, a rapidly
deployable interagency Emergency Support Team (EST) will
provide required capabilities on scene: a Foreign Emergency
Support Team (FEST) for foreign incidents and a Domestic
Emergency Support Team (DEST) for domestic incidents. DEST
membership will be limited to those agencies required to
respond to the specific incident. Both teams will include
elements for specific types of incidents such as nuclear,
biological or chemical threats.
The Director, FEMA, will ensure that the Federal Response
Plan is adequate for consequence management activities in
response to terrorist attacks against large U.S. populations,
including those where weapons of mass destruction are involved.
FEMA will also ensure that State response plans and
capabilities are adequate and tested. FEMA, supported by all
Federal Response Plan signatories, will assume the Lead Agency
role for consequence management in Washington, D.C. and on
scene. If large scale casualties and infrastructure damage
occur, the President may appoint a Personal Representative for
consequence management as the on scene Federal authority during
recovery. A roster of senior and former government officials
willing to perform these functions will be created and the
rostered individuals will be provided training and information
necessary to allow them to be called upon on short notice.
Agencies will bear the costs of their participation in
terrorist incidents and counterterrorist operations, unless
otherwise directed.
d. NBC Consequence Management. The development of effective
capabilities for preventing and managing the consequences of
terrorist use of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC)
materials or weapons is of the highest priority. Terrorist
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction is not acceptable
and there is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition
of such materials/weapons or removing this capability from
terrorist groups. FEMA will review the Federal Response Plan on
an urgent basis, in coordination with supporting agencies, to
determine its adequacy in responding to an NBC-related
terrorist incident; identify and remedy any shortfalls in
stockpiles, capabilities or training; and report on the status
of these efforts in 180 days.
b. Terrorism Incident Annex to the Federal Response Plan Implementing
PDD-39
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Terrorism Incident Annex
Signatory Agencies: Department of Defense, Department of
Energy, Department of Health and Human Services,
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Emergency
Management Agency.
I. Introduction
Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), U.S. Policy on
Counter Terrorism, establishes policy to reduce the Nation's
vulnerability to terrorism, deter and respond to terrorism, and
strengthen capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat, and manage
the consequences of terrorist use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). PDD-39 states that the United States will
have the ability to respond rapidly and decisively to terrorism
directed against Americans wherever it occurs, arrest or defeat
the perpetrators using all appropriate instruments against the
sponsoring organizations and governments, and provide recovery
relief to victims, as permitted by law.
Responding to terrorism involves instruments that provide
crisis management and consequence management. ``Crisis
management'' refers to measures to identify, acquire, and plan
the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or
resolve a threat or act of terrorism. The Federal Government
exercises primary authority to prevent, preempt, and terminate
threats or acts of terrorism and to apprehend and prosecute the
perpetrators; State and local governments provide assistance as
required. Crisis management is predominantly a law enforcement
response. ``Consequence management'' refers to measures to
protect public health and safety, restore essential government
services, and provide emergency relief to governments,
businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of
terrorism. State and local governments exercise primary
authority to respond to the consequences of terrorism; the
Federal Government provides assistance as required. Consequence
management is generally a multi function response coordinated
by emergency management.
Based on the situation, a Federal crisis management
response may be supported by technical operations, and by
Federal consequence management, which may operate concurrently.
``Technical operations'' include actions to identify, assess,
dismantle, transfer, dispose of, or decontaminate personnel and
property exposed to explosive ordnance or WMD.
a. purpose
The purpose of this annex is to ensure that the Federal
Response Plan (FRP) is adequate to respond to the consequences
of terrorism within the United States, including terrorism
involving WMD. This annex:
1. Describes crisis management. Guidance is provided in
other Federal emergency operations plans;
2. Defines the policies and structures to coordinate crisis
management with consequence management; and
3. Defines consequence management, which uses the FRP
process and structure, supplemented as necessary by resources
normally activated through other Federal emergency operations
plans.
b. scope
This annex:
1. Applies to all threats or acts of terrorism within the
United States that the White House determines require a
response under the FRP;
2. Applies to all Federal departments and agencies that may
be directed to respond to the consequences of a threat or act
of terrorism within the United States; and
3. Builds upon the process and structure of the FRP by
addressing unique policies, situations, operating concepts,
responsibilities, and funding guidelines required for response
to the consequences of terrorism.
II. Policies
A. PDD-39 validates and reaffirms existing lead agency
responsibilities for all facets of the U.S. counter terrorism
effort.
B. The Department of Justice is designated as the lead
agency for threats or acts of terrorism within U.S. territory.
The Department of justice assigns lead responsibility for
operational response to the Federal Bureau of investigation
(FBI). Within that role, the FBI operates as the on-scene
manager for the federal Government. It is FBI policy that
crisis management will involve only those federal agencies
requested by the FBI to provide expert guidance and/or
assistance, as described in the PDD-39 Domestic Deployment
Guidelines (classified) and the FBI WMD Incident Contingency
Plan.
C. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)is
designated as the lead agency for consequence management within
U.S. territory.FEMA retains authority and responsibility to act
as the lead agency for consequence management throughout the
Federal response.It is FEMA policy to use FRP structures
coordinate all Federal assistance to State and local
governments for consequence management.
D. To ensure that there is one overall Lead Federal Agency
(LFA), PDD-39 directs FEMA to support the Department of Justice
(as delegated to the FBI) until the Attorney General transfers
the overall LFA role to FEMA. FEMA supports the overall LFA as
permitted by law.
III. Situation
a. conditions
1. FBI assessment of a potential or credible threat of
terrorism within the United States may cause the FBI to direct
other members of the law enforcement community and to
coordinate with other Federal agencies to implement a pre-
release response.
a. FBI requirements for assistance from other Federal
agencies will be coordinated through the Attorney
General and the President, with coordination of
National Security Council (NSC) groups as warranted.
b. FEMA will advise and assist the FBI and coordinate
with the affected state and local emergency management
authorities to identify potential consequence
management requirements and with Federal consequence
management agencies to increase readiness.
2. An act that occurs without warning and produces major
consequences may cause FEMA to implement a post-release
consequence management response under the FRP. FEMA will
exercise its authorities and provide concurrent support to the
FBI as appropriate to the specific incident.
b. planning assumptions
1. No single agency at the local, State, Federal, or
private-sector level possesses the authority and expertise to
act unilaterally on many difficult issues that may arise in
response to a threat or act of terrorism, particularly if WMD
are involved.
2. An act of terrorism, particularly an act directed
against a large population center within the United States
involving WMD, may produce major consequences that would
overwhelm the capabilities of many local and State governments
almost immediately.
3. Major consequences involving WMD may overwhelm existing
Federal capabilities as well, particularly if multiple
locations are affected.
4. Local, State, and Federal responders will define working
perimeters that may overlap. Perimeters may be used to control
access to the area, target public information messages, assign
operational sectors among responding organizations, and assess
potential effects on the population and the environment.
Control of these perimeters may be enforced by different
authorities, which will impede the overall response if adequate
coordination is not established.
5. If appropriate personal protective equipment is not
available, entry into a contaminated area (i.e., a hot zone)
may be delayed until the material dissipates to levels that are
safe for emergency response personnel. Responders should be
prepared for secondary devices.
6. Operations may involve geographic areas in a single
State or multiple States, involving responsible FBI Field
Offices and Regional Offices as appropriate. The FBI and FEMA
will establish coordination relationships as appropriate, based
on the geographic areas involved.
7. Operations may involve geographic areas that spread
across U.S. boundaries. The Department of State is responsible
for coordination with foreign governments.
IV. Concept of Operations
a. crisis management \1\
1. PDD-39 reaffirms the FBI's Federal lead responsibility
for crisis management response to threats or acts of terrorism
that take place within U.S. territory or in international
waters and that do not involve the flag vessel of a foreign
country. The FBI provides a graduated, flexible response to a
range of incidents, including:
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\1\ Source: FBI, National Security Division, Domestic Terrorism/
Counterterrorism Planning Section.
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a. A credible threat, which may be presented in
verbal, written,intelligence-based, or other form;
b. An act of terrorism that exceeds the local FBI
field division's capability to resolve;
c. The confirmed presence of an explosive device or
WMD capable of causing a significant destructive event,
prior to actual injury or property loss;
d. The detonation of an explosive device, utilization
of a WMD, or other destructive event, with or without
warning, that results in limited injury or death; and
e. The detonation of an explosive device, utilization
of a WMD, or other destructive event, with or without
warning, that results in substantial injury or death.
2. The FBI notifies FEMA and other Federal agencies
providing direct support to the FBI of a credible threat of
terrorism. The FBI initiates a threat assessment process that
involves close coordination with Federal agencies with
technical expertise, in order to determine the viability of the
threat from a technical as well as tactical and behavioral
standpoints.
3. The FBI provides initial notification to law enforcement
authorities within the affected State of a threat or occurrence
that the FBI confirms as an act of terrorism.
4. If warranted, the FBI implements an FBI response and
simultaneously advises the Attorney General, who notifies the
President and NSC groups as warranted, that a Federal crisis
management response is required. If authorized, the FBI
activates multiagency crisis management structures at FBI
Headquarters, the responsible FBI Field Office, and the
incident scene. Federal agencies requested by the FBI,
including FEMA, will deploy a representative(s) to the FBI
Headquarters Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC)
and take other actions as necessary and appropriate to support
crisis management. (The FBI provides guidance on the crisis
management response in the FBI WMD Incident Contingency Plan.)
5. If the threat involves WMD, the FBI Director may
recommend to the Attorney General, who notifies the President
and NSC groups as warranted, to deploy a Domestic Emergency
Support Team (DEST). The mission of the DEST is to provide
expert advice and assistance to the FBI On-Scene Commander
(OSC) related to the capabilities of the DEST agencies and to
coordinate follow-on response assets. When a Joint Operations
Center (JOC) is formed, DEST components merge into the JOC
structure as appropriate. (The FBI provides guidance on the
DEST in the PDD-39 Domestic Deployment Guidelines
(classified).)
6. During crisis management, the FBI coordinates closely
with local law enforcement authorities to provide a successful
law enforcement resolution to the incident. The FBI also
coordinates with other Federal authorities, including FEMA.
7. The FBI Field Office responsible for the incident site
modifies its Command Post to function as a JOC and establishes
a Joint Information Center (JIC). The JOC structure includes
the following standard groups: Command, Operations, Support,
and Consequence Management. Representation within the JOC
includes some Federal, State, and local agencies.
8. The JOC Command Group plays an important role in
ensuring coordination of Federal crisis management and
consequence management actions. Issues arising from the
response that affect multiple agency authorities and
responsibilities will be addressed by the FBI OSC and the other
members of the JOC Command Group, who are all working in
consultation with other local, State, and Federal
representatives. While the FBI OSC retains authority to make
Federal crisis management decisions at all times, operational
decisions are made cooperatively to the greatest extent
possible. The FBI OSC and the Senior FEMA Official at the JOC
will provide, or obtain from higher authority, an immediate
resolution of conflicts in priorities for allocation of
critical Federal resources (such as airlift or technical
operations assets) between the crisis management and the
consequence management response.
9. A FEMA representative coordinates the actions of the JOC
Consequence Management Group, expedites activation of a Federal
consequence management response should it become necessary, and
works with an FBI representative who serves as the liaison
between the Consequence Management Group and the FBI OSC. The
JOC Consequence Management Group monitors the crisis management
response in order to advise on decisions that may have
implications for consequence management, and to provide
continuity should a Federal consequence management response
become necessary. Coordination will also be achieved through
the exchange of operational reports on the incident. Because
reports prepared by the FBI are ``law enforcement sensitive,''
FEMA representatives with access to the reports will review
them, according to standard procedure, in order to identify and
forward information to Emergency Support Function (ESF) #5--
Information and Planning that may affect operational priorities
and action plans for consequence management.
b. consequence management
1. Pre-Release
a. FEMA receives initial notification from the FBI of a
credible threat of terrorism. Based on the circumstances, FEMA
Headquarters and the responsible FEMA region(s) may implement a
standard procedure to alert involved FEMA officials and Federal
agencies supporting consequence management.
b. FEMA deploys representatives with the DEST and deploys
additional staff for the JOC, as required, in order to provide
support to the FBI regarding consequence management. FEMA
determines the appropriate agencies to staff the JOC
Consequence Management Group and advises the FBI. With FBI
concurrence, FEMA notifies consequence management agencies to
request that they deploy representatives to the JOC.
Representatives may be requested for the JOC Command Group, the
JOC Consequence Management Group, and the JIC.
c. When warranted, FEMA will consult immediately with the
Governor's office and the White House in order to determine if
Federal assistance is required and if FEMA is permitted to use
authorities of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act to mission-assign Federal consequence
management agencies to pre-deploy assets to lessen or avert the
threat of a catastrophe. These actions will involve appropriate
notification and coordination with the FBI, as the overall LFA.
d. FEMA Headquarters may activate an Emergency Support Team
(EST) and may convene an executive-level meeting of the
Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG). When FEMA
activates the EST, FEMA will request FBI Headquarters to
provide liaison. The responsible FEMA region(s) may activate a
Regional Operations Center (ROC) and deploy a representative(s)
to the affected State(s). When the responsible FEMA region(s)
activates a ROC, the region(s) will notify the responsible FBI
Field Office(s) to request a liaison.
2. Post-Release
a. If an incident involves a transition from joint (crisis/
consequence) response to a threat of terrorism to joint
response to an act of terrorism, then consequence management
agencies providing advice and assistance at the JOC pre-release
will reduce their presence at the JOC post-release as necessary
to fulfill their consequence management responsibilities. The
Senior FEMA Official and staff will remain at the JOC until the
FBI and FEMA agree that liaison is no longer required.
b. If an incident occurs without warning that produces
major consequences and appears to be caused by an act of
terrorism, then FEMA and the FBI will initiate consequence
management and crisis management actions concurrently. FEMA
will consult immediately with the Governor's office and the
White House to determine if Federal assistance is required and
if FEMA is permitted to use the authorities of the Stafford Act
to mission-assign Federal agencies to support a consequence
management response. If the President directs FEMA to implement
a Federal consequence management response, then FEMA will
support the FBI as required and will lead a concurrent Federal
consequence management response.
c. The overall LFA (either the FBI or FEMA when the
Attorney General transfers the overall LFA role to FEMA) will
establish a Joint Information Center in the field, under the
operational control of the overall LFA's Public Information
Officer, as the focal point for the coordination and provision
of information to the public and media concerning the Federal
response to the emergency. Throughout the response, agencies
will continue to coordinate incident-related information
through the JIC. FEMA and the FBI will ensure that appropriate
spokespersons provide information concerning the crisis
management and consequent management responses. Before a JIC is
activated, public affairs offices of responding Federal
agencies will coordinate the release of information through the
FBI SIOC.
d. During the consequence management response, the FBI
provides liaison to either the ROC Director or the Federal
Coordinating Officer (FCO) in the field, and a liaison to the
EST Director at FEMA Headquarters. While the ROC Director or
FCO retains authority to make Federal consequence management
decisions at all times, operational decisions are made
cooperatively to the greatest extent possible.
e. As described previously, resolution of conflicts between
the crisis management and consequence management responses will
be provided by the Senior FEMA Official and the FBI OSC at the
JOC or, as necessary, will be obtained from higher authority.
Operational reports will continue to be exchanged. The FBI
liaisons will remain at the EST and the ROC or DFO until FEMA
and the FBI agree that a liaison is no longer required.
3. Disengagement
a. If an act of terrorism does not occur, the consequence
management response disengages when the FEMA Director, in
consultation with the FBI Director, directs FEMA Headquarters
and the responsible region(s) to issue a cancellation
notification by standard procedure to appropriate FEMA
officials and FRP agencies. FRP agencies disengage according to
standard procedure.
b. If an act of terrorism occurs that results in major
consequences, each FRP component (the EST, CDRG, ROC, and DFO
if necessary) disengages at the appropriate time according to
standard procedure. Following FRP disengagement, operations by
individual Federal agencies or by multiple Federal agencies
under other Federal plans may continue, in order to support the
affected State and local governments with long-term hazard
monitoring, environmental decontamination, and site restoration
(cleanup).
V. Responsibilities
a. department of justice
PDD-39 validates and reaffirms existing lead agency
responsibilities for all facets of the U.S. counterterrorism
effort. The Department of Justice is designated as the overall
LFA for threats of acts of terrorism that take place within the
United States until the Attorney General transfers the overall
LFA role to FEMA. The Department of Justice delegates this
overall LFA role to the FBI for the operational response. On
behalf of the Department of Justice, the FBI will:
1. Consult with and advise the White House, through the
Attorney General, on policy matters concerning the overall
response;
2. Designate and establish a JOC in the field;
3. Appoint an FBI OSC to manage and coordinate the Federal
operational response (crisis management and consequence
management). As necessary, the FBI OSC will convene and chair
meetings of operational decision makers representing lead State
and local crisis management agencies, FEMA, and lead State and
local consequence management agencies in order to provide an
initial assessment of the situation, develop an action plan,
monitor and update operational priorities, and ensure that the
overall response (crisis management and consequence management)
is consistent with U.S. law and achieves the policy objectives
outlined in PDD-39. The FBI and FEMA may involve supporting
Federal agencies as necessary; and
4. Issue and track the status of actions assigned by the
overall LFA.
b. federal bureau of investigation
Under PDD-39, the FBI supports the overall LFA by operating
as the lead agency for crisis management. The FBI will:
1. Determine when a threat of an act of terrorism warrants
consultation with the White House, through the Attorney
General;
2. Advise the White House, through the Attorney General,
when the FBI requires assistance for a Federal crisis
management response, in accordance with the PDD-39 Domestic
Deployment Guidelines;
3. Work with FEMA to establish and operate a JIC in the
field as the focal point for information to the public and the
media concerning the Federal response to the emergency;
4. Establish the primary Federal operations centers for the
crisis management response in the field and Washington, DC;
5. Appoint an FBI OSC (or subordinate official) to manage
and coordinate the crisis management response. Within this
role, the FBI OSC will convene meetings with operational
decision makers representing Federal, State, and local law
enforcement and technical support agencies, as appropriate, to
formulate incident action plans, define priorities, review
status, resolve conflicts, identify issues that require
decisions from higher authorities, and evaluate the need for
additional resources;
6. Issue and track the status of crisis management actions
assigned by the FBI; and
7. Designate appropriate liaison and advisory personnel to
support FEMA.
c. federal emergency management agency
Under PDD-39, FEMA supports the overall LFA by operating as
the lead agency for consequence management until the overall
LFA role is transferred to FEMA. FEMA will:
1. Determine when consequences are ``imminent'' for the
purposes of the Stafford Act;
2. Consult with the Governor's office and the White House
to determine if a Federal consequence management response is
required and if FEMA is directed to use Stafford Act
authorities. This process will involve appropriate notification
and coordination with the FBI, as the overall LFA;
3. Work with the FBI to establish and operate a JIC in the
field as the focal point for information to the public and the
media concerning the Federal response to the emergency;
4. Establish the primary Federal operations centers for
consequence management in the field and Washington, DC;
5. Appoint a ROC Director or FCO to manage and coordinate
the Federal consequence management response in support of State
and local governments. In coordination with the FBI, the ROC
Director or FCO will convene meetings with decision makers of
Federal, State, and local emergency management and technical
support agencies, as appropriate, to formulate incident action
plans, define priorities, review status, resolve conflicts,
identify issues that require decisions from higher authorities,
and evaluate the need for additional resources;
6. Issue and track the status of consequence management
actions assigned by FEMA; and
7. Designate appropriate liaison and advisory personnel to
support the FBI.
d. federal agencies supporting technical operations
1. Department of Defense
As directed in PDD-39, the Department of Defense (DOD) will
activate technical operations capabilities to support the
Federal response to threats or acts of WMD terrorism. DOD will
coordinate military operations within the United States with
the appropriate civilian lead agency(ies) for technical
operations.
2. Department of Energy
As directed in PDD-39, the Department of Energy (DOE) will
activate technical operations capabilities to support the
Federal response to threats or acts of WMD terrorism. In
addition, the FBI has concluded formal agreements with
potential LFAs of the Federal Radiological Emergency Response
Plan (FRERP) that provide for interface, coordination, and
technical assistance in support of the FBI's mission. If the
FRERP is implemented concurrently with the FRP:
a. The Federal On-Scene Commander under the FRERP will
coordinate the FRERP response with the FEMA official (either
the ROC Director or the FCO), who is responsible under PDD-39
for coordination of all Federal support to State and local
governments.
b. The FRERP response may include on-site management,
radiological monitoring and assessment, development of Federal
protective action recommendations, and provision of information
on the radiological response to the public, the White House,
Members of Congress, and foreign governments. The LFA of the
FRERP will serve as the primary Federal source of information
regarding on-site radiological conditions and off-site
radiological effects.
c. The LFA of the FRERP will issue taskings that draw upon
funding from the responding FRERP agencies.
3. Department of Health and Human Services
As directed in PDD-39, the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) will activate technical operations capabilities
to support the Federal response to threats or acts of WMD
terrorism. HHS may coordinate with individual agencies
identified in the HHS Health and Medical Services Support Plan
for the Federal Response to Acts of Chemical/Biological (C/B)
Terrorism, to use the structure, relationships, and
capabilities described in the HHS plan to support response
operations. If the HHS plan is implemented:
a. The HHS on-scene representative will coordinate, through
the ESF #8--Health and Medical Services Leader, the HHS plan
response with the FEMA official (either the ROC Director or the
FCO), who is responsible under PDD-39 for on-scene coordination
of all Federal support to State and local governments.
b. The HHS plan response may include threat assessment,
consultation, agent identification, epidemiological
investigation, hazard detection and reduction, decontamination,
public health support, medical support, and pharmaceutical
support operations.
c. HHS will issue taskings that draw upon funding from the
responding HHS plan agencies.
4. Environmental Protection Agency
As directed in PDD-39, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) will activate technical operations capabilities to
support the Federal response to acts of WMD terrorism. EPA may
coordinate with individual agencies identified in the National
Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP)
to use the structure, relationships, and capabilities of the
National Response System as described in the NCP to support
response operations. If the NCP is implemented:
a. The Hazardous Materials On-Scene Coordinator under the
NCP will coordinate, through the ESF #10--Hazardous Materials
Chair, the NCP response with the FEMA official (either the ROC
Director or the FCO), who is responsible under PDD-39 for on-
scene coordination of all Federal support to State and local
governments.
b. The NCP response may include threat assessment,
consultation, agent identification, hazard detection and
reduction, environmental monitoring, decontamination, and long-
term site restoration (environmental cleanup) operations.
VI. Funding Guidelines
A. As stated in PDD-39, Federal agencies directed to
participate in the resolution of terrorist incidents or conduct
of counterterrorist operations bear the costs of their own
participation, unless otherwise directed by the President. This
responsibility is subject to specific statutory authorization
to provide support without reimbursement. In the absence of
such specific authority, the Economy Act applies, and
reimbursement cannot be waived.
B. FEMA can use limited pre-deployment authorities in
advance of a Stafford Act declaration to ``lessen or avert the
threat of a catastrophe'' only if the President expresses
intention to go forward with a declaration. This authority is
further interpreted by congressional intent, to the effect that
the President must determine that assistance under existing
Federal programs is inadequate to meet the crisis, before FEMA
may directly intervene under the Stafford Act. The Stafford Act
authorizes the President to issue ``emergency'' and ``major
disaster'' declarations.
1. Emergency declarations may be issued in response
to a Governor's request, or in response to those rare
emergencies, including some acts of terrorism, for
which the Federal Government is assigned in the laws of
the United States the exclusive or preeminent
responsibility and authority to respond.
2. Major disaster declarations may be issued in
response to a Governor's request for any natural
catastrophe or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood,
or explosion that has caused damage of sufficient
severity and magnitude, as determined by the President,
to warrant major disaster assistance under the Act.
3. If a Stafford Act declaration is provided, funding
for consequence management may continue to be allocated
from responding agency operating budgets, the Disaster
Relief Fund, and supplemental appropriations.
C. If the President directs FEMA to use Stafford Act
authorities, FEMA will issue mission assignments through the
FRP to support consequence management.
1. Mission assignments are reimbursable work orders,
issued by FEMA to Federal agencies, directing
completion of specific tasks. Although the Stafford Act
states that ``Federal agencies may [emphasis added] be
reimbursed for expenditures under the Act'' from the
Disaster Relief Fund, it is FEMA policy to reimburse
Federal agencies for eligible work performed under
mission assignments.
2. Mission assignments issued to support consequence
management will follow FEMA's Standard Operating
Procedures for the Management of Mission Assignments or
applicable superseding documentation.
D. FEMA provides the following funding guidance to the FRP
agencies:
1. Commitments by individual agencies to take
precautionary measures in anticipation of special
events will not be reimbursed under the Stafford Act,
unless mission-assigned by FEMA to support consequence
management.
2. Stafford Act authorities do not pertain to law
enforcement functions. Law enforcement or crisis
management actions will not be mission-assigned for
reimbursement under the Stafford Act.
VII. References
A. Presidential Decision Directive 39, U.S. Policy on
Counterterrorism (classified). An unclassified extract may be
obtained from FEMA.
B. PDD-39 Domestic Deployment Guidelines (classified).
C. PDD-62, Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the
Homeland and Americans Overseas (classified).
D. FBI WMD Incident Contingency Plan.
E. HHS Health and Medical Services Support Plan for the
Federal Response to Acts of Chemical/Biological Terrorism.
VIII. Terms and Definitions
a. biological agents
The FBI WMD Incident Contingency Plan defines biological
agents as microorganisms or toxins from living organisms that
have infectious or noninfectious properties that produce lethal
or serious effects in plants and animals.
b. chemical agents
The FBI WMD Incident Contingency Plan defines chemical
agents as solids, liquids, or gases that have chemical
properties that produce lethal or serious effects in plants and
animals.
c. consequence management
FEMA defines consequence management as measures to protect
public health and safety, restore essential government
services, and provide emergency relief to governments,
businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of
terrorism.
d. credible threat
The FBI conducts an interagency threat assessment that
indicates that the threat is credible and confirms the
involvement of a WMD in the developing terrorist incident.
e. crisis management
The FBI defines crisis management as measures to identify,
acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate,
prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.
f. domestic emergency support team (dest)
PDD-39 defines the DEST as a rapidly deployable interagency
support team established to ensure that the full range of
necessary expertise and capabilities are available to the on-
scene coordinator. The FBI is responsible for the DEST in
domestic incidents.
g. lead agency
The FBI defines lead agency, as used in PDD-39, as the
Federal department or agency assigned lead responsibility to
manage and coordinate a specific function--either crisis
management or consequence management. Lead agencies are
designated on the basis of their having the most authorities,
resources, capabilities, or expertise relative to
accomplishment of the specific function. Lead agencies support
the overall Lead Federal Agency during all phases of the
terrorism response.
h. nuclear weapons
The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (DOE, 1977) defines nuclear
weapons as weapons that release nuclear energy in an explosive
manner as the result of nuclear chain reactions involving
fission and/or fusion of atomic nuclei.
i. senior fema official
The official appointed by the Director of FEMA or his
representative to represent FEMA on the Command Group at the
Joint Operations Center. The Senior FEMA Official is not the
Federal Coordinating Officer.
j. technical operations
As used in this annex, technical operations include actions
to identify, assess, dismantle, transfer, dispose of, or
decontaminate personnel and property exposed to explosive
ordnance or WMD.
k. terrorist incident
The FBI defines a terrorist incident as a violent act, or
an act dangerous to human life, in violation of the criminal
laws of the United States or of any State, to intimidate or
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment
thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives.
l. weapon of mass destruction (wmd)
Title 18, U.S.C. 2332a, defines a weapon of mass
destruction as (1) any destructive device as defined in section
921 of this title, [which reads] any explosive, incendiary, or
poison gas, bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of
more than four ounces, missile having an explosive or
incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, mine or
device similar to the above; (2) poison gas; (3) any weapon
involving a disease organism; or (4) any weapon that is
designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level
dangerous to human life.
Updated: June 3, 1999.
c. Comprehensive Readiness Program for Countering Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report to Congress, Pursuant to Public Law
104-201, Sec. 1443(c), May 5, 1997
105th congress,1st session
house document 105-79
Message from the President of the United States
Transmitting
a report that describes the united states comprehensive readiness
program for countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
pursuant to public law 104-201, sec. 1443(c) (110 stat. 2729)
May 5, 1997--Message and accompanying papers referred to the Committees
on National Security and International Relations, and ordered to be
printed
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d. National Emergencies
(1) Report to Congress on the Declaration of a National Emergency and
the Issuance of an Executive Order with Respect to the Afghan Taliban
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate
July 4, 1999
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
Pursuant to section 204(b) of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(b) and section 301 of the
National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1631, I hereby report that
I have exercised my statutory authority to declare a National
emergency with respect to the threat to the United States posed
by the actions and policies of the Afghan Taliban and have
issued an executive order to deal with this threat.
The actions and policies of the Afghan Taliban pose an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and
foreign policy of the United States. The Taliban continues to
provide safe haven to Usama bin Ladin allowing him and the Al-
Quida organization to operate from Taliban-controlled territory
a network of terrorist training camps and to use Afghanistan as
a base from which to sponsor terrorist operations against the
United States.
Usama bin Ladin and the Al-Qaida organization have been
involved in at least two separate attacks against the United
States. On August 7, 1998, the U.S. embassies in Nairobi,
Kenya, and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were attacked using
powerful explosive truck bombs. The following people have been
indicted for criminal activity against the United States in
connection with Usama bin Ladin and/or the Al-Qaida
organization: Usama bin Ladin, his military commander Muhammed
Atef, Wadih El Hage, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Mohammed Sadeek
Odeh, Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali, Mustafa Mohammed Fadhil,
Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Fahid Mohommed
Ally Msalam, Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim,
Ali Mohammed, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, and Khaled Al Fawwaz. In
addition, bin Ladin and his network are currently planning
additional attacks against U.S. interests and nationals.
Since at least 1998 and up to the date of the Executive
order, the Taliban has continued to provide bin Ladin with safe
haven and security, allowing him the necessary freedom to
operate. Repeated efforts by the United States to persuade the
Taliban to expel bin Ladin to a third country where he can be
brought to justice for his crimes have failed. The United
States has also attempted to apply pressure on the Taliban both
directly and through frontline states in a position to
influence Taliban behavior. Despite these efforts, the Taliban
has not only continued, but has also deepened its support for,
and its relationship with, Usama bin Ladin and associated
terrorist networks.
Accordingly, I have concluded that the actions and policies
of the Taliban pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security and foreign policy of the United States. I
have, therefore, exercised my statutory authority and issued an
Executive order which, except to the extent provided for in
section 203 (b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1072(b)) and regulations,
orders, directives or licenses that may be issued pursuant to
this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or
any license or permit granted prior to the effective date:
--blocks all property and interests in property of the
Taliban, including the Taliban leaders listed in the
annex to the order that are in the United States or
that are or hereafter come within the possession or
control of United States persons;
--prohibits any transaction or dealing by United States
persons or within the United States in property or
interests in property blocked pursuant to the order,
including the making or receiving of any contribution
of funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of
the Taliban;
--prohibits the exportation, re-exportation, sale, or supply,
directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a
United States person, wherever located, of any goods,
software, technology (including technical data), or
services to the territory of Afghanistan under the
control of the Taliban or to the Taliban; and
--prohibits the importation into the United States of any
goods, software, technology, or services owned or
controlled by the Taliban or from the territory of
Afghanistan under the control of the Taliban.
The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, is directed to authorize commercial sales
of agricultural commodities and products, medicine and medical
equipment, for civilian end use in the territory of Afghanistan
controlled by the Taliban under appropriate safeguards to
prevent diversion to military, paramilitary, or terrorist end-
users or end-use or to political end-use. This order and
subsequent licenses will likewise allow humanitarian,
diplomatic, and journalistic activities to continue.
I have designated in the Executive order, Mullah Mohhamad
Omar, the leader of the Taliban, and I have authorized the
Secretary of State to designate additional persons as Taliban
leaders in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and
the Attorney General.
The Secretary of the Treasury is further authorized to
designate persons or entities, in consultation with the
Secretary of State and the Attorney General, that are owned or
controlled, or are acting for or on behalf of the Taliban or
that provide financial, material, or technical support to the
Taliban. The Secretary of the Treasury is also authorized to
issue regulations in the exercise of my authorities under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act to implement these
measures in consultation with the Secretary of State and the
Attorney General. All Federal agencies are directed to take
actions within their authority to carry out the provisions of
the Executive order.
The measures taken in this order will immediately
demonstrate to the Taliban the seriousness of our concern over
its support for terrorists and terrorist networks, and increase
the international isolation of the Taliban. The blocking of the
Taliban's property and the other prohibitions imposed under
this executive order will further limit the Taliban's ability
to facilitate and support terrorists and terrorist networks. It
is particularly important for the United States to demonstrate
to the Taliban the necessity of conforming to accepted norms of
international behavior.
I am enclosing a copy of the Executive order \1\ I have
issued. This order is effective at 12:01 a.m. Eastern Daylight
Time on July 6, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See section H1 of this compilation for text of this Executive
Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton
(2) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning the National
Emergency with Respect to Sudan \1\
Message from the President of the United States transmitting a report
on developments concerning the national emergency with respect to Sudan
that was declared in Executive Order 13067 of November 3, 1997, and
matters relating to the measures in that Order, pursuant to 50 U.S.C.
1641(c)
To the Congress of the United States:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ House Document 106-58.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As required by section 401(c) of the National Emergencies
Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c) and section 204(c) of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(c), I
transmit herewith a 6-month periodic report on the national
emergency with respect to Sudan that was declared in Executive
Order 113067 of November 3, 1997.
William J. Clinton.
The White House, May 3, 1999.
President's Periodic Report on the National Emergency With Respect to
Sudan
I hereby report to the Congress on developments concerning
the national emergency with respect to Sudan that was declared
in Executive Order 13067 of November 3, 1997, and matters
relating to the measures in that order. This report is
submitted pursuant to section 204(c) of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(c) (``IEEPA''),
and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C.
1641(c). This report discusses only matters concerning the
national emergency with respect to Sudan that was declared in
Executive Order 13067.
1. On November 3, 1997, I issued Executive Order 13067 (62
Fed. Reg. 59989, November 5, 1997--the ``Order'') to declare a
national emergency with respect to Sudan pursuant to IEEPA. A
copy of the order was provided to the Speaker of the House and
the President of the Senate by letter dated November 3, 1997.
2. Executive Order 13067 became effective at 12:01 a.m.,
eastern standard time on November 4, 1997. On July 1, 1998, the
Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control
(``OFAC'') issued the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (the
``SSR'' or the ``Regulations'') (63 Fed. Reg. 35809, July 1,
1998). The Regulations block all property and interests in
property of the Government of Sudan, its agencies,
instrumentalities, and controlled entities, including the
Central Bank of Sudan, that are in the United States, that
hereafter come within the United States, or that are or
hereafter come within the possession or control of U.S.
persons, including their overseas branches. The SSR also
prohibit (1) the importation into the United States of any
goods or services of Sudanese origin except for information or
informational materials; (2) the exportation or reexportation
of goods, technology, or services, to Sudan or the Government
of Sudan except for information or informational materials and
donations of humanitarian aid; (3) the facilitation by a U.S.
person of the exportation or reexportation of goods,
technology, or services to or from Sudan; (4) the performance
by any U.S. person of any contract including a financing
contract, in support of an industrial, commercial, public
utility, or governmental project in Sudan; (5) the grant or
extension of credits or loans by any U.S. person to the
Government of Sudan; and (6) transactions relating to the
transportation or cargo.
3. Since the issuance of Executive Order 13067, OFAC has
made numerous decisions with respect to applications for
authorizations to engage in transactions under the Sudanese
sanctions. As of March 23, 1999, OFAC has issued 68
authorizations to non-governmental organizations engaged in the
delivery of humanitarian aid and 198 licenses to others. OFAC
has denied many requests for licenses. The majority of
denialswere in response to requests to authorize commercial
exports to Sudan--particularly of machinery and equipment for
various industries-- and the importation of Sudanese-origin
goods. The majority of licenses issued permitted the unblocking
of financial transactions for individual remitters who
inadvertently routed their funds through blocked Sudanese
banks. Other licenses authorized the completion of diplomatic
transfers, pre-effective date trade transactions, intellectual
property protection, the performance of certain legal services,
and transactions relating to air and sea safety policy.
4. At the time of signing Executive Order 13067, I directed
the Secretary of the Treasury to block all property and
interests in property of persons determined, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, to be owned or controlled by, or
to act for or on behalf of, the Government of Sudan. On
November 5, 1997, OFAC disseminated details of this program to
the financial, securities, and international trade communities
by both electronic and conventional media. This information
included the names of 62 entities owned or controlled by the
Government of Sudan. The list includes 12 financial
institutions and 50 other enterprises. As of March 17, 1999,
OFAC has blocked approximately $730,000 during this reporting
period.
5. During this reporting period, OFAC has collected three
civil monetary penalties totaling more than $13,000 from three
U.S. financial institutions for violations of IEEPA and the
SSR. The violations related to funds transfers in which the
Government of Sudan or an entity owned or controlled by the
Government of Sudan had an interest or which involved
commercial transactions relating to Sudan. OFAC, in cooperation
with the U.S. Customs Service, is closely monitoring potential
violations of the import prohibitions of the Regulations by
businesses and individuals. Various reports of violations are
being pursued aggressively.
6. The expenses incurred by the Federal Government in the
six-month period from November 3, 1998, through May 2, 1999,
that are directly attributable to the exercise of powers and
authorities conferred by the declaration of a national
emergency with respect to Sudan are reported to be
approximately $360,000, most of which represent wage and salary
costs of Federal personnel. Personnel costs were largely
centered in the Department of the Treasury (particularly in the
Office of Foreign Assets Control, the U.S. Customs Service, the
Office of the Under Secretary for Enforcement, and the Office
of the General Counsel), the Department of State (particularly
the Bureaus of Economic and Business Affairs, African Affairs,
Near Eastern Affairs, Consular Affairs, and the Office of the
Legal Adviser), and the Department of Commerce (the Bureau of
Export Administration and the General Counsel's Office).
7. The situation in Sudan continues to present an
extraordinary and unusual threat to the national security and
foreign policy of the United States. The declaration of the
national emergency with respect to Sudan contained in Executive
Order 13067 underscores the United States Government's
opposition to the actions and policies of the Government of
Sudan, particularly its support of international terrorism and
its failure to respect basic human rights including freedom of
religion. The prohibitions contained in Executive Order 13067
advance important objectives in promoting the anti-terrorism
and human rights policies of the United States. I shall
exercise the powers at my disposal to deal with these problems
and will continue to report periodically to the Congress on
significant developments.
(3) Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Sudan
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate
October 27, 1998
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national
emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its
declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register
and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the
emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date.
In accordance with this provision, I have sent the enclosed
notice to the Federal Register for publication, stating that
the Sudanese emergency is to continue in effect beyond November
3, 1998.
The crisis between the United States and Sudan that led to
the declaration on November 3, 1997, of a national emergency
has not been resolved. The Government of Sudan continues to
support international terrorism and engage in human rights
violations, including the denial of religious freedom. Such
Sudanese actions pose a continuing unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security and foreign policy of the
United States. For these reasons, I have determined that it is
necessary to maintain in force the broad authorities necessary
to apply economic pressure on the Government of Sudan.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton
Notice
Continuation of Emergency with Respect to Sudan
On November 3, 1997, by Executive Order 13067, I declared a
national emergency to deal with the unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security and foreign policy of the
United States constituted by the actions and policies of the
Government of Sudan. By Executive Order 13067, I imposed trade
sanctions on Sudan and blocked Sudanese government assets.
Because the Government of Sudan has continued its activities
hostile to United States interests, the national emergency
declared on November 3, 1997, and the measures adopted on that
date to deal with that emergency must continue in effect beyond
November 3, 1998. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d)
of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am
continuing the national emergency for 1 year with respect to
Sudan.
This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and
transmitted to the Congress.
William J. Clinton
The White House, October 27, 1998.
(4) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning the National
Emergency with Respect to Iran \1\
Message from the President of the United States transmitting a 6-month
periodic report on the national emergency with respect to Iran that was
declared in Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995, pursuant to 50
U.S.C. 1641(c)
President's Periodic Report on the National Emergency with Respect to
Iran
I hereby report to the Congress on developments concerning
the national emergency with respect to Iran that was declared
in Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995, and matters
relating to the measures in that order and in Executive Order
12959 of May 6, 1995, and in Executive Order 13059 of August
19, 1997. This report is submitted pursuant to section 204(c)
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.
1703(c) (IEEPA), section 401(c) of the National Emergencies
Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c), and section 505(c) of the International
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, 22 U.S.C.
2349aa-9(c). This report discusses only matters concerning the
national emergency with respect to Iran that was declared in
Executive Order 12957 and does not deal with those relating to
the emergency declared on November 14, 1979, in connection with
the hostage crisis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ House Document 106-40, March 15, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. On March 15, 1995, I issued Executive Order 12957 (60
Fed. Reg. 14615, March 17, 1995) to declare a national
emergency with respect to Iran pursuant to IEEPA, and to
prohibit the financing, management, or supervision by United
States persons of the development of Iranian petroleum
resources. This action was in response to actions and policies
of the Government of Iran, including support for international
terrorism, efforts to undermine the Middle East peace process,
and the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and the
means to deliver them. A copy of the Order was provided to the
Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate by letter
dated March 15, 1995.
Following the imposition of these restrictions with regard
to the development of Iranian petroleum resources, Iran
continued to engage in activities that represent a threat to
the peace and security of all nations, including Iran's
continuing support for international terrorism, its support for
acts that undermine the Middle East peace process, and its
intensified efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. On
May 6, 1995, I issued Executive Order 12959 (60 Fed. Reg.
24757, May 9, 1995) to further respond to the Iranian threat to
the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the
United States. The terms of that order and an earlier order
imposing an import ban on Iranian-origin goods and services
(Executive Order 12613 of October 29, 1987) were consolidated
and clarified in Executive Order 13059 of August 19, 1997.
At the time of signing Executive Order 12959, I directed
the Secretary of the Treasury to authorize through specific
licensing certain transactions, including transactions by
United States persons related to the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal in The Hague, established pursuant to the Algiers
Accords, and related to other international obligations and
U.S. Government functions, and transactions related to the
export of agricultural commodities pursuant to preexisting
contracts consistent with section 5712(c) of title 7, United
States Code. I also directed the Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, to consider
authorizing United States persons through specific licensing to
participate in market-based swaps of crude oil from the Caspian
Sea area for Iranian crude oil in support of energy projects in
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.
Executive Order 12959 revoked sections 1 and 2 of Executive
Order 12613 of October 29, 1987, and sections 1 and 2 of
Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995, to the extent they are
inconsistent with it. A copy of Executive Order 12959 was
transmitted to the Congressional leadership by letter dated May
6, 1995.
2. On August 19, 1997, I issued Executive Order 13059 in
order to clarify the steps taken in Executive Order 12957 and
Executive Order 12959, to confirm that the embargo on Iran
prohibits all trade and investment activities by United States
persons, wherever located, and to consolidate in one order the
various prohibitions previously imposed to deal with the
national emergency declared on March 15, 1995. A copy of the
Order was transmitted to the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate by letter dated August 19, 1997.
The Order prohibits (1) the importation into the United
States of any goods or services of Iranian origin or owned or
controlled by the Government of Iran except information or
informational material; (2) the exportation, reexportation,
sale, or supply from the United States or by a United States
person, wherever located, of goods, technology, or services to
Iran or the Government of Iran, including knowing transfers to
a third country for direct or indirect supply, transshipment,
or reexportation to Iran or the Government of Iran, or
specifically for use in the production, commingling with, or
incorporation into goods, technology, or services to be
supplied, trans-shipped, or reexported exclusively or
predominantly to Iran or the Government of Iran; (3) knowing
reexportation from a third country to Iran or the Government of
Iran of certain controlled U.S.-origin goods, technology, or
services by a person other than a United States person; (4) the
purchase, sale, transport, swap, brokerage, approval,
financing, facilitation, guarantee, or other transactions or
dealings by United States persons, wherever located, related to
goods, technology, or services for exportation, reexportation,
sale or supply, directly or indirectly, to Iran or the
Government of Iran, or to goods or services of Iranian origin
or owned or controlled by the Government of Iran; (5) new
investment by United States persons in Iran or in property or
entities owned or controlled by the Government of Iran; (6)
approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by a United
States person of any transaction by a foreign person that a
United States person would be prohibited from performing under
the terms of the Order; and (7) any transaction that evades,
avoids, or attempts to violate a prohibition under the Order.
Executive Order 13059 became effective at 12:01 a.m.,
eastern daylight time on August 20, 1997. Because the Order
consolidated and clarified the provisions of prior orders,
Executive Order 12613 and paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d) and (f)
of section 1 of Executive Order 12959 were revoked by Executive
Order 13059. The revocation of corresponding provisions in the
prior Executive orders did not affect the applicability of
those provisions, or of regulations, licenses or other
administrative actions taken pursuant to those provisions, with
respect to any transaction or violation occurring before the
effective date of Executive Order 13059. Specific licenses
issued pursuant to prior Executive orders continue in effect,
unless revoked or amended by the Secretary of the Treasury.
General licenses, regulations, orders, and directives issued
pursuant to prior orders continue in effect, except to the
extent inconsistent with Executive Order 13059 or otherwise
revoked or modified by the Secretary of the Treasury.
The declaration of national emergency made by Executive
Order 12957, and renewed each year since, remains in effect and
is not affected by the Order.
3. On March 10, 1999, I renewed for another year the
national emergency with respect to Iran pursuant to IEEPA. This
renewal extended the authority for the current comprehensive
trade embargo against Iran in effect since May 1995. Under
these sanctions, virtually all trade with Iran is prohibited
except for trade in information and informational materials and
certain other limited exceptions.
4. There has been one amendment to the Iranian Transactions
Regulations, 31 CFR Part 560 (the ``ITR''), since my report of
September 16, 1998. On November 10, 1998, section 560.603 was
amended to eliminate dealings in Iranian-origin petrochemicals
from the definition of `reportable transactions' and to
terminate the reporting requirement for subsidiaries' sales of
oilfield supplies and equipment (63 Fed. Reg. 62940, November
10, 1998). The revised section 560.603 retains the reporting
requirements covering crude oil and natural gas. A copy of the
amendment is attached to this report.
5. During the current 6-month period, the Department of the
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) made
numerous decisions with respect to applications for licenses to
engage in transactions under the ITR, and issued 14 licenses.
The majority of denials were in response to requests to
authorize commercial exports to Iran--particularly of machinery
and equipment for various industries--and the importation of
Iranian-origin goods. The licenses that were issued authorized
certain administrative, diplomatic, and financial transactions,
and the importation of art objects for public exhibition.
Pursuant to sections 3 and 4 of Executive Order 12959,
Executive Order 13059, and consistent with statutory
restrictions concerning certain goods and technology, including
those involved in air safety cases, Treasury continues to
consult with the Departments of State and Commerce prior to
issuing licenses.
Since September 15, 1998, more than 900 financial
transactions involving Iran initially have been ``rejected'' by
U.S. financial institutions based on their possible
constituting transactions prohibited by IEEPA and the ITR. U.S.
banks declined to process these instructions in the absence of
OFAC authorization. Twelve percent of the 900 transactions
scrutinized by OFAC resulted in investigations by OFAC to
assure compliance with regulations by United States persons. As
of January 29, 1999, such investigations have resulted in 15
referrals for civil penalty action and the issuance of 36
warning letters involving de minimis transactions. Numerous
other cases are still undergoing compliance or legal review
prior to final agency action.
Since my last report, OFAC has collected nearly $380,000 in
civil monetary penalties from one U.S. financial institution,
three companies, and eight individuals for violations of IEEPA
and the Regulations.
6. On October 6, 1998, a Federal Grand Jury in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, returned a five-count indictment against a Wisconsin
corporation and two if its officers for transactions relating
to the illegal exportation of U.S. origin aircraft parts to
Iran. Trial is scheduled for March 1999. On December 2, 1998, a
Federal Grand Jury in Atlanta, Georgia, returned a 24-count
indictment against a Georgia corporation and two of its
officers for transactions relating to the illegal exportation
of automobile parts to Iran.
The U.S. Customs Service has continued to effect numerous
seizures of Iranian-origin merchandise, primarily carpets, for
violation of the import prohibitions of the ITR. Various
enforcement actions carried over from previous reporting
periods are continuing and new reports of violations are being
aggressively pursued.
7. The expenses incurred by the Federal Government in the
6-month period from September 15, 1998 through March 14, 1999,
that are directly attributable to the exercise of powers and
authorities conferred by the declaration of a national
emergency with respect to Iran are reported to be approximately
$1.2 million, most of which represent wage and salary costs for
Federal personnel. Personnel costs were largely centered in the
Department of the Treasury (particularly in the Office of
Foreign Assets Control, the U.S. Customs Service, the Office of
the Under Secretary for Enforcement, and the Office of the
General Counsel), the Department of State (particularly the
Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, the Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and
the Office of the Legal Adviser), and the Department of
Commerce (the Bureau of Export Administration and the General
Counsel's Office).
8. The situation reviewed above continues to present an
extraordinary and unusual threat to the national security,
foreign policy, and economy of the United States. The
declaration of the national emergency with respect to Iran
contained in Executive Order 12957 and the comprehensive
economic sanctions imposed by Executive Order 12959 underscore
the Government's opposition to the actions and policies of the
Government of Iran, particularly its support of international
terrorism and its efforts to acquire weapons of mass
destruction and the means to deliver them. The Iranian
Transactions Regulations issued pursuant to Executive Orders
12957, 12959, and 13059 continue to advance important
objectives in promoting the nonproliferation and anti-terrorism
policies of the United States. I shall exercise the powers at
my disposal to deal with these problems and will report
periodically to the Congress on significant developments.
* * * * * * *
(5) Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Iran
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
March 10, 1999
To the Congress of the United States:
Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national
emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its
declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register
and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the
emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date.
In accordance with this provision, I have sent the enclosed
notice, stating that the national emergency declared with
respect to Iran on March 15, 1995, pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-
1706) is to continue in effect beyond March 15, 1999, to the
Federal Register for publication. This emergency is separate
from that declared on November 14, 1979, in connection with the
Iranian hostage crisis and therefore requires separate renewal
of emergency authorities. The last notice of continuation was
published in the Federal Register on March 6, 1998.
The factors that led me to declare a national emergency
with respect to Iran on March 15, 1995, have not been resolved.
The actions and policies of the Government of Iran, including
support for international terrorism, its efforts to undermine
the Middle East peace process, and its acquisition of weapons
of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, continue to
threaten the national security, foreign policy, and economy of
the United States. Accordingly, I have determined that it is
necessary to maintain in force the broad programs I have
authorized pursuant to the March 15, 1995, declaration of
emergency.
William J. Clinton
The White House, March 10, 1999.
NOTICE
Continuation of Iran Emergency
On March 15, 1995, by Executive Order 12957, I declared a
national emergency with respect to Iran pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-
1706) to deal with the threat to the national security, foreign
policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the
actions and policies of the Government of Iran, including its
support for international terrorism, efforts to undermine the
Middle East peace process, and acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction and the means to deliver them. On May 6, 1995, I
issued Executive Order 12959 imposing more comprehensive
sanctions to further respond to this threat, and on August 19,
1997, I issued Executive Order 13059 consolidating and
clarifying these previous orders. The last notice of
continuation was published in the Federal Register on March 6,
1998.
Because the actions and policies of the Government of Iran
continue to threaten the national security, foreign policy, and
economy of the United States, the national emergency declared
on March 15, 1995, must continue in effect beyond March 15,
1999. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the
National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing
the national emergency with respect to Iran. Because the
emergency declared by Executive Order 12957 constitutes an
emergency separate from that declared on November 14, 1979, by
Executive Order 12170, this renewal is distinct from the
emergency renewal of November 1998. This notice shall be
published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the
Congress.
William J. Clinton
The White House, March 10, 1999.
(6) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning the National
Emergency Declared in Executive Order 12947, with Respect to Terrorists
Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process \1\
Message from the President of the United States transmitting a 6-month
periodic report on the national emergency with respect to terrorists
who threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process that was declared
in Executive Order 12947 of January 23, 1995, pursuant to 50 U.S.C.
1703(c)
President's Periodic Report on the National Emergency with Respect to
Terrorists who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process
I hereby report to the Congress on developments concerning
the national emergency with respect to terrorists who threaten
to disrupt the Middle East peace process that was declared in
Executive Order 12947 of January 23, 1995. This report is
submitted pursuant to section 401(c) of the National
Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c), and section 204(c) of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C.
1703(c).
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\1\ House Document 106-106, July 30, 1999.
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1. On January 23, 1995, I signed Executive Order 12947,
``Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten To
Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process'' (the ``Order'') (60
Fed. Reg. 5079, January 25, 1995). The Order blocks all
property subject to U.S. jurisdiction in which there is any
interest of 12 terrorist organizations that threaten the Middle
East peace process as identified in an Annex to the Order. The
Order also blocks the property and interests in property
subject to U.S. jurisdiction of persons designated by the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Attorney General, who are found (1) to have
committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of
violence that have the purpose or effect of disrupting the
Middle East peace process, or (2) to assist in, sponsor, or
provide financial, material, or technological support for, or
services in support of, such acts of violence. In addition, the
Order blocks all property and interests in property subject to
U.S. jurisdiction in which there is any interest of persons
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination
with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to be
owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of, any
other person designated pursuant to the Order (collectively
``Specially Designated Terrorists'' or ``SDTs''.
The Order further prohibits any transaction or dealing by a
United States person or within the United States in property or
interests in property of SDTs, including the making or
receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or services to
or for the benefit of such persons. This prohibition includes
donations that are intended to relieve human suffering.
Designations of persons blocked pursuant to the Order are
effective upon the date of determination by the Secretary of
State or her delegate, or the Director of the Office of Foreign
Assets Control (``OFAC'') acting under authority delegated by
the Secretary of the Treasury. Public notice of blocking is
effective upon the date of filing with the Federal Register, or
upon prior actual notice.
Because terrorist activities continue to threaten the
Middle East peace process and vital interests of the United
States in the Middle East, on January 21, 1999, I continued for
another year the national emergency declared on January 23,
1995, and the measures that took effect on January 24, 1995, to
deal with that emergency. This action was taken in accordance
with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1622(d)).
2. On January 25, 1995, the Department of the Treasury
issued a notice listing persons blocked pursuant to Executive
Order 12947 who have been designated by the President as
terrorist organizations threatening the Middle East peace
process or who have been found to be owned or controlled by, or
to be acting for or on behalf of, these terrorist organizations
(60 Fed. Reg. 5084, January 25, 1995). The notice identified 31
entities that act for or on behalf of the 12 Middle East
terrorist organizations listed in the Annex to Executive Order
12947, as well as 18 individuals who are leaders or
representatives of these groups. In addition, the notice
provided 9 name variations or pseudonyms used by the 18
individuals identified. The list identifies blocked persons who
have been found to have committed, or to pose a significant
risk of committing, acts of violence that have the purpose or
effect of disrupting the Middle East peace process or to have
assisted in, sponsored, or provided financial, material or
technological support for, or services in support of, such acts
of violence, or are owned or controlled by, or act for or on
behalf of other blocked persons. The Department of the Treasury
issued three additional notices adding the names of three
individuals, as well as their pseudonyms, to the List of SDTs
(60 Fed. Reg. 41152, August 11, 1995; 60 Fed. Reg. 41152,
August 11, 1995; 60 Fed. Reg. 44932, August 29, 1995; and 60
Fed. Reg. 58435, November 27, 1995).
On August 20, 1998, I signed Executive Order 13099 (63 Fed.
Reg. 45167, August 20, 1998) amending Executive Order 12947 by
adding Usama bin Muhammad bin Awad bin Ladin (a.k.a. Usama bin
Ladin) and two of his associates, Abu Hafa al-Marsi and Rifai
Ahmad Taha Musa, and the Islamic Army to the Annex of Executive
Order 12947 as terrorists who threaten to disrupt the Middle
East peace process. Executive Order 13099 does not limit or
otherwise affect the other provisions of Executive Order 12947.
3. On February 2, 1996, OFAC issued the Terrorism Sanctions
Regulations (the ``TSRs'' or the ``Regulations'') (61 Fed. Reg.
3805, February 2, 1996). The TSRs implement the President's
declaration of a national emergency and imposition of sanctions
against certain persons whose acts of violence have the purpose
or effect of disrupting the Middle East peace process. Pursuant
to Executive Order 13099 of August 20, 1998, ``Prohibiting
Transactions with Terrorists who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle
East Peace Process,'' (63 Fed. Reg. 45167, 3 C.F.R., 1998
Comp., p. 208) and the Regulations, on June 28, 1999, OFAC
amended appendix A to 31 C.F.R. chapter V by adding three
individuals and one organization as persons who have been
designated in the Executive Order as terrorists who threaten to
disrupt the Middle East peace process or STDs (64 Fed. Reg.
35575, 31 C.F.R., July 1, 1999).
4. Since the signing of Executive Order 12947 in January
1995 through June 1998, more than $650,000 in assets in which
STDs have an interest were blocked. The blocking of these
assets, consisting of funds and real property, stopped their
conversion or other disposal for the benefit of the STDs having
an interest in them. In June 1998, assets totaling $1.2
million, including a large portion of the assets previously
blocked, were seized pursuant to civil forfeiture statutes.
Following the issuance of Executive Order 13099, several
million dollars in STD-related funds were blocked in aid of
investigation. On May 3, 1999, a determination was made to
unblock the funds in light of pending lawsuits filed seeking to
release the funds, the information then at the government's
disposal, and following consultations with the Department of
Justice. Federal agencies will continue to work closely to
identify and block assets in which STDs have an interest and
will vigorously implement Executive Orders 12947 and 13099
against Usama bin Ladin and other Middle East terrorists.
5. Since January 25, 1995, OFAC has issued nine licenses
pursuant to the Regulations. These licenses authorize payment
of legal expenses of individuals and the disbursement of funds
for normal expenditures for the maintenance of family members,
the employment, receipt of salary and payment of educational
expenses for an STD, secure storage of tangible assets of STDs,
and certain administrative transactions of individuals
designated pursuant to Executive Order 12947.
6. The expenses incurred by the Federal Government in the
6-month period from January 23 through July 22, 1999, that are
directly attributable to the exercise of powers and authorities
conferred by the declaration of the national emergency with
respect to organizations that disrupt the Middle East peace
process, are estimated at approximately $4.2 million. This
amount reflects additional personnel costs not previously
identified as being directly associated with the administration
of this program.
7. Executive Orders 12947 and 13099 provide this
Administration with a tool for combating fund raising in this
country on behalf of organizations that use terror to undermine
the Middle East peace process. The orders makes it harder for
such groups to finance these criminal activities by cutting off
their access to sources of support in the United States and to
U.S. financial facilities. It is also intended to reach
charitable contributions to designated organizations and
individuals to preclude diversion of such donations to
terrorist activities.
The Executive Orders demonstrate the United States
determination to confront and combat those who would seek to
destroy the Middle East peace process, and our commitment to
the global fight against terrorism. I shall continue to
exercise the powers at my disposal to apply economic sanctions
against extremists seeking to destroy the hopes of peaceful
coexistence between Arabs and Israelis as long as these
measures are appropriate, and will continue to report
periodically to the Congress on significant developments
pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1703(c).
(7) Report to Congress on an Amendment to Executive Order 12947
Responding to the Worldwide Threat Posed by Foreign Terrorists Who
Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate
August 20, 1998
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
On January 23, 1995, in light of the threat posed by grave
acts of violence committed by foreign terrorists that disrupt
the Middle East peace process, using my authority under, inter
alia, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), I declared a national emergency and
issued Executive Order 12947. Because such terrorist activities
continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United
States, I have renewed the national emergency declared in
Executive Order 12947 annually, most recently on January 21,
1998. Pursuant to section 204(b) of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(b)) and section 201 of the
National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1631), I hereby report to
the Congress that I have exercised my statutory authority to
issue an Executive Order that amends Executive Order 12947 in
order more effectively to respond to the worldwide threat posed
by foreign terrorists.
The amendment to the Annex of Executive Order 12947 adds
Usama bin Muhammad bin Awad bin Ladin (a.k.a. Usama bin Ladin),
Islamic Army, Abu Hafs al-Masri, and Rifa'i Ahmad Taha Musa to
the list of terrorists that are subject to the prohibitions
contained in the Executive Order. These prohibitions include
the blocking of all property and interests in the property of
the terrorists listed in the Annex, the prohibition of any
transaction or dealing by United States persons or within the
United States in property or interests in property of the
persons designated, and the prohibition of any transaction by
any United States persons or within the United States that
evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or avoiding,
any of the prohibitions set forth in the Executive Order.
Usama bin Ladin and his organizations and associates have
repeatedly called upon their supporters to perform acts of
violence. Bin Ladin has declared that killing Americans and
their allies ``is an individual duty for every Muslim . . . in
order to liberate the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Mosque.''
These threats are clearly intended to violently disrupt the
Middle East peace process.
This Executive Order does not limit or otherwise affect the
other provisions of Executive Order 12947.
I have authorized these actions in view of the danger posed
to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the
United States by the activities of Usama bin Muhammad bin Awad
bin Ladin (a.k.a. Usama bin Ladin), Islamic Army, Abu Hafs al-
Masri, and Rifa'i Ahmad Taha Musa that disrupt the Middle East
peace process. I am enclosing a copy of the Executive Order
that I have issued exercising my emergency authorities.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton
Executive Order 13099
Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists who Threaten to Disrupt the
Middle East Peace Process
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America,
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,
I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of
America, in order to take additional steps with respect to
grave acts of violence committed by foreign terrorists that
disrupt the Middle East peace process and the national
emergency described and declared in Executive Order 12947 of
January 23, 1995, hereby order:
Section 1. The title of the Annex to Executive Order 12947
of January 23, 1995, is revised to read ``Terrorists who
Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process.''
Sec. 2. The Annex to Executive Order 12947 of January 23,
1995, is amended by adding thereto the following persons in
appropriate alphabetical order:
Usama bin Muhammad bin Awad bin Ladin (a.k.a. Usama bin
Ladin) Islamic Army (a.k.a. Al-Qaida, Islamic
Salvation Foundation, The Islamic Army for the
Liberation of the Holy Places, The World Islamic
Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, and The
Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites)
Abu Hafs al-Masri
Rifa'i Ahmad Taha Musa
Sec. 3. Nothing contained in this order shall create any
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any
party against the United States, its agencies or
instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other
person.
Sec. 4. (a) This order is effective at 12:01 a.m., eastern
daylight time on August 21, 1998.
(b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and
published in the Federal Register.
William J. Clinton
The White House, August 20, 1998.
(8) Continuation of the National Emergency Declared in Executive Order
12947, with Respect to Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle
East Peace Process
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate
January 20, 1999
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national
emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its
declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register
and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the
emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date.
In accordance with this provision, I have sent the enclosed
notice, stating that the emergency declared with respect to
grave acts of violence committed by foreign terrorists that
disrupt the Middle East peace process is to continue in effect
beyond January 23, 1999, to the Federal Register for
publication. The most recent notice continuing this emergency
was published in the Federal Register on January 22, 1998.
The crisis with respect to the grave acts of violence
committed by foreign terrorists that threaten to disrupt the
Middle East peace process that led to the declaration on
January 23, 1995, of a national emergency has not been
resolved. Terrorist groups continue to engage in activities
with the purpose or effect of threatening the Middle East peace
process, and which are hostile to United States interests in
the region.
Such actions threaten vital interests of the national
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. On
August 20, 1998, I identified four additional persons,
including Usama bin Ladin, that threaten to disrupt the Middle
East peace process. For these reasons, I have determined that
it is necessary to maintain in force the broad authorities
necessary to deny any financial support from the United States
for foreign terrorists that threaten to disrupt the Middle East
peace process.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton
Notice
Continuation of Emergency Regarding Terrorists who Threaten to Disrupt
the Middle East Peace Process
On January 23, 1995, by Executive Order 12947, I declared a
national emergency to deal with the unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of
the United States constituted by grave acts of violence
committed by foreign terrorists that disrupt the Middle East
peace process. By Executive Order 12947 of January 23, 1995, I
blocked the assets in the United States, or in the control of
United States persons, of foreign terrorists who threaten to
disrupt the Middle East peace process. I also prohibited
transactions or dealings by United States persons in such
property. On August 20, 1998, by Executive Order 13099, I
identified four additional persons, including Usama bin Ladin,
that threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process. I have
annually transmitted notices of the continuation of this
national emergency to the Congress and the Federal Register.
Last year's notice of continuation was published in the Federal
Register on January 22, 1998.
Because terrorist activities continue to threaten the
Middle East peace process and vital interests of the United
States in the Middle East, the national emergency declared on
January 23, 1995, and the measures that took effect on January
24, 1995, to deal with that emergency must continue in effect
beyond January 23, 1999. Therefore, in accordance with section
202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I
am continuing the national emergency with respect to foreign
terrorists who threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace
process.
This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and
transmitted to the Congress.
William J. Clinton
The White House, January 20, 1999.
(9) Report and Notice to Congress on the Continuation of the National
Emergency with Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction \1\
Message from the President of the United States transmitting a 6-month
report on the national emergency declared by Executive Order 12938 of
November 14, 1994, in response to the threat posed by the proliferation
of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and of the means of
delivering such weapons, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1703(c)
Report to the Congress on the National Emergency Concerning Weapons of
Mass Destruction
On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the
proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons
(``weapons of mass destruction''--WMD) and of the means of
delivering such weapons, I issued Executive Order 12938, and
declared a national emergency under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Under section
202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the
national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of its
declaration, unless I publish in the Federal Register and
transmit to the Congress a notice of its continuation. Because
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
means of delivery continues to pose an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy,
and economy of the United States, on November 12, 1998, I
extended the national emergency declared in Executive Order
12938.
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\1\ House Document 106-93, July 14, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following report is made pursuant to section 204 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703)
and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1641(c)), regarding activities taken and money spent pursuant
to the emergency declaration. Additional information on
nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and biological weapons (CBW)
nonproliferation efforts is contained in the most recent annual
Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential
Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons,
provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and
1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation
Report,'' and the most recent annual report provided to the
Congress pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law
102-182), also known as the ``CBW Report.''
On July 28, 1998, in E.O. 13094, I amended section 4 of
E.O. 12938 so that the United States Government could more
effectively respond to the worldwide threat of weapons of mass
destruction proliferation activities. The amendment to section
4 strengthens Executive Order 12938 in several significant
ways. The amendment broadens the type of proliferation activity
that subjects entities to potential penalties under the
Executive Order. The original Executive Order provided for
penalties for contributions to the efforts of any foreign
country, project or entity to use, acquire, design, produce, or
stockpile chemical or biological weapons; the amended Executive
Order also covers contributions to foreign programs for nuclear
weapons and for missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass
destruction. Moreover, the amendment expands the original
Executive Order to include attempts to contribute to foreign
proliferation activities, as well as actual contributions, and
broadens the range of potential penalties to expressly include
the prohibition of United States Government assistance to
foreign persons, and the prohibition of imports into the United
States and U.S. Government procurement.
Nuclear Weapons
In May 1998, India and Pakistan each conducted a series of
nuclear tests. World reaction included nearly universal
condemnation across a broad range of international fora and
multilateral support for a broad range of sanctions, including
new restrictions on lending by international financial
institutions unrelated to basic human needs and aid from the G-
8 and other countries.
Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. sanctions, we have
worked unilaterally, with other P-5 and G-8 members, and
through the U.N., to dissuade India and Pakistan from taking
further steps toward developing nuclear weapons. We have urged
them to join multilateral arms control efforts, to prevent a
regional arms race and build confidence by practicing
restraint, and to resume efforts to resolve their differences
through dialogue. The P-5, G-8, and U.N. Security Council have
called on India and Pakistan to take a broad range of concrete
actions. The United States has focused most intensely on
several objectives that can be met over the short and medium
term: an end to nuclear testing and prompt, unconditional
adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT);
a moratorium on production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons and other explosive devices, and engagement in
productive negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty
(FMCT); restraint in deployment of nuclear-capable missiles and
aircraft; and adoption of controls meeting international
standards on exports of sensitive materials and technology.
Against this backdrop of international pressure on India
and Pakistan, high-level U.S. dialogues with Indian and
Pakistani officials have yielded some progress. Both
governments, having already declared testing moratoria,
indicated they are prepared to adhere to the CTBT by September
1999 under certain conditions. Both India and Pakistan withdrew
their opposition to negotiations on an FMCT in Geneva at the
end of the 1998 Conference on Disarmament session. They have
also pledged, in the last two rounds of discussions, to
institute strict control of sensitive exports that meet
internationally accepted standards. In addition, they have
resumed their bilateral dialogue on outstanding disputes,
including Kashmir, at the Foreign Secretary level. We will
continue discussions with both governments at the senior and
expert levels, and our diplomatic efforts in concert with P-5,
G-8, and in international fora.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North
Korea) continues to maintain a freeze on its nuclear facilities
consistent with the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, which
calls for the immediate freezing and eventual dismantling of
the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plant
at Yongbyon and Taechon. The United States has raised its
concerns with the DPRK about a suspect underground site under
construction, possibly intended to support nuclear activities
contrary to the Agreed Framework. In March 1999, the United
States reached agreement with the DPRK for visits by a team of
U.S. experts to the facility.
The framework requires the DPRK to come into full
compliance with its NPT and IAEA obligations as a part of a
process that also included the supply of two light water
reactors to North Korea. U.S. experts remain on-site in North
Korea working to complete clean-up operations after largely
finishing the canning of spent fuel from the North's 5-megawatt
nuclear reactor.
So far, 152 countries have signed and 34 have ratified the
CTBT. During 1998, CTBT signatories conducted numerous meetings
of the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) in Vienna, seeking to
promote rapid completion of the International Monitoring System
(IMS) established by the Treaty.
On September 22, 1997, I transmitted the CTBT to the
Senate, requesting prompt advice and consent to ratification.
The CTBT will serve several U.S. national security interests by
prohibiting all nuclear explosions. It will constrain the
development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; end
the development of advanced new types; contribute to the
prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear
disarmament; and strengthen international peace and security.
The CTBT marks a historic milestone in our drive to reduce the
nuclear threat and to build a safer world.
With 35 member states, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is
a widely accepted, mature, and effective export-control
arrangement. China is the only major nuclear supplier which is
not a member of the NSG, primarily because it has not accepted
the NSG policy of requiring full-scope safeguards as a
condition for supply of nuclear trigger list items to non-
nuclear weapon states. However, China has taken major steps
toward improving its export control system by adopting language
identical to the NSG trigger list, becoming a full-member of
the Zangger Committee, and by promulgating in 1998 nuclear-
related dual-use export control regulations.
The NSG is considering requests for membership from
Belarus, Cyprus, Kazakhstan and Turkey; of these four potential
candidate countries, only Turkey has all the necessary steps
for acceptance as a member. The NSG continues to consider
whether adherence without membership, rather than membership,
is more appropriate for countries which are not suppliers but
transit states for nuclear transactions. The Chairman, in
coordination with other members, will continue contacts with
all candidate countries. The ultimate goal of the NSG continues
to be to obtain agreement of all supplier and transit states,
including non-NSG members, to control nuclear and nuclear-
related exports in accordance with the NSF Guideline
During the last six months, we reviewed intelligence and
other reports of trade in nuclear-related material and
technology that might be relevant to nuclear-related sanctions
provisions in the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992,
as amended and in the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of
1994. No statutory sanctions determinations were reached during
this reporting period. The administrative measure imposed
against three Russian entities for their nuclear-and missile-
related cooperation with Iran are discussed in the Missiles
section below.
Chemical and Biological Weapons
The export control regulations issued under the Enhanced
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remain fully in force
and continue to be applied by the Department of Commerce in
order to control the export of items with potential use in
chemical or biological weapons or unmanned delivery systems for
weapons of mass destruction.
Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious
threat to our security and that of our allies. On April 29,
1997, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC)
entered into force with 87 of the CWC's 165 signatories as
original States Parties. The United States was among their
number, having deposited its instrument of ratification on
April 25. Russia ratified the CWC on November 5, 1997, and
became a State Party on December 5, 1997. To date, 121
countries (including China, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Ukraine)
have become States Parties.
The implementing body for the CWC--the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)--was established at
entry into force (EIF) of the Convention on April 29, 1997. The
OPCW, located in The Hague, has primary responsibility (along
with States Parties) for implementing the CWC. It consists of
the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council
(EC), and the Technical Secretariat (TS). The TS carries out
the verification provisions of the CWC, and presently has a
staff of approximately 500, including about 200 inspectors
trained and equipped to inspect military and industrial
facilities throughout the world. To date, the OPCW has
conducted nearly 300 inspections in some 26 countries. To date,
nearly 100 inspections have been conducted at military
facilities in the United States. The OPCW maintains a permanent
inspector presence at operational U.S. CW destruction
facilities in Utah, Nevada, and Johnston Island.
The United States is determined to seek full implementation
of the concrete measures in the CWC designed to raise the costs
and risks for any state or terrorist attempting to engage in
chemical weapons-related activities. The CWC's declaration
requirements improve our knowledge of possible chemical weapons
activities. Its inspection provisions provide for access to
declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus making
clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling more
difficult, more risky, and more expensive.
The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998
was enacted into U.S. law in October 1998, as part of the
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriation
Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-277). Accordingly, the Administration
is working to publish the appropriate executive order and
regulations regarding industrial declarations and inspections
of industrial facilities. Submission of these declarations to
the OPCW will begin to bring the U.S. into full compliance with
the CWC. U.S. noncompliance to date has, among other things,
undermined U.S. leadership in the organization as well as our
ability to encourage other States Parties to make complete,
accurate, and timely declarations.
Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically
isolated and prohibited under the CWC from trading with States
Parties in certain key chemicals. The relevant treaty provision
is specifically designed to penalize countries that refuse to
join the rest of the world in eliminating the threat of
chemical weapons.
The United States also continues to play a leading role in
the international effort to reduce the threat from biological
weapons (BW). We are an active participant in the Ad Hoc Group
(AHG) striving to complete a legally binding protocol to
strengthen and enhance compliance with the 1972 Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stock-piling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction (the Biological Weapons Convention or BWC). This Ad
Hoc Group was mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special
Conference. The Fourth BWC Review Conference, held in November/
December 1996, urged the AHG to complete the protocol as soon
as possible but not later than the next Review Conference to be
held in 2001. Work is progressing on a draft rolling text
through insertion of national views and clarification of
existing text. Five AHG negotiating sessions are scheduled for
1999. The United States is working toward completion of the
substance of a strong Protocol by the end of 1999.
On January 19, 1998,\2\ during the State of the Union
Address, I announced that the United States would take a
leading role in the effort to erect stronger international
barriers against the proliferation and use of BW by
strengthening the BWC with a new international system to detect
and deter cheating. The United States is working closely with
U.S. industry representatives to obtain technical input
relevant to the development of U.S. negotiating positions and
then to reach international agreement on data declarations,
non-challenge visits, and challenge investigations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 1998 State of the Union Address delivered on January 27, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States continued to be a leading participant in
the 30-member Australia Group (AG) CBW nonproliferation regime.
The United States attended the most recent annual AG Plenary
Session from October 9-15, 1998, during which the Group
reaffirmed the members' continued collective belief in the
Group's viability, importance and compatibility with the CWC
and BWC. It was further agreed that full adherence to the CWC
and BWC will be the only way to achieve a permanent global ban
on chemical and biological weapons, and that all states
adhering to these Conventions must take steps to ensure that
their national activities support these goals. At the 1998
Plenary, the Group continued to focus on strengthening AG
export controls and share information to address the threat of
CBW terrorism. AG participants shared information on legal and
regulatory efforts each member has taken to counter this
threat. The AG also reaffirmed its commitment to continue its
active outreach program of briefings for non-AG countries, and
to promote regional consultations on export controls and
nonproliferation to further awareness and understanding of
national policies in these areas.
During the last six months, we continued to examine closely
intelligence and other reports of trade in CBW-related material
and technology that might be relevant to sanctions provisions
under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare
Elimination Act of 1991. No new sanctions determinations were
reached during this reporting period. The United States also
continues to cooperate with its AG partners and other countries
in stopping shipments of proliferation concern.
Missiles for Delivery of Weapons of Mass Destruction
The United States carefully controlled exports that could
contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction and closely monitored activities of potential
missile proliferation concern. We also continued to implement
U.S. missile sanctions law. In March 1999, we imposed missile
sanctions against three Middle Eastern entities for transfers
involving Category II MTCR Annex items. Category II missile
sanctions imposed against two North Korean entities in August
1977 also remain in effect, as do Category I missile sanctions
imposed in April 1998 against North Korean and Pakistani
entities for the transfer from North Korea to Pakistan of
equipment and technology related to the Ghauri missile.
During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to
share information about proliferation problems with each other
and with other potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment
states. Partners also emphasized the need for implementing
effective export control systems. This cooperation has resulted
in the interdiction of missile-related materials intended for
use in missile programs of concern.
The United States worked unilaterally and in coordination
with its MTCR Partners to combat missile proliferation and to
encourage non-members to export responsibly and to adhere to
the MTCR Guidelines. Since my last report, we have continued
our missile nonproliferation dialogues with China, India, the
republic of Korea (ROK), North Korea (DPRK), and Pakistan. In
the course of normal diplomatic relations, we also have pursued
such discussions with other countries in Central Europe and the
Middle East.
In March 1999, the United States and the DPRK held a fourth
round of missile talks aimed at obtaining the DPRK commitments
to restrain its missile practices. The talks were detailed and
substantive, and covered the full range of missile
proliferation issues. The United States expressed serious
concerns about North Korea's missile-related exports and its
indigenous missile activities, including missile production,
deployment, and flight testing. We continued to press for tight
constraints on these activities, and also made clear that
further launches of long-range missiles or further exports of
such missile or their related technology would have very
negative consequences for efforts to improve U.S.-North Korean
relations.
In response to reports of continuing Iranian efforts to
acquire sensitive items from Russian entities for use in Iran's
missile development program, the United States continued its
high-level dialogue with Russia. This dialogue is developing
ways the United States and Russia can work together to cut off
the flow of sensitive goods to Iran. Despite the Russian
government's nonproliferation and export control efforts,
Russian entities continued to cooperate with Iran's ballistics
missile program during this reporting period, and to engage in
nuclear cooperation with Iran beyond the Bushehr reactor
project. There was some improvement in Russia's efforts to
crack down on such activities during 1998. However, while
Russia continues to try to implement some export control
measures, the flow to Iran continues. We continue to press
Russia to improve its record.
In January 1999, we imposed administrative measures against
three Russian entities for their nuclear- and missile-related
cooperation with Iran. Specifically, the United States has
banned exports to and imports from these entities. We also have
banned U.S. Government procurement from and assistance to them.
(Last July, we took the same action against seven Russian
entities involved with Iran's ballistic missile program.) In
addition, we are continuing our longstanding, broad, and
intensive efforts with the Russian government aimed at stopping
proliferation. As part of this approach, the United States will
be chairing in June the first meeting of the joint U.S.-Russia
Missile Sub-group of our bilateral Export Control Working
Group. This Sub-group will focus, among other things, on
improving risk assessment in Russia's missile-related licensing
decisions.
Threat Reduction
The proliferation of WMD and delivery system expertise also
poses a significant threat to national and international
security. A major concern is that the potential for
proliferation is increased due to the economic crisis in Russia
and other NIS. The Administration gives high priority to
controlling the human dimension of proliferation through
programs that support the transition of former Soviet weapons
scientists to civilian research and technology development
activities. I have proposed an additional $4.5 billion for
programs embodied in the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative
(ETRI) that would support activities in four areas: nuclear
security; non-nuclear WMD; science and technology
nonproliferation; and military relocation, stabilization and
other security cooperation programs. Congressional support for
this initiative would enable the engagement of a broad range of
programs under the Departments of State, Energy and Defense.
Expenses
Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act
(50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses
directly attributable to the exercise of Authorities conferred
by the declaration of the national emergency in Executive Order
12938 during the period from November 1, 1998, through May 14,
1999.
Notice
Continuation of Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction
On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order 12938, I declared
a national emergency with respect to the unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy,
and economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass
destruction'') and the means of delivering such weapons.
Because the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
the means of delivering them continues to pose an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy,
and economy of the United States, the national emergency first
declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on November 14,
1995, November 12, 1996, and November 13, 1997, must continue
in effect beyond November 14, 1998. Therefore, in accordance
with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1622(d)), I am continuing the national emergency declared in
Executive Order 12938.
This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and
transmitted to the Congress.
William J. Clinton
The White House, November 12, 1998.
(10) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning the National
Emergency with Respect to Iraq
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate
August 13, 1998
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
I hereby report to the Congress on the developments since
my last report of February 3, 1998, concerning the national
emergency with respect to Iraq that was declared in Executive
Order 12722 of August 2, 1990. This report is submitted
pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50
U.S.C. 1641(c), and section 204(c) of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(c).
Executive Order 12722 ordered the immediate blocking of all
property and interests in property of the Government of Iraq
(including the Central Bank of Iraq) then or thereafter located
in the United States or within the possession or control of a
United States person. That order also prohibited the
importation into the United States of goods and services of
Iraqi origin, as well as the exportation of goods, services,
and technology from the United States to Iraq. The order
prohibited travel-related transactions to or from Iraq and the
performance of any contract in support of any industrial,
commercial, or governmental project in Iraq. United States
persons were also prohibited from granting or extending credit
or loans to the Government of Iraq.
The foregoing prohibitions (as well as the blocking of
Government of Iraq property) were continued and augmented on
August 9, 1990, by Executive Order 12724, which was issued in
order to align the sanctions imposed by the United States with
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 661 of
August 6, 1990.
This report discusses only matters concerning the national
emergency with respect to Iraq that was declared in Executive
Order 12722 and matters relating to Executive Orders 12724 and
12817 (the ``Executive Orders''). The report covers events from
February 2 through August 1, 1998.
1. In April 1995, the U.N. Security Council adopted UNSCR
986 authorizing Iraq to export up to $1 billion in petroleum
and petroleum products every 90 days for a total of 180 days
under U.N. supervision in order to finance the purchase of
food, medicine, and other humanitarian supplies. UNSCR 986
includes arrangements to ensure equitable distribution of
humanitarian goods purchased with UNSCR 986 oil revenues to all
the people of Iraq. The resolution also provides for the
payment of compensation to victims of Iraqi aggression and for
the funding of other U.N. activities with respect to Iraq. On
May 20, 1996, a memorandum of understanding was concluded
between the Secretariat of the United Nations and the
Government of Iraq agreeing on terms for implementing UNSCR
986. On August 8, 1996, the UNSC committee established pursuant
to UNSCR 661 (``the 661 Committee'') adopted procedures to be
employed in implementation of UNSCR 986. On December 9, 1996,
the President of the Security Council received the report
prepared by the Secretary General as requested by paragraph 13
of UNSCR 986, making UNSCR 986 effective as of 12:01 a.m.
December 10, 1996.
On June 4, 1997, the U.N. Security Council adopted UNSCR
1111, renewing for another 180 days the authorization for Iraqi
petroleum sales and purchases of humanitarian aid contained in
UNSCR 986 of April 14, 1995. The Resolution became effective on
June 8, 1997. On September 12, 1997, the Security Council,
noting Iraq's decision not to export petroleum and petroleum
products pursuant to UNSCR 1111 during the period June 8 to
August 13, 1997, and deeply concerned about the resulting
humanitarian consequences for the Iraqi people, adopted UNSCR
1129. This resolution replaced the two 90-day quotas with one
120-day quota and one 60-day quota in order to enable Iraq to
export its full $2 billion quota of oil within the original 180
days of UNSCR 1111. On December 4, 1997, the U.N. Security
Council adopted UNSCR 1143, renewing for another 180 days,
beginning December 5, 1997, the authorization for Iraqi
petroleum sales and humanitarian aid purchases contained in
UNSCR 986.
On February 20, 1998, the U.N. Security Council adopted
UNSCR 1153, authorizing the sale of Iraqi petroleum and
petroleum products and the purchase of humanitarian aid for a
180-day period beginning with the date of notification by the
President of the Security Council to the members thereof of
receipt of the report requested in UNSCR 1153. UNSCR 1153
authorized the sale of $5.256 billion worth of Iraqi petroleum
and petroleum products. On March 25, 1998, the Security
Council, noting the shortfall in revenue from Iraq's sale of
petroleum and petroleum products during the first 90-day period
of implementation of UNSCR 1143, due to the delayed resumption
in sales and a serious decrease in prices, and concerned about
the resulting humanitarian consequences for the Iraqi people,
adopted UNSCR 1158. This Resolution reaffirmed the
authorization for Iraqi petroleum sales and purchases of
humanitarian aid contained in UNSCR 1143 for the remainder of
the second 90-day period and set the authorized value during
that time frame to $1.4 billion pending implementation of UNSCR
1153. The 180-day period authorized in UNSCR 1153 began on May
30, 1998. On June 19, 1998, the Security Council adopted UNSCR
1175, authorizing the expenditure of up to $300 million on
Iraqi oil infrastructure repairs in order to help Iraq reach
the higher export ceiling permitted under UNSCR 1153. UNSCR
1175 also reaffirmed the Security Council's endorsement of the
Secretary General's recommendation that the ``oil-for-food''
distribution plan be ongoing and project-based. During the
period covered by this report, imports into the United States
under the program totaled about 14.2 million barrels, bringing
total imports since December 10, 1996, to approximately 51.5
million barrels.
2. There have been no amendments to the Iraqi Sanctions
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 575 (the ``ISR'' or the
``Regulations'') administered by the Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC) of the Department of the Treasury during the
reporting period.
As previously reported, the Regulations were amended on
December 10, 1996, to provide a statement of licensing policy
regarding specific licensing of United States persons seeking
to purchase Iraqi-origin petroleum and petroleum products from
Iraq (61 Fed. Reg. 65312, December 11, 1996). Statements of
licensing policy were also provided regarding sales of
essential parts and equipment for the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik
pipeline system, and sales of humanitarian goods to Iraq,
pursuant to United Nations approval. A general license was also
added to authorize dealings in Iraqi-origin petroleum and
petroleum products that have been exported from Iraq with
United Nations and United States Government approval.
All executory contracts must contain terms requiring that
all proceeds of oil purchases from the Government of Iraq,
including the State Oil Marketing Organization, must be placed
in the U.N. escrow account at Banque Nationale de Paris, New
York (the ``986 escrow account''), and all Iraqi payments for
authorized sales of pipeline parts and equipment, humanitarian
goods, and incidental transaction costs borne by Iraq will,
upon approval by the 661 Committee and satisfaction of other
conditions established by the United Nations, be paid or
payable out of the 986 escrow account.
3. Investigations of possible violations of the Iraqi
sanctions continue to be pursued and appropriate enforcement
actions taken. Several cases from prior reporting periods are
continuing, and recent additional allegations have been
referred by OFAC to the U.S. Customs Service for investigation.
Investigation also continues into the roles played by
various individuals and firms outside Iraq in the Iraqi
government procurement network. These investigations may lead
to additions to OFAC's listing of individuals and organizations
determined to be Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) of the
Government of Iraq.
Since my last report, OFAC has collected two civil monetary
penalties totaling $9,000 from one company and one individual
for violations of IEEPA and ISR prohibitions against
transactions with Iraq.
4. The Office of Foreign Assets Control has issued hundreds
of licensing determinations regarding transactions pertaining
to Iraq or Iraqi assets since August 1990. Specific licenses
have been issued for transactions such as the filing of legal
actions against Iraqi governmental entities, legal
representation of Iraq, and the exportation to Iraq of donated
medicine, medical supplies, and food intended for humanitarian
relief purposes, sales of humanitarian supplies to Iraq under
UNSCRs 986, 1111, 1143, and 1153, diplomatic transactions, the
execution of powers of attorney relating to the administration
of personal assets and decedents' estates in Iraq, and the
protection of preexistent intellectual property rights in Iraq.
Since my last report, 75 specific licenses have been issued,
most with respect to sales of humanitarian goods.
Since December 10, 1996, OFAC has issued specific licenses
authorizing commercial sales of humanitarian goods funded by
Iraqi oil sales pursuant to UNSCRs 986, 1111, 1143, and 1153
valued at more than $324 million. Of that amount, approximately
$298 million represents sales of basic foodstuffs, $14 million
for medicines and medical supplies, $9.2 million for water
testing and treatment equipment, and nearly $3 million to fund
a variety of United Nations activities in Iraq. International
humanitarian relief in Iraq is coordinated under the direction
of the United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator of
Iraq. Assisting U.N. agencies include the World Food Program,
the U.N. Population Fund, the U.N. Food and Agriculture
Organization, the World Health Organization, and UNICEF. As of
June 29, 1998, OFAC had authorized sales valued at more than
$85 million worth of humanitarian goods during the current
reporting period.
5. The expenses incurred by the Federal Government in the
6-month period from February 2 through August 1, 1998, that are
directly attributable to the exercise of powers and authorities
conferred by the declaration of a national emergency with
respect to Iraq, are reported to be about $1.1 million, most of
which represents wage and salary costs for Federal personnel.
Personnel costs were largely centered in the Department of the
Treasury (particularly in the Office of Foreign Assets Control,
the U.S. Customs Service, the Office of the Under Secretary for
Enforcement, and the Office of the General Counsel), the
Department of State (particularly the Bureau of Economic and
Business Affairs, the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, the
Bureau of International Organization Affairs, the Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs, the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and the
Office of the Legal Adviser), and the Department of
Transportation (particularly the U.S. Coast Guard).
6. The United States imposed economic sanctions on Iraq in
response to Iraq's illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait, a
clear act of brutal aggression. The United States, together
with the international community, is maintaining economic
sanctions against Iraq because the Iraqi regime has failed to
comply fully with relevant United Nations Security Council
resolutions. Iraqi compliance with these resolutions is
necessary before the United States will consider lifting
economic sanctions. Security Council resolutions on Iraq call
for the elimination of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, Iraqi
recognition of Kuwait and the inviolability of the Iraq-Kuwait
boundary, the release of Kuwaiti and other third-country
nationals, compensation for victims of Iraqi aggression, long-
term monitoring of weapons of mass destruction capabilities,
the return of Kuwaiti assets stolen during Iraq's illegal
occupation of Kuwait, renunciation of terrorism, an end to
internal Iraqi repression of its own civilian population, and
the facilitation of access by international relief
organizations to all those in need in all parts of Iraq. Eight
years after the invasion, a pattern of defiance persists: a
refusal to account for missing Kuwaiti detainees; failure to
return Kuwaiti property worth millions of dollars, including
military equipment that was used by Iraq in its movement of
troops to the Kuwaiti border in October 1994; sponsorship of
assassinations in Lebanon and in northern Iraq; incomplete
declarations to weapons inspectors and refusal to provide
immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to sites by
these inspectors; and ongoing widespread human rights
violations. As a result, the U.N. sanctions remain in place;
the United States will continue to enforce those sanctions
under domestic authority.
The Baghdad government continues to violate basic human
rights of its own citizens through systematic repression of all
forms of political expression, oppression of minorities, and
denial of humanitarian assistance. The Government of Iraq has
repeatedly said it will not comply with UNSCR 688 of April 5,
1991. The Iraqi military routinely harasses residents of the
north, and has attempted to ``Arabize'' the Kurdish, Turkomen,
and Assyrian areas in the north. Iraq has not relented in its
artillery attacks against civilian population centers in the
south, or in its burning and draining operations in the
southern marshes, which have forced thousands to flee to
neighboring states.
The policies and actions of the Saddam Hussein regime
continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security and foreign policy of the United States, as
well as to regional peace and security. The U.N. resolutions
affirm that the Security Council be assured of Iraq's peaceful
inten-ions in judging its compliance with sanctions. Because of
Iraq's failure to comply fully with these resolutions, the
United States will continue to apply economic sanctions to
deter it from threatening peace and stability in the region.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton
(11) Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Iraq
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
July 21, 1999
To The Congress of the United States:
Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national
emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its
declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register
and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the
emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date.
In accordance with this provision I have sent the enclosed
notice, stating that the Iraqi emergency is to continue in
effect beyond August 2, 1999, to the Federal Register for
publication.
The crisis between the United States and Iraq that led to
the declaration on August 2, 1990, of a national emergency has
not been resolved. The Government of Iraq continues to engage
in activities inimical to stability in the Middle East and
hostile to United States interests in the region. Such Iraqi
actions pose a continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to
the national security and vital foreign policy interests of the
United States. For these reasons, I have determined that it is
necessary to maintain in force the broad authorities necessary
to apply economic pressure on the Government of Iraq.
William J. Clinton
The White House, July 20, 1999.
Notice
Continuation of Iraqi Emergency
On August 2, 1990, by Executive Order 12722, President Bush
declared a national emergency to deal with the unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign
policy of the United States constituted by the actions and
policies of the Government of Iraq. By Executive Orders 12722
of August 2, 1990, and 12724 of August 9, 1990, the President
imposed trade sanctions on Iraq and blocked Iraqi government
assets. Because the Government of Iraq has continued its
activities hostile to United States interests in the Middle
East, the national emergency declared on August 2, 1990, and
the measures adopted on August 2 and August 9, 1990, to deal
with that emergency must continue in effect beyond August 2,
1999. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the
National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing
the national emergency with respect to Iraq.
This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and
transmitted to the Congress. William J. Clinton The White
House, July 20, 1999.
William J. Clinton
The White House, July 20, 1999.
(12) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning the National
Emergency with Respect to Libya
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
July 19, 1999
To The Congress of the United States:
I hereby report to the Congress on the developments since
my last report of December 30, 1998, concerning the national
emergency with respect to Libya that was declared in Executive
Order 12543 of January 7, 1986. This report is submitted
pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50
U.S.C. 1641(c); section 204(c) of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(c); and section
505(c) of the International Security and Development
Cooperation Act of 1985, 22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9(c).
1. On December 30, 1998, I renewed for another year the
national emergency with respect to Libya pursuant to IEEPA.
This renewal extended the current comprehensive financial and
trade embargo against Libya in effect since 1986. Under these
sanctions, virtually all trade with Libya is prohibited, and
all assets owned or controlled by the Government of Libya in
the United States or in the possession or control of U.S.
persons are blocked.
2. On April 28, 1999, I announced that the United States
will exempt commercial sales of agricultural commodities and
products, medicine, and medical equipment from future
unilateral sanctions regimes. In addition, my Administration
will extend this policy to existing sanctions programs by
modifying licensing policies for currently embargoed countries
to permit case-by-case review of specific proposals for
commercial sales of these items. Certain restrictions apply.
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the
Department of the Treasury is currently drafting amendments to
the Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 550 (the
Regulations), to implement this initiative. The amended
Regulations will provide for the licensing of sales of
agricultural commodities and products, medicine, and medical
supplies to nongovernmental entities in Libya or to government
procurement agencies and parastatals not affiliated with the
coercive organs of that country. The amended Regulations will
also provide for the licensing of all transactions necessary
and incident to licensed sales transactions, such as insurance
and shipping arrangements. Financing for the licensed sales
transactions will be permitted in the manner described in the
amended Regulations.
3. During the reporting period, OFAC reviewed numerous
applications for licenses to authorize transactions under the
Regulations. Consistent with OFAC's ongoing scrutiny of banking
transactions, the largest category of license approvals (20)
involved types of financial transactions that are consistent
with U.S. policy. Most of these licenses authorized personal
remittances not involving Libya between persons who are not
blocked parties to flow through Libyan banks located outside
Libya. Three licenses were issued authorizing certain travel-
related transactions. One license was issued to a U.S. firm to
allow it to protect its intellectual property rights in Libya;
another authorized receipt of payment for legal services; and a
third authorized payments for telecommunications services. A
total of 26 licenses were issued during the reporting period.
4. During the current 6-month period, OFAC continued to
emphasize to the international banking community in the United
States the importance of identifying and blocking payments made
by or on behalf of Libya. The office worked closely with the
banks to assure the effectiveness of interdiction software
systems used to identify such payments. During the reporting
period, 87 transactions potentially involving Libya, totaling
nearly $3.4 million, were interdicted.
5. Since my last report, OFAC has collected 7 civil
monetary penalties totaling $38,000 from 2 U.S. financial
institutions, 3 companies, and 2 individuals for violations of
the U.S. sanctions against Libya. The violations involved
export transactions relating to Libya and dealings in
Government of Libya property or property in which the
Government of Libya had an interest.
On April 23, 1999, a foreign national permanent resident in
the United States was sentenced by the Federal District court
for the Middle District of Florida to 2 years in prison and 2
years supervised release for criminal conspiracy to violate
economic sanctions against Libya, Iran, and Iraq. He had
previously been convicted of violation of the Libyan Sanctions
Regulations, the Iranian Transactions Regulations, the Iraqi
Sanctions Regulations, and the Export Administration
Regulations for exportation of industrial equipment to the oil,
gas, petrochemical, water, and power industries of Libya, Iran,
and Iraq.
Various enforcement actions carried over from previous
reporting periods have continued to be aggressively pursued.
Numerous investigations are ongoing and new reports of
violations are being scrutinized.
6. The expenses incurred by the Federal Government in the
6-month period from January 7 through July 6, 1999, that are
directly attributable to the exercise of powers and authorities
conferred by the declaration of the Libyan national emergency
are estimated at approximately $4.4 million. Personnel costs
were largely centered in the Department of the Treasury
(particularly in the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the
Office of the General Counsel, and the U.S. Customs Service),
the Department of State, and the Department of Commerce.
7. In April 1999, Libya surrendered the 2 suspects in the
Lockerbie bombing for trial before a Scottish court seated in
the Netherlands. In accordance with UNSCR 748, upon the
suspects' transfer, UN sanctions were immediately suspended. We
will insist that Libya fulfill the remaining UNSCR requirements
for lifting UN sanctions and are working with UN Secretary
Annan and UN Security Council members to ensure that Libya does
so promptly. U.S. unilateral sanctions remain in force, and I
will continue to exercise the powers at my disposal to apply
these sanctions fully and effectively, as long as they remain
appropriate. I will continue to report periodically to the
Congress on significant developments as required by law.
William J. Clinton
The White House, July 19, 1999.
(13) Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Libya
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate
December 30, 1998
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national
emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its
declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register
and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the
emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date.
In accordance with this provision, I have sent the enclosed
notice, stating that the Libyan emergency is to continue in
effect beyond January 7, 1999, to the Federal Register for
publication. Similar notices have been sent annually to the
Congress and published in the Federal Register. The most recent
notice was signed on January 2, 1998, and appeared in the
Federal Register on January 6, 1998.
The crisis between the United States and Libya that led to
the declaration of a national emergency on January 7, 1986, has
not been resolved. The Government of Libya has continued its
actions and policies in support of terrorism, despite the calls
by the United Nations Security Council, in Resolutions 731
(1992), 748 (1992), and 883 (1993), that Libya demonstrate by
concrete actions its renunciation of terrorism. Such Libyan
actions and policies pose a continuing unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and vital foreign
policy interests of the United States. Furthermore, the Libyan
government has not delivered the two Lockerbie bombing suspects
for trial, even though the United States and United Kingdom
accepted Libya's proposal to try the suspects in a Scottish
court in a third country. Libya's stalling in handing over the
suspects is yet another indication of Libya's continued support
for terrorism and rejection of international norms. For these
reasons, I have determined that it is necessary to maintain in
force the broad authorities necessary to apply economic
pressure to the Government of Libya to reduce its ability to
support international terrorism.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton
Notice
Continuation of Libyan Emergency
On January 7, 1986, by Executive Order 12543, President
Reagan declared a national emergency to deal with the unusual
and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign
policy of the United States constituted by the actions and
policies of the Government of Libya. On January 8, 1986, by
Executive Order 12544, the President took additional measures
to block Libyan assets in the United States. Every President
has transmitted to the Congress and the Federal Register a
notice continuing this emergency each year since 1986.
The crisis between the United States and Libya that led to
the declaration of a national emergency on January 7, 1986, has
not been resolved. The Government of Libya has continued its
actions and policies in support of terrorism, despite the calls
by the United Nations Security Council, in Resolutions 731
(1992), 748 (1992), and 883 (1993), that it demonstrate by
concrete actions its renunciation of terrorism. Therefore, in
accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act
(50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing the national emergency
with respect to Libya. This notice shall be published in the
Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress.
William J. Clinton
The White House, December 30, 1998.
(14) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning the National
Emergency with Respect to Iran \1\
Message from the President of the United States transmitting a 6-month
periodic report on the national emergency with respect to Iran that was
declared in Executive Order 12170 of November 14, 1979, pursuant to 50
U.S.C. 1703(c)
President's Periodic Report on the National Emergency with Respect to
Iran and Iranian Assets Blocking
I hereby report to the Congress on developments since the
last Presidential report of November 16, 1998, concerning the
national emergency with respect to Iran that was declared in
Executive Order 12170 of November 14, 1979. This report is
submitted pursuant to section 204(c) of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(c) (``IEEPA'').
This report covers events through March 31, 1999. My last
report, dated November 16, 1998, covered events through
September 30, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ House Document 106-73, May 27, 1999.
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1. There have been no amendments to the Iranian Assets
Control Regulations, 31 CFR Part 535 (the ``IACR''), since my
last report.
2. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (the
``Tribunal''), established at The Hague pursuant to the Algiers
Accords, continues to make progress in arbitrating the claims
before it. Since the period covered in my last report, the
Tribunal has rendered three awards. This brings the total
number of awards rendered by the Tribunal to 591, the majority
of which have been in favor of U.S. claimants. As of March 31,
1998, the value of awards to successful U.S. claimants paid
from the Security Account held by the NV Settlement Bank was
$2,502,365,655.22.
Since my last report, Iran has failed to replenish the
Security Account established by the Algiers Accords to ensure
payment of awards to successful U.S. claimants. Thus, since
November 5, 1992, the Security Account has continuously
remained below the $500 million balance required by the Algiers
Accords. As of March 31, 1998, the total amount in the Security
Account was $106,713,705.15, and the total amount in the
Interest Account was $29,521,369.18. Therefore, the United
States continues to pursue Case No. A/28, filed in September
1993, to require Iran to meet its obligation under the Algiers
Accords to replenish the Security Account. In Case No. A/28,
the United States filed a request for additional relief on
November 30, 1998, to which Iran responded on March 8, 1999.
The Tribunal has scheduled a hearing on this case for June 28-
30, 1999.
The United States also continues to pursue Case No. A/29 to
require Iran to meet its obligation of timely payment of its
equal share of advances for Tribunal expenses when directed to
do so by the Tribunal.
3. The Department of State continues to present other
United States Government claims against Iran and to respond to
claims brought against the United States by Iran, in
coordination with concerned government agencies.
Under the February 22, 1996, settlement agreement related
to the Iran Air case before the International Court of Justice
and Iran's bank-related claims against the United States before
the Tribunal (see report of May 16, 1996), the Department of
State has been processing payments. As of March 31, 1999, the
Department has authorized payment to U.S. nationals totaling
$17,615,113.84 for 56 claims against Iranian banks. In
addition, the Department authorized transfer of $2,886,580.00
to the Tribunal for Iran's share of the Tribunal's operating
expenses. The Department has also authorized payments to
surviving family members of 242 Iranian victims of the aerial
incident, totaling $60,600,000.00.
On December 29, 1998, the full Tribunal issued a partial
award in cases A/15 and A/24. The Tribunal dismissed some
Iran's claims and, with respect to other, held that the United
States had failed to comply with obligations under the Algiers
Accords to terminate claims against Iran in U.S. courts, and
that the United States may be obligated to compensate Iran for
expenses incurred in connections with such failures. In a
subsequent phase, the Tribunal will determine the nature and
amount of damages, if any, suffered by Iran.
In Case No. A/30, a case in which Iran alleges that the
United States has violated paragraphs 1 and 10 of the General
Declaration of the Algiers Accords, based on an alleged covert
action program aimed at Iran and U.S. sanctions, the United
States filed a submission on March 9, 1999, in response to
Iran's request that the Tribunal require the United States to
produce classified intelligence information.
4. U.S. nationals continue to pursue claims against Iran at
the Tribunal. Since my last report, the Tribunal has issued
awards in two private claims. On November 16, 1998, Chamber One
issued an award in Ford Aerospace & Communications v. Iran, AWD
No. 589-93-1, heeding Iran's ``Request to Close the Case,'' and
determining that the sole remaining issue, Iran's counterclaim
against Ford Aerospace, was moot.
On January 13, 1999, Chamber One issued an award in Rana
Kipour v. Iran, AWD No. 591-336-1, giving effect to a
settlement agreement between the parties, under which the
claimant was paid $850,000.
5. The situation reviewed above continues to implicate
important diplomatic, financial, and legal interests of the
United States and its nationals and presents an unusual
challenge to the national security and foreign policy of the
United States. The Iranian Assets Control Regulations issued
pursuant to Executive Order 12170 continue to play an important
role in structuring our relationship with Iran and in enabling
the United States to implement properly the Algiers Accords. I
shall continue to exercise the powers at my disposal to deal
with these problems and will continue to report periodically to
the Congress on significant developments.
(15) Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Iran
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate
November 9, 1998
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national
emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its
declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register
and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the
emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date.
In accordance with this provision, I have sent the enclosed
notice, stating that the Iran emergency declared in 1979 is to
continue in effect beyond November 14, 1998, to the Federal
Register for publication. Similar notices have been sent
annually to the Congress and the Federal Register since
November 12, 1980. The most recent notice appeared in the
Federal Register on October 1, 1997. This emergency is separate
from that declared with respect to Iran on March 15, 1995, in
Executive Order 12957.
The crisis between the United States and Iran that began in
1979 has not been fully resolved. The international tribunal
established to adjudicate claims of the United States and U.S.
nationals against Iran and of the Iranian government and
Iranian nationals against the United States continues to
function, and normalization of commercial and diplomatic
relations between the United States and Iran has not been
achieved. On March 15, 1995, I declared a separate national
emergency with respect to Iran pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act and imposed separate sanctions.
By Executive Order 12959 of May 6, 1995, these sanctions were
significantly augmented, and by Executive Order 13059 of August
19, 1997, the sanctions imposed in 1995 were further clarified.
In these circumstances, I have determined that it is necessary
to maintain in force the broad authorities that are in place by
virtue of the November 14, 1979, declaration of emergency,
including the authority to block certain property of the
Government of Iran, and that are needed in the process of
implementing the January 1981 agreements with Iran.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton
Notice
Continuation of Iran Emergency
On November 14, 1979, by Executive Order 12170, the
President declared a national emergency to deal with the threat
to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the
United States constituted by the situation in Iran. Notices of
the continuation of this national emergency have been
transmitted annually by the President to the Congress and the
Federal Register. The most recent notice appeared in the
Federal Register on October 1, 1997. Because our relations with
Iran have not yet returned to normal, and the process of
implementing the January 19, 1981, agreements with Iran is
still underway, the national emergency declared on November 14,
1979, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 1998.
Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National
Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing the
national emergency with respect to Iran. This notice shall be
published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the
Congress.
William J. Clinton
The White House, November 9, 1998.
2. Office of the Vice President
a. Report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
Partial text of the report of the White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security, submitted by the Vice President in compliance with
Executive Order 13015 of August 22, 1996
Vice President Al Gore, Chairman
february 12, 1997
the white house
washington, dc
Dear Mr. President,
We are pleased to present you with the report of the White
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. You
established this Commission by issuing Executive Order 13015 on
August 22, 1996 with a charter to study matters involving
aviation safety and security, including air traffic control and
to develop a strategy to improve aviation safety and security,
both domestically and internationally.
During the past six months, we have conducted an intensive
inquiry into civil aviation safety, security and air traffic
control modernization. Commission and staff have gathered
information from a broad range of aviation specialists, Federal
Agencies, consumer groups, and industry leaders.
After many months of deliberations we have agreed on a set
of recommendations which we believe will serve to enhance and
ensure the continued safety and security of our air
transportation system.
We are privileged to submit these recommendations herewith.
Sincerely,
Vice President Al Gore, Chairman
In compliance with the Executive Order 13015 of August 22,
1996, the undersigned present the report of the White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.
_______________________________________________________________________
Editor's Note:
l. The final two sentences of the first paragraph of
Recommendation 4.4 have been changed to reflect the
precise nature of the agreement by U.S. airlines.
2. The typed version of the final report
inadvertently omitted manufacturers from the list of
those to whom the Commission expressed appreciation.
That mistake has been corrected in this edition.
3. In this edition, typographical errors have been
silently corrected.
4. This edition contains as Appendix I a dissent by
Commissioner Cummock which was transmitted to the
Commission one week after the report was voted on in
public session and presented to President Clinton.
During the public session, Commissioner Cummock
dissented from three recommendations. The dissent
published in this document goes far beyond those
registered in public. It presents for the first time
material and arguments the other Commissioners did not
have an opportunity to consider. However, many of the
arguments made in the dissent were considered and
rejected by the other members of the Commission.
Supplemental material included in Commissioner
Cummock's dissent is available upon request to Richard
K. Pemberton, Office of the Secretary of
Transportation, U.S. Department of Transportation.
_______________________________________________________________________
Introduction
change.
That one word sums up both the challenges in aviation
safety and security, and the means by which government and
industry must respond. Change is nothing new in this field. The
first powered flight, covering 120 feet in twelve seconds, took
place just over ninety years ago. Today, planes cross the
Atlantic Ocean in a matter of hours, as hundreds of passengers
watch movies and dine. An industry that essentially did not
even exist before World War I now occupies a central position
in our economy. Today, commercial aviation generates over $300
billion annually, and accounts for close to one million
American jobs.
The changes taking place in aviation today are as profound
as any this industry has seen before. Since 1992, sixty new
airlines have started service, opening up new markets,
attracting new passengers, and impacting the economics of the
industry significantly. The number of passengers flying in the
United States over the last decade has grown to more than half
a billion. The FAA has certified twenty new aircraft models in
the last ten years, and plans are under consideration for a new
High-Speed Civil Transport.
As dramatic as these changes have been, even more
significant change looms on the horizon. Information technology
presents opportunities that will again revolutionize the
industry, in ways as significant as the introduction of the jet
engine forty years ago. Air traffic today is still controlled
through ground-based radar, and on a point-to-point basis.
Satellite-based navigation will bring a fundamental change in
the way that air traffic is directed, and may make the notion
of ``highway lanes in the sky'' as obsolete as the bonfires
that used to guide early fliers. Digital technology will
replace analog systems, making communications with and among
aircraft dramatically faster, more efficient, and effective.
These and other new technologies offer tremendous opportunities
for improved safety, security and efficiency, and will
transform aviation in the same way that the Internet and World
Wide Web are transforming the way the world does business.
Other changes are even more imminent. By the end of the
century, the commercial fleet serving the United States will
have been completely overhauled, with aircraft that make a
fraction of the old noise and emit far less pollution.
Continuing success in the United States' efforts to open up
foreign markets to competition by our airlines likely will mean
more airlines, serving more markets, carrying more people. A
continuation of the trend toward greater competition and lower
fares will make flying even more available to average Americans
than it is today. In fact, the FAA projects that, in 2007, more
than 800 million passengers will fly in the United States--
three times the number who flew in 1980.
This is a time of change for government, as well. President
Clinton's declaration that ``the era of big government is
over,'' coalesced a bipartisan drive to make government work
better and cost less. The Administration's commitment to
government reform resulted not just from a desire to bring down
government spending, but from a recognition that the same types
of changes facing industries such as aviation face government,
as well. Like the private sector, government must change with
the times. The question is, how?
establishment of the commission on aviation safety and security
President Clinton created the White House Commission on
Aviation Safety and Security to address that question, and
assigned it three specific mandates: to look at the changing
security threat, and how we can address it; to examine changes
in the aviation industry, and how government should adapt its
regulation of it; to look at the technological changes coming
to air traffic control, and what should be done to take best
advantage of them. In the wake of concerns over the crash of
Trans World Airlines Flight 800, President Clinton asked the
Commission to focus its attention first on the issue of
security. He asked for an initial report on aviation security
in 45 days, including an action plan to deploy new
hightechnology machines to detect the most sophisticated
explosives.
On September 9, 1996, the Commission presented that initial
report to the President. It contained twenty recommendations
for enhancing aviation security which are presented again in
Chapter 3 of this report. The response to the initial report
was unprecedented. In October 1996, at the request of President
Clinton, the Congress appropriated over $400 million, in direct
accord with the Commission's recommendations, for the
acquisition of new explosives detection technology and other
security enhancements. In the five months since they were
presented, implementation has begun on virtually all of the
initial recommendations.
From its inception, the Commission took a hands-on approach
to its work. President Clinton announced the formation of the
Commission on July 25, 1996. A few days later, Vice President
Gore led a site visit to Dulles International Airport, where he
and other Commissioners saw airport and airline operations
first-hand, and discussed issues with front line workers. This
was the first of dozens of such visits. Over the next six
months, the Commission visited facilities throughout the United
States and in various locations abroad. Seeking to reach the
broadest possible audience, the Commission established a
homepage on the Internet (http://
www.aviationcommission.dot.gov), both to make the Commission's
work available and to receive input. The web site has had
almost 7,000 contacts, many providing valuable insights. The
Commission held six public meetings, hearing from over fifty
witnesses representing a cross section of the aviation industry
and the public, including families of victims of air disasters.
Recognizing the increasingly global nature of aviation, the
Commission co-sponsored an International Conference on Aviation
Safety and Security with the George Washington University,
attended by over 700 representatives from sixty-one countries.
Out of this extensive process, the Commission compiled the
recommendations presented in this final report.
a vision for the future
To compete in the global economy of the 21st Century,
America needs a healthy, vibrant aviation industry. In turn,
the health and vibrancy of aviation depend on improved levels
of safety, security and modernization. For the last fifty
years, the United States has led the field of aviation. But,
that position is being challenged, both by competition from
abroad and by weaknesses in our own systems.
These weaknesses can be overcome. The Commission believes
that it should be a national priority to do so. This report
outlines steps that can set government and industry on a course
to achieve that goal together. Heading into the next century,
our activities, programs, and results should define aviation
safety and security for the rest of the world.
Leadership in aviation goes far beyond having strong,
competitive airlines. It means assuring leadership in
communications, satellite, aerospace, and other technologies
that increasingly are defining the global economy. It means
more than the highest possible levels of safety and security
for travelers.
The Commission's report reflects a focus on this vision: to
ensure greater safety and security for passengers; to
restructure the relationships between government and industry
into partnerships for progress; and to maintain global
leadership in the aviation industry.
key recommendations
In the area of safety, the Commission believes that the
principal focus should be on reducing the rate of accidents by
a factor of five within a decade, and recommends a re-
engineering of the FAA's regulatory and certification programs
to achieve that goal.
In the area of air traffic control, the Commission believes
that the safety and efficiency improvements that will come with
a modernized system should not be delayed, and recommends that
the program be accelerated for to achieve full operational
capability by the year 2005. In addition, a more effective
system must be established to finance modernization of the
National Airspace System and enhancements in safety and
security.
In the area of security, the Commission believes that the
threat against civil aviation is changing and growing, and that
the federal government must lead the fight against it. The
Commission recommends that the federal government commit
greater resources to improving aviation security, and work more
cooperatively with the private sector and local authorities in
carrying out security responsibilities.
Although not specifically directed to do so, the Commission
also took up the issue of responding to aviation disasters. In
this area, the Commission believes that a better coordinated
and more compassionate response is necessary, and that the
responsibility for coordinating the response needs to be placed
with a single entity. The Commission is pleased with the
progress made to date in this area, including the designation
of the National Transportation Safety Board as that single
entity.
Many of the Commission's recommendations apply equally to
each of the three major areas of focus, including those
relating to regulation and certification. Primary among these
recommendations is the call for greater use of partnerships in
meeting goals. Regulatory and enforcement agencies such as the
Customs Service, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, and the Food and Drug Administration have put
new emphasis on partnerships with industries, and are achieving
tremendous results: seizing more drugs while expediting travel
for legitimate travelers; reducing workplace accidents while
increasing productivity; and getting important new AIDS and
cancer-fighting drugs to market in a fraction of the time it
used to take.
The premise behind these partnerships is that government
can set goals, and then work with industry in the most
effective way to achieve them. Partnership does not mean that
government gives up its authorities or responsibilities. Not
all industry members are willing to be partners. In those
cases, government must use its full authority to enforce the
law. But, through partnerships, government works with industry
to find better ways to achieve its goals, seeking to replace
confrontation with cooperation. Such partnerships hold
tremendous promise for improving aviation safety and security.
A shift away from prescriptive regulations will allow companies
to take advantage of incentives and reach goals more quickly.
Transportation Secretary Pena's cooperative program with
airlines to establish a single level of safety is an example of
innovative government-industry partnership. Another is Vice
President Gore's January 15, 1997 announcement that Boeing, in
concert with government agencies, had developed a plan to
modify the rudders on hundreds of its 737 aircraft. By acting
without waiting for a government mandate, Boeing will complete
many of these safety-enhancing modifications before the
government could complete a rule requiring the action.
Partnership must extend not only to regulated entities, but
also to the various federal agencies involved with aviation
safety and security. A number of agencies outside the
Department of Transportation have expertise and resources that
can have a direct impact on improving safety and security. The
Commission urges the Administration to continue to work to
expand and improve these intergovernmental relationships.
In the last few years, the FAA has begun to recognize and
respond to the tremendous changes it faces. Reviews such as the
Challenge 2000 report examined ways of improving the way the
FAA regulates operators and manufacturers. Now is the time for
the FAA to build on that work, and aggressively reengineer
itself to adapt to the demands of the 21st Century.
It is important to note that the FAA, alone among federal
agencies, has been given some critical new tools to help shape
its own future. A new Management Advisory Council will provide
valuable input to the agency's decision-making process. In
1995, the Congress granted the Clinton Administration's request
for unprecedented reforms of the FAA's personnel and
procurement systems. These reforms give the FAA almost
unlimited latitude to design new systems to meet the agency's
unique and particular needs. The first phases of these reforms
were implemented in April 1996, and are already producing
dividends. The FAA used to have 233 procurement documents, and
today there are less than 50. Using its streamlined process,
the FAA recently completed a billion dollar procurement in six
months, with no protests. Under the old system, it would have
taken three times as long, and likely would have been delayed
by costly protests. A stack of personnel rules that used to be
one-foot high has been reduced to 41 pages, and will allow the
agency to hire people where they're needed and when they're
needed.
This flexibility will be critical to meeting the challenges
of the next century. As former FAA Administrator David Hinson
recently noted, this type of reform is ``the seed for what
needs to happen at the FAA.'' The incoming leadership at the
Department of Transportation and the FAA must utilize fully the
flexibilities that have been granted if the agency is to keep
pace with the rapidly changing industry it regulates.
responsibility for implementing change
The Commission's goal for aviation in the next century may
be summed up by the words of Robert Crandall, Chairman of
American Airlines, when he said, ``We would like the public to
take safety and security as a given. If that is going to
happen, change is necessary.''
The responsibility for achieving that change lies with all
the partners in aviation. The Administration, the Congress, the
entire aviation industry and its employees must work together
to make the changes that are necessary to keep pace with the
challenges facing them. Commitments must be made at the highest
levels of every organization, in government and in the private
sector.
To ensure that the government remains focused on the goals
established in this report, the Commission recommends three
steps:
(1) that the Secretary of Transportation report publicly
each year on the implementation status of these
recommendations;
(2) that the President assign the incoming leadership at
the Department of Transportation and the FAA the clear mission
of leading their agencies through the necessary transition to
re-engineered safety and security programs; and
(3) that the performance agreements for these positions,
which the documents that senior managers sign with the
President outlining their goals and specific means of measuring
progress, include implementation of these recommendations.
Chapter One: Improving Aviation Safety
``The FAA, despite its professionalism and many
accomplishments, was simply never created to deal with
the environment that has been produced by deregulation
of the air transport industry.''
--Stuart Matthews, President and CEO, Flight
Safety Foundation.
Commercial aviation is the safest mode of transportation.
That record has been established not just through government
regulation, but through the work of everyone involved in
aviation--manufacturers, airlines, airport operators, and a
highly-skilled and dedicated workforce. Their combined efforts
have produced a fatal accident rate of 0.3 per million
departures in the United States. The accident rate for
commercial aviation declined dramatically between 1950 and
1970. But, over the last two decades, that rate has remained
low, but flat. Heading into the next century, the overall goal
of aviation safety programs is clear: to bring that rate down
even lower.
Focusing on the accident rate is critical because of the
projected increases in traffic. Unless that rate is reduced,
the actual number of accidents will grow as traffic increases.
Given the international nature of aviation, cutting the
accident rate is an imperative not just for the United States,
but for all countries involved in aviation. Accident rates in
some areas of the world exceed those in the U.S. by a factor of
ten or more. Boeing projects that unless the global accident
rate is reduced, by the year 2015, an airliner will crash
somewhere in the world almost weekly.
While fatality rates in general aviation are higher than in
commercial operations, the principal causes of general aviation
accidents are similar to commercial aviation accidents. The
Commission's recommendations will help address the safety of
general aviation as well.
Lessons from reinventing government must be applied to
aviation programs. Improvements in safety and security will
result from a focus on several key areas: expanded use of
partnerships; reengineering of the FAA's regulatory and
certification processes; greater focus on human factors and
training; and, the faster introduction of proven new
technologies. These technologies are enabling the introduction
of increasingly sophisticated automation into virtually every
aspect of aviation operations. They offer opportunities for
improved safety, security, and efficiency, and are driving the
aviation industry toward an integrated system that will alter
many of the things that have remained unchanged in aviation for
decades.
Adapting to these changes will require renewed commitments
from all partners, and a willingness to re-engineer long-
standing practices and procedures. This change also calls for a
cultural transformation of the FAA to improve its ability to
regulate and lead the development of the integrated aviation
system on the horizon. In the areas of regulation and
certification, the Challenge 2000 report represents a good
first step. However, it and other internal reviews have not
provided a comprehensive, agency-wide assessment of the need
for change. That is what is needed.
A strong government-industry partnership is needed to
develop and integrate the research, standards, regulations,
procedures, and infrastructure needed to support the aviation
system of the future. The FAA has applied this approach
successfully to cooperative research projects with NASA in the
development of advanced air traffic technologies. The
Commission encourages these agencies and others to expand their
cooperative efforts in aviation safety research and
development.
Regular and random inspection of airlines and facilities
should remain an important part of the FAA's safety and
security oversight programs. However, given the tremendous
growth and globalization in the industry, it is neither
realistic nor desirable to expect the FAA to rely on hands-on
inspections to ensure safety. It is critical that industry be
given the incentives and flexibility to be full partners in
this effort, and be encouraged to monitor and improve their own
performance. This will not only produce better focus on
results, but will also allow the FAA to deploy its resources
more effectively.
recommendations
1.1 Government and industry should establish a national
goal to reduce the aviation fatal accident rate by a factor of
five within ten years and conduct safety research to support
that goal.
Historically, major advances in aviation safety have been
driven by technological improvements in airframes, engines,
communications, radar and other areas. Today, information
technology can help aviation make the next leap forward in
safety.
Aviation safety experts at the FAA and at NASA are
confident that a five-fold reduction in the fatal accident rate
could be achieved in the next decade given the right resources
and focus. The Commission urges the FAA, NASA and industry to
step up to this challenge. Achieving this goal will require the
combined efforts of government and industry focused on three
objectives: preventing equipment malfunctions; reducing human-
caused mishaps; and ensuring separation between aircraft and
other air or ground hazards. Government can play a strong role
in research and development, but it must be in partnership with
industry, which ultimately is responsible for operating safely.
The Commission urges NASA, which has considerable expertise and
resources in the area of safety research, to expand its
involvement in the promotion of aviation safety.
1.2. The FAA should develop standards for continuous safety
improvement, and should target its regulatory resources based
on performance against those standards.
The FAA should promote aviation safety and security by
setting high standards, requiring aviation businesses to
monitor and improve their own safety performance, and by
developing objective methods of measuring the ability of
companies to monitor and improve its own safety. Significant
efforts have already been made in this direction. Current
regulations, for example, require commercial air carriers to
implement a Continuing Analysis and Surveillance Program to
evaluate the effectiveness of their maintenance and inspection
processes. Significant investment and effort have been put into
developing the Safety Performance Analysis System, which will
allow safety inspectors to compare the performance of similar
operators to identify trends that could lead to reduced levels
of safety. Such approaches to aviation safety oversight should
be broadened. Operators should be encouraged to implement
systems that ensure their continued compliance with regulations
and that promote continuous improvements in aviation safety and
security.
Last year, the FAA undertook an independent review of its
regulatory and certification programs. That effort, known as
Challenge 2000, recommended in part that the agency move toward
implementing rules that establish performance standards where
possible, and that the rulemaking process be streamlined and
reengineered. Further, the report urged that the regulatory
process be restructured to provide compelling technical and
business incentives for industry to develop and certify
products that help fulfill priority safety needs.
The Commission recognizes the value of the Challenge 2000
report, and urges the FAA and industry to work together to
develop standards for continuous safety and security
improvement that recognize variations in company maturity and
best industry practices. These standards should serve as the
basis for certification, regulation and oversight of the
aviation industry. Objective criteria should be developed that
enable the FAA to assess each organization's safety improvement
processes and performance, and use this assessment to improve
performance throughout the industry. As an incentive to
implement effective safety and security improvement programs,
FAA oversight should be adjusted to recognize the maturity and
actual performance of individual operators and manufacturers.
Such an approach will allow the FAA to target its inspector
resources on those operators demonstrating the greatest risk,
while allowing mature operators and manufacturers to manage
their organizations without unproductive FAA involvement. The
FAA should adjust its internal classifications and rankings of
inspectors to reflect this change.
1.3 The DOT and the FAA should be more vigorous in the
application of high standards for certification of aviation
businesses.
In the past, both the FAA and the DOT have devoted
significant resources to helping new companies meet regulatory
requirements and manage their operations. The recent 90 Day
Safety Review conducted by the DOT and the FAA determined that
this is an inappropriate role for the government and
recommended many actions that will improve the certification
process. The Commission agrees. While the government should
assist companies in improving the safety and security of their
operations, it should not use its resources to compensate for
lack of experience, technical expertise or judgment in a
company's day-to-day operations.
In some cases, the FAA's certification standards and
processes have not kept up with the changing needs of civil
aviation. For example, current standards for hiring security
personnel do not take into account changes in explosives
detection technology. And the certification of engines and
airframes still reflects a time when these systems were
produced as completely independent systems. Today, engine and
airframe development is integrated, so the certification
process must take into account the entire system rather than
its individual parts. In the future, as the airplane becomes an
integral component of the air traffic management system, the
certification of the aircraft, as part of an integrated
aviation system, will become even more important.
The FAA demonstrated its ability to integrate these
processes and work effectively with industry in the
certification of the Boeing 777 airplane. Lessons from the 777
certification should be applied to the way the FAA certificates
airplanes in the future. Additional certification tools and
processes should be developed to encourage the introduction of
new technologies.
Considerable attention has been given to the issue of
outsourcing of maintenance and other work, particularly in the
wake of the Valujet crash. The Commission does not believe that
outsourcing, in and of itself, presents a problem--if it is
performed by qualified companies and individuals. The proper
focus of concern should be on the FAA's certification and
oversight of any and all companies performing aviation safety
functions, including repair stations certificated by the FAA
but located outside of the United States,.
1.4. The Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) should be
simplified and, as appropriate, rewritten as plain English,
performance-based regulations.
The Commission believes that government can achieve better
regulatory compliance if its objectives are stated clearly and
its focus is on goals, not process. While that sounds simple,
the FAA's rules too often do not meet those criteria.
The Commission urges the FAA to take two steps to address
this problem. First, as appropriate, all new rules should be
rewritten as performance-based regulations, and in plain
English. Second, within 18 months, a bottom-up review of
existing regulations should be conducted to identify those in
need of rewriting as performance-based, plain English
regulations. Such clarifications would improve compliance and
help the FAA resolve serious problems created by differences in
interpretation of regulations by FAA officials across the
country.The current FARs and supporting Handbooks, Technical
Standards Orders, Security Directives, and Advisory Circulars
have become too prescriptive and complex and are increasingly
open to misinterpretation. Sometimes they provide conflicting
policy or procedural guidance. They often stifle the creativity
of those who would do more than the rules require. In many
cases, the FARs do not allow for advances in technology that
increase security, safety or efficiency. For example, the FARs
currently have no provisions for design criteria to protect
aircraft from high intensity electromagnetic fields such as
those emanating from TV antennas, radars, cellular phones,
portable stereos, and laptop computers. These electromagnetic
fields are potentially hazardous to aircraft using digital
communications, avionics and flight controls. The FAA has been
working for more than eight years to develop standard
certification requirements to address these hazards, but today
each certification is handled through the use of special
conditions. Mandating performance rather than dictating
procedures will break the regulatory logjam.
1.5. Cost alone should not become dispositive in deciding
aviation safety and security rulemaking issues.
As noted earlier, the rate of fatal accidents in commercial
aviation in the U.S. is less than 0.3 per million departures.
The rarity of accidents can make it difficult to justify safety
and security improvements under benefitcost criteria applied to
regulatory activities. Nevertheless, benefitcost analysis can
enlighten the regulatory decisionmaking process. For example,
such analysis can help identify the most costeffective way to
achieve a safety or security objective. Cost considerations and
mathematical formulas, however, should never be dispositive in
making policy determinations regarding aviation safety they are
one input for decisionmaking. Further, non-quantifiable safety
and security benefits should be included in the analysis of
proposals.
1.6. Government and industry aviation safety research
should emphasize human factors and training.
Over the past ten years, flight crew error accounted for
over 60% of all aviation accidents world-wide. And over the
past five years, two types of flight crew error, loss of
control in flight and controlled flight into terrain, accounted
for over 70% of all airline fatalities. Moreover, recent
airport testing of explosive detection systems revealed
significant deficiencies in the performance of security
personnel. Research, technology, training and sharing of safety
data can reduce human error. Aviation safety and security have
always depended upon a talented and dedicated workforce. Today,
changes in technology are presenting that workforce--flight
crews, ground and air traffic controllers, maintenance
technicians--with new challenges. The aviation system will
continue to rely on these highly skilled people to be
responsible for all aspects of operations, and it is critical
to assess and address issues relating to human interaction with
changing technologies.
The FAA, NASA, the DoD, and the aviation industry jointly
developed a National Aviation Human Factors Plan that describes
a strategic approach to solving the problem of human-caused
mishaps. Two additional studies, one by the FAA dealing with
flight deck human factors and the other published by
representatives from government, industry, and union
organizations as their 1997 Aviation Safety Plan, identify a
wide range of safety issues, including human factors. The
Commission acknowledges the importance of all three of these
reports and urges the immediate development of an
implementation plan.
1.7. Enhanced ground proximity warning systems should be
installed in all commercial and military passenger aircraft.
The introduction of ground proximity warning systems (GPWS)
in commercial aircraft in the late-1970s led to significant
reductions in controlled flight into terrain, the second-
leading cause of aviation accidents. These accidents occur when
pilots cannot reconcile their positions with changing terrain.
Current GPWS systems are not predictive, however, and only warn
pilots when ground impact is imminent. Several recent incidents
indicate the need for a forward-looking system that can provide
better situational awareness and advanced warning to pilots
when they are approaching hazardous terrain. Digital terrain
elevation data developed for military purposes can help provide
this capability.
On January 15, 1997, Vice President Gore announced that the
Department of Defense is releasing a version of its global
digital terrain elevation database for use in the civilian
sector. Combined with advanced navigation systems, this will
provide pilots with the tools that they need to reduce, and
maybe even eliminate, these kinds of accidents in the future.
The Commission applauds the voluntary introduction of
advanced ground proximity warning systems in commercial
aircraft, and urges all segments of the aviation community to
install this vital safety system. To achieve this goal, the
Commission urges the FAA to work with industry to develop and
promote the use of such equipment in general aviation aircraft.
1.8. The FAA should work with the aviation community to
develop and protect the integrity of standard safety databases
that can be shared in accident prevention programs.
The identification of deviations from normal operations,
adverse trends, and other incidents can be a valuable tool in
preventing accidents. The most effective way to identify
incidents and problems in aviation is for the people who
operate in the system (pilots, mechanics, controllers,
dispatchers, etc.) to self-disclose the information. There are
a number of separate safety data collection efforts ongoing
within government and industry. Many of these efforts either
duplicate existing data, report the same information, or are
not interconnected or integrated. The FAA should work with the
aviation community to develop standard databases of safety
information that can be shared openly and encompass operations
within the aviation industry as well as those within the FAA,
such as air traffic control.
People and companies will not provide or assemble safety
data or information if the information will disclose trade
secrets, if it can threaten a person's job or be used in an
enforcement action against a person or company, or if it can in
any way cause them a liability. Data protection is the key to
self-disclosure. The Flight Safety Foundation has studied this
issue and concluded that legislation is the only way to
guarantee protection of safety data. The joint industry/DOT
Aviation Safety Plan cites data protection as a key to
achieving Zero Accidents. The Congress, at the request of the
Administration, recently enacted legislation providing for the
protection from public disclosure of certain safety and
security data voluntarily provided to the FAA. The FAA needs to
expeditiously complete its rulemaking to implement this
legislation. Since adequate legislative protection is key to
building the trust necessary for self disclosure and safety
monitoring, the FAA should assess the adequacy of the new
legislative authority and implementing regulations one year
after the regulations take effect. Any necessary regulatory or
legislative modifications identified at that time should be
promptly addressed.
1.9. In cooperation with airlines and manufacturers, the
FAA's Aging Aircraft program should be expanded to cover non-
structural systems.
The average age of commercial airline fleets is continuing
to increase. In 1975, few large commercial aircraft were in
service beyond their original design life, typically twenty
years. But with increased competition and growth in passenger
and cargo traffic brought on by deregulation, service lives of
dependable aircraft models were extended through expanded
maintenance and overhaul programs. By the year 2000, more than
2,500 commercial aircraft in the United States may be flying
beyond their original design life.
In 1988, a Boeing 737 in Hawaii suffered severe structural
failure of its forward fuselage sections due to corrosion not
visible during normal maintenance inspections. As a direct
result of this accident, the FAA greatly expanded its
structural integrity inspection program and formed the
Airworthiness Assurance Working Group (AAWG). Its focus has
been almost exclusively on structural integrity, and the
effects of structural corrosion and fatigue. The programs in
existence under the AAWG have been effective and are considered
adequate to deal proactively with the structural problems
associated with aging commercial aircraft.
However, much less is known about the potential effects of
age on non-structural components of commercial aircraft. Non-
structural components include electrical wiring; connectors,
wiring harnesses, and cables; fuel, hydraulic and pneumatic
lines; and electro-mechanical systems such as pumps, sensors,
and actuators. Neither the manufacturers nor the commercial
airlines consider the aging of non-structural components to
pose serious safety problems primarily because they consider
their redundancy, replacement upon failure, and periodic,
programmed maintenance to be sufficient to assure aircraft
safety.
The Commission is concerned that existing procedures,
directives, quality assurance, and inspections may not be
sufficient to prevent safety related problems caused by the
corrosive and deteriorating effects of non-structural
components of commercial aircraft as they age. To address this,
the Commission recommends that the FAA work with airlines and
manufacturers to expand the aging aircraft program to include
non-structural components, through steps including: full and
complete tear-downs of selected aircraft scheduled to go out of
service; the establishment of a lead-the-fleet research
program; an expansion of the FAA-DoD-NASA cooperative aging
aircraft program; an expansion of programs of the Airworthiness
Assurance Working Group to include non-structural components;
and encouraging the development of modern technical means to
ensure and predict the continued airworthiness of aging non-
structural components and systems.
1.10. The FAA should develop better quantitative models and
analytic techniques to inform management decision-making.
The FAA is called upon to evaluate many proposals for
safety and security improvements and capacity enhancements as
part of its NAS modernization, and other programs. The FAA does
not have a developed model for the air traffic control system
that permits the systematic evaluation and comparison of these
proposals with respect to their life-cycle cost and their
likely effects on the operation of the air traffic control
system. If available, such analysis would be of great
assistance to support decision-making by the FAA and the DOT
leadership.
The Commission urges the FAA to strengthen its analytic and
planning tools, especially through the development of models
that give insight into the system-wide consequences of
alternative courses of action and the development of a credible
cost accounting system, as mandated in the Federal Aviation
Reauthorization Act of 1996.
1.11. The DOT should work with the Department of Justice to
ensure that airline crew members performing their duties are
protected from passenger misconduct.
Passenger behavior that amounts to criminal conduct is a
matter of growing concern to U.S. airlines. When crew members
are called upon to enforce in-flight safety and security rules
and regulations, they are working to ensure that our aviation
system remains safe and secure. Their responsibilities at times
require them to confront passengers who are unwilling to comply
with lawful instructions and become abusive. Such conduct by
passengers threatens the well-being of all those on the plane,
and is subject to federal prosecution. The Commission urges the
DOT to work with the Department of Justice and the United
States Attorneys to ensure that priority is given the
prosecution of offending passengers to the fullest extent of
the law for interfering with airline crew members in the
performance of their duties.
1.12. Legislation should be enacted to protect aviation
industry employees who report safety or security violations.
In a number of important industries, statutory protection
is provided to ``whistleblowers'' who report violations of
safety procedures. The Commission believes that aviation safety
and security will be enhanced if employees, who are a critical
link in safety and security, are able to report unsafe
conditions to the FAA without fear of retribution from their
employers. Some aviation employees are provided protections
through contractual agreements. However, the Commission
believes that statutory protection, such as that provided to
workers under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, would
provide uniformity within the industry and provide coverage to
those not already protected.
1.13. The FAA should eliminate the exemptions in the
Federal Aviation Regulations that allow passengers under the
age of two to travel without the benefit of FAA-approved
restraints.
Current regulations require that all passengers over the
age of two have their own seats, and that those seats are
equipped with FAA-approved restraints. The Commission believes
that it is inappropriate for infants to be afforded a lesser
degree of protection than older passengers. The FAA should
revise its regulations to require that all occupants be
restrained during takeoff, landing, and turbulent conditions,
and that all infants and small children below the weight of 40
pounds and under the height of 40 inches be restrained in an
appropriate child restraint system, such as child safety seats,
appropriate to their height and weight. The Commission also
notes and commends the FAA's ongoing efforts in collaboration
with major airframe and seat manufacturers to develop standards
for integrated child safety seats.
1.14. The Commission commends the joint government-industry
initiative to equip the cargo holds of all passenger aircraft
with smoke detectors, and urges expeditious implementation of
the rules and other steps necessary to achieve the goal of both
detection and suppression in all cargo holds.
In December 1996, most of the nation's major airlines
announced a voluntary action to install smoke detection systems
in the cargo holds of commercial airplanes and to study
additional measures for fire suppression. This announcement
broke a deadlock that had existed for most of the last decade.
The Commission commends this initiative as an example of the
partnership that will be necessary to enhance safety and
security.
Chapter Two: Making Air Traffic Control Safer and More Efficient
``While the airlines are posting record traffic figures
and profits, the ground-based air traffic control
infrastructure is outdated and unable to keep pace with
expansion.''
--Barry Krasner, President of the National Air
Traffic Controllers Association
It is essential that the air traffic system of the United
States be modernized. Although the current system remains safe,
it is showing signs of aging. System outages, brownouts,
inefficiencies in air traffic control, and capacity limitations
on the ground add costs to the FAA and to users of the airspace
system. The Air Transport Association estimates that
inefficiencies in the system cost airlines in excess of $3
billion in 1995--costs ultimately paid by passengers and anyone
who purchases goods shipped by air.
In 1996, a government-industry task force defined a future
operational concept known as Free Flight. Under this concept,
national airspace system (NAS) operations will transition from
ground-based air traffic control (using analog radios,
navigational beacons and radar) to more collaborative air
traffic management based on digital communication, satellite
navigation, and computer-aided decision support tools for
controllers and pilots. This proposed new system offers
significant benefits for users of the NAS, for the safety and
convenience of the traveling public, and for greater FAA
operational efficiency.
The FAA's proposed technical approach and schedule for NAS
modernization are documented in its recently published National
Airspace System Architecture. The proposed NAS architecture is
generally consistent with industry's vision for the future of
air traffic management, but the proposed schedule for
modernization is too slow to meet projected demands and funding
issues are not adequately addressed. Unless the schedule is
accelerated, the United States may lose its position of global
leadership in civil aviation.
The technology needed to modernize the ATC system by and
large exists, and is available off-the-shelf. The challenge is
completing the transition to the new system in a timely and
cost-effective manner, and ensuring that all users participate
in the upgrade. Unfortunately, the FAA has encountered serious
problems in its modernization program. Before major changes
were made in 1994, the centerpiece of the FAA's modernization
program had, according to the General Accounting Office, fallen
eight years behind schedule, and was $5 billion over budget.
Cost overruns in five other key programs ranged from 50 to more
than 500%, and delays averaged close to four years.
These problems have been traced to inadequate user input,
poor management and contractor performance, and inadequate
oversight. Although availability of funds does not appear to
have been a problem in the past, the capital needs of the
future could well outstrip the ability to fund them through the
traditional budget process, particularly as capital
improvements are accelerated, as recommended by the Commission.
Traditionally, the FAA has seen it necessary to design, own
and operate its air traffic control system, in cooperation with
the Department of Defense. Current off-the-shelf technology
allows the FAA to consider its needs differently, particularly
in areas such as the acquisition of communications systems. In
other critical areas of government, including Defense, the
private sector has proved its ability to provide critical
services with increased quality and lower costs. A number of
major U.S. manufacturers are producing new ATC systems for
deployment in other countries. The FAA should seek
collaborative opportunities with the private sector in order to
accelerate the transition to a new NAS.
There have been several important changes that should allow
the modernization program to move forward more effectively. The
Commission notes, in particular, the following factors which
should help avoid problems of the past: the redefinition of the
modernization program; the personnel and procurement reforms
granted the FAA, which give it unprecedented ability to hold
managers accountable for results and to streamline procurement
processes; and the creation of the new Management Advisory
Committee by the Congress, which will give users a more
effective voice in decision-making. However, the Commission
believes that a new long-term financing mechanism is also
necessary to ensure that modernization occurs on an acceptable
schedule, and that the resulting safety and efficiency benefits
are realized faster.
The FAA must take advantage of personnel, procurement, and
other reforms to ensure that it is spending existing resources
more effectively in order to gain approval of innovative
funding proposals from the Administration and the Congress.
Additionally, the Commission believes that it is critical that
the senior management at the DOT and the FAA take additional
steps to ensure that past problems are being dealt with, and
that an accelerated modernization schedule can proceed.
recommendations
2.1. The FAA should develop a revised NAS modernization
plan within six months that will set a goal of the modernized
system being fully operational nationwide by the year 2005; and
the Congress, the Administration, and users should develop
innovative means of financing this acceleration.
Modernization of our aging airspace system is critical to
the safety of the traveling public, to maintaining our world
leadership in aviation, and to our economic interests. The
FAA's current plan calls for the modernized system to be
operational after 2012. That is simply too long to postpone the
safety and economic benefits that will derive from the
modernized system. Therefore, the Commission recommends that
2005 be set as the date when all elements of the communication,
navigation, and surveillance and air traffic management
capabilities defined in the NAS architecture should be fully
operational. This accelerated implementation must be
coordinated with the Department of Defense, which is a major
user and provider of air traffic control services.
Implementation of the initiative announced by Vice President
Gore on January 15, 1997 to demonstrate these systems in Hawaii
and Alaska is an important step toward full operational status.
Achieving this goal depends on the availability of several
tools, as discussed in the following recommendations. Chief
among these tools is the need to find non-traditional means of
financing the capital improvements. Innovative approaches to
federal financing of major infrastructure projects have been
proposed in the past, including leveraging the revenues coming
into the FAA, multi-year appropriations and non-traditional
budget scoring. Non-federal financing approaches have also been
proposed, such as the creation of private infrastructure banks.
The Commission expects that the National Civil Aviation Review
Commission (NCARC), established in the Federal Aviation
Reauthorization Act of 1996 by Congress to explore funding
options for the FAA, will consider these options. Whatever the
funding mechanism selected, the Commission believes it is
critical to our global leadership in civil aviation to finance
an accelerated modernization of the NAS.
2.2. The FAA should develop plans to ensure that
operational and airport capacity needs are integrated into the
modernization of the NAS.
The FAA's current NAS modernization program focuses on
equipment and infrastructure. However, there is no clear plan
for how the people who operate the system will make the
transition, and what their roles and responsibilities will be
under the new systems. The FAA should develop immediately a NAS
Operational Plan to address these issues.
The FAA should also develop a National Airport System
Modernization Plan that presents a strategic vision, plan and
schedule for modernization of U.S. airports that is consistent
with modernization of the NAS. This plan, produced in
collaboration with local airport officials, should identify
critical system capacity enhancement needs and should address
major safety issues at airports. These plans, when incorporated
into the revised NAS implementation plan called for in
recommendation 2.1, would provide a balanced strategic plan for
aviation in the United States.
2.3. The FAA should explore innovative means to accelerate
the installation of advanced avionics in general aviation
aircraft.
The safety and efficiency benefits of the modernized NAS
will not be realized fully until all users have incorporated
its features. Delays in the installation of the equipment
needed to operate in the future NAS will put off the benefits
for all system users. Therefore, it is essential that the FAA,
as it accelerates its modernization, works with users to ensure
that they keep pace.
Savings from more efficient operations provide significant
incentive for commercial carriers to install the required
digital radios, GPS receivers, and automatic dependent
surveillance equipment. But it is essential to find ways to
ensure general aviation users are equipped for future NAS
operations.
2.4. The U.S. government should ensure the accuracy,
availability and reliability of the GPS system to accelerate
its use in NAS modernization and to encourage its acceptance as
an international standard for aviation.
Satellite-based navigation and positioning is a core
element of our NAS modernization plans, and is critical to
achieving a seamless, efficient global aviation system in the
future. The U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS), which is a
dual civil-military system operated by the U.S. Air Force, is
the current and foreseeable backbone for any global navigation
satellite system. Full acceptance of GPS as an international
standard for aviation is dependent on greater assurance to the
user community--both foreign and domestic--of its accuracy,
availability and reliability. As part of its NAS modernization
plans, the FAA is currently developing a Wide Area Augmentation
System (WAAS) that will enhance the basic GPS civil service to
meet the requirements of civil aviation users. Many other
nations, including Europe and Japan, are planning similar
augmentations, but are still somewhat reluctant to base their
own airspace management on a GPS system which they perceive to
be controlled by the U.S. military.
The recent U.S. GPS policy made considerable progress in
addressing these international concerns by assuring the
continued availability of basic civil GPS services worldwide,
free of direct user fees. This new policy also established a
joint civil-military Executive Board to manage GPS and its
augmentations, and initiated formal international discussions
aimed at developing agreements on the provision and use of GPS
services. But, there are still a number of important technical
and policy issues that must be resolved if GPS is to become the
system of choice for global aviation navigation and
positioning.
First, the U.S. must provide stronger strategic leadership
for civil users of GPS. The acceptance of GPS as an
international standard is key to continued U.S. leadership in
aviation, and can only be achieved through strong civilian
participation in GPS planning and decision-making. A number of
working groups and advisory committees currently exist
throughout the Federal government and the private sector to
coordinate and represent the needs of civil users of GPS. The
Commission recommends that civilian leadership be strengthened
by establishing a Civil GPS Users Advisory Council, with
representatives from both the users and providers of GPS
equipment and services, reporting to the GPS Executive Board.
The Commission also encourages the Administration to work
rapidly on the development of international guidelines on the
provision and use of GPS services called for in the President's
recent GPS policy directive.
Second, greater redundancy is needed to enhance the ability
of users to cross-check GPS accuracy and to verify the system's
reliability. The most effective means of achieving this
redundancy is to provide additional civil GPS precision ranging
signals in space. Studies have shown that additional precision
ranging capability can be achieved at relatively little cost
while providing enormous benefits to all civil GPS users. The
Commission recommends that this capability be added to the
FAA's WAAS system. This action will result in a more robust and
inherently more reliable system and will provide a major boost
to the international acceptance of GPS as a standard for
aviation navigation and positioning.
Third, the GPS Executive Board should resolve the remaining
issues over funding and frequency assignment for a second civil
frequency as quickly as possible so that this needed
improvement can be included in the next generation of GPS
satellites. The GPS Executive Board is considering enhancements
to future GPS satellites that would include an additional
broadcast frequency. This additional frequency would expand the
base of civil GPS users worldwide and would send a strong
message to the international community that the U.S. intends to
maintain a long-term commitment to providing civil GPS
services. Moreover, the FAA's WAAS system requires two
frequencies to meet the accuracy needs of civil aviation users,
and the additional frequency would allow for complete
independence of civil and military GPS services in the future.
Fourth, the GPS system must be protected from both
intentional and unintentional interference. The GPS system will
be a core, safety-critical component of the future global
aviation information system. The security of GPS should be a
major consideration in carrying out Recommendation 3.6 for
protecting all aviation information systems.
2.5. The users of the NAS should fund its development and
operation.
The current system of funding the ATC system provides
little direct connection between the excise taxes paid and
services provided or the amount made available to the FAA
through the budget and appropriations process. Replacing the
traditional system of excise taxes with user fees offers the
potential to correlate revenues and spending more closely. \1\
Importantly, a financing system would not only help ensure
adequate availability of funding , but would also build
incentives for efficiency and safety into the system--both for
the users and for the FAA. The National Civil Aviation Review
Commission is the proper venue for resolving the details of a
new user fee system, and the Commission expects that it will be
formed and begin its work in the very near future. The
Commission urges the NCARC, in designing a new financing
system, to ensure that any changes in the relative amount of
revenues generated from any segment of the aviation industry do
not result in undue economic disruption within any segment of
the industry, and that the fees are not discriminatory or anti-
competitive among carriers. In addition, non-business general
aviation users of the NAS should not be adversely impacted by
any new financing system. This will help ensure that general
aviation users will be full and willing participants in the
modernized NAS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Commissioner Coleman takes no position with respect to the
first two sentences of recommendation 2.5 as he feels this is among the
issues NCARC is to resolve.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.6. The FAA should identify and justify by July 1997 the
frequency spectrum necessary for the transition to a modernized
air traffic control system.
Expansion of telecommunications and other industries is
creating greater competition for frequency spectrum. The FAA
has indicated a need to retain large segments of its current
spectrum allocation, but has provided insufficient
justification for doing so. To ensure that the FAA's spectrum
needs during modernization are not compromised the Commission
recommends that the FAA complete a full justification, as well
as a plan for freeing up spectrum as older systems are
modernized or decommissioned. This process must be completed
not later than July, 1997, and the results included by the DOT
in the Federal Radio Navigation Plan and the RTCA 185 Report:
Aeronautical Spectrum Planning for the Years 1997-2010.
Chapter Three: Improving Security for Travelers
``We know we can't make the world risk-free, but we can
reduce the risks we face and we have to take the fight
to the terrorists. If we have the will, we can find the
means.''
--President Clinton
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and other intelligence sources have been
warning that the threat of terrorism is changing in two
important ways. First, it is no longer just an overseas threat
from foreign terrorists. People and places in the United States
have joined the list of targets, and Americans have joined the
ranks of terrorists. The bombings of the World Trade Center in
New York and the Federal Building in Oklahoma City are clear
examples of the shift, as is the conviction of Ramzi Yousef for
attempting to bomb twelve American airliners out of the sky
over the Pacific Ocean. The second change is that in addition
to well-known, established terrorist groups, it is becoming
more common to find terrorists working alone or in ad-hoc
groups, some of whom are not afraid to die in carrying out
their designs.
Although the threat of terrorism is increasing, the danger
of an individual becoming a victim of a terrorist attack--let
alone an aircraft bombing--will doubtless remain very small.
But terrorism isn't merely a matter of statistics. We fear a
plane crash far more than we fear something like a car
accident. One might survive a car accident, but there's no
chance in a plane at 30,000 feet. This fear is one of the
reasons that terrorists see airplanes as attractive targets.
And, they know that airlines are often seen as national
symbols.
When terrorists attack an American airliner, they are
attacking the United States. They have so little respect for
our values--so little regard for human life or the principles
of justice that are the foundation of American society--that
they would destroy innocent children and devoted mothers and
fathers completely at random. This cannot be tolerated, or
allowed to intimidate free societies. There must be a concerted
national will to fight terrorism. There must be a willingness
to apply sustained economic, political and commercial pressure
on countries sponsoring terrorists. There must be an unwavering
commitment to pursuing terrorists and bringing them to justice.
There must be the resolve to punish those who would violate
sanctions imposed against terrorist states.
Today's aviation security is based in part on the defenses
erected in the 1970s against hijackers and on recommendations
made by the Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism,
which was formed in the wake of the bombing of Pan Am 103 over
Lockerbie, Scotland. Improvements in aviation security have
been complicated because government and industry often found
themselves at odds, unable to resolve disputes over financing,
effectiveness, technology, and potential impacts on operations
and passengers.
Americans should not have to choose between enhanced
security and efficient and affordable air travel. Both goals
are achievable if the federal government, airlines, airports,
aviation employees, local law enforcement agencies, and
passengers work together to achieve them. Accordingly, the
Commission recommends a new partnership that will marshal
resources more effectively, and focus all parties on achieving
the ultimate goal: enhancing the security of air travel for
Americans.
The Commission considered the question of whether or not
the FAA is the appropriate government agency to have the
primary responsibility for regulating aviation security. The
Commission believes that, because of its extensive interactions
with airlines and airports, the FAA is the appropriate agency,
with the following qualifications: first, that the FAA must
improve the way it carries out its mission; and second, that
the roles of intelligence and law enforcement agencies in
supporting the FAA must be more clearly defined and
coordinated. The Commission's recommendations address those
conditions.
The terrorist threat is changing and growing. Therefore, it
is important to improve security not just against familiar
threats, such as explosives in checked baggage, but also to
explore means of assessing and countering emerging threats,
such as the use of biological or chemical agents, or the use of
missiles. While these do not present significant threats at
present, it would be short-sighted not to plan for their
possible use and take prudent steps to counter them.
The Commission believes that aviation security should be a
system of systems, layered, integrated, and working together to
produce the highest possible levels of protection. Each of the
Commission's recommendations should be looked upon as a part of
a whole, and not in isolation. It should be noted that a number
of the Commission's recommendations outlined in the previous
chapter, particularly those relating to certification and
regulation, apply to the FAA's security programs, as well.
recommendations
3.1. The federal government should consider aviation
security as a national security issue, and provide substantial
funding for capital improvements.
The Commission believes that terrorist attacks on civil
aviation are directed at the United States, and that there
should be an ongoing federal commitment to reducing the threats
that they pose. In its initial report, the Commission called
for approximately $160 million in federal funds for capital
costs associated with improving security, and Congress agreed.
As part of its ongoing commitment, the federal government
should devote significant resources, of approximately $100
million annually, to meet capital requirements identified by
airport consortia and the FAA. The Commission recognizes that
more is needed. The Commission expects the National Civil
Aviation Review Commission to consider a variety of options for
additional user fees that could be used to pay for security
measures including, among others, an aviation user security
surcharge, the imposition of local security fees, tax
incentives and other means.
3.2. The FAA should establish federally mandated standards
for security enhancements.
These enhancements should include standards for use of
Explosive Detection System (EDS) machines, training programs
for security personnel, use of automated bag match technology,
development of profiling programs (manual and automated), and
deployment of explosive detection canine teams.
3.3. The Postal Service should advise customers that all
packages weighing over 16 ounces will be subject to examination
for explosives and other threat objects in order to move by
air.
The Postal Service now requires that packages weighing over
16 ounces must be brought to a post office, rather than be
placed in a mailbox. To improve security further, the Postal
Service should mandate that all mail weighing over 16 ounces
contain a written release that allows it to be examined by
explosive detection systems in order to be shipped by air. The
Postal Service should develop and implement procedures to
randomly screen such packages for explosives and other threat
objects. If necessary, the Postal Service should seek
appropriate legislation to accomplish this.
3.4. Current law should be amended to clarify the U.S.
Customs Service's authority to search outbound international
mail.
Currently, the Customs Service searches for explosives and
other threat objects on inbound mail and cargo. This
recommended legislative enhancement parallels the Customs
Service's existing border search authority.
3.5. The FAA should implement a comprehensive plan to
address the threat of explosives and other threat objects in
cargo and work with industry to develop new initiatives in this
area.
The FAA should place greater emphasis on the work of teams,
such as the Aviation Security Advisory Committee and the
Baseline Cargo Working Group, to address cargo issues. The
Commission believes that the FAA should implement the Baseline
Group's recommendation with regard to profiling by ``known''
and ``unknown'' shippers. In addition, unaccompanied express
shipments on commercial passenger aircraft should be subject to
examination by explosives detection systems; the FAA should
work with industry to develop a computer assisted cargo
profiling system that can be integrated into airlines' and
forwarders' reservation and operating systems; requirements
should be implemented requiring that trucks delivering cargo
for loading on planes be sealed and locked; the FAA should
develop and distribute air cargo security training materials;
and enhanced forwarder and shipper employee screening
procedures should be developed.
3.6. The FAA should establish a security system that will
provide a high level of protection for all aviation information
systems.
In addition to improving the physical security of the
traveling public, information systems critical to aircraft, air
traffic control and airports should also be protected. Although
government is responsible for a great number of aviation
related information systems, a partnership must be formed in
order to create integrated protection among these and related
private sector systems. Some protective measures will become
the responsibility of airlines, some that of the airports and
others of the aircraft and air traffic control systems
manufacturers and maintenance providers. The National Security
Agency must play a role in coordinating information security
measures, setting standards and providing oversight of system
security to ensure protection against outside interference,
disruption and corruption. Specific legislation should be
reviewed that makes willful interference with information
systems a federal crime with substantial penalties to provide a
clear deterrent.
3.7. The FAA should work with airlines and airport
consortia to ensure that all passengers are positively
identified and subjected to security procedures before they
board aircraft.
Curb-side check-in, electronic ticketing, advance boarding
passes, and other initiatives are affecting the way passengers
enter the air transportation system. As improved security
procedures are put into place, it is essential that all
passengers be accounted for in that system, properly identified
and subject to the same level of scrutiny. The Commission urges
the FAA to work with airlines and airport consortia to ensure
that necessary changes are made to accomplish that goal.
3.8. Submit a proposed resolution, through the U.S.
Representative, that the International Civil Aviation
Organization begin a program to verify and improve compliance
with international security standards.
Although 185 nations have ratified the International Civil
Aviation Organization convention, and the security standards
contained in it, compliance is not uniform. This creates the
potential for security vulnerabilities on connecting flights
throughout the world. To help raise levels of security
throughout the world, the International Civil Aviation
Organization needs greater authority to determine whether
nations are in compliance. Strong U.S. sponsorship for adding
verification and compliance capabilities to the International
Civil Aviation Organization could lead to enhanced worldwide
aviation security.
3.9. Assess the possible use of chemical and biological
weapons as tools of terrorism.
FAA should work with the Department of Defense and the
Department of Energy on programs to anticipate and plan for
changing threats, such as chemical and biological agents.
3.10. The FAA should work with industry to develop a
national program to increase the professionalism of the
aviation security workforce, including screening personnel.The
Commission believes it's critical to ensure that those charged
with providing security for over 500 million passengers a year
in the United States are the best qualified and trained in the
industry. One proposal that could accomplish this goal is the
creation of a nationwide non-profit security corporation,
funded by the airlines, to handle airport security. This
concept, under consideration by the major airlines, merits
further review.
The Commission recommends that the FAA work with the
private sector and other federal agencies to promote the
professionalism of security personnel through a program that
could include: licensing and performance standards that reflect
best practices; adequate, common and recurrent training that
considers human factors; emphasis on reducing turnover rates;
rewards for performance; opportunities for advancement; a
national rank and grade structure to permit employees to find
opportunities in other areas; regional and national
competitions to identify highly skilled teams; and, an
agreement among users to hire based on performance, not just
cost.
3.11 Access to airport controlled areas must be secured and
the physical security of aircraft must be ensured.
Air carriers and airport authorities, working with FAA,
must develop comprehensive and effective means by which to
secure aircraft and other controlled areas from unauthorized
access and intrusion. Use of radio frequency transponders to
track the location of people and objects in airport controlled
areas, including aircraft, offers significant advantages over
the current security measures commonly used today. Where
adequate airport controlled area and aircraft security are not
assured by other means, this technology should be considered
for use at both international and domestic airports.
The Following Recommendations Were Presented to President Clinton on
September 9, 1996
3.12. Establish consortia at all commercial airports to
implement enhancements to aviation safety and security.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Establish consortia at all commercial airports to implement
enhancements to aviation safety and security. The Commission is
convinced that safety, security, efficiency, and affordability
can go hand in hand if all parties work as partners. The FAA
should direct its officials responsible for oversight of
security procedures at the nation's 450 commercial airports to
convene relevant aviation and law enforcement entities for the
purpose of implementing the Commission's recommendations and
further improving aviation safety and security. At each
airport, these partners will: (1) immediately conduct a
vulnerability assessment; and (2) based on that assessment,
develop an action plan that includes the deployment of new
technology and processes to enhance aviation safety and
security.
The FAA will approve these action plans on an expedited
basis; procure and allocate, based on availability, new
equipment; and test airports to ensure that the plans are being
implemented properly.
Status
Forty-one major airport consortia have submitted action
plans for FAA review.
The Commission's most important recommendation in its
initial report was that local consortia be convened to identify
vulnerabilities and propose action plans. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) called for initial consortia meetings by
September 27, 1996, at 41 major U.S. airports where FAA
personnel are permanently deployed. By December 2, 1996, all
consortia action plans or reports from these airports had been
presented to the FAA for review. The consortia action plans
defined local security threat conditions based on input from
FAA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Consortia also
assessed other areas such as personnel training, passenger
screening, access control measures, and equipment and
technology needs.
Augmenting Recommendation
The FAA should formalize the establishment of consortia at
all Category X through Category III airports by September 30,
1997, and, after consultation with industry, issue guidance on
the future of consortia.
3.13. Conduct airport vulnerability assessments and develop
action plans.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Conduct airport vulnerability assessments and develop
action plans.
Using models already developed by Sandia National
Laboratory, periodic vulnerability assessments of the nation's
commercial airports should be conducted. Based on the results,
action plans tailored to each airport will be developed for
expedited approval by the FAA.
Status
Law enforcement agencies are conducting assessments and
addressing problems.
The FAA Authorization Act of 1996 required the FAA and FBI
to conduct joint threat and vulnerability assessments on
security every three years, or more frequently if necessary, at
each airport determined to be high risk.
In November 1996, officials from the FBI, FAA and
Department of Transportation (DOT) established a working group
to define ``high risk'' airports. Discussions have been held on
the criteria to be used to identify an airport facility as high
risk, methodology to use in conducting joint FAA/FBI
vulnerability assessments, and which airports should be
assessed on a priority basis. The target date for completing
the procedures for conducting vulnerability assessments is
April 30, 1997, and initial assessments are to begin by late
June, 1997.
3.14. Require criminal background checks and FBI
fingerprint checks for all screeners, and all airport and
airline employees with access to secure areas.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Require criminal background checks and FBI fingerprint
checks for all screeners, and all airport and airline employees
with access to secure areas.
Currently, employees, including those with unescorted
access to secure areas of airports, are not subject to such
review. Given the risks associated with the potential
introduction of explosives into these areas, the Commission
recommends that screeners and employees with access to secure
areas be subject to criminal background checks and FBI
fingerprint checks.
Status
The FBI has reduced fingerprint check turnaround time to at
most seven days.
The FBI has expedited the processing of aviation related
fingerprint submissions. The FBI will accelerate its efforts to
make software modifications and purchase additional computer
hardware to adapt its Electronic Fingerprinting Image Print
Server (EFIPS) system to accept civil fingerprint cards.
Augmenting Recommendation
The Commission reiterates that the overall goal is FBI
fingerprint checks of all airport and airline employees with
access to secure areas, no later than mid-1999.
3.15 Deploy existing technology.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Deploy existing technology. The Commission has reviewed
numerous machines designed to detect explosives in cargo,
checked baggage, carry-on bags, and on passengers. There is no
silver bullet. No single machine offers a solution to the
challenges we face. Each machine has its own advantages and its
own limitations. Even machines that work fairly well in the
laboratory need to be tested in actual use at busy airports. We
recognize that the FAA has certified only one technology for
baggage screening, but we believe we must get a variety of
machines, including some in use in other countries, into the
field. There day-to-day operators can figure out which
equipment works best in what situations and combinations, and
what features need to be improved. Finding the strengths and
weakness of existing technology will spur industry's
creativity, leading to the invention of better and better
instruments. Ultimately, the goal should be to deploy equipment
that can be certified by the FAA to detect explosives likely to
be used by terrorists.
The Commission recommends the government purchase
significant numbers of computed tomography detection systems,
upgraded x-rays, and other innovative systems. By deploying
equipment widely, passengers throughout the aviation system
will receive the benefits of the enhancements. The Commission
strongly believes it would be improper to discuss the details
of such deployment, as to do so would serve only to compromise
the integrity of an enhanced security system.
The Commission recommends that this initial equipment
purchase be paid for with appropriated funds. This
recommendation does not settle the issue of how security costs
will be financed in the long run. That will be dealt with in
our final report.
Status
Congress funded the purchase of commercially available
advanced security screening equipment.
The FAA has ordered 54 advanced explosives detection
systems.
In November and December 1996, FAA awarded six fixed priced
contracts to various manufacturers of explosives trace
detection technologies.
Augmenting Recommendation
The Commission recognizes that deployed technology for
examining carry-on baggage may be outdated. New developments
such as computerized systems with high resolution digital
displays, innovative use of color to highlight threat objects,
and ability to accommodate technologies such as threat image
projection to maintain screener performance, can provide
enhanced security. The FAA should review available technology
for screening carry on items, regularly update minimum
standards for new installations, and develop programs for
upgrading deployed technology.
Cross Reference to Related Recommendations
This recommendation is related to recommendation 3.2.
3.16. Establish a joint government-industry research and
development program.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Establish a joint government-industry research and
development program. The Commission recommends the
establishment of a new joint government-industry partnership
whose mission will be to accelerate research and development to
enhance the security of air travel.
This could be modeled on the Partnership For A New
Generation Vehicle (PNGV), in which the federal government and
auto makers are combining resources to develop automobiles with
significantly enhanced fuel economy, safety, and reduced
emissions. We propose to increase federal funding and to ask
the private sector to contribute.
Status
The FAA is working with industry to develop agreements and
award research grants.
Congress increased the federal funding of R&D as required.
The FAA is moving in the direction of interacting more
closely with industry, having set up advisory mechanisms such
as the Aviation Security Advisory Committee; participating in
individual Cooperative Research and Development Agreements with
individual firms; giving grants to airlines and airports to
conduct demonstrations and otherwise involve themselves in
security technology development; entering into cost-sharing
arrangements with firms to develop security technology.
Augmenting Recommendation
The FAA received additional funding and has aggressively
accelerated systems to (1) improve screener performance, (2)
reduce aircraft vulnerability, (3) screen cargo, and (4) to
develop options for dealing with threats other than explosives.
The FAA is encouraged to use the best technology available to
solve security and safety challenges throughout the air
transportation system.
3.17. Establish an interagency task force to assess the
potential use of surface-to-air missiles against commercial
aircraft.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Assess the viability of anti-missile defense systems..
Whether or not the explosion of TWA 800 turns out to have been
due to a surface-to-air missile attack, as some eye-witness
accounts suggest, missile attacks have downed passenger planes
in other countries, and it is a risk that should be evaluated.
The Commission will continue to analyze this problem in
cooperation with the Department of Defense and other government
agencies.
Status
DoD will convene an interagency task force to examine the
threat to civil aircraft.
Initial analyses of both the missile threat and electronic
systems available to counter it support a decision to take
positive steps. Experts from the Department of Defense (DoD),
the intelligence community, defense contractors and research
scientists contributed to analysis of the viability of anti-
missile defense systems for civil aviation.
Augmenting Recommendation
Within ninety days, the Department of Defense should
convene an interagency task force including the DOT, the FAA
and the intelligence community to address the potential threat
from surface-to-air missiles against commercial aviation.
Working with airport consortia, this task force should develop
plans to provide increased surveillance, and, if necessary, the
deployment of countermeasures. The task force should make
recommendations to the DOT regarding the testing, evaluation
and preparation for deployment of measures to protect civil
aircraft against an increased threat from surface-to-air
missiles.
Appropriate steps should be taken by the intelligence
community and through international diplomacy to reduce the
possibility that terrorists could obtain or use surface-to-air
missiles. The State Department should study the expansion of
conventional arms agreements to include man-portable surface-
to-air missiles, and the U.S. Representative to the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) should propose
a new convention addressing these weapons.
3.18. Significantly expand the use of bomb-sniffing dogs.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Significantly expand the use of bomb-sniffing dogs. Canines
are used to detect explosives in many important areas, but only
sparingly in airport security. The Commission is convinced that
an increase in the number of well-trained dogs and handlers can
make a significant and rapid improvement in security, and
recommends the deployment of 114 additional teams.
Status
The FAA received funding for 114 new dog teams and training
has begun.
Augmenting Recommendation
Additionally, the Commission recommends that ATF continue
to work to develop government-wide standards for canine teams.
3.19. Complement technology with automated passenger
profiling.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Complement technology with automated passenger profiling.
Profiling can leverage an investment in technology and trained
people. Based on information that is already in computer
databases, passengers could be separated into a very large
majority who present little or no risk, and a small minority
who merit additional attention.
Such systems are employed successfully by other agencies,
including the Customs Service. By utilizing this process
Customs is better able to focus its resources and attention. As
a result, many legitimate travelers never see a customs agent
anymore--and drug busts are way up.
The FAA and Northwest Airlines are developing an automated
profiling system tailored to aviation security, and the
Commission supports the continued development and
implementation of such a system.
To improve and promote passenger profiling, the Commission
recommends three steps. First, FBI, CIA, and BATF should
evaluate and expand the research into known terrorists,
hijackers, and bombers needed to develop the best possible
profiling system. They should keep in mind that such a profile
would be most useful to the airlines if it could be matched
against automated passenger information which the airlines
maintain.
Second, the FBI and CIA should develop a system that would
allow important intelligence information on known or suspected
terrorists to be used in passenger profiling without
compromising the integrity of the intelligence or its sources.
Similar systems have been developed to give environmental
scientists access to sensitive data collected by satellites.
Third, the Commission will establish an advisory board on
civil liberties questions that arise from the development and
use of profiling systems.
Status
Profiling systems are being developed.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Northwest
Airlines are completing final programming changes to an
automated profiling system. A tentative completion date for
programming changes and implementation of Computer Assisted
Passenger Screening (CAPS) on Northwest flights is April, 1997.
Additional programming will begin for use of CAPS on other
airline reservations systems, with a tentative completion date
of August, 1997.
On January 17, 1997, a Civil Liberties Advisory Board met
with Commissioners to discuss civil liberties concerns
pertaining to profiling. The Board submitted recommendations to
the Commission. (Appendix A)
Augmenting Recommendation
The Commission believes that profiling is one part of a
comprehensive, layered security program. As with other
measures, it becomes less necessary with the introduction of
efficient screening technology. Based on readily-available
information, passengers could be separated into a very large
majority about whom we know enough to conclude that they
present little or no risk, and a small minority about whom we
do not know enough and who merit additional attention. The
Customs Service uses this approach successfully to better focus
its resources and attention. As a result, many legitimate
travelers never see a customs agent anymore--and drug busts are
way up.
The Commission supports the development and implementation
of manual and automated profiling systems, such as the one
under development by the FAA and Northwest Airlines. The
Commission strongly believes the civil liberties that are so
fundamentally American should not, and need not, be compromised
by a profiling system. Consistent with this viewpoint, the
Commission sought the counsel of leading experts in the civil
liberties field. Those experts provided a series of
recommendations found in Appendix A. The Commission recommends
the following safeguards:
1. No profile should contain or be based on material of a
constitutionally suspect nature--e.g., race, religion,
national origin of U.S. citizens. The Commission
recommends that the elements of a profiling system be
developed in consultation with the Department of
Justice and other appropriate experts to ensure that
selection is not impermissibly based on national
origin, racial, ethnic, religious or gender
characteristics.
2. Factors to be considered for elements of the profile
should be based on measurable, verifiable data
indicating that the factors chosen are reasonable
predictors of risk, not stereotypes or generalizations.
A relationship must be demonstrated between the factors
chosen and the risk of illegal activity.
3. Passengers should be informed of airlines security
procedures and of their right to avoid any search of
their person or luggage by electing not to board the
aircraft.
4. Searches arising from the use of an automated profiling
system should be no more intrusive than search
procedures that could be applied to all passengers.
Procedures for searching the person or luggage of, or
for questioning, a person who is selected by the
automated profiling system should be premised on
insuring respectful, non-stigmatizing, and efficient
treatment of all passengers.
5. Neither the airlines nor the government should maintain
permanent databases on selectees. Reasonable
restrictions on the maintenance of records and strict
limitations on the dissemination of records should be
developed.
6. Periodic independent reviews of profiling procedures
should be made. The Commission considered whether an
independent panel be appointed to monitor
implementation and recommends at a minimum that the
DOJ, in consultation with the DOT and FAA, periodically
review the profiling standards and create an outside
panel should that, in their judgment, be necessary.
7. The Commission reiterates that profiling should last only
until Explosive Detection Systems are reliable and
fully deployed.
8. The Commission urges that these elements be embodied in
FAA standards that must be strictly observed.
3.20. Certify screening companies and improve screener
performance.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Certify screening companies and improve screener
performance. Better selection, training, and testing of the
people who work at airport x-ray machines would result in a
significant boost in security. The Commission recommends
development of uniform performance standards for the selection,
training, certification, and recertification of screening
companies and their employees. The Commission further
recommends that in developing these standards, the FAA give
serious consideration to implementing the National Research
Council recommendations. The Commission also recommends the
purchase and deployment of SPEARS, a computerized training and
testing system.
Status
The FAA has begun rulemaking procedures to require new
certifications.
The Federal Aviation Administration is developing an
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) which will
establish the requirement for screening companies to be
certified in order to provide screening services to air
carriers. The rule will include requirements to improve the
training and testing of security screeners through development
of uniform performance standards for providing security
screening services. Congress gave FAA authority to certify
screening companies, but did not provide FAA authority to
certify individual screeners. This Commission urges Congress to
provide that additional authority.
Augmenting Recommendation
The Commission also recommends that the purchase and
deployment of SPEARS, a computerized training and testing
system, be completed at all major airports by the end of 1997.
3.21. Aggressively test existing security systems.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Aggressively test existing security systems. ``Red team''
(adversary) type testing should also be increased by the FAA,
and incorporated as a regular part of airport security action
plans. Frequent, sophisticated attempts by these red teams to
find ways to dodge security measures are an important part of
finding weaknesses in the system and anticipating what
sophisticated adversaries of our nation might attempt. An
aggressive red team strategy will require significant increases
in the number of FAA personnel currently assigned to these
tasks.
Status
The FAA is hiring 300 new special agents to test airport
security.
3.22. Use the Customs Service to enhance security.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Use the Customs Service to enhance security. The Customs
Service has many responsibilities that are parallel to the
FAA's in dealing with airlines and contraband. As a law
enforcement agency, Customs has authorities and tools not
available to the FAA. Further, it has developed successful
partnership programs with the airlines. By using the Customs
Service to complement the FAA, FBI, and other agencies, the
Commission believes that aviation security would be
significantly enhanced.
The Customs Service has thousands of agents currently
stationed at US international airports. Customs has statutory
authority to search people and cargo to stop contraband from
coming in or going out of the country. Customs has arrangements
with most airlines to receive automated passenger and cargo
manifests. These arrangements could be adapted for use in
security procedures. Customs, as a law enforcement agency, has
access to automated law enforcement databases that could be an
invaluable tool in fighting not just drugs but terrorism. The
Commission recommends that Customs upgrade and adapt its
computer systems to take on this additional responsibility.
Status
The Customs Service is deploying 140 inspectors and
investigators to critical airports.
The U.S. Customs Service is in the process of deploying 140
inspectors, intelligence analysts, and criminal investigators
(special agents) to critical airports, for aviation security;
anti-terrorism efforts, and to perform increased searches of
passengers, baggage, and cargo departing the United States.
Customs is purchasing and deploying additional x-ray vans, tool
trucks and radiation detector pagers at critical airports to
assist in these searches.
The Customs Service and the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) are working with an FAA contractor to study the technical
issues associated with converting Customs' Automated Targeting
System (ATS), which is designed for sea cargo analysis, to air
cargo analysis. Although ATS is designed for contraband
analysis and detection in the sea cargo environment, the plan
would be to add anti-terrorism criteria to the system and
convert it to an air cargo environment. The study should be
completed in the Spring of 1997.
3.23. Give properly cleared airline and airport security
personnel access to the classified information they need to
know.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Give properly cleared airline and airport security
personnel access to the classified information they need to
know. The red tape of classification is getting in the way of
security. There are two problems that must be solved. The first
involves intelligence information about specific terrorist
threats. The CIA or FBI pass the threat information to the FAA,
which in turn alerts the airlines. But the information gets
progressively ``sanitized'' to avoid jeopardizing the source.
Often, airlines are just told what to do but not why they are
to do it. If airlines were provided more information about the
threat, they could help design more effective responses.
Corporate personnel are often cleared to know the most
secret information when national security is at stake. Defense
contractors with access to highly classified intelligence
information are far from rare. For that matter, airline
personnel were cleared to know highly classified information
during Operation Desert Storm, when commercial aircraft
transported 80% of our troops to Saudi Arabia.
The other classified information problem involves the
airport vulnerability assessments in recommendation number 2.
These assessments become classified information if they
conclude that a high degree of vulnerability exists. Some
people responsible for security at the airports are not cleared
to receive classified information.
The Commission recommends that the FAA arrange for
appropriate airline and airport security personnel to be
cleared to address this problem.
Status
The FAA is arranging for adequate clearance levels at
airports and airlines.
The FAA has agreed to collaborate more closely with
airlines and airports in developing responses to threat
information, and has agreed to disseminate vulnerability
assessments to properly cleared officials.
3.24. Begin implementation of full bag-passenger match.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Begin implementation of full bag-passenger match. Matching
bags to passengers ensures that the baggage of anyone who does
not board the plane is removed. Full bag match ensures that no
unaccompanied bag remains on board a flight.
Manual and automated systems to conduct full bag match have
been employed in international aviation for several years, but
need additional work to ensure they can be phased into domestic
airline operations. The Commission recommends implementing full
bag match at selected airports, including at least one hub,
within sixty days to determine the best means of implementing
the process system-wide.
Status
The Commission remains committed to baggage match as a
component of a comprehensive, layered security program aimed at
keeping bombs and explosive devices off airlines. New
technologies are available which facilitate positive and
automated identification of the bag as it is tracked through
the system. Automatic bag tracking systems can also facilitate
the removal of bags from aircraft if required by security
concerns. The Commission feels that these technologies can be
combined with the development of a passenger manifest to
implement a passenger-bag matching system as one component of a
layered approach to aviation security.
The Commission urges the industry and the FAA to work
together to hasten the development of sophisticated technology
for determining the presence of explosives in checked baggage.
Until such machines are widely available, the Commission
believes that bag match, initially based on profiling, should
be implemented no later than December 31, 1997. The
Commission's recommendation is consistent with that of the
Baseline Working Group's recommendation in this contentious and
difficult area.
By that date, the bags of those selected either at random
or through the use of automated profiling must either be
screened or matched to a boarded passenger. No unaccompanied
bag should be transported on a passenger aircraft unless (1) it
has been screened by a screening method that meets the FAA
standard, or (2) it belongs to a passenger who at the time of
check in was neither randomly selected for security review nor
selected by the profile for further review. This approach is
the most effective methodology available now. It would allow
the aviation industry to remove the unaccompanied bag or bags
which represent the greatest threat.
3.25. Provide more compassionate and effective assistance
to families of victims.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Providing more compassionate and effective assistance to
families of victims. The tragedy of losing a loved one in an
aviation disaster can be unnecessarily and cruelly compounded
by disjointed or incomplete information in the aftermath of the
incident. At the Commission's urging, the President is
directing the National Transportation Safety Board to take the
lead in coordinating provision of services to families of
victims. The NTSB will work with the Departments of State,
Defense, Transportation, Health and Human Services, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, and private organizations like the
Red Cross.
Status
The NTSB was given responsibility to coordinate response.
On October 9, 1996, Congress passed the Aviation Family
Disaster Act of 1996 giving the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) the responsibility for aiding families of aircraft
accident victims and coordinating the federal response to major
domestic aviation accidents.
Since the signing of the law, NTSB has completed the
initial phase of coordinating the federal response to a major
domestic aviation accident. The NTSB is in the process of
finalizing existing interim Memoranda of Understanding with the
Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of
Health and Human Services, Department of Justice, Department of
Transportation, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the
American Red Cross (ARC). The NTSB has been vigorously
assisting the airline industry to develop a model plan to
address the needs of aviation disaster victims and their
families. Letters from Chairman Jim Hall and DOT Secretary
Federico Pena went out in November, 1996, to airlines informing
them of their responsibility for producing an emergency
response plan as specified in section 703 of the Aviation
Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996.
An interim federal response has been developed by the NTSB
that assigns responsibilities to the airlines and participating
federal agencies. The ARC will be responsible for family care
and mental health; the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) will be responsible for identification and preparation of
human remains (with support by the Department of Defense, as
needed); and the Department of State will assist the airlines
and NTSB when foreign passengers are involved in an aviation
accident. The Federal Emergency Management Agency will provide
the NTSB with communications equipment and additional public
affairs personnel. If the aviation disaster is officially
determined to be a criminal act, the Department of Justice will
provide information to families on entitlements and benefits
under the Victims of Crime Act. Many elements of the interim
NTSB plan were successfully implemented and tested following
the United Express Flight 5925/5926 accident in Quincy,
Illinois on November 19, 1996.
The Department of Transportation and the NTSB have formed a
task force to provide recommendations on the issues elaborated
in section 704 of the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act
of 1996. The task force includes officials from the NTSB,
Federal Emergency Management Agency, American Red Cross,
airlines, family groups, and organizations considered
appropriate by the Secretary of Transportation. Airlines are
required by the Act to submit their plans to the Secretary of
Transportation and to the Chairman of the NTSB by April 9,
1996.
Cross Reference to Related Recommendations
This recommendation is related to recommendations 4.2 and
4.3.
3.26. Improve passenger manifests.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Improve passenger manifests. The Commission believes that
Section 203 of the 1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act,
which requires airlines to keep a comprehensive passenger
manifest for international flights, should be implemented as
quickly as possible. While Section 203 does not apply to
domestic flights, the Commission urges the Department of
Transportation to explore immediately the costs and effects of
a similar requirement on the domestic aviation system.
Status
The DOT is proceeding with rulemaking to require
international and domestic manifests.
The DOT has developed a draft rule covering domestic flight
manifesting, and an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(ANPRM), should be issued in early 1997. The DOT anticipates an
extensive comment period for the ANPRM, because no data exist
related to domestic flights. The final rule for domestic
manifesting is likely to be published in 1998.
3.27. Significantly increase the number of FBI agents
assigned to counterterrorism investigations, to improve
intelligence, and to crisis response.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Significantly increase the number of FBI agents assigned to
counter-terrorism investigations, to improve intelligence, and
to crisis response. The Commission recognizes the vital role
that the FBI plays in fighting terrorism against Americans, and
recommends that the agency's ability to assess vulnerabilities,
gather and analyze intelligence, and conduct forensic
investigations be augmented.
3.28 Provide anti-terrorism assistance in the form of
airport security training to countries where there are airports
served by airlines flying to the US.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Provide anti-terrorism assistance in the form of airport
security training to countries where there are airports served
by airlines flying to the US. The Commission believes that it
is important to raise the level of security at all airports
serving Americans. Assisting foreign countries through training
in explosive detection, post-blast investigation, VIP
protection, hostage negotiation, and incident management is an
important means of achieving this goal.
Status
The State Department and the FAA are sponsoring domestic
and foreign courses.
The Department of State and the FAA continue to jointly
sponsor Anti-Terrorism Assistance Training Programs. In FY
1997, six domestic law enforcement classes and six
international/foreign classes will be held.
3.29. Resolve outstanding issues relating to explosive
taggants and require their use.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Resolve outstanding issues relating to explosive taggants
and require their use. The use of taggants can be a critical
aid when investigating explosions on aircraft and in bringing
terrorists to justice. The Commission recommends that remaining
issues relating to the use of these taggants, including the
analysis of black and smokeless powder, be resolved as quickly
as possible, and that requirements for the use of taggants then
be put into place.
Status
Studies by the ATF have been initiated, with results
expected in April, 1997.
ATF has contracted with the National Academy of Sciences/
National Research Council to conduct an independent study. The
International Fertilizer Development Center is under contract
with ATF to conduct a study on the economic and agronomic
effects of tagging ammonium nitrate fertilizer. A report is due
to Congress on the study findings late in April, 1997.
3.30. Provide regular, comprehensive explosives detection
training programs for foreign, federal, state, and local law
enforcement, as well as FAA and airline personnel.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Provide regular, comprehensive explosives detection
training programs for foreign, federal, state, and local law
enforcement, as well as FAA and airline personnel. The
Commission believes that law enforcement agencies with
expertise in explosives detection can provide valuable training
to those involved in aviation security.
Status
The ATF and FAA are preparing a training course for airport
law enforcement agencies.
The ATF is developing a curriculum on Improvised Explosive
Devices. The pilot program is planned for Spring, 1997. In
addition to ongoing explosives training for ATF personnel,
three states and local Advanced Explosives Investigative
Techniques classes are scheduled at the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. Finally, post blast and
improvised explosive device recognition training will be
conducted by 198 ATF certified explosive specialists for State
and Local law enforcement personnel throughout the United
States.
3.31. Create a central clearinghouse within government to
provide information on explosives crime.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Create a central clearinghouse within government to provide
information on explosives crime. The Commission recommends that
a central clearinghouse be established to compile and
distribute important information relating to previously
encountered explosive devices, both foreign and domestic.
Status
The Secretary of the Treasury has established a national
repository at the ATF.
The Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to establish a
national repository of information on incidents involving arson
and the suspected criminal misuse of explosives. All Federal
agencies having information concerning such incidents report
the information to the Secretary. The ATF National Repository
committee, has established a target date of October 1, 1997,
for the implementation of the pilot project, with full
implementation by the end of FY 1998. The system will be
designed and constructed in incremental stages providing
varying levels of service as early as April, 1997.
Chapter Four: Responding to Aviation Disasters
``I am testifying today to give a sense of purpose to
the death of my daughter and the others who lost their
lives on TWA flight 800. I believe that by identifying
areas in need of improvement, we can successfully
generate a change in policy and action for the future.
We will create a living memorial to their death.''
--Aurlie Becker.
The Commission's recommendations included setting a goal of
reducing the rate of fatal accidents by a factor of five over
the next ten years, and outlined a course of action that would
help achieve that goal. Additionally, the Commission has
recommended specific steps to reduce the threat of terrorism
against commercial aircraft. However, it must be recognized
that, in spite of the strongest efforts of all involved,
disasters may still occur. While government and industry must
do everything possible to prevent them, they must also be
prepared to respond quickly and compassionately when one does
take place. The tragedy of losing a loved one in a plane crash
can be cruelly and needlessly compounded by an uncoordinated,
ineffective, or uninformed response to family members.
The infrequency of commercial aviation accidents has
complicated the response to such disasters. For example, when
TWA Flight 800 crashed on July 17, 1996, it had been over
twenty years since that airline's last fatal accident. Most
crashes simply overwhelm state and local response teams, and
take a tremendous toll on airline employees, who must
immediately begin addressing the concerns of family members at
the same time that they are coping with the loss of their own
colleagues.
Responding to the frustrations and complaints of family
members over the treatment they received after accidents,
President Clinton signed an executive memorandum giving the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) the responsibility
for coordinating federal services to families after aviation
disasters. Congress subsequently passed legislation further
expanding and clarifying the NTSB's new responsibilities.
Since its creation in 1967, the NTSB is the one entity that
has been on the site of every transportation disaster. The
Commission applauds the designation of the NTSB as the
coordinating agency after aviation disasters, and commends the
agency for its diligence in carrying out its new
responsibilities.
recommendations
4.1. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) should
finalize by April, 1997, its coordinated federal response plan
to aviation disasters, and Congress should provide the NTSB
with increased funding to address its new responsibilities.
The NTSB has developed an interim plan for a coordinated
federal response to aviation disasters, which should be
finalized as quickly as possible. That interim plan was put to
the test in two recent disasters involving commuter aircraft,
and resulted in clear improvements in service. The Commission
commends the work of the NTSB and believes that only through a
coordinated effort, and establishment of a standard protocol,
can effective support be provided to local governments and
airlines to meet the needs of family members. The Commission
recommends that Congress provide such additional funds
necessary to allow the NTSB to carry out the new
responsibilities described in the Aviation Disaster Family
Assistance Act of 1996.
4.2. The Department of Transportation should coordinate the
development of plans for responding to aviation disasters
involving civilians on government aircraft.
The families of civilians killed while traveling on
government aircraft face the same traumas and challenges as
those whose loved ones were killed on commercial flights.
However, the response to such disasters is covered under
different laws and procedures. Those differences, and a clear
statement regarding their rights and benefits in the event of
an aviation disaster, should be provided to passengers on
government aircraft prior to boarding. The Commission believes
that it is essential that those families receive assistance
comparable to that provided after commercial disasters through
the enhanced role of the NTSB. The Commission urges the DOT to
work with the NTSB, DoD, other agencies, and family members to
develop plans to accomplish that goal by September 1997 and to
evaluate the need to revise existing laws and regulations
governing the rights and benefits of civilians on government
aircraft.
4.3. The Department of Transportation and the NTSB should
implement key provisions of the Aviation Disaster Family
Assistance Act of 1996 by March 31, 1997.
This Act authorized the formation of a task force to study
the need for modifications to laws or regulations that would
result in improvements to the treatment of family members of
victims of aviation disasters. This task force will consider,
among other things, issues relating to treatment of families by
the media and legal community. Additionally, the Commission
urges the task force to consider the development of uniform
guidelines for notification, autopsies and DNA testing and
other issues raised by family members, including rights and
treatment of foreign citizens and non-traditional families,
securing crash sites, availability of cockpit voice recorder
transcripts, and the composition of accident investigation
teams. The Commission expects that establishment of the task
force will be one of the first priorities for the new Secretary
of Transportation, and that it will be accomplished without
delay.
In November 1996, the Chairman of the NTSB and the
Secretary of Transportation (DOT) sent a joint letter to
airlines to underscore the importance of this Act and to advise
on the responsibilities of airlines to formulate disaster
response plans. Those plans are due to the DOT and the NTSB by
early April 1997.
In addition, the NTSB should work with the State Department
through Memoranda of Understanding or other mechanisms to
provide direct services to the families of U.S. citizens who
are victims of disasters on U.S. carriers abroad.
4.4. The United States Government should ensure that family
members of victims of international aviation disasters receive
just compensation and equitable treatment through the
application of federal laws and international treaties.
Certain statutes and international treaties, established
over 50 years ago, historically have not provided equitable
treatment for families of passengers involved in international
aviation disasters. Specifically, the Death on the High Seas
Act of 1920 (Act) and the Warsaw Convention of 1929
(Convention), although designed to aid families of victims of
maritime and aviation disasters, have inhibited the ability of
family members of international aviation disasters from
obtaining fair compensation. A recent agreement by U.S.
airlines waived the liability of the Warsaw Convention.
However, the Death on the High Seas Act still limits recoveries
available after certain aviation disasters.
Congress passed the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of
1996 as a first step to remedy this situation. The Commission
urges the Administration and the Congress to take additional
steps necessary to ensure fairer and more equitable treatment
of families of victims of international aviation disasters,
including the establishment of an advisory board, pursuant to
section 211 of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990,
to develop a plan for equitable compensation of victims of
aviation disasters.
4.5 Provisions should be made to ensure the availability of
funding for extraordinary costs associated with accident
response.
The NTSB and other federal, state, and local government
agencies can incur significant costs in the course of an
accident response. Those costs cannot be anticipated nor
budgeted for in advance, and their recovery has been made on an
ad hoc basis, further complicating an already difficult
situation. The Commission urges the Administration and Congress
to address this issue, through the consideration of measures
such as requirements for increased insurance coverage for
companies involved in air transportation.
4.6. Federal agencies should establish peer support
programs to assist rescue, investigative, law enforcement,
counseling and other personnel involved in aviation disaster
response.
The men and women who respond on the scene of aviation
disasters can suffer from considerable trauma and emotional
impact. Specially trained peer support counselors, who are
themselves investigators who have had similar experiences,
should be dispatched to the scene of a disaster to help those
involved in the response effort. The Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), because of its frequent
investigations of arson and bombings, has developed such a
program for its agents. The NTSB, the FAA, and other agencies
should work with the ATF to develop programs for their
personnel within existing budgets.
conclusions
The Commission believes that each of its recommendations is
achievable. But, the Commission has no authority to implement
its recommendations. That responsibility lies with government
and industry. Many of the proposals will require additional
funding. Some of them will require legislation. Each of them
requires sustained attention. We now urge the President to make
these recommendations his own. We urge Congress to provide the
necessary legislation and funding. We urge the incoming
leadership of the DOT and the FAA to make fulfillment of these
recommendations a cornerstone of their work. We urge the
commercial aviation industry to take up the technical and
organizational challenges. We urge the thousands of private
pilots across the nation to convert their enthusiasm for flying
into a commitment make the changes necessary to enhance safety
for everyone flying. And, we urge the American people to demand
that this country take the steps now to do what is needed.
By virtually any measure, the aviation system in the United
States is the best in the world. But, every system can be
improved; made safer, more secure, and more efficient. Every
crash is a stark reminder of that reality.
The world is changing, and so, too, must our aviation
policies and practices. They should challenge everyone involved
in aviation to improve. They should serve as the model for the
rest of the world, and lead to improvements that will make
passengers safer, regardless of where they board their flight.
There are few areas in which the public so uniformly
believes that government should play a strong role as in
aviation safety and security. Aviation is an area over which
the average person can exert little control; therefore, it
becomes government's responsibility to work with industry to
make sure that Americans enjoy the highest levels of safety and
security when flying. Problems in these areas contribute to an
erosion of public faith in aviation, and in government itself.
The Commission has laid out an aggressive agenda to help
address those concerns, and believes that the implementation of
this course of action must be the top priority for all those
involved in aviation.
The Commission expresses its appreciation to: President
Clinton, for his heartfelt interest and his strong support for
this work; to the 104th Congress, for its decisive action in
response to the initial report; to the men and women in
numerous government agencies, for their work in identifying
issues and in implementing recommendations; and to the
representatives of airlines, airports, labor, and general
aviation who provided invaluable input.
Finally, and especially, the Commission thanks the families
of those who have lost loved ones in crashes, for their
commitment and their insights, and for ensuring that the
Commission always kept its focus on the ultimate goals.
* * * * * * *
Appendix D: Executive Order 13015 of August 22, 1996
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
By the authority vested in me as President by the
constitution and the laws of the United States, including
section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby
ordered as follows:
Section 1. Establishment. There is established the White
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (the
``Commission''). The Commission shall be of not more than 25
members, to be appointed by the President from the public and
private sectors, each of whom shall have experience or
expertise in some aspect of safety or security. The Vice
President shall serve as Chair of the Commission.
Section 2. Functions.
(a) The Commission shall advise the President on
matters involving aviation safety and security,
including air traffic control.
(b) The Commission shall develop and recommend to the
President a strategy designed to improve aviation
safety and security, both domestically and
internationally.
(c) The Chair may, from time to time, invite experts
to submit information to the Commission; hold hearings
on relevant issues; and form committees and teams to
assist the Commission in accomplishing its objectives
and duties, which may include individuals other than
members of the Commission.
Sec. 3. Administration.
(a) The heads of executive departments and agencies
shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide the
Commission such information with respect to aviation
safety and security as the Commission requires to
fulfill its functions.
(b) The Commission shall be supported, both
administratively and financially, by the Department of
Transportation and such other sources (including other
Federal agencies) as may lawfully contribute to
Commission activities.
Sec. 4. General.
(a) I have determined that the Commission shall be
established in compliance with the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, as amended (5.U.S.C. App.2).
Notwithstanding any other Executive Order, the
functions of the President under the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, as amended, shall be performed by the
Secretary of Transportation in accordance with the
guidelines and procedures established by the
Administrator of General Services, except that of
reporting to the Congress.
(b) The Commission shall exist for a period of 6
months from the date of this order, unless extended by
the President.
William Jefferson Clinton
The White House, August 22, 1996
(FR Doc. 96-21996)
* * * * * * *
Appendix I: Commissioner Cummock Dissent Letter
February 19, 1997
Vice President Albert Gore, Chairman
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
18th and F Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20405
Re: Dissent with the Final Report of the White House Commission
on Aviation Safety and Security
Dear Mr. Vice President:
It is after much thoughtful consideration and with a very
heavy heart that I register my dissent with the final report of
the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.
Sadly, the overall emphasis of the recommendations reflects a
clear commitment to the enhancement of aviation at the expense
of the Commission's mandate of enhancing aviation safety and
security. Clearly, as a nation we have the capability to do all
three, but sadly as a Commission have not had the moral courage
nor will to do so.
History has proven the aviation industry's lack of
sincerity and willingness to address safety and security on
behalf of their customers by continually citing misleading
safety statistics as their rationale for inaction. Valid
statistics compare apples to apples, yet repeatedly we are
inundated with apple to orange comparisons by the industry.
Specifically, we must compare injuries and deaths of
PASSENGERS ABOARD MASS TRANSPORTATION, not invalid comparisons
to automotive injuries and deaths. Even more far fetched was
the comparison made to the Commission by Charles Higgins, a
Boeing VP citing aviation safety statistics versus household
related injuries and death. Yes living is risky, but clearly
flying is riskier than traveling on a bus or a train. Last year
alone hundreds of passengers died aboard scheduled flights, a
far cry from the number of passenger deaths onboard public
busses or trains.
Detailed below are specific objections to the various
passengers and/or air disaster victims issues pertaining to
aviation safety and security. Most were raised by family
members of the victims of numerous air disasters, ranging from
TWA 800, Valujet 592, Sec. Ron Brown's plane, KAL007 and Pan Am
103. Some previous recommendations were omitted entirely,
others were included but reduced to a nebulous inactionable
mention, while a large number contained language that was
either unnecessarily misleading or non-specific in order to
give the perception of recommended change.
These are the standards that I have applied in evaluating
the Commissions' recommendations:
(a) Specificity (b) Responsibility (c) Substance (d)
Accountability (e) Applicability (f) Timetables/Deadline
i. improving aviation safety
1.14 ``The commission commends the joint government-
industry initiative to equip the cargo holds of all passenger
aircraft with smoke detectors, and urges expeditious
implementation of the rules and other steps necessary to
achieve the goal of both detection and suppression in all cargo
holds.''
1.14 Is a statement not a recommendation since it lacks:
(a) Specificity (c) Substance (d) Accountability (f) Timetable-
Deadline
--Require the immediate installation of smoke detectors and
fire suppressants in all passenger planes' cargo holds.
Rationale: There are approximately 2,900 airplanes without
smoker detectors and fire suppressants that regularly fly
passengers with hazardous materials and dangerous cargo in the
class D cargo holds. The current partial, voluntary deployment
of smoke detectors is limited to a handful of airlines, with no
time table for completion of installation. Installation of FAA
certified fire suppression systems (currently in use on class C
cargo holds, new 777 and other planes) must also be mandated.
Both systems must be mandated immediately since each are
essential for survivability of passengers; detectors warn the
cockpit of a problem, while suppressants buys time to land the
plane. Estimated cost 30 cents per ticketed passenger.
--Mandate installation of passenger protective breathing
apparatus effective against smoke, toxic fumes and oxygen
deprivation.
Rationale: Existing breathing apparatus technology is over
20 yr. old and limited only to oxygen deprivation, but does not
protect passengers from smoke or toxic fumes in the cabin.
Enhanced breathing apparatus technology is available and FAA
certified. The FAA certified technology is on military planes,
used by crews on passenger planes, used on Air Force One and
Two and numerous corporate/ private planes. Commercial
passenger planes should provide equal standard of protection
for passengers by providing FAA certified protective breathing
apparatus currently used by crews. Estimated cost 4 cents per
ticketed passenger.
--Ship hazardous materials and dangerous cargo on ``cargo
carriers'' until smoke detector, fire suppressant and
protective breathing apparatus technology are installed on
``passenger carriers'' for passenger use.
Rationale: Until passengers can adequately be protected and
increase their survivability from smoke and toxic fumes in the
cabin, remove all unnecessary dangerous cargo and hazards
materials from passenger carriers.
1.13 ``The FAA should eliminate the exemptions in the
Federal Aviation Regulations that allow passengers under the
age of two to travel without the benefit of FAA approved
restraints.''
1.13 Recommendation lacks: (a) Specificity (f) Timetable/
deadline
--Require immediate use of FAA certified babyseats for all
children under two yrs.
1.5 ``Cost alone should not become dispositive in deciding
aviation safety and security rulemaking issues.''
1.5 Recommendation lacks: (a) Specificity (b)
Responsibility (c) Substance (d) Accountability (f) timetable/
Deadline
--Waive FAA/DOT cost/benefit requirement criteria in deciding
safety and security rulemaking issues.
--Eliminate FAA's authority to issue private or secret
exceptions/waivers to safety and security rules, except
in very limited and controlled circumstances..
Rationale: Airlines and airports regularly obtain
indefinite waivers to safety and/or security rules without
knowledge or oversight creating an ineffective regulatory
system. Require exceptions or waivers to include a statement of
necessity, signed by the air carriers' president, the Assoc.
Administrator of FAA for Rulemaking, and reviewed by the FAA
Administrator and Chairman of the relevant advisory committee.
Any approved waivers or exceptions shall be sent to all members
of the FAA's Advisory Committee on Rulemaking (ARAC) and the
chairmen of the Senate and House Aviation Subcommittees.
--Limit safety/security exceptions/waivers to no more than 6
months.
Rationale: The use of indefinite waivers or private
exceptions to air safety and security regulations must be
limited in time to temporary emergency situations. The current
indefinite secret waiver system compromises safety and
security, and provides certain carriers with unfair competitive
advantages over other carriers that are in compliance with a
safety or security regulations. Furthermore, such a system
amounts to fraud on the public who is led to believe that
safety and security standards and regulations are being
complied with and enforced. Time limits of 6 months or less
will ensure that remedial actions are undertaken promptly by
out of compliance carriers, rather than rewarding out of
compliance carriers with indefinite waivers.
Pan Am alleged that it had received prior to the Lockerbie
bombing a verbal FAA waiver of the security rule requiring hand
searching of unaccompanied luggage for Pan Am European
locations. Pan Am claimed this waiver allowed it merely to X-
ray unaccompanied luggage. It is quite possible that the bomb
which destroyed Pan Am 103 could have been discovered if a then
excising FAA security regulation had been strictly followed and
enforced. The criminal investigation determined that an
unaccompanied bag containing a Toshiba cassette played packed
with explosives destroyed the jumbo jet over Lockerbie
resulting in the worst terrorist attack against U.S. civilians
in history.
iii. improving security for travelers
With the current day realities of domestic terrorism such
as the bombings of the World Trade Center in New York and the
Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City, combined with the
numerous successful airmail bombs sent by a variety of
disgruntled criminals, the Unibomber, and the recent Egyptian
letter bombs, domestically the flying public is now flying less
secure than when my husband John and his fellow passengers died
aboard Pan Am 103! To-date, both the FAA and Dept. of
Transportation have required only minimal changes in aviation
security for international flights and have maintained the
status-quo for domestic flights, not only leaving aviation's
back door unlocked, but wide open.
The security preamble on p.25 effectively ignores the
significant measures taken unilaterally by the FAA in the mid-
1985 to protect U.S. International Aviation from bombs in
unaccompanied checked baggage (FAA Aircarrier Standard Security
Program (ACSSP), Section XV,C,1,(a) July 7, 1985). It also
ignores the joint actions, or is ignorant of, the joint actions
by the U.S. Secretary of Transportation and her Canadian
counterpart, the Minister of Transport, to get the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to adopt ICAO
Annex 17 Security Standards to protect international aviation
against bombs in 1985. This ICAO Security Standard 4.3.1
states:
``Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure
that operators when providing service from that State do not
transport the baggage of passengers who are not on board the
aircraft unless the baggage separated from the passengers is
subject to other security measures.
Note--This Standard has been applicable since 19 December
1987 with respect to the baggage of passengers at the point of
origin and on-line transfer passengers. With respect to the
baggage of other categories of passengers, the Standard became
applicable on 1 April 1989.''
This specific ICAO Security Standard was not only
significant from the protection it provided against
unaccompanied baggage but also because it has the distinction
of being ratified by a majority of ICAO Contracting States in a
record time of a few months. These actions sometimes take years
to win adoption. These are still mandatory ICAO requirements
and the U.S. is a ICAO Contracting State and thus is to comply
with these procedures internationally.
These ICAO Security Standards, set in the mid to late
1980's, internationally recognized that the primary threat to
civil aviation had shifted from hijacking to sabotage requiring
specific security measures that both the U.S. and ICAO would
undertake to protect air passengers against bombs.
This FAA ACSSP requirements stated than a U.S. airline
could not carry an unaccompanied bag from a designated high-
threat international airport unless the bag had been physically
searched. This FAA unaccompanied bag requirement preceded the
subsequent ICAO Accompanied Bag Standard by 2 years. Pan
American World Airways failure to comply with this FAA security
requirement resulted in the PAA-103 tragedy on December 21,
1988 and the airline's conviction of ``Willful Misconduct'' in
U.S. Federal Court on July 10, 1992.
Needless to say, if the public was aware of the test
results of the ``Red Team'' aviation security forces
domestically to regularly and successfully breach the so called
``Aviation Security'' systems, in combination with the
aforementioned domestic terrorist acts and threats, they would
be shocked and terrified at how much they are currently at
risk.
Even of greater concern are that the recommendations in
this report will do nothing more than give the flying public
the perception of security. They do not provide any tangible or
immediate improvement in our security measures. Once again, we
will enable the tombstone mentality that is pervasive of the
FAA, DOT and the U.S. airlines to continue.
This report contains no specific call to action, no
commitments to address aviation security system-wide by
mandating the deployment of current technology and training,
with actionable timetables and budgets. As the previous
commission on aviation security and terrorism noted eight years
ago, ``The U.S. civil aviation security system is seriously
flawed and has failed to provide the proper level of protection
for the traveling public. This system needs major reform.
Rhetoric is no substitute for strong, effective action.''
3.1 ``The federal government should consider aviation
security as a national security issue, and provide substantial
funding for capitol improvements.''
3.1 Recommendation lacks (c) Substance (d) Accountability
(e) Applicability (f) Timetables/Deadlines
--Mandate the establishment of a federal passenger ``User
Security Surcharge''
--Sequester funds solely to be allocated for the purchase/
development:
--EDS (Explosive Detection Systems) equipment grant money
--R & D grant money for EDS development for cargo, mail,
carry on and checked baggage.
--Standardized Training Programs for Security Personnel
--FBI Fingerprinting/National NCIC Criminal Background Checks
--Deploy hardened baggage containers through attrition
--Interim purchase of automated bag match technology
--Development of Profiling Programs--Manual/Automated
--Fund Explosive Detection Canine Teams
The initial $160 million in federal funds provided by
Congress in 1996 was woefully inadequate to address the scope
of the problems in U.S. aviation security. There are 450
commercial airports that have obsolete security systems, most
of which is 20 yrs. old and designed for anti-hijacking system.
This technology provides basic metal detection X-ray technology
with no explosive detection capabilities for carry on baggage.
Outside of the limited deployment of CTX 5000 SP, this is also
true for checked baggage. Additionally, this funding does not
address inadequate security personnel selection/training).
Likewise, ``$100 million annual recommendation by the Gore
Commission . . . to meet capitol requirements identified by
local airport consortia and FAA'' is woefully inadequate to
meet anti-sabotage aviation security needs. A ``passenger user
security surcharge'' of ($4-5) would raise in excess of $2
Billion a year, swiftly and adequately funding the actual cost
to upgrade aviation security to an effective level. A
``passenger user surcharge,'' sequestered only for security is
the most viable method to raise the large amount of capitol
needed to adequately address the changes system wide, due to
the inaccessibility/deficit of general revenue funds and/or
aviation trust funds. Security related expenses should not be
considered a part of the airlines cost of doing business, but a
part of our National responsibility to protect our citizens.
``Security'' threats typically are not targeted against a
specific airline but after the American Flag on the tail of
passenger carriers. There must be a clear, consistent source of
revenue and commitment in order to adequately protect our
citizens.
Rationale: Since the bombing of Pan Am 103 there have been
numerous but unsuccessful attempts at ``aviation security
enhancements'' by the former President Bush's Commission on
Aviation Security & Terrorism, Congress and two
Administrations. For 8+ yr. without an adequate and consistent
funding mechanism in place to implement recommendations,
legislation's (i.e. ``1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act'')
or regulations, the obsolete security status-quo has prevailed.
Note: Section 107(9) ``1990 Aviation Security Improvement
Act''--entitled ``Authorization of Appropriations.'' There are
authorized to be appropriated from the Airport and Airway Trust
Fund, . . . such sums of money necessary for the purpose of
caring out the technology grant program.'' In 7 yr. no security
funds were made available due to budget constraints in the
Trust Fund.
3.3 `` The Postal Service should advise customers that all
packages weighing over 16 ounces will be subject to examination
for explosives and other threat objects in order to move by
air.''
3.3 Recommendation lacks: (c) Substance (e) Applicability
(f) Timetable/Deadline
--Mandate immediate examination of all packages weighing over
8 ounces or move them on ``cargo'' carriers.
--Required the research and development of (EDS) explosive
detection systems for mail.
Rationale: Forensic scientists who investigated the bombing
of Pan Am 103 estimated that the bomb used contained as little
as 9.6 ounces of explosives. While I commend the Commissions'
recommendation a more effective and realistic solution is
required by changing the recommendation to 8 versus 16 ounces.
Additionally, Section 112(b,1)of the ``1990 Aviation Security
Improvement Act'' entitled, ``Screening Mail and Cargo'' stated
`` require for mail and cargo the same screening procedures as
are required for checked baggage.''
3.5 ``The FAA should implement a comprehensive plan to
address the threat of explosives and other threat objects in
cargo and work with industry to develop new initiatives in this
area.''
3.5 Recommendation lacks (a) Specificity (c) Substance (d)
Accountability (f) Timetables/Deadlines
--Mandate immediate examination of all cargo or move cargo on
``cargo'' carriers.
--Required the research and development of (EDS) explosive
detection systems for cargo.
Rationale: Profiling relies on the honesty of the shipper
and is not an effective security tool in itself since many
shippers and freight forwarders regularly combine questionable
cargo together that are manifested as ``known'' shipments.
Currently, all express packages shipped by express mail
companies are considered as ``known'' shipments and don not
require further scrutiny. Additionally, EDS for cargo has not
been developed yet ! Additionally, Section 112(b,1)of the
``1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act'' entitled,
``Screening Mail and Cargo'' stated `` require for mail and
cargo the same screening procedures as are required for checked
baggage.''
3.7 `` The FAA should work with airlines and airport
consortia to ensure that all passengers are positively
identified and subject to security procedures before they board
aircraft.''
3.7 Recommendation lacks: (a) Specificity (c) Substance (e)
Applicability (f) Timetable/Deadline
--Eliminate the issuance of advanced boarding passes and
require that all passengers, including electronically
ticketed passengers, check-in with a airline employee
prior to boarding a flight until EDS is utilized
systemwide.
Rationale: Current airline ticketing procedure allows
passenger to be issued advanced boarding passes with seat
assignments. Passengers with advance issued boarding passes can
walk directly to the jet bridge entrance at the boarding gate,
present the boarding pass to an airline employee, and have a
cursory security and identification take place. While this
procedure provides a convenience to the passenger, it takes
away from airline security procedures. The FAA should implement
a regulatory change requiring that all air carriers stop
issuing advanced boarding passes and ticketless travel. Require
all passengers including those participating in electronic
ticketing to check-in at an airline counter or gate check-in
desk prior to boarding, until explosive detection technology is
in place for passenger carry on bags and checked baggage.
3.10 ``The FAA should work with industry to develop a
national program to increase the professionalism of the
aviation security workforce, including screening personnel.''
3.10 Recommendation lacks: (a) Specificity (b)
Responsibility (c) Substance (d) Accountability (e)
Applicability (f) Timetables/Deadline
Rationale: This recommendation contains a number of
admirable objectives but it, like its predecessor
recommendation in President Bush's Commission on Aviation
Security and Terrorism lacks teeth. Following President Bush's
Commission of Aviation Security and Terrorism and the follow-on
Aviation Security Improvement Act in 1990, the FAA established
standards for the selection and training of aviation security
personnel. Those standards were, and still are, totally
inadequate. There is nothing to prevent the same inadequate
actions by the FAA to this recommendation. The Commission
should specifically recommend that the FAA mandate 80 hours of
intensive classroom/laboratory and 40 hours of On-the-Job
training before performance certification for all airline
security screening personnel.
3.11 ``Establish consortia at all commercial airports to
implement enhancements to aviation safety and security.''
3.11 Recommendation lacks (b) Responsibility (d)
Accountability (f) Timetables/Deadline
--Require all 450 Commercial Airports to immediately
establish a local consortia to implement safety and
security FAA and DOT mandates
Rationale: Only about 10% or 41 out of 450 commercial
airports have established consortia. Since effective security
is as good as its weakest link, a system wide approach to
implement federal standards must be required. The local
consortia role should be limited to executing minimal federal
safety and security standards not to determining the federal
standards. For example, the consortia can determine the best
placement for deployment of EDS but not if, how many or when to
install explosive detection systems.
3.13 ``Conduct airport vulnerability assessments and
develop action plans.''
3.13 Recommendation lacks (a) Specificity (d)
Accountability (f) Timetables/Deadline
Rationale: This recommendation does not contain criteria to
ensure that follow-up actions are taken to problems identified
during vulnerability assessments. The recommendation for FAA
``Red Teams'' test of airport security systems outlined in 3.21
should be tied to this recommendation to ensure that these
assessments do not continue the incestuous process where
security problems are rationalized away and no corrective
actions are taken within a specified period of time.
Additionally, a dis-interested third party should be contracted
to work with the FAA to conduct airport and/or airline tests in
order to avoid a conflict of interest.
3.14 ``Require criminal background checks and FBI
fingerprint checks for all screeners, and all airport and
airline employees with access to secure areas . . . The
Commission reiterates that the overall goal is FBI fingerprint
check of all airport and airline employees with access to
secure areas, no later than mid-1999''
3.14 Recommendation lacks (a) Specificity (b) Substance (f)
Timetable/Deadline
--Require immediate and direct access to NCIC III for
comprehensive evaluations of screeners and all
individuals with unescorted access to secure areas of
airports. NCIC will be used as a ``trigger'' for a FBI
criminal record prior to granting unescorted access to
secure areas. Use NCIC as an interim measure pending
IAFIS for conducting fingerprint generated FBI criminal
history checks by mid-1999.
Rationale: The aviation industry must be required to
provide the same degree of employment security review that is
currently required of employees hired by banks and security
exchange companies. Double standards must be eliminated to
adequately protect peoples lives equal to protecting peoples
money. The'' FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996'' section 304
entitled ``Requirement for criminal history checks'' did not
require security checks equal to that of the banking or
securities industries. The legislation allows for ineffective
``local'' criminal background checks on the basis of an array
of triggering criteria such as ``(I) an employment
investigation leaves a gap in employment of 12 months or
more..''etc. The ``1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act''
section 105 (2 a-c) required national criminal history checks
as did the Bush Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism.
We can not expect to have any meaningful security measures
implemented if the background of thousands of airport personnel
is potentially questionable
3.15 ``Deploy existing technology.''
3.15 Recommendation lacks: (a) Specificity (c) Substance
(f) Timetable/Deadlines
Rationale: This recommendation is far too nebulous and
vague. It like many other recommendations contain no deadlines
and is quite non-specific in addressing several needed
technology additions to the U.S. aviation security system. The
statement recognizing `` . . . that deployed technology for
examining carry-on baggage may be outdated'' was a major
understatement. The facts are that the technology currently in
use for examining carry-on baggage is not capable of
automatically detecting explosives, and in many instances is
not even capable of imaging explosives compounds. I believe
that an unequivocal recommendation should be made to change out
all technology that is currently used to screen carry-on
luggage. Moreover, I believe that on-going research that is
funded by the FAA should be accelerated to complete the
development and deployment of walk-through trace explosives
detectors that can be used to examine passengers for explosives
residues. Additionally, the deployment of 54 advanced explosive
detection systems for checked bag to cover 450 commercial
airports does very little to catch up with 20 yr. of technology
advancements in a meaningful way to protect the flying public .
3.16 `` Establish a joint government-industry research and
development program.''
3.16 Recommendation lacks: (c) Substance (d)
Accountability(f) Timetable/Deadline
Rationale: The current $3 million FAA R&D budget is totally
inadequate to research & develop technology for screening
cargo, mail, checked bag, carry on bags and passengers.
Adoption of a ``Passenger Security Surcharge'' of ($4-5) could
generate substantial revenue to adequately accelerate the
aviation R&D process, deploy existing technology and provide
adequate security personnel training programs.
3.19 ``Compliment technology with automated passenger
profiling.''
3.19 Recommendation lacks: (c) Substance (e) Applicability
(f) Timetables/Deadlines
Rationale: I agree that profiles can be most useful as an
overall part of a multi-layered security system. This
recommendation has placed an over-reliance, and therefore
unrealistic expectations on an early development and the
widespread application of an automated profile system. The
historical review of attempts to automate profiles within
airline's computer system takes us back to the mid-l980's when
a fledging attempt was made to do so by TWA. I believe that a
realistic implementation date for a fully automated profile
system that interfaces with law enforcement and intelligence
agencies will take several years to accomplish. I state this
mindful of the substantial amount of work that must be done by
the FBI, CIA, and BATF (and others) in building terrorist
databases on which detailed profile elements can be built. In
addition, interfacing any such data base with airline computer
systems will, in itself; be a major undertaking.
Nonetheless, I recognize that a limited automated profile
system such as Northwest Airlines' CAPS can be developed and
implemented more quickly. While I applaud and support the
effort to automate the CAPS system I doubt that the additional
programming for CAPS use outside of the Northwest Airlines
system can be completed by August 1997. In the interim I urge
the FAA mandate the use of manual profiles to identify the
small minority of passengers that may merit additional
attention.
Another serious concern regarding the recommended use of
profiles to trigger the use of a passenger/baggage match. This
process is actually less effective than the procedures Pan Am
was using (illegally) that led to the destruction of Pan Am 103
on December 21, 1988. If profiles are a necessary part of a
good layered security system then full baggage/passenger match
is as well. The recommendation to base passenger/baggage match
on profile and random selectees is unacceptable. I believe that
both security efficiency techniques, i.e., profiles and full
bag/passenger match, should be equally applied throughout the
U.S. aviation security system. In fact full automated baggage/
passenger match procedures can be implemented immediately and
provide an immediate substantive increase in our aviation
security system. As noted above, this is not so for the
recommended automated profile system in 3.19.
3.20 ``Certify screening companies and improve screener
performance.''
3.20 Recommendation lacks (a) Specificity (d)
Accountability (e) Applicability (f) Timetables/Deadlines
--FAA mandate 80 hours of intensive classroom/laboratory and
40 hours of On-the-Job training, before performance
certification, for all airline security screening
personnel.
Rationale: Currently, screeners typically receive 8 hr. of
combined class room and on-the-job training. Most security
screeners are minimum wage employees required to buy their
uniforms and pay for parking daily. Airlines typically pay
airplane cleaners more that security screeners, hence a 200-400
% employment turnover rate exists for security screeners.
Security screeners are an integral part of a effective security
system. Security screeners must be selected and trained
adequately, paid fairly and given the appropriate technology
tools to do their job
3.23 ``Give properly cleared airline and airport security
personnel access to the classified information they need to
know.''
3.23 Recommendation lacks: (a) Specificity (c) Substance
Rationale: It is my understanding that the problem of
distribution of classified intelligence information extends to
FAA Regional and Field facilities. Here the primary problem is
no one without clearance is to see classified data (the persons
needing access are FAA employees). In this instance it is a
problem of a failure of the FAA to establish a requirement for
their employees to see the data and to establish a means of
rapid distribution of the information to its own field
employees.
3.24 ``Begin implementation of full bag-passenger
match....the Commission believes that bag match, initially
based on profiling, should be implemented no later than
December 31, 1997...........By that date, the bags of those
selected either at random or through the use of automated
profiling must either be screened or matched to a boarded
passenger. . . .''
3.24 Recommendation lacks: (a) Specificity (b)
Responsibility(c) Substance (d) Accountability (e)
Applicability (f) Timetables/Deadline
Rationale: The recommendation states that `` the Commission
remains committed to baggage match as a component of a
comprehensive, layered security program aimed at keeping bombs
and explosive devices off airlines'' but subsequent comments
tie bag-match to profiles and random selections. I do not take
issue that bag-match should be specifically applied to
``profile selectees'' and/or random selection of passengers as
both these measures are a welcome addition to our aviation
security system. I do however, adamantly object to a failure to
endorse the immediate application of a full-baggage/passenger
match.
The enclosed detection matrix in Figure 1 (see p.XXX)
illustrates that the terrorist bomb that downed Pan Am Flight
103 on December 21, 1988 would only have been caught by either
a full-baggage/passenger match or through and examination of
the suitcase carrying the bomb using the new CTX-5000SP EDS.
Applying a profile in this instance would not have worked
because there was never a passenger ever associated with the
bag containing the bomb. Since you can only profile passengers
(not bags) the bag with the bomb would not have been detected.
As there are no current plans to screen all baggage using a
CTX-5000SP EDS then the only reliable security counter measure
(see Figure 1 detection matrix) available to serve as an alert
to a Pan Am-103 type of attack is the full-bag/passenger match.
Therefore the recommended application of a bag-match to a
``profile selectee'', i.e., a passenger, will not catch a Pan
Am-103 type of attack. The second approach is to applying a
bag-match was to randomly select passengers. (see Figures 2-3
p. ) As no passenger was ever associated with the Pan Am-103
bomb then this part of the recommendation to apply a bag-
passenger match to randomly selected passengers would also not
stop a Pan Am-103 type of attack. I cannot accept this
recommendation as Pan American World Airways was illegally
using an originating passenger bag-match (partial passenger-bag
match) procedure that resulted in the death of my husband and
269 other people. To do so would be unconscionable.
iv. responding to aviation disasters
4.3 `` The Department of Transportation and the NTSB should
implement key provisions of the Aviation Disaster Family
Assistance Act of 1996 by March 31, 1997. . . . The Commission
urges the task force to consider the development of uniform
guidelines..''
4.3 Recommendation lacks (a) Specificity (c) Substance (e)
Applicability and actionable timetable.
4.3 ``Air Disaster Family Assistance Act'' Title VII,
section 705 of the ``FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996'' requires
the establishment of a joint task force, including ``families
which have been involved in aircraft accidents.''
Task force should address and develop uniform federal
standards for:
--Civilians killed on government planes
--American passengers on U.S. carriers that crash
internationally.
--Notification procedures of families of air disasters
--Autopsy procedures
--DNA testing
--Care and disposition of unidentified remains (i.e.
knowledge and consent by next-of-kin prior to burial or
disposition)
--Personal possession decontamination, return and/or
disposition (i.e. knowledge and consent by next-of-kin
prior to disposition)
--Media access to survivors and victims families
--Legal solicitation/Access to survivors and victims families
--Develop and distribute a ``Disaster Response Information
Pamphlet'' to air disaster victims and their families.
Rationale: ``Implementation of key provisions of the act by
March 31, 1997'' can only be accomplished with the input of all
parties as cited by the law (including the victims families).
Family representatives have not been named or included in a
task force nor provided equal access to work group meetings or
received underlying documents to allow them to assist in the
work in progress. Additionally, representation of both the
legal and media are a necessary part of the process to develop
guidelines and negotiate the MOU (memoranda of understanding)
between all organizations responding to air disasters.
4.4 `` The U.S. Government should ensure that family
members of victims of international aviation disasters receive
just compensation and equitable treatment through the
application of federal laws and international treaties.''
4.4 Recommendation lacks: (a) Specificity (e) Applicability
(f) Timetable/Deadline
4.4 Restore passenger rights whether crashes occur over
land, territorial waters or over the high seas. Equality in
awardable damages can be restored by amendment to 49 U.S.C.
40120.
Rationale: Currently the application of law for aircraft
that crash over water (three miles or more off shore) is based
on a 1920's treaty ``Death on the High Seas Act,'' limiting
liability of air carrier or manufacturer up to $2,300.
Ironically, DOHSA was adopted prior to start of commercial
passenger air transportation, yet it still applies to air
disasters such as recently as TWA 800, Aeroperu, KAL007 and
others. Since all international flights and most domestic
landing approaches on our coasts are over water this unjust and
inequitable system must be abolished. Airlines and
manufacturers have hidden behind DOHSA indefinitely avoiding
swift and adequate compensation of victims families requiring
prolonged trial lasting over a decade.
--Provide the same venue (U.S. Courts jurisdiction) for U.S.
citizens regardless of where their tickets were bought
, changed or if they live abroad. U.S. jurisdiction can
be obtained by amendment to 49 U.S.C. 40105.
Rationale: Presently, U.S. citizens are afforded U.S. court
jurisdiction only if their ticket was purchased in the U.S.
Over 5 million Americans live, work and travel outside the U.S.
depriving them and their families of swift and adequate damages
in case of air disasters. Airlines and manufacturers have
hidden behind jurisdictional issues to indefinitely avoiding
swift and adequate compensation of victims families requiring
prolonged international trials lasting over a decade and
compensatory damages or awards paid in foreign currency.
--Require uniform certification standards and mandate
adequate levels of liability insurance on all non-
scheduled commercial passenger air travel (i.e.
charters)
Rationale: Privatization and deregulation has created a
sizable market of non scheduled air entities that regularly
transport private citizens, government employees and military.
Many private charters temporarily lease aircraft and crews with
questionable certification, maintenance and recurrent training,
putting unwitting passengers at great unnecessary risk. Mandate
equal requirement levels of certification for scheduled and
non-scheduled passenger flights. Note: Most personal life and
travel insurance policies exclude payment of charter related
claims since charters do not afford passengers the established
scheduled commercial passengers air travel safety standards.
conclusions
In summary, the final report contains no specific call to
action, no commitments to address aviation safety and security
system-wide by mandating the deployment of current technology
and training, with actionable timetables and budgets. Later
attempts to track these recommendations will result in problems
with differing agency interpretations, misunderstandings, and
outright opposition to implementation by individuals and/or
organizations who oppose the specific recommendations.
I recommend that time limits for completion be added to all
recommendations that have no deadlines and that all
recommendations be re-written for specific actions by specific
agencies with an accountability matrix added for follow-on
actions to ensure that the recommendations are implemented.
Without specifics, once again we will allow the airlines to
lead and the government follow as to what is necessary to
secure the flying public.
Sadly we remain, as noted eight years ago, by our
predecessor commission, President Bush's Commission on Aviation
Security and Terrorism which concluded that, ``The U.S. civil
aviation security system is seriously flawed and has failed to
provide the proper level of protection for the traveling
public. This system needs major reform. Rhetoric is no
substitute for strong, effective action.''
At best, these recommendations allow and encourage more
research, more pilot programs and more analysis. Once again, it
leaves in place domestically and internationally, highly
limited anti-hijacking machines that provide basic metal
detection X-ray technology with no explosive detection
capabilities for carry on baggage. Outside of the limited
deployment (54 units ) of CTX 5000SP, this is also true for
checked in baggage.
Until Explosive detection technology is ordered in
sufficient quantities and deployed system wide, specific
efficiency measures must be implemented to identify which bags
out of the millions transported annually need further scrutiny.
Matching bags to passengers does this. Sadly, the commissions
recommendation matches bags only to ``Selectees'' after
profiling. Partial bag match does not allow for the
identification of an unaccompanied ``rouge'' bag since it
requires a ``passenger Selectee'' to trigger matching
passengers to their bags and further scrutiny.
The automated profiling system developed by Northwest
Airlines and the FAA will rely on the ability of a skycab or a
counter check in agent to successfully verify a passengers
identity as the same individual the computer profiled.
Currently the airlines are not required to collect complete
passenger manifest data on either domestic or international
flights. We have seen the short comings of incomplete fight
manifest information, as evident every time a plane crashes. It
often takes the airlines days to notify victims families since
without complete names, the airlines don't accurately know who
boarded the plane. Profiling will now rely on the incomplete
passenger data to produce a ``Selectee'' in order to identify
the bags that need further scrutiny.
While I greatly support the upgrade in training and
certification of security screeners and personnel, we can not
expect them to adequately perform their jobs in detecting
explosives inside carry on bags with minimal training and
obsolete 8-20 yr. old anti-hijacking technology designed to
detect metal and not explosives. We must deploy state of the
art screening technology with at least limited EDS (Explosive
Detection) capabilities.
In terms of mail and cargo transported on passengers
planes, the recommendations do not provide any meaningful
degree of protection for the flying public nor require and fund
Research & Development of EDS (Explosion Detection Systems).
Based on the threat of letter bombs/packages and the systemwide
vulnerability that exist in the belly of every passenger plane
the recommendations do not provide either a short or long term
fix.
Mr. Vice President, we are all aware that any comprehensive
security system is as good as its weakest link. Criminals and
terrorist will continue to identify and exploit the weakest
link in our defenses. Nationally, there are over 450 commercial
airports with scheduled passenger flights. It is up to the
Federal government that regulates the airlines to provide
national security standards, adequate funding and actionable
timetables. Anything short of that does not fulfill the
Commissions mandate of enhancing aviation security in a
meaningful way.
The Boeing chart on p.6 projects an aviation accident a
week by the year 2015 based on the projected increases in air
traffic. That acknowledges 250-300 people will die onboard
passenger airplanes a week; 1,000-1,200 a month or projected
total deaths of 12,000-15,000 annually ! Statistically, that
compares weekly commercial aviation deaths to the weekly death
toll in the Vietnam War. This is totally unacceptable and an
outrage ! Commercial air travel need not bear the same risk as
going to war.
In closing, Mr. Vice President, I feel that the flying
public should be able to put their family members aboard a
plane with a great degree of confidence that they will walk off
at the point of their destination and not come home in a body
bag like my husband did. It is for all the aforementioned
safety and security reasons that I can not sign a report that
blatantly allows the American flying public to be placed
regularly at ``unnecessary risk'' while we as a nation have the
capability, but not the will to reasonably protect them.
For the record, I take objection to the inclusion of any
``Classified Annex'' to the Final Report of the White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. If a classified
annex was issued in the name of the Commissioners, it has been
included without privying all the Commissioners to the
contents, issues, or providing applicable background data or
conclusions, with our knowledge or consent.
Sincerely,
M. Victoria Cummock
Commissioner, White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security
Member, FAA Security Baseline Work Group
President, Families of Pan Am 103/Lockerbie
Widow of John Binning Cummock
b. Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting
Terrorism, February, 1986
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3. Department of State
a. Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998
Introduction
The cowardly and deadly bombings of the US Embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 were powerful reminders that
the threat of international terrorism still confronts the
world. These attacks contributed to a record-high number of
casualties during 1998: more than 700 people died and almost
6,000 were wounded. It is essential that all law-abiding
nations redouble their efforts to contain this global threat
and save lives.
Despite the Embassy bombings, the number of international
terrorist attacks actually fell again in 1998, continuing a
downward trend that began several years ago. There were no acts
of international terrorism in the United States last year. This
decrease in international terrorism both at home and abroad
reflects the diplomatic and law enforcement progress we have
made in discrediting terrorist groups and making it harder for
them to operate. It also reflects the improved political
climate that has diminished terrorist activity in recent years
in various parts of the world.
The United States is engaged in a long-term effort against
international terrorism to protect lives and hold terrorists
accountable. We will use the full range of tools at our
disposal, including diplomacy backed by the use of force when
necessary, as well as law enforcement and economic measures.
US Policy
The United States has developed a counterterrorism policy
that has served us well over the years and was advanced
aggressively during 1998:
First, make no concessions to terrorists and strike
no deals.
Second, bring terrorists to justice for their
crimes.
Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that
sponsor terrorism to force them to change their
behavior.
The Secretary of State has designated seven countries as
state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North
Korea, Sudan, and Syria. In addition, the US Government
certified an eighth country--Afghanistan--as not fully
cooperating with US antiterrorism efforts.
Fourth, bolster the counterterrorism capabilities of
those countries that work with the United States and
require assistance.
This last element is especially important in light of the
evolving threat from transnational terrorist groups. These
loosely affiliated organizations operate more independently of
state sponsors, although those relationships still exist. They
are highly mobile and operate globally, raising large amounts
of money, training in various countries, and possessing
sophisticated technology. The United States must continue to
work together with like-minded nations to close down these
terrorist networks wherever they are found and make it more
difficult for them to operate any place in the world.
The US Response to the Africa Bombings
Following the bombings of the two US Embassies in East
Africa, the US Government obtained evidence implicating Usama
Bin Ladin's network in the attacks. To preempt additional
attacks, the United States launched military strikes against
terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan on 20 August. That
same day, President Clinton amended Executive Order 12947 to
add Usama Bin Ladin and his key associates to the list of
terrorists, thus blocking their US assets-including property
and bank accounts-and prohibiting all US financial transactions
with them. As a result of what Attorney General Janet Reno
called the most extensive overseas criminal investigation in US
history, and working closely with the Kenyan and Tanzanian
Governments, the US Government indicted Bin Ladin and 11 of his
associates for the two bombings and other terrorist crimes.
Several suspects were brought to the United States to stand
trial. The Department of State announced a reward of up to $5
million for information leading to the arrest or conviction of
any of the suspects anywhere in the world. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Legislation passed by Congress and signed by the President in
1998 increased the maximum amount of a reward offered under the
Counterterrorism Rewards Program from $2 million to $5 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Presidential Decision Directives
On 22 May President Clinton announced the signing of two
new Presidential decision directives, or PDDs, on combating
terrorism and protecting critical infrastructures.
The first directive, PDD-62, highlights the growing
threat of unconventional attacks against the United
States and details a new, more systematic approach to
fighting the terrorist threat. It reinforces the
mission of the many US agencies charged with roles in
defeating terrorism. It also codifies and clarifies
their activities in the wide range of US
counterterrorism programs, from apprehending and
prosecuting terrorists to increasing transportation
security, enhancing response capabilities, and
protecting the computer-based systems that lie at the
heart of the US economy. The new directive also
establishes the position of the National Coordinator
for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and
Counterterrorism to oversee the broad variety of
relevant policies and programs.
The second directive, PDD-63, calls for a national
effort to ensure the security of the United States'
increasingly vulnerable and interconnected
infrastructures. These infrastructures include
telecommunications, banking and finance, energy,
transportation, and essential government services. The
directive requires immediate US Government action,
including risk assessment and planning, to reduce
exposure to attack. It stresses the critical importance
of cooperation between the US Government and the
private sector by linking designated federal agencies
with private-sector representatives.
US Diplomatic Efforts
On 24 August, Secretary Albright, in an effort to bring to
justice the two Libyans suspected in the Pan Am 103 bombing,
announced a joint US-UK proposal to try them in the Netherlands
before a Scottish court with Scottish judges applying Scottish
law. The Arab League, the Organization of African Unity, the
Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Non-Aligned
Movement endorsed the proposal. At yearend, however, Libya
continued to defy UN Security Council resolutions by refusing
to turn over the suspects for trial.
The Group of 8 (G-8) partners intensified their exchange of
basic information on persons and groups suspected of terrorist-
linked activities. The eight nations also focused their efforts
on trying to deprive terrorist groups of the money, acquired
through criminal activities or raised by front organizations,
used to fund operations. Toward this end, the G-8 placed major
emphasis on countering terrorist fundraising and did
substantial work to advance a French draft international
convention to make such fundraising illegal. The G-8 also
worked for the acceptance of a Russian-proposed international
convention against nuclear terrorism, discussed improved export
controls on explosives and other terrorist-related materials,
and considered guidelines for the prevention and resolution of
international hostage-taking incidents.
Representatives from the Organization of American States
met in Mar del Plata, Argentina, on 23-24 November for the
second Inter-American Specialized Conference on Terrorism. They
agreed to recommend the creation of an Inter-American Committee
on Terrorism to combat the threat in Latin America. They also
agreed to establish a central database of information about
terrorists, to follow certain guidelines for improving
counterterrorism cooperation, and to adopt measures to
eliminate terrorist fundraising.
The United States conducts a successful program to train
foreign law enforcement personnel in such areas as airport
security, bomb detection, maritime security, VIP protection,
hostage rescue, and crisis management. To date, we have trained
more than 20,000 representatives from more than 100 countries.
We also conduct an active research and development program to
adapt modern technology for use in defeating terrorists.
As Secretary Albright declared shortly after the US
military strikes against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and
Sudan: ``The terrorists should have no illusion: Old Glory will
continue to fly wherever we have interests to defend. We will
meet our commitments. We will strive to protect our people. And
we will wage the struggle against terror on every front, on
every continent, with every tool, every day.''
Legislative Requirements
This report is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the
United States Code, Section 2656f(a), which requires the
Department of State to provide Congress a full and complete
annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups
meeting the criteria of Section (a)(1) and (2) of the Act. As
required by legislation, the report includes detailed
assessments of foreign countries where significant terrorist
acts occurred and countries about which Congress was notified
during the preceding five years pursuant to Section 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979 (the so-called terrorism list
countries that repeatedly have provided state support for
international terrorism). In addition, the report includes all
relevant information about the previous year's activities of
individuals, terrorist organizations, or umbrella groups known
to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of any US citizen
during the preceding five years and groups known to be financed
by state sponsors of terrorism.
In 1996, Congress amended the reporting requirements
contained in the above-referenced law. The amended law requires
the Department of State to report on the extent to which other
countries cooperate with the United States in apprehending,
convicting, and punishing terrorists responsible for attacking
US citizens or interests. The law also requires that this
report describe the extent to which foreign governments are
cooperating, or have cooperated during the previous five years,
in preventing future acts of terrorism. As permitted in the
amended legislation, the Department of State is submitting such
information to Congress in a classified annex to this
unclassified report.
Definitions
No one definition of terrorism has gained universal
acceptance. For the purposes of this report, however, we have
chosen the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the
United States Code, Section 2656f(d). That statute contains the
following definitions:
The term ``terrorism'' means premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant \2\ targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an
audience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ For purposes of this definition, the term ``noncombatant'' is
interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel
who at the time of the incident are unarmed or not on duty. For
example, in past reports we have listed as terrorist incidents the
murders of the following US military personnel: the 19 airmen killed in
the bombing of the Khubar Towers housing facility in Saudi Arabia in
June 1996; Col. James Rowe, killed in Manila in April 1989; Capt.
William Nordeen, US defense attache killed in Athens in June 1988; the
two servicemen killed in the La Belle discotheque bombing in West
Berlin in April 1986; and the four off-duty US Embassy Marine guards
killed in a cafe in El Salvador in June 1985. We also consider as acts
of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military
personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the
site, such as bombings against US bases in Europe, the Philippines, or
elsewhere.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The term ``international terrorism'' means terrorism
involving citizens or the territory of more than one
country.
The term ``terrorist group'' means any group
practicing, or that has significant subgroups that
practice, international terrorism.
The US Government has employed these definitions of
terrorism for statistical and analytical purposes since 1983.
Domestic terrorism is a more widespread phenomenon than
international terrorism. Because international terrorism has a
direct impact on US interests, it is the primary focus of this
report. Nonetheless, the report also describes, but does not
provide statistics on, significant developments in domestic
terrorism.
Note
Adverse mention in this report of individual members of any
political, social, ethnic, religious, or national group is not
meant to imply that all members of that group are terrorists.
Indeed, terrorists represent a small minority of dedicated,
often fanatical, individuals in most such groups. It is those
small groups-and their actions-that are the subject of this
report.
Furthermore, terrorist acts are part of a larger phenomenon
of politically inspired violence, and at times the line between
the two can become difficult to draw. To relate terrorist
events to the larger context, and to give a feel for the
conflicts that spawn violence, this report will discuss
terrorist acts as well as other violent incidents that are not
necessarily international terrorism.
Michael A. Sheehan
Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism
The Year in Review
There were 273 international terrorist attacks during 1998,
a drop from the304 attacks we recorded the previous year and
the lowest annual total since1971. The total number of persons
killed or wounded in terrorist attacks,however, was the highest
on record: 741 persons died, and 5,952 personssuffered
injuries.
Most of these casualties resulted from the
devastating bombings in August of the US Embassies in
Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. In Nairobi,
where the US Embassy was located in a congested
downtown area, 291 persons were killed in the attack,
and about 5,000 were wounded. In Dar es Salaam, 10
persons were killed and 77 were wounded.
About 40 percent of the attacks in 1998-111-were
directed against US targets. The majority of these--
77--were bombings of a multinational oil pipeline in
Colombia, which terrorists regard as a US target.
Twelve US citizens died in terrorist attacks last
year, all in the Nairobi bombing. Each was an Embassy
employee or dependent:
--Marine Sgt. Jesse N. Aliganga, Marine Security Guard
detachment
--Julian L. Bartley, Sr., Consul General
--Julian L. Bartley, Jr., son of the Consul General
--Jean Rose Dalizu, Defense Attache's Office
--Molly Huckaby Hardy, Administrative Office
--Army Sgt. Kenneth Ray Hobson, II, Defense Attache's
Office
--Prabhi Kavaler, General Services Office
--Arlene Kirk, Military Assistance Office
--Mary Louise Martin, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention
--Air Force Senior Master Sgt. Sherry Lynn Olds, Military
AssistanceOffice
--Michelle O'Connor, General Services Office
--Uttamlal Thomas Shah, Political Section
Eleven other US citizens were wounded in terrorist
attacks last year, including six in Nairobi and one in
Dar es Salaam.
Three-fifths--166--of the total attacks were
bombings. The foremost type of target was business
related.
There were no acts of international terrorism in the United
States in 1998.There were successful efforts to bring
international terrorist suspects to justice, however, in
several important cases:
On 4 November indictments were returned before the
US District Court for the Southern District of New York
in connection with the two US Embassy bombings in
Africa. Charged in the indictment were: Usama Bin
Ladin, his military commander Muhammad Atef, and al-
Qaida members Wadih El Hage, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed,
Mohammed Sadeek Odeh, and Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-
Owhali. Two of these suspects, Odeh and al-Owhali, were
turned over to US authorities in Kenya and brought to
the United States to stand trial. Another suspect,
Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, was arrested in Germany in
September and extradited to the United States in
December. On 16 December five others were indicted for
their role in the Dar es Salaam Embassy bombing:
Mustafa Mohammed Fadhil, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, Ahmed
Khalfan Ghailani, Fahid Mohommed Ally Msalam, and
Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan. (See box on Usama Bin Ladin
on page 29.)
In June, Mohammed Rashid was turned over to US
authorities overseas and brought to the United States
to stand trial on charges of planting a bomb in 1982 on
a Pan Am flight from Tokyo to Honolulu that detonated,
killing one passenger and wounding 15 others. Rashid
had served part of a prison term in Greece in
connection with the bombing until that country released
him from prison early and expelled him in December
1996, in a move the United States called
``incomprehensible.'' The nine-count US indictment
against Rashid charges him with murder, sabotage,
bombing, and other crimes in connection with the Pan Am
explosion.
Three additional persons convicted in the bombing of
the World Trade Center in 1993 were sentenced last
year. Eyad Mahmoud Ismail Najim, who drove the
explosive-laden van into the World Trade Center, was
sentenced to 240 years in prison and ordered to pay $10
million in restitution and a $250,000 fine. Mohammad
Abouhalima, who was convicted as an accessory for
driving his brother to the Kennedy International
Airport knowing he had participated in the bombing, was
sentenced to eight years in prison. Ibrahim Ahmad
Suleiman received a 10-month sentence on two counts of
perjury for lying to the grand jury investigating the
bombing.
In May, Abdul Hakim Murad was sentenced to life in
prison without parole for his role in the failed
conspiracy in January 1995 to blow up a dozen US
airliners over the Pacific Ocean. Murad received an
additional 60-year sentence for his role and was fined
$250,000. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, who was convicted
previously in this conspiracy and for his role in the
World Trade Center bombing in 1993, is serving a life
prison term.
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Africa Overview
The murderous and near-simultaneous bombing attacks on the
US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 7
August 1998 caused more casualties than any other terrorist
attack during the year. In Nairobi, where the US Embassy was
located in a congested downtown area, the attack killed 291
persons and wounded about 5,000. The bombing in Dar es Salaam
killed 10 persons and wounded 77.
These attacks clarified more than ever that terrorism is a
global phenomenon. In the months since the bombings, evidence
has emerged of terrorist networks involved in potential anti-US
activity in a number of African nations.
In addition, state sponsors of terrorism, particularly
Libya, are increasing significantly their activities in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
angola
In late April, National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA) guerrillas kidnapped two Portuguese citizens
from thecommune of Ebangano. The two have not been found.
UNITA rebels fired on a United Nations Mission to Angola
(MONUA) vehicle near Calandula on 19 May. The attack killed an
Angolan official working for MONUA and wounded two foreigners.
On 23 March and 22 April, separatists from the Cabinda
Liberation Front-Cabindan Armed Forces (FLEC-FAC) kidnapped
three Portuguese citizens working for Mota and Company, a
Portuguese construction firm. FLEC-FAC claimed it took the
workers hostage to force Portugal to pressure the Angolan
Government to leave Cabinda.
On 9 November more than 100 suspected UNITA rebels overran
the Canadian-owned Yetwene diamond mine in eastern Angola,
killing eight individuals-including two British nationals, one
Portuguese, and five Angolans-and wounding at least 22 persons.
The gunmen took four workers hostage: a South African, a
British national, and two Filipinos.
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central african republic
A small bomb detonated on 27 November outside the walls of
the French Embassy, causing only minor damage.
chad
On 3 February armed rebels of the Union of Democratic
forces kidnapped four French citizens in Manda National Park.
The four were released unharmed five days later. On 22 March a
group calling itself the National Front for the Renewal of Chad
took six French and two Italian nationals hostage in the
Tibesti region. Chadian forces freed all but one hostage within
hours. The militants announced they would not release the last
hostage until all French troops and Western oil firms left
Chad. Five days later Chadian security forces freed the last
hostage.
democratic republic of congo
On 12 August gunmen seized a tour group sightseeing along a
nature trail in the Ruwenzori Range of western Congo. The
tourists--one Canadian, two Swedes, and three New Zealanders--
were abducted after they crossed from Uganda into the Congo. A
previously unknown group, the People in Action for the
Liberation of Rwanda, claimed responsibility for the abduction.
Local authorities believe the gunmen are former Rwandan
soldiers who fled to Congo after the former regime was forced
from power in 1994. Two New Zealanders escaped one week later,
and the Canadian was released on 19 August. The other victims
still are missing.
ethiopia
On 25 February rebels of the Ogaden National Liberation
Front took an Austrian national hostage as she traveled from
Gode to Denan. She was released in mid-April after the rebels
determined that she ``was not a spy for the Ethiopian
Government.''
An Islamic group based in Somalia, al-Ittihad al-Islami,
claimed responsibility for kidnapping six International
Committee of the Red Cross workers in the eastern Ogaden region
of Ethiopia on 25 June. Al-Ittihad said the abducted workers--
one Swiss national and five ethnic Somalis--were spies. The six
were released unharmed on 10 July even though al-Ittihad found
them ``guilty of conducting business outside of their duties.''
kenya
On 7 August a car bomb exploded behind the US Embassy,
killing 291 persons and wounding about 5,000. The majority of
the casualties were Kenyan citizens. Twelve US citizens died,
and six were injured in the attack. A group calling itself the
``Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places''
immediately claimed responsibility for the attacks in Nairobi
and a near-simultaneous explosion in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
US officials believe the group is a cover name used by Usama
Bin Ladin' al-Qaida organization. Indictments were returned in
the US District Court for the Southern District of New York
charging Usama Bin Ladin and 11 other individuals for these and
other terrorist acts against US citizens. At year end, four of
the indicted--Wadih El Hage, Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali,
Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, and Mohammed Sadeeck Odeh--were being
held in New York, while Khalid al-Fawwaz remained in the United
Kingdom pending extradition to the United States. The other
suspects remain at large. The Government of Kenya cooperated
closely with the United States in the criminal investigation of
the bombing. On 20 August, President Clinton amended Executive
Order 12947 to add Usama Bin Ladin and his key associates to
the list of terrorists, thus blocking their US assets--
including property and bank accounts--and prohibiting all US
financial transactions with them.
nigeria
On 11 November a mob of angry youths abducted eight Shell
Oil workers in Bayelsa. The hostages included three US
citizens, one British citizen, one Croatian, one Italian, one
South African, and one Nigerian. The youths demanded jobs and
economic development projects for their community. After talks
with the oil firm, all eight hostages were released unharmed on
18 November.
sierra leone
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) militants commanded by
S.A.F. Musa kidnapped an Italian Catholic missionary from his
residence in Kamalo on 15 November. In exchange for the
hostage' release, Musa demanded medical supplies, a satellite
phone, and contact with his family, who are being detained by
regional peacekeeping forces in the capital. At year end, talks
between the RUF and the government were at a standstill.
south africa
An explosion on 25 August in the entrance of the US-
franchised Planet Hollywood restaurant in Cape Town killed one
person and injured at least two dozen others, including nine
British citizens. Muslims Against Global Opression (MAGO), a
front organization for the Islamic radical groups People
Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) and Qibla, initially
claimed responsibility but then denied involvement. Local
authorities believe that PAGAD members masterminded the attack
in retaliation for the US bombings of terrorism-related targets
in Sudan and Afghanistan.
PAGAD, a vigilante group that first appeared in August
1996, conducted a series of violent attacks against criminal
elements and moderate Muslim leaders in Cape Town last year.
Though police are investigating PAGAD members aggressively,
none has been convicted for these crimes.
somalia
On 15 April militant Somali clansmen took nine foreign
nationals hostage after their aircraft landed at a north
Mogadishu airstrip. The hostages included one US citizen, a
German, a Belgian, a Frenchman, a Norwegian, and two Swiss. The
two pilots, a South African and a Kenyan, also were held. The
clansmen demanded $100,000 ransom. The kidnappers released the
hostages unharmed on 24 April without receiving any ransom,
however, after the international community pressured the
kidnappers' leaders.
tanzania
Terrorists associated with Usama Bin Ladin' al-Qaida
organization detonated an extremely large truck bomb outside
the US Embassy in Dar es Salaam on 7 August, just as another
truck bomb exploded outside the US Embassy in Nairobi. The
blast killed 10 Tanzanians, including seven local Embassy
employees, and injured 77 persons, including one US citizen.
Tanzanian authorities cooperated closely with the United States
in the criminal investigation of the bombing.
uganda
Unidentified assailants on 4 April detonated bombs at two
downtown Kampala restaurants, the Nile Grill and the outdoor
cafe at the Speke Hotel, killing five persons--including
Swedish and Rwandan nationals--and wounding six others. The
Ugandan Government suspects that Islamic militants of the
Allied Democratic Forces are responsible.
On 8 July a United Nations World Food Program worker was
killed when rebels of the Uganda National Rescue Front II fired
a rocket-propelled grenade at his truck while he was driving in
northwestern Uganda.
Rebels of the Lord' Resistance Army attacked a civilian
convoy traveling along a major corridor in the north on 27
November, killing seven persons and wounding 28 others.
Asia Overview
The overall number of terrorist incidents in East Asia
decreased in 1998. Individual countries still suffered
terrorist attacks and endured continued terrorist group
activities, however.
In Cambodia, the last remnants of the weakened Khmer Rouge
(KR) virtually disbanded in 1998, and two of the group's top
three leaders came out of hiding to surrender. Earlier in the
year, KR elements committed two acts of international terrorism
that caused 12 deaths. The US Secretary of State has designated
the KR a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
In Japan, the Aum Shinrikyo religious cult, accused of
attacking the Tokyo subway system with sarin gas in March 1995,
increased its membership and business activity in 1998.
Prosecution of cult leaders continues at a sluggish pace. In
June a Lebanese court rejected appeals by five imprisoned
Japanese Red Army members; Japan has asked that they be
deported to Japan upon completion of their three-year jail
terms. Both groups are designated foreign terrorist
organizations pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996.
The Philippines experienced violent attacks in the southern
province of Mindanao from rebels in the Moro Islamic Liberation
Army (MILF), the New Peoples Army (NPA), and the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG). The government began negotiations with the MILF
that showed little progress in 1998. The ASG experienced a
major setback in December when its leader was killed during a
government ambush. Other incidents, including attacks on rural
police posts around the country and kidnappings of foreign
nationals, occurred in 1998.
In Thailand, a strong military offensive against Muslim
separatists of the New Pattani United Liberation Organization
(New PULO)--in cooperation with Malaysia--helped restore calm
in the south, which had experienced a wave of bombings in
January. The Thai Supreme Court overturned the conviction of
Hossein Dastgiri, an Iranian charged in 1994 with plotting to
bomb the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok.
In South Asia, the Taliban has made Afghanistan a safehaven
for international terrorists, particularly Usama Bin Ladin. The
United States made it clear to the Taliban on numerous
occasions that it must stop harboring such terrorists. Despite
US engagement of the Taliban in an ongoing dialogue, its
leaders have refused to expel Bin Ladin to a country where he
can be brought to justice.
In 1998 the United States continued its efforts to
ascertain the fate of the four Western hostages--including one
US citizen--kidnapped in India's Kashmir in 1995 by affiliates
of the Harakat-ul-Ansar (HUA). Despite ongoing cooperative
efforts between US and Indian law enforcement authorities, we
have been unable to determine their whereabouts. The HUA was
designated a foreign terrorist organization in 1997 pursuant to
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
In Pakistan, sectarian violence continues to affect lives
and property. In Karachi and elsewhere in the Sindh and Punjab
Provinces, clashes between rival ethnic and religious groups
reached dangerously high levels. As in previous years, there
were continuing credible reports of official Pakistani support
for Kashmiri militant groups that engage in terrorism.
In Sri Lanka, the government continues to battle the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Designated a foreign
terrorist organization in 1997 pursuant to the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the LTTE has continued
its attempts to gain a Tamil homeland through a campaign of
violence, intimidation, and assassination. By targeting
municipal officials and civilian infrastructure and conducting
random attacks, the LTTE seeks to force the government to meet
to its demands. The Government of Sri Lanka is pursuing a two-
track policy of fighting the Tigers and building support for
its ambitious package of political reforms aimed at addressing
many of the Tamil minority's grievances. Recent military
setbacks may push the government toward negotiations, but the
LTTE has shown no willingness to move in this direction.
afghanistan
Islamic extremists from around the world--including large
numbers of Egyptians, Algerians, Palestinians, and Saudis--in
1998 continued to use Afghanistan as a training ground and a
base of operations for their worldwide terrorist activities.
The Taliban, which controls most of the territory in
Afghanistan, facilitated the operation of training and
indoctrination facilities for non-Afghans and provided
logistical support and sometimes passports to members of
various terrorist organizations. Throughout 1998 the Taliban
continued to host Usama Bin Ladin, who was indicted in November
for the bombings in August of two US Embassies in East Africa.
cambodia
Weakened by defections and internal discord, the last
remnants of the Khmer Rouge virtually disbanded in 1998
following 30 years of civil war and terror. The KR suffered
significant losses in 1998, including the death of leader Pol
Pot in April. During crackdowns in August, the government
arrested Nuon Paet, a former KR fugitive suspected of ordering
the execution of three European tourists after holding them
hostage for two months in 1994. By late December the last main
fighting unit of the KR had surrendered, including two of the
group's top three leaders: Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea.
Before fragmenting, Khmer Rouge elements committed two acts
of international terrorism in 1998. In January, KR militants
reportedly placed a handgrenade near the Vietnamese military
attache's office in Phnom Penh. In April, KR forces murdered 12
Vietnamese nationals at a fishing village near Tonle Sap lake.
india
Security problems persisted in India in 1998 because of
ongoing insurgencies in Kashmir and the northeast. Kashmiri
militant groups stepped up attacks against civilian targets in
India's Kashmir and shifted their tactics from bombings to
targeted killings, including the massacres of Kashmiri
villagers. In April the massacres spilled over to Udhampur
district, where 28 villagers died in two simultaneous attacks.
Elsewhere in India, election-related violence at the beginning
of 1998 claimed more than 150 lives. In an effort to disrupt a
Bharatiya Janata Party rally on 14 February, Islamic militants
in Coimbatore conducted a series of bombings that killed 50 and
wounded more than 200.
The Indian and Pakistani Governments each claim that the
intelligence service of the other country sponsors bombings on
its territory. The Government of Pakistan acknowledges that it
continues to provide moral, political, and diplomatic support
to Kashmiri militants but denies allegations of other
assistance. Reports continued in 1998, however, of official
Pakistani support to militants fighting in Kashmir.
japan
Three years after the sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo
subway system in March 1995, the prosecution of high-level Aum
Shinrikyo religious cult leaders--including cult founder Shoko
Asahara--continues. Press reports indicate that, if it
maintains its current sluggish pace, the trial could take 30
years to complete. Japanese security officials reported a rise
in Aum Shinrikyo membership and business activity in 1998,
despite a severe police crackdown on the group following the
sarin attack. The United States designated Aum Shinrikyo a
foreign terrorist organization in 1997 pursuant to the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
On 3 June the highest criminal court in Lebanon rejected an
appeal made by five convicted Japanese Red Army members and
endorsed their three-year prison sentence for forgery and
illegal residency. Tokyo has asked that they be deported to
Japan upon completion of their jail terms.
pakistan
Sectarian and political violence surged in Pakistan in 1998
as Sunni and Shia extremists conducted attacks against each
other, primarily in Punjab Province, and as rival wings of an
ethnic party feuded in Karachi. The heightened political
violence prompted the imposition of Governor's rule in Sindh
Province in October. According to press reports, more than 900
persons were killed in Karachi from January to September, the
majority by acts of domestic terrorism.
In the wake of US missile strikes on terrorist training
camps in Afghanistan, several Pakistani-based Kashmiri militant
groups vowed revenge for casualties their groups suffered. At a
press conference held in Islamabad in November, former Harakat
ul-Ansar and current Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) leader Fazlur
Rehman Khalil reportedly vowed: ``We will kill one hundred
Americans for one Muslim.'' Other Kashmiri and domestic
Pakistani sectarian groups also threatened to target US
interests. The leader of the Lashkar-i-Taiba declared a jihad
against the United States, and the leader of the Lashkar-i-
Jhangvi vowed publicly to kill US citizens and offered his
support to Bin Ladin.
Pakistani officials stated publicly that, while the
Government of Pakistan provides diplomatic, political, and
moral support for"freedom fighters'' in Kashmir, it is firmly
against terrorism and provides no training or materiel support
for Kashmiri militants. Kashmiri militant groups continued to
operate in Pakistan, however, raising funds and recruiting new
cadre. These activities created a fertile ground for the
operations of militant and terrorist groups in Pakistan,
including the HUA and its successor organization, the HUM.
philippines
The new government of President Joseph Estrada continued
the previous administration's attempts to reach a peaceful
settlement with rebels of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. In
August the two sides pledged to begin substantive talks in
September. By yearend, however, little progress had been made
toward ending the conflict, and both sides continued to engage
in low-level violence. The Communist New People's Army also was
active in 1998, conducting a series of attacks on rural police
posts throughout the country.
Clashes between government forces and various insurgent
groups were particularly violent in the southern province of
Mindanao. In this remote region the Philippine Armed Forces
sporadically engaged militants of the MILF and the smaller,
more extremist Abu Sayyaf Group. These periodic military sweeps
appear to have weakened both groups. The ASG, in particular,
suffered a major setback in late December when government
security forces killed its leader during an ambush.
Islamic insurgents were responsible for several
international terrorist incidents in the Philippines in 1998.
In early September, suspected MILF and ASG militants conducted
a rash of kidnappings of foreign nationals, including three
Hong Kong businessmen and an Italian priest. Two months later,
one group of rebels freed the Italian after 100 MILF fighters
surrounded the rebels' jungle hideout and forced his release.
sri lanka
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam conducted significant
levels of terrorist activity in 1998. The LTTE attacked
government troops, bombed economic and infrastructure targets,
and assassinated political opponents. An LTTE suicide vehicle
bombing at the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy in January 1998
killed the three suicide bombers and 13 civilians--including
three children--and injured 23. The LTTE's deadliest terrorist
act in 1998 was a vehicle bomb explosion in the Maradana
district of Colombo in March that killed 36 persons--including
five schoolchildren--and wounded more than 250.
The LTTE assassinated several political and military
officials in 1998. In May a suicide bomber killed a senior Sri
Lankan Army commander, Brigadier Larry Wijeratne. Three days
after that attack, armed gunmen assassinated newly elected
Jaffna Mayor S. Yogeswaran--a widow of an LTTE-assassinated
Tamil politician--in an attack claimed by the Sangilian Force,
a suspected LTTE front group. In July an LTTE mine explosion
killed Tamil parliamentarian S. Shanmuganathan, his son, and
three bodyguards. In September an LTTE bomb planted in a Jaffna
government building killed new Jaffna Mayor P. Sivapalan and 11
others.
During the year, the LTTE conducted numerous attacks on
infrastructure and commercial shipping. In the first half of
1998 the LTTE bombed several telecommunications and power
facilities in Sri Lanka. In August the LTTE stormed a Dubai-
owned cargo ship, the Princess Kash, which was carrying food,
concrete, and general supplies to the Jaffna Peninsula. The
Tigers took hostage the 21 crewmembers--including 16 Indians--
but released the Indians five days later.
``Operation Sure Victory,'' the Sri Lankan military's
ground offensive aimed at reopening and securing a ground
supply route through LTTE-held territory in northern Sri Lanka,
continued through 1998. The offensive ended in December about
40 kilometers short of its goal. The Sri Lankan military
immediately initiated a new offensive in the same area.
The Sri Lankan Government strongly supported international
efforts to address the problem of terrorism in 1998. Colombo
was quick to condemn terrorist attacks in other countries and
has raised terrorism issues in several international venues,
including the UN General Assembly in New York and the UN High
Commission for Refugees in Geneva. Sri Lanka was the first
country to sign the International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings at the United Nations in
January.
There were no confirmed cases of LTTE or other terrorist
groups targeting US interests or citizens in Sri Lanka in 1998.
Nonetheless, the Sri Lankan Government was quick to cooperate
with US requests to enhance security for US personnel and
facilities and cooperated fully with US officials investigating
possible violations of US law by international terrorist
organizations. Sri Lankan security forces received training in
explosive incident countermeasures, vital installation
security, and post-blast investigation under the US Anti-
Terrorism Assistance Program.
thailand
On February 18 the Thai Supreme Court overturned the
conviction of Iranian Hossein Dastgiri, who had been prosecuted
for a plot in 1994 to bomb the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok. The
court ruled that conflicting eyewitness testimony failed to
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that Dastgiri was the
driver of the bomb-laden truck. In southern Thailand, Muslim
separatists of the New Pattani United Liberation Organization
conducted a series of bombings in January. Thai authorities
launched a military counteroffensive in mid-January that netted
several PULO militants. These arrests, combined with
unprecedented assistance from Malaysia, where PULO militants
had traditionally found refuge, helped to restore calm in the
south.
Eurasia Overview
In Russia, several prominent local officials were killed
and some US and Russian citizens were kidnapped in Chechnya and
the North Caucasus region. At least some of the killings
appeared politically motivated, including the assassination of
Russian State Duma deputy Galina Starovoytova and Shadid
Bargishev, head of the Chechen antikidnapping squad. Some
Chechen insurgents have links to terrorist Usama Bin Ladin.
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze survived an
assassination attempt by supporters of a former president in
1998. The arrest of some of his attackers provoked further
incidents and led to Russian cooperation in the arrest and
extradition of an individual alleged to have conspired in
planning the attack. The breakaway region of Abkhazia witnessed
the abduction of four UN military observers in July and the
ambush and wounding of UN observers in September.
The Kazakhstan Government averted a potential threat to the
US Embassy in Almaty by arresting and expelling three Iranian
Government agents for illegal activities. Four members of a
United Nations mission of observers to Tajikistan were killed
while on patrol 150 kilometers outside of Dushanbe. Of the
various terrorist incidents that occurred in Tajikistan in
1998, this was of greatest concern to the international
community.
armenia
On 1 April local US Embassy guards discovered and safely
disarmed a handgrenade outside the US Ambassador's residence.
There was no claim of responsibility.
georgia
Supporters of deceased former Georgian President Zviad
Gamsakhurdia, known as ``Zviadists,'' and ethnic Chechen
mercenaries attempted to assassinate Georgian President Eduard
Shevardnadze on 9 February. The assailants launched a well-
organized attack against Shevardnadze's motorcade late in the
evening using rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons.
Shevardnadze survived the attack--the second against him in
three years--but it almost succeeded. Two officers of
Shevardnadze's protective service and one of the attackers, an
ethnic Chechen, died in the ensuing gunfight. The government
arrested 11 of the assailants within days of the attack.
Subsequently, some 15 of Shevardnadze's assailants
kidnapped four United Nations observers from their compound in
Zugdidi, western Georgia, to ensure the assailants' escape and
their colleagues' release. The hostages escaped or were
released following a dialogue between the Shevardnadze
government and former members of Gamsakhurdia's faction. Some
of the hostage takers surrendered, but Gocha Esebua, the
Zviadist leader of the assassination team, escaped. According
to press reports, Georgian police killed Esebua in a shootout
on 31 March after they tracked him to a house in western
Georgia.
Georgian officials also apprehended former Gamsakhurdia
government Finance Minister Guram Absandze, the alleged
mastermind of the assassination attempt. Russian security
authorities detained Absandze in Smolensk, Russia, on 16 March
and extradited him to Georgia three days later, where he was
formally arrested.
Violence in Georgia's breakaway region of Abkhazia
accounted for several incidents that involved foreign
personnel. In July four UN military observers were taken
hostage. On 21 September three UN military observers and their
Abkhaz driver were wounded in Sukhumi during an ambush on a
clearly marked UN vehicle, according to press reporting. Two of
the injured were military observers from Bangladesh, and the
third victim was a UN employee from Nigeria.
kazakhstan
During 1998 the United States and Kazakhstan cooperated to
avert potential security threats to the US Embassy in Almaty.
In February, Committee for National Security (KNB) authorities
arrested--and subsequently expelled--three Iranian Ministry of
Intelligence and Security agents for illegal activities. The
Government of Kazakhstan did not publicize details of the
Iranian agents' activities or prosecute them before their
expulsion, however. The US Government and the Government of
Kazakhstan signed a joint statement on combating terrorism in
November.
kyrgyzstan
According to press reports, Kyrgyzstani security
authorities alleged that Islamic extremists, vaguely identified
as ``Wahhabis,'' conducted two bombings in 1998 in Osh,
Kyrgyzstan's second-largest city located in the Fergana Valley.
On 30 May an explosion occurred in a public minibus, killing
two persons and wounding 10, while an explosion in an apartment
the next day killed two persons. The motive behind the
explosions was unclear because of insufficient information.
Nonetheless, Wahhabism, a fundamentalist Sunni Islamic sect
originating in Saudi Arabia, never has been widespread in
Kyrgyzstan.
russia
The assassination on 20 November of noted reformist and
Russian State Duma deputy Galina Starovoytova by unidentified
assailants--possibly a politically motivated contract killing--
highlights both the terrorist tactics used by domestic
antagonists to influence Russian politics and Moscow's
inability to curb this violence. Chechen militants assassinated
Shadid Bargishev, head of the Chechen antikidnapping squad, on
25 October in reaction to widely publicized antikidnapping
operations in Chechnya's capital, Groznyy. No one claimed
responsibility for an explosive device that detonated under
Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov's car in June. Maskhadov
escaped without injury, but four others were killed in the
attack.
At least three US citizens were kidnapped in Russia for
financial gain in 1998. On 18 March unknown assailants abducted
two US missionaries in Saratov, Russia, took their money and
bank cards, and released them on 22 March. No ransom appears to
have been paid. On 11 November in Makhachkala, Dagestan,
unidentified assailants kidnapped US citizen Herbert Gregg, a
member of a nondenominational Protestant organization based in
Illinois. Russian authorities continue to investigate the
incident.
Numerous abductions occurred in Russia's North Caucasus
region during 1998. Most involved ransom demands, although
political motives cannot be excluded. Some Chechen groups in
1998 used kidnapping to raise money, and hostages could be sold
and resold among various Chechen kidnapping groups, according
to Russian officials. Several foreigners and hundreds of
Russian civilians and soldiers kidnapped in the region still
are missing. On 20 January, Vincent Cochetel, a French citizen
who led the United Nations Human Rights Commission's North
Caucasus office, was abducted. He finally was released on 12
December. Four British employees of Granger Telecom were
kidnapped in early October and on 8 December were found
murdered. On 1 May, Valentin Vlasov, President Boris Yeltsin's
representative to Chechnya, was kidnapped by unknown
assailants. He was released on 13 November.
Mujahidin with extensive links to Middle Eastern and
Southwest Asian terrorists aided Chechen insurgents with
equipment and training. The insurgents were led by Habib Abdul
Rahman, alias Ibn al-Khattab, an Arab mujahidin commander with
links to Usama Bin Ladin. Khattab's forces launched attacks
against Russian military targets, but their activities in
Russia were localized in the North Caucasus region.
tajikistan
Security for the international community in Tajikistan did
not improve significantly in 1998, as a number of criminal and
terrorist incidents--including bombings, assaults, and
murders--took place. The most serious incident occurred on 20
July when attackers shot and killed four members of the United
Nations mission of observers to Tajikistan while on patrol some
150 kilometers east of Dushanbe. Tajikistani authorities later
arrested three former Tajikistani opposition members, who
initially confessed to the killings but later recanted.
In September the US State Department ordered the suspension
of Embassy operations in Dushanbe. The decision was made
because of threats to US facilities worldwide following the US
Embassy bombings on 7 August in East Africa, turmoil in
Tajikistan, and the Embassy's limited ability to secure the
safety of US and foreign personnel in the facility.
Europe Overview
The number of terrorist incidents declined in Europe in
1998, in large part because of increased vigilance by security
forces and the recognition by some terrorist groups that
longstanding political and ethnic controversies should be
addressed in negotiations. Terrorism in Spain was attributable
almost entirely to the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
group. In Turkey, most incidents were related to the Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK). In Greece, a variety of anarchist and
terrorist groups continued to operate with virtual impunity.
The deadliest terrorist act occurred in Omagh, Northern
Ireland, when a splinter Irish Republican Army (IRA) group
exploded a 500-pound car bomb that killed 29 persons, including
children.
In Northern Ireland, the Catholic and Protestant
communities made a major commitment to end the violence by
signing the Good Friday Accord. Under the leadership of the
British and Irish Governments, both communities and the
political parties that represent them agreed to compromises
that are to create new, local governmental institutions for
resolving conflicts and turn away from terrorism as an accepted
political instrument. In support of the peace process, most
paramilitary terrorist groups on both nationalist and loyalist
sides agreed to a cease-fire. The issue of ``decommissioning''
the IRA's weaponry and bombs continued to complicate the
process, however.
In Spain, the terrorist ETA declared a cease-fire on 16
September to provoke negotiations with the central government.
Public outrage throughout Spain over the ETA assassinations of
several local Spanish officials earlier in 1998 and the
government's infiltration and dismantling of several ETA
``commandos'' in recent years prompted the group's cease-fire.
Strong French legal pressure also eroded the ETA's support base
in neighboring French provinces.
The Turkish Government's threat to act against PKK
safehavens in neighboring Syria led Damascus to expel PKK
leader Abdullah Ocalan, who for years had been directing PKK
terrorist activities from his villa there. Ocalan's departure
and subsequent flight to seek a new safehaven left the PKK in
some disarray, although its members conducted several deadly
suicide bombings in Turkey after his departure from Syria.
The Greek Government's counterterrorist efforts remained
ineffective. The Revolutionary Organization 17 November group
struck six times in early 1998, and several other groups
claimed responsibility for bombings in various locations in
Greece. The Greek Government has not arrested a single 17
November member in the 23 years since the group killed its
first victim, a US Embassy employee; the group subsequently
eliminated 22 other persons.
In Germany, the remnants of the Red Army Faction (RAF)
announced the dissolution of their organization, once among the
world's deadliest. The declaration suggested that the remaining
members realized their terrorist group had lost its purpose.
albania
Albania took an active stance against international
terrorism in 1998 by launching a campaign of arrests and
investigations against suspected Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)
terrorists operating in the capital, Tirana. In late June,
Albanian security forces captured four Egyptian extremists and
rendered them immediately to Egypt. Despite public EIJ threats,
Albanian police continued to pursue the group. In October
security forces raided an EIJ safehouse, killing one suspected
terrorist.
While these examples demonstrate the government's
commitment to fight terrorism, Albania's poor internal security
provides an environment conducive to terrorist activity.
belgium
Belgian police arrested 10 suspected Armed Islamic Group
(GIA) members in March during raids in Brussels. Police seized
false documents, detonators, and some small caliber weapons.
During a follow-up raid, police uncovered explosives in a GIA
supporter's home. The arrests were part of a joint security
operation with France, Britain, Sweden, and Italy before the
World Cup soccer match in Paris.
In April, Belgium prosecuted three suspected GIA members
for the grenade attack in December 1995 on two police officers
in Bastogne. Two suspects, Kamel Saddeddine and Youssef El
Majda, were convicted and sentenced to five years in prison.
The other, Ah El Madja, also was convicted and sentenced to
serve three years.
france
French authorities initiated a large-scale security effort
across Europe before France hosted the World Cup soccer match
last summer. In late May police apprehended about 100 suspected
Algerian GIA members during simultaneous operations in France,
Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland. Antiterrorism
magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguiere described the coordinated
effort as a ``preventive'' measure to protect the games.
In 1998, French authorities brought numerous terrorists to
justice for past acts of violence. In September, French
prosecutors began a mass trial of 138 Algerian terrorists for a
wave of bombings committed in 1995 and 1996. Controversy marred
the two-month trial, however, and more than 50 politicians
signed a petition denouncing the proceedings as unfair and
racist. Those convicted received sentences ranging from four
months to 10 years.
In late November, France prosecuted eight suspected members
of Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) on charges of
smuggling arms to terrorists. The suspects allegedly belong to
a network headed by FIS leader Djamel Lounici, currently under
house arrest in Italy pending trial. A French court already has
sentenced Lounici in absentia to five years in prison for arms
smuggling in another case concerning Morocco.
germany
The Red Army Faction announced its ``self-dissolution'' in
April, following more than two decades of struggle against the
German Government. Meanwhile, German courts continued to
adjudicate cases against RAF members for terrorist acts
committed in the 1980s.
German police took an active stance against terrorism in
1998. Acting on a request from the United States, they detained
Salim Mamdouh Mahmud, an associate of Usama Bin Ladin, in
September and extradited him to the United States in December.
In the weeks before the World Cup soccer match, they worked
closely with the French to disrupt Algerian terrorist networks
in Germany.
On the judicial front, the trial of five suspected
terrorists continued for their part in the La Belle discotheque
bombing in 1986 in Berlin. Controversy has plagued the trial
from the start, and at the current pace a verdict is not
expected before the year 2000.
The German Government showed less resolve in November when
PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan arrived unannounced in Rome. Germany
withdrew its longstanding international arrest warrant for the
Kurdish terrorist leader after PKK militants threatened riots
and violence in German cities if Ocalan were prosecuted there.
The German action effectively precluded Ocalan's extradition
from Italy.
greece
The majority of the international terrorist incidents
committed in Europe in 1998 occurred in Greece. Most of these
attacks were firebombings that numerous leftist and anarchist
groups conducted against businesses and Greek Government
offices. The government made arrests in connection with only
one attack.
Greece's most deadly terrorist group, the Revolutionary
Organization 17 November, claimed responsibility for six
attacks against US or US-related businesses in Athens between
February and April, including a rocket attack on a Citibank
office. As in the past, Greek efforts failed to achieve any
tangible success against 17 November terrorists. To augment
their counterterrorism capability, Greek officials met in
September with FBI Director Louis Freeh. The discussions
improved Greek cooperation with US law enforcement agencies.
In January an Athens appeals court denied Italy's petition
to extradite Enrico Bianco, a former Red Brigades member whom
Greek police arrested in November 1997 and subsequently freed.
Bianco continues to live freely in Greece.
Greek relations with Turkey remained tense as numerous
members of the Greek Parliament continued to court PKK members.
In April some Greek parliamentarians attended a reception
hosted by the PKK's political wing, the ERNK. At the reception
a self-proclaimed PKK representative announced plans to open an
office in Athens under the PKK's rubric. Greek officials
interceded to prevent the opening.
In November, 109 Greek parliamentarians-mostly from the
governing PASOK party-signed a letter reiterating a standing
invitation to PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan to visit Greece. The
Greek Government distanced itself from the invitation, saying
Ocalan was not welcome. In November, Ocalan arrived in Rome at
the beginning of what became an odyssey to gain asylum in
Europe. (After his capture in Nairobi in February 1999, it
became known that Ocalan had transited Greece at least twice
during his travels with the knowledge and assistance of highly
placed Greek officials. At one point, Ocalan remained in Greece
for several days. Senior Greek officials took responsibility
for providing Ocalan with haven in the Greek Embassy residence
in Kenya in February 1999.)
italy
On 12 November, PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan arrived
unexpectedly in Rome and requested political asylum. He
initially was detained there on an international warrant issued
by Germany. Italy declined to act on a Turkish extradition
request, citing Turkey's long-unused capital punishment
statute, which prohibits extradition to countries with capital
punishment. Italy also declined to exercise its option under
international law to prosecute Ocalan. After Bonn withdrew the
warrant, the Italians told Ocalan he was free to leave. After
trying unsuccessfully to find a country willing to take him,
Italian officials said he no longer was welcome in Italy.
Ocalan eventually left for Russia, with the apparent assistance
of Italian officials, beginning an odyssey that culminated in
his seizure in Kenya in February 1999.
In October police arrested five Islamic terrorists in Turin
for weapons violations and reported links to Usama Bin Ladin.
The next month police arrested suspected GIA terrorist Rahid
Fetter in Milan on charges of forgery, counterfeiting, and
membership in a subversive organization. The Italians accused
Fetter of providing shelter, funds, and false identification
papers to GIA militants.
latvia
A series of bomb attacks in the Latvian capital, Riga,
targeted Russian and Jewish interests in 1998. On 2 April a
bomb exploded in the courtyard of the main Jewish synagogue in
Riga's historic Old Town. The blast caused extensive damage to
the main entrance and a swastika-adorned Latvian flag was found
on the scene, according to press reporting. On 5 April a mine
exploded in a park across the street from the Russian Embassy
in Riga. The explosion did not damage the Embassy, but it
shattered the windows of four Embassy vehicles. These
incidents, which occurred late at night, caused no casualities.
There were no claims of responsibility, but authorities suspect
members of Eduard Limonov's Russian National Bolshevist Party,
a Russian ultranational group. On 19 October, Israeli officials
discovered a mail bomb during a routine check of packages
mailed to the Israeli Embassy in Riga. Latvian authorities
safely destroyed the device.
spain
The terrorist group Basque Fatherland and Liberty announced
a unilateral and unconditional cease-fire on 16 September. At
yearend the cease-fire was holding. ETA has not renounced
terrorism and continued to engage in terrorist activity before
the cease-fire. In 1998, the ETA killed six persons, compared
with 13 in 1997. On 3 November, President Aznar called for
direct talks with ETA to make the cease-fire permanent, but the
two sides appear to have differing agendas for the talks. The
government is offering some measures of relief for 530 ETA
prisoners in Spanish jails and an estimated 1,000 exiles, while
ETA wants to include political issues of sovereignty and self-
determination.
The Spanish Government energetically and successfully has
sought extradition of ETA fugitives from some countries,
including France and several Latin American nations. A Spanish
request for extradition from the United States of accused ETA
terrorist Ramon Aldasoro was delayed in 1998, but on 4 February
1999 the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in
Atlanta paved the way for Aldasoro's extradition.
In addition to ongoing police and law enforcement action to
break up ETA commandos and arrest their members, the Spanish
Government in 1998 undertook a series of measures designed to
debilitate ETA's financial infrastructure. These measures
included attempts to limit ETA's fundraising capabilities, shut
down businesses with ETA involvement, and locate ETA's
financial assets. In July the government shut down the pro-ETA
newspaper Egin.
The leftwing terrorist First of October Anti-Fascist
Resistance Group (GRAPO) reemerged in 1998 after a three-year
hiatus. The government discounts GRAPO's operational
capability, but the organization claimed responsibility for a
number of bombings and sent extortion letters to businessmen.
turkey
Turkey achieved some notable successes in its battle
against terrorism in 1998, especially against the PKK, its
foremost terrorist group. Turkey continued its vigorous
campaign against the PKK in southeastern Turkey and northern
Iraq. Turkey's large-scale military offensives appear to have
affected greatly the PKK's ability to operate in Turkey. In
March, Turkish military commandos captured Semdin Sakik, the
PKK's second in command, in northern Iraq and bought him to
Turkey. Turkish security forces launched a series of successful
military campaigns in late spring and early fall that hampered
PKK activity in southeast Turkey. In October, Turkey applied
intense pressure on the Syrian Government to discourage Syrian
support for the PKK. As a result, Syria forced PKK leader
Ocalan to leave. Ocalan fled to Russia and then on to Italy
where he requested political asylum. Italy subsequently refused
to extradite Ocalan to Turkey and Ocalan left Italy. (Turkey
scored a major coup against PKK terrorism in February 1999,
when Turkish officials tracked down Ocalan in Nairobi, captured
him, and brought him back to Turkey to stand trial.)
During 1998 the PKK continued to conduct acts of violence
against military and civilian targets. On 10 April, PKK
terrorists on a motorcycle threw a bomb into a park near the
Blue Mosque in Istanbul. The explosion injured two Indians, a
New Zealander, and four Turkish citizens. The PKK also
continued its campaign of kidnappings in southeast Turkey. In
early June, PKK terrorists kidnapped a German tourist and a
Turkish truckdriver at a roadblock in Karakose. The German
tourist was found unharmed the next morning near the kidnapping
site, but the truckdriver still is missing. Immediately after
Ocalan's arrest in Italy, the PKK conducted three suicide
bombings in southeastern Turkey, which killed three persons and
injured dozens of Turkish citizens, despite Ocalan's public
renunciation of terrorism.
Several extreme leftist and other groups were active in
Turkey in 1998. Leftist groups operating in Turkey include the
Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front, Turkish Workers'
and Peasants' Liberation Army, Turkish Peoples' Liberation
Army, and the Turkish Peoples' Liberation Front. Fundamentalist
Islamic organizations operating in Turkey include the so-called
``Turkish Hizballah,'' the Islamic Movement Organization, and
the Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front. Effective Turkish
security measures appear to have reduced the threat from these
fringe groups over the years. For example, on 31 December,
Turkish police arrested the head of the Islamic Great Eastern
Raiders Front, Salih Mirzabeyoglou, in Istanbul.
united kingdom
In April feuding Catholic and Protestant parties signed the
landmark Good Friday Accord. This historic agreement outlined a
comprehensive power-sharing arrangement between both
communities in a multiparty administration of Northern Ireland.
For the first time, the Irish Republican Army's political wing,
Sinn Fein, was allowed to join the new administration, as long
as its leaders remained committed to ``exclusively peaceful
means.'' Both sides hotly debated the meaning of this and other
provisions in the accord following the signing. The most
contentious issue was whether the IRA would abandon its weapons
and bombs. Notwithstanding the IRA's commitment to uphold its
cease-fire, several splinter groups continued to engage in
terrorist activity.
As the debates wore on over the summer, Ireland suffered
its worst single terrorist act. On 15 August terrorists from
one of the splinter groups, the self-styled Real IRA, exploded
a 500-pound car bomb outside a courthouse in downtown Omagh,
killing 29 persons and injuring more than 330 others. This
attack followed another terrorist bombing by the Real IRA in
Banbridge on 1 August, which injured 35 persons and damaged
approximately 200 homes.
By November the accord appeared on the verge of collapse as
neither side could come to agreement on key issues. Both sides
worked vigorously to jump-start negotiations by Christmas so
that the new government could take power by February 1999. Only
one paramilitary group-one of Northern Ireland's most vicious,
the Loyalist Volunteer Force-willingly has surrendered a cache
of weapons. Both sides viewed the group's disarmament as a sign
that a breakthrough in the stalled peace accord was possible.
The IRA continued to resist what it labels a ``surrender'' of
its arms, however, while in its view the conditions that caused
the conflict remain unresolved.
The United Kingdom continued to cooperate closely with the
United States on counterterrorism issues in 1998. In September,
British authorities arrested Khalid al-Fawwaz, a Saudi
national, who is wanted by the United States for conspiring to
murder US citizens between January 1993 and September 1998. Al-
Fawwaz remains in British custody pending his extradition to
the United States.
Latin America Overview
Colombia's principal insurgent groups, the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation
Army (ELN), stepped up attacks against security forces and
civilians in 1998, despite a budding peace process with the
Colombian Government. They continued to conduct kidnapping,
bombing, and extortion campaigns against civilians and
commercial interests.
Bogota pursued peace negotiations while guerrillas launched
a concerted offensive against police and military bases
throughout the country. By yearend, the government had
completed the demilitarization of five municipalities as an
incentive for talks, which began in January 1999.
In March, FARC commanders announced they would target US
military personnel assisting Colombian security forces, but
insurgent attacks--including intensified operations against
police and military bases--did not harm US forces. Colombian
terrorists continued to target private US interests, however.
Guerrillas kidnapped US citizens in Colombia and northern
Ecuador, and the FARC refused to account for the whereabouts of
three missionaries it kidnapped in January 1993. Guerrillas
also continued to bomb US commercial interests, such as oil
pipelines and small businesses.
Arrests in Peru contributed to the steady decline in
Sendero Luminoso (SL) and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
(MRTA) terrorist capabilities. Peruvian officials arrested two
of the four original members of SL's Central Emergency
Committee, which comprises the SL's top leaders. The SL failed
uncharacteristically to commemorate Peru's Independence Day in
July with even a low-level attack or to disrupt municipal
elections in October. The MRTA did not launch a terrorist
attack in 1998, continuing a trend of relative inactivity since
the hostage crisis at the Japanese Ambassador's residence in
Lima ended in April 1997.
Switzerland denied Chile's request for the extradition of a
terrorist from the dissident wing of the Manuel Rodriguez
Patriotic Front, who escaped from a maximum security prison in
Santiago in December 1996.
In the triborder area, Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay
consolidated efforts to stem the illicit activities of
individuals linked to Islamic terrorist groups. The three
countries consulted closely on enforcement efforts and actively
promoted regional counterterrorist cooperation.
The Government of Argentina hosted an Organization of
American States conference on terrorism and gained the
participants' commitment to form a regional commission on
counterterrorist initiatives.
argentina
Investigations continued into the two devastating bombings
against Jewish and Israeli targets in Buenos Aires: the attack
in March 1992 against the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, in
which 29 persons died, and the bombing in July 1994 of the
Argentine Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) building that
killed 86 persons and injured hundreds more. Islamic Jihad,
Hizballah's terrorist arm, claimed responsibility for the
attack in 1992. No clear claim for the AMIA bombing has been
made, although the two attacks had many similarities. At
yearend, Argentine authorities questioned two possible key
informants in the attacks.
The Iranian Government expelled the Argentine commercial
attache from Tehran in early 1998 in response to growing
criticism in Argentina about a possible official Iranian role
in the attacks. The Argentine Government responded by asking
Tehran to reduce the number of diplomats in its mission in
Buenos Aires to one, the number of official Argentines left in
Iran. The judge responsible for the AMIA investigation
interviewed Iranian defectors in Western Europe and the United
States who claimed to have knowledge about the bombing. He also
charged an Argentine citizen with providing the stolen vehicle
used in the bombing. Several former Buenos Aires provincial
police officials remain in custody for their role in supplying
the vehicle.
In August, Argentine authorities arrested two SL members
living in Argentina. At yearend, they were awaiting extradition
to Peru.
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay cooperated actively in the
triborder region against terrorism and continued their work to
counter criminal activities of individuals linked to Islamic
terrorist groups. In March the three countries signed a plan to
improve security in the triborder area and created a commission
to oversee implementation of the plan.
In late November, Argentina hosted the second Inter-
American Specialized Conference on Terrorism in Mar del Plata.
Conference participants agreed to recommend that the
Organization of American States' General Assembly form an
Inter-American Committee on Terrorism to coordinate regional
cooperation against terrorism.
chile
The Swiss Government denied Chile's extradition request for
Patricio Ortiz Montenegro, a member of the Manuel Rodriguez
Patriotic Front dissident wing who escaped from prison in
Santiago on 30 December 1996, because it was concerned that
Chile would not safeguard Ortiz's physical and psychological
well-being. Chilean authorities continued to pursue the
whereabouts of the three other terrorists who escaped with
Ortiz.
colombia
The incipient peace process in Colombia did not inhibit the
guerrillas' use of terrorist tactics. The FARC and ELN
continued to fund their insurgencies by protecting narcotics
traffickers, conducting kidnap-for-ransom operations, and
extorting money from oil and mining companies operating in the
Colombian countryside.
Colombian insurgents began an offensive against security
forces in the summer and retained their military momentum at
yearend. The Colombian Government demilitarized five
municipalities to meet FARC conditions for peace negotiations,
and in mid-December the FARC leader agreed to meet Colombia's
President on 7 January 1999 to set the agenda for talks.
FARC commanders announced in March that they would target
US military personnel assisting Colombian security forces. The
guerrillas did not act on these threats, and their heightened
attacks against Colombian police and military bases did not
target or incidentally kill or injure US forces.
Colombian terrorists continued to target private US
interests, kidnapping seven US citizens in 1998. The FARC
abducted four US birdwatchers in March at a FARC roadblock; one
escaped and the terrorists released the three others in April.
Also in March, the FARC kidnapped one retired US oil worker and
released him in September. ELN terrorists in September released
one US citizen held since February 1997. The ELN kidnapped two
other US citizens in northern Ecuador in October; one hostage
escaped, and the kidnappers released the other in late
November. The FARC has not accounted for the whereabouts of
three missionaries it kidnapped in January 1993.
Terrorists also continued to bomb US commercial interests,
such as oil pipelines and small businesses, raising costs to US
companies operating in Colombia. There were 77 pipeline
bombings during the year. In October the ELN bombed Colombia's
central oil pipeline--used by US companies--causing a massive
explosion that killed 71 persons, including 28 children. An ELN
commander subsequently announced that, despite the
unanticipated death toll, the guerrillas would continue to
target the nation's oil infrastructure to prevent the foreign
``looting'' of Colombia's wealth.
panama
Alleged terrorist Pedro Miguel Gonzalez won the Democratic
Revolutionary Party (PRD) candidacy for a seat in the National
Assembly. Gonzalez, whose father heads the ruling PRD, was
acquitted of the murder in 1992 of US serviceman Zak Hernandez
in a Panamanian trial characterized by irregularities and
political manipulation. The US case against Gonzalez and one
other suspect remains open, and the US Embassy in Panama
continues to raise the issue with senior Panamanian
authorities.
Panamanian authorities made no arrests in connection with
the bombing in 1994 of a commuter airline that killed 21
persons, including three US citizens. US law enforcement
agencies continued to investigate the case actively but still
had not determined whether the bombing was politically
motivated or tied to drug traffickers.
peru
Peruvian law enforcement and judicial authorities continued
to arrest and prosecute members of the SL and MRTA terrorist
groups. In 1998 they arrested Pedro Quinteros Ayylon and Jenny
Maria Rodriguez Neyra, two of the four original members of SL's
25-person Central Emergency Committee who still were at large.
The Peruvian Government also captured Andres Remigio Huarnan
Ore, leader of the MRTA military detachment in the Chanchanmayo
Valley, and most of that unit's members.
Peru extradited Peruvian citizen Cecilia Nunez Chipana, a
Sendero Luminoso militant, from Venezuela. The Peruvian
Government also requested the extradition from Argentina of
Peruvian nationals Julio Cesar Mera Collazo and Maria del
Rosano Silva, two SL members accused of murder. At yearend the
extradition request was pending in Buenos Aires.
Both groups failed to launch a significant terrorist
operation in Lima in 1998 and generally limited their
activities to low-level attacks and propaganda campaigns in
rural areas. The SL continued to attack police stations and
other government targets in the Peruvian countryside and in
August conducted a particularly brutal attack in Sapasoa,
killing the mayor and three of his supporters at a rally. The
SL did not commemorate Peru's Independence Day or disrupt
municipal elections in October with its characteristic
terrorist violence. The MRTA had not engaged in major terrorist
activities since the end of the hostage crisis at the Japanese
Ambassador's residence in Lima in April 1997.
Middle East Overview
Middle Eastern terrorist groups and their state sponsors
continued to plan, train for, and conduct terrorist acts in
1998, although their actions cumulatively were less lethal than
in 1997. The lower level of fatalities resulted from more
effective counterterrorist measures by various governments and
from the absence in 1998 of the kinds of major incidents that
had killed dozens the previous year, such as the attack on
Luxor temple in Egypt and a series of HAMAS suicide bombings in
public places in Israel. The most dramatic terrorist acts
attributed to Middle Eastern terrorists in 1998 actually
occurred in Africa, where Usama Bin Ladin's multinational al-
Qaida network bombed the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es
Salaam.
In Egypt, government security forces scored some successes
in reducing violence by Islamist opponents, particularly the
al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya, which had conducted the lethal attack
on tourists at Luxor in 1997. Judicial proceedings brought
convictions against many terrorists. Deaths from terrorism-
related incidents in 1998 fell to 47, fewer than one-third the
number in 1997. Nonetheless, there was troubling evidence of a
growing collaboration in other countries between Egyptian
extremists--from both the Gama' and the Egyptian al-Jihad--and
Usama Bin Ladin.
The Algerian Government also made progress in combating
domestic terrorism in 1998, undertaking aggressive
counterinsurgency operations again the Armed Islamic Group
(GIA) that slowed the GIA's campaign of indiscriminate violence
against civilians. As the GIA's bloody tactics drew increasing
criticism both inside and outside Algeria, other militants
joined the unilateral cease-fire that the Islamic Salvation
Army had declared in late 1997.
Palestinian groups opposed to the peace process mounted
terrorist attacks in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. HAMAS
conducted car bombings, shootings, and grenade attacks--
injuring dozens of civilians--while two terrorists belonging to
the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) launched a suicide bombing at
a Jerusalem market. Both Israel and the Palestinian Authority
conducted raids and arrests that undercut the extremists'
ability to inflict as many fatalities as in previous years.
Security conditions in Lebanon improved in 1998, but the
lack of complete government control in parts of Beirut,
portions of the Bekaa Valley, and the so-called Israeli
security zone in southern Lebanon enabled numerous terrorist
groups to operate with relative impunity. Hizballah, HAMAS, the
PIJ, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--
General Command (PFLP-GC) used camps in Lebanon for training
and operational planning. The conflict in southern Lebanon
between Lebanese armed groups and Israel and its local allies
continued unabated.
In Yemen, foreign and indigenous extremists in 1998
conducted several bombings and numerous kidnappings, including
the abduction and subsequent release of more than 60 foreign
nationals. A group calling itself the Islamic Army of Aden
claimed responsibility for the seizure of 16 Western tourists.
The terrorists killed four of the hostages when Yemeni
Government security forces tried to free them.
Iran, Syria, Libya, and Iraq all persisted in their direct
and indirect state sponsorship of terrorism. In most cases,
this support included providing assistance, training, or
safehaven to terrorist groups opposed to the Middle East peace
process. In some cases, particularly Iran and Iraq, it also
included targeting dissidents and opponents of these
authoritarian regimes for assassination or harassment.
algeria
The Government of Algeria in 1998 made progress in
combating domestic terrorism, which has claimed approximately
75,000 lives since Islamic extremists began their violent
campaign to overthrow the government in 1992. The government
intensified its counterinsurgency operations against the Armed
Islamic Group, and several militant groups in 1998 joined the
unilateral cease-fire declared by the Islamic Salvation Army
(AIS)--the armed wing of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)--in
October 1997. The GIA also suffered a number of setbacks to its
networks in Europe. No foreign nationals were killed in acts of
terrorism in Algeria during the year.
The GIA continued to conduct terrorist operations in
Algeria in 1998, targeting a broad spectrum of Algerian
civilians. The worst incident of 1998 occurred on 11 January
during the holy month of Ramadan, when GIA extremists massacred
numerous civilians in Sidi Hamed. Official estimates put the
death toll at more than 100 civilians; press accounts reported
the death toll even higher. Other smaller civilian massacres
and acts of violence also continued throughout the year.
The seemingly indiscriminate and horrific violence against
civilians--including women and children--was condemned widely
in domestic and international circles and eroded Islamist
support for the group abroad. The GIA's campaign of attacking
civilians also exacerbated internal divisions: dissident GIA
leader Hassan Hattab in May publicly criticized GIA faction
leader Antar Zouabri for his attacks on civilians and in
September formally separated from the GIA. Hattab created a new
element, the Salafi Group for Call and Combat, aimed primarily
at attacking security force elements. Despite the split from
Zouabri, Hattab's faction continued to commit violence in
Algeria throughout 1998. Hattab claimed responsibility for
assassinating the popular Berber singer Matoub Lounes in June,
an act that further alienated the Algerian public.
bahrain
Minor security incidents continued to plague Bahrain in
1998. Bahraini security forces in November arrested several
Bahraini and Lebanese citizens, seizing weapons and explosives,
in connection with a plot to attack public facilities and other
installations in Bahrain. Bahraini Prime Minister Shaykh
Khalifa claimed the operation was planned in Lebanon, where
members of the group reportedly had received military training.
Some of those arrested allegedly also confessed to conducting
arson attacks.
Bahrain continued in 1998 to seek the extradition of eight
individuals--including five in the United Kingdom--who were
convicted in absentia in November 1997 for orchestrating and
funding from abroad a campaign aimed at disrupting Bahraini
security.
egypt
The number of deaths in 1998 from terrorist-related
incidents fell to 47, fewer than one-third of the tally for
1997 and the lowest since 1992. Egyptian security forces
increased security and counterterrorist operations against
Egyptian extremists, particularly al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya,
following its attack in November 1997 at Luxor that killed 58
foreign tourists and four Egyptians. Trials of Egyptian
extremists responsible for various terrorist acts were held
throughout the year, resulting in several convictions. The
improving security situation led tourism to increase in 1998.
Egypt also hosted in October an Interpol conference that
promoted international cooperation in the fight against
terrorism. Egypt also worked closely with other Arab countries
in counterterrorism efforts, pursuant to an agreement reached
among Arab interior ministers earlier in the year.
Despite the intensified security and counterterrorist
actions following the Luxor incident, Egyptian extremists--
particularly al-Jihad--continued to levy threats against Egypt
and the United States for the arrests and extradition in 1998
of their cadre from Albania, Azerbaijan, South Africa, Italy,
and the United Kingdom. Both al-Jihad and al-Gama'at al-
Islamiyya signed terrorist sponsor Usama Bin Ladin's fatwa in
February that called for attacks against US civilians, although
al-Gama'at publicly denied that it is a member of Bin Ladin's
World Islamic Front for the Jihad Against the Jews and
Crusaders. Al-Gama'at leaders imprisoned in Egypt followed the
lead of imprisoned Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, issuing a public
statement in early November that called for the cessation of
operations in Egypt and urged al-Gama'at to create a ``peaceful
front.'' Gama'at leaders abroad endorsed the idea but
emphasized they would continue to target US interests and
support the jihad.
israel, the west bank, and gaza strip
Violence and terrorism by Palestinian groups opposed to the
peace process continued in 1998, albeit at a reduced level as
compared with the previous two years. HAMAS alone launched more
than a dozen attacks over the year. Among the more notable were
grenade attacks in Hebron in September that injured 25 persons
and in Beersheva in October that injured more than 50. A HAMAS
car bomb in the Gaza Strip in late October killed one Israeli
soldier and injured several schoolchildren. The PIJ attempted a
car bombing in November in Jerusalem that killed only the two
militants.
Other serious attacks against Israel and its citizens also
occurred, including the shooting deaths of two settlers on
guard duty in early August and the assassination of a prominent
rabbi in Hebron later that month. Small bomb explosions in Tel
Aviv in August and in Jerusalem in September wounded a total of
13 Israelis.
For its part, Israel continued vigorous counterterrorist
operations, including numerous arrests and seizures of weapons
and explosives. In one of the most significant actions of the
year, Israeli forces on 10 September raided a farmhouse near
Hebron, killing two leading HAMAS terrorists, Adil and Imad
Awadallah.
The Palestinian Authority (PA), which is responsible for
security in Gaza and most major West Bank cities, continued to
act against Palestinian perpetrators of anti-Israeli violence.
The PA's security apparatus preempted several attacks over the
year, including a planned HAMAS double-suicide bombing staged
from the Gaza Strip in late September. The PA launched several
large-scale arrest campaigns targeting individuals with ties to
terrorist organizations and detained several leading HAMAS and
PIJ political figures. In one of the more significant
operations of the year, the PA in late September uncovered a
HAMAS bomb lab filled with hundreds of kilograms of explosives.
At the same time, more PA effort is needed to enhance its
bilateral cooperation with Israel and its unilateral fight
against terrorism.
In late October, the PA and Israel signed the Wye River
Memorandum, which includes a number of provisions for increased
security cooperation.
jordan
There were no major international terrorist attacks in
Jordan in 1998, but several low-level incidents kept security
forces focused on combating the terrorist threat. In February,
amid rising tensions over Iraqi weapons inspections, the
British Embassy in Amman was the target of a firebomb attack
that caused no damage. Between mid-March and early May, the
Reform and Defiance Movement--a small, mostly indigenous
radical Islamic group--conducted a string of small bombings in
Amman targeting Jordanian security forces, the Modern American
School, and a major hotel. These attacks caused minor property
damage.
Amman continued to maintain tight security along its
borders and to interdict and prosecute individuals caught
smuggling weapons and explosives, primarily intended for
Palestinian rejectionist groups in the West Bank. In September,
Amman convicted two Jordanians of possession of illegal
explosives with the intent to commit terrorist acts and
sentenced them to 15 years in prison with hard labor. The two
reportedly had planned to attack Israelis in Israel or the West
Bank. In October the state prosecutor referred to the security
court the case of six men accused of possessing and selling of
explosives to support terrorist aims.
Jordan permitted and monitored the limited presence of
several Palestinian rejectionist groups, including HAMAS, the
PIJ, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine,
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the
Popular Front for the Liberation of the Palestine-General
Command. The Jordanian Government allowed the HAMAS Political
Bureau to maintain a small information office in Amman as well
as personal offices for senior HAMAS members who live in
Jordan, several of whom are Jordanian citizens. In 1998, Jordan
did not permit known members of the group's military wing to
reside or operate in country, however. In November, Jordan
issued a public warning to HAMAS and other rejectionist groups
that it would not tolerate acts that ``impede implementation''
of the Wye River Memorandum.
Jordan continued to cooperate with other regional states
concerning terrorist threats to the region and in April signed
the multilateral Arab Anti-Terrorism Agreement. King Hussein
publicly voiced support for the US-UK initiative in the Pan Am
103 case.
lebanon
Security conditions in Lebanon continued to improve in
1998, but lack of complete government control in several areas
of the country--including portions of the Bekaa Valley and
Beirut's southern suburbs--and easy access to arms and
explosives throughout much of the country contributed to an
environment with the potential for acts of violence. The
Lebanese Government did not exert full control over militia
groups engaged in fighting in and near the so-called security
zone occupied by Israel and its proxy militia, the Army of
South Lebanon.
In these areas, a variety of terrorist groups continued to
operate with relative impunity, conducting terrorist training
and other operational activities. These groups include
Hizballah, HAMAS, the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), the PIJ and
the PFLP-GC. Hizballah presents the most potent threat to US
personnel and facilities in Lebanon by an organized group.
Although Hizballah has not attacked US interests in Lebanon
since 1991, its animosity toward the United States has not
abated, and the group continued to monitor the US Embassy and
its personnel in Beirut. Hizballah leaders routinely denounced
US policies in the region and sharply condemned the Wye River
Memorandum between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
One anti-US attack occurred in Lebanon in 1998. On 21 June
four rocket-propelled grenades were fired at the US Embassy in
Beirut from some 700 meters away, falling only a short distance
from their launch site and causing no damage. The grenades were
launched from a crudely manufactured firing device, suggesting
that the attack was not conducted by an organized group.
Lebanese authorities responded swiftly to the incident, but as
of 31 December investigators had not determined who had
conducted the attack and there were no claims of
responsibility. The reason for the attack is unclear, but its
occurrence two days after Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri had
visited Washington suggested it was intended as a sign of
displeasure with US-Lebanese relations or was an attempt to
embarrass Hariri.
Lebanese citizens also were the targets of random bombings
in 1998. Car bombs targeted Amal and PIJ leaders in south
Lebanon in October, a resident of Sidon in July, and a Sunni
mayoral candidate in west Beirut in May. Although no one was
killed, these incidents illustrate the potential danger from
random political violence in Lebanon.
The Lebanese Government continued to support publicly
international counterterrorist initiatives, and its judiciary
system made limited progress in prosecuting terrorist court
cases. In early June the Lebanese Supreme Court rejected a
defense appeal for a retrial of five Japanese Red Army members
and endorsed the three-year prison sentence handed down last
year.
saudi arabia
There were several reported threats against US interests in
Saudi Arabia in 1998 but no terrorist incidents. The US Embassy
in Riyadh and Consulates in Jiddah and Dhahran closed for a few
days in early October after receiving information that a
terrorist attack was being planned against the Embassy.
Terrorist Usama Bin Ladin, whose Saudi citizenship was
revoked in 1994, continued publicly to threaten US interests in
Saudi Arabia in 1998. In a press conference in Afghanistan in
May, Bin Ladin declared a holy war against US forces in the
Arabian Peninsula, many of whom are stationed in Saudi Arabia.
The declaration followed a communique in February in which Bin
Ladin and other terrorists called for attacks on US and allied
civilians and military interests worldwide.
The investigation into the bombing in June 1996 of the
Khubar Towers housing facility near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia,
continued in 1998, but it has not been resolved. In that
incident, a large truck bomb killed 19 US citizens and wounded
more than 500 others. The Saudi Government has requested that
the United States extradite Hani al-Sayegh--a Saudi national
arrested by the Canadians and deported to the United States in
1997--so they may question him about his alleged role in the
bombing. At the end of 1998 a decision on al-Sayegh's
extradition case was pending with the US Immigration and
Naturalization Service. In November, Saudi Interior Minister
Prince Nayif stated publicly that Bin Ladin was not responsible
for the Khubar Towers bombing or the bombing in November 1995
of the Office of the Program Manager-Saudi Arabia National
Guard (OPM/ SANG) facility in Riyadh, which killed seven
persons. Nayif allowed that individuals motivated by Bin Ladin
could have conducted the attacks, however.
tunisia
There were no terrorist incidents reported in Tunisia in
1998. The Government of Tunisia remains publicly committed to
countering terrorist threats, particularly from Islamic
extremists. The government continued publicly to express its
opposition to international terrorism, strongly condemning the
terrorist attacks in August against the US Embassies in Nairobi
and Dar es Salaam. Tunis also remains concerned about Algeria's
violence spilling over into Tunisia and employs strict domestic
security controls to counter this threat.
Tunisia continued to participate in regional counter-
terrorism efforts. In January the government hosted a meeting
of Arab League interior ministers at which an agreement was
reached to enhance inter-Arab counterterrorism cooperation.
Tunisia agreed to extradite convicted terrorists, improve
information exchanges, and strengthen control on the
infiltration and travel of suspected terrorists in Arab
countries.
The government continued to prosecute individuals for
membership in the outlawed An-Nahda movement, which it
considers a terrorist organization, although there were no
reports of terrorist attacks by the group in 1998. On 2 June a
Tunisian court found two Tunisian nationals guilty of
assassinating Belgian Vice Premier Andre Cools in Liege in 1991
and sentenced them to 20-year prison terms.
yemen
A series of bombings in 1998 in Sanaa and southern Yemen
caused numerous casualties and some property damage. A bombing
in April at a mosque near Sanaa killed two persons and injured
27 others, including two US citizens. In response to the
bombings, Yemeni authorities in August announced the arrest of
several Yemeni oppositionists, alleging they were working for
``foreign parties.'' Interior Minister Arab also blamed
``foreign groups'' for a bombing in September at a market in
Aden that caused two deaths and 27 injuries. In August the
United States warned US citizens in Yemen of a threat to US
interests there, days after terrorists bombed the US Embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania. Three persons were killed and several
were injured in November when a car bomb exploded near the
German Embassy in Sanaa.
Yemeni tribesmen kidnapped and released more than 60
foreign nationals in l998, more than three times the number
abducted in 1997. The Islamic Army of Aden--a little known
Islamic group that has issued anti-US threats--claimed
responsibility for the kidnapping in late December of 16
Western tourists, including two US citizens. Four of the
tourists died, and two others--including one US citizen--were
wounded during a Yemeni Government rescue attempt that
liberated the remaining hostages. Following the incident, the
group issued a statement calling for the lifting of sanctions
against Iraq. In addition, gunmen in December shot and wounded
a US citizen working on a Dutch agricultural development
project while they were attempting to hijack his car. The
Yemeni Government issued a decree in August implementing severe
punishment--including execution--for kidnappers and stepped up
enforcement of the law on unlicensed weapons in major cities.
Continuing efforts begun in 1997, the Yemeni Government
took further steps to rein in foreign extremists. Sanaa
increased its security cooperation with other Arab countries
and reportedly forced several foreign extremists to leave
Yemen. The government also instituted the requirement that
Algerian, British, Egyptian, Libyan, Sudanese, and Tunisian
nationals seeking entry into Yemen travel directly from their
home counties. Nevertheless, the government's inability to
control many remote areas continued to make the country a
safehaven for terrorist groups.
Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism
Terrorist attacks sponsored by states have declined in
recent years but remain a serious threat. With state
sponsorship a terrorist group often receives safehaven, money,
weapons, training, logistic support, or use of diplomatic
facilities. Some of the most violent terrorist attacks on
record would not have been possible without such sponsorship.
usama bin ladin
The bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar
es Salaam, Tanzania on 7 August 1998 underscored the global
reach of Usama Bin Ladin--a long-time sponsor and financier of
Sunni Islamic extremist causes--and his network. A series of
public threats to drive the United States and its allies out of
Muslim countries foreshadowed the attacks. The foremost threat
was presented as a Muslim religious decree and published on 23
February 1998 by Bin Ladin and allied groups under the name
``World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and
Crusaders.'' The statement asserted that it was a religious
duty for all Muslims to wage war on US citizens, military and
civilian, anywhere in the world.
The 17th son of Saudi construction magnate Muhammad Bin
Ladin, Usama joined the Afghan resistance almost immediately
after the Soviet invasion in December 1979. He played a
significant role in financing, recruiting, transporting, and
training Arab nationals who volunteered to fight in
Afghanistan. During the war, Bin Ladin founded al-Qaida--the
``Base"--to serve as an operational hub for like-minded Sunni
Islamic extremists. In 1994 the Saudi Government revoked his
citizenship and his family officially disowned him. He moved to
Sudan in 1991 but international pressure on Khartoum forced him
to move to Afghanistan in 1996.
Bin Ladin leads a broad-based, versatile organization.
Suspects named in the wake of the Embassy bombings--four
Egyptians, one Comoran, one Jordanian, three Saudis, one US
citizen, one or possibly two Kenyan citizens, and one
Tanzanian--reflect the range of al-Qaida operatives. The
diverse groups under his umbrella afford Bin Ladin resources
beyond those of the people directly loyal to him. With his own
inherited wealth, business interests, contributions from
sympathizers in various countries, and support from close
allies like the Egyptian and South Asian groups that signed his
so-called fatwa, he funds, trains, and offers logistic help to
extremists not directly affiliated with his organization.
Bin Ladin seeks to aid those who support his primary goal--
driving US forces from the Arabian Peninsula, removing the
Saudi ruling family from power, and ``liberating Palestine"--or
his secondary goals of removing Western military forces and
overthrowing what he calls corrupt, Western-oriented
governments in predominantly Muslim countries. To these ends,
his organization has sent trainers throughout Afghanistan as
well as to Tajikistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya,
Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen, and has trained fighters from
numerous other countries, including the Philippines, Egypt,
Libya, Pakistan, and Eritrea.
Using the ties al-Qaida has developed, Bin Ladin believes
he can call upon individuals and groups virtually worldwide to
conduct terrorist attacks. His Egyptian and South Asian allies,
for example, publicly threatened US interests in the latter
half of 1998. Bin Ladin's own public remarks underscore his
expanding interests, including a desire to obtain a capability
to deploy weapons of mass destruction.
On 4 November indictments were returned in the US District
Court for the Southern District of New York in connection with
the two US Embassy bombings in Africa. Charged in the
indictment were: Usama Bin Ladin, his military commander
Muhammad Atef, and Wadih El Hage, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed,
Mohammed Sadeek Odeh, and Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali, all
members of al-Qaida. Two of these suspects, Odeh and al-Owhali,
were turned over to US authorities in Kenya and brought to the
United States to stand trial. Another suspect, Mamdouh Mahmud
Salim, was arrested in Germany and extradited to the United
States in December. On 16 December five others were indicted
for their role in the Dar es Salaam Embassy bombing: Mustafa
Mohammed Fadhil, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, Ahmed Khalfan
Ghailani, Fahid Mohommed Ally Msalam, and Sheikh Ahmed Salim
Swedan.
Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria are
the seven governments that the US Secretary of State has
designated as state sponsors of international terrorism. US
policy is to pressure these states to cease their support by
applying a broad range of sanctions, both unilateral and
multilateral. International cooperation is essential in making
these sanctions work, and more needs to be done in this area.
Cuba has reduced significantly its support to leftist
revolutionaries in Latin America and elsewhere, but it
maintains close ties to other state sponsors of terrorism and
leftist insurgent groups and continues to provide safehaven to
a number of international terrorists.
Iran continues to plan and conduct terrorist attacks,
including the assassination of dissidents abroad. It supports a
variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals--
including several that oppose the Middle East peace process--by
providing varying degrees of money, training, safehaven, and
weapons.
Iraq provides safehaven to terrorist and rejectionist
groups and continues its efforts to rebuild its intelligence
network, which it used previously to support international
terrorism. The leader of the Abu Nidal organization may have
relocated to Baghdad in late 1998.
Libya continues to harbor two Libyan intelligence
operatives charged in the United States and Scotland for the
bombing in 1988 of Pan Am Flight 103. Libya's action defies UN
Security Council resolutions requiring Tripoli to surrender
them for trial and ignores a US-UK offer to prosecute them
before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands. Libya also
harbors six suspects in the bombing of UTA flight 772 in 1989,
although French authorities agreed to try the six in absentia.
Several Middle Eastern terrorist groups continue to receive
support from Libya, including the PIJ and the PFLP-GC. There is
no evidence of Libyan involvement in recent acts of
international terrorism, however.
Although North Korea has not been linked definitively to
any act of international terrorism since 1987, it continues to
provide safehaven to terrorists who hijacked a Japanese
airliner to North Korea in 1970.
Sudan provides safehaven to some of the world's most
violent terrorist groups, including Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qaida,
Lebanese Hizballah, the PIJ, the ANO, and HAMAS. The Sudanese
Government also refuses to comply with UN Security Council
demands that it hand over for trial three fugitives linked to
the assassination attempt in 1995 against Egyptian President
Mubarak in Ethiopia.
There is no evidence of direct Syrian involvement in acts
of international terrorism since 1986, but Syria continues to
provide sanctuary and support for a number of terrorist groups
that seek to disrupt the Middle East peace process.
cuba
Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin
America or elsewhere. Previously, the Castro regime provided
significant levels of funding, military training, arms, and
guidance to various revolutionary groups across the globe.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Havana has been
forced to reduce dramatically its support to leftist
revolutionaries.
Cuba, nonetheless, continues to maintain close ties to
other state sponsors of terrorism and leftist insurgent groups
in Latin America. For instance, Colombia's two main terrorist
groups, the FARC and the ELN, maintain representatives in Cuba.
Moreover, Havana continues to provide safehaven to a number of
international terrorists and US terrorist fugitives.
iran
Iran in 1998 continued to be involved in the planning and
execution of terrorist acts. Tehran apparently conducted fewer
antidissident assassinations abroad in 1998 than in 1997.
Tehran continued, however, to support a variety of groups that
use terrorism to pursue their goals. Despite Iranian public
statements condemning certain terrorist acts or expressing
sympathy for Kenyan and Tanzanian victims of the August 1998
bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam,
Iranian support for terrorism remains in place.
Tehran is reported to have conducted several assassinations
outside Iran during 1998. In June the ``League of the Followers
of the Sunna'' accused Iranian intelligence agents of murdering
an Iranian Sunni cleric, Shaikh Nureddin Ghuraybi, in
Tajikistan. In September the leaders of Sipah-e-Sahaba
Pakistan, a virulently anti-Shia sectarian group, accused Iran
of responsibility for the murders of two of the organization's
leaders, Allama Shoaib Nadeem and Maulana Habibur Rehman
Siddiqui. In late November the National Council of Resistance
claimed that the Iranian regime had kidnapped and killed Reza
Pirzadi in Pakistan. Pirzadi was described as a warrant officer
who had been released from prison in Iran in 1996.
Members of Iran's Ministry of Security and Intelligence
(MOIS) may have conducted five mysterious murders of leading
writers and political activists in Iran. Late in the year,
Tehran announced the discovery of an operational cell within
the MOIS that it alleged operated without the knowledge of
senior government officials. Tehran reportedly arrested the
cell's members.
The Iranian Government stated publicly that it would take
no action to enforce the fatwa on Salman Rushdie, a British
citizen, which has been in effect since 1989. The Iranian
Government's assurance led the UK Government to upgrade its
diplomatic relations with Iran. Tehran stated, however, that
revoking the fatwa is impossible since its author is deceased.
Moreover, the Iranian Government has not required the Fifteen
Khordad Foundation to withdraw its reward for executing the
fatwa on Rushdie, and in November the Foundation increased its
offer to $2.8 million.
Iran continued to provide support to a variety of terrorist
groups, including the Lebanese Hizballah, HAMAS, and the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which oppose the Middle East peace
process through violence. Iran supports these groups with
varying amounts of training, money, and/or weapons.
In March, a US district court ruled that Iran should pay
$247 million to the family of Alisa Flatow, a US citizen killed
in a PIJ bomb attack in Gaza in April 1995. The court ruled
that Iran was responsible for her death because it provided
funding to the PIJ, which claimed responsibility for the act.
Palestinian sources said Iran supported the PIJ's claimed
attack in Jerusalem in early November 1998, in which two
suicide bombers injured some 21 persons.
Iran still provides safehaven to elements of the PKK, a
Turkish separatist group that has conducted numerous terrorist
attacks in Turkey and on Turkish targets in Europe.
Iran also provides support to North African groups. In an
interview in April 1998, former Iranian president Bani Sadr
accused Tehran of training Algerian fighters, among others.
Tehran accurately claims it also is a victim of terrorism.
In 1998 several high-ranking members of the Iranian Government
were attacked and at least two were killed in attacks claimed
by the terrorist group Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK). The MEK claimed
responsibility for the killing on 23 August of Asadollah
Lajevardi, the former director of Tehran's Evin Prison. It also
claimed responsibility for the deaths in June of several
persons, including Haj Hassan Salehi, allegedly a torturer at
the prison, during a bombing attack on the Revolutionary
Prosecutor's Office in Tehran.
Mohsen Rafiqdust, head of the Foundation for the Oppressed
and Disabled, escaped an attack on his life on 13 September. He
said counterrevolutionary elements had embarked on efforts to
make the country insecure.
At least nine Iranian diplomatic and associated personnel
died when unknown persons invaded the Iranian Consulate in
Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan, in early August during the Taliban
takeover of that city. The Taliban denied responsibility for
the deaths.
iraq
In 1998, Baghdad continued efforts to rebuild its
intelligence network, which it previously had used to support
international terrorism. Press reports indicated that Iraqi
intelligence agents may have been planning an attack against
Radio Free Europe in Prague in October 1998. Other press
reports citing ``reliable diplomatic sources'' in Amman claimed
that Iraq had sent abroad for terrorist purposes intelligence
agents who pretended to be refugees and businessmen. Iraqi
oppositionists have claimed publicly that the regime intends to
silence them and have accused Baghdad of planning to
assassinate Iraqi exiles. There are various claims that the
Iraqi intelligence service was responsible for the killings of
some nine persons in Amman, but we cannot corroborate the
charges.
In January 1998 an Iraqi diplomat was fired on in Amman,
Jordan. Jordanian authorities arrested five persons who
subsequently confessed responsibility. In a separate incident,
eight persons--including an Iraqi diplomat--were murdered in
the home of an Iraqi businessman. Jordanian authorities in
April arrested several persons for this crime.
In southern Iraq, Ayatollah Morteza Borujerdi--a senior
Shia cleric--was killed on 22 April. Oppositionists claimed the
Iraqi Government assassinated Borujerdi because he refused to
cease leading prayers. A second high-ranking Shia cleric,
Ayatollah Ali Gharavi, was killed on 18 June. The oppositionist
Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq accused
Baghdad of responsibility. Both men were respected Shia clerics
of Iranian origin and their murders remain unsolved.
Iraq continues to provide safehaven to a variety of
Palestinian rejectionist groups, including the Abu Nidal
organization, the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), and the former
head of the now-defunct 15 May Organization, Abu Ibrahim, who
masterminded several bombings of US aircraft. In December press
reports indicated that Abu Nidal had relocated to Iraq and may
be receiving medical treatment. Abu Nidal's move to Baghdad--if
true--would increase the prospect that Saddam may call on the
ANO to conduct anti-US attacks. Iraq also provides bases,
weapons, and protection to the MEK, a terrorist group that
opposes the current Iranian regime.
libya
Despite a joint US-UK offer to prosecute the two Libyans
charged with the bombing in 1988 of Pan Am Flight 103 before a
Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands, Libya remained
unwilling to meet the demands of UN Security Council
resolutions 731, 748, 883, and 1192. These measures call upon
Libyan leader Qadhafi to cease all support to terrorism, turn
over the two indicted Pan Am 103 suspects for trial, and
cooperate in the investigation. (On 5 April 1999, Libya turned
over the two suspects, `Abd al Basit al-Megrahi and Lamin
Kalifah Fhima, for prosecution in the Netherlands under
Scottish law.)
French officials in January completed their investigation
into the bombing in 1989 of UTA Flight 772. The French
officials believe that the Libyan intelligence service was
responsible and named Qadhafi's brother-in-law, Muhammad
Sanusi, as the attack's mastermind. (Six Libyan suspects, all
intelligence officers, were tried in absentia by a French court
in March 1999. The suspects were convicted on 8 March 1999.)
Libya remains the primary suspect in several other past
terrorist operations, including the La Belle discotheque
bombing in Berlin in 1986, which killed two US servicemen, one
Turkish civilian, and wounded more than 200. The trial in
Germany of five defendants in the case, who are accused of ``an
act of assassination commissioned by the Libyan state,'' began
in November 1997 and continued through 1998.
Despite ongoing sanctions against Libya for its sponsorship
of terrorism, Tripoli in 1998 continued to harass and
intimidate expatriate dissidents. Moreover, Qadhafi continued
publicly and privately to support Palestinian terrorist groups,
including the PIJ and the PFLP-GC. Libya has not been
implicated in any international terrorist act for several
years, however.
north korea
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has not been
linked solidly to the planning or execution of an international
terrorist attack since 1987, when a KAL airliner was bombed in
flight. North Korea continues to provide safehaven to members
of the Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction who
participated in the hijacking of a Japanese Airlines flight to
North Korea in 1970. In March, P'yongyang allowed members of
the Japanese Diet to visit some of the hijackers.
sudan
Sudan continued to serve as a meeting place, safehaven, and
training hub for a number of international terrorist groups,
particularly Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qaida organization. The
Sudanese Government also condoned many of Iran's objectionable
activities, such as funding terrorist and radical Islamic
groups operating and transiting Sudan.
Sudan still has not complied fully with UN Security Council
Resolutions 1044, 1054, and 1070, passed in 1996, despite the
regime's efforts to distance itself publicly from terrorism.
The UNSC demands that Sudan end all support to terrorists. It
also requires Khartoum to hand over three Egyptian al-Gama'at
fugitives linked to the assassination attempt in 1995 against
Egyptian President Mubarak in Ethiopia. Sudanese officials
continue to deny that they are harboring the three suspects and
that they had a role in the attack.
Khartoum continues to provide safehaven to members of
several of the world's most violent terrorist groups, including
Lebanese Hizballah, the PIJ, the ANO, and HAMAS. Khartoum also
supports regional Islamic and non-Islamic opposition and
insurgent groups in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, and Tunisia.
Sudanese support to terrorists includes provision of
paramilitary training, money, religious indoctrination, travel
documents, safe passage, and refuge. Most of the organizations
in Sudan maintain offices or other types of representation.
In August the United States accused Sudan of involvement in
chemical weapons development. On 20 August the United States
conducted military strikes against the al-Shifa pharmaceutical
plant in Khartoum, which was associated with Usama Bin Ladin's
terrorist network and believed to be involved in the
manufacture of chemical weapons, to prevent an anti-US attack.
Sudan has denied that the plant was involved in chemical
weapons production and vigorously has protested the US bombing.
syria
There is no evidence that Syrian officials have engaged
directly in planning or executing international terrorist
attacks since 1986. Syria, nonetheless, continues to provide
safehaven and support to several terrorist groups, allowing
some to maintain training camps or other facilities on Syrian
territory. Ahmad Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, for
example, have their headquarters in Damascus. In addition,
Syria grants a wide variety of terrorist groups--including
HAMAS, the PFLP-GC, and the PIJ--basing privileges or refuge in
areas of Lebanon's Bekaa Valley under Syrian control.
In response to Turkish pressure, Damascus took several
important steps against the Kurdistan Workers' Party in
October. PKK leader Abdallah Ocalan departed Syria, and
Damascus forced many PKK members to relocate to northern Iraq.
It is unclear whether Damascus has made a long-term commitment
to sever its ties to the PKK.
Although Damascus claims to be committed to the Middle East
peace process, it has not acted to stop anti-Israeli attacks by
Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist groups in southern
Lebanon. Syria allowed--but did not participate in--a meeting
of Palestinian rejectionist groups in Damascus in December to
reaffirm their public opposition to the peace process. Syria
also assists the resupply of rejectionist groups operating in
Lebanon via Damascus. Nonetheless, the Syrian Government
continues to restrain the international activities of some
groups and to participate in a multinational monitoring group
to prevent attacks against civilian targets in southern Lebanon
and northern Israel.
Appendix A: Chronology of Significant Terrorist Incidents
5 January
Yemen
Two Yemeni tribesmen kidnapped three South Korean citizens,
including the wife and daughter of the First Secretary of the
Korean Embassy, in Sanaa. The hostages were released on 9
January.
8 January
Russia
Two Swedish missionaries were kidnapped in Makhackala. An
anonymous telephone caller claiming to represent the Dagestani
kidnappers stated the hostages had been moved to Chechnya. The
hostages were released on 24 June 1998.
14 January
Israel
A boobytrapped videocassette exploded at the Israel-Lebanon
border crossing near Metulla, injuring three Israelis and three
Lebanese, including the man who carried it. The Amal claimed
responsibility, stating that the intended target was a senior
Israeli intelligence officer.
21 January
Yemen
Armed tribesmen abducted two engineers in two separate
incidents. The tribesmen released the hostages, one German and
one Chinese, the next day.
25 January
India
Heavily armed masked militants attacked four Hindu families in
Wandhama, on the Pakistani side of the Kashmir Line of Control,
killing at least 23 men, women, and children. A lone survivor
described the militants as Urdu-speaking foreigners, who first
took tea with the Hindu families before opening fire. The
militants also set fire to a Hindu temple and some homes.
3 February
Chad
Five armed members of a Chadian opposition group kidnapped four
French nationals in Manda National park in Moyen-Chari
Prefecture, releasing them unharmed on 8 February. The Union of
Democratic Forces (UFD) claimed responsibility.
Greece
Bombs detonated at two McDonald's restaurants in the Halandri
and Vrilissia suburbs of Athens, causing extensive damage.
Authorities suspect anarchists carried out the attacks in
retaliation for the arrest of the alleged leader of the
Fighting Guerrilla Formation (MAS).
9 February
Yemen
Yemeni tribesmen kidnapped a Dutch tourist in Sanaa. The
kidnappers demanded the release of three members of their clan
who had been arrested for stealing a United Nations vehicle.
The hostage was released on 25 February.
19 February
Georgia
Armed supporters of late Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia
abducted four United Nations military observers from Sweden,
Uruguay, and the Czech Republic. On 22 February one Uruguayan
military observer was released. The remaining hostages were
released after President Shevardnadze met with the Gamsakhurdia
opposition on 25 February. Eight of the kidnappers were
captured. (The leader, a key figure in the assault on 9
February on President Shevardnaze's motorcade, remained at
large until Georgian authorities tracked him to western Georgia
and killed him in a shootout on 31 March.)
19 February
Yemen
Yemeni al-Hadda tribesmen kidnapped a Dutch agricultural expert
in Dhamar. The kidnappers demanded development projects in
their area and released the hostage the next day.
21 February
Pakistan
Unidentified gunmen killed two Iranian engineers near the
Iranian Cultural Center in Karachi. The shooting may have been
conducted to mark the anniversary of the attack on 20 February
1997 on the Iranian Cultural Center in Multan.
25 February
Ethiopia
An armed group kidnapped an Austrian national as she traveled
from Gode to Denan, according to press reports. The Ogaden
National Liberation Front (ONLF) claimed responsibility. The
ONLF released the hostage 23 March after announcing on a
radiobroadcast its intent to release her.
14 March
Colombia
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas
kidnapped two French businessmen in Meta Department, according
to press accounts. The hostages are brothers who run a hotel in
the department. One hostage was released shortly after the
abduction with a huge ransom demand by the rebels for his
brother's release.
21 March
Colombia
FARC rebels kidnapped a US citizen in Sabaneta. According to
multiple media sources, the hostage was released to the
International Red Cross on 6 September 1998.
22 March
Chad
Gunmen kidnapped six French and two Italian nationals in the
Tibesti region. Chadian forces freed all but one hostage within
hours. A group called the National Front for the Renewal of
Chad (FNTR) claimed responsibility in a statement to the press,
saying it would release the remaining hostage on the condition
that French troops withdraw from Chad and that Western oil
companies halt exploration and exploitation of all resources in
Chad. On 27 March, Chadian security forces freed the last
hostage.
23 March
Angola
Rebels from the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda
Enclave-Cabinda Armed Forces (FLEC-FAC) abducted two Portuguese
citizens in Cabinda. The victims are employed by Mota &
Company, a Portuguese construction company. The FLEC-FAC
demanded $500,000 in ransom, the intervention of Portuguese
authorities, and negotiations for the withdrawal of Portugal
from Angola. On 24 June the FLEC-FAC released the hostages. It
is not known if a ransom was paid.
Colombia
FARC rebels killed three persons, wounded 14, and kidnapped at
least 27 others at a roadblock near Bogota. Four US citizens
and one Italian were among those kidnapped, as well as the
acting president of the National Electoral Council (CNE) and
his wife. On 25 March the rebels released the CNE president and
his wife. The rebels released nine of the Colombian hostages
two days later. On 2 April one of the US hostages escaped his
captors. On 25 April the last two hostages were released.
25 March
Colombia
At the British Petroleum oil field in Cupiagua, a bomb blast
injured one US citizen and two British workers. At least one
bomb was placed near the oil workers' sleeping trailers and
detonated around midnight. Police blame the attack on the
National Liberation Army.
Early April
Morocco
An armed Islamic group killed 10 Moroccans near the border town
of Oujda in early April, according to news reports.
4 April
Uganda
The US Embassy reported that bombs exploded at two restaurants
in Kampala, killing five persons--including one Swedish and one
Rwandan national--and wounding at least six others. The
restaurants, the Nile Grill and the cafe at the Speke Hotel,
are within walking distance of the US Embassy and the Sheraton
Hotel. A Ugandan Government official reported to local press
that the Allied Democratic Forces may be responsible.
10 April
Turkey
Two Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) members on a motorcycle
threw a bomb into a park near the Blue Mosque in Istanbul,
according to press reports. The explosion injured two Indian
tourists, one New Zealander, four Turkish civilians, and two
Turkish soldiers. On 12 April authorities arrested the two PKK
members involved in the attack.
15 April
Somalia
Multiple media sources reported that militiamen abducted nine
Red Cross and Red Crescent workers at an airstrip north of
Mogadishu. The hostages included a US citizen, a German, a
Belgian, a French, a Norwegian, two Swiss, and one Somali. The
gunmen are members of a subclan loyal to Ali Mahdi Mohammed,
who controls the northern section of the capital. On 24 April
the hostages were released unharmed, and no ransom was paid.
17 April
Cambodia
Approximately 60 armed suspected Khmer Rouge militants attacked
two fishing villages on the Tonle Sap lake in Kampong Chhnang
Province, killing 21 persons and wounding at least nine others,
according to press accounts. Twelve of the victims were
Vietnamese nationals. The attack occurred in the early morning
when the victims were asleep.
Yemen
Press reported that tribesmen kidnapped a British Council
official, along with his wife and son, as they traveled from
Aden to Sanaa. The kidnappers released the hostages on 3 May.
18 April
India
Muslim militants attacked Barankot village in Udhampur
district, Kashmir, killing 29 persons, according to press
reports. Lashkar-i-Taiba claimed responsibility for the
massacre.
19 April
Venezuela
Unidentified Colombian guerrillas kidnapped a Venezuelan
cattleman in Los Flores hacienda. On 23 April the Venezuelan
Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services rescued the
hostage.
22 April
Angola
Suspected secessionists from the Front for the Liberation of
the Cabinda Enclave abducted a Portuguese citizen and nine
Angolans in Cabinda, according to press reports. The victims
are employed by Mota & Company, a Portuguese construction
company. The Portuguese hostage was released unharmed on 24
June.
Iraq
A gunman shot and killed an Iranian clergyman and injured his
two companions in An Najaf, according to press reports. No one
claimed responsibility for the attack.
23 April
Yemen
A police officer from the Al-Marakesha tribe kidnapped a
Ukrainian citizen on his way to Sanaa and handed him over to
the tribe, according to press reports. Tribesmen released the
hostage the next day.
24 April
Yemen
A bomb exploded in the courtyard of the Al-Kheir mosque after
midday prayers in Sanaa, according to US Embassy reporting. The
explosion killed two persons and wounded 26 others, including
two United States citizens, one Canadian, one Libyan, and
several Somalis.
25 April
Colombia
FARC guerrillas kidnapped a Palestinian connected to the
Palestine Liberation Organization in Bogota. The victim is a
Colombian citizen who has resided in Colombia for the past 20
years. On 17 July the FARC rebels released the hostage,
reportedly at the request of the International Red Cross and of
a special envoy of the Palestinian Authority.
Late April
Angola
Militants thought to be from the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA) abducted a Portuguese couple
involved in trading, according to the press. An administrative
source told the Angolan Press Agency that the abduction
occurred after 150 armed men occupied the commune of Ebanga.
UNITA does not have a history of kidnapping foreigners, and the
motive is unclear.
1 May
India
A bomb exploded under a crowded bus in Shupiyan, injuring six
persons, according to press reports. Muslim militants are
suspected.
4 May
India
Near Manchar, east of Jammu, Kashmir, police reported that
suspected Muslim militants killed four members of a village
defense committee, four other villagers and one police officer.
5 May
India
Armed Islamic militants reportedly entered a home in Surankote,
north of Jammu and killed four persons.
6 May
India
Suspected Muslim militants killed five Hindu family members
during a funeral procession outside the town of Punch, Kashmir,
according to US Embassy reports.
16 May
Colombia
Six unidentified heavily armed men kidnapped an Italian
engineer near Medellin. The engineer, who was overseeing the
construction of a tunnel, was taken from his car and forced to
enter a taxi with the gunmen, according to police reports.
Police said it was unclear whether the kidnappers were leftist
guerrillas.
India
In Binola Chuora village, Kashmir, militants killed at least
seven persons. According to press accounts, the victims were
former militants who had become police informants or members of
village defense groups opposed to the militants.
19 May
Angola
Armed assailants attacked a marked United Nations vehicle at
Calandula, killing one Angolan interpreter working for the UN
and wounding two other UN employees and one Angolan police
officer. A UN spokesperson blamed UNITA.
22 May
Sudan
Guerrillas from the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)
abducted a British contractor for the World Food Program (WFP)
and held him for ransom in an SPLA-controlled area of southern
Sudan, according to official sources. The victim is employed by
Terra Firma and was on a survey mission for WFP when he was
abducted. SPLA demanded $58,000 and 125 drums of diesel fuel.
The contractor was released on 19 June.
23 May
India
A provincial legislator, his driver, a bodyguard, and three
others were injured seriously when a bomb detonated on the
outskirts of Srinagar, according to police reports. Their
armored car was totally destroyed. Pakistani-supported Muslim
militants are suspected.
26 May
Venezuela
Three armed FARC guerrillas kidnapped a Venezuelan engineer in
La Victoria. On 18 June the rebels released the engineer and
gave him money to travel home. The hostage told authorities
that the FARC stated they intended to kidnap a businessman from
that area but took him by mistake.
27 May
Colombia
In Santa Marta, 20 National Liberation Army (ELN) rebels bombed
the offices of a subsidiary of the US-owned Dole company. The
guerrillas overpowered the guards, gagged the employees, and
destroyed files before detonating four bombs, partially
destroying the headquarters. The rebels painted graffiti
accusing the company owners of assisting paramilitary groups in
the region. The rebels opened fire on the police as they
escaped.
1 June
India
Local press reported that a bomb exploded at a busy market in
the heart of Jammu, Kashmir, killing one child and injuring 19
other persons. At least 10 shops were damaged. Indian officials
suspect that Muslim militants are responsible.
India
A bomb exploded at an Army base in Jammu, Kashmir, killing two
civilians and damaging the Army's intelligence wing. Indian
officials suspect that Muslim militants are responsible.
3 June
Turkey
Armed PKK militants kidnapped a German tourist and a Turkish
truck driver at a roadblock in Agri, according to press
reports. The German tourist was found unharmed the next morning
near the kidnapping site, but the truck driver still is
missing.
7 June
Pakistan
Police reported that a bomb ripped through an 18-car passenger
train en route from Karachi to Peshawar, killing 23 persons and
wounding at least 32 others, and destroying one railcar.
Pakistan blames India's Research and Analysis Wing for the
bombing. Indian officials deny the accusation.
18 June
Iraq
Unidentified assailants shot and killed an Iranian Shiite
cleric, two of his relatives, and his driver. The victims were
driving back to An Najaf after a pilgrimage to a shrine in
Karbala'.
Yemen
Tribesmen kidnapped nine Italian tourists and their Yemeni
driver in Husn al-Ghurab in the Bir Ali area of Mayfaah
District. The tribesmen demanded the government pay them
800,000 riyals that were pledged to them in a previous
agreement, compensation for a car lost in the civil war in
1994, and construction of a school and health facility in their
region. The kidnappers released two elderly women and the
driver on 19 June and the remaining seven hostages on 21 June.
19 June
India
Five armed militants attacked Hindu villagers in Champnari
village in Jammu's Doda District, killing at least 25 persons
and injuring seven others, according to police reports. The
victims were members of two wedding parties. Indian officials
blame Pakistani-backed Muslim militants.
21 June
Lebanon
Unknown assailants fired four rocket-propelled grenades in the
direction of the US Embassy in Beirut. The rockets exploded
immediately after being launched, missing the Embassy.
23 June
India
A remote-controlled bomb exploded under the Delhi-bound
Shalimar Express in Kashmir, injuring at least 35 of the 2,000
passengers and derailing seven cars, according to press
reports. A police spokesperson stated that Muslim militants are
suspected.
25 June
Ethiopia
Six staff members of the International Committee of the Red
Cross were abducted when they were traveling from Gode to Degeh
Bur in three marked vehicles. The ICRC members include one
Swiss national and five ethnic Somalis. On 3 July the Islamic
group al-Ittihad al-Islami claimed responsibility, stating that
the hostages were under investigation for spying. On 10 July
the hostages were released.
Colombia
FARC rebels kidnapped a Canadian, a Bolivian, and a Colombian
citizen in Santander Department. The Bolivian citizen works for
a Colombian-German firm, while both the Canadian and Colombian
work for a Canadian mining company. The three men were
kidnapped while driving on a rural road.
28 June
India
According to press reports, a bomb hidden in a lunchbox
detonated in Achaval Gardens, a popular picnic site in
Anantnag, Kashmir. Two persons were killed and at least fifteen
persons were injured in the blast.
8 July
Uganda
A United Nations World Food Program (WFP) worker was killed
instantly when guerrillas from the Uganda National Rescue Front
II fired a rocket-propelled grenade at his WFP truck.
14 July
Colombia
FARC rebels kidnapped an Ecuadorian citizen near Medellin. The
victim, a US resident, was enroute to visit his family in
Ecuador when he was abducted. The FARC demanded $1 million for
his release.
17 July
India
An unidentified militant threw a grenade in the Jehangir Chowk
area in Srinagar, Kashmir, injuring 13 persons, according to
press accounts. A police official stated that the grenade was
thrown at a Border Security Force post but exploded in the road
instead. No one claimed responsibility, but police believe that
Muslim militants are behind the attack.
18 July
Ecuador
The Indigenous Defense Front for Pastaza Province (FDIP)
kidnapped three employees of an Ecuadorian pipeline maker
subcontracted by a US oil company in Pastaza Province. The
group accuses the company of causing environmental damage in
its oilfield developments. On 28 July the FDIP released one
hostage, and it released the remaining two hostages the next
day.
20 July
Tajikistan
Unidentified assailants ambushed and killed four members of the
United Nations Mission of Observers in the Tavildara area. The
victims included military observers from Poland and Uruguay, a
Japanese Civil Affairs officer, and a Tajikistani interpreter.
22 July
Yemen
An assailant possibly associated with the Abu Nidal
organization murdered an Egyptian citizen in Sanaa. The victim,
Muhammad Salah Sha'ban, was the Imam of al-Husayni Mosque in
Sanaa. The motive for the murder of Sha'ban--reportedly a
member of the Egyptian al-Gama'at-al-Islamiyya--is unclear.
24 July
India
A bomb exploded near the railroad tracks moments after the
Shalimar Express passed by in Jammu and Kashmir, killing one
soldier and injuring two civilians. Indian officials believe
that Muslim militants are responsible.
25 July
Yemen
A Yemeni shot and killed three Catholic nuns, one Filipino, and
two Indians in the Red Sea port city of Al Hudaydah. Press
reports stated that the assailant considers himself a Muslim
fundamentalist and that he trained in Bosnia as a fighter, but
Yemeni officials described him as ``deranged.''
26 July
India
A bomb exploded on an empty bus parked at the interstate bus
terminal in New Delhi, killing two persons and injuring at
least eight others, according to police reports. The bomb
destroyed the bus and caused major damage to six others.
28 July
India
According to police reports, suspected Muslim militants killed
ten villagers in a predawn attack northwest of Doda, Kashmir.
Five persons are reported missing.
India
In Doda, Kashmir, suspected Muslim militants killed at least
eight members of two Hindu families and wounded three others.
Eyewitnesses reported that the gunmen lined up the victims and
shot them at point blank range.
1 August
Northern Ireland
A 500-pound car bomb exploded outside a shoe store in
Banbridge, injuring 35 persons and damaging at least 200 homes.
Authorities had received a warning telephone call and were
evacuating the area when the bomb went off. The Real IRA, the
Republic of Ireland-based military wing of the 32 County
Sovereignty Council, claimed responsibility.
4 August
India
Suspected militants from the Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) gunned
down 19 persons near Surankot, Kashmir, according to the Indian
Border Security Force and press reports. Two survivors traveled
six hours on foot to report the attack to authorities. The
victims were family members of a rival group that reportedly
had been collaborating with Indian security forces.
India
Unidentified assailants with automatic rifles opened fire on a
group of sleeping laborers at a remote construction site in
Himachal Pradesh, killing 26 persons and wounding eight others.
As the militants headed back to Kashmir they attacked a second
group of workers, killing eight persons and wounding three
others. Authorities suspect Pakistani-backed militants.
India
According to eyewitness reports, militants detonated a grenade
in a crowded marketplace in Lal Chowk, Srinagar, Kashmir,
injuring seven persons.
7 August
Kenya
A bomb exploded at the rear entrance of the US Embassy in
Nairobi, killing 12 US citizens, 32 Foreign Service Nationals
(FSNs), and 247 Kenyan citizens. Approximately 5,000 Kenyans,
six US citizens, and 13 FSNs were injured. The US Embassy
building sustained extensive structural damage. The US
Government is holding terrorist financier Usama Bin Ladin
responsible.
Tanzania
Almost simultaneously, a bomb detonated outside the US Embassy
in Dar es Salaam, killing seven FSNs and three Tanzanian
citizens, and injuring one US citizen and 76 Tanzanians. The
explosion caused major structural damage to the US Embassy
facility. The US Government holds Usama Bin Ladin responsible.
10 August
India
Unidentified assailants threw a grenade and fired automatic
weapons into a crowded bus in Anantnag, Kashmir, killing four
persons and injuring seven others, according to police reports.
Authorities suspect Pakistani-backed separatists.
12 August
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Suspected former Rwandan soldiers abducted six tourists--one
Canadian, two Swedes, and three New Zealanders--after the
tourists crossed into the Congo from Uganda. Two of the New
Zealanders escaped one week later, and the Canadian was
released on 19 August with a statement from a previously
unknown group called People in Action for the Liberation of
Rwanda. The group claimed responsibility and stated that the
remaining captives would be freed if a message from the group
was read over BBC broadcasts in Africa. The remaining hostages
reportedly were sighted in the forests in eastern Congo.
14 August
Sri Lanka
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) seized a Dubai-
owned cargo ship and abducted 21 crew-members, including 17
Indian nationals. The LTTE evacuated the crew before the Sri
Lankan Air Force bombed and destroyed the ship, on the
suspicion that the vessel was transporting supplies to the
LTTE. The 17 Indian hostages were released to the International
Committee of the Red Cross on 19 August. The LTTE continues to
hold four Sri Lankans hostage.
15 August
Northern Ireland
A 500-pound car bomb exploded outside a local courthouse in
Omag's central shopping district, killing 29 persons and
injuring more than 330. Authorities were in the process of
clearing the shopping area around the courthouse when the bomb
exploded. On 17 August authorities arrested five local men
suspected of involvement in the bombing. The Real IRA claimed
responsibility.
25 August
India
Separatist guerrillas threw a grenade at a vehicle carrying
security personnel in Srinagar. According to police, the
grenade missed its target and exploded in the crowded street,
injuring 12 persons.
India
Police reported that unidentified militants threw a grenade in
downtown Srinagar, killing one civilian and injuring 11 others.
South Africa
A bomb exploded in the Planet Hollywood restaurant in Capetown,
killing one person and injuring at least 24 others--including
nine British citizens--and causing major damage. The Muslims
Against Global Oppression (MAGO) claimed responsibility in a
phone call to a local radio station, stating that the bomb was
in retaliation for the US missile attacks on terrorist
facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan. Police believe that People
Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) are responsible.
29 August
Belgium
Arsonists firebombed a McDonald's restaurant in Puurs,
destroying the restaurant and causing up to $1.4 million in
damage. The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) claimed
responsibility for the attack.
2 September
India
Police reported that Muslim militants detonated a landmine
under a bus carrying troops from Jammu to Punch, killing the
civilian driver and seriously injuring 15 soldiers.
8 September
Philippines
Approximately 30 suspected Muslim militants armed with rifles
and grenade launchers abducted an Italian priest and 12
Filipinos from a cooperative store in the parish church. The
Filipino hostages were released the next day, but the priest
still is being held. No ransom has been demanded. Police
suspect either the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) or the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF).
9 September
Philippines
Suspected ASG members kidnapped three Hong Kong businessmen in
Mindanao. The victims are employed by the Jackaphil Company. No
ransom demand has been made. On 23 December the three kidnapped
victims were released unharmed.
21 September
Georgia
Unidentified assailants opened fire on a bus in Sukhumi,
wounding three UN military observers and one other UN mission
employee, according to UN officials. The injured include two
Bangladeshis and one Nigerian.
22 September
Colombia
Suspected FARC members kidnapped a Japanese businessman from
his farm in Bogota.
India
Police and doctors reported that unidentified gunmen shot and
wounded a French tourist near the Jama Masjid mosque in
Srinagar. Witnesses said that two assailants fired at the
victim. Muslim guerrillas are suspected.
29 September
Ecuador
A bomb exploded at the Ecuadorian Bishops' Conference, injuring
one Spanish missionary and causing major damage. The explosion
released leaflets calling for improved cost of living and
utility services. Police believe the bombing is linked to a
national strike protesting the economic package implemented by
the Ecuadorian President.
3 October
Russia
On 3 October 1998 in Groznyy, Chechnya, 20 unidentified armed
assailants kidnapped three Britons and one New Zealander. On 8
December partial remains of the hostages were discovered on a
roadside.
5 October
Ecuador
Three employees of the Santa Fe Oil Company, two US citizens
and one Ecuadorian, were kidnapped, according to local press
accounts. One US citizen escaped the next day.
6 October
India
According to police reports, suspected Muslim militants threw a
bomb at a vehicle carrying a prominent former militant in Tral,
Kashmir, killing him and 10 others.
8 October
India
According to police officials, Muslim militants threw a grenade
at a police post in Srinagar, Kashmir, injuring five civilians,
four police officers and four soldiers.
India
Police reported that Muslim militants detonated a bomb near the
state secretariat building in Srinagar, Kashmir, injuring 13
persons and causing minor damage.
9 October
Pakistan
Police reported that unidentified assailants opened fire on the
Iranian Cultural Center in Multan, killing one Pakistani
security guard and wounding another.
12 October
Colombia
People's Liberation Army (EPL) rebels kidnapped 20 persons,
including four foreigners at a road block on the Northeastern
Highway. The rebels burned three cars and released two hostages
to report the situation to the media.
18 October
Colombia
A bomb exploded on the Ocensa pipeline in Antioquia Department,
killing approximately 71 persons and injuring at least 100
others. The explosion caused major damage when the spilled oil
caught fire and burned nearby houses in the town of Machuca.
The pipeline is jointly owned by the Colombia State Oil Company
Ecopetrol and a consortium including US, French, British, and
Canadian companies. On 19 October the ELN claimed
responsibility.
26 October
Colombia
Guerrillas abducted a Danish engineer and two Colombians at a
roadblock in San Juan. Local authorities suspect the FARC or
ELN is responsible. (On 21 January 1999 in Carmen de Bolivar
EPL rebels freed the Danish hostage. There have been no reports
on the two Colombians.)
28 October
Yemen
Armed tribesmen in the Mahfad region kidnapped two Belgian
citizens, demanding the release of a tribesman sentenced to
death by a Yemeni court. On 29 October tribesmen released the
hostages.
8 November
Angola
In Lunde Norte Province at least 50 armed assailants attacked a
Canadian-owned diamond mine, killing one Portuguese national,
two Britons, three Angolans, and wounding 18 others. The
assailants also took four workers hostage, including one South
African, one Briton, and two Filipinos. Angolan officials blame
the attack on UNITA. The secretary general of UNITA claimed
responsibility for the attack but denied taking hostages.
14 November
India
In Budgam, near Srinagar, Kashmir, a police spokesman reported
that militants threw a grenade near a telephone booth,
seriously injuring one person.
India
Police reported an explosion at a taxi stand near Srinagar that
injured four persons and damaged four vehicles.
15 November
Colombia
Armed assailants followed a US businessman and his family home
in Cundinamarca Department and kidnapped his 11-year-old son
after stealing money, jewelry, one automobile, and two cell
phones. The kidnappers demanded $1 million in ransom.
On 21 January 1999 the US Embassy reported that the kidnappers
released the boy to his mother and uncle in Tolima Department.
It is not known if any ransom was paid. The kidnappers claim to
be members of the Leftist Revolutionary Armed Commandos for
Peace in Colombia.
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone authorities report that rebels led by Sierra
Leone's ousted junta leader, Solomon Musa, kidnapped an Italian
Catholic missionary from his residence. Musa leads a faction of
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. Musa demanded a
satellite telephone, medical supplies, and radio contact with
his wife for release of the priest. His wife, Tina Musa, was
arrested in September and is being detained in Freetown.
17 November
Greece
According to press reports, a bomb exploded outside a Citibank
branch in Athens, causing major damage. An unidentified
telephone caller to a local newspaper claimed the attack was to
protest against arrests made during a student march.
India
A bomb exploded near the Madana bridge in Surankot, Kashmir,
killing four persons and injuring several others, according to
press reporting. Muslim militants are suspected.
India
Press reported a bomb detonated near a crowded bus stand in
Anantnag, killing three persons and wounding 38 others.
India
Police reported Muslim militants detonated a grenade in
Anantnag, killing three persons and injuring 35 others.
24 November
Yemen
A car bomb exploded near the German Embassy in Sanaa, killing
two persons and injuring several others, according to reports
from German and Yemeni officials. The German Embassy confirmed
that no Germans were killed or injured.
25 November
India
In Handwara, Kashmir, police reported that Muslim militants
threw a grenade at a wedding party, injuring 11 persons.
27 November
Uganda
Ugandan officials state that 30 Lord's Resistance Army rebels
attacked a World Food Program (WFP) convoy, killing seven
persons and wounding 28 others. An eyewitness reported the
rebels also abducted five persons believed to be WFP officials,
and one other person.
3 December
Colombia
Guerrillas kidnapped one German citizen and two Colombians from
a bus at a false roadblock in Cauca Department. The guerrillas
set the bus on fire and dynamited a tollbooth after stealing
the money. Authorities suspect the FARC or ELN is responsible.
On 8 January the ELN released the German citizen unharmed.
6 December
Yemen
Local press reported that armed tribals kidnapped four German
tourists in Sanaa, demanding $500,000 ransom and improvements
to local health and educational facilities. On 30 December the
guerrillas released the hostages.
7 December
Italy
During the week of 7 December the ALF sent panettone cakes
laced with rat poison to two branches of the Italian news
agency ANSA. Two Italian subsidiaries of Swiss Nestle were
forced to halt production, costing the company $30 million.
According to Italy's ALF founder, the poisoned cakes were sent
to protest Nestle's genetic manipulation of food.
8 December
Colombia
A Spanish newspaper reported that FARC guerrillas kidnapped one
Spanish citizen and three Colombians. No ransom demands have
been made.
9 December
India
A bomb exploded in a shop in the Punch District of Kashmir,
wounding the shopkeeper. Police suspect Muslim militants are
responsible.
India
In Bandipura, Kashmir, local press reported that Muslim
militants threw a grenade at a group near a bus station,
killing three persons and injuring 20 others.
Yemen
In Sanaa, Yemeni passengers on a chartered Egyptian airliner
demanded to be flown to Libya. The Egyptian pilot landed the
plane in Tunisia and told the 150 passengers he could not fly
the plane to Libya due to the UN sanctions. The plane and
passengers remained on the ground for 15 hours before returning
to Yemen.
23 December
India
Muslim militants forced their way into three homes in three
separate villages in Kulham District, Kashmir, killing nine
persons, according to police reports. The victims were all
close relatives of former militants who now support the pro-
Indian government militia. Kashmir authorities blame the
attacks on the Hizbul Mujahidin.
26 December
Angola
United Nations officials report that a transport plane carrying
10 UN officials and four crew members was shot down over an
area of intense fighting between UNITA rebels and government
troops. National Radio Services state that UNITA shot down the
plane. A UN rescue team arrived at the crash site on 8 January
1999, reporting that no one survived the crash and that the
bodies of all 14 persons aboard the plane were accounted for.
28 December
Yemen
Armed militants kidnapped a group of tourists traveling on the
main road from Habban to Aden. The victims included two US
citizens, twelve Britons, and two Australians. On 29 December
Yemeni security forces undertook a rescue attempt, during which
three Britons and one Australian were killed, and one US
citizen was injured seriously. Yemeni officials reported that
the kidnappers belong to the Islamic Jihad, but the
investigation is ongoing.
Appendix B: Background Information on Terrorist Groups
The following list of terrorist groups is not exhaustive.
It focuses on the groups that were designated foreign terrorist
organizations on 8 October 1997 pursuant to the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (denoted by an
asterisk) but also includes other major groups that were active
in 1998. Terrorist groups whose activities were limited in
scope in 1998 are not included.
abu nidal organization (ano)*
a.k.a.: Fatah Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary
Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Black September, and
Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims
Description: International terrorist organization led by
Sabri al-Banna. Split from PLO in 1974. Made up of various
functional committees, including political, military, and
financial.
Activities: Has carried out terrorist attacks in 20
countries, killing or injuring almost 900 persons. Targets
include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel,
moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and various Arab countries.
Major attacks included the Rome and Vienna airports in December
1985, the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul and the Pan Am
Flight 73 hijacking in Karachi in September 1986, and the City
of Poros day-excursion ship attack in July 1988 in Greece.
Suspected of assassinating PLO deputy chief Abu Iyad and PLO
security chief Abu Hul in Tunis in January 1991. ANO
assassinated a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon in January 1994
and has been linked to the killing of the PLO representative
there. Has not attacked Western targets since the late 1980s.
Strength: Several hundred plus militia in Lebanon and
limited overseas support structure.
Location/Area of Operation: Al-Banna may have relocated to
Iraq in December 1998, where the group maintains a presence.
Has an operational presence in Lebanon in the Bekaa Valley and
several Palestinian refugee camps in coastal areas of Lebanon.
Also has a presence in Sudan and Syria, among others. Has
demonstrated ability to operate over wide area, including the
Middle East, Asia, and Europe.
External Aid: Has received considerable support, including
safehaven, training, logistic assistance, and financial aid
from Iraq, Libya, and Syria (until 1987), in addition to close
support for selected operations.
abu sayyaf group (asg)*
Description: Smallest and most radical of the Islamic
separatist groups operating in the southern Philippines. Split
from the Moro National Liberation Front in 1991 under the
leadership of Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a
clash with Philippine police on 18 December 1998. Some members
have studied or worked in the Middle East and developed ties to
Arab mujahidin while fighting and training in Afghanistan.
Activities: Uses bombs, assassinations, kidnappings, and
extortion payments to promote an independent Islamic state in
western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, areas in the
southern Philippines heavily populated by Muslims. Raided the
town of Ipil in Mindanao in April 1995, the group's first
large-scale action. Suspected of several small-scale bombings
and kidnappings in 1998.
Strength: Unknown, but believed to have about 200 members.
Location/Area of Operation: The ASG operates in the
southern Philippines and occasionally in Manila.
External Aid: Probably receives support from Islamic
extremists in the Middle East and South Asia.
al-jihad
(see under J)
alex boncayao brigade (abb)
Description: The ABB, the urban hit squad of the Communist
Party of the Philippines, was formed in the mid-1980s.
Activities: Responsible for more than 100 murders and
believed to have been involved in the 1989 murder of US Army
Col. James Rowe in the Philippines. Although reportedly
decimated by a series of arrests in late 1995, the murder in
June 1996 of a former high-ranking Philippine official, claimed
by the group, demonstrates that it still maintains terrorist
capabilities. In March 1997 the group announced that it had
formed an alliance with another armed group, the Revolutionary
Proletarian Army.
Strength: Approximately 500.
Location/Area of Operation: Operates exclusively in Manila.
External Aid: Unknown.
armed islamic group (gia)*
Description: An Islamic extremist group, the GIA aims to
overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an
Islamic state. The GIA began its violent activities in early
1992 after Algiers voided the victory of the Islamic Salvation
Front (FIS)--the largest Islamic party--in the first round of
legislative elections in December 1991.
Activities: Frequent attacks against civilians,
journalists, and foreign residents. In the last several years
the GIA has conducted a terrorist campaign of civilian
massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of
operations and frequently killing hundreds of civilians. Since
announcing its terrorist campaign against foreigners living in
Algeria in September 1993, the GIA has killed more than 100
expatriate men and women--mostly Europeans--in the country.
Uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs, and it
is known to favor kidnapping victims and slitting their
throats. The GIA hijacked an Air France flight to Algiers in
December 1994, and suspicions centered on the group for a
series of bombings in France in 1995.
Strength: Unknown, probably several hundred to several
thousand.
Location/Area of Operation: Algeria.
External Aid: Algerian expatriates and GIA members abroad,
many of whom reside in Western Europe, provide some financial
and logistic support. In addition, the Algerian Government has
accused Iran and Sudan of supporting Algerian extremists and
severed diplomatic relations with Iran in March 1993.
aum supreme truth (aum)*
a.k.a.: Aum Shinrikyo
Description: A cult established in 1987 by Shoko Asahara,
Aum aims to take over Japan and then the world. Its
organizational structure mimicks that of a nation-state, with
``finance,'' ``construction,'' and ``science and technology''
ministries. Approved as a religious entity in 1989 under
Japanese law, the group ran candidates in a Japanese
parliamentary election in 1990. Over time, the cult began to
emphasize the imminence of the end of the world and stated that
the United States would initiate"Armageddon'' by starting World
War III with Japan. The Japanese Government revoked its
recognition of Aum as a religious organization in October 1995,
but in 1997 a government panel decided not to invoke the Anti-
Subversive Law against the group, which would have outlawed the
cult.
Activities: On 20 March 1995 Aum members simultaneously
released sarin nerve gas on several Tokyo subway trains,
killing 12 persons and injuring up to 6,000. The group was
responsible for other mysterious chemical incidents in Japan in
1994. Its efforts to conduct attacks using biological agents
have been unsuccessful. Japanese police arrested Asahara in May
1995, and he remained on trial facing seventeen counts of
murder at the end of 1998. In 1997 and 1998 the cult resumed
its recruiting activities in Japan and opened several
commercial businesses. Maintains an Internet homepage that
indicates Armageddon and anti-US sentiment remain a part of the
cult's world view.
Strength: At the time of the Tokyo subway attack, the group
claimed to have 9,000 members in Japan and up to 40,000
worldwide. Its current strength is unknown.
Location/Area of Operation: Operates in Japan, but
previously had a presence in Australia, Russia, Ukraine,
Germany, Taiwan, Sri Lanka, the former Yugoslavia, and the
United States.
External Aid: None.
basque fatherland and liberty (eta)*
a.k.a: Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna
Description: Founded in 1959 with the aim of establishing
an independent homeland based on Marxist principles in Spain's
Basque region and the southwestern French provinces of Labourd,
Basse-Navarra, and Soule.
Activities: Primarily bombings and assassinations of
Spanish Government officials, especially security and military
forces, politicians, and judicial figures. In response to
French operations against the group, ETA also has targeted
French interests. Finances its activities through kidnappings,
robberies, and extortion. Has killed more than 800 persons
since it began lethal attacks in the early 1960s; responsible
for murdering 6 persons in 1998. ETA declared a ``unilateral
and indefinite'' cease-fire on 17 September 1998.
Strength: Unknown; may have hundreds of members, plus
supporters.
Location/Area of Operation: Operates primarily in the
Basque autonomous regions of northern Spain and southwestern
France, but also has bombed Spanish and French interests
elsewhere.
External Aid: Has received training at various times in the
past in Libya, Lebanon, and Nicaragua. Some ETA members
allegedly have received sanctuary in Cuba. Also appears to have
ties to the Irish Republican Army through the two groups' legal
political wings.
continuity irish republican army (cira)
a.k.a.: Continuity Army Council
Description: Radical terrorist group formed in 1994 as the
clandestine armed wing of Republican Sinn Fein, a political
organization dedicated to the reunification of Ireland.
Established to carry on the republican armed struggle after the
Irish Republican Army announced a cease-fire in September 1994.
Activities: Bombings, assassinations, kidnappings,
extortion, and robberies. Targets include British military and
Northern Irish security targets and Northern Irish Loyalist
paramilitary groups. Also has launched bomb attacks against
predominantly Protestant towns in Northern Ireland. Does not
have an established presence or capability to launch attacks on
the UK mainland.
Strength: Fewer than 50 activists. The group probably
receives limited support from IRA hardliners, who are
dissatisfied with the IRA cease-fire, and other republican
sympathizers.
Location/Area of Operation: Northern Ireland, Ireland.
External Aid: Suspected of receiving funds and arms from
sympathizers in the United States.
democratic front for the liberation of palestine (dflp)*
Description: Marxist-Leninist organization founded in 1969
when it split from the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP). Believes Palestinian national goals can be
achieved only through revolution of the masses. In early 1980s
occupied political stance midway between Arafat and the
rejectionists. Split into two factions in 1991; Nayif Hawatmah
leads the majority and more hardline faction, which continues
to dominate the group. Joined with other rejectionist groups to
form the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF) to oppose the
Declaration of Principals signed in 1993. Broke from the APF--
along with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP)--over ideological differences. Has made limited moves
toward merging with the PFLP since the mid-1990s.
Activities: In the 1970s conducted numerous small bombings
and minor assaults and some more spectacular operations in
Israel and the occupied territories, concentrating on Israeli
targets. Involved only in border raids since 1988, but
continues to oppose the Israel-PLO peace agreement.
Strength: Estimated at 500 (total for both factions).
Location/Area of Operation: Syria, Lebanon, and the
Israeli-occupied territories; terrorist attacks have taken
place entirely in Israel and the occupied territories. Conducts
occasional guerrilla operations in southern Lebanon.
External Aid: Receives limited financial and military aid
from Syria.
devrimci sol (revolutionary left)
a.k.a.: Dev Sol (see Revolutionary People's Liberation
Party/Front, DHKP/C)
ela
(see Revolutionary People's Struggle)
eln
(see National Liberation Army)
eta
(see Basque Fatherland and Liberty)
farc
(see Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
fpmr
(see Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front)
al-gama'at al-islamiyya (islamic group, ig) *
Description: Egypt's largest militant group, active since
the late 1970s; appears to be loosely organized. Has an
external wing with a worldwide presence. Signed Usama Bin
Ladin's fatwa in February 1998 calling for attacks against US
civilians but publicly has denied that it supports Bin Ladin.
Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman is al-Gama'at's preeminent spiritual
leader, and the group publicly has threatened to retaliate
against US interests for his incarceration. Primary goal is to
overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an
Islamic state.
Activities: Armed attacks against Egyptian security and
other government officials, Coptic Christians, and Egyptian
opponents of Islamic extremism. Al-Gama'at has launched attacks
on tourists in Egypt since 1992, most notably the attack in
November 1997 at Luxor that killed 58 foreign tourists. Also
claimed responsibility for the attempt in June 1995 to
assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia.
Strength: Unknown, but probably several thousand hardcore
members and another several thousand sympathizers.
Location/Area of Operation: Operates mainly in the Al
Minya, Asyu't, Qina, and Soha Governorates of southern Egypt.
Also appears to have support in Cairo, Alexandria, and other
urban locations, particularly among unemployed graduates and
students. Has a worldwide presence, including in the United
Kingdom, Afghanistan, and Austria.
External Aid: Unknown. The Egyptian Government believes
that Iranian, Sudanese, and Afghan militant groups support the
IG.
hamas (islamic resistance movement)*
Description: Formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of the
Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Various HAMAS
elements have used both political and violent means, including
terrorism, to pursue the goal of establishing an Islamic
Palestinian state in place of Israel. Loosely structured, with
some elements working clandestinely and others working openly
through mosques and social service institutions to recruit
members, raise money, organize activities, and distribute
propaganda. HAMAS's strength is concentrated in the Gaza Strip
and a few areas of the West Bank. Also has engaged in peaceful
political activity, such as running candidates in West Bank
Chamber of Commerce elections.
Activities: HAMAS activists, especially those in the Izz
el-Din al-Qassam Brigades, have conducted many attacks--
including large-scale suicide bombings--against Israeli
civilian and military targets, suspected Palestinian
collaborators, and Fatah rivals.
Strength: Unknown number of hardcore members; tens of
thousands of supporters and sympathizers.
Location/Area of Operation: Primarily the occupied
territories, Israel, and Jordan.
External Aid: Receives funding from Palestinian
expatriates, Iran, and private benefactors in Saudi Arabia and
other moderate Arab states. Some fundraising and propaganda
activity take place in Western Europe and North America.
harakat ul-mujahidin (hum)
Description: Formerly the Harakat ul-Ansar, which was
designated a foreign terrorist organization in October 1997.
HUM is an Islamic militant group based in Pakistan that
operates primarily in Kashmir. Leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil has
been linked to Bin Ladin and signed his fatwa in February 1998
calling for attacks on US and Western interests. Operates
terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan and suffered
casualties in the US missile strikes on Bin Ladin-associated
training camps in Khowst in August 1998. Fazlur Rehman Khalil
subsequently said that HUM would take revenge on the United
States.
Activities: Has conducted a number of operations against
Indian troops and civilian targets in Kashmir. Linked to the
Kashmiri militant group al-Faran that kidnapped five Western
tourists in Kashmir in July 1995; one was killed in August
1995, and the other four reportedly were killed in December of
the same year.
Strength: Has several thousand armed supporters located in
Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and India's southern Kashmir and Doda
regions. Supporters are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris, and
also include Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. Uses
light and heavy machineguns, assault rifles, mortars,
explosives, and rockets.
Location/Area of Operation: Based in Muzaffarabad,
Pakistan, but members conduct insurgent and terrorist
activities primarily in Kashmir. The HUM trains its militants
in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
External Aid: Collects donations from Saudi Arabia and
other Gulf and Islamic states and from Pakistanis and
Kashmiris. The source and amount of HUA's military funding are
unknown.
hizballah (party of god)*
a.k.a.: Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice Organization,
Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, and Islamic Jihad for
the Liberation of Palestine
Description: Radical Shia group formed in Lebanon;
dedicated to creation of Iranian-style Islamic republic in
Lebanon and removal of all non-Islamic influences from the
area. Strongly anti-West and anti-Israel. Closely allied with,
and often directed by, Iran but may have conducted operations
that were not approved by Tehran.
Activities: Known or suspected to have been involved in
numerous anti-US terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck
bombing of the US Embassy and US Marine barracks in Beirut in
October 1983 and the US Embassy annex in Beirut in September
1984. Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping
and detention of US and other Western hostages in Lebanon. The
group also attacked the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992.
Strength: Several thousand.
Location/Area of Operation: Operates in the Bekaa Valley,
the southern suburbs of Beirut, and southern Lebanon. Has
established cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North
America, and elsewhere.
External Aid: Receives substantial amounts of financial,
training, weapons, explosives, political, diplomatic, and
organizational aid from Iran and Syria.
irish republican army (ira)
a.k.a.: Provisional Irish, Republican Army (PIRA), the
Provos
Description: Radical terrorist group formed in 1969 as
clandestine armed wing of Sinn Fein, a legal political movement
dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and
unifying Ireland. Has a Marxist orientation. Organized into
small, tightly knit cells under the leadership of the Army
Council.
Activities: Bombings, assassinations, kidnappings,
extortion, and robberies. Before its cease-fire in 1994,
targets included senior British Government officials, British
military and Royal Ulster Constabulary targets in Northern
Ireland, and a British military facility on the European
Continent. The IRA has been observing a cease-fire since July
1997; the group's previous cease-fire was from 1 September 1994
to February 1996.
Strength: Several hundred, plus several thousand
sympathizers.
Local/Area of Operation: Northern Ireland, Ireland, Great
Britain, and Europe.
External Aid: Has received aid from a variety of groups and
countries and considerable training and arms from Libya and, at
one time, the PLO. Is suspected of receiving funds and arms
from sympathizers in the United States. Similarities in
operations suggest links to the ETA.
islamic resistance movement (see hamas)
jamaat ul-fuqra
Description: Islamic sect that seeks to purify Islam
through violence. Led by Pakistani cleric Shaykh Mubarik Ali
Gilani, who established the organization in the early 1980s.
Gilani now resides in Pakistan, but most cells are located in
North America and the Caribbean. Members have purchased
isolated rural compounds in North America to live communally,
practice their faith, and insulate themselves from Western
culture.
Activities: Fuqra members have attacked a variety of
targets that they view as enemies of Islam, including Muslims
they regards as heretics and Hindus. Attacks during the 1980s
included assassinations and firebombings across the United
States. Fuqra members in the United States have been convicted
of criminal violations, including murder and fraud.
Strength: Unknown.
Location/Area of Operation: North America, Pakistan.
External Aid: None.
japanese red army (jra)*
a.k.a.: Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB)
Description: An international terrorist group formed around
1970 after breaking away from Japanese Communist League-Red
Army Faction. Led by Fusako Shigenobu, believed to be in
Syrian-garrisoned area of Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. Stated goals
are to overthrow Japanese Government and monarchy and help
foment world revolution. Organization unclear but may control
or at least have ties to Anti-Imperialist International Brigade
(AIIB). Also may have links to Antiwar Democratic Front, an
overt leftist political organization in Japan. Details released
following arrest in November 1987 of leader Osamu Maruoka
indicate that JRA may be organizing cells in Asian cities, such
as Manila and Singapore. Has had close and longstanding
relations with Palestinian terrorist groups--based and
operating outside Japan--since its inception.
Activities: During the 1970s JRA conducted a series of
attacks around the world, including the massacre in 1972 at Lod
Airport in Israel, two Japanese airliner hijackings, and an
attempted takeover of the US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur. In April
1988, JRA operative Yu Kikumura was arrested with explosives on
the New Jersey Turnpike, apparently planning an attack to
coincide with the bombing of a USO club in Naples and a
suspected JRA operation that killed five, including a US
servicewoman. Kikumura was convicted of these charges and is
serving a lengthy prison sentence in the United States. In
March 1995, Ekita Yukiko, a longtime JRA activist, was arrested
in Romania and subsequently deported to Japan. Eight others
have been arrested since 1996, but leader Shigenobu remains at
large.
Strength: About eight hardcore members; undetermined number
of sympathizers.
Location/Area of Operation: Location unknown, but possibly
based in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon.
External Aid: Unknown.
al-jihad*
a.k.a.: Jihad Group, Islamic Jihad, Vanguards of Conquest,
Talaa' al-Fateh
Description: Egyptian Islamic extremist group active since
the late 1970s. Appears to be divided into two factions: one
led by Ayman al-Zawahiri--who currently is in Afghanistan and
is a key leader in terrorist financier Usama Bin Ladin's new
World Islamic Front--and the Vanguards of Conquest (Talaa' al-
Fateh) led by Ahmad Husayn Agiza. Abbud al-Zumar, leader of the
original Jihad, is imprisoned in Egypt and recently joined the
group's jailed spiritual leader, Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, in
a call for a ``peaceful front.'' Primary goal is to overthrow
the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state.
Increasingly willing to target US interests in Egypt.
Activities: Specializes in armed attacks against high-level
Egyptian Government officials. The original Jihad was
responsible for the assassination in 1981 of Egyptian President
Anwar Sadat. Appears to concentrate on high-level, high-profile
Egyptian Government officials, including cabinet ministers.
Claimed responsibility for the attempted assassinations of
Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi in August 1993 and Prime
Minister Atef Sedky in November 1993. Has not conducted an
attack inside Egypt since 1993 and never has targeted foreign
tourists there. Has threatened to retaliate against the United
States, however, for its incarceration of Shaykh Umar Abd al-
Rahman and, more recently, for the arrests of its members in
Albania, Azerbaijan, and the United Kingdom.
Strength: Not known, but probably several thousand hardcore
members and another several thousand sympathizers among the
various factions.
Location/Area of Operation: Operates in the Cairo area. Has
a network outside Egypt, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, the
United Kingdom, and Sudan.
External Aid: Not known. The Egyptian Government claims
that Iran, Sudan, and militant Islamic groups in Afghanistan--
including Usama Bin Ladin--support the Jihad factions. Also may
obtain some funding through various Islamic nongovernmental
organizations.
kach* and kahane chai*
Description: Stated goal is to restore the biblical state
of Israel. Kach (founded by radical Israeli-American rabbi Meir
Kahane) and its offshoot Kahane Chai, which means ``Kahane
Lives,'' (founded by Meir Kahane's son Binyamin following his
father's assassination in the United States) were declared to
be terrorist organizations in March 1994 by the Israeli Cabinet
under the 1948 Terrorism Law. This followed the groups'
statements in support of Dr. Baruch Goldstein's attack in
February 1994 on the al-Ibrahimi Mosque--Goldstein was
affiliated with Kach--and their verbal attacks on the Israeli
Government.
Activities: Organize protests against the Israeli
Government. Harass and threaten Palestinians in Hebron and the
West Bank. Have threatened to attack Arabs, Palestinians, and
Israeli Government officials. Claimed responsibility for
several shootings of West Bank Palestinians that killed four
persons and wounded two in 1993.
Strength: Unknown.
Location/Area of Operation: Israel and West Bank
settlements, particularly Qiryat Arba' in Hebron.
External Aid: Receives support from sympathizers in the
United States and Europe.
khmer rouge
(see The Party of Democratic Kampuchea)
kurdistan workers' party (pkk)*
Description: Established in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist
insurgent group primarily composed of Turkish Kurds. In recent
years has moved beyond rural-based insurgent activities to
include urban terrorism. Seeks to establish an independent
Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey, where the population is
predominantly Kurdish.
Activities: Primary targets are Turkish Government security
forces in Turkey but also has been active in Western Europe
against Turkish targets. Conducted attacks on Turkish
diplomatic and commercial facilities in dozens of West European
cities in 1993 and again in spring 1995. In an attempt to
damage Turkey's tourist industry, the PKK has bombed tourist
sites and hotels and kidnapped foreign tourists.
Strength: Approximately 10,000 to 15,000. Has thousands of
sympathizers in Turkey and Europe.
Location/Area of Operation: Operates in Turkey, Europe, the
Middle East, and Asia.
External Aid: Has received safehaven and modest aid from
Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The Syrian Government claims to have
expelled the PKK from its territory in October 1998.
liberation tigers of tamil eelam (ltte)*
Known front organizations: World Tamil Association (WTA),
World Tamil Movement (WTM), the Federation of Associations of
Canadian Tamils (FACT), the Ellalan Force, the Sangillan Force.
Description: The most powerful Tamil group in Sri Lanka,
founded in 1976. Uses overt and illegal methods to raise funds,
acquire weapons, and publicize its cause of establishing an
independent Tamil state. Began its armed conflict with the Sri
Lankan Government in 1983 and relies on a guerrilla strategy
that includes the use of terrorist tactics.
Activities: Has integrated a battlefield insurgent strategy
with a terrorist program that targets not only key government
personnel in the countryside but also senior Sri Lankan
political and military leaders in Colombo. LTTE political
assassinations and bombings have become commonplace, including
suicide attacks against Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe
Premadasa in 1993 and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in
1991. Has refrained from targeting Western tourists out of fear
that foreign governments would crack down on Tamil expatriates
involved in fundraising activities abroad. Prefers to attack
vulnerable government facilities and withdraw before
reinforcements arrive.
Strength: Approximately 10,000 armed combatants in Sri
Lanka; about 3,000 to 6,000 form a trained cadre of fighters.
The LTTE also has a significant overseas support structure for
fundraising, weapons procurement, and propaganda activities.
Location/Area of Operation: Controls most of the northern
and eastern coastal areas of Sri Lanka and has conducted
operations throughout the island. Headquartered in the Jaffna
peninsula, LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran has established
an extensive network of checkpoints and informants to keep
track of any outsiders who enter the group's area of control.
External Aid: The LTTE's overt organizations support Tamil
separatism by lobbying foreign governments and the United
Nations. Also uses its international contacts to procure
weapons, communications, and bombmaking equipment. Exploits
large Tamil communities in North America, Europe, and Asia to
obtain funds and supplies for its fighters in Sri Lanka. Some
Tamil communities in Europe also are involved in narcotics
smuggling.
loyalist volunteer force (lvf)
Description: Extremist terrorist group formed in 1996 as a
splinter of the mainstream loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force
(UVF). Seeks to subvert a political settlement with Irish
nationalists in Northern Ireland by attacking Catholic
politicians, civilians, and Protestant politicians who endorse
the Northern Ireland peace process. Composed of hardliners
formerly associated with the UVF. Mark ``Swinger'' Fulton now
leads the LVF following the assassination in December 1997 of
LVF founder Billy"King Rat'' Wright. Announced a unilateral
cease-fire on 15 May and, in a move unprecedented among Ulster
terrorist groups, decommissioned a small but significant amount
of weapons on 18 December 1998.
Activities: Bombings, kidnappings, and close-quarter
shooting attacks. LVF bombs often have contained Powergel
commercial explosives, typical of many loyalist groups. LVF
attacks have been particularly vicious: LVF terrorists killed
an 18-year old Catholic girl in July 1997 because she had a
Protestant boyfriend. Murdered numerous Catholic civilians with
no political or terrorist affiliations following Billy Wright's
assassination. Also has conducted successful attacks against
Irish targets in Irish border towns.
Strength: British press speculates about 500 activists.
Location/Area of Operation: Northern Ireland, Ireland
External Aid: None.
manuel rodriguez patriotic front (fpmr)*
Description: Founded in 1983 as the armed wing of the
Chilean Communist Party and named for the hero of Chile's war
of independence against Spain. Splintered into two factions in
the late 1980s, and one faction became a political party in
1991. The dissident wing FPMR/D is Chile's only remaining
active terrorist group.
Activities: FPMR/D attacks civilians and international
targets, including US businesses and Mormon churches. In 1993,
FPMR/D bombed two McDonald's restaurants and attempted to bomb
a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant. Successful government
counterterrorist operations have undercut the organization
significantly. Four FPMR/D members escaped from prison using a
helicopter in December 1996. One of them, Patricio Ortiz
Montenegro, fled to Switzerland where he requested political
asylum. Chile requested Ortiz's extradition, but the Swiss
Government--fearing Chile would not safeguard Ortiz's physical
and psychological well-being--denied the request. Chilean
authorities continued to pursue the whereabouts of the three
others who escaped with Ortiz.
Strength: Now believed to have between 50 and 100 members.
Location/Area of Operation: Chile.
External Aid: None.
mujahedin-e khalq organization (mek or mko)*
a.k.a.: The National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA, the
militant wing of the MEK), the People's Mujahidin of Iran
(PMOI), National Council of Resistance (NCR), Muslim Iranian
Student's Society (front organization used to garner financial
support)
Description: Formed in the 1960s by the college-educated
children of Iranian merchants, the MEK sought to counter what
it perceived as excessive Western influence in the Shah's
regime. Following a philosophy that mixes Marxism and Islam,
has developed into the largest and most active armed Iranian
dissident group. Its history is studded with anti-Western
activity, and, most recently, attacks on the interests of the
clerical regime in Iran and abroad.
Activities: Worldwide campaign against the Iranian
Government stresses propaganda and occasionally uses terrorist
violence. During the 1970s the MEK staged terrorist attacks
inside Iran and killed several US military personnel and
civilians working on defense projects in Tehran. Supported the
takeover in 1979 of the US Embassy in Tehran. In April 1992
conducted attacks on Iranian embassies in 13 different
countries, demonstrating the group's ability to mount large-
scale operations overseas. Recent attacks in Iran include three
explosions in Tehran in June 1998 that killed three persons and
the assassination of Asadollah Lajevardi, the former director
of the Evin Prison.
Strength: Several thousand fighters based in Iraq with an
extensive overseas support structure. Most of the fighters are
organized in the MEK's National Liberation Army (NLA).
Location/Area of Operation: In the 1980s the MEK's leaders
were forced by Iranian security forces to flee to France. Most
resettled in Iraq by 1987. In the mid-1980s did not mount
terrorist operations in Iran at a level similar to its
activities in the 1970s. In recent years has claimed credit for
a number of operations in Iran.
External Aid: Beyond support from Iraq, the MEK uses front
organizations to solicit contributions from expatriate Iranian
communities.
mrta
(see Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement)
national liberation army (eln)--colombia*
Description: Pro-Cuban, anti-US guerrilla group formed in
January 1965. Primarily rural based, although has several urban
fronts, particularly in the Magdalena Medio region. Entered
peace talks with Colombian Civil Society in mid-1998 and was
preparing to participate in a national convention in early
1999.
Activities: Conducted weekly assaults on oil infrastructure
(typically pipeline bombings) and has inflicted massive oil
spills. Extortion and bombings against US and other foreign
businesses, especially the petroleum industry. Annually
conducts several hundred kidnappings for profit, including
foreign employees of large corporations. Forces coca and opium
poppy cultivators to pay protection money and attacks
government efforts to eradicate these crops.
Strength: Approximately 3,000-5,000 armed combatants and an
unknown number of active supporters.
Location/Area of Operation: Colombia, border regions of
Venezuela.
External Aid: None.
new people's army (npa)
Description: The guerrilla arm of the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP), NPA is an avowedly Maoist group formed
in December 1969 with the aim of overthrowing the government
through protracted guerrilla warfare. Although primarily a
rural-based guerrilla group, the NPA has an active urban
infrastructure to conduct terrorism and uses city-based
assassination squads called sparrow units. Derives most of its
funding from contributions of supporters and so-called
revolutionary taxes extorted from local businesses.
Activities: Has suffered setbacks since the late 1980s
because of splits within the CPP, lack of money, and successful
government operations. The NPA primarily targets Philippine
security forces, corrupt politicians, and drug traffickers.
Opposes any US military presence in the Philippines and
attacked US military interests before the US base closures in
1992.
Strength: Estimated between 6,000 to 8,000.
Location/Area of Operation: Operates in rural Luzon,
Visayas, and parts of Mindanao. Has cells in Manila and other
metropolitan centers.
External Aid: Unknown.
the palestine islamic jihad (pij)*
Description: Originated among militant Palestinians in the
Gaza Strip during the 1970s; a series of loosely affiliated
factions rather than a cohesive group. Committed to the
creation of an Islamic Palestinian state and the destruction of
Israel through holy war. Because of its strong support for
Israel, the United States has been identified as an enemy of
the PIJ. Also opposes moderate Arab governments that it
believes have been tainted by Western secularism.
Activities: Has threatened to retaliate against Israel and
the United States for the murder of PIJ leader Fathi Shaqaqi in
Malta in October 1995. Conducted suicide bombings against
Israeli targets in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel. Has
threatened to attack US interests in Jordan.
Strength: Unknown.
Location/Area of Operation: Primarily Israel and the
occupied territories and other parts of the Middle East,
including Jordan and Lebanon. The largest faction is based in
Syria.
External Aid: Receives financial assistance from Iran and
limited assistance from Syria.
palestine liberation front (plf)*
Description: Broke away from the PFLP-GC in mid-1970s.
Later split again into pro-PLO, pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan
factions. Pro-PLO faction led by Muhammad Abbas (Abu Abbas),
who became member of PLO Executive Committee in 1984 but left
it in 1991.
Activities: The Abu Abbas-led faction has conducted attacks
against Israel. Abbas's group also was responsible for the
attack in 1985 on the cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder
of US citizen Leon Klinghoffer. A warrant for Abu Abbas's
arrest is outstanding in Italy.
Strength: At least 50.
Location/Area of Operation: PLO faction based in Tunisia
until Achille Lauro attack. Now based in Iraq.
External Aid: Receives support mainly from Iraq. Has
received support from Libya in the past.
the party of democratic kampuchea (khmer rouge)*
Description: Communist insurgency trying to overthrow the
Cambodian Government. Under Pol Pot's leadership, conducted a
campaign of genocide, killing more than 1 million persons
during its four years in power in the late 1970s. Defections
starting in 1996 and accelerating in spring 1998 appear to have
shattered the Khmer Rouge as a military force, but hardline
remnants still may pose a threat in remote areas.
Activities: Virtually has disintegrated as a viable
insurgent organization because of defections, but hardline
remnants continue low-level attacks against government troops
in isolated areas. Some small groups may have turned to
banditry. Also targets Cambodian and ethnic Vietnamese
villagers and occasionally has kidnapped and killed foreigners
traveling in remote rural areas.
Strength: Fewer than 500, possibly no more than 100.
Location/Area of Operation: The Khmer Rouge operates in
outlying provinces in Cambodia, particularly in the northwest
along the border with Thailand.
External Aid: The Khmer Rouge currently does not receive
external assistance.
pkk
(see Kurdistan Workers' Party)
popular front for the liberation of palestine (pflp)*
Description: Marxist-Leninist group founded in 1967 by
George Habash as a member of the PLO. Joined the Alliance of
Palestinian Forces (APF) to oppose the Declaration of
Principles signed in 1993 and has suspended participation in
the PLO. Broke away from the APF, along with the DFLP, in 1996
over ideological differences. Has made limited moves toward
merging with the DFLP since the mid-1990s.
Activities: Committed numerous international terrorist
attacks during the 1970s. Since 1978 has conducted numerous
attacks against Israeli or moderate Arab targets, including
killing a settler and her son in December 1996.
Strength: Some 800.
Location/Area of Operation: Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and the
occupied territories.
External Aid: Receives most of its financial and military
assistance from Syria and Libya.
popular front for the liberation of palestine-general command (pflp-
gc)*
Description: Split from the PFLP in 1968, claiming it
wanted to focus more on fighting and less on politics.
Violently opposed to Arafat's PLO. Led by Ahmad Jabril, a
former captain in the Syrian Army. Closely tied to both Syria
and Iran.
Activities: Has conducted numerous cross-border terrorist
attacks into Israel using unusual means, such as hot-air
balloons and motorized hang gliders.
Strength: Several hundred.
Location/Area of Operation: Headquartered in Damascus with
bases in Lebanon and cells in Europe.
External Aid: Receives logistic and military support from
Syria and financial support from Iran.
provisional irish republican army (pira)
(see Irish Republican Army)
al-qaida
Description: Established by Usama Bin Ladin about 1990 to
bring together Arabs who fought in Afghanistan against the
Soviet invasion. Helped finance, recruit, transport, and train
Sunni Islamic extremists for the Afghan resistance. Current
goal is to ``reestablish the Muslim State'' throughout the
world. Works with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow
regimes it deems ``non-Islamic'' and remove Westerners from
Muslim countries. Issued statement under banner of ``The World
Islamic Front for Jihad Against The Jews and Crusaders'' in
February 1998, saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill US
citizens, civilian or military, and their allies everywhere.
Activities: Conducted the bombings of the US Embassies in
Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on 7 August that
killed at least 301 persons and injured more than 5,000 others.
Claims to have shot down US helicopters and killed US
servicemen in Somalia in 1993 and to have conducted three
bombings targeted against the US troop presence in Aden, Yemen
in December 1992. Linked to plans for attempted terrorist
operations, including the assassination of the Pope during his
visit to Manila in late1994; simultaneous bombings of the US
and Israeli Embassies in Manila and other Asian capitals in
late 1994; the midair bombing of a dozen US trans-Pacific
flights in 1995; and a plan to kill President Clinton during a
visit to the Philippines in early 1995. Continues to train,
finance, and provide logistic support to terrorist groups that
support these goals.
Strength: May have from several hundred to several thousand
members. Also serves as the core of a loose umbrella
organization that includes many Sunni Islamic extremist groups,
including factions of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Gama'at
al-Islamiyya, and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin.
Location/Area of Operation: The Embassy bombings in Nairobi
and Dar es Salaam underscore al-Qaida's global reach. Bin Ladin
and his key lieutenants reside in Afghanistan, and the group
maintains terrorist training camps there.
External Aid: Bin Ladin, son of a billionaire Saudi family,
is said to have inherited around $300 million that he uses to
finance the group. Al-Qaida also maintains money-making
businesses, collects donations from like-minded supporters, and
illicitly siphons funds from donations to Muslim charitable
organizations.
qibla and people against gangsterism and drugs (pagad)
Description: Qibla is a small radical Islamic group led by
Achmad Cassiem, who was inspired by Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini.
Cassiem founded Qibla in the 1980s, seeking to establish an
Islamic state in South Africa. PAGAD began in 1996 as a
community anticrime group fighting drug lords in Cape Town's
Cape Flats section. PAGAD now shares Qibla's anti-Western
stance as well as some members and leadership. Though distinct,
the media often treat the two groups as one.
Activities: Qibla routinely protests US policies toward the
Muslim world and uses radio station 786 to promote its message
and mobilze Muslims. PAGAD is suspected of conducting 170
bombings and 18 other violent actions in 1998 alone. Qibla and
PAGAD may have masterminded the bombing on 15 August of the
Cape Town Planet Hollywood. Often use the front names Muslims
Against Global Oppression (MAGO) and Muslims Against
Illegitimate Leaders (MAIL) when anti-Western campaigns are
launched.
Strength: Qibla is estimated at 250 members. Police
estimate there are at least 50 gunmen in PAGAD, and the size of
PAGAD-organized demonstrations suggests it has considerably
more adherents than Qibla.
Location/Area of Operation: Operate mainly in the CapeTown
area, South Africa's foremost tourist venue.
External Aid: Probably have ties to Islamic extremists in
the Middle East.
real ira (rira)
a.k.a: True IRA
Description: Formed in February-March 1998 as clandestine
armed wing of the 32-County Sovereignty Movement, a ``political
pressure group'' dedicated to removing British forces from
Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. The 32-County
Sovereignty Movement opposed Sinn Fein's adoption in September
1997 of the Mitchell principles of democracy and nonviolence
and opposed the amendment in May 1998 of Articles 2 and 3 of
the Irish Constitution, which lay claim to Northern Ireland.
Former IRA ``quartermaster general'' Mickey McKevitt leads the
group; Bernadette Sands-McKevitt, his common-law wife, is the
vice-chair of the 32-County Sovereignty Movement.
Activities: Bombings, assassinations, and robberies. Most
Real IRA activists are former IRA members; the group has
inherited a wealth of experience in terrorist tactics and
bombmaking. Targets include British military and police in
Northern Ireland and Northern Irish Protestant communities.
Claimed responsibility for the car bomb attack in Omagh,
Northern Ireland on 15 August, which killed 29 and injured 220
persons. Announced a cease-fire after that bombing. Has
attempted several unsuccessful bomb attacks on the UK mainland.
Strength: About 70, plus limited support from IRA
hardliners dissatisfied with the current IRA cease-fire and
other republican sympathizers.
Location/Area of Operation: Northern Ireland, Ireland,
Great Britain.
External Aid: Suspected of receiving funds from
sympathizers in the United States. Press reports claim Real IRA
leaders also have sought support from Libya.
revolutionary armed forces of colombia (farc)*
Description: The largest, best-trained, and best-equipped
insurgent organization in Colombia. Established in 1964 as a
rural-based, pro-Soviet guerrilla army. Organized along
military lines and includes several urban fronts. Has been
anti-United States since its inception. The FARC agreed in 1998
to enter into preliminary peace talks with the Colombian
Government. The Pastrana administration demilitarized five
large rural municipalities to meet FARC conditions for peace
talks. (President Pastrana traveled to this area on 7 January
1999 to inaugurate peace talks with guerrilla leaders, although
the FARC's senior-most leader failed to attend.)
Activities: Armed attacks against Colombian political,
economic, military, and police targets. Many members pursue
criminal activities, carrying out hundreds of kidnappings for
profit annually. Foreign citizens often are targets of FARC
kidnappings. Group has well-documented ties to narcotics
traffickers, principally through the provision of armed
protection for coca and poppy cultivation and narcotics
production facilities, as well as through attacks on government
narcotics eradication efforts. Also began in 1998 a bombing
campaign against oil pipelines.
Strength: Approximately 8,000-12,000 armed combatants and
an unknown number of supporters, mostly in rural areas.
Location/Area of Operation: Colombia, with occasional
operations in border areas of Venezuela, Panama, Peru, Brazil,
and Ecuador.
External Aid: None.
revolutionary organization 17 november (17 november)*
Description: Radical leftist group established in 1975 and
named for the student uprising in Greece in November 1973 that
protested the military regime. Anti-Greek establishment, anti-
US, anti-Turkey, anti-NATO, and committed to the ouster of US
bases, removal of Turkish military presence from Cyprus, and
severing of Greece's ties to NATO and the European Union (EU).
Possibly affiliated with other Greek terrorist groups.
Activities: Initial attacks were assassinations of senior
US officials and Greek public figures. Added bombings in 1980s.
Since 1990 has expanded targets to include EU facilities and
foreign firms investing in Greece and has added improvised
rocket attacks to its methods.
Strength: Unknown, but presumed to be small.
Location/Area of Operation: Athens, Greece.
External Aid: Unknown.
revolutionary people's liberation party/front (dhkp/c)*
a.k.a.: Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left), Dev Sol
Description: Originally formed in 1978 as Devrimci Sol, or
Dev Sol, a splinter faction of the Turkish People's Liberation
Party/Front. Renamed in 1994 after factional infighting, it
espouses a Marxist ideology and is virulently anti-US and anti-
NATO. Finances its activities chiefly through armed robberies
and extortion.
Activities: Since the late 1980s has concentrated attacks
against current and retired Turkish security and military
officials. Began a new campaign against foreign interests in
1990. Assassinated two US military contractors and wounded a US
Air Force officer to protest the Gulf war. Launched rockets at
US Consulate in Istanbul in 1992. Assassinated prominent
Turkish businessman in early 1996, its first significant
terrorist act as DHKP/C.
Strength: Unknown.
Location/Area of Operation: Conducts attacks in Turkey--
primarily in Istanbul--Ankara, Izmir, and Adana. Raises funds
in Western Europe.
External Aid: Unknown.
revolutionary people's struggle (ela)*
Description: Extreme leftist group that developed from
opposition to the military junta that ruled Greece from 1967 to
1974. Formed in 1971, ELA is a self-described revolutionary,
anti-capitalist, and anti-imperialist group that has declared
its opposition to ``imperialist domination, exploitation, and
oppression.'' Strongly anti-US and seeks the removal of US
military forces from Greece.
Activities: Since 1974 has conducted bombings against Greek
Government and economic targets as well as US military and
business facilities. In 1986 stepped up attacks on Greek
Government and commercial interests. Raid on a safehouse in
1990 revealed a weapons cache and direct contacts with other
Greek terrorist groups, including 1 May and Revolutionary
Solidarity. In 1991, ELA and 1 May claimed joint responsibility
for over 20 bombings. Greek police believe they have
established a link between the ELA and the Revolutionary
Organization 17 November. Has not claimed responsibility for a
terrorist attack since January 1995.
Strength: Unknown.
Location/Area of Operation: Greece.
External Aid: No known foreign sponsors.
sendero luminoso (shining path, sl)*
Description: Larger of Peru's two insurgencies, SL is among
the world's most ruthless guerrilla organizations. Formed in
the late 1960s by then university professor Abimael Guzman.
Stated goal is to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and
replace them with peasant revolutionary regime. Also wants to
rid Peru of foreign influences. Guzman's capture in September
1992 was a major blow, as were arrests of other SL leaders in
1995, defections, and Peruvian President Fujimori's amnesty
program for repentant terrorists.
Activities: Has engaged in particularly brutal forms of
terrorism, including the indiscriminate use of bombs. Conducted
fewer attacks in 1998, generally limited to rural areas. Almost
every institution in Peru has been a target of SL violence. Has
bombed diplomatic missions of several countries in Peru,
including the US Embassy. Conducts bombing campaigns and
selective assassinations. Has attacked US businesses since its
inception. Involved in cocaine trade.
Strength: Approximately 1,500 to 2,500 armed militants;
larger number of supporters, mostly in rural areas.
Location/Area of Operation: Rural based, with few violent
attacks in the capital.
External Aid: None.
17 november
(see Revolutionary Organization 17 November)
sikh terrorism
Description: Sikh terrorism is sponsored by expatriate and
Indian Sikh groups who want to carve out an independent Sikh
state called Khalistan (Land of the Pure) from Indian
territory. Active groups include Babbar Khalsa, International
Sikh Youth Federation, Dal Khalsa, Bhinderanwala Tiger Force. A
previously unknown group, the Saheed Khalsa Force, claimed
credit for the marketplace bombings in New Delhi in 1997.
Activities: Attacks in India are mounted against Indian
officials and facilities, other Sikhs, and Hindus; they include
assassinations, bombings, and kidnappings. Attacks have dropped
markedly since 1992, as Indian security forces have killed or
captured numerous senior Sikh militant leaders and have
conducted successful army, paramilitary, and police operations.
Many low-intensity bombings that might be attributable to Sikh
extremists now occur without claims of credit.
Strength: Unknown.
Location/Area of Operation: Northern India, western Europe,
Southeast Asia, and North America.
External Aid: Militant cells are active internationally and
extremists gather funds from overseas Sikh communities. Sikh
expatriates have formed a variety of international
organizations that lobby for the Sikh cause overseas. Most
prominent are the World Sikh Organization and the International
Sikh Youth Federation.
tupac amaru revolutionary movement (mrta)*
Description: Traditional Marxist-Leninist revolutionary
movement formed in 1983. Aims to rid Peru of imperialism and
establish Marxist regime. Has suffered from defections and
government counterterrorist successes in addition to infighting
and loss of leftist support.
Activities: Bombings, kidnappings, ambushes,
assassinations. Previously responsible for large number of
anti-US attacks; recent activity has dropped off dramatically.
Most members have been jailed. Nonetheless, in December 1996,
14 MRTA members overtook the Japanese Ambassador's residence in
Lima during a diplomatic reception, capturing hundreds.
Government forces stormed the residence in April, 1997 rescuing
all but one of the remaining hostages. Has not conducted a
significant terrorist operation since then.
Strength: Believed to have fewer than 100 remaining
members.
Location/Area of Operation: Peru.
External Aid: None.
al ummah
Description: Radical Indian Muslim group founded in 1992 by
S.A. Basha.
Activities: Believed responsible for the Coimbatore
bombings in Southern India in February 1998. Basha and 30 of
his followers were arrested and await trial for those bombings.
Strength: Unknown. No estimate available.
Location/Area of Operation: Southern India.
External Aid: Unknown.
zviadists
Description: Extremist supporters of deceased former
Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Following Gamsakhurdia's
ouster in 1991, his supporters launched a revolt against his
successor, Eduard Shevardnadze. Suppressed in late 1993, and
Gamsakhurdia committed suicide in January 1994. Some
Gamsakhurdia sympathizers have formed a weak legal opposition
in Georgia, but others remain violently opposed to
Shevardnadze's rule and seek to overthrow him. Some
Gamsakhurdia government officials fled to Russia following
Gamsakhurdia's ouster and now use Russia as a base of
operations to bankroll anti-Shevardnadze activities.
Activities: Bombings and kidnappings. Attempted two
assassinations against Shevardnadze in August 1995 and February
1998. Took UN personnel hostage following the February 1998
attempt, but released the hostages unharmed.
Strength: Unknown.
Location/Area of Operation: Georgia, especially Mingrelia,
and Russia.
External Aid: May have received support and training in
Chechen terrorist training camps. Chechen mercenaries
participated in the assassination attempt against Shevardnadze
in February 1998.
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Appendix D: Extraditions and Renditions of Terrorists to the U.S. 1993-
1998
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Extradition or
Date Name Rendition From
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 1993.................... Mahmoud Abu Halima Extradition a
(February 1993 World Trade Center bombing)
July 1993..................... Mohammed Ali Rezaq Rendition Nigeria
(November 1985 hijacking of Egyptair 648)
February 1995................. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef Extradition Pakistan
(January 1995 Far East bomb plot, February
1993 World Trade Center bombing
April 1995.................... Abdul Hakim Murad Rendition Philippines
(January 1995 Far East bomb plot)
August 1995................... Eyad Mahmoud Ismail Najim Extradition Jordan
(February 1993 World Trade Center bombing)
December 1995................. Wali Khan Amin Shah Rendition a
(January 1995 Far East bomb plot)
September 1996................ Tsutomu Shirosaki Rendition a
(May 1986 attack on US Embassy Jakarta)
June 1997..................... Mir Aimal Kansi Rendition a
(January 1993 shooting outside CIA
headquarters)
June 1998..................... Mohammed Rashid Rendition a
(August 1982 Pan Am bombing)
August 1998................... Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali Rendition Kenya
(August 1998 US Embassy bombing in Kenya)
August 1998................... Mohamed Sadeek Odeh Rendition Kenya
(August 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing in
Kenya)
December 1998................. Mamdouh Mahmud Salim Extradition Germany
(August 1998 East African bombings)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Country not disclosed.
b. Antiterrorism Assistance Program: Annual Report--Fiscal Year 1997
[Pursuant to Public Law 99-83, sec. 502]
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c. Foreign Terrorist Organizations
Designation and list of foreign terrorist organizations
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
U.S. Department of State
October 8, 1997
The Designations
The Secretary of State has designated 30 groups as
foreign terrorist organizations. Her action sends a
powerful signal that the United States will not
tolerate support for international terrorism.
The Secretary acted under the authority provided by
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, with the concurrence of the Attorney General and
the Secretary of the Treasury.
On October 1, the State Department notified Congress
of the Secretary's intent to designate 30 foreign
terrorist organizations. Congress also received the
factual bases for her decisions on each of the 30
designations.
A formal announcement of the designations was placed
in the Federal Register on October 8, and the
Department of the Treasury has notified financial
institutions to block funds of the designated
organization.
The designations are a significant addition to our
enforcement tools against international terrorists and
their supporters. They supplement the Executive Order
the President signed in January 1995 (and has renewed
annually), which blocks funds of 12 Middle Eastern
organizations that use or threaten to use violence to
disrupt the Middle East Peace Process.
Legal Consequences
The 1996 law makes it a criminal offense to provide
funds or other forms of material support or resources,
such as weapons or safehouses, to designated foreign
terrorist organizations.
--The law applies to anyone within the United States or
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
--Violators are subject to fines and up to 10 years in
prison.
Aliens abroad who are members or representatives of
designated foreign terrorist organizations are
ineligible for visas to the U.S. and are subject to
exclusion from the U.S.
U.S. financial institutions are required to block
those funds of designated foreign terrorist
organizations or their agents over which they have
possession or control. They are subject to civil
penalties and possible criminal prosecution if they do
not conform with the law and regulations.
The Process
The designations are subject to judicial review, as
the statute required, and extensive administrative
records were created to substantiate each
recommendation to the Secretary of State. A major
interagency effort included the examination of
thousands of pages of documents and the preparation of
a complete administrative record on each group.
--The administrative records are and will remain
classified. Unclassified descriptions of terrorist
organizations, including those formally designated,
appear in the annex of the Department's annual
report, Patterns of Global Terrorism, which is
available on the State Department's web site.
The designations expire in two years unless renewed.
The law also allows groups to be added at any time
following a decision by the Secretary, in consultation
with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the
Treasury. Designations can also be revoked if the
Secretary determines that there are grounds for doing
so and notifies Congress. Congress can also pass
legislation to revoke designations.
Background
The law responded to concerns that foreign terrorist
organizations were raising money in the United States.
Some groups have tried to broaden their financial base
because state sponsors were becoming less reliable
sources of money.
Some terrorist organizations have tried to portray
themselves as raising money for charitable activities
such as clinics or schools. These activities have
helped recruit supporters and activists.
Congress noted in the statement of findings in the
legislation:
--Foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity
are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any
contribution to such an organization facilitates
that conduct.'' (Section 301(a)(7)).
--Therefore, any contribution to a foreign terrorist
organization, regardless of the intended purpose,
is prohibited by the statute, unless the
contribution is limited to medicine or religious
materials.
Foreign Terrorist Organizations
office of the coordinator for counterterrorism
department of state, october 8, 1997.
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
Aum Shinrikyo (Aum)
Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine-
Hawatmeh Faction (DFLP)
HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA)
Hizballah (Party of God)
Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG)
Japanese Red Army (JRA)
al-Jihad
Kach
Kahane Chai
Khmer Rouge
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front Dissidents (FPMR/D)
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK, MKO)
National Liberation Army (ELN)
Palestine Islamic Jihad-Shaqaqi Faction (PIJ)
Palestine Liberation Front-Abu Abbas Faction (PLF)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-
General Command (PFLP-GC)
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November)
Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/
C)
Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA)
Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)
d. Report To Congress Concerning the Administration's Comprehensive
Counterterrorism Strategy: Agency Resource Requirements, April 29, 1997
(unclassified excerpts)
3. Agency Resource Requirements
a. department of justice
The Department of Justice is requesting $417,683,000 and
2,984 positions (1,579 agents and attorneys) in FY 1998 for
counterterrorism programs, an increase of more than $50,000,000
over the FY 1997 appropriations level. The Department's
counterterrorism budget has increased 360 percent since 1993,
reflecting the heightened threat from domestic and
international terrorism and the substantial expansion in the
Department's counterterrorism responsibilities pursuant to PDD-
39, the 1996 anti-terrorism law, the President's Executive
order on critical infrastructure protection, and recent
Congressional appropriations initiatives. (U)
A substantial portion of the increase in FY 1998 is
required to annualize the enhancements provided in the FY 1997
appropriations process, which more than doubled the
Department's counterterrorism resources. The Department is
requesting a limited number of enhancements in FY 1998,
primarily to bolster the Department's ability to locate,
apprehend and prosecute persons suspected of terrorist
activities. (U)
Federal Bureau of Investigation. In FY 1998, the FBI is
requesting $287,598,000 for 2,632 positions (1,350 agents) and
2,592 FTEs for counterterrorism activities, an increase of more
than $40,000,000 over the FY 1997 enacted level. The increase
is required to annualize the enhancements provided in the FY
1997 counterterrorism appropriations amendment. In addition,
the 1998 budget requests $6,000,000 for additional regional
computer crime squads. (U)
The resource requirements of the FBI are dictated largely'
by its responsibilities under PDD-39. The FBI has lead-agency
responsibility for investigating terrorist acts in the United
States by foreign or domestic terrorist groups and for such
attacks against U.S. citizens or interests abroad; providing an
operational. response to terrorist incidents in the United
States; leading and managing the Domestic Emergency Support
Team in domestic incidents; collecting, analyzing and
disseminating intelligence on terrorist groups in the United
States, including threat warnings; and preventing, detecting
and deterring terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass
destruction. (U)
To meet the FBI's responsibility to investigate terrorist
acts committed in the United States or directed at U.S.
citizens or interests abroad, the FY 1997 counterterrorism
appropriations amendment provided $27,800,000 and 331 positions
for emerging domestic terrorism; $2,700,000 for Joint Terrorism
Task Force matters; and $17,900,000 and 216 positions for
infrastructure vulnerability and key asset matters. The FBI's
FY 1998 budget request seeks annualized base-level funding for
each of these and related programs funded in FY 1997. (U)
The FBI also is responsible for identifying critical
national information and other infrastructure and developing
plans to harden such targets against terrorist attack and/or
respond to actual terrorist attacks. The FBI's Critical
Infrastructure Threat Assessment Center (CITAC) and
infrastructure vulnerability/key asset program require
continued funding for the 63 CITAC and 216 key asset positions
provided in FY 1997. (U)
To enhance FBI's ability to coordinate the collection,
analysis and dissemination of counterterrorism information, the
FBI is seeking annualized base-level funding for 31 positions
in the counterterrorism Center, continued funding for state and
local participation in the Center, and two field translation
centers staffed with contract translators. (U)
The FBI resource requirements discussed above are in
addition to the $77,140,000 enhancement provided in the 1995
supplemental terrorism bill, including initial funding for the
FBI's Counterterrorism Center ($10,000,000), evidence response
teams ($2,900,000), lab equipment modernization ($2,100,000),
427 new positions for counterterrorism investigations,
intelligence collection and analysis, and technical support
($48,040,000) . Approximately $52,100,000 of the 1995
supplement appropriation had been obligated as of January 31,
1997, with the multi-year capital projects constituting the
balance of the unobligated funds. (U)
Criminal Division. The Department is requesting 82
positions, 55 attorneys, and $11,064,000 for the Criminal
Division's counterterrorism activities. This represents a
program increase of 22 positions, 10 attorneys, and $3,113,000
from the Division's FY 1998 base level. (U)
The Criminal Division plays an important role in
implementing the components of the terrorism strategy involving
the swift investigation, apprehension and prosecution of
domestic and international terrorists; the identification and
protection of national information infrastructure; and the
training of foreign and U.S. State and local law enforcement
personnel in counterterrorism investigations and prosecutions.
The Division also maintains a cadre of experienced prosecutors
with expertise in terrorism cases who handle major terrorism
cases together with Assistant United States Attorneys in the
particular districts. (U)
Congress recently ratified twelve new extradition and
mutual legal assistance treaties, including the first
extradition treaty with an Arab country (Jordan) . Two
additional criminal Division attorneys are needed to address
the anticipated increase in requests for extradition and/or
mutual legal assistance under these new agreements as well as
to handle the explosive growth in requests from federal, state
and local agencies under existing international agreements. (U)
The Division also is requesting funding to expand its
presence overseas in areas where an on-the-ground presence will
facilitate more effective cooperation in sensitive extradition
cases and cooperative law enforcement investigations. Three new
attorney positions are sought for placement in the following
strategic locations: Manila to support East Asia, Brasilia to
support South America, and Athens to support the Middle East.
In addition, with the assumption by the United States of the
Presidency of the Eight in 1997, and as summit agendas focus
increasingly on terrorism, the Criminal Division will be relied
upon, and has requested one attorney and two support positions,
to provide support and assistance to the myriad task forces
originating front the Eight. (U)
Similarly, the Division is requesting new funds for the
creation of an Analysis Unit in the Office of International
Affairs. The Analysis Unit will collect, organize, and
critically analyze sensitive international law enforcement and
terrorism information, with the goal of developing specific
enforcement strategies for particular countries, regions, or
forms of terrorist and criminal activity. The Division's FY
1998 request seeks nine positions (five analysts and four
support staff) for this new unit. (U)
Last year, Congress approved the creation of a new
Computer, Crime Section within the Division. The Section is
coordinating and/or participating in the implementation of key
aspects of the Administration's effort to identify and protect
the national information infrastructure. Additional resources
also are needed to prosecute computer terrorists, strengthen
network integrity, cooperate with foreign entities and
governments in efforts' to harmonize computer crime laws, and
eliminate procedural impediments in international computer
terrorism investigations. The Division's FY 1998 budget request
seeks funding for an additional four attorneys and one support
staff for the Computer Crime Section. (U)
U.S. Attorneys. Additional resources for the U.S.
Attorneys' Offices are needed to respond to the increasing
number of cases involving radi ' cal militias and extremist
groups, the use of explosives, and other domestic terrorism
matters. Moreover, to address the need for greater coordination
of counterterrorism efforts at the district level, the
Department's FY 1998 budget request seeks $3,100,000 and 18
additional AUSAs for the appointment of a terrorism coordinator
in U.S. Attorneys' Offices around the country. The coordinator
would be responsible for assessing the terrorist threat in
their district; working with federal, state and local officials
to prepare and update emergency response plans for terrorist
attacks; and effectively prosecuting terrorism cases in their
district. (U)
Counterterrorism Fund. Recent experience has demonstrated
the need for a mechanism to marshal massive and sustained
counterterrorism resources in response to specific terrorist
incidents or threats, and much of the U.S. strategy focuses on
the continuing development of such capabilities it the tactical
and operational level. The creation of the Counterterrorism
Fund in the 1995 supplement appropriation provided an effective
resource response mechanism for the Department of Justice,
while ensuring adequate accountability and oversight of
counter-terrorism spending. The Administration is requesting
$29,450,000 for the Counterterrorism Fund in FY 1998, the same
as the FY 1997 appropriations level. (U)
Other DOJ Programs. Other DOJ components have important
responsibilities under PDD-39 and the U.S. terrorism strategy,
including the Office of intelligence Policy and Review
(assisting in the investigation of terrorism cases under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) ; Executive Office for
Immigration Review (expeditiously expelling suspected
terrorists who are in the United States unlawfully) ; and
office of Justice Programs (providing funds to state and local
law enforcement agencies to bolster their preparedness in the
event of a terrorist attack, particularly involving chemical or
biological weapons). (U)
Additional DOJ components with responsibilities under the
strategy are the Justice Management Division (security and
emergency planning staff); Immigration and Naturalization
Service (arrest and exclusion and/or incarceration of foreign
alien terrorists); U.S. National Central Bureau-Interpol; Drug
Enforcement Administration (protection of DEA facilities and
personnel in the United States and abroad); and the U.S.
Marshals Service (security at high-risk facilities and
proceedings). Each of these components received substantial
funding increases in FYs 1996 or 1997, and the Department is
seeking an increase in appropriations to provide full-year
funding for each of these components. (U)
b. department of state
PDD-39 continued the designation of the State Department as
the lead agency for international terrorism outside U.S.
territory and within the jurisdiction of another nation. State
also is responsible for counterterrorism training programs for
foreign security personnel; operating the international
terrorism rewards program; and ensuring that visas to enter the
United States are not issued to persons involved in terrorist
activities. In addition, the Department bears the
responsibility for protecting diplomatic facilities and U.S.
government personnel against terrorist attack. (U)
The State Department's expenditures for countering
terrorism include both identifiable budget items such as those
described below, and difficult-to-quantify efforts by various
elements of the Department and overseas missions on diplomatic
activities related to countering terrorism, or dealing with a
specific terrorist incident. For FY 1998, the State
Department's request for specific components and programs is
$325 million, an increase of about $11 million above the FY
1997 estimates. (U)
Policy-level guidance and coordination for international
terrorism is the responsibility of the Department's Coordinator
for Counterterrorism. Approximately $2,250,000 is required in
FY 1998 for salaries and expenses, equipment, and deployment
and exercises. Further, the State Department is requesting
$19,000,000 for the Antiterrorism Assistance Training (ATA)
program, $1,800,000 for the Department's contribution of the
interagency counterterrorism research and development program,
and $1,500,000 for the rewards program. (U)
The Department requires $600,000 in FY 1998 funds to
support the TIPOFF initiative, which serves as the interface
between the highly classified intelligence products of U.S.
agencies and U.S. personnel and consular officials, who must
have access to such information in adjudicating visa
applications and requests to enter the United States. (U)
The Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)
provides the security platform for the protection of U.S.
government personnel, national security information, and
diplomatic facilities under the authority of the Chiefs of
Mission overseas, as well as for the protection of State
Department personnel and facilities in the United States. The
Department is requesting $285,200,000 in FY 1998 for diplomatic
security and law enforcement operations, including DS
operations, along with $7,900,000 to reimburse state and local
jurisdictions for ``extraordinary'' protective services
associated with the activities of foreign missions and
officials. The Security and Maintenance of United States
Missions account supports overseas buildings which must be
built and maintained to withstand terrorist attacks. In
addition, for FY 1998, $5,000,000 is requested specifically for
physical security upgrades for buildings. (U)
The Fiscal Year 1997 Counterterrorism Budget Amendment,
provided an additional $38 million in no-year funding to help
combat the threat of terrorism worldwide, especially in the
Middle East, and to make an initial down payment on the
security infrastructure gap that has to addressed over the next
several years. The operating portion of that amendment, which
is essential for continuing the security improvements now
underway, has been included in the FY 98 request. (U)
c. department of defense
The Department of Defense spends approximately $3.5 to 4.0
billion each year to combat overseas and domestic terrorism.
DOD's combatting terrorism program consists of all actions
taken to oppose terrorism including defensive measures used to
reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts and offensive measures
taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. The program
includes resources (personnel and dollars) for physical
security; security and investigative matters,
counterintelligence; and counterterrorism. The effort excludes
costs associated with counterproliferation, information
assurance and intelligence activities since these activities do
not directly focus upon combatting terrorism. (U)
In addition, DOD received $100 million in FY 1997 for
defense against weapons of mass destruction. The FY 1998/FY
1999 President's Budget submission includes $49.5 million in FY
1998 and $52.1 million in FY 1999 to continue to provide
emergency response preparedness, first responder training, and
assistance to metropolitan area agencies, and to conduct
exercises and preparedness tests in coordination with federal,
state, and local agencies. It is DOD's intention to transition
the first responder training and expert assistance programs to
other agencies after FY 1999 as allowed for in section 1412 of
the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 1997.
Similarly, DOD intends to fund exercises and preparedness tests
only through FY 2001 in accordance with section 1415 of the
NDAA. (U)
Approximately $350 million of the Administration's $1.1
billion supplemental to the FY 1997 budget was earmarked for
DOD, including measures to tighten security at U.S. facilities
in the Persian Gulf; general overseas facilities and force
protection upgrades; and training, awareness, and other
programs designed to combat terrorism. (U)
d. intelligence agencies
Although the preparation of this Report was coordinated
through appropriate channels within the U.S. intelligence
community,. the Report does not address the counterterrorism
resource requirements of the Central Intelligence Agency or
other components of the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
(U)
Pursuant to Executive Order 12333, the Director of Central
Intelligence is responsible for developing an annual budget
specifically for the NFIP components, which is reviewed by the
Executive Branch and Congress outside the normal budget
process. A substantial portion of the counterterrorism assets
of U.S. intelligence agencies fall within the NFIP. Persons
interested in reviewing the terrorism resource requirements in
the NFIP are referred to the classified NFIP budget and
analysis prepared by the staff elements within the DCI. (U)
e. PLO Commitments Compliance Act--Report to Congress, November 20,
1997
Report to Congress pursuant to Title VIII of Public Law 101-246
[Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990-91], as
amended
This document is submitted in accordance with Title VIII of
Public Law 101-246 (the PLO Commitments Compliance Act of
1989--PLOCCA), as amended. This report covers the period from
the date of submission of the last combined PLOCCA/Middle East
Peace Facilitation Act (MEPFA) report on January 22, 1997 to
November 20, 1997.
This report describes actions and statements of the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and, as relevant, the
performance of the Palestinian Authority (PA) with respect to
commitments set forth in Chairman Arafat's September 9, 1993
letters to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and Norwegian Foreign
Minister Holst and those in, and resulting from, the good faith
implementation of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) and
subsequent agreements. Under the commitments in these letters
and accords, the PLO, inter alia, (1) recognizes Israel's right
to exist in peace and security; (2) accepts UN Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338; (3) commits itself to the Middle East
peace process and to a peaceful resolution of its conflict with
Israel; (4) undertakes to submit to the Palestine National
Council (PNC) changes to the PLO Covenant necessary to
eliminate articles that deny Israel's right to exist; (5)
renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence,
states that it will call on Palestinians to refrain from
violence, and assumes responsibility over all PLO elements and
personnel to assure their compliance, prevent violations and
discipline violators; and (6) agrees to strengthen cooperation
with Israel on a wide range of security issues. Even though a
MEPFA report is not required at this time, because of
Congressional interest this report also addresses MEPFA topics.
Incidents of Violence/Terrorism
The month following the signing on January 15, 1997 of the
Hebron redeployment agreement was relatively calm and free of
violence. In accordance with the terms of that agreement,
Israel-Palestinian joint security patrols--suspended since the
September 1996 violence--resumed operation. Tensions increased
significantly, however, following announcement by Israel in
late February that construction was to begin on the Har Homa/
Jebel Abu Ghunaym housing project in Jerusalem. Palestinian
demonstrators in the West Bank and Gaza routinely clashed with
settlers and Israeli security forces. While there were reports
that the PA organized large-scale demonstrations in the major
cities under its control, we have no evidence that the PA or
Chairman Arafat at any time directed participants to use
violence.
As Israel-Palestinian confrontations grew in scope and
intensity throughout March (Har Homa construction began March
18), PA security and police forces were ordered to refrain from
using arms or resorting to violence against Israeli forces,
whatever the circumstances. As a result of the violent clashes
between Palestinian and Israeli security forces near Hebron in
September 1996, the PA confiscated weapons from Palestinian
police in the West Bank. During the demonstrations this spring,
the police in the West Bank were not issued arms in order to
avoid an escalation of the conflict as had occurred in
September 1996. Muhammad Dahlan, head of the Palestinian
Preventive Security Organization in Gaza, stated ``I am
certainly concerned about an outbreak of violence. We do not
want an escalation which would only serve HAMAS and the Popular
Front. However, we will not be able to prevent the protest
activities. In any case, even if there are confrontations with
Israel, we will not reach a situation in which firearms will be
used, because this would only lead to casualties and exacerbate
our relations. We will not permit anybody to use firearms or
carry out terrorist attacks.''
Confrontations diminished following the March 21 ``Cafe
Apropos'' bombing in Tel Aviv (discussed below). However, a new
and more violent series of demonstrations--primarily occurring
on the separation line between Palestinian and Israeli-
controlled areas in the city of Hebron--followed the mid-June
Congressional Concurrent Resolution expressing the sense of
Congress regarding Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.
Palestinian security forces were initially slow to respond to
the increasing intensity of the clashes, which included
incendiary and explosive devices thrown at Israeli forces.
Israel claimed that Palestinian police were deliberately
not acting as required by the Hebron accord to impose calm on
the demonstrators and prevent confrontation. By mid-July,
however, following the serious wounding of an Israeli soldier,
the Palestinian police took up positions along the
confrontation line and were able to reinstate calm in the city
of Hebron and elsewhere. Senior IDF commanders and Israeli
Defense Minister Mordechai praised the Palestinian security
officers for their cooperation in bringing the situation under
control.
We have no information that any PLO element under Arafat's
control was involved in terrorism during the period covered by
this report. Nor do we have any information that the PLO has
provided financial or material assistance or training to any
group to carry out actions inconsistent with the Declaration of
Principles. PLO rejectionist groups such as the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (IPFLP) and the Democratic
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) do not participate
in PLO decision-making and are beyond Arafat's political and
physical control. These groups actively seek to undermine the
Palestinian Authority and to disrupt the peace process.
Statements made by leaders of these factions do not reflect
official PLO policy.
In March, the Government of Israel stated its belief that
Arafat had given a ``green light'' to terror by failing to
crack down on terrorist groups and signaling to these groups
that the PA would not act against them. We do not have any
information to suggest that a ``green light'' was given, but it
is clear that a sufficiently ``red light'' was not given
either. We have made clear to the PA that anything less than a
serious, sustained and concrete effort to uproot the terrorist
infrastructure is unacceptable.
In addition to the ongoing confrontations between
Palestinians and Israeli security forces, the following is a
list of incidents of violence and terrorism in relevant areas
during the period from January 22 through November 20, 1997:
6 March.
A settler reported that Palestinians tried to murder him
and that the assailants escaped in a car in the direction of
Hebron. The man sustained light injuries. The car was found
abandoned near the entrance to Hebron.
In Jerusalem a 50 year old man was stabbed near the King
David Hotel by a young Arab man. A suspect was later detained
by Israeli authorities and the attack was deemed to be criminal
in nature.
21
March A bomber killed himself and 3 others at the Cafe
Apropos in Tel Aviv. A HAMAS caller to the Israeli Channel 1
Television news room said his ``organization carried out the
operation but was not responsible for the action. The
responsible party is the Government of Israel which attacked
Jerusalem.''
23 March
A fire bomb was thrown at an IDF post in Hebron; no
casualties were reported.
1 April
A bomb detonated at approximately 7:00 a.m. local time near
Netzarim in Gaza, killing only the bomber.
Around 7:30 a.m. local time a second bomb exploded on
Gaza's main north-south road (Rte 4) near the Israeli
settlement of Kfar Darom. The suicide bomber involved
reportedly wore a Palestinian police uniform. The blast
occurred close to a local (Palestinian) taxi. Five Palestinians
were injured.
27 April
Two Israeli women were stabbed to death in Wadi Kelt. A
Palestinian Bedouin was eventually arrested and confessed to
the attack. The Bedouin was not affiliated with any terrorist
organization and the attack was treated as a crime by Israeli
authorities.
29 May
Three terrorists, reportedly armed with an automatic weapon
and knives, attacked Jewish merchants visiting a Gazan
greenhouse. The Palestinian owner of the greenhouse hid the
Jewish woman in his house and defended her husband with his own
body. The Gazan was wounded in the attack, the couple was
unharmed.
13 June
An Israeli woman was shot and wounded by terrorists as she
drove out of Har Adar, northwest of Jerusalem. Six Palestinians
from a nearby village were arrested by Israeli Defense Forces.
20 June
An Israeli thief discovered a bomb in a bag he had stolen
from a beach in Tel Aviv. Israeli police were able to disarm
the bomb.
9 July
Two border policemen were lightly injured when a small
explosive device detonated close to their jeep as they escorted
a bus of students from the 'Od Yosef Hay Yeshiva at Joseph's
Tomb.
10 July
A Rabbi's car was shot at near Elon Moreh; no one was hurt.
15 July
Israeli security forces arrested three Palestinian
policemen who allegedly planned to attack a guard at the Har
Bracha settlement near Nablus. According to Israeli police, the
three were also responsible for the shooting attack on the
Rabbi's car near Elon Moreh on July 10.
Israeli officials later stated their belief that the
Palestinian policemen were operating on orders from the
Palestinian Authority's Chief of Civil Police, Ghazi Al-Jabali.
The Palestinian Authority is conducting its own, internal
investigation of these allegations.
20 July
Palestinian security forces uncovered a bomb making factory
in Bayt Sahur near Bethlehem. The discovery came as part of the
investigation into the death of a HAMAS activist who blew
himself up while making a bomb on July 14.
30 July
Two suicide bombs detonated in the Mahane Yehuda Jerusalem
market place. Sixteen people, including the 2 bombers, were
killed in the blast and over 160 were injured. HAMAS
distributed leaflets claiming responsibility for the attack and
vowed that the attacks would continue if Palestinian prisoners
were not released.
4 September
Suicide bombers detonated 3 explosive charges on Ben Yehuda
street in downtown Jerusalem, killing 8 people and wounding
over 100.
Israeli security forces detained 69 Palestinians throughout
the territories in the wake of the Jerusalem bombing on
suspicion of aiding terrorist infrastructures.
12 September
Israel issued an arrest warrant and extradition request to
the Palestinian Authority for Ghazi Al-Jibali.
13 September
A young Arab woman tried to stab a border policeman near
the gate of an IDF base on the Jerusalem-Ramallah highway. The
policeman was not hurt and the woman was detained.
29 September
A Palestinian suspect was detained by Israel for abetting
the kidnappers of soldier Nachshon Wachsman, who was murdered
three years ago.
30 September
An Israeli court convicted Musa Mustafa, head of
Palestinian security in Jericho, of kidnapping and aggravated
extortion. The conviction stemmed from a case 15 months prior,
in which a resident of East Jerusalem was kidnapped, tortured,
and detained for over five months on suspicion of having
committed murder while under the employment of Israeli
intelligence.
6 November
Shots were fired at a school bus near Elon Moreh. No one
was injured.
19 November
A yeshiva student was killed and a second wounded in a
suspected terrorist attack inside the old city of Jerusalem.
The students were ambushed while returning to their residence,
a settler-owned home in the Muslim Quarter.
PLO Renunciation of Terrorism
The Palestinian Authority in general, and Chairman Arafat
in particular, consistently condemned acts of violence and
terrorism during this period. Following the March 21 Cafe
Apropos bombing Marwan Kanafani, adviser to and spokesman for
Chairman Arafat, spoke on Voice of Palestine radio saying ``the
bombing incident today was condemned by the [Palestinian]
Authority.'' Chairman Arafat spoke to Israeli President Weizman
and reiterated his condemnation of the bombing, stating that
``the Palestinian National Authority is against any violence.''
Palestinian Council member Ziad Abu Ziad told Israeli TV ``the
bombing truly pains me. I condemn it sharply. I think
condemnations are not enough to express the anger and pain we
feel as we see the region reverting to the era of bombings,
dead, and wounded. I sincerely hope the situation will not
become like it was before, that this was an isolated event.''
Likewise, Orient House head Faisel Husseini stated that the
bombing ``is a painful thing. We hope that it is an isolated
event, that it is even not a political one; that it is not a
terrorist attack. But if it is, we condemn it. We are against
hurting, injuring innocent people. I am not for violence and my
heart is with those who have been injured.''
In the aftermath of the two apparently botched suicide
bombings on April 1 in the Gaza strip that killed only the
bombers themselves and wounded five Palestinians, the
Palestinian Authority mounted a campaign against Islamic
militants particularly members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad
(PIJ) in the Gaza strip.
As he had done following the March 21 bombing, Chairman
Arafat strongly condemned the July 30 double suicide bombing in
Jerusalem saying, ``today's explosions ... aim to undermine the
peace process.'' Mahmud Abbas (``Abu Mazen'') also condemned
the attack saying it was ``tantamount to a crime against the
peace process.'' In an interview with London's MBC television
Faisel Husseini condemned the attack saying ``First of all we
expressed, and have always expressed, our rejection and
denunciation of any incident that involves the killing of
civilians, Palestinians or Israelis ... Moreover, there can be
no security for us if there is no security for the Israelis.
So, we feel that we have to provide security, not only for
ourselves, but also for the Israelis.''
Security Matters
The Palestinian Authority has constituted law enforcement
institutions for carrying out its security responsibilities in
areas subject to its jurisdiction. The Palestinian Police Force
(PPF) was established in May 1994 and consists of the
Palestinian National Security Force (PNSF); the Palestinian
civil police; the Preventive Security Organization (PSO);
Palestinian intelligence, or the Mukhabarat; the civil defense
force; and the Palestinian Presidential Security Force.
Palestinian police are responsible for security and law
enforcement for Palestinians and other non-Israelis in Gaza and
five West Bank towns and surrounding villages. The
establishment of these security forces is pursuant to the
Interim Agreement.
The PA inherited a court system based on structures and
legal codes of differing origins. The Gaza legal code derives
from the British Mandate, Egyptian, and some locally generated
law. Pre-1967 Jordanian law applies in those areas in the West
Bank under PA control. However, the body of law in both Gaza
and the West Bank was substantially modified by Israeli
military orders. The PA is continuing efforts to unify the Gaza
and West Bank legal codes.
In February 1995 the PA established a security court in
Gaza to try cases involving terrorism. The PA has also
established military courts to handle cases of abuse of
authority. In each case, three judges, drawn from senior ranks
of the security forces, preside over the civilian law court.
There is no right of appeal, but verdicts may be either
ratified or repealed by the head of the PA. A similar system
operates in the West Bank under the same guidelines as the Gaza
court. On June 2, five PA intelligence officers (Mukhabarat)
were brought before the military courts on charges of having
caused the death of a suspect in custody. The courts convicted
the officers who received sentences from 2 months to 5 years in
prison.
In a highly publicized case, the eight Palestinian
policemen allegedly responsible for the death of Nasir Radwan,
a Gazan who died June 30, 1997, as a result of violent beating
in the hands of Palestinian security service members, were
immediately brought before the military courts. The officers
were charged with unlawful detention and perpetrating gross
abuse which led to death. In an unprecedented move Chairman
Arafat ordered that this trial be open to the public. Six of
the eight officers were found guilty with three receiving death
sentences and the other three receiving sentences from six
months to five years.
Human rights organizations have reported that the PA
continues to engage in arbitrary arrests, denial of due process
rights and abusive treatment. The U.S. government has urged the
PA to respect the rule of law, even as it pursues those who
defy it. In an effort to address these issues, the PA has
established a team of legal advisors to provide guidance to
interrogators who are stationed at PA security facilities.
Security coordination and cooperation diminished in the
period between March and September, largely as a result of
tension between Israel and the Palestinians. Both sides had
publicly announced a severing of the security dialogue: the
Israelis in reaction to Palestinian accusations of Israeli
involvement in the April 1 Gaza bombings, and the Palestinians
in reaction to the late February Israeli decision to build at
Har Homa/Jebel Abu Ghunaym.
Despite the public posturing regarding security
cooperation, and an absence of high level, public cooperation,
some security cooperation continued at lower levels prior to
October. For example, Joint Patrols were halted in March after
Har Homa construction began and the Cafe Apropos bombing, but
were gradually resumed as the situation normalized. They were
halted again by the Government of Israel after the July 30
Mahane Yehuda bombing. In general Joint Patrols have been
linked to closure by the Israeli government. At times when
closure is imposed the Joint Patrols are also stopped. As of
this report, Joint Patrols had resumed in all areas of the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. Likewise, both bilateral and trilateral
meetings to coordinate and facilitate security cooperation
(with U.S. participation) took place over the period of this
report, totaling over 20 meetings held between April and
November 20, 1997.
During her September 9-15 trip to the region, Secretary
Albright emphasized the paramount importance of the Palestinian
Authority's resuming security cooperation with Israel and
undertaking unilateral security measures as a sine qua non for
moving the peace process forward. In conjunction with the
Secretary's visit, the Palestinian Authority gave assurances
that it would adopt a systematic approach to uprooting the
HAMAS terrorist infrastructure.
Partially as a result of this trip and a follow-up meeting
in New York between the Secretary, Israeli Foreign Minister
David Levy and chief Palestinian negotiator Abu Mazen (Mahmud
Abbas), Israel and the Palestinians resumed direct bilateral
negotiations on October 6 with SMEC Ross present. Since then,
the quality and frequency of security cooperation has improved
significantly. Following meetings between Israeli and
Palestinian security chiefs in mid-October, an Israeli
government source was quoted as saying that security
cooperation had nearly reached the level. extant at the
beginning of the year. SMEC Ross attended a trilateral security
meeting on October 21 with PA Chairman Arafat, Israeli Defense
Minister Mordechai, and their respective security chiefs to
review security cooperation between the two sides. Most
recently, the Joint Security Committee met on November 19
chaired by senior Israeli and Palestinian military officials.
The following list highlights on-going security relations
between the Israelis and the Palestinians as well as specific
examples of Palestinian efforts to control violence and
terrorist acts during this period:
26 Feb. An IDF undercover unit in the Palestinian town of Hizma
near Jerusalem fired at residents, killing 1 and injuring 3
others. Principal Palestinian peace process negotiator Sa'eb
Erekat said ``We condemn this act and regard it as a planned
terrorist action against our people. We strongly condemn this
act and demand from all the sponsors of the peace process to
stand against the Israeli government and request it to adhere
to the peace process.'' West Bank Preventive Security
Organization (PSO) chief Jibril al Rajoub and his forces
intervened rapidly to quiet demonstrations which followed the
shootings.
17 March
A senior PSO official claimed that a planned terrorist
attack in Jerusalem had been thwarted by Palestinian security
forces. At the same time, he cautioned that a HAMAS squad was
believed to be at large and planning an attack in Jerusalem.
The Palestinian Authority reported that recent raids on HAMAS
activists resulted in 60 arrests and the confiscation of 1500
kilos of explosive material and 14 pistols.
21 March
In the aftermath of the Cafe Apropos bombing in Tel Aviv,
PSO chiefs Rajoub (West Bank) and Dahlan (Gaza) met immediately
with the head of Israel's Shin Bet to coordinate actions.
Rajoub also met with the Israeli Security Minister and the two
established a hotline to improve cooperation between their
offices. The PA immediately launched a wave of arrests,
detaining over 30 HAMAS activists within the first two days. By
the end of the week, Palestinian security forces reported the
arrest of over 100 people. The raids and arrests resulted in
the confiscation of 8 machine guns, 10 pistols, 3 remote
control explosive devises, 20 kilos of inflammable liquid, 15
thousand rounds of ammunition, 25 hand grenades, 5 suitcase
bombs, and 150 kilos of TNT, and arrested five trained suicide
bombers.
30 March
Palestinian police effectively intervened to avoid violence
during Palestinian Land day demonstrations in Nablus and
Ramallah. Israeli Defense Minister Mordechai said ``I have to
say that in most places the Palestinian police made visible
efforts to deal with the incident. I think the majority of the
Palestinian forces, policemen, were working with us against the
violence in the area.''
8 April
An Israeli settler shot and killed a Palestinian in the
Hizbi market area of Hebron and a female settler driving a car
struck and injured a 16 year old Palestinian also in Hebron.
Palestinian authorities condemned the settlers' actions but
acted to quell the street violence in Hebron. Senior IDF
commanders praised the Palestinian police forces for
controlling the situation.
9 April
Joint Israeli-Palestinian coordination led to the break-up
of a previously-unknown terrorist cell in Surif. The arrest of
one of the cell members produced information which led Israeli
forces to the body of long-missing, slain Israeli soldier
Sharon Edri. In addition to Edri's kidnapping and murder, the
cell was also implicated in the Cafe Apropos bombing.
7 May
Chairman Arafat announced that Palestinian security
officials would participate in a trilateral meeting that
evening with the aim of resuming security coordination with
Israel.
14 May
The Palestinian Authority uncovered and destroyed a tunnel
at the Gaza-Israel border adjacent to Burayj camp. The tunnel
was 35 meters long, heading in the direction of Israeli
territory.
15 May
The PSO conducted a campaign of arrests against the PIJ,
detaining some 200 activists, including a group of doctors who
reportedly held positions in the top echelon of the PIJ's
military wing and were responsible for the planning and
execution of attacks in Israel. Israeli security sources
praised the PSO actions as a step aimed at crippling the PIJ.
7 June
In response to an Israeli request that the Palestinian
police help search for a missing family feared to have been
victims of terrorist activities, Palestinian security forces
immediately responded with a widespread search resulting in
location of the family. Joint Israeli-Palestinian investigation
showed the family had died in a car accident and no foul play
was involved.
21 June
Palestinian police intervened to quell large-scale
demonstrations in Nablus. Palestinian protesters were blocked
from going to Joseph's tomb--a flash point for earlier violent
confrontations.
2 July
Palestinian Public Security Commander Brig. Gen. al-Hajj
Isma'il Jabber met with Major General Gabi Ofir, Commander of
IDF troops in the West Bank, to discuss the resumption of
security cooperation. Jibril al-Rajoub traveled to Hebron, the
site of on-going clashes, to restore calm and meet with the
commander of IDF troops in the area.
12 July
Palestinian and Israeli security forces worked jointly to
search for a missing Israeli businessman. He was found unharmed
within 24 hours.
14 July
Palestinian security forces took up positions in Hebron to
prevent Palestinians from confronting IDF troops.
18 July
Following the arrest of three Palestinian policemen by
Israeli security forces, Chairman Arafat appointed an inquiry
committee to investigate allegations that the police were
involved in planning terrorist attacks.
20 July
Palestinian police, under direct orders from Chairman
Arafat, arrested Nablus police commander Colonel Jihad Masimi,
accused by Israel of being connected to the Palestinian
policemen who were allegedly planning to carry out terrorist
attacks against Israel.
Palestinian Security forces uncovered a bomb making factory
in Bayt Sahur near Bethlehem. The discovery came as part of the
investigation into the death of a HAMAS activist who blew
himself up while making a bomb on July 14.
22 July
Prime Minister Netanyahu's special envoy, Yitzhaq Molkho,
delivered a message from the Prime Minister to Chairman Arafat
expressing the Prime Minister's satisfaction with the PA's
cooperation with Israel on the issue of the Palestinian
policemen.
25 July
Palestinian security officials announced they had
apprehended a wanted PIJ terrorist.
28 July
Prime Minister Netanyahu, in an Israeli television
interview ``the Palestinians have taken measures to restrain
(Hamas and the PIJ). I set the goal of lowering the level of
terrorism and stopping the horror that was happening here. This
was hard and required a concentrated effort, but we did it.''
30 July
In the wake of the Mahane Yehuda suicide bombing, three
high-level security meetings took place. At this time, the
Israelis shared the preliminary information they had gained
from the bomb site, including photographs of the suicide
bombers. Palestinian authorities provided Israel with samples
of explosive material from the Bayt Sahui bomb factory for
comparison.
31 July
Palestinian security forces arrested over 20 Hamas and
Islamic Jihad members in the wake of the July 30 suicide
bombings.
1 August
The PA detained two of the most senior HAMAS fugitives
wanted by the Israelis, Muhammad Sanwar, a member of the
military branch and Muhammad Dayf's long-time partner, and Abd-
al-Fatah Sutari, another senior member of HAMAS.
8 August
Palestinian police uncovered a arms cache in Qalqilyah.
Police confiscated the weapons and arrested a person connected
to the cache.
11 August
Palestinian police in Hebron stopped protesters from
heading to an Israeli checkpoint, avoiding violent clashes
between the demonstrators and Israeli security forces.
16 August
Israeli security forces asked the PA for help in locating
an Israeli taxi driver missing since August 14.
Palestinian police located his body in a well near Jericho
and found his taxi near the Aqabat Jabr refugee camp. Three
suspects were arrested by the Palestinian police and
immediately brought to trial and convicted of the driver's
murder. Two of the men were given life sentences and the third
15 years in prison. Israeli authorities praised the action of
the PA and Prime Minister Netanyahu's advisor Yitzhaq Molkho
met with Arafat to thank him for his cooperation.
27 August
Israeli soldiers and Palestinian police held a first-ever
joint exercise, simulating a car-bomb attack in the Gaza Strip.
9 September
September Palestinian security forces arrested more than 30
Hamas activists throughout PA-controlled territory in response
to the September 4 bombing.
12 September
Israeli and Palestinian security personnel worked together
to search for an Israeli man missing for two days. He was found
in an burning abandoned building, tied up and in a state of
shock. It was later learned that the kidnapping was a hoax
orchestrated by the victim himself.
16 September
September Palestinian security services shut down the Gaza
Headquarters of the Islamic Bloc Youth Union, a student
organization with ties to Hamas.
23 September
Israeli security services announced that they had
identified four of the five suicide bombers involved in the
Mahane Yehuda and Ben Yehuda incidents.
According to the Government of Israel, all four were
residents of Azira Shamaliya, a village near Nablus, and had
been arrested by the Palestinian Authority in the spring of
1996. In September 1996 the four men escaped and had been
fugitives ever since. According to the Government of Israel,
the four were included in a list of 88 individuals the
Government of Israel had requested the Palestinian Authority to
arrest.
According to information from the PA, these individuals
were sought by the PA but were fugitives from justice. The PA
also noted that the town of Azira Shamaliya is in an area in
which Israel retains responsibility for internal security; the
Palestinian authority has responsibility only for public order
for Palestinians.
Israeli and Palestinian security officials met in Ramallah
to discuss the results of Israel's investigation.
According to press reports, this was the first time the two
sides had met since the September 4 bombing.
5 September
Thirteen people were detained by Palestinian security
forces in Qaiqilya as part of the crackdown against Hamas.
The Palestinian Authority ordered the closing of sixteen
Hamas-affiliated associations and institutions in response to
the news that several of those responsible from the recent
bombings in Jerusalem had come from an area jointly
administered by Israel and the PA.
13 October
Shin Bet Chief Ayalon conducted a series of meetings over
the previous weekend with his Palestinian counterparts Amin al-
Hindi, Mohammed Dahlan and Jibril al-Rajoub aimed at renewing
security cooperation. Commenting on these meetings, an unnamed
Israeli government official was quoted on Israel Channel One as
saying that ``we are on our way to being where we were early
this year when the level of intelligence sharing was ongoing,
thorough and serious.'' He added that the sides had ``reached
understandings'' on holding regular meetings.
21 October
PA Chairman Yassir Arafat, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak
Mordechai, and U.S. Special Middle East Coordinator Dennis Ross
held a trilateral security meeting at Erez crossing. The
meeting was attended by Israeli Defense Forces Chief of Staff
Shahak, Shin Bet Chief Ayalon, the Chief of Israeli Military
Intelligence, and Palestinian security chiefs Jibril Rajoub,
Amin al-Hindi and Mohammed Dahlan. The goal of the meeting was
to rebuild trust and mutual confidence between the two security
apparatuses. Amidst a positive atmosphere, Arafat pledged to
step up counter-terrorism efforts.
29 October
Israeli Shin Bet established the identity of the third
suicide bomber who carried out the Ben-Yehuda street attack.
13 November
Israeli security forces seized two Hamas activists from
members of the Palestinian Preventative Security Organization
(PSO) who were transporting them from one prison to another in
the West Bank. The action took place near the West Bank village
of Hawara within ``Zone B.'' The PSO escorts were detained
briefly as well. The Government of Israel stated that the two
detainees, from the West Bank village of Surif, ran a Hamas
terrorist cell responsible for the deaths of eleven Israelis.
17 November
Major General Abdel Razek al-Majaydah, Palestinian director
of public security for Gaza, denied Hamas' public accusation
that the PA had voluntarily handed over the two Hamas activists
seized by Israel on November 13. Describing the Israeli action
as an ``abduction,'' al-Majaydah demanded that Israel return
the two suspects.
19 November
The Joint Security Committee met to discuss issues of
security cooperation and coordination. The Israeli side was
headed by Major General Shlomo Yanai and included Brig. General
Shlomo Brom and Colonel Michael Herzog. The Palestinian side
was represented by General Abdul Rizaq al-Yahya.
PLO Covenant
The April 24, 1996 action by the Palestinian National
Council (PNC) honored the important commitment to Israel to
make the necessary changes to the PLO covenant. At that time,
the Israeli Government accepted the PNC vote as the fulfillment
of the PLO's commitment to abandon violence and all other
actions that endanger peace and stability.
The PNC action is best understood through a comparison of
the actual text of the PLO commitment--as contained in the
September 9, 1993 and May 4, 1994 letters from Chairman Arafat
to Prime Minister Rabin and Article XXXI(9) of the September
1995 Interim Agreement between Israel and the PLO--with the
official English language text of the PNC resolution adopted on
April 24.
Arafat's September 9, 1993 letter to Rabin states:
In view of the promise of a new era and the signing
of the Declaration of Principles and based on
Palestinian acceptance of Security Council Resolutions
242 and 338, the PLO affirms that those articles of the
Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to
exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are
inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are
now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the
PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National
Council for formal approval the necessary changes in
regard to the Palestinian Covenant.
The commitments in the September 9, 1993 letter include:
recognition of the right of the State of Israel to exist in
peace and security, PLO acceptance of Security Council
resolutions 242 and 338, PLO commitment to the Middle East
peace process and the peaceful resolution of the conflict
through negotiations, PLO renunciation of the use of terrorism
and its assumption of responsibility over all PLO elements to
assure their compliance.
In a May 4, 1994 letter to Rabin, Arafat further stated:
The PLO undertakes to submit to the next meeting of
the Palestinian National Council for formal approval
the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian
Covenant, as undertaken in the letter dated September
9, 1993 signed by the Chairman of the PLO and addressed
to the Prime Minister of Israel.
In the September 1995 Interim Agreement, Article XXXI(9),
the PLO undertook that ``within two months of the date of the
inauguration of the Council, the Palestinian National Council
will convene and formally approve the necessary changes in
regard to the Palestinian Covenant, as undertaken in the
letters signed by the Chairman of the PLO and addressed to the
Prime Minister of Israel, dated September 9, 1993 and May 4,
1994.''
The key sections of the April 24, 1996 PNC resolution to
amend the Covenant read as follows:
1. The Palestinian National Charter is hereby amended
by canceling the articles that are contrary to the
letters exchanged between the PLO and the Government of
Israel 9-10 September 1993.
2. Assigns its legal committee with the task of
redrafting the Palestinian National Charter in order to
present it to the first session of the Palestinian
central council.
This resolution was approved overwhelmingly by a vote of
504-54 (with 14 abstentions), easily sufficient for amending
the Covenant. The PNC delegated to its legal committee the
responsibility of writing a new Covenant but did not fix a
timetable for this undertaking.
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat conveyed this decision in a May
4, 1996 letter to Prime Minister Peres, which stated:
As part of our commitment to the peace process, and
in adhering to the mutual recognition between the
Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Government
of Israel, the PNC was held in Gaza City between 22-25
of April 1996, and in an extraordinary session decided
that the Palestine National Charter is hereby amended
by canceling the provisions that are contrary to the
letters exchanged between the PLO and the Government of
Israel on 9/10 September 1993.
The White House issued the following statement after the
PNC decision:
President Clinton warmly welcomes the Palestine
National Council's vote to revoke the sections of the
Palestinian Covenant that called for the destruction of
the State of Israel. By an overwhelming majority, the
Palestine National Council has honored an important
commitment made in the Interim Agreement signed here in
September 1995. It is a major step forward on the road
to a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
The President applauds this action as a decisive
statement, at this difficult moment, that those who
champion peace will not be deterred by the murderous
acts of those desperate to prevent the people of the
Middle East from building a better future.
During the Hebron negotiations (October 1996-January 1997),
Chairman Arafat undertook to complete the process of revising
the Palestinian National Charter.
On March 5, 1997, Chairman Arafat told assembled Permanent
Representatives of the UN Security Council that 29 paragraphs
in the Covenant were annulled, all of them concerning the
elimination of the state of Israel. He also noted that a
Palestinian legal committee was working on a revised charter.
Arab League Boycott of Israel
The PLO reiterated its stand against the Arab boycott of
Israel when it signed the September 28, 1995 Joint Declaration
of the Washington Summit. That declaration called, inter alia,
for an end to the boycott as soon as possible. Additionally,
senior Palestinian Authority economic and trade official Ahmed
Quray (now Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council) made
the following commitment in an October 17, 1996 letter to then
U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor: ``The PLO and the
Palestinian Authority and its successors will support all
efforts to end the boycott of Israel and will not enforce any
elements of the boycott within the West Bank and Gaza Strip.''
Three weeks after the July 30 Israeli closure of the West
Bank and Gaza, the Palestinian Authority (PA) began urging
Palestinians to stop purchasing certain Israeli products and
items imported by Israelis that are considered luxury items or
which can be produced within the West Bank and Gaza.
Enforcement appears to be lax, but there have been reports of
zealous officials barring the entry of certain goods,
especially in Gaza. PA officials have generally avoided
referring to this measure as a ``boycott.'' While it is
impossible at this time to gauge the effectiveness of the PA's
urging, there have been extensive reports of exceptions granted
to Palestinian businessmen who have approached the PA for
clearance to import products covered by the action. The
extensive easing of closure measures brought no change in the
PA's call for restricted imports. Although some officials have
referred to the need for the GOI to lift its 'blockade``
against the West Bank and Gaza in order for the PA's action to
be rescinded, the exact measures that must be taken for this to
occur have not been made clear.
Status of the PLO Office
The State Department's Office of Foreign Missions
designated the PLO office in Washington a ``foreign mission''
under the Foreign Missions Act on June 21, 1994, to provide a
statutory basis for regulating the office. The designation was
published in the Federal Register on July 20, 1994. The PLO
office and personnel are not accorded diplomatic status,
privileges or immunities. The office may not portray itself as
a diplomatic mission or embassy, but may portray itself as
representing the PLO. Office personnel support U.S. travel by
members of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority and have
testified before Congress and participated in discussions with
U.S. government officials and in numerous meetings and media
events. The office has approximately ten employees, all of whom
are permanent resident aliens or U.S. citizens. The office is
currently headed by Mr. Hassan Abdel Rahman.
On August 8, the PLO Office in Washington was informed by
the Department of State that effective midnight, August 12,
with the expiration of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act
and accompanying Presidential waiver of statutory restrictions
on the PLO, the PLO Office was required to suspend its
activities.
Palestinian Assistance
The U.S. is working with the international donor community
to meet the legitimate development needs of the Palestinians as
they seek to build self-governing institutions and implement
their agreements with Israel. We also have worked to ensure
that all U.S. assistance is handled in a transparent and
accountable manner. The largest single international assistance
program has been the World Bank's Holst Fund, to which the U.S.
has contributed $39.9 million and other donors $187.2 million
(as of December 7, 1996). A total amount of $227.1 million for
the Holst Fund has been disbursed. This fund sustains
Palestinian Authority operations and is subject to rigorous
World Bank auditing.
There have been no credible reports of irregularities in
the use of the Holst Fund, nor is there any information to
indicate that other U.S. assistance projects have been used for
other than their intended purposes. The U.S. Agency for
International Development continues to implement scrupulously
its procedures for the monitoring and supervision of activities
performed by USG-funded non-governmental organizations and
contractors.
The U.S. has been actively engaged, together with other
donors, in supporting ongoing efforts to increase the
accountability of the Palestinian Authority's financial
operations. We have also taken a leadership role in ensuring
that the fiscal control steps in the Tripartite Action Plan
(TAP), a document signed by the Palestinian Authority, Israel
and the donor community, are functioning. The PA reiterated its
commitment to fulfill its TAP obligations regarding account
consolidation at the December 10 meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison
Committee in Brussels. According to the IMF, higher than
anticipated revenues and extraordinary expenditure control
resulted in a slight budget surplus for the first quarter of
1997. The PA and the IMF are still projecting an overall budget
deficit of $52 million for this year, significantly lower than
the deficit of $95 million recorded in 1996. Major Western
based accounting and consulting firms are involved in the
monitoring and supervision of Palestinian financial activities
on a regular basis.
Other Issues
Finally, the PLO Commitments Compliance Act calls for
information on several other issues:
The status of Muhammad Rashid and Abu Abbas were
last discussed in the January 22, 1997 report. The
status of Rashid and Abu Abbas has not changed since
that time.
We have raised with the PLO the issue of PLO
compensation to American citizen victims of PLO
terrorism. Lawyers representing the PLO, the family of
Leon Klinghoffer (who was murdered in 1985 when
terrorists seized the cruise ship Achille Lauro) and
Crown Travel Service Inc. reached a settlement on
compensation that was entered into the US district
court in Manhattan on August 6, 1997. The State
Department was not a participant in the litigation and
has no information on the terms of the settlement.
Issues relating to the Hawari group and others were
last reported in the January 1994 report. Their status
has remained unchanged since that time.
The PLO has cooperated in the past with our requests
for information available to them that could shed light
on the status of U.S. nationals known to have been held
by the PLO or factions thereof in the past. There have
been no new developments.
In the Interim Agreement, both Israel and the PLO
agreed that, ``Neither side shall initiate or take any
step that will change the status of the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent
status negotiations.'' The PLO has respected this
commitment. Under Israeli-Palestinian agreements, the
Palestinian Authority may only maintain offices in the
areas under its jurisdiction, which do not include
Jerusalem. Oft-repeated Palestinian rhetoric about the
future ``state of Palestine with its capital in
Jerusalem,'' constitutes a statement of position only.
Several Palestinian institutions were given a
closure notice by Israeli authorities in August 1995,
but were allowed to remain open after they signed a
declaration that they were not connected with or funded
by the PA. Similarly, PLO Executive Committee member
and Orient House head Faisal Husseini has consistently
refused appointment as an official of the PA, nor did
he seek election to the Palestinian legislative
council. His most recent disavowal came on July 1.
The Palestinian Authority Minister of Religious
Affairs, Hassan Tahbub maintains offices in Ramallah
and Gaza for the conduct of his official PA duties. He
is also president of the Higher Islamic Council, which
has been headquartered in Jerusalem's Old City since
its establishment in 1967. He occupied this office
prior to being named minister of religious affairs.
Tahboub has publicly said that his Jerusalem office
pre-dates the existence of the Palestinian Authority
and has nothing to do with the PA.
In response to Israeli concerns, the PA announced
that three offices (the Vocational Training Center, the
Mapping and Geography Department, and the Youth and
Sports Department) were to be closed in August. Israeli
officials welcomed this move.
We have no evidence the PLO has signed any
agreements not within the areas allowed in its
agreements with Israel (economic agreements, agreements
with donor countries for the purpose of implementing
arrangements for the provision of assistance to the
Council, agreements for the purpose of implementing the
regional development plans, cultural, scientific, and
educational agreements), nor have we seen any evidence
that Palestinian offices abroad issue Palestinian
passports or other Palestinian travel documents.
We continue to monitor the size and composition of
the Palestinian police. Israel alleges that the force
totals more than the 30,000 allowed in the Interim
Agreement. The PA acknowledges employing about 34,500,
but contends that the excess is due to the employment
of five to six thousand Palestinians as unarmed, non-
uniformed clerical and support staff and informants.
The PA indicates that it routinely notifies the GOI of
all regular police hires, but not of clerical staff or
informants. The PA, as part of the agreement on Hebron,
reaffirmed its commitment on the size of the
Palestinian police forces, in accordance with the
Interim Agreement.
Israel has alleged that the Palestinian Authority
has not transferred suspected terrorists. The PA has
deferred action on the transfer of some of those
requested, citing Annex IV, article II, section 7(f)(2)
of the Interim Agreement, covering delays in transfers
to the requesting side for the duration of a suspect's
detention or imprisonment. The PA notes that in other
cases the Israeli government has not officially
requested a transfer in accordance with the procedures
outlined in the agreement. In still other cases, the PA
indicates that the suspects are at large, their
whereabouts unknown.
f. Report on Rewards for Information Relating to International
Narcoterrorism July 12, 1994 [Pursuant to P.L. 84-885, sec. 36(h)]
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
June 20, 1994
The Honorable Thomas S. Foley,
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Speaker:
I am writing to advise the Congress that a reward has been
paid pursuant to 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2708. The enclosed
documentation provides information required under paragraph (h)
of that statute.
Sincerely,
Wendy R. Sherman
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs
Amount of the Reward Paid
Special Agents of the Diplomatic Security Service met with
Mr. Adnan Awad and provided him with a reward of $750,000.
To Whom the Reward Was Paid
The reward recipient is Mr. Adnan Awad. Although normally
we do not reveal the identity of a reward recipient, in this
case the recipient has publicly revealed his participation in
the Rewards Program. His role in the trial of terrorist Mohamed
Rashed is also public knowledge.
Acts with Respect to Which the Reward was Paid
Over the span of more than a decade, Mr. Adnan Awad
provided crucial information to the United States regarding the
``15 May'' organization. This terrorist organization was
responsible for at least fifteen bombings during the early and
mid-1980s, three of which involved aircraft. In one particular
case, a top aide to the organization, Mohamed Rashed, placed a
bomb on board a Pan American World Airways aircraft. The bomb
exploded en route from Tokyo to Honolulu on August 11, 1982,
killing a teenager.
Terrorist Mohamed Rashed was arrested in Greece in 1988.
Rashed's trial for the Pan American aircraft bombing started in
1991 and was conducted within the Greek legal system. As a
result of Mr. Awad's cooperation and testimony, provided at
extreme personal risk, the ``15 May'' organization was
dismantled; and Mohamed Rashed was convicted in 1992, receiving
eighteen years in prison. Rashed appealed the verdict which was
upheld on June 18, 1993, followed another trial by a higher
court. Mr. Awad provided testimony in both of Rashed's trials
in Greece and also testified before a U.S. Grand Jury.
Significance of the Information
Mr. Adnan Awad's information was pivotal to the dismantling
of the ``15 May'' terrorist organization and the conviction of
terrorist Mohamed Rashed. Particularly significant were the
sustained nature of Mr. Awad's contributions and the powerful
signal his court testimony sent to terrorists everywhere about
our commitment to defeat international terrorism.
g. Determination Placing Sudan on Terrorism List (Public Notice 1878),
October 7, 1993
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Secretary
[Public Notice 1878]
determination sudan
On August 12, 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher
made the following determination:
``In accordance with section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), I hereby determine
that Sudan is a country which has repeatedly provided support
for acts of international terrorism. The list of 6(j) countries
as of this time therefore includes Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
North Korea, Sudan and Syria.''
Warren Christopher,
Secretary of State.
[FR Doc. 93-24838 Filed 10-7-93; 8:45 am]
Billing Code 4710-10-M
h. Counter-Terrorism Rewards Program \1\ (Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, U.S. Department of State)
U.S. Offers up to $7 Million for Information About Terrorists
The U.S. Department of State offers substantial rewards for
information preventing acts of international terrorism against
United States persons or property, or leading to the arrest or
conviction of terrorist criminals responsible for such acts.
The reward level is up to $7 million when U.S. civil aviation
is targeted by terrorists.
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\1\ U.S. Department of State HEROES Homepage: http://
www.heroes.net/pub/heroes/content2.html
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The Counter-Terrorism Rewards Program was established by
the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, Public Law 98-
533. Under the Rewards Program, cooperating individuals and
their immediate family members may be relocated to the U.S., or
elsewhere, and they are assured complete confidentiality.
Rewards, totaling millions of dollars, have been paid in dozens
of cases. Innocent lives have been saved and terrorists put
behind bars.
In 1994, Congress expanded the definition of
``international terrorism'', authorizing rewards for
information regarding '' . . . any act substantially
contributing to the acquisition of unsafeguarded special
nuclear material . . . or any nuclear explosive device . . . by
an individual, group, or non-nuclear-weapon state.''
Public-Private Partnership
In 1990, the State Department forged a unique public-
private partnership with the Air Transport Association of
America and the Air Line Pilots Association, International, in
which each organization pledges up to $1 million to supplement
rewards paid by the U.S. Government for information that
prevents a terrorist act against U.S. civil aviation, or leads
to the arrest and conviction of any person who has committed
such an act. This has resulted in a maximum reward of up to $7
million in such cases.
The U.S. Government's standing reward offer of up to $5
million applies in all cases not addressed by the partnership
agreement. Moreover, efforts are underway to expand the
Government partnership with the private sector, so that rewards
at the $7 million level can be offered outside the sphere of
civil aviation.
Interagency Rewards Committee
The Director of the Diplomatic Security Service, or his/her
designee, chairs an interagency committee which identifies
reward candidates and then recommends rewards to the Secretary
of State. This committee serves as the forum for discussion of
many aspects of the Program. The Interagency Rewards Committee
is comprised of representatives from the White House National
Security Council staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Marshals Service
Witness Security Program, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of
Energy, and the Department of State.
Every Government and Every Citizen
While the law governing the Rewards Program is aimed at
terrorism directed against Americans, the United States shares
information with other nations whose citizens are at risk.
Every government and every citizen has a stake in bringing
terrorists to justice and in preventing acts of terrorism.
Terrorists are violent criminals. They must be stopped.
On August 7, 1998, terrorist bombings in Nairobi,
Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania tragically resulted
in hundreds of deaths and the savage maimings of
thousands, those murdered included U.S. Embassy
personnel in Nairobi.
On the morning of November 12, 1997, Ephrahim C.
Egbu, Joel B. Enlow, William L. Jennings, and Tracy L.
Ritchie, employees of the Union Texas Petroleum Company
(UTP) who were in Karachi on temporary assignment, were
picked up from the Sheraton Hotel for a ride to UTP
headquarters along the waterfront. As the station wagon
in which they were traveling proceeded across the only
bridge leading to the UTP office building, a red Honda
Civic pulled in front and two gunmen jumped out. The
gunmen fired into the UTP station wagon, brutally
murdering the Pakistani driver, Anwar Mirza, and
Messrs. Egbu, Enlow, Jennings and Ritchie.
During the period December 1996 to January 1997,
sixteen letter bombs disguised as holiday greeting
cards were delivered through the mail to recipients in
the United States and the United Kingdom.
On June 25, 1996, the brutal and cowardly terrorist
attack on a multi-national peacekeeping force in
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia left 19 dead and hundreds
injured. These peacekeepers were enforcing United
Nations sanctions and the dead and injured represent
citizens from several nations. The Department of State
is offering a reward of up to $5 million for
information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of
those responsible for the Khobar Towers bombing.
Additionally, the Government of Saudi Arabia is
offering a reward of $3 million.
On July 4, 1995, Dr. Donald Hutchings, a respected
American medical professional, was abducted by unknown
persons in the hill country of Kashmir. Please help us
find Dr. Hutchings.
On March 8, 1995 in Karachi, Pakistan, terrorists
armed with automatic rifles murdered two American
Consulate employees and wounded a third as they
traveled in the Consulate shuttle bus.
On January 6, 1995, a fire broke out in an apartment
in Manila occupied by Khaled Shaikh Mohammad. The
information developed from an investigation revealed
that in August 1994 through January 1995, in this
apartment and elsewhere, Khaled Shaikh Mohammad
unlawfully and willfully conspired to bomb U.S.
civilian airliners by placing explosive devices on
twelve airliners flying over the Pacific Ocean during a
two-day period in January 1995.
On February 26, 1993, terrorists bombed the New York
World Trade Center, murdering six innocent people,
injuring over 1,000 others and trapping terrified
school children in a smoke-filled elevator for hours.
On January 25, 1993, Mir Aimal Kansi allegedly
murdered two persons and injured seriously three
others, allegedly firing an AK-47 assault rifle into
cars waiting at a stoplight.
On December 21, 1988, terrorists destroyed Pan
American Flight 103. The terrorist bombing of Pan Am
103 over Scotland points to the global impact of
terrorism. The plane carried 259 citizens from 30
nations, including Americans, when it was destroyed
over Lockerbie, Scotland; another 11 persons perished
on the ground.
In April 1986, one of the youngest victims of
terrorism, nine-month-old Demetra Stylian Klug, was
killed in the terrorist bombing of TWA Flight 840.
On June 13, 1985, terrorists hijacked TWA Flight
847. During a violent rampage against passengers and
crew, they beat Robert Stethem to death then dumped his
body onto the tarmac.
On October 23, 1983, 243 U.S. Marines were murdered
in a cowardly truck bomb attack, ending their mission
to help establish peace for the people of Lebanon.
During the 1980's, in conditions of the utmost
cruelty and deprivation, kidnapped American citizens--
as many as nine at one time--were held hostage in
Lebanon. For long and painful years, they were chained
in the dark, beaten, and denied medical care. Three
were murdered during their captivity.
In the past 22 years, terrorist actions in Greece
have resulted in the deaths of four Americans: Richard
Welch, George Tsantes, William Nordeen, and Ronald
Stewart, injuries to 28 other Americans, and a rocket
attack on the Embassy compound in February 1996.
Emphasis on Prevention
During the first four years of the Program, the State
Department offered specific rewards for information leading to
the arrest or conviction of those responsible for specific
terrorist attacks. In December 1988, however, new emphasis was
placed on provisions of the law which allowed for payment of
rewards in cases where information led to the ``prevention,
frustration, or favorable resolution of terrorist attacks
against United States persons.'' Specific reward amounts for
particular terrorist incidents were no longer announced. It was
instead announced the Secretary of State is authorized to pay
for information regarding any past, present, or planned future
act of terrorism. This policy reaped benefits during Operation
Desert Storm, during which the Program was heavily publicized.
Operation Desert Storm
At the start of the Persian Gulf War, an informant in an
East Asian country came forward with alarming information about
a series of terrorist attacks planned by the Iraqi intelligence
service. The terrorists had already surveyed their intended
targets. They had acquired automatic weapons, grenades and high
explosives. The attacks were beyond the planning stage and
about to be carried out. One of the attacks, a planned
terrorist bombing and strafing of airline ticket counters at a
major airport, was scheduled to be carried out within 48 hours.
The cooperating individual provided information which was
essential in thwarting the planned terror attacks; and the
terrorists were stopped in their tracks by U.S. and host nation
authorities. Had the planned attacks succeeded, scores of
Americans and citizens of our coalition partners would have
been murdered. The informant, and his/her immediate family,
were relocated under the Rewards Program to a place of safety
in the United States. He/She was given a reward of
approximately $1/2 million for coming forward and saving lives.
New York World Trade Center Bombing
On February 26, 1993, the phenomenon of terrorism struck
home for Americans in New York. A large improvised explosive
device, concealed in a vehicle, was detonated in the sub-ground
garage of the 110-story World Trade Center complex. One of the
terrorists responsible, when subsequently captured, admitted
the attackers sought to collapse one or both of the twin
towers, killing tens of thousands of innocent people. The
terrorists who bombed the World Trade Center succeeded in
murdering six innocent people, injuring 1,000 others, and
trapping terrified school children in a smoke-filled elevator
for hours. Suspected terrorists Abdul Rahman Yasin and Ramzi
Ahmed Yousef fled the United States following the bombing.
Yasin is believed to be hiding in Iraq. Immediately following
the indictments of Yasin and Yousef, the U.S. launched a
massive international manhunt for the two fugitives. Wanted
posters offering up to $5 million rewards for information
leading to their capture were distributed in a variety of
languages. Multi-language leaflets containing the reward offers
were also sent throughout the world. Even matchbooks containing
photos of the fugitives have been distributed. On February 8,
1995, based upon information provided through the Counter-
Terrorism Rewards Program, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef was captured in
Pakistan. He is currently in jail.
Public Efforts
The State Department has an ongoing public campaign to
promote awareness of the Rewards Program. Advertisements have
been placed both to promote awareness of the Program and to
reach those with information. Ads in English, Arabic, Spanish,
French, German and Russian have appeared in publications as
far-ranging as The New York Times, Al Hayat, Paris Match, Die
Welt, and Pravda. Additionally, public service announcements
featuring entertainment personalities Charlton Heston, Charles
Bronson, and Charlie Sheen have been widely distributed.
For further information, contact:
Rewards for Justice
P.O. Box 96781
Washington, D.C. 20090-6781, USA.
Internet: [email protected]
Voice: 1-800-HEROES-1
4. Department of Defense
a. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Reserve Component Integration Plan
Partial text of the Department of Defense Plan for Integrating National
Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using
Weapons of Mass Destruction, January 1998
Memorandum for the Under Secretary of the Army
Subject: Transmittal of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Tiger Team--Reserve Component Integration Plan \1\
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\1\ Full text of this hyperlinked document is available on the
World Wide Web at: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/wmdresponse/.
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This plan was developed at the direction of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense. It is based on using the premise that
disaster relief is primarily a state mission. Given the unique
nature of a WMD attack, we anticipate requests for federal
assets much earlier than during typical disasters. Accordingly,
we focused on the most likely tasks that DoD would be asked to
support as the Federal Response Plan is implemented in support
of a WMD event. With integration of the RC as our cornerstone,
our work focused on the vulnerabilities from a United States'
state, territory and possession perspective.
During the mission analysis we assessed current DoD
capabilities. Our analysis concluded we are insufficiently
prepared to perform likely tasks which other federal agencies
may request within consequence management. Additionally, there
is a significant void in the response community chemical,
biological and radiological assessment capability. As a result,
we found it necessary to create a DoD response capability that
does not exist today. These Rapid Assessment and Initial
Detection Elements will assist with agent identification and
appropriate hazard mitigation in the affected areas of a WMD
release. Operationally, these elements will be responsible for
identifying the areas to evacuate and where it is safer to
remain. The elements are intended to respond under the State
control and, if necessary, be available for military
contingencies. We recommend fielding teams in every state. We
were reminded frequently during our survey process, if the
responders were not in the geographic proximity, then they were
likely to be too late. This plan represents a beginning, a
start point, of a larger effort that requires support of senior
leadership. So too must be our overall commitment to prepare
for WMD attacks. Preparing for this mission requires a multi-
year effort.
Finally I would like to recognize the Team that made this
integration plan possible. Lt Col Jay Steinmetz from the Forces
Command Domestic Plans Branch served as the Tiger Team Chief.
In that capacity, he performed superbly and represents a real
DoD treasure. The core group included: Mr. William McCoy,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; COL Chuck Winn, Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs; LTC
Tim Madere, Office of the Under Secretary of the Army; Maj
Keith McCullough, Office of Air Force National Security
Emergency Preparedness; LTC Pete Aylward, Directorate of
Military Support, LTC Dutch Thomas, National Guard Bureau, and
MAJ Alicia Tate-Nadeau, U.S. Army Reserve Command.
Special recognition is due to Captain Todd Burton of the
Army National Guard Military Support Branch, and Major Tom
Welch of the U.S. Army Reserve 100th Division, whose technical
contributions to the team and their agencies, truly ensured a
quality final product. This Team, truly experts in their
respective fields, have exceeded the standards by every
measure. Their work must be regarded as ``above and beyond''
the call.
(signed)
Roger C. Schultz
Brigadier General, USA
Executive Director
Foreword
background
The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996
sponsored by Senators Nunn, Lugar, and Domenici mandates the
enhancement of domestic preparedness and response capability
for terrorist attacks involving nuclear, radiological,
biological, and chemical weapons. The Legislation provided
funding to improve the capability of the federal, state and
local emergency response agencies to prevent and, if necessary,
respond to domestic terrorist incidents involving weapons of
mass destruction (WMD).
The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) designated the Secretary
of the Army (SECARMY) as the Executive Agent for DoD program
implementation. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Installations, Logistics, and Environment (ASA(ILE)) provides
oversight for the Director of Military Support (DOMS) as the
Staff Action Agent. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC))
provides policy and funding oversight for the DoD Domestic
Preparedness Program.
A Senior Interagency Coordinating Group (SICG), chaired by
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), provides
direction for orchestration of the overall program, ensuring
that terrorism-related federal preparedness programs are
coordinated nationally to enhance state and local response
capabilities. ASD (SO/LIC) and DOMS represent DoD on the SICG.
The SICG receives guidance from the National Security Council
(NSC).
The Interagency Strategic Plan, developed in concert with
our federal interagency partners represented on the SICG, was
written to enhance response using a peacetime context
addressing incident models such as the World Trade Center and
the Tokyo Subway. While many facets of response are included in
this program, its overwhelming emphasis is on training first
responders in large U.S. cities. Interagency teams coordinate
with local city officials including fire, law enforcement and
medical responders to tailor training to meet their specific
needs and requirements.
As a result of an October 3, 1997 Defense Review Board
meeting, the Deputy Secretary of Defense asked the ASD (SO/
LIC), ASD (Reserve Affairs), and the ASA (ILE) to provide an
assessment for integrating the National Guard and Reserves into
ongoing Nunn-Lugar-Domenici sponsored WMD Domestic Preparedness
programs. On October 19, 1997 the Deputy Secretary of Defense
(DEPSECDEF) returned the initial Reserve Component (RC) plan
seeking a more complete RC integration model.
On November 3, 1997 the DEPSECDEF directed that the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness oversee the
development of a plan to integrate the Reserve Components into
the DoD response to attacks using WMD. During a November 7,
1997 meeting, the Under Secretary of Defense directed the
construction of a complete model for integrating the Reserve
Components into a consequence management response for domestic
terrorism incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. The
formation of a core group of experts, with support from
agencies throughout the Department, was formed to complete the
plan. In a November 14, 1997, memorandum, the Under Secretary
of Defense placed the Under Secretary of the Army in charge of
the plan development. Subsequently, the Under Secretary of the
Army directed this core group ``Tiger Team'', to incorporate
the capabilities of the RC into the plan. The Tiger Team
tasking included developing the concept, model, overall
direction for the program, and the funding necessary to support
the RC integration. The Team's focus on the appropriate,
substantive and integrated DoD support model to local, state,
and federal government authorities responding to a WMD attack
form the basis for this plan.
In developing this plan, the Tiger Team reviewed existing
programs, applied scenario-driven analysis, and sought the
opinions of other recognized experts in the Emergency
Preparedness field. The Tiger Team recognized statutory
restrictions and training limitations as part of their analysis
and used the Interagency Strategic Plan and the Federal
Response Plan (FRP) as the framework for roles and missions
definition.
This plan outlines the evolutionary process to fill
existing gaps in consequence management response capabilities.
It focuses on improving DoD support for the response to a WMD
event. In particular, response options were developed to
incorporate and leverage the unique assets and capabilities of
the Reserve Component into the overarching WMD strategy.
methodology
The Tiger Team mission and charter focused on producing a
comprehensive plan to incorporate work from many previous
efforts and leverage all available assets. The Tiger Team
recognized that any response effort must be accomplished within
the statutory and regulatory provisions that govern Military
Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). A questionnaire designed
to assess current DoD capabilities was developed. This survey
resulted in a response profile outlining DoD capabilities to
support the Emergency Support Functions in the FRP.
More specifically, the team used Annex C to the U.S.
Government Interagency CONPLAN entitled ``Combating Domestic
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism (Draft- November
10, 1997)''. The annex lists the tasks the Interagency Group
deemed critical to successfully respond to a WMD incident. The
Tiger Team grouped these tasks to correspond with the Emergency
Support Functions in the FRP. Next the Team identified vital
response tasks and requested the Services assess their
capability to perform the tasks that DoD would likely be asked
to support. The Team consolidated the Service responses to
identify existing gaps in the DoD capability to respond to a
WMD event. The results form a snapshot baseline of capabilities
and assets.
Following the assessment of current capabilities, the Team
developed a model for a prototype National Guard response
concept that enhances and supports the existing and planned
federal response structure. The model was tested for
appropriateness by querying experts in the field representing
the first responder community, primary federal agencies tasked
to support state and local governments, and knowledgeable
representatives from DoD organizations. These experts provided
the Team with comments and recommendations. The Tiger Team also
reviewed and considered numerous authoritative DoD sanctioned
studies. These included the findings of the 1997 Defense
Science Board (DSB) Summer Study on Transnational Terrorism,
and the Chem-Bio 2010 (Foss-Downing) Report. It is recognized
that some interagency partners possess a robust capability, and
may already have sufficient resources to deal with small-scale
WMD events. This plan capitalizes on these existing resources
and provides a basis for modeling, analysis and prototyping for
further exercise. As a result, a framework for even more
enhanced integration of the Total Force into the WMD program is
clearly possible. The existing DoD Directives, policies, and
MSCA related statutes were also considered in the development
of this plan.
The Tiger Team recognized the federal response concepts
identified in the May 1, 1997 Report to Congress and the SICG
Strategic Plan. In addition, the Tiger Team reviewed the United
States Atlantic Command (USACOM) and Chemical and Biological
Defense Command (CBDCOM) response plans which included Response
Task Force (RTF) and Chem-Bio Rapid Response Team concepts.
Upon review, it was evident that few military elements are
currently focused, trained or equipped to respond to WMD
events. Hence the purpose of the project -- to increase the DoD
response capabilities while developing the potential within the
Reserve Component units.
While this project focuses on the RC response to a WMD
attack on cities, there are other areas potentially at even
greater risk. With our military today primarily CONUS based,
the ability to project our Nation's military power becomes
crucial to our military response options. By leveraging the
Reserve Component capability, the DoD response model takes on a
new and different dimension. Even further as certain RC units
qualify for direct deployment, a local WMD response capability
becomes all the more important.
The employment of a WMD in the United States against our
power projection systems during a Major Theater War could
severely degrade our ability to respond during a crisis. Both
the Chem-Bio 2010 Study and the 1997 DSB Summer Study on
Transnational Terrorist Threats found that no dedicated force
structure exists to address potential CB use on military and
civilian facilities in CONUS or in theater. At issue -
projecting our Nation's military power at the appropriate time
and place.
The concept for an integrated DoD consequence management
model recognizes that the same or similar capabilities are
required against this asymmetric threat. The response model in
this plan includes force protection concepts, research &
development, and resource allocations that could be applied to
CONUS Major Theater of War enabling facilities. Here again,
using the RC integrated response capability would support both
the National Military Strategy of Force Projection by providing
support to United States bases prior to and during operational
deployments and also provides a response capability to WMD
attacks on other U.S. targets. In addition to current tactical
battlefield CB defense units, the Total Army Analysis (TAA) has
documented the need for additional CB structure. As these new
units are stationed, the USAR and ARNG leadership will be
informed of the gaps in state and regional coverage. These new
MTOE units will greatly enhance the capability to respond to
WMD emergencies. Again, the existing RC unit capability is
being leveraged. Since there is a relationship between the WMD
skills and the unit's wartime mission, a complementary outcome
clearly exists.
The methods for the first phase of this project and during
the mission analysis were oriented first on the units in the
current force and their capabilities to respond to WMD attacks.
In the final analysis, the concept outlined here reaches far
beyond just local WMD contingencies. Over time, these response
elements will develop the skills necessary to be employed at US
military bases or at other strategic points of U.S. interest
under Title 10 U.S.C. In addition to the current force
structure, this plan outlines a requirement for new structure.
This proposed structure is not large by any measure but the
potential impact is enormous. Further detailed in this plan,
the Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) Element
provides the core capability for the technical DoD response.
Early assessment and detection of a WMD agent, determining the
concentration of the release and the areas to evacuate or
remain are the likely technical areas the DoD will be asked to
support.
These questions form the most significant challenge facing
communities and states as they respond to WMD attacks. Here
again, National Guard and RC integration will enhance the DoD
capability in response to WMD attacks.
Executive Summary
This plan was developed by direction of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense. Its aim is to improve the military
capabilities required to effectively support local, state, and
federal agency consequence management response to terrorist
attacks. These attacks may include the use of nuclear,
radiological, biological, and chemical weapons - Weapons of
Mass Destruction.
The Quadrennial Defense Review and National Defense Panel
Report underscore the need to fully address the possibility
that a future adversary will use biological or chemical weapons
and integrate that threat into defense planning. Appropriate
acquisition, intelligence and domestic response operations will
result. Emerging doctrine, training and equipment requirements
must be developed in concert with this theme. Recognizing the
importance and understanding the complexities involved, we must
provide the force with a capability to defend against and
respond to asymmetric attacks at military installations or
support the response to attacks on our homeland.
The very nature of a WMD attack places tremendous pressure
on the local response community. As a result, consequence
management planning is just as demanding and even evolutionary
in many respects. This plan outlines the concept to fill
existing gaps in consequence management response capabilities.
It defines the concepts, model, direction, and funding required
for appropriate, substantive, integrated military support to
local, state, and federal government authorities responding to
the use of weapons of mass destruction. Specifically, the plan
focuses on improving DoD's support for the response to a WMD
attack. This plan includes response options. Options that
explore ways to incorporate and leverage unique Reserve
Component assets and capabilities into the overarching local,
state, and federal interagency effort to assist first
responders.
This effort reinforces the Department of Defense supporting
role in the overall domestic response capability. Furthermore,
an efficient response requires cooperation among federal
departments and agencies, as well as state and local
authorities. Each of these governmental organizations possesses
unique responsibilities, priorities, and demands on resources.
Success depends on a fully integrated effort that shares both a
common vision and mutual goals and objectives. Consequently,
this plan builds upon previous interagency work (most notably
the Senior Interagency Coordinating Group Strategic Plan
written August 29, 1997) and develops DoD capabilities to
support those concepts and initiatives.
The complementary skills of the Reserve Component create a
more robust DoD response capability that must be integrated
into a comprehensive WMD consequence management response. The
realities of an operational environment are characterized by
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rapidly
changing technologies, and a smaller military with severely
constrained resources. This plan reinforces the principles in
the Defense Reform Initiative and conveys the structure and
direction required for implementing and institutionalizing
changes necessary in the DoD for successful program execution.
The first part (Chapters 1-3) defines the plan's purpose
and scope, identifies the nature of the problems we face as a
nation in responding to WMD attacks, and assesses current
capabilities to respond. It sets the conceptual foundation of
the response process and highlights the need to enhance
currently limited response capabilities. The second part
(Chapters 4-6) identifies the tasks for improving military
response capabilities, describes the required response
elements, and outlines the training requirements necessary to
establish and sustain the essential skill levels.
Functional tasks which the military anticipates from local,
state, and other federal agencies have been defined for the DoD
response elements based on the Emergency Support Functions in
the Federal Response Plan. Specific elements have been
identified to perform these functional tasks. The integration
of these elements into the current response model provides a
flexible, robust response capability that can be applied to
support local, state, and federal responders.
Finally, the annexes provide the framework for a continued
effort by the program office. They provide additional
information, references, points of contact, and specific
equipment and training requirements for those elements that
will be initially organized. The first year program sets the
foundation to establish a Rapid Assessment and Initial
Detection capability in every state and territory. It also
begins the identification of, training for, and equipping of
reconnaissance and decontamination elements from the existing
chemical companies in National Guard and Reserve Component.
Other elements will necessarily be refined and focused during
the first year of the program. The plan provides sufficient
detail to establish a program office to integrate these
activities, execute the FY99 budget request, and field the
initial military support elements. As this program develops,
the new program office performs a key role in synchronizing the
RC integration activities with existing interagency programs.
Since the Tiger Teams effort was executed in short measure,
portions of this plan will require additional study and
development. Of particular note are the results of the DoD
capability survey. It was evident early on in the survey
process that the Department sponsored training in the Domestic
Preparedness Program that could also be of real benefit to
selected members of the RC. It is envisioned during the first
year of this integration program that a small cadre at each
installation, reserve center and armory will receive the
(Awareness Biological Chemical Plus) ABC+ training. ABC+ is
based on the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) awareness
course currently being taught in the NLD City Training Program.
In addition to the awareness training, key leaders and
individuals will receive training in WMD emergency procedures.
These procedures will also reinforce the proper techniques,
protocols, and references that are essential to first
responders. The intent is to answer questions that might be
asked and provide an awareness of particular items to be alert
to as the events develop during a WMD event. An ABC+ checklist
will be provided that will guide the person through a series of
questions that provide a profile of a potential WMD attack.
ABC+ training will be provided on an interactive CD-ROM. At a
minimum, full time National Guard and Reserve Component staff
members need to complete the ABC+ training.
Overall, this is an integration effort, one that requires a
long-term commitment. The Program Office must assume
sponsorship and follow the major themes outlined in this work -
- both now and into the future.
Chapter 1: Overview
introduction
The United States is beginning to realize that terrorists
may attack individuals, institutions, and facilities with
weapons of considerable destructive power. Under Secretary of
State Bartholomew, during testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee in 1993, delivered an almost prophetic
warning when he said,
``We are especially concerned about the spread of
biological and toxin weapons falling into the hands of
terrorists. . . . To date we have no evidence that any
known terrorist organization has the capability to
employ such weapons . . . However, we cannot dismiss
the possibilities . . . It may be only a matter of time
before terrorists do acquire and use these weapons.''
While not employing true weapons of mass destruction, the
1993 terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York
and the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City portend the tremendous response necessary if a WMD is used
in the US. Few communities, including military installations
and facilities, have the full array of response assets and
expertise required to adequately deal with the effects of
radiological, biological, or chemical weapons or the necessary
depth to sustain these response operations. They must rely on
the concerted effort of local, state, and federal government
agencies, cooperating with private organizations, to meet the
technological, medical, and engineering demands posed by such
attacks. The DoD anticipates requests from civilian agencies
responding to WMD attacks and plans to augment the local
response capability with expertise, manpower, and equipment.
Conversely, the DoD may also require mutual community and state
support to respond to attacks on military installations, bases,
or ports necessary to deploy and sustain military forces
employed overseas.
purpose and scope
The DEPSECDEF directed the development of this plan which
includes the concepts, model, direction, and funding required
to deliver an appropriate, substantive, integrated military
support to local, state, and federal government authorities
responding to the use of WMD. This plan provides a
comprehensive and cohesive program consistent with national
policy and DoD Directives. It integrates and advances many
ongoing efforts throughout the Department and specifically
addresses issues identified in a number of studies and reports.
The plan supports evolving interagency plans including the FRP
and the evolving Interagency Plan for WMD Response. It
specifically identifies the actions required to leverage the
capabilities of United States military forces. These
capabilities are vital to fill the gaps in civil response
assets currently prepared to respond throughout the United
States. Many cities, states, and other federal agencies simply
do not have the focus, the equipment, or the trained personnel
needed in such a demanding environment. This plan addresses the
DoD role within that context and the emergency management tasks
that may require a DoD response.
This plan develops capabilities for operational response to
nuclear, biological, and chemical threats within the confines
of the United States, its territories, and possessions. These
capabilities can and should be used outside the United States
when required to support validated Commander-in-Chief
requirements.
definition of weapons of mass destruction
For the purpose of this strategic plan, WMD include any
weapon or device that are intended, or have the capability, to
cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of
people through the release of toxic or poisonous chemicals or
their precursors, a disease organism, or radiation or
radioactivity.
the threat of weapons of mass destruction
The threat to the US posed by WMD is characterized by
several factors. Recent events illustrate a real threat of
domestic terrorism. Today terrorists have an improved ability
to collect information, raise money, and disseminate rhetoric.
Advanced information technology available through the Interned
allows extremists to communicate widely and efficiently.
Additionally, publicly available databases serve as
repositories for technical information relating to weapons
production.
Another important factor is that WMD, together with the
materials and technology used to make them, are increasingly
available. Many of these materials are widely available for
legitimate commercial purposes. Moreover, the disintegration of
the former Soviet Union increased concerns about the
protection, control, and accountability of WMD, related
materials and technologies, and the potential unemployment and
proliferation of thousands of scientists skilled in this field.
Transnational threats arising from the collapse of the eastern
bloc, including the development of Chem-Bio capabilities by
terrorist organizations, have increased the potential for
attacks within our borders. A final factor is the relative ease
of manufacture and delivery of WMD. Facilities required to
produce radiological, biological, and chemical weapons are
small and hard to detect, compared with those associated with
nuclear weapons.
The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act
contains several findings which define the requirement for an
enhanced domestic response capability. Among these findings
are:
``. . . the capability of potentially hostile nations
and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear, radiological,
biological, and chemical weapons is greater than at any
time in history.''
``There is a significant and growing threat of attack
of weapons of mass destruction on targets that are not
military targets in the usual sense.''
``. . . the threat posed to the citizens of the
United States by nuclear, radiological, biological, and
chemical weapons delivered by unconventional means is
significant and growing.''
``The United States lacks adequate planning and
countermeasures to address the threat of nuclear,
radiological, biological, and chemical terrorism.''
planning principles
The plan underscores the principle that domestic disaster
relief is fundamentally a State mission falling with the
State's broad authority/responsibility for public safety and
welfare within its borders. Consequence management of a WMD
incident is a category of disaster relief over which the State
usually will have primary responsibility. Federal assistance in
WMD consequence management situations generally will be in
support of the State's disaster relief efforts, to include
efforts in response to a WMD incident. Recognizing these basic
principles, the plan focuses on filling the void in the State's
initial assessment capability and the United States' ability to
rapidly facilitate required assistance in excess of the State's
capability to respond.
Two organizing principles were considered in developing
this plan:
To structure the force based on the State disaster relief
mission
To structure the force based on the Federal national defense/
MSCA mission
The team chose the Federal mission as the organizing
principle. Under this organizing principle, the immediate
response elements act as the tip of the Federal MSCA spear.
Although immediate WMD response would be in a State status,
under the control of the Governor, the unit's force structure
would also support homeland defense, MSCA missions, and provide
a secondary warfighting capability.
This organizing principle is consistent with the use of
Federal military funds and other resources in support of this
plan, and the extension of Federal military personnel benefits
to National Guard personnel assigned to units engaged in these
operations. This choice also avoids the legal and policy
difficulties inherent in Federally funding and organizing a
National Guard unit solely to conduct a State mission and is
consistent with the general organizing principle of the
National Guard for other missions.
operational concept
The operational concepts outlined in this plan are based on
the principles noted above. The Rapid Assessment and Initial
Detection (RAID) Elements, in their immediate response
capacity, will assist in confirming the nature of a WMD attack.
In most instances, the response elements will remain under
State control. Under a worst-case scenario, Federal resources
may also be requested very early in a WMD incident. We must
anticipate these cases in planning for a coordinated local,
state and federal response.
Chapter 2: The Problem
response capabilities today
Terrorist attacks using Sarin gas (a nerve agent) in the
Tokyo subway affected more than 5,000 people. Concern for
similar or larger events using chemical, biological, or
radiological weapons have spurred legislation and programs to
prepare local firefighters, emergency medical technicians, and
other first responders. Despite these commendable efforts,
significant shortfalls remain in trained and equipped response
capability throughout the United States. The relatively small-
area bombing in Oklahoma City required 11 of today's 27
national Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces. Even these highly
skilled teams are not prepared to operate in or around
chemical, biological, or radiological hazards. The sheer size
of WMD events may demand the support of many other properly
trained and equipped personnel. First response organizations,
state support agencies, and other federal agencies require
major efforts to develop adequate capabilities. Until this
occurs the DoD will continue to be tasked to support the WMD
response. Even military units prepared to fight in a nuclear,
biological, or chemical environment are not fully focused,
trained, or equipped to support response to victims of attacks
in the United States. Furthermore, our own ability to project
combat power may be severely degraded by asymmetric attacks on
sea and air ports of embarkation. Military units must also be
prepared to respond to attacks on our facilities and
installations.
level of current preparedness
Local, state, and federal governments are applying
tremendous resources in many ongoing efforts to improve their
WMD response capabilities. All responder agencies of local,
state, and the federal governments must prioritize resources to
address deficiencies in their plans for responding to a
domestic WMD event. Military units identified to perform
functions in and around the hazard areas will require
additional personal protective gear, special training, and
periodic exercises to ensure their safety and ability for
timely and effective responses. This plan highlights those
areas and provides sound solutions to meet those needs.
assessments
Results of the assessments conducted by the Catastrophic
Disaster Response Group (CDRG) were highlighted in a report to
the President in February 1997. These same shortfalls were
identified in the SICG Strategic Plan produced in August 1997.
The critical areas of concern which are highlighted below:
Tailored and timely Federal Response to augment stat
and local responders.
Specialized equipment and coordinated training.
Capability to deal with a large number of victims.
Adequate medical supplies and pharmaceuticals:
available and stockpiled.
Baseline information of capability at federal, state
and local levels.
Better planning interface among federal, state and
local authorities.
Prioritization of transportation infrastructure for
rapid movement of time-sensitive response resources.
Timely and accurate emergency information.
Electronic information management and communications
capability.
Manage stringent Public Safety measures.
Finalize FRP Terrorism Incident Annex.
In addition to the CDRG assessment, DoD has identified four
additional areas not addressed in the existing NLD Domestic
Preparedness Program highlighted below:
Current NLD program targets 120 cities--11 states
and 4 territories are not included in this program.
Federal assets are not well dispersed
geographically.
Military personnel require additional equipment and
training to reach an adequate response capability.
The RC has some statutory limitations that impede
response decisions.
military preparedness to support wmd response
While many military units possess basic skills and
capabilities that can be applied to WMD response requirements,
few have been specifically focused on the precise tasks or
equipped with the appropriate assets to immediately respond to
such an event. During the development of this plan, Services
were asked to identify units that might perform the response
tasks identified in the interagency WMD response plan and to
indicate if those units were adequately organized, trained, and
equipped to perform these specific tasks. This survey
dramatically displayed existing gaps in procedures, training,
and equipment necessary for appropriate response.
For many of the WMD response tasks, focusing units on the
missions they may be asked to perform and developing their
awareness of the Incident Command System (ICS) is all that may
be necessary. For others, specific tasks will require training.
In a WMD scenario, selected members will be tasked to deploy to
the Hot Zone and operate for extended periods of time, quite
different from our wartime practices. Even more demanding, the
tasks requiring total decontamination must be anticipated.
These are very different practices when compared to our
military doctrine today. Here again, the value of training to
the same standards, using common terminology and exercising
with first responders, we have the opportunity to prepare for
this most demanding mission. In general terms today, the
Department is not prepared for the WMD response. This plan
addresses the areas requiring DoD attention and isolates in
some detail the response options the Department may be asked to
perform. In the end, the solution to the WMD response mission
requires a partnership - military and civilian.
Chapter 3: The Response
integrated response concept
Local
Local response to an emergency situation uses the Incident
Command System (ICS) to ensure that all responders and their
support assets are coordinated for an effective and efficient
response. The Incident Commander is normally the senior
responder of the organization with the preponderance of
responsibility for the event (e.g., fire chief, police chief,
or emergency medical). If local assets are not sufficient to
meet the emergency response requirements, they request state
(or regional) assets through the State Office of Emergency
Services.
State
The state's substantial resources, including the National
Guard in state status, are coordinated through the state's
response plan(s) and are normally coordinated by the state's
Office of Emergency Services. If state assets are not
sufficient to meet the emergency response requirements, they
request federal assets through the FEMA Regional Operations
Center.
Federal
The Presidential Decision Directive 39 entitled ``U.S.
Policy on Counterterrorism'' recognizes that there must be a
rapid and decisive capability to protect U.S. citizens, defeat
or arrest terrorists, respond against terrorist sponsors, and
provide relief to victims. The goals during the immediate
response phase of an incident are to terminate the terrorist
attack so that terrorists do not accomplish their objectives or
maintain their freedom, and to minimize loss of life and damage
and to provide emergency assistance to the affected area. In
responding to a terrorist incident, Federal departments and
agencies rapidly deploy the needed Federal capabilities to the
scene, including specialized elements for dealing with specific
types of incidents resulting from the threat or actual use of
WMD. To coordinate the Federal response, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and FEMA have been assigned lead agency
responsibility for crisis and consequence management,
respectively, in response to a domestic terrorist threat or
incident.
The FBI is the lead agency for crisis management response
to acts of domestic terrorism, which includes measures to
identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to
anticipate, prevent, or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.
The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the
Federal government to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism;
State and local governments provide assistance as required.
Crisis management is predominantly a law enforcement response.
Crisis management activities include active measures for
prevention, immediate incident response, and post-incident
response. Activities include command of the operational
response as the on-scene manager for an incident in
coordination with other Federal agencies and State and local
authorities. The FBI provides guidance on the crisis management
response in the FBI Nuclear Incident Contingency Plan
(classified) and the FBI Chemical/Biological Incident
Contingency Plan (classified).
FEMA is the lead agency for consequence management, which
entails both preparedness for and dealing with the consequences
of a terrorist incident. Although the affected State and local
governments have primary jurisdiction for emergencies, a
terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction could
create havoc beyond their capability to respond. If this were
to happen, FEMA would coordinate consequence management
activities including measures to alleviate damage, loss,
hardship, or suffering caused by the incident; to protect
public health and safety; to restore essential government
services; and to provide emergency assistance. FEMA would
implement the Federal Response Plan, cooperating with State and
local emergency response agencies. Final authority to make
decisions onscene regarding the consequences of the incident
(rescue and treatment of casualties, protective actions for the
affected community) rests with the local Incident Commander.
The federal government, including the DoD, responds to
emergency requests from the states through the FRP. After the
President declares a major disaster or emergency, the resources
of the federal government needed to support the state response
are managed by the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCC). When the
State Coordinating Officer makes specific requests for
assistance, he or she certifies that the state does not have
the capability to meet the requirements. The FCO assigns the
request to one of the 12 Emergency Support Functions (ESF)
represented within the Emergency Response Team. If the lead
agency of any ESF is not able to meet the requirements, it may
ask the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) to provide the
necessary response. The DCO coordinates all federal military
assistance provided during the consequence management response.
Military Support
The DoD supports local, state, and federal government
agencies in planning for and responding to domestic
emergencies. Local units may respond under the immediate
response doctrine when necessary to save lives, prevent human
suffering, or mitigate great property damage. Many units
execute memorandums of understanding for mutual support of
emergency services with local jurisdictions or municipalities.
National Guard units may also respond under state control when
directed by appropriate state authorities. Upon the declaration
of an emergency or major disaster by the President, the
Secretary of Defense or his Executive Agent directs a supported
CINC to provide federal military support to the FCO through a
DCO and Defense Coordinating Element (DCE). For most domestic
emergency responses requiring DoD assets, the DCO controls all
DoD response elements. Because of the potentially large number
of DoD requirements, the supported CINC may activate a Response
Task Force to command and control all federal military
personnel responding for consequence management (with the
exception the Joint Special Operations Task Force). The RTF
deploys to support the federal crisis and consequence
management operations in support of the Lead Federal Agency
(LFA) during domestic operations. A Chem-Bio Rapid Response
Team (CBRRT) under the RTF has been established to provide
technical expertise and assessment support to the local
officials. A network of Reserve Emergency Preparedness Liaison
Officers (EPLOs) from all Services in each state and federal
region supports the DCO and provides the military interface to
coordinate response requirements and activities with each state
and federal region.
At the local, state, and federal levels, a task force
oriented structure and process responds to the emergency
requirements. The missing elements in most structures are the
task-oriented, trained and equipped task force elements that
actually perform the required response functions. The local
civil Incident Commander directs these response elements. Task-
organized elements that can be plugged into the task forces at
the local, state, or federal level must be formed.
Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve forces possess
expertise, trained manpower, and equipment that can support
response to chemical, biological, radiological attacks at DoD
installations and in civilian communities. As the Department of
Defense supports all Emergency Support Functions identified in
the FRP, we must be prepared to perform those functions which
other agencies are not capable of supporting or simply do not
have adequate resources to meet the demand. Specific response
functions have been identified that may require substantial
military augmentation for execution. Units capable of
performing these functions must be focused, task organized,
adequately trained, and properly equipped to work in and around
nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards.
Today's task organized response assets in the DoD are very
limited. Expert and capable response organizations like
Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams, the Army's Technical Escort
Unit, and the Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident
Response Force have been involved in the development of
response plans and procedures. The RTF staffs have also been
instrumental in organizing and employing military assets to
support requests for assistance.
Certain DoD laboratories can also be called upon to respond
with specialized equipment and capabilities. One such
laboratory is the AMC Treaty Laboratory that was established to
verify compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
It is an ISO 9001 registered quality system that was pre-
deployed to support the FBI during the Olympics in Atlanta. The
US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID) is capable of deploying an Aeromedical Isolation
Team consisting of physicians, nurses, medical assistants and
laboratory technicians. These team members are specially
trained to provide care for and transport of patients with
diseases caused by either biological warfare agents or
infectious diseases requiring high containment. Also, Edgewood
Research, Development and Engineering Center (ERDEC) maintains
a rapidly deployable mobile environmental monitoring and
technical assessment system. This Mobile Analytical Response
System (MARS) provides a state-of-the-art analytical assessment
of chemical or biological hazards at incident sites. The Naval
Medical Research Institute (NMRI), through their Biological
Defense Research Program (BDRP), has designed reagents, assays
and procedures for agents classically identified as biological
threat, as well as non-classical threat agents in environmental
and clinical specimens. This program has developed rapid, hand-
held screening assays that can be deployed globally. Though
highly capable in their areas of expertise, these teams are
extraordinarily limited in their response capacity and could be
easily consumed by a WMD event.
The Office of Naval Research Science & Technology Reserve
Program (S&T Reserve Program, or Program 38) has a small cadre
dedicated to chemical, biological, and radiological defense
(CBRD). These include medical service corps officers, hospital
corpsmen, and officers of assorted line designators. Program
38's lead CBRD unit--NR NRL Chemical, Biological, and
Radiological Defense Detachment 106 (NR NRL CBRD106)--drills at
the headquarters of CBDCOM in the spaces of the Naval Research
Laboratory's Detachment to CBDCOM. Program 38 members comprise
the Navy's intellectual capital of military personnel in CBRD,
and can help the National Team to deal with problems of an
unexpected nature; (e.g., one might imagine generically
engineered microbes being used against us in which case we can
provide Ph.D. microbiologists with connections into academia
and industry who could help deal with this problem.) The main
contribution of Program 38 officers is probably in providing a
reach back resource that responders can tap into to better
assess the situation at hand, and formulate the best action to
take.
Overall, the group consensus was that the local
preparedness for response to WMD terrorist incidents is
nominal. To the extent that hazardous material preparedness
applies to the NBC arena, some basic military skill levels
exist. The group recognized that there are other programs that
have specific statutory authority to provide support including
the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program and the
Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Program. Leveraging the
resources provided by these programs as well as the National
Disaster Medical System will improve the linkage between expert
assistance and the first responders. However, much needed
attention must be applied to resourcing, planning, and training
for the unique nature of NBC terrorist incidents.
response policy
The Stafford Act (P.L. 93-288) establishes the authority
and process for ``all hazards'' response to natural and man-
made disasters in the United States. It is implemented through
Executive Order 12656 and the FRP.
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 established the
policy for crisis and consequence management of terrorist
incidents involving the use of weapons of mass destruction.
DoD has assigned the CINCs planning, coordinating, and
execution authorities for responding to ``all hazards''
disasters in the United States and its territories. Response to
the consequences of WMD should use the same process as response
to other natural and man-made disasters, as specified in the
``all-hazard'' concepts of the Stafford Act and the FRP and
laid out in DoD Directive 3025.1. CINCs have developed plans to
support this response as the DoD planning agents for their
respective areas. They, in turn, have designated regional
planning agents to interface with the other federal agencies
and the states. A network of EPLO's from all Services has been
established and trained to represent the federal military in
each state and in each of the ten federal regions.
DoD support of a federal response to a domestic terrorism
incident will be personally managed by the Secretary of
Defense, with the assistance of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Secretary of the Army. The DoD
crisis management response will be provided through the
national interagency terrorism response system. DoD response
forces will be employed either under the operational control of
the Joint Special Operations Task Force or a Response Task
Force assigned to the appropriate Unified Combatant Commander.
The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act of 1996 mandates training and development of
capability to respond to WMD attacks in the United States.
Response to WMD attacks or accidents must be consistent with
the concepts, response model, and responsibilities for other
domestic emergencies. We may often be in the situation that we
do not know who or what caused the event to which we are
responding. Section 1414, Title IV of the Defense
Appropriation, mandates that the SECDEF ``shall develop and
maintain at least one domestic terrorism rapid response team
composed of members of the Armed Forces and employees of DoD
who are capable of aiding Federal, state, and local officials
in the detection, neutralization, containment, dismantlement,
and disposal of weapons of mass destruction containing
chemical, biological, or related materials.'' The DoD has
formed the RTF and the CBRRT to meet this requirement. The
elements described in this plan further support this
requirement.
DoD has developed two consequence management RTFs under the
command of U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM). The headquarters
elements of these RTFs are assigned to First and Fifth U.S.
Army for responses east and west of the Mississippi River
respectively. Forces of the RTF will be tailored and assigned
based on the situation. Central to these forces will be
technical and specialized units capable of supporting a
response to a chemical, biological or radiological incident.
One concept being studied is the chemical and biological quick
response cell.
Responsibilities for oversight and execution of Title XIV,
Subtitle A, Domestic Preparedness, are spread among several
organizations. ASD(SO/LIC) has responsibility for policy and
resource oversight. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Nuclear, Chemical & Biological Defense Programs) provides
resource oversight for equipment procurement. Additionally, in
accordance with Section 1413, Title XIV, the Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF) designated the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY)
to serve as the Executive Agent for the coordination of DoD
training assistance to Federal, state, and local officials to
better assist them in responding to threats involving chemical
and biological weapons or related materials or technologies,
including assistance in identifying, neutralizing, dismantling,
and disposing of biological and chemical weapons and related
materials and technologies. As the Executive Agent, the
Secretary is responsible for developing the planning guidance,
plans, implementation, and procedures for the Domestic
Preparedness Program. The SECARMY subsequently named the
ASA(ILE) as the focal point for all matters in which the Army
has executive agency, and the DOMS as the DoD Staff Action
Agent. In a separate directive, the SECARMY directed the
Commander, Army Materiel Command (AMC) to appoint a DoD Program
Director. AMC subsequently directed Commander, CBDCOM to
appoint a DoD Program Director with the primary responsibility
to implement the basic elements of Title XIV. Also under Title
XIV, for nuclear and radiological preparedness, the Secretary
of Energy has specific responsibilities. The Secretary of
Energy is responsible to test and improve the responses of
Federal, State and local agencies involving nuclear and
radiological weapons or related materials. Here again, agency
responsibility must be communicated clearly and the value of
PDD 39 becomes even more evident.
Co-Chaired by FEMA, the Senior Interagency Coordination
Group (SICG) on Terrorism was established to facilitate the
interagency coordination of policy issues and program
activities in support of Federal initiatives to assist Federal,
state, and local first responders in responding to WMD
incidents. The SICG is composed of senior members from DoD,
FEMA, the FBI, the Public Health Service (PBS), the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy
(DoE), the Department of Justice (DoJ), the Department of
Transportation (DoT), United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA), General Services Administration (GSA), and the National
Communications System (NCS).
Chapter 4: Improving the Response
wmd response integration program goals
The Interagency Strategic Plan laid out an ambitious list
of objectives that are part of the overall goal to improve the
nation's WMD response capability. A program to coordinate and
integrate DoD's capabilities to support local, state, and
federal consequence management response to WMD events must be
established. This program supports the Military Support to
Civil Authorities policies of the Department and the plans of
the supported CINCs charged to execute that response. It must
coordinate and orchestrate many on-going efforts throughout the
DoD to meet requirements for response to WMD attacks at our
installations and facilities and within civilian communities.
The program should:
1. Establish a fully operational DoD preparedness and
response capability to deal with potential effects of
domestic terrorism involving weapons of mass
destruction.
2. Leverage Reserve Component preparedness and response
capabilities to deal with these threats.
3. Enhance local, state, and other federal agency access to
military capabilities and expertise.
plan for improving response
Key actions required to implement this program
1. Establish a Reserve Component Consequence Management
Program Integration Office to implement this plan. Assign
program management responsibility and transfer functions to the
program office. A program office of at least 14 people will be
established with contractor support to ensure the integration
of research & development, procurement, training, and doctrine
development for response to WMD. The program director should
report to the Secretary of the Army, as the DoD Executive Agent
for Military Support to Civil Authorities, through the DoD
Director of Military Support and hold quarterly program reviews
on project status.
2. Review DoD Directives 3025.1, 3025.15, 3025.12, 3020.26,
5160.54 and others that may require updating as the RC
integration effort matures. Assist in the coordination of
policy as applied to the many DoD organizations that may become
involved in a WMD response.
3. Coordinate the development of legislation that
facilitates Reserve Component activation for WMD response.
4. Modify Defense Planning Guidance and the Unified Command
Plan to reflect WMD response requirements.
5. Coordinate the development of an OPLAN to respond to
terrorist on U. S. installations, facilities, ports, and the
states and communities.
Reserve Component Consequence Management Program Integration Office
Functions
1. Identify and task military response elements. The
Departments will identify specific units to provide the
response elements, so the program office can coordinate the
training and equipment necessary for each. Each Service will
task these units to be prepared to perform the response element
mission.
2. Develop and publish individual position descriptions and
doctrine for integrated employment of the teams.
3. Integrate WMD training for DCOs, EPLOs, RTFs, and
military response elements. Leverage existing responder
training programs as the core and develop required specialized
training. The program office will coordinate training and
exercises to ensure the identified response elements, EPLOs,
DCOs, and RTFs receive training identified in the plan. The DoD
Emergency Preparedness Course and other regional training
programs provide a solid foundation for individual
responsibilities of the command and liaison elements.
Interagency exercises conducted at the state or regional levels
will be used to validate concepts of employment and response
integration with local, state, and federal response assets.
This training will leverage existing federal training for WMD
response (currently led by CBDCOM). Response elements will
interface with local and state exercises and federal
interagency response exercises. The program office will ensure
crossflow of lessons learned and coordinate improvement
recommendations between similar response elements.
4. Purchase equipment for the military response elements.
In year one, equipment will be purchased for the Rapid
Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) Elements, the
reconnaissance and decontamination elements, some of the
medical personnel and the laptop computers for the Emergency
Preparedness Liaison officers (EPLOs).
5. Identify DoD WMD response assets and capabilities. U.S.
Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) will include DoD's WMD response
assets and capabilities in the DoD Resources Data Base and
coordinate with FEMA to include appropriate information in the
Rapid Response Information System. The program office will
coordinate this effort with the Joint Staff and Unified
Commands.
6. Facilitate training exercises for the military response
elements under the CINC's RTF. Coordinate these exercises with
local, state, and federal agencies.
7. Identify and coordinate the WMD related interests with
the Advanced Concepts and Research & Development initiatives.
The program office will identify equipment that requires
prototyping, simulation, or testing. There are currently a
number of Chemical Defense Equipment (CDE) initiatives of
significant value to the WMD response effort. ASA(RDA)
initiatives are of particular interest and require attention by
the program office. The ASD(SO/LIC) Technical Support Working
Group will be a key office to facilitate development of this
equipment. The OSD Office for Counterproliferation will be an
additional resource for testing advanced concepts and newly
developed equipment.
8. Establish and maintain linkages with the processes of
the CJCS Readiness System to include:
The Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR)
Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) Teams
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC)
9. Coordinate with the Department of Health and Human
Services, Veterans Affairs, FEMA, and other federal agencies in
development of the Presidential Report on Preparations for a
National Response to Medical Emergencies Arising From the
Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and leverage the
results of the report to ensure that the Reserve Components are
trained and ready to provide this support.
10. Work with the National Guard Bureau to develop a plan
to reprogram current resources to fully resource RAID Elements
if additional full time spaces are not authorized.
11. Evaluate geographic dispersion of Reserve Component
assets for support within the U.S.
12. Develop or revise procedures and doctrine to address:
Capability to deal with a large number of
contaminated victims.
Use of chemical units to perform patient
decontamination
Response element tactics, techniques, and procedures
Response to attacks on U. S. facilities and
installations.
Additional doctrinal shortfalls
13. Ensure medical supplies and pharmaceuticals are rapidly
available to military response elements for use in U. S. WMD
incidents.
14. Ensure that designated response elements have readily
accessible Personal Protective Equipment for rapid deployment
to respond within the United States.
15. Develop and publish individual position descriptions
and doctrine for integrated employment of the teams.
16. Coordinate the new response capabilities into the
ongoing interagency exercise program in order to validate
concepts of employment and response integration with local,
state, and federal response assets.
17. Ensure communication of lessons learned and coordinate
improvement recommendations between similar response elements.
18. Establish at least a partial Rapid Assessment and
Initial Detection Element in each State and Territory.
19. Integrate Civilian Hazardous Material (HAZMAT)
operations into existing Chemical Training programs.
20. Develop FY00-03 POM requirements.
21. Develop a program to train leaders on HAZMAT, ICS, the
FRP and how all of the local, state, and federal agencies
interrelate to support the operations.
22. Leverage the existing NLD training programs to provide
training to DoD responders.
23. Provide Reserve Component medical personnel with
additional specialized training in the management of nuclear,
chemical, and biological agent casualties.
24. Develop a rapid systematic notification process to
notify military medical personnel when an incident occurs.
25. Upgrade JANUS, Spectrum, or other simulations for use
in WMD exercises and execute a proof of concept for using
SPECTRUM and JANUS to conduct WMD response exercises.
26. Fund participation by response elements including DCOs,
EPLOs, and the RTF staffs in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici city
visits and training.
27. Integrate WMD response elements and assets into the DoD
Resources Database.
28. Define requirements for additional number and types of
military response elements.
29. Document the authorization document for the RAID
Elements and the requirements for any new force structure.
30. Coordinate the development of training material for the
NBC Defense Teams.
31. Coordinate the DoD WMD training efforts using distance
learning techniques.
5-Year Integration Concept for WMD Response
The program office will develop a schedule of milestones to
ensure that the elements identified in this plan are tasked,
trained, and equipped in a smooth and efficient manner.
The first year of the program will start with the RAID,
reconnaissance, and decontamination elements. Training for
medical personnel will also begin the first year. Follow on
work will expand training to the other elements, analyze
equipment requirements, and orchestrate integration of the
response concepts and models.
The chart below \2\ shows a phased approach that begins to
develop domestic response in FY 99 and certifies coverage by FY
02. The most critical elements to develop, task, train, and
equip are the RAID Elements. This will ensure a minimal
assessment and requirement definition capability in each state
and territory. Additionally, the Reconnaissance and
Decontamination Elements, which leverage the capabilities of
Army Chemical Companies and Air Force Patient Decontamination
Teams, will be trained and equipped over a two-year period.
Medical Elements will begin their individual training and
development of concepts for fielding and equipment purchases in
the second and subsequent years. The other less technical
elements may not require as much training to be fully prepared
for a WMD response. By phasing in the element tasking,
training, and equipping over time, less stress will be placed
on doctrine development, training delivery, and procurement
activities. Lessons learned from evolving military and civil
assets will allow for review and improvement of element
procedures and structures in the latter years.
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\2\ See http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/wmdresponse/
chapter__4.html.
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The program office will develop and integrate operational
plans and doctrine for the domestic WMD response elements,
working closely with the supported CINCs. The program office
will prepare specific procedures for each response element and
evolve those procedures as the response elements mature. These
procedures will be based on established and evolving
interagency plans and procedures. Integrated exercises and
training will ensure elements can operate together as military
units and with corresponding civilian responders.
Chapter 5: Response Elements
overview
The Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) and other
elements have been identified to support local, state, and
federal agencies responding to a WMD. The basis for developing
these elements is the four elements of the Incident Command
System (Information and Planning, Operations, Logistics, and
Finance) and the 12 Emergency Support Functions of the Federal
Response Plan. Elements are designed to ``plug into'' existing
task force structures required by the incident commander, the
Governor, or the CINC responding in support of the FRP. A
potential model response is portrayed in the figure below.
command
Military command elements are established by the Adjutant
General for the National Guard responding as state resources
and by the CINC for the area (s) affected for federal military
assets. In most cases, the pre-designated DCO coordinates for
any federal military assets. A RTF may be deployed to provide
command and control during a major federal response. The CINC's
RTF is responsible for the command and control of all
responding military elements, less the Joint Special Operations
Task Force. It is comprised of command, staff, and technical
experts required to support the WMD consequence management
response.
[Organization Chart] \3\
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\3\ See http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/wmdresponse/
chapter__5.html.
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response elements
Most military elements called to respond to a WMD attack
will perform operations supporting the incident commander,
state authorities, or federal agencies requiring their help.
These elements include:
Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Element
The point of the military response spear is the National
Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Element. This
element is comprised of highly trained experts in a cross-
discipline of functional areas that can deploy and assess the
situation, advise the local, state and federal response
elements, define requirements, and expedite employment of state
and federal military support.
Mission: Provide early assessment, initial detection, and
technical advice to the incident commander during an incident
involving weapons of mass destruction. Facilitate
identification of DoD asset requirements.
[C2 Cell Organization Chart] \3\
C2 Cell: Provides overall command and control of the
assessment team and conducts hazard modeling.
Recon Cell: Provides early detection, initial sample
collection, and NBC reconnaissance.
Medical Support Cell: Provides an initial DoD medical
assessment.
Security Cell: Provides initial assessment of security
requirements and manages force protection/assessment element
security.
Logistics Cell: Determines initial resource requirements
and provides supply and maintenance support for the assessment
element.
Air Liaison Cell: Coordinates for transportation and/or air
movement of assessment element.
Communications Cell: Provides internal communications
within the assessment element, coordinates for communications
connectivity with civilian responders, and maintains a reach
back capability for additional technical expertise.
Units Employed: The RAID Elements assigned to each state/
territory represent the first military responders. Regardless
of the full-time and traditional member mix, the reconnaissance
team will likely be the primary area that technical assistance
will be requested. Given the goal of four-hour on-scene, the
demands of the RAID Elements will be significant. While not
ideal in terms of fully developed response capability, teams
from surrounding states or even use of the regional assets may
well be necessary if the disaster escalates quickly.
Employment: The RAID Element is organized as an element
under the peacetime control of the Adjutant General. Given its
rapid response and assessment mission, the RAID Element is
designed to assist incident commanders with the initial
detection and the nature of the emergency. There is also a
wartime RAID Element mission: to provide force protection
support within the state during mobilization. As with the other
elements of the response module, these elements can also be
used as part of a federal (Title 10) response to support the
National Military Strategy (NMS) requirements.
The RAIDs have the capability to rapidly deploy to an
incident site and provide initial support to the Incident
Commander. The element has the capability to conduct
reconnaissance, provide medical advice and assistance, perform
detection, assessment, and hazard prediction, and can provide
technical advice concerning WMD incidents and agents. Equipping
the RAIDs requires both military standard and commercial-off-
the-shelf components. The equipment list can be found in Annex
F.
Information and Planning Element
Mission: Collect, process and disseminate information about
WMD emergency to facilitate the overall response activities.
The scope of this functional element is to coordinate the
overall information activities. Provide an initial assessment
of disaster impacts including the identification of boundaries
of the affected area and distribution, type and severity of
damages, including the status of critical facilities. The
information and planning activities are grouped among the
following functions:
Information Processing function to collect and
process essential elements of information from the
State, and other sources, disseminate it for
operations, and provide input for reports, briefings,
displays and plans;
Reports function to consolidate information into
reports and other materials to describe and document
overall response activities and to keep follow-on
support personnel informed of the status of the
response operations;
Displays function to maintain displays of pertinent
information and facilitate briefings using maps, charts
and status boards other means, such as computer
bulletin boards or electronic mail, as available;
Consolidate information to support the action
planning process initiated by ICS.
Units Employed: Air Force Information Management staffs and
Army Information Operations staffs.
Employment: When activated, this functional element will
provide information processing support to military response
activities. Information may be obtained from a variety of
sources to include but not limited to ICS representatives. This
functional element will proactively seek information that is a
viable to develop an accurate picture of the emergency
condition. The collection and processing of critical
information is forwarded to the operational element in order to
create an overall perspective of the situation. The release of
information directly to the public or media remains a Public
Affairs function. These elements deploy to an incident site
between 8-72 hours after an incident to assist the Incident
Commander.
NBC Reconnaissance Element
Mission: Provide NBC Reconnaissance Support to the local
Incident Commander.
NBC reconnaissance operations include search, survey,
surveillance, and sampling missions.
Search: Reconnaissance undertaken to obtain significant
information about the NBC condition of routes, areas, and
zones. This information confirms or denies the presence of NBC
hazards with detection and identification equipment. Visual
observation or the collection of samples in the specified
location or region can also provide this information.
Surveys: Missions conducted to collect detailed information
of NBC contamination hazards. The survey determines the type of
contamination, the degree (extent/intensity), and the
boundaries.
Surveillance: The systematic observation of an area to
provide early warning.
Sampling: Provides physical evidence of NBC attacks and
technical intelligence concerning NBC weapons systems.
Units Employed: Each National Guard and USAR Chemical
Company will train a platoon-sized element to perform
reconnaissance operations. (The Separate Brigade Chemical
Platoons will also train to provide recon support.)
Employment: These elements should be prepared to deploy to
an incident site after an incident to assist the incident
commander to:
Confirm or deny contaminated areas.
Confirm the area is clear of contamination.
Units will operate primarily using standard MTOE and TDA
equipment. Additional equipment requirements are attached
(Annex F.)
NBC Patient Decontamination Element
Mission: Provide patient decontamination support to the
local Incident Commander. Prepare to:
Perform casualty decontamination near the incident
site, prior to evacuation, or;
Establish decontamination/detection stations at
community hospitals.
Decontamination of non-ambulatory casualties is normally
performed prior to evacuation. However, in a terrorist
incident, many ambulatory casualties will self evacuate,
arriving at the hospital still contaminated. Hospitals must
have the capability to detect contamination, and decontaminate
when necessary.
Casualty decontamination is done by trained non-medical
personnel under the supervision of the medical personnel in
accordance with procedures outlined in FM 8-10-7.
Units Employed: Each National Guard and USAR Chemical
Company, and each Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve
Medical Patient Decontamination Team will train platoon-sized
elements to perform patient decontamination. (Separate Brigade
Chemical Platoons will also train to provide decon support.)
This training will be conducted during a weekend drill by the
unit squad and platoon level leadership. A train-the-trainer
program will be established and a program of instruction will
be developed.
Employment: Each decontamination team will consist of
twenty non-medical personnel and is capable of decontaminating
12 casualties per hour.
Three teams are required per decontamination site to run
24-hour operations (4 hours on and 8 hours off shifts).
This team requires three to five medical personnel from
either the supported hospital/EMS or a medical unit to
supervise the process and perform triage and immediate
treatment of casualties. Equipment requirements are defined in
Annex F.
NBC Medical Response Element
The Medical Response Elements require further study
and analysis. Noted below are the initial concepts for
tasking and element employment. The ongoing medical
studies must be considered before the DoD response plan
is finalized. With many initiatives in various stages
of fielding, a more detailed medical response element
missions and tasks will be developed further during the
first year of the program. The medical response plan
requires coordination with our partners, in both the
private and public sector.
Mission: Provide medical advice to incident commander and
local authorities on protection of first responders and health
care personnel in an NBC environment. Provide advice on
casualty decontamination procedures, first aid and initial
medical treatment. Provide medical threat information and
characterize the health risks to civilian and military
populations. Provide initial medical advice to include signs,
symptoms, and first aid.
Units Employed: NBC Medical elements consist of 6 medical
personnel and is capable of providing medical advice to include
signs, symptoms, and first aid of NBC agents. Teams consist of:
1 Preventative Medicine Officer, 1 Preventive Medicine NCO, 1
Acute Care Physician, 1 Nurse, 1 Preventive Medicine Science
Officer, 1 Practical Nurse, 1 NBC NCO, 1 Nuclear Medical
Science Officer, 1 Nuclear Medical Officer, 1 Nuclear Medicine
Specialist/Health Physics Specialist.
Employment: After the initial assessment National Guard/
Reserve Component NBC medical elements will provide periodic
updates to the incident commander and local authorities on
protection of first responders and health care personnel in an
NBC environment. Elements may elect to use telemedicine reach
back capabilities to provide medical advice to local hospitals
on appropriate management of care issues. These elements deploy
to an incident site between 8-72 hours after an incident to
assist the Incident Commander.
Triage Medical Response Element
Mission: Provide triage support to the Incident Commander
including the sorting and assignment of treatment priorities to
various categories of wounded, and providing immediate
emergency care.
Units Employed: Each National Guard, USAR, AFRES, USNR
triage team will be trained to perform triage using the Simple
Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) system and deploy to an
incident site within 72 hours to assist the Incident Commander
with a Mass Casualty Incident (MCI).
Employment: Each triage team will consist of 26 personnel
and is capable of treating 100 patients per hour.
Trauma Medical Response Element
Mission: Provide expertise in triage, resuscitation, and
damage control medicine near the incident site or at a
definitive care location. Specific tasks are:
Perform damage control surgery for up to four
patients.
Augment community hospital systems overwhelmed by
NBC casualties.
Augment hospital/Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams
(MMST) after 24 hours to conduct sustainment
operations.
Provide support to local hospitals or MMST triage
and immediate treatment of casualties.
Provides Analgesia and anesthesia for patients under
their care.
Units Employed: Each National Guard, USAR, and USNR, AFRES
trauma team will be trained in the treatment of chemical,
biological and radiological casualties and associated effects
from blasts and crush injuries. Teams consist of: 2 General
Surgeons, 1 Anesthesiologist, 1 Emergency Medical Physician/
Orthopedic Surgeon, 1 Critical Care Nurse, 1 ER Nurse
Employment: These elements deploy to an incident site
between 8-72 hours after an incident to assist the Incident
Commander.
Preventive Medicine Element
Mission: Provides initial disease and environmental health
threat assessments during early or continuing assistance stages
of a disaster. Specific tasks are:
Provide medical threat information and characterize
the health risks to civilian and military populations.
Prepare preventive medicine estimates; conduct rapid
hazard sampling, monitoring and analysis.
Sampling including endemic and epidemic disease
indicators.
Provide initial disease and environmental health
threat assessments prior to or in the initial stages of
a disaster.
Units Employed: Each National Guard, USAR, and Naval
Reserve preventive medicine team will be trained in initial
disease and environmental health threat assessments. Teams may
require information from the Center for Disease Control and
other agencies with endemic disease and environmental effect
information to prepare their database for the area. Teams
consist of: 1 Preventative Medicine Officer, 1 Industrial
Hygienist/Health Physicist, 1 Environmental Science/
Engineering, 1 Community Health Nurse, 1 Entomologist, 1
Biologist, 1 Preventive Medicine NCO. This team should attend
the HHS/FEMA public health aspects of natural disasters and
civil emergencies.
Employment: These elements deploy to an incident site
between 8-72 hours after an incident to assist the Incident
Commander. Personnel are alerted using pagers and deploy to
incident site.
Stress Management Element
Mission: Provides initial stress management for military
and civilian responder and incident survivors.
Units Employed: This element is highly trained in stress
management and neuropsychiatry. It is capable of providing
limited neuropsychiatric triage and stabilization of clinical
cases in order to reduce the disabling effects associated with
post traumatic stress disorder.
Personnel: Each NBC element will consist of 6 medical
personnel and is capable of providing medical advice to include
signs, symptoms, and first aid of NBC agents. Teams consist of:
1 Psychiatrist , 1 Clinical Psychologist, 1 Social Work
Officer, 1 Psychiatric Nurse, 2 Mental Health NCOs, 1 Chaplain,
1 Occupational Therapy Officer, 1 Occupational Therapy NCO and
require training victim assistance, psychological trauma, post
traumatic stress disorder, mental health risks associated with
relief workers (burn out syndrome) critical events management
course.
Employment: These elements deploy to an incident site
between 18 and 48 hours after an incident to assist the
Incident Commander.
Security/Law Enforcement Element
Mission: The National Guard provides support for the
Incident Commander IAW state and local emergency response plans
to assist in maintaining order, ensuring public safety and
providing assistance to the law enforcement officials. Specific
tasks and capabilities include:
Access Control: The potential for mass panic following a
WMD incident will overwhelm the ability of hospitals to
function effectively without additional personnel to control
access to the facilities. National Guard troops could be called
upon to augment law enforcement and hospital security personnel
to maintain efficient access control in the hospitals. Because
arriving victims may be contaminated, the personnel assigned
this function require both awareness level knowledge and
training in performing security operations in personal
protective equipment (PPE). The units assigned this
responsibility need ready access to PPE which allows for rapid
mobilization from a local armory to an incident site.
Site Security: Once the limits of the contaminated area are
established, a cordon will need to be established to prevent
people from entering the area. Because this mission will be
performed outside the hot zone and National Guard units
regularly perform this type of mission in other disaster
situations, no additional training beyond basic awareness will
be required.
Civil Disturbances: The potential for lawlessness and
disorder will exist following any WMD incident. Units
designated with on-street civil disturbance missions need to
have awareness level training on WMD incidents.
Quarantine: The National Guard could be called on to assist
in the implementation of a quarantine if public health
officials determine that a biological attack using a
communicable disease agent occurs.
Evacuation: National Guard units will be required to assist
in any evacuation ordered by the local officials. Military
Police and other types of units may be called upon to assist in
managing the flow of traffic during an evacuation. Because this
mission will be performed outside the hot zone and National
Guard units regularly perform this type of mission in other
disaster situations, no additional training beyond basic
awareness will be required.
Mass Care Elements
Mission: Provide support to the incident commander in
providing shelter, feeding, emergency first aid, and bulk
distribution of emergency relief supplies. Specific tasks and
capabilities include:
Shelter: The provision of emergency shelter for disaster
victims includes the use of pre-identified shelter sites in
existing structures; creation of temporary facilities such as
tent cities, or the temporary construction of shelters; and use
of similar facilities outside the disaster-affected area,
should evacuation be necessary. Military installations and
facilities such as the armories and reserve centers can be
used. The military can also be tasked to provide tentage, cots,
etc. in the event of an incident.
Feeding: The provision for feeding disaster victims and
emergency workers through a combination of fixed sites, mobile
feeding units, and bulk food distribution. Such operations will
be based on sound nutritional standards and will include
provisions for meeting dietary requirements of disaster victims
with special dietary needs. Mobile kitchens and MAE's may be
requested from the military to support mass feeding operations.
Emergency First Aid: Emergency first aid services will be
provided to disaster victims and workers at mass care
facilities and at designated sites within the disaster area.
This emergency first aid service will be supplemental to
emergency health and medical services established to meet the
needs of disaster victims.
Bulk Distribution of Emergency Relief Items: Sites will be
established within the affected area for distribution of
emergency relief items. The bulk distribution of these relief
items will be determined by the requirement to meet urgent
needs of disaster victims for essential items. Military units
can be tasked to man these operations.
Mortuary Affairs Element
Mission: Provide mortuary support to include
identification, processing, storage, and disposition of remains
following a mass casualty WMD incident. Specific tasks and
capabilities include: assist in providing victim identification
and mortuary services, temporary morgue facilities; victim
identification utilizing latent fingerprint, forensic dental,
and/or forensic pathology/anthropology methods; and processing,
preparation, and disposition of remains.
Communications Element
Mission: This function is to assure the provision of
telecommunications support to the response forces following a
WMD emergency. This functional element coordinates actions to
assure the provision of required telecommunications support.
This functional element will coordinate the establishment of
required temporary telecommunications. Support includes
Government-furnished telecommunications, commercially leased
communications, and telecommunications.
Units Employed: Tactical Army, Navy, and Air Force
communications units may provide communications elements to
link key command and control and deployed assets. Each NBC
command element will consist of an information specialist.
Employment: These elements deploy to an incident site
between 8-72 hours after an incident to assist the incident
commander. Personnel are alerted using pagers and deploy to
incident site. This functional element serves as a basis for
planning and use of military telecommunications assets and
resources in a WMD emergency.
Engineering Element
Mission: Public Works and Engineering support includes
technical advice and evaluations, engineering services,
construction management and inspection, emergency contracting,
emergency repair of waste water and solid waste facilities, and
real estate support for the stated purposes. The United States
Army Corps of Engineers is the lead for this Emergency Support
Function.
Specific tasks include:
Emergency clearance of debris for reconnaissance of the
damage areas and passage of emergency personnel and
equipment for lifesaving, life protecting, health and
safety purposes during the initial response phase,
Temporary construction of emergency access routes which
include damaged streets, roads, bridges, ports,
waterways, airfields, and any other facilities
necessary for passage of rescue personnel,
Emergency restoration of critical public services and
facilities including supply of adequate amounts of
potable water, temporary restoration of water supply
systems, and the provision of water for fire fighting,
Emergency demolition or stabilization of damaged structures
and facilities designated by State or local government
as immediate hazards to the public health and safety,
or as necessary to facilitate the accomplishment of
life saving operations (undertake temporary protective
measures to abate immediate hazards to the public for
health and safety reasons until demolition is
accomplished),
Technical assistance and damage assessment, including
structural inspection of structures.
Units Employed: ARNG & USAR Engineer units and ANG/AFRES
Civil Engineering units could be tasked.
Transportation Elements
Mission: Provide support for the incident commander
(through the SCO or FCO/DCO) IAW state and local emergency
response plans and the Federal Response Plan to satisfy the
requirements of Federal agencies, State and local governmental
entities, and voluntary organizations requiring transportation
capacity (service, equipment, facilities, and systems) to
perform their assigned WMD response missions.
Units Employed:
Air (Fixed): The Air Force (including ANG and AFRES) will
be tasked to transport both civil and military response assets
and elements to the site of an incident. Pilots and aircrews
require awareness training.
Air assets may be tasked under the National Disaster
Medical System to provide transport of patients (post-
decontamination) to medical facilities around the nation.
Pilots and aircrews require only an awareness level of
training.
Air (Rotary): Military rotary wing assets will be critical
to the operations of the other military response elements and
in support of the local Incident Commander. Potential missions
include:
Transport of the RAID: In order to meet a four-hour
response window, many of the RAID's will be stationed at or
near air units. Rapid activation of pilots and crews will be
necessary. The RAID air liaison cell needs to coordinate with
the supporting aviation element to ensure that adequate cargo
capacity is available. The pilots and crews will require an
awareness level of training.
Air Ambulance: The potential for mass casualties in a WMD
incident will quickly overwhelm the hospital capacity in a
local community. The use of aeromedical ambulance companies to
transport patients to more distant treatment facilities can
help to alleviate this problem. This transport capability is
post decontamination and outside the hot zone. (Helicopters
should not be used within a chemically contaminated area
because their rotors tend to spread agents/contamination.)
Pilots and crews will therefore only require an awareness level
of training.
Survey/Reconnaissance: Helicopters may be used to conduct
an aerial reconnaissance of a radiologically contaminated area
to determine the spread/level of contamination. Pilots need to
receive training in the conduct of this type of operation.
Ground: Military vehicles such as military busses, HMMWV's,
trucks, etc. can be operated in support of ESF#1 if not
otherwise required to carry out the unit's emergency mission.
Potential assets include transportation units that can be
activated to provide additional transportation support. Only an
awareness level of training will be required for those vehicles
operating outside the hot zone. The assigned drivers of
vehicles operating within the hot zone (such as ambulances)
will require training on vehicle operations while wearing
protective clothing.
USCG National Strike Force
The Coast Guard's National Strike Force's capabilities and
responsibilities are available for responding beyond port
areas. The Strike Teams are regularly deployed throughout the
US on behalf of both USCG and EPA On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs).
Further, the Strike Teams are key tactical response units for
the EPA to call upon when responding under the Federal Response
Plan Emergency Support Function #10. The potential exists that
the Coast Guard OSCs could very well be the first Federal
presence in a WMD scenario. Coast Guard OSCs have a pre-
established response organization in coastal areas (including
rivers and Great Lakes) with state and local responders as well
as fire and police. USCG OSCs have experience coordinating
support services (NOAA Scientific Support Coordinators, CDC,
etc.) and other government agencies with response capabilities
into a cohesive unified command.
Chapter 6: Training Requirements
training overview
Training and exercises are the two key components of the
overall training program. Achieving a level of enhanced
readiness is directly linked to both. The challenge is to
utilize the limited resources available during the development
phases through a rigorous training and exercise program.
Training must be conducted to ensure an efficient and effective
response. Exercises offer an opportunity to practice response
operations and to validate training preparations. Ultimately
the real test will be when the first unit responds to an
event--turning victims into patients, rather than collecting
casualties for body bags.
This challenge is complicated by the fact that this effort
is evolutionary. Instruction must focus on the unique aspects
of a domestic WMD response. On the surface, responding to
civilian casualties in a downtown metropolitan area would seem
to have similar tasks that a soldier would perform when
responding to a fellow member on the battlefield. The key
difference is in the emergency operational environment. One is
a wartime theater and the other is just as chaotic, just as
lethal but CONUS based. Of course there is a correlation to the
individual tasks and the circumstances surrounding the event,
the response and the associated functions the unit will perform
when it arrives on scene. Yet, the specific conditions may vary
greatly given the unique nature of a WMD attack in a CONUS
setting. Performance based objectives will define the overall
training needed for these teams to effectively respond.
Identification of the Performance Based Training Objectives
for the first responder community has been an ongoing CBDCOM
effort. This program should reap the benefits of that hard work
by leveraging the already developed CBDCOM compendium of
courses and program of instruction and then tailoring them to
meet the training requirements of the state response teams.
Orchestrating that effort will have to be accomplished by the
program office. Concept development and rigorously exercising
the response elements will help refine doctrine development. To
meet the challenges of such an incident, an integrated training
approach must be applied for both civilian and military
personnel. Training for and response to a WMD incident is an
interwoven process that must be viewed and analyzed as a total
system.
In addition to leveraging CBDCOM's programs of instruction,
a ``Center for Excellence'' should be established as the
accrediting body to oversee WMD training to ensure a complete
crosswalk between both civilian and military training. One
solution would leverage the seven Institutional Training
Division's TRADOC approved chemical training battalions and
medical training brigades to support the Center for Excellence.
Another solution could include expanding the current training
base through the use of mobile training teams to satisfy
training requirements. The program office needs to determine
the cost reduction potential realized through innovative
training technologies such as distance learning and interactive
CD-ROM. Utilizing these capabilities could dramatically reduce
the costs associated with training large numbers of military
response elements. TRADOC schools and courses should integrate
the Incident Command System, Civilian HAZMAT procedures and the
Federal Response Plan into lesson plans and programs of
instruction.
In addition, simulation exercises will provide city
leaders, first responders and other federal partners a cost-
effective method of testing current response procedures. In
conjunction with training objectives, exercises can be tailored
to individual city or state needs, allowing them to improve
their process to meet specific training requirements.
individual training
In particular, first responder training is viewed as the
single most critical area for enhancing the nation's capability
to respond to domestic terrorism. This training addresses the
competence of skills needed to execute WMD response missions.
There does exist a training gap between battlefield skills and
the unique response skills required for civil WMD missions. In
addition to providing individual training for the teams
outlined in this plan, awareness training to the entire Reserve
Component community will enhance our nation's overall response
capability. Awareness training linked to ongoing unit training
delivered using distance learning technology or via interactive
CDROM capability provides low cost solutions with a high impact
yield. Course material developed by CBDCOM for training first
responders under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program is a readily
available training source.
awareness chemical biological plus (abc+) program
Early detection, identification and notification of the
emergency management system is essential to saving lives and
mitigating the effects of a WMD event. Situational awareness,
recognizing symptoms and effects, knowing what to do and who to
call, is the theme of the ABC+ training program. During the
first year of this integration program, a small cadre at each
installation, reserve center and armory will receive the ABC+
training. ABC+ is based on the NBC awareness course currently
being taught in the NLD City Training Program. In addition to
the awareness training, key leaders and individuals will
receive training in WMD emergency procedures. These procedures
will also reinforce the proper techniques, protocols, and
references that are essential to first responders. The intent
is to answer questions that might be asked and provide an
awareness of particular items to be alert to as the events
develop during a WMD event. An ABC+ checklist will be provided
that will guide the person through a series of questions that
provide a profile of a potential WMD attack. ABC+ training will
be provided on an interactive CD-ROM. At a minimum, full time
National Guard and Reserve Component staff members need to
complete the ABC+ training.
unit training
Preparing for a WMD response requires a focus on new and
different tasks for some units. While many of these tasks are
complementary to the unit's mission, some tasks have a new
focus. Unit training builds on the individual skill proficiency
to achieve unit domestic readiness. Rigorous training exercises
are most appropriate for units with a WMD mission. These
exercises require an understanding of the critical
infrastructure nodes and emergency response protocols within
the state and local communities to allow response units to
refine ``battle drill'' techniques. The focus of unit training
should provide immediate feedback to participants, which
reinforces individual skills training. Also, measuring the
effectiveness of completed training will identify areas that
require further improvement. Unit NBC Defense Team's provide a
WMD response capability as well. These teams are trained today
for their military NBC mission and a basic orientation on the
unique WMD tasks will be necessary. Annually, these defense
teams exercise for their wartime mission, which is their
primary orientation. With a minimum investment, a special
training module could be developed that would provide a WMD
track for the NBC Defense Teams. The Program will coordinate
this initiative with the appropriate proponent school.
course evaluation and development
The timely evaluation of training courses and materials is
critical to ensuring that course content is properly focused.
In this way emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures
applicable to WMD responses will be made available to units.
exercises
Exercises allow the teams, elements and units to practice
for the WMD mission. A critical step in this process is
learning the roles and responsibilities that individuals will
assume should an actual incident occur. Exercises provide the
opportunity to practice and develop skills as well as foster
teamwork among responders and between agencies. Exercises
ensure that a crisis is not the first opportunity for
interagency coordination among responders. Lessons learned and
opportunities to improve should be documented and shared with
our interagency partners.
Exercises complement and enhance training activities. Since
the Regional Training Brigades have the mission to conduct
exercises using simulation, WMD scenarios can be developed for
this capability.
training objective
The overarching training objective is to employ joint,
interagency, and intergovernmental efforts to mitigate the
effects of a WMD incident. The specific training objective may
be broad or narrow in scope. A broad application of this
training objective is focused on training interagency leaders
and staffs in response management. A narrow application focuses
on a specific sub-system not normally exercised by local
emergency services such as planning decontamination of urban
infrastructure assisting survivors, preventing additional
casualties from chemical or radioactive agent drift, or
restoration of public order.
simulation exercises
WMD Simulation Training Exercises (WMD SIMEX) will be
conducted after initial training has been completed. The WMD
SIMEX is a modified SPECTRUM or JANUS driven training event
focusing on key leaders and response agencies. A CD-ROM and/or
Internet based interactive computer-assisted training program
with learner controls, practical exercises, and comprehensive
assessments will be developed to support this program. The
concept behind a WMD SIMEX is similar to the military's use of
simulation training prior to field training exercises in order
to maximize scarce operational dollars.
This methodology parallels the Army Battle Command Training
Program. A read-ahead package made available provides selected
materials appropriate to the training audience. Seminars bring
interagency teams together to learn the process of reducing
risk and mitigating the effects of a WMD attack. The exercise
concludes with an Incident Command Post Exercise which brings
interagency teams together in their actual operations centers
to deal with issues, including fog and friction, generated by
the separation in time and space from an event. The CBDCOM
sponsored training provides a model for developing future
training simulations.
regional training exercise
This event brings all regional responders to a training
incident and evaluates the entire response. The exercise is a
joint, city, state, and federal effort. The leadership of these
organizations should have completed a WMD SIMEX prior to a
regional training exercise in order to maximize the benefit of
the training event. Lessons learned will generate improvements
in response.
A read-ahead package provides selected materials
appropriate to the training audience. Civic leaders choose
tasks they wish to exercise. Training scenarios will pull
together the interagency team in a focused training exercise
that allows them to operate together to reduce and mitigate the
effects of a WMD. Through realistic execution the teams will
test emergency response plans and coordination of
responsibilities which will serve as the basis for formulating
and testing alternatives to developing capabilities. Finally,
an after action review process emphasizes lessons learned from
and a take home packet provides direction for future
interagency training events.
modeling and simulations
Many elaborate simulation models and simulation tools have
been developed for Major Theater Warfare scenarios using
current Active and Reserve Component data. These models can be
adapted to scenarios which impact the civilian populace at
large. Data generated from these models can produce hazard
effects, which would be useful identifying ``hot zones'',
evacuation areas and safe areas. Custom reports generated from
these databases could instantaneously identify units within the
geographic proximity of an event by zip code. This will be
helpful for identifying gaps in the existing capability. More
important, it will facilitate decisions about fielding force
structure that could be used to fill current force structure
gaps.
Two agencies that provided invaluable help to the Tiger
Team include the Concepts Analysis Agency and Defense Special
Weapons Agency. Each organization has extensive experience in
developing modeling and simulations for the Department of
Defense. Furthermore, each organization has the technical
expertise to assist the future efforts of the program office in
many ways including doctrine and training development. Areas of
interest for the program office include: determine WMD impact,
number of casualties in a contaminated area, downwind hazard,
areas to avoid and evacuate, neutralization procedures, analyze
and determine tasks and their priority, and estimate response
force size and composition.
When used properly, simulations and models can create the
environment and stress needed for effective response options.
Proper use ensures quality training that can compensate for
fiscal constraints that limit live exercises. In addition,
simulations and modeling efforts will provide leaders at all
levels effective training alternatives.
nunn-lugar-domenici sustainment training
The Senior Interagency Coordination Group Sustainment
Training Process Action Team has recommended four Courses of
Action for providing training to first responders following the
initial 120 cities:
1. Maintain the Domestic Preparedness Training Teams for
the cities beyond the current mandate.
2. Use or expand the existing training infrastructure to
include NBC models.
3. Enable the cities to train themselves.
4. Empower the states to execute sustainment training by
providing them a menu of approved Domestic Preparedness
training courses.
Their plan provides multiple options depending on funding
availability. Integration of Reserve Component personnel into
each of the courses of action could leverage the unique
capabilities and geographic dispersion to provide a cost-
effective training opportunity.
Annex A: Acronyms
ACTD Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration
AFNSEP Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness
Office
AFRES Air Force Reserve
AMC Army Materiel Command
ANG Air National Guard
ARNG Army National Guard
ASA Assistant Secretary of the Army
ASD Assistant Secretary of Defense
BDRP Biological Defense Research Program
C2 Command and Control
CAM Chemical Agent Monitor
CB Chemical Biological
CB2010 Assessment of Chemical & Biological Agents on Joint
Operations in 2010
CBDCOM Chemical Biological Defense Command
CBIRF Chemical Biological Initial Response Force
CBRRT Chemical & Biological Rapid Response Team
CDC Centers for Disease Control
CDRG Catastrophic Disaster Response Group
CINC Commander in Chief
Commo Communications
CONPLAN Contingency plan
CONUS Continental United States
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
DCO Defense Coordinating Officer
Decon Decontamination
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD Department of Defense
DoDRDB Department of Defense Resources Database
DoE Department of Energy
DoJ Department of Justice
DOMS Director of Military Support
DoT Department of Transportation
DPP Domestic preparedness Program
DSB Defense Science Board
DSWA Defense Special Weapons Agency
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPLO Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer
ER Emergency Room
ERDEC Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center
ESF Emergency Support Function
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCO Federal Coordinating Officer
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FORSCOM Forces Command
FRP Federal Response Plan
GSA General Services Administration
HAZMAT Hazardous Materials
HQDA Headquarters Department of the Army
IAW In Accordance With
ICS Incident Command System
ILE Installations, Logistics & Environment
I-TRAP Interagency Terrorism Response Awareness Program
LFA Lead Federal Agency
MARS Mobile Analytical Response System
MMST Metropolitan Medical Strike Team
MRE Meal, Ready to Eat
MRMC Medical Research and Materiel Command
MSCA Military Support to Civilian Authorities
MTOE Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
MTW Major Theater War
NBC Nuclear Biological Chemical
NC&B Nuclear, Chemical & Biological
NCO Non Commissioned Officer
NCS National Communications System
NDP National Defense panel
NG National Guard
NGA National Governors' Association
NGB National Guard Bureau
NICI National Interagency Counterdrug Institute
NLD Nunn-Lugar Domenici
NMRI Naval Medical Research Institute
NRC National Response Center
OCAR Office, Chief of the Army Reserve
OCONUS Outside of the Continental United States
P.L. Public Law
PAT Process Action Team
PC Personal Computer
PDD Presidential Decision Directive
PHS Public Health Service
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
PSRC Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
RA Reserve Affairs
RAID Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection
RC Reserve Component
Recon Reconnaissance
RTF Response Task Force
SCO State Coordinating Officer
SECARMY Secretary of the Army
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SICG Senior Interagency Coordination Group
STARC State Area Command
TAG The Adjutant General
TDA Table of Distribution of Allowances
TEU Technical Escort Unit
USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers
USACOM United States Atlantic Command
USAMRICD United States Army Medical Research Institute for
Chemical Defense
USAMRIID United States Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Disease
USAR United States Army Reserve
USCG United States Coast Guard
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
USMCRC United States Marine Corps Reserve Component
USNR United States Naval Reserve
VA Department of Veterans Affairs
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
Annex B: References
statutes
Title 42 Sections 5121-5204c Stafford Act
Title 14 Sections 1402-1455 1997 Defense Authorization Act
Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction
Title 32 Section 502, 3500 Mobilization Statutes (Army and Air
National Guard)
Title 14 Section 712 Coast Guard
Title 10 Sections 12301-12304 Reserve Components
Title 50 Appendix 2251- 2303 Civil Defense Act
Title 18 Section 1385 Posse Comitatus Act
Title 10 Sections 331-335 Insurrection Act
Title 31 Section 1535 Economy Act
Title 42 Sections 9601-9675 CERCLA (Superfund)
executive orders
E.O. 12656 (53 FR 47491) Assignment of Emergency Preparedness
Responsibilities, 18 Nov 88
E.O. 12472 (49 FR 13471) Assignment of National Security and
Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions, 3 Apr
84
E.O. 12148 (44 FR 43239) Federal Emergency Management, 20 Jul
79
E.O. 13010 Critical Infrastructure Protection, 15 Jul 96
national security and presidential decision directives
NSD 66 Civil Defense, 16 Mar 92
PDD 39 U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (Unclassified extract),
21 Jun 95
dod directives
DOD Directive 3020.26 Continuity of Operations Policies and
Planning, 26 May 95
DOD Directive 3020.36 Assignment of National Security
Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) Responsibilities to DoD
Components, 2 Nov 88
DOD Directive 3025.1 Military Support to Civil Authorities
(MSCA), 15 Jan 93
DOD Directive 3025.12 Military Assistance for Civil
Disturbances (MACDIS), 4 Feb 94
DOD Directive 3025.15 Military Assistance for Civil Authorities
(MACA), 18 Feb 97
DOD Directive 3150.5 DOD Response to Improvised Nuclear Device
(IND) Incidents, 24 Mar 87
DOD Directive 3150.8 DOD Response to Radiological Incidents, 13
Jun 96
DOD Directive 4000.19 Interservice and Intergovernmental
Support 9 Aug 95
DOD Directive 5030.41 Implementation of National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 1 Jun 77
DOD Directive 5160.54 DOD Key Asset Protection Program (KAPP),
26 Jun 89
DOD Directive 5525.5 DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law
Enforcement Officials, 15 Jan 86
dod manuals
DOD 3025.1-M Manual for Civil Emergencies, Jun 94
DOD 5100.52-M Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures
(NARP), Sep 90
joint publications
Joint Publication 5.0 Joint Operations
plans
A National Security Strategy for A New Century prepared by the
White House, May 1997.
National Military Strategy of the United States of America.
Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New
Era prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
September 97.
Strategic Plan for Developing a Weapons of Mass Destruction
Domestic Terrorism Preparedness and Response Capability
prepared by the Interagency Working Group on Domestic
Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, 29 August 97.
Annex C to U.S Government Interagency CONPLAN: ``Combating
Domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism,''
Draft - 10 November 97.
government reports
Defense Reform Initiative Report, William S. Cohen, November
97.
GAO Report (GAO/NSIAD-97-129) Proposals to Expand Call-up
Authorities Should Include Numerical Limitations.
GAO Report (GAO/NSIA-97-254) Combating Terrorism: Federal
Agencies Effort to Implement National Policy and Strategy.
FEMA, Focus Group Report: NBC Terrorism Response Focus Group
For Local Government, 29 October 97.
Annex D: Studies and Analyses
1. Department of Defense Report to Congress: Domestic
Preparedness Program in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction (1 May 1997).
2. An Assessment of Federal Consequence Management
Capabilities for Response to Nuclear, Biological or Chemical
(NBC) Terrorism - A Report to the President in coordination
with the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (February 1997).
3. Chem-Bio 2010: Assessment of the impact of Chem/Bio
Weapons on Joint Operations in 2010 (Joint Staff - September
1997).
4. The Role of the National Guard in Emergency Preparedness
and Response for the United States Congress and Federal
Emergency Management Agency (January 1997).
5. Defense Science Board: DoD Responses to Transnational
Threats (August 1997).
6. Proliferation: Threat and Response. Office of the
Secretary of Defense (November 1997).
7. Report of the National Defense Panel: Transforming
Defense National Security for the 21st Century (December 1997).
8. NBC Terrorism Response Focus Group for Local Government
Report (October 1996).
9. National Governor's Association Workshop with
Interagency Partners (FEMA, DoD, EPA, FBI, DHHS and DVA)
(September 1996).
Twenty six states participated in assessing capabilities to
respond to and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological,
or chemical (NBC) terrorism. These 26 states were chosen
because their large urban areas and other factors could make
them potential targets for a terrorist incident.
10. FEMA--September 1996
During September 1996, FEMA met with representatives from
Boston, MA; Denver, CO; Los Angeles, CA; and Philadelphia, PA.
They focused on the capabilities and needs of local government
to respond to terrorist incidents involving WMD. Input and
feedback from this sampling of U.S. metropolitan areas was
intended to provide an indication of the spectrum of nationwide
preparedness at the local level. Participants primarily
represented emergency response and public health organizations
from the respective state and local governments. Policy and
subject matter experts included Federal officials from FEMA,
the FBI, DHHS, and DoD.
Overall, the group consensus was that the local
preparedness for response to WMD terrorist incidents is
nominal. To the extent that hazardous material preparedness
applies to the NBC arena, some base level exists. However, a
great deal of progress remains to be made on resource,
planning, and training fronts regarding the unique nature of
NBC terrorist incidents.
11. FEMA/FBI Report to Congress (January 1997).
FEMA and FBI submitted a Joint Report to Congress in
January 1997. It addressed both crisis management/prevention
and consequence management/response activities. This report
focused on capabilities and interagency roles and
responsibilities to respond to an incident involving WMD. In
the assessment summary, the impact of a WMD incident and
significant response requirement were recognized.
A NBC terrorist incident may occur as a local event with
potentially profound national implications. In responding to a
NBC incident, first responders must be able to provide critical
resources within minutes to mitigate the effects of the
incident. Since the ability of the local government to deal
with the immediate effects of an incident is essential to the
success of any NBC response, enhancing and maintaining the
local capability with trained and adequately equipped
responders is a key component of a viable national terrorism
response capability.
12. DoD Focus Group Meetings (February 1997).
DoD, with the support of other Federal agencies, conducted
a series of focus group meetings with first responders during
February 1997. The findings and recommendations of the groups
formed the basis of a comprehensive set of training performance
objectives. Based upon the focus group's review, a training
course development program was begun to modify existing
training courses, and develop programs of instruction and
instructional material.
13. DoD/DoE Report to Congress (April 1996).
DoD and DoE, in consultation with FEMA, submitted a report
to Congress in 1996 on current plans, resources, and
capabilities to respond to a nuclear, radiological, biological,
or chemical terrorist attack. The report covered consequence
management plans and capabilities. Key points made were, first,
there is a fundamental shift from the local or regional level
of Federal involvement and decision-making authority to
Washington, DC and the SECDEF's personal involvement during a
WMD domestic terrorist incident. Second, there are some highly
trained personnel available and excellent capabilities in many
consequence management organizations to respond to a domestic
NBC disaster. Finally, first responders need training,
equipment, and supplies, yet there are limited quantities of
DoD combat supplies available for NBC contingencies.
* * * * * * *
Annex G: Legal Issues
planning principles
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the team selected the Federal
mission as the principle to guide the organization of the
response elements. Under this organizing principle, the
immediate response elements act as the tip of the Federal MSCA
spear. It is anticipated the initial WMD response would be in a
State status, under the control of the Governor. Since the
unit's outlined in this plan remain DoD assets, the unit's
force structure would also be available to support the homeland
defense and MSCA missions, and provide a secondary warfighting
capability.
current legislative initiatives
Status of full time personnel: The team analyzed a number
of options regarding the status of full time personnel. These
included: state active duty (SAD), full time National Guard
duty for special work (Title 32), full time Active Guard and
Reserve duty (AGR)(Title 32) and active duty for special work
(Title 10). The team recommends full time Active Guard and
Reserve duty (AGR)(Title 32), for National Guard personnel.
This status best enables the personnel to perform required
missions within the envisioned command and control structure
and with federal military personnel benefits. This status
provides a career track for soldiers who will be highly skilled
and in high demand. A change to current statutes covering Title
32 is necessary since the WMD mission is operational in nature.
The specific language has been included in the fast-track
legislative package being staffed separate from this plan.
Stafford Act Amendments: The team also recommends amending
provisions of the Stafford Disaster Assistance Act that concern
Federal and State disaster preparedness programs and disaster
response, to include WMD incidents within the definition of a
disaster under the act and to authorize the use of the National
Guard (as defined in section (101)(3) of Title 32) or the
reserve components (as named in Section 10101 of Title 10) ``to
take such actions that may be necessary to provide an immediate
response to a disaster involving a weapon of mass destruction''
(as that term is defined in Section 102 of the Act, as it would
be amended). The act would also be amended to also require that
DoD be reimbursed for any expenses incurred by the department
for disaster preparedness programs conducted by the National
Guard or the reserve Components from funds ``appropriated for
the purposes of the Act'' and to authorize the Secretary of
Defense, at the request of the Director of FEMA, to direct the
National Guard and Reserve Components to conduct training
exercises, preposition equipment and other items, and to take
such other actions that may be necessary to provide an
immediate response to an incident involving a weapon of mass
destruction (as that term is defined in Section 102 of the Act,
as it would be amended). The Department of Defense would be
reimbursed with funds made available for the purposes of
disaster relief. These changes facilitate use of the reserve
component in WMD response under the Stafford Act.
fast track legislation
As mentioned previously in this document, WMD response
activity will be quite different. In fact, federal resources
may be required much earlier than during a typical disaster
response. Given this potential, access to federal resources
takes on a new and perhaps even demanding dimension. With quick
access in mind, now is the time to work the accessibility
issues, not after an event has occurred. Both have unique
features but it appears that at a minimum, the amendment to 10
USC 12301(b) deserves favorable consideration. The 10 USC 12304
amendment addresses access but extends the current PSRC
authority to WMD related incidents. The nature of just these
amendments is an example of the issues requiring attention.
More work remains necessary. Perhaps, in the end, a new status
covering operational missions will be most appropriate for the
type duty outlined in this plan. The two categories for
consideration are listed below:
1. Extension of Involuntary Call-up Authority to 30 Days:
Amendment to 10 USC 12301(b). That section currently authorizes
the Secretary of a military department to order, without the
consent of the persons affected, any unit, and any member not
assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in an active
status in a reserve component under the jurisdiction of the
Secretary to active duty for not more than 15 days a year. This
amendment would increase a period of active duty from 15 to 30
days a year. This authority would enable the military
departments to initially respond more effectively to a domestic
incident involving a weapon of mass destruction and to make
members of the ready reserve more readily available to
participate in other operational missions.
2. Enhanced access to the Reserve Components: Amendment to
10 USC 12304(b) concerning the authority of the President to
authorize the Secretary of Defense to order members of the
Selective Reserve to active duty not in time of war or during a
national emergency declared by Congress and amendments to the
Stafford Act to authorize and facilitate DoD preparation for
and response in WMD consequence management situations.
Currently, Section 12304(b) prohibits such an order to active
duty ``to provide assistance to either the Federal Government
or a State in time of a serious natural or manmade disaster,
accident, or catastrophe.'' The amendment inserts a very
limited exception to section 12304(b) that would allow a unit
or member to be ordered to active duty to provide assistance in
responding to an emergency involving a ``weapon of mass
destruction.''
* * * * * * *
b. Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Force
Overseas (Letter Report, July 21, 1997, GAO/NSIAD-97-207).\1\
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to
protect U.S. forces from terrorist attacks, focusing on: (1)
measures taken at overseas U.S. bases to enhance the security
of deployed personnel; and (2) recent DOD initiatives to
improve its antiterrorism program.
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GAO reviewed that: (1) many deployed U.S. forces are better
protected today from terrorist attacks similar to the one that
occurred at Khobar Towers; (2) during March and April 1997, GAO
visited 30 overseas sites and found that security improvements
were most evident where the risk of terrorism is the greatest,
such as Turkey and the Middle East; (3) DOD has placed less
emphasis on addressing vulnerabilities in countries that are
currently considered to have a lower threat; (4) senior
military commanders and defense officials GAO met with
emphasized that they can reduce, but not eliminate,
vulnerabilities and that further terrorist attacks against U.S.
forces should be expected; (5) they also observed that efforts
to defend against terrorism are complicated by a number of
factors, including the ability of terrorists to decide where
and when to attack and to choose from a wide selection of
targets; (6) nevertheless, the officials said, some risk must
be accepted as the United States pursues its national security
strategy abroad; (7) since the bombing at Khobar Towers, DOD
has initiated a number of changes aimed at improving its
antiterrorism program; (8) for example, DOD has established a
new office for combating terrorism on the Joint Staff, enhanced
the antiterrorism responsibilities of the geographic combatant
commands, and instituted a vulnerability assessment process
under the aegis of the joint staff; (9) these initiatives,
however, have not resulted in a comprehensive, consistent
approach to antiterrorism as called for by the Downing task
force; (10) for instance, DOD's force protection focal point
has not provided the geographic combatant commanders the
guidance the commanders believe they need to carry out their
expanded antiterrorism responsibilities; (11) such guidance
would include establishing standards for assessing
vulnerabilities and agencywide physical security requirements
designed to provide a minimum level of protection to U.S.
forces no matter where they are located; (12) a comprehensive,
consistent approach to antiterrorism using common standards
would give commanders a more objective basis for determining
whether they are providing adequate protection to their
facilities and personnel; and (13) DOD would have a capability
to compare vulnerabilities at different sites on a worldwide
basis and thus ensure that sufficient emphasis is being placed
on the most vulnerable areas.
c. Domestic Preparedness Program in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction, May 1, 1997.\1\
Executive Summary
This report summarizes the Department of Defense (DoD)
actions as requested by Public Law 104-201, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Title XIV: Defense
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Subtitle A: Domestic
Preparedness. The Conference Report accompanying Public Law
104-208 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,
requested DoD to submit a report to Congress by May 1, 1997 on
four specific issues: assess the types and characteristics of
chemical and biological threats; identify unmet training,
equipment and other requirements for first responders; identify
chemical/biological warfare information, expertise and
equipment that could be adapted to civilian application; and
present a detailed plan for DoD assistance in equipping,
training and providing other necessary assistance for first
responders to such incidents.
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A threat assessment has been prepared and is contained in
Volume II of this report. It assesses the types and
characteristics of chemical and biological threats against U.S.
citizens and Government assets in the United States.
Over the past few years, several studies, discussions,
workgroups, and focus groups have identified capabilities,
specific requirements and shortfalls in requirements that are
needed by first responders to meet the threat of a chemical,
biological or nuclear terrorist attack. The findings of these
studies and workgroups show a common trend in unmet training,
equipment, and other resources, such as technical information
for first responders.
The DoD is using existing interagency programs as the
foundation to build links between these programs and
initiatives outlined in Title XIV. These programs include a
nationwide training support plan with an initial focus on 27
cities. Modular training courses will then be available to
other cities throughout the nation. Through the Helpline in
non-emergency, and the Hotline in emergency situations, first
responders will have access to DoD chemical/biological agent/
warfare information and technical expertise to enhance their
preparedness. Local Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams and their
supporting systems are being geographically developed to
respond to medical consequence management issues related to NBC
terrorism. A Chemical-Biological Quick Response Force has been
developed for rapid deployment to detect, neutralize, contain,
dismantle, and dispose of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
Operational control of committed response forces will be
provided by two geographically located Response Task Forces.
Other Federal departments and agencies are enhancing their
response capabilities. Lessons learned from completed exercises
will be applied to developing exercises/tests to be executed in
the next five successive fiscal years to improve the response
of Federal, state, and local agencies to emergencies involving
WMD incidents.
All programs and initiatives outlined within this report
are supported by congressional legislation. The overall success
is dependent upon combined cooperation of all Federal agencies
participating in efforts related to domestic preparedness for
WMD. The key to success, however, is continued funding through
the outyears to ensure that all agencies, local, state,
regional and Federal, are adequately prepared to respond to a
WMD terrorist attack.
VOLUMES 1-6
1. introduction
This report summarizes the Department of Defense (DoD)
actions as requested by Public Law 104-201, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Title XIV: Defense
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Subtitle A: Domestic
Preparedness. The Conference Report accompanying Public Law
104-208 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,
requested DoD to submit a report to Congress on four specific
issues that are outlined in the Scope of the Report.
1.1 Background
Within the last five years at least eleven states as well
as other nations have experienced terrorist incidents. Some of
the most widely publicized incidents were the bombing of the
World Trade Center in 1993, the chemical terrorist attack on
the Tokyo Subway system in 1995, the bombing of the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, and the
Centennial Park bombing in Atlanta in 1996. With the increasing
availability of raw materials and technology from worldwide
sources, the potential use of WMD by subversive groups has
mounted dramatically. In response to the growing concern of the
potential use of WMD in a terrorist attack, Title XIV was
established.
1.2 Responsibilities
Under Title XIV, Subtitle A, Domestic Preparedness,
responsibilities for oversight and execution are as follows.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low
Intensity Conflict) has responsibility for policy and resource
oversight. The Assistant to The Secretary of Defense (Nuclear,
Chemical & Biological Defense Programs) provides resource
oversight for equipment procurement. Additionally, in
accordance with Section 1413, Title XIV, the Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF) designated the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY)
to serve as the Executive Agent for the coordination of DoD
training assistance to Federal, state, and local officials to
better assist them in responding to threats involving chemical
and biological weapons or related materials or technologies,
including assistance in identifying, neutralizing, dismantling,
and disposing of biological and chemical weapons and related
materials and technologies. As the Executive Agent, the
Secretary is responsible for developing the planning guidance,
plans, implementation, and procedures for the Domestic
Preparedness Program. The SECARMY subsequently named the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics and
Environment) (ASA(IL&E)) as the focal point for all matters in
which the Army has executive agency, and the Director of
Military Support (DOMS) as the DoD staff action agent. In a
separate directive, the SECARMY directed the Commander, Army
Materiel Command (AMC) to appoint a DoD Program Director. AMC
subsequently directed Commander, Chemical Biological Defense
Command (CBDCOM) to appoint a DoD Program Director with the
primary responsibility to implement the basic elements of Title
XIV.
The Senior Interagency Coordination Group (SICG) on
Terrorism was established to facilitate the interagency
coordination of policy issues and program activities in support
of Federal initiatives to assist Federal, state, and local
first responders in responding to WMD incidents. The SICG is
composed of senior members from DoD, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), the Public Health Service (PHS), the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy (DoE), the
Department of Justice (DoJ), the Department of Transportation
(DoT), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), General
Services Administration (GSA), and the National Communications
System (NCS).
1.3 Scope of the Report
This report responds to four issues outlined by Congress.
The report will assess the types and characteristics of
chemical and biological threats against the U.S. and the
capabilities of civilian agencies to respond to these threats;
identify unmet training, equipment, and other requirements of
civilian first responders necessary to provide a basic
capability to respond to domestic chemical and biological
attacks; identify DoD chemical/biological warfare information,
expertise and equipment that could be adapted to civilian
application to help meet identified requirements; and present a
detailed plan for DoD assistance in equipping, training, and
providing other necessary assistance for first responders to
such incidents.
This report provides information to Congress on the status
of the existing programs and initiatives required to enhance
Federal, state, and local capabilities to respond to terrorist
incidents involving WMD. The overall initiative uses existing
Federal agencies' chemical and biological assets and programs
as the foundation for its program. The SICG members are
building links between participating agencies to develop new
programs to ensure that the intent of Congress is met as
outlined in Title XIV and subsequent legislation. The DoD
initiative is an evolving program. This report will provide
information on the status of the individual components of the
DoD program and plan. Volume I of this report is unclassified.
Volume II provides an assessment which is classified SECRET US
ONLY.
2. types and characteristics of chemical and biological threats against
u.s. citizens and government assets in the u.s. and the capability of
civilian agencies to respond to these threats
This portion of the Report to Congress is contained in
Domestic Preparedness Program, Volume II: Assessment of the
Chemical and Biological Transnational Terrorist Threat in the
Continental United States (U). The assessment is classified
SECRET US ONLY.
3. unmet training, equipment, and other requirements of civilian first
responders necessary to provide basic capability to respond to a
domestic chemical or biological attack
3.1 Introduction
Several Federal agencies have conducted studies and focus
group discussions with different local, state, and regional
representatives over the past several years in an attempt to
determine the needs of first responders in the event of a WMD
incident. These studies focused on areas such as plans,
capabilities, procedures, training, equipping and response
integration at different levels. The findings from several of
the studies/discussions are summarized below.
3.2 Studies
3.2.1 National Governors Association - September 1996
In September 1996 the National Governors Association (NGA)
conducted a workshop for the NGA policy advisors with
representatives from FEMA, DoD, DoE, EPA, FBI, Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS), and the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA). The workshop sought to 1) identify the
nature, impact, and response issues associated with a nuclear,
biological or chemical terrorist incident; 2) discuss the
adequacy of both Federal and state plans and response
capabilities to an incident involving mass casualties; and 3)
formulate the next steps for developing a coordinated Federal,
state, and local response framework.
In preparation for the workshop, NGA conducted a survey of
the 26 participating states to assess the capabilities of these
states to respond to and manage the consequences of nuclear,
biological, or chemical (NBC) terrorism. These 26 states were
chosen because their large urban areas and other factors could
make them potential targets for a terrorist incident.
Most states acknowledged they receive satisfactory
intelligence about potential terrorist groups operating in
their state and could adequately respond to a nuclear terrorist
attack due to their planning and training for possible nuclear
power plant accidents. However, in the arena of chemical and
biological terrorism, the states felt they were not adequately
resourced or trained. The NGA findings indicate a need for more
information on the types of resources available to combat
chemical or biological attacks and indicated a need for Federal
assistance in areas of monitoring and detection equipment,
technical assistance, manpower, and recovery efforts. FEMA
recommended holding regional meetings to review resources and
discuss issues of mutual concern between the Federal and state
governments.
First responder issues focused on the states capabilities
to respond to an NBC terrorist incident, recognizing that first
responders are essentially on their own for the first six to
ten hours after an incident has occurred. Participants
discussed resources the Federal government could provide and
the role of Federal agencies during the early stages of the
crisis; leveraging existing capabilities and expertise;
improving interaction between emergency management
organizations and first responders; acquiring low cost NBC
equipment and protective clothing; improving decontamination
capabilities; conducting specialized training; and providing
opportunities for partnerships with industry to advance current
expertise and develop tools and techniques.
Public information issues explained the need to present
fully coordinated, timely, and accurate emergency information
to the public and the importance of considering the objectives
in consequence management versus crisis management.
Law enforcement and intelligence issues centered on the
collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of
terrorist intelligence information between state and Federal
agencies. Participants also addressed public safety issues and
agency roles regarding the responsibility for maintaining order
and discipline during and after an incident.
Health and medical service issues focused on the states
capabilities and capacities, and the type and quantity of
assistance available from the Federal government.
When discussing how the states and Federal agencies could
best work together on the issue of NBC terrorism, most states
suggested that FEMA should hold regional meetings. To develop a
coordinated framework for states and Federal agencies to work
together, FEMA proposed the following: imitate the Federal
Response Plan (FRP) review process at the state level; host a
series of workshops at the regional level; establish a national
information clearinghouse; visit/assist each reviewing state;
pool Federal and state capabilities data; develop a national
plan outlining state and Federal responsibilities, priorities,
and approaches to develop/sustain capability; secure state and
Federal funding support; and implement a multi-year plan.
3.2.2 FEMA--September 1996
During September 1996 FEMA met with representatives from
Boston, MA; Denver, CO; Los Angeles, CA; and Philadelphia, PA.
They focused on the capabilities and needs of local government
to respond to terrorist incidents involving WMD. Input and
feedback from this sampling of U.S. metropolitan areas was
intended to provide an indication of the spectrum of nationwide
preparedness at the local level. Participants primarily
represented emergency response and public health organizations
from the respective state and local governments. Policy and
subject matter experts included Federal officials from FEMA,
the FBI, DHHS, and DoD.
Four concurrent sessions were held to discuss the local
response to terrorism scenarios involving NBC incidents
tailored to reflect specifics of each city's jurisdiction. A
surprising number of common response issues were identified
among the four different types of incidents.
Participants believed that local government had the ability
to meet normal emergency response needs: performing the
firefighting, law enforcement, emergency medical services and
rescue tasks they do so effectively on a day-to-day basis. In
addition, some personal protective equipment and some hazardous
materials response equipment is generally in place at the local
level and would be available to respond to a very small WMD
incident. However, they identified a critical need for access
to information and expert advice as well as training. They also
thought that local government was ready, willing and able to do
more with the proper training and equipment.
The groups highlighted the need for subject matter experts
to be identified and available within the first few hours of an
incident. These subject matter experts would provide advice and
reference materials describing the hazards, the effects and
recommended protective response actions.
Beyond technical experts, personnel resources would be
required by local governments to assist with the potentially
massive public impacts of such incidents - whether it be mass
casualties or large-scale evacuation. National Guard (NG),
state police, and additional fire and emergency medical
personnel from outlying municipalities were noted as probable
sources to meet these needs. The cities indicated that in many
cases mutual aid agreements were in place to obtain resources
from neighboring communities. In other cases, they recognized
the need for such agreements and that this was a local
responsibility.
The need for hazard-specific procedures was uniformly
supported. Local responders do not have enough knowledge of the
requirements for response to NBC threats to develop their own
procedures. Guidance from state and Federal experts is needed
on procedures to monitor, treat, protect and decontaminate
after release of NBC contaminants.
Participants highlighted training as a key component in
building local, state, and Federal response capabilities. First
responders need awareness training specific to NBC hazards so
that they could quickly recognize victim symptoms and other
characteristics of such an incident which may distinguish them
from other hazardous material incidents. Participants also felt
that first responders needed training on routes of exposure,
means of protection, health effects, treatment and monitoring,
and decontamination methods. Training on handling of mass
casualties and on the requirements of triage was also
highlighted as a need for the emergency medical community.
Multi-jurisdictional exercises were noted by the groups as
another critical element of the preparedness program that was
currently missing. They felt that local plans and procedures
were evaluated on a frequent basis, but that opportunities to
test integration and coordination with state and Federal
agencies were lacking. The groups encouraged the Federal
government to promote more full-scale integrated exercises.
Overall, the group consensus was that the local
preparedness for response to WMD terrorist incidents is
nominal. To the extent that hazardous material preparedness
applies to the NBC arena, some base level exists. However, a
great deal of progress remains to be made on resource,
planning, and training fronts regarding the unique nature of
NBC terrorist incidents.
3.2.3 FEMA/FBI - January 1997
FEMA and FBI submitted a Joint Report to Congress in
January 1997. It addressed both crisis management/prevention
and consequence management/response activities. This report
focused on capabilities and interagency roles and
responsibilities to respond to an incident involving WMD. In
the assessment summary, the impact of a WMD incident and
significant response requirement were recognized.
A NBC terrorist incident may occur as a local event with
potentially profound national implications. In responding to a
NBC incident, first responders must be able to provide critical
resources within minutes to mitigate the effects of the
incident. Since the ability of the local government to deal
with the immediate effects of an incident is essential to the
success of any NBC response, enhancing and maintaining the
local capability with trained and adequately equipped
responders is a key component of a viable national terrorism
response capability.
While the assessment of the FRP and Federal capabilities
found some deficiencies, it also identified several current
capabilities being expanded to ensure a more viable national
level NBC response capability. Current initiatives for
supplementing existing plans, enhancing operational response
capabilities, and increasing the availability of training are
ongoing. These new efforts, coupled with ongoing preparedness
efforts, will facilitate a better coordinated and more
effective response by local, state, and Federal governments to
the consequences of domestic NBC terrorist incidents.
3.2.4 DoD--February 1997
DoD, with the support of other Federal agencies, conducted
a series of focus group meetings with first responders during
February 1997. The findings and recommendations of the groups
formed the basis of a comprehensive set of training performance
objectives (Annex A). Based upon the focus groups review, a
training course development program was begun to modify
existing training courses, and develop programs of instruction
and instructional material.
3.2.5 DoD/DoE--April 1996
DoD and DoE, in consultation with FEMA, submitted a report
to Congress in 1996 on current plans, resources, and
capabilities to respond to a nuclear, radiological, biological,
or chemical terrorist attack. The report covered consequence
management plans and capabilities. Key points made were, first,
there is a fundamental shift from the local or regional level
of Federal involvement and decision-making authority to
Washington, DC and the SECDEF's personal involvement during a
WMD domestic terrorist incident. Second, there are some highly
trained personnel available and excellent capabilities in many
consequence management organizations to respond to a domestic
NBC disaster. Finally, first responders need training,
equipment, and supplies, yet there are limited quantities of
DoD combat supplies available for NBC contingencies.
The shift in the level of involvement was due to
recognizing the mass casualties, physical damage, and potential
for civil disorder resulting from a WMD detonation. Simply
stated, a terrorist use or potential use of a WMD is considered
a vital threat to the national security of the United States.
The interagency community found that including consequence
management experts from the very beginning of a crisis
management response was absolutely essential for minimizing
casualties, reducing public panic, and ensuring a rapid Federal
response to state and local communities. The interagency
counterterrorism community has also taken steps to include
senior policy decision-makers for consequence management in
their Washington deliberations on crisis management.
The FRP, involving 28 departments and agencies, provides a
framework for response to most natural and manmade domestic
civil emergencies. A recently published Terrorism Annex to the
FRP, addresses how the various agencies, including DoD, would
respond to a domestic NBC disaster. While DoD, DoE and other
Federal agencies currently have some very highly trained and
well equipped teams available to respond to such an event, NBC
response personnel and equipment are limited compared to the
potential threat. The Federal response community continues to
work together to increase their capabilities but there is still
much room for improvement.
This report recognizes that state and local authorities, as
first responders, are in need of their own NBC equipment and
supplies, and greater access to up-to-date NBC training. DoD
has an inventory of combat supplies for NBC contingencies, but
in many cases this equipment is not suitable for civilian use
during a terrorist incident. Additionally, the use of DoD
stockpiles of NBC supplies and materials for domestic
emergencies will have a direct adverse impact on military
readiness and force protection.
3.3 Summary
DoD has extensively used the findings of these studies and
reports to formulate the Domestic Preparedness Program. The
specific elements of the program are discussed in Section 5.
The ongoing program of activities in FY 97 encompassing
planning and guidance development, training and exercises, and
capability enhancement involving Federal, state, and local
governments will improve the current levels of preparedness and
response.
4. dod chemical/biological warfare information, expertise, and
equipment that could be adapted to civilian applications to meet
identified requirements.
4.1 Information and Expertise
DoD and other Federal agencies routinely provide support to
first responders at the local, state, and Federal level in the
form of expert advice and assistance. A major source of the
information comes from a vast knowledge base at CBDCOM and the
Medical Research and Materiel Command (MRMC). The Defense
Technical Response Group, part of the Naval Explosive Ordnance
Disposal (EOD) Technical Division, is a joint-service manager
for explosive ordnance disposal. Finally, the 52nd Ordnance
Group can be called upon for OD assistance. Specially trained
EOD operators in DoD special mission units are the primary
experts to be called upon by the FBI for access and device
disablement operations involving weapons of mass destruction.
The current process used to identify and link up first
responders and technical expertise is somewhat cumbersome. The
initiative of establishing a Helpline and a Hotline focuses on
streamlining the process so first responders know how to obtain
information in both non-emergency and emergency situations.
4.2 Equipment
An annual report to Congress entitled ``Department of
Defense Nuclear/ Biological/Chemical (NBC) Warfare Defense''
submitted as required by Section 1703 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 documents quantities,
characteristics, and capabilities of fielded chemical and
biological defense equipment which would be used in an NBC
combat scenario. Although DoD does have a program for loaning
equipment to civilian agencies, personal protective equipment
such as the mask or protective suit, if adapted for civilian
use, would require National Institute For Occupational Safety
and Health or National Fire Protection Association approval.
Equipment currently used by chemical depot workers is
listed in Department of the Army Pam 385-61, Toxic Chemical
Agent Safety Standards. However, commercial protective
equipment alternatives have been tested and are currently in
use at many locations. A program will begin in 4th Quarter of
FY 97 to evaluate and test additional commercial protective
equipment in a chemical agent environment in order to provide a
much larger database on commercially available equipment. The
test results will be available for use by the local, state, and
Federal agencies as they go through the decision-making process
in selecting various items of protective equipment for their
use.
5. dod plan for assistance in equipping, training, and providing other
necessary assistance for first responders to incidents
5.1 General
5.1.1 Program Intent
Under Title XIV, Congress directed a program to enhance the
capability of the Federal Government to prevent and respond to
terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, and
provide enhanced support to improve the capabilities of state
and local emergency response agencies to prevent and respond to
such incidents at both the national and the local level. DoD
will implement the necessary training and assistance programs,
but intends to transition this responsibility to other agencies
after FY 1999 as allowed for in Section 1412 of Title XIV.
5.1.2 Program Scope
DoD's Domestic Preparedness Program encompasses the nine
programs outlined in Title XIV. As shown in Figure 5.1, the
program is aimed at improving the preparedness and the
responsiveness of first responders and other elements that may
support them in a time of crisis.
5.1.2.1 Preparedness
The training and exercise programs shown in Figure 5.1 are
intended to improve the local ability to respond to an incident
involving WMD. In almost all cases, the local first responders
will be the first on the scene and the actions that they take
may significantly affect the overall success of the response.
Accordingly, the major portion of the programs effort and
funding is directed toward this end. In addition, the
availability of Federal-level expert advice, data bases, and
inventories will greatly assist planning at all levels.
5.1.2.2 Response
If a WMD incident were to occur, the NG, serving in a Title
32 status, provides the state a readily available asset to
augment the first responders. Normally within 12 hours, NG
units can be mobilized to their armory and prepare to deploy to
an incident site. In all cases, NG plans call for mobilizing
and being prepared to deploy within 24 hours.
Additionally, when authorized to do so by statute or
regulation, U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) units may also be
available to provide prompt support and augmentation to the
Chemical/Biological Quick Response Force (CBQRF) and other
Federal agencies. However, before USAR units can be deployed to
provide such support, the request must be made and approved in
accordance with DoD Directive 3025.15, ``Military Assistance to
Civil Authorities.'' Both components possess appropriate force
structure to respond to a domestic terrorist incident involving
WMD. The DoD policy for disaster support and response has
established that the inherent command and control, and
communications capabilities of a unit is of primary importance
in a domestic response mission. The specific technical
requirements of a WMD incident are best addressed by a CBQRF
with augmentation support by the NG and other Army Reserve
Components force structure that is locally in place or
available under the provisions of an Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC).
Under existing agreements such as the EMAC, neighboring
states can augment immediate response efforts during times of
emergency. Compacts resolve fiscal and legal issues
facilitating emergency response across state lines. The 104th
Congress ratified EMAC as PL 104-321 in October 1996. To
establish an EMAC, states must enact the necessary legislation.
Once states pass new legislation to participate in an EMAC and
comply with the necessary statutory requirement of submission
to Congress for a 60 day review/approval process, no further
Congressional action is required for the states to provide
mutual support.
Federal support to the local governments consequence
management response will be greatly enhanced by fielding the
CBQRF and the Public Health Services specially trained and
equipped medical response teams. In addition, the availability
of Federal-level expert advice, data bases, and inventories
could greatly assist the local response and make the Federal
support more responsive.
5.1.3 Program Implementation
5.1.3.1 Interagency Approach
From the beginning of the program, DoD has sought the
active participation of the other Federal agencies. This
interagency approach has allowed a comprehensive and
interagency Federal approach to meet the needs of local
communities. In addition, the synergism of the interagency
cooperation has started to meld several Federal programs
related to WMD preparedness into a single Federal effort under
the direction of the SICG.
5.1.3.2 The Senior Interagency Coordination Group
The SICG on Terrorism was established to facilitate the
interagency coordination of Federal policy issues and program
activities in support of Federal consequence management
training initiatives concerning terrorist incidents involving
WMD. The SICG is chaired by FEMA.
The SICG serves as the interagency policy level forum for
identification, discussion, and resolution of issues involving
the interagency strategy to provide guidance and training
support to Federal, state and local first responders who may be
called upon to respond to a terrorist WMD event. The SICG
focuses on emergency response training in support of
established US Government counterterrorism response procedures
as directed by Presidential Decision Directive -39 (PDD-39).
This includes coordination with other Federal agencies of DoD
Domestic Preparedness Program activities under Title XIV, in
conjunction with local and state governments. Since October
1996, the SICG has met at least monthly with member agencies
providing valuable input on the overall direction and focus of
the training effort. It is expected that the SICG will continue
to provide interagency coordination and assistance to DoD in
implementing program activities as long as required.
5.1.3.3 Funding
Approximately $52.6 million is provided for the Domestic
Preparedness Program during FY97. It is allocated as follows:
The Emergency Response Assistance Program to include
the training, expertise advice, Hotline and Helpline
programs described below: $16.4 million.
The development and fielding of the Metropolitan
Emergency Medical Response Teams, which is called
Metropolitan Mobile Strike Team (MMST) Systems: $6.6
million.
The coordination of the NBC response capability to
include the development and fielding of the CBQRF
described below: $9.8 million.
The testing of preparedness for emergencies
involving nuclear, radiological, chemical, and
biological weapons: $9.8 million.
The upgrade of equipment for the Marine Corps
Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF),
including funds for prepositioned equipment at key
domestic locations: $10 million.
The FY 1998/FY 1999 Presidents Budget includes $49.5
million in FY 1998 and $52.1 million in FY 1999 to continue to
provide emergency response preparedness first responder
training and assistance to metropolitan area agencies, and to
conduct exercises and preparedness tests in coordination with
Federal, State, and local agencies. After
FY 1999, DoD will no longer fund first responder training
nor expert assistance, since we plan to transfer these
responsibilities to another agency in accordance with Title
XIV, Section 1412 provisions. Also, DoD support for exercises
and preparedness tests will terminate after FY 2001.
5.2 Programs
5.2.1 Training Program
Section 1412, Title XIV, directs the SECDEF to carry out a
program that provides training to civilian personnel of
Federal, state, and local agencies. The training program is to
include the use, operation, and maintenance of equipment for
detecting, monitoring, protecting, and decontaminating. It will
also include other aspects regarding emergency responses to the
use or threatened use of WMD or related materials. The training
support programs outlined below include existing and new
programs needed for first responders.
5.2.1.1 Training Support to 120 Cities
Currently, the Federal government offers various programs
to train agencies in responding to a WMD attack. For example,
DoE offers 15 training programs to first responders that train
them in various aspects of WMD. For instance, DoE offers a
course that provides a basic knowledge of nuclear radiation,
radiation health effects and medical considerations, and
nuclear weapons effects. This course is primarily given to
first responders such as physicians, Emergency Medical
Technicians and firefighters. They also offer a joint course
with the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) that teaches DoD
and the intelligence community professionals how to identify
technologies associated with weapons program and roles, and
responsibilities and capabilities when responding to threats.
The DoD also has provided training courses to first responders.
These include first responder training prior to the 1996 Summer
Olympics, and a course offered to civilian personnel in
Federal, state and local agencies at the US Army Chemical
School. The four day course, Chemical-Biological
Countermeasures for First Responders, includes one day of live
agent training at the Chemical Defense Training Facility. These
courses, which have been taught to civilian agencies, are being
incorporated into the overall training program.
The DoD Program Director held four focus group meetings
during February 1997 to determine core competencies and to
develop comprehensive training performance objectives (Annex
A). Firefighters, hazardous materials (HAZMAT) handlers, and
on-scene incident commanders; emergency medical specialists and
doctors; law enforcement officials; and 911 operators and call
takers, as well as the appropriate Federal agencies,
participated in this effort. In addition, a concurrent effort
was initiated to identify existing NBC training modules within
DoD and other Federal agencies to fulfill these training needs.
Concurrent with the effort to develop the performance
objectives and to identify the training modules to support
them, the DoD Program Director developed a discussion document
to assist local governments assess their level of training
against stated performance objectives. The city's self
assessment will drive the city's individual training plan.
The proposed training is expected to provide a basic
response capability for first responders. In most cases, it
will be train-the-trainer type training to be embedded in
existing local institutions. As the Federal Domestic
Preparedness Program evolves, modifications will be made to the
training program as necessary.
Denver, Colorado has been selected as the pilot city for
the program. It was selected because of its involvement in the
Oklahoma City Bombing Trials and the Summit of 8 Conference in
June 1997. An initial meeting was conducted with local and
state leaders on March 19, 1997. Within this forum, they were
provided an overview of the training and exercise program.
First responder training is expected to be conducted prior to
the June 20-22, 1997 Summit of 8 Conference. In addition, an
integrated exercise will be conducted prior to the Summit of 8
Conference.
Using Denver as the benchmark, self assessments will be
conducted by the remaining 26 targeted cities. An April 18,
1997 ``Kick-Off'' meeting with Mayors, Governors, and other
regional representatives of the 27 target cities and their
representative states will provide an overview on the overall
training program and self assessments. Also, each city will be
given information and material for conducting a self
assessment. In addition to Denver being the pilot city, New
York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, the District of
Columbia, Philadelphia, San Diego, and Kansas City should begin
their training during FY 97. The training program will assess
the requirements for the first 27 cities in 1997 and,
contingent on funding, has a goal of providing training to 120
cities by the end of 1999.
5.2.1.2 Nationwide Training Support
In addition to the individual training plans designed for
selected cities and states, the DoD Program Director is
designing low cost training packages which will receive wide
dissemination via an inexpensive media (e.g. Internet, etc).
This training initiative should make training packages
available to state and local agencies as rapidly and
inexpensively as possible. The DoD has already produced a CD-
ROM in October 1996 entitled ``Management of Chemical Warfare
Injuries'' which provides:
technical information on chemical warfare agents
(i.e., nerve, blister, choking and riot control agents
and cyanides)
self-test for evaluating mastery of key learning
objectives
dramatized scenarios offering opportunities for
practicing differential diagnoses of patients
extensive reference materials.
Another CD-ROM will be available in October 1997 entitled
``Medical Management of Biological Casualties'' which will
provide:
dual learning tracks (one for medical professionals;
e.g., physicians, nurses, and physician assistants, and
one for first responders; e.g., military medics,
emergency medical technicians, and paramedics)
physiology of and signs and symptoms of exposure to
those biological warfare agents identified by United
States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Disease (USAMRIID) as posing the greatest threat to
military personnel (bacteria: anthrax, plague,
tularemia, Q fever; viruses: smallpox, Venezuelan
equine encephalitis, viral hemorrhagic fever; and
toxins: botulinum toxins, staphylococcal enterotoxin B,
ricin, trichothecene mycotoxins)
self-test for evaluating mastery of key learning
objectives
dramatized scenarios offering opportunities for
practicing differential diagnoses of patients
extensive reference materials.
In addition, DoD expects to publish the performance
objectives (Annex A) on the Internet.
The NG's Distance Learning Initiative at the National
Interagency Counterdrug Institute (NICI) in California may also
be included in the nationwide training support program. NICI is
developing a course to train civilians and military leaders on
the interagency processes necessary to plan for and coordinate
with a joint response to a major terrorist incident. Their
intent is to conduct one pilot and three more classes before
the end of FY 97. The NG has trained over 6,000 soldiers in
1996 and 1997 via their Distance Learning Initiative.
Another alternative is for the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) to
provide training to first responders through the seven USAR
Divisions (Institutional Training) [DIV(IT)]. Organic to each
DIV(IT) is a Chemical Training Battalion and a Medical Health
Services Brigade. The DIV(IT)s are regionally located
throughout the United States in Richmond, VA; Milwaukee, WI;
Oklahoma City, OK; Rochester, NY; Louisville, KY; Vancouver,
WA; and Charlotte, NC.
5.2.2 Chemical/Biological (CB) Hotline/Helpline
5.2.2.1 CB Hotline
As stated in section 1412, Title XIV, DoD will establish
``a designated telephone link to a designated source of
relevant data and expert advice for the use of state or local
officials responding to emergencies involving WMD or related
materials.'' As depicted in Figure 5.3, DoD will tie into the
National Response Center (NRC) to establish access to expert
Chemical/Biological (CB) advice and assistance readily
available to state and local agencies during emergency
situations. To establish the Hotline, the existing NRC
automated checklist will be modified to include chemical or
biological incidents. The NRC will link the caller with
personnel from CBDCOM's operations center. The NRC will
concurrently notify the designated Federal On-Scene
Coordinator/Regional Response Team and other supporting
agencies. Access to nuclear expertise in DoE continues to be in
place through the DoE's 24 hour emergency operations center.
The NRC, located in Washington DC, is operational 24 hours
a day. The NRC personnel scan incident reports and classify
them according to a prescribed decision tree. Once the report
is classified, the NRC executes the notification process to the
prescribed Federal agencies. In the case of a WMD incident, a
direct link would be made between NRC, CBDCOM, and U.S. Army
Medical Research and Material Command (MRMC), or between NRC
and DoE. These agencies would then respond directly to the
local, state, or Federal agencies requesting assistance.
To meet the requirements of Section 1412, additional
personnel and software will be added to ensure that expert
advice and timely response are given 24 hours a day. The
Hotline is expected to be operational by July 1997.
5.2.2.2 CB Helpline
DoD is establishing a Technical Assistance Chemical/
Biological (CB) Helpline to support Federal, state, and local
agencies by assisting them as they prepare for emergencies. The
Helpline is for non-emergency situations and is a pipeline to
the vast knowledge base at CBDCOM and the MRMC. The Helpline
provides access to technical experts who can advise or assist
on a wide variety of subjects, including personal protective
equipment, decontamination systems, medical treatment, sources
of equipment, symptoms, detectability and detection equipment,
organization of responders, and many other technical aspects of
CB incident operations. As depicted in Figure 5.4, incoming
calls will be checked against the CB database. If not covered
by the database, then the calls will be forwarded to the
appropriate technical expert. The Helpline will provide first
responders and planners with single source access to required
technical information. This Helpline is anticipated to be
operational by July 1997.
5.2.3 Expert Advice
DoD and other Federal agencies routinely provide expert
advice to local, state and other Federal agencies. For
instance, DoD's Technical Escort Unit (TEU), working with the
EPA, recently provided technical assistance at the Evor-
Phillips Superfund Site in New Jersey to safely dispose of
buried containers labeled ``Poisonous Gas''. The DoD will
continue these efforts. The DoD intends to expand, and make
more readily available, this level of assistance by
establishing the CB Helpline.
5.2.4 Loan of Equipment
DoD may loan ``appropriate equipment'' upon request. The
loan of equipment will be accomplished under the normal DoD
procedures established for Military Assistance to Civil
Authorities (MACA), DoD Directive 3025.15. Additionally, by
using EMACs states can provide cross-state border assistance
without additional Congressional approval.
5.2.5 Metropolitan Medical Strike Team (MMST) Systems
Through the assistance of DoD support in FY 1997, DHHS will
be assisting 27 major cities throughout the United States in
the initial planning and development of MMSTs and their related
MMST systems, the procurement of special antidotes and
pharmaceuticals, initiation of necessary special equipment
procurements, and training of selected personnel. This will be
done through direct contracts with the cities and is expected
to be completed within 15 months after contract award. However,
DoD intends to provide no funding to support these DHHS teams
beyond FY 1997.
The MMST is a highly trained, readily deployable, and fully
equipped local response team organized and equipped to address
WMD effects on human health. It would have specialized skills,
pharmaceuticals, and equipment that would enable it to assist
in identifying a WMD agent and initiating victim
decontamination, conduct medical triage, and initiate
appropriate therapy prior to transportation to emergency and
definitive medical care facilities.
Each MMST will operate within a system that not only
provides an initial, on-site response, but also provides for
safe patient transportation to hospital emergency rooms,
provides definitive medical and mental health care to victims
of this type of attack and can prepare patients for onward
movement to other regions should local health care resources be
insufficient to meet the total demand for health services. This
complete local WMD health care response system is referred to
as an MMST system. Experience with two MMSTs formed to support
the 1996 Summer Olympics and 1997 Presidential Inaugural
indicates the formation and training of each team could take
between six and twelve months.
5.2.6 Rapid Response Team
Section 1414, Title XIV, mandates that the SECDEF ``shall
develop and maintain at least one domestic terrorism rapid
response team composed of members of the Armed Forces and
employees of Department of Defense who are capable of aiding
Federal, state, and local officials in the detection,
neutralization, containment, dismantlement, and disposal of
weapons of mass destruction containing chemical, biological, or
related materials.'' The DoD has formed the Response Task Force
(RTF) and the CBQRF to fulfill this requirement. This CBQRF
would fall under the RTF who is responsible for operational
control of DoD response forces, less the Joint Special
Operations Task Force. The RTF deploys to support the Federal
crisis and consequence management operations in support of the
Lead Federal Agency (LFA) during domestic operations.
5.2.6.1 Concept
Currently there are established procedures for a U.S.
Government response to a terrorist incident involving a weapon
of mass destruction. Within the United States the Department of
Justice, acting through the FBI, has lead responsibility for
managing terrorist incidents. The FBI functions as the on-scene
manager for the US Government. FEMA, with the support of the
agencies within the Federal Response Plan, acts in support of
the FBI in Washington, DC and on the scene of the crisis until
such time as the Attorney General transfers lead Federal Agency
role to FEMA. The Department of Justice and FBI have developed,
with interagency concurrence, operational guidelines that
further define procedures and responsibilities. DoJ/FBI as LFA
may request DoD to deploy the CBQRF to assist under three
distinct scenarios: no notice; credible threat; and planned
event scenarios.
The no-notice scenario assumes that an agent has been
released. FEMA, acting in support of the DoJ/FBI, will request
DoD assistance to manage the consequences of the incident in
accordance with established interagency guidelines and DoD
Directive 3025.15. DoD will utilize a quick response team to
deploy and assess the incident site and coordinate for
additional augmentation. Within this scenario, the CBQRF will
be deployed upon notification and at the direction of the
SECDEF to support the LFA. The number of individuals deployed
may vary and the capabilities may change based on the location
of the incident, existing assets available to first responders,
and proximity of Federal assets.
The credible threat scenario assumes that intelligence
sources have indicated a high probability of a known threat and
that deployment of a response force is warranted prior to the
actual use of a WMD. Within this scenario, the FBI will request
WMD EOD and technical assistance from DoD special mission units
as defined under DoD plans and interagency guidelines. Those
elements will be called upon by the FBI to detect, render safe,
and turn over for disposition any rendered safe WMD devices
with EOD potential. Upon request from FEMA, acting in support
of the FBI, DoD will deploy the CBQRF, whose focus will be the
consequence management aspects of the incident. This response
will include a command and control element, appropriate forces
from TEU, and the US Marine Corps CBIRF, reinforced as
necessary with additional specialized teams for both crisis and
consequence management. The task organization for this scenario
is directed by the SECDEF, after coordination with the LFA, who
will coordinate with local and state official.
The planned event scenario assumes that predetermined WMD
response elements will be prepositioned based upon coordination
with the LFAs. This scenario is usually associated with special
events such as political conventions, inaugurations or large
public gatherings of personnel that would be vulnerable to a
terrorist incident. The planned event scenario response may
include a larger command and control element and will include
an additional response team reinforced, if necessary, by
trained medical, decontamination, and monitoring teams. The
task organization for this response will also be directed by
the SECDEF, after coordination with the LFA, who will
coordinate with local and state official.
Based on the threat scenario, a three-tiered consequence
management organization and response capability will be
deployed to augment existing first responders capabilities.
5.2.6.1.1 Phase 1/Tier I (NLT 4 hours)
The lead elements of the CBQRF respond to a notification of
an incident at the direction of the SECDEF. The team will be on
24 hour alert status and ready to depart within 4 hours after
receiving their orders. This small team will have a limited
capability to detect, neutralize, contain, dismantle and
dispose of a chemical or biological device. Their primary
purpose is to assess the situation, and provide advice and
assistance to the local officials until the response force
arrives. This team will also provide advice to the LFA and
local officials on the task organization of the follow-on
elements.
5.2.6.1.2 Phase 2/Tier II (NLT 18 hours)
The main element of the CBQRF will be ready to deploy
within 18 hours after notification. In addition to command and
control and liaison elements, the capabilities brought by this
force will include decontamination stations, medical triage
stations, agent detection, low level agent monitoring,
perimeter entry control and support elements which are
currently available for deployment. During June 1997 in Denver,
DoD plans to validate the headquarters element. The exercise
will also test the headquarters' interoperability with other
DoD units and Federal agencies, as well as its ability to
respond to a WMD incident.
5.2.6.1.3 Phase 3/Tier III (NLT 24-96 hours)
Tier III response elements will be specialized units that
augment the capabilities of the CBQRF. Configuration of these
augmentation units will be driven by the local situation and
assets available. For instance, certain DoD laboratories could
be called upon to respond with specialized equipment and
capabilities. One such laboratory is the AMC Treaty Laboratory
that was established to verify compliance with the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC). It is a ISO 9001 registered quality
system that was pre-deployed to support the FBI during the
Olympics in Atlanta. The US Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) is capable of deploying an
Aeromedical Isolation Team consisting of physicians, nurses,
medical assistants and laboratory technicians. These team
members are specially trained to provide care for and transport
of patients with diseases caused by either biological warfare
agents or infectious diseases requiring high containment. Also,
Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center (ERDEC)
maintains a rapidly deployable mobile environmental monitoring
and technical assessment system, the Mobile Analytical Response
System (MARS). The MARS provides a state-of-the-art analytical
assessment of chemical or biological hazards at incident sites.
The Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI), through their
Biological Defense Research Program (BDRP), has designed
reagents, assays and procedures for agents classically
identified as biological threat, as well as non-classical
threat agents in environmental and clinical specimens. This
program has developed rapid, hand-held screening assays that
can be deployed globally. Other units that could be utilized
would be Active Army, National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve
chemical decontamination and medical units.
5.2.7 Exercises
5.2.7.1 Testing
Section 1415, Title XIV mandates that the SECDEF, in
conjunction with the FBI, FEMA, DoE and other Federal agencies,
``shall develop and carry out a program for testing and
improving the responses of the Federal, state, and local
agencies to emergencies involving biological weapons and
related materials and emergencies involving chemical weapons
and related materials.'' The program will include exercises to
be carried out during five successive fiscal years beginning
with fiscal year 1997 and ending with FY 2001.
5.2.7.2 Exercise Approach
Over the last two years, a wide variety of exercises have
addressed accidents and incidents involving use of WMD. These
include MIRRORED IMAGE, CALYPSO WIND, CAPITOL REACTION and
TERMINAL BREEZE. The ILL WIND series of exercises and DISPLAY
SELECT, a nuclear weapons accident exercise, have also provided
valuable insights and a baseline for future exercise design.
Additionally, there have been over a much longer period
classified exercises dealing with WMD terrorism. There is an
established interagency Counterterrorism exercise program that
has been in existence since the early 1980's. Over the past
four years there has been an increased emphasis on WMD
terrorism exercises. The Counterterrorism interagency exercises
committee is working to integrate various agency exercises to
ensure synergism and efficiency. DoD's Program Director is
examining how to meet the domestic preparedness program
exercise requirements by coordination with the counterterrorism
committee and FEMA on the National exercise schedule. The
exercise approach is still evolving, given the many exercises
already planned by other Federal agencies and state and local
governments.
The first component of the exercise program is to train-
the-trainers. Then, conduct tabletop exercises that lead to
practical or ``muddy boots'' exercises for first responders.
The underlying philosophy is to get the trainer trained and
then build upon his/her growing experience base.
The tabletop exercise would test city and state response to
chemical or biological weapon incidents. The exercise would
involve the local and state responders and would occur
immediately after they were trained. A practical exercise for a
WMD incident would emphasize city and state response functions
unique to WMD incidents with simulation role playing of Federal
support. This series of exercises will accomplish the follow
objectives: 1) Provide immediate feedback to participants; 2)
Reinforce training; and 3) Evaluate the effectiveness of
training.
A second component of the exercise program will involve
conducting systematic preparedness testing in two model cities.
The purpose of the test will be to conduct a systematic
comprehensive evaluation of available and alternative concepts,
procedures, approaches and equipment for responding to a range
of terrorist WMD incidents in each city. The results of
systematic preparedness testing would be to develop an
integrated model or system of procedures, equipment, response
approaches that could be applied throughout the nation at the
Federal, state, and local levels. This integrated model could
then be implemented in the United States to improve domestic
preparedness. Results from the program will continually be
transitioned to the on-going training program.
The third component of the exercise program will seek to
coordinate and integrate the WMD exercises through the
interagency exercise program which are already planned by
various Federal agencies. By the different Federal agencies
participating in each others exercises and by involving state
and local players, response force personnel could capitalize on
the training potential of each exercise and gain an additional
synergistic effect. In these situations where cross-level
participation in exercises would occur, the response force
personnel would sharpen their individual skills and be better
prepared in the event of a WMD situation.
5.2.7.3 Exercises
Two WMD-related exercises have occurred and two are planned
during FY 97.
The exercise CAPITOL REACTION was the first exercise to be
conducted since the passage of the Defense Against Weapons of
Mass Destruction Act of 1996. It addressed a local-state-
Federal response to a potential terrorist use of a WMD during
the Inaugural. Overall, CAPITOL REACTION enhanced the
interagency cooperation by providing a forum to discuss and
resolve interagency policy issues resulting from a crisis and
consequence response in support of the Inauguration.
Furthermore, it provided the operating parameters for future
interagency exercises. It also established a process for
interagency communication in the events of an incident. In
addition, the FBI sponsored and the DoE funded and organized a
WMD Interagency Support Exercise (WISE) to assist interagency
contingency preparation for a nuclear, chemical or biological
terrorist incident during the Presidential Inauguration. The
WISE included a WMD counterterrorism crisis response tabletop
seminar and a field training exercise to rehearse current
procedures for nuclear, chemical or biological terrorist
incidents.
In May 1997, the interagency community will conduct an
Interagency Terrorism Response Awareness Program (I-TRAP)
tabletop seminar which will focus on consequence management in
response to a WMD incident. Just prior to the Summit of 8
Conference in Denver (June 20-22, 1997), DoD will host a
chemical-biological exercise to validate the Headquarters,
CBQRF, improve local, state and Federal operational plans and
to evaluate the domestic preparedness training provided to the
first responders. The interagency community will conduct a
tabletop and limited on-the-ground exercise to assist Denver
and Colorado in preparing for the Summit of 8 Conference.
5.2.8 Military Assistance to Civil Law Enforcement Officials
The DoD and DoJ are developing statutorily mandated
regulations for DoD to support the DoJ during emergency
situations involving NBC weapons. These regulations are based
upon draft interagency guidelines implementing PDD-39 as well
as agreed upon DoJ-DoD procedures used for the 1996 Summer
Olympics and Presidential Inaugural. These regulations would
apply to those situations where technical assistance is
requested by the Attorney General in emergencies involving
biological weapons, chemical weapons, nuclear material, or
nuclear byproduct material. The DoD and DoJ have developed a
draft which should be completed, coordinated, and approved this
summer. The intent is to make these regulations an appendix to
DoD Directive 3025.15, ``Military Assistance to Civil
Authorities,'' and then examine the best method to disseminate
these regulations to appropriate Federal agencies.
5.2.9 Rapid Response Information System
The components required by section 1417, Title XIV, that
form the Rapid Response Information System are covered below.
5.2.9.1 Master Inventory
The FEMA is currently compiling a master inventory which
will contain information on physical equipment and assets owned
by each of the FRP agencies that could be made available for
use to aid state and local officials in emergency situations
involving WMD. The master inventory will include assets
associated with search and rescue, detection and analysis,
personnel protection, medical treatment, monitoring and
decontamination. The compilation of the master inventory is
scheduled to be completed by December 31, 1997.
5.2.9.2 Database on Chemical and Biological Materials
The FEMA, with the support of DoD and other agencies, is
preparing a database which will provide a source of information
on chemical and biological agents, munitions characteristics
and safety precautions for civilian use. DoD is supporting FEMA
in the development of the database by providing technical
expertise needed to prepare the database. Officials from DoD
and FEMA are determining the design and specific information
that will be included on the database. The initial design and
compilation of the database will be completed not later than
December 31, 1997, and updated annually thereafter.
6.0 Conclusions
This report reflects the programs that are ongoing or
planned in order to improve the domestic preparedness in
response to WMD incidents. Provided adequate Congressional
funding in the out-years is available, DoD and the interagency
community will continue to provide direct training to 120
cities over the next several years. DoD will continue to
provide nationwide training and support to local, state and
other Federal agencies to ensure that first responders as well
as supporting agencies are prepared to react in the event of an
emergency involving WMD.
ANNEX A: First Responders Performance Objectives to the Domestic Preparedness Program in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance Requirements Legend for requirements: o--basic level --advanced
level *--specialized
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Competency Level Ref Awareness
-------------------------------------- Operations Technician/ Incident
Employees Responders Specialist Command
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Examples Facility workers, Initial Incidents Incident Incident
hospital support firefighters, response teams, response team commanders.
personnel, police officers, EMS basic specialists,
janitors, HAZMAT personnel technicians,
security guards on scene: 911 EMS advanced,
operators/ and medical
dispatchers specialsts
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Know the potential for terrorist use C,F,M,m,G
of NBC weapons:
--what nuclear/biological/chemical o
(NBC) weapons substances are,
--their hazards, and risks associated o *
with them,
--likely locations for their use, o
--the potential outcomes of their use o
by terrorists.
--indicators of possible criminal or
terrorist activity involving such
agents,
--behavior of NBC agents *
2. Know the indicators, signs and C, F,M,m o *
symptoms for exposure to NBC agents, and
identify the agents from signs and
symptoms, if possible.
2a. Knowledge of questions to ask caller G,m
to elicit critical information regarding (911 only)
an NBC incident.
2b. Recognize unusual trends which may G,m *
indicate an NBC incident
3. Understand relevant NBC response plans C,F,M,m o
and SOPs and your role in them.
4. Recognize and communicate the need for C,m,G o
additional resources during a NBC
incident.
5. Make proper notification and C,F,M,m o
communicate the NBC hazard.
6. Understand: C,F,m
--NBC agent terms o
--NBC toxicology terms
(EMS-B only)
7. Individual protection at a NBC C,F,M,m
incident:
--Use self-protection measures o *
--Properly use assigned NBC protective *
equipment
--Select and use proper protective
equipment
8. Know protective measures, and how to F,M o
initiate actions to protect other and
safeguard property in an NBC incident.
8a. Know measures for evacuation of M,G
personnel in a downwind hazare area for
an NBC incident.
9. CB decontamination procedures for C,F,M,m
self, victims, site/equipment and mass
casualties:
--Understand & implement o *
(self)
--Determine
10. Know crime scene and evidence F,M,m o
preservation at an NBC incident. (except 911)
10a. Know procedures and safety F,G,m *
precautions for collecting legal
evidence at an NBC incident.
11. Know Federal and other support C,F,M,m o o *
infrastructure and how to access in an (911 only)
NBC incident.
12. Understand the risks of operating in C,F,m o *
protective clothing when used at an NBC
incident
13. Understand emergency and first aid F,M o *
procedure for exposure to NBC agents,
and principles of triage.
14. Know how to perform hazard and risk C,F,M,m
assessment for NBC agents.
15. Understand termination/all clear C,F,m
procedures for a NBC incident
16. Incident Command System/Incident C,F,M
Management System
--Function within role in NBC incident *
--Implement for NBC incident *
17. Know how to perform NBC contamination C,F,M,m *
control and containment operations,
including for fatalities.
17a. Understand procedures and equipment G,m *
for safe transport of contaminated
items.
18. Know the classification, detection, C,F,M,m o *
identification and verification of NBC
materials using field survey instruments
and equipment, and methodsfor collection
of solid, liquid and gas samples.
19. Know safe patient extraction and NBC F,m * o
antidote administration. (Medical only) (Medical only)
20. Know patient assessment and emergency M,m,G *
medical treatment in NBC incident. (Medical only) (Medical only)
21. Be familiar with NBC related Public G o
Health & Local EMS Issues. (Medical only) (Medical only)
22.Know procedures for patient transport F,G o
following NBC incident. (Medical only) (Medical only)
23. Execute NBC triage and primary care. G *
(Medical only) (Medical only)
24. Know laboratory identification and G *
diagnosis for biological agents. (Medical only)
25. Have the ability to develop a site C,F * *
safety plan and control plan for a NBC
incident.
26. Have ability to develop NBC response G,m
plan and conduct exercise of response.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend for References:
C-29 CFR 1910.120 (OSHA Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response)
M--Macro objectives developed by a training subgroup of the Senior Interagency Coordinating Group
m--Micro objectives developed by CBDCOM
G--Focus Group Worshop
F--NFPA Standard 472 (Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents) and/or NFPA Standard 473 (Competencies for EMS Personnel
Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents.
ANNEX B: Acronym List to the Domestic Preparedness Program in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction
AMC Army Materiel Command
ASA (IL&E) Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installation, Logistics, & Environment)
BDRP Biological Defense Research Program
CB Chemical Biological
CBDCOM Chemical Biological Defense Command
CBIRF Chemical Biological Initial Response Force
CBQRF Chemical Biological Quick Response Force
CDC Centers for Disease Control
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DoE Department of Energy
DoJ Department of Justice
DoT Department of Transportation
DOMS Director of Military Support
DSWA Defense Special Weapons Agency
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
ERDEC Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FRP Federal Response Plan
GSA General Services Administration
HAZMAT Hazardous Materials
HQDA Headquarters Department of the Army
I-TRAP Interagency Terrorism Response Awareness Program
LFA Lead Federal Agency
MARS Mobil Analytical Response System
MMST System Metropolitan Medical Strike Team System
MRMC Medical Research and Materiel Command
MSCA Military Support to Civilian Authorities
NBC Nuclear Biological Chemical
NCS National Communications System
NG National Guard
NGA National Governors Association
NGB National Guard Bureau
NICI National Interagency Counterdrug Institute
NMRI Naval Medical Research Institute
NRC National Response Center
OD Ordnance Disposal
PHS Public Health Services
RC Reserve Component
SECARMY Secretary of the Army
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SICG Senior Interagency Coordination Group
TEU Technical Escort Unit
USAMRIID United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease
USCG United States Coast Guard
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
VA Department of Veterans Affairs
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WISE WMD Interagency Support Exercise
d. The Protection of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad: Report to the
President from the Secretary of Defense, September 15, 1996 \1\
The attack on U.S. forces at Khobar Towers has dramatically
underscored that for U.S. forces deployed overseas, terrorism
is a fact of life. Every terrorist attack provides lessons on
how to prevent further tragedies. However, the Khobar Towers
attack should be seen as a watershed event pointing the way to
a radically new mind-set and dramatic changes in the way we
protect our forces deployed overseas from this growing threat.
This report reviews the Khobar Towers attack, the context of
our Persian Gulf force deployments, the force protection
measures taken before and after the attack, and lessons learned
for all of our military operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Source: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/downing__rpt/
report__f.html.
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The Attack Against Khobar Towers on June 25th
Khobar Towers is a compound built by the Saudi Government
near Dhahran that housed the residential quarters of almost
3,000 U. S. military personnel of the 4404th Air Wing
(Provisional), along with military personnel from the United
Kingdom, France, and Saudi Arabia. U.S. military personnel
first occupied this compound in 1991 during the Coalition force
buildup before the Gulf War.
Shortly before 10:00 p.m. local time on Tuesday, June 25,
1996, a fuel truck parked next to the northern perimeter fence
at the Khobar Towers complex. Air Force guards posted on top of
the closest building, Building 131, immediately spotted the
truck and suspected a bomb as its drivers fled the scene in a
nearby car. The guards began to evacuate the building, but were
unable to complete this task before a tremendous explosion
occurred. The blast completely destroyed the northern face of
the building, blew out windows from surrounding buildings, and
was heard for miles. Nineteen American service members were
killed and hundreds more were seriously injured. Many Saudis
and other nationals were also injured.
The response of our forces at Khobar Towers to this tragedy
reflected their thorough training and bravery. The buddy system
worked, and every injured airman received on-the-spot first aid
before being escorted to the clinics. Medical teams, both
military and civilian, American and Saudi Arabian, performed
commendably without rest for many hours and, in some cases,
despite their own wounds.
Once the immediate steps were taken to care for the
injured, search for survivors, and account for everyone, the
command of the 4404th Air Wing began to reconstitute itself to
carry out its Southern Watch mission. In less than three days,
the skies over southern Iraq once again were being patrolled by
the Coalition in full force.
The June 25 bombing attack remains under investigation by
the Saudi Arabian Government, assisted by large numbers of
forensic experts from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation,
which has responsibility within the U. S. government for
investigating terrorist attacks against Americans overseas. The
Department of Defense (DoD) knows neither who the perpetrators
of this attack are, nor who sponsored them.
Why Are We in The Persian Gulf?
The attack on Khobar Towers has raised questions about the
need for our presence in the Arabian Gulf Region, and Saudi
Arabia in particular.
Our security interests in Saudi Arabia date back to 1945
when President Franklin Roosevelt met with King Abdul Aziz on
his way home from the Yalta Conference. The United States has
had a military presence in Saudi Arabia since the early 1950s.
During most of this time, our presence has been well under
1,000 uniformed personnel and civilian employees, in addition
to their families, engaged in training and advising the Saudi
Arabian military. The United States Military Training Mission
to Saudi Arabia (USMTM) was established in 1953 to assist the
regular Saudi military under the Ministry of Defense and
Aviation. In 1965 a U.S. Army program manager's office (OPM/
SANG) was established to help in the modernization of the Saudi
Arabian National Guard.
Our presence in helping the Saudis modernize their military
and absorb new equipment was welcomed and unobtrusive. The
Kingdom was a benign environment in which tens of thousands of
American civilians lived and worked, particularly since the oil
boom of the 1970s. Since 1977, our military assistance,
including the salaries and expenses of our uniformed personnel
and civilian employees, has been fully funded by the Saudi
Arabian Government.
Saudi Arabia has never hosted foreign military bases of any
nation. While Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors generally
welcomed an American military presence in the region after
Great Britain ended its security responsibilities east of Suez
in the early 1970s, they preferred that presence to be ``over
the horizon.'' For the United States, this presence was
manifested primarily by our naval Middle East Force in the
Arabian Gulf. While the United States made use of the Saudi air
base at Dhahran in the early years of the Cold War, U.S.
combatant forces were rarely deployed to the Kingdom. The major
exception before the Gulf War was during the Iran-Iraq war in
the 1980s when American AWACs and tanker aircraft were deployed
to Riyadh.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990,
dramatically changed the security dynamics, and the U.S.
presence, in the region. The United States, acting to protect
its vital interests, led a coalition of Western and Islamic
forces that deployed over half a million men and women to the
Gulf to defend Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states and to
free Kuwait from Iraq's brutal occupation. Through Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm they won an impressive victory,
although the threats to the region from aggressor states were
not completely destroyed.
The primary American interest that we acted decisively to
protect in the Gulf War was access to the vast energy resources
of the region, i.e., nearly two-third of the world's proven oil
reserves upon which our own economy and those of the entire
industrial world depend so heavily. This fact alone would have
justified our actions in 1990-1991, but America also has other
vital interests in the region. The security of Israel and Egypt
and the Gulf states themselves was endangered by Iraq's
aggression and desire to dominate the politics of the region.
Coupled with the end of the Cold War, the Coalition victory
allowed the United States to move forward on the Middle East
peace process in a manner not previously possible. America also
has vital interests in protecting U.S. citizens and property
abroad, and in ensuring freedom of navigation through the air
and sea lanes that connect Europe and the West with Africa,
Asia, and the Indian Ocean, all of which pass through and
alongside the Arabian Peninsula.
The Nature of Our Current Mission
When President Bush sought King Fahd's permission to deploy
American forces to Saudi Arabia in 1990 for the build-up to
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, he made a commitment that we would
depart when our wartime mission was concluded. The United
States sought no permanent bases or operational presence on the
Arabian Peninsula, and that continues to be our policy.
However, the threat to U.S. vital interests in the region
from Saddam Hussein's regime did not end with Desert Storm.
While the Desert Storm coalition ejected the Iraqi army from
Kuwait in 1991, the goal of the Coalition was not to dismember
Iraq or advance to Baghdad to change the regime. Saddam Hussein
has remained in power in Baghdad and continues to ignore or
obstruct the U.N. Security Council resolutions that defined the
terms of the cease-fire, particularly the requirement to
disclose and destroy all weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
nuclear, chemical, and biological, and their long-range means
of delivery. Consequently, at the invitation of the Gulf
countries, a coalition of forces, primarily from the United
States, Great Britain and France, has remained in the region to
enforce the U.N. Resolutions. These forces include the 4404th
Air Wing, the unit that occupied the Khobar Towers facility.
In the years since the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein's regime
has undertaken overt acts threatening peace in the region. In
1992, in response to Iraqi repression of the Shia, the
Coalition created Operation Southern Watch. In 1993, the Iraqi
regime plotted to assassinate former President George Bush
during a visit to Kuwait. In response, the United States
launched cruise missile strikes against the Iraqi intelligence
headquarters. In 1994, the Iraqi regime again moved forces
toward the Kuwaiti border with an intent to launch another
invasion. U.S. forces responded with a rapid buildup, using
host nation bases, including those in Saudi Arabia, and the
Iraqis turned back. The U.N. subsequently passed UNSCR 949,
which limits Iraq's right to deploy military forces in Southern
Iraq--the area defined by the Coalition as south of 32 degrees
North. In August 1996, Saddam Hussein, again in violation of
U.N. resolutions, attacked without provocation the Kurdish city
of Irbil. He then declared the two No Fly Zones, established in
the terms of the cease-fire and after Saddam's repression of
the Kurds, null and void. The United States and the United
Kingdom extended the southern No Fly Zone to 33 degrees
parallel and launched a series of missile attacks against Iraqi
air defenses.
We have been able to respond to Iraq's continued
provocations and threats to the peace and stability of its
neighbors because the United States, together with its
coalition partners, France and the United Kingdom, has
maintained a strong military presence on the Arabian Peninsula,
principally Saudi Arabia, since the end of Operation Desert
Storm. Our forward presence not only allows us to respond
quickly, but to monitor Iraq's compliance with U.N. Security
Council resolutions, with respect to both repression of the
Kurds and direct military threats to the Gulf states. This
forward presence includes:
Nearly 5,000 U.S. Air Force men and women in Operation Southern
Watch who conduct combat air missions from Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait, enforcing the No Fly Zone over southern
Iraq that restricts Saddam Hussein's ability to oppress
his people and threaten the peace and stability of the
region.
U.S. servicemen and women who support the work of the United
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) charged with
discovering and destroying Saddam's programs to develop
and produce weapons of mass destruction, efforts which
Iraq continues to oppose. This effort includes U-2
surveillance missions over Iraq to assist with UNSCOM's
monitoring responsibilities.
U.S. Army PATRIOT air defense batteries that have been deployed
to protect our forces and major Saudi population
centers at Dhahran and Riyadh since 1991 and regular
rotations of battalion-sized armor units that exercise
in Kuwait.
The U.S. Navy Middle East Force that has been greatly expanded
from a few surface combatant ships to include the
presence of an Aircraft Carrier Battle Group and a
Marine Amphibious Ready Group throughout most of the
year.
Robust military exercise programs with every Gulf state,
unheard of before Desert Storm, that contribute to the
operational readiness of all our military forces and
help deter Iraq as well as Iran, which also has
hegemonic ambitions coupled with a military
modernization program that is out of all proportion to
its defensive needs.
Prepositioned equipment--a full brigade's worth in Kuwait,
another two brigades' worth afloat, and we are building
up to a fourth brigade's worth in Qatar. This equipment
allows us to insert a substantial deterrent force onto
the Arabian Peninsula in a fraction of the time that it
took us in 1990.
Maintaining the U.S. military presence in the Arabian Gulf
has not been easy for our uniformed personnel who have served
repeated tours of duty in a harsh environment. It places a
serious strain on ships, aircraft, and other equipment
operating at high tempo. While the cost of our presence has
been greatly eased through generous Host Nation Support
contributions from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the other Gulf
countries, the monetary cost to the United States remains high.
But this residual cost and the other sacrifices associated with
our presence, are justified because they protect vital U.S.
national interests at stake in the region.
Our experience clearly shows that an immediate and forceful
response to Saddam Hussein's provocative actions has been
effective in causing his regime to back off from threatening
moves each time it has been foolish enough to try them. It is
far more cost-effective to be in a position to deter Saddam
Hussein than have to fight another war.
In addition, should deterrence fail, we are, without
question, in a better position to defeat aggression than we
were in the Summer of 1990, prior to Desert Shield. Then, it
took more than four weeks to place meaningful combat power
ashore. Today, we can do so in four to five days, using the
combination of forward presence and measures that we have taken
to improve our ability to deploy rapidly. We demonstrated this
potential in October 1994 with great success, and we continue
to exercise with the equipment for both training and deterrent
purposes.
Terrorist Attacks
The terrorist attacks on the OPM/SANG in Riyadh last
November and on Khobar Towers in Dhahran last June were not
only attacks on American citizens and forces, they were also an
assault on our security strategy in the region.
Our military presence in the region is opposed by Iran and
Iraq, obviously, but also by home-grown dissidents in some
countries of the region. The opposition includes extremist
groups who are not only coldblooded and fanatical, but also
clever. They know that they cannot defeat us militarily, but
they may believe they can defeat us politically, and they have
chosen terror as the weapon to try to achieve this. They
estimate that if they can cause enough casualties or threat of
casualties to our forces, they can weaken support in the United
States for our presence in the region, or weaken support in the
host nations for a continued U.S. presence. They seek to drive
a wedge between the U.S. security strategy in the Gulf and the
American public, and between the United States and our regional
allies.
Before the terrorist attacks, Saudi Arabia had long been
seen as an oasis of calm and safety in the turbulent Middle
East. Americans, both military and civilians alike, felt secure
and generally welcome, albeit within a very different and
restrictive culture compared to the United States or in Western
Europe and elsewhere our forces were stationed overseas. Our
approach to security matters in the Kingdom reflected this
attitude, which was the reality until recent years. We lived
and worked in urban environments and considered them on a par
with Europe or Japan. While U.S. military security practices
around the world were tightened following the Beirut bombings
in 1983, we felt little danger in Saudi Arabia. Our presence in
Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War had been requested and agreed
to by the Saudi Government. Indeed, our presence contributed
significantly to our host's defense.
The location of a large number of our personnel and our
major combat air operations in the Dhahran region reflected
this sense of well-being. The air facilities were excellent and
the Saudi Government provided good quality residences and
office facilities in the nearby Khobar Towers complex. That
complex had been built by the Saudi Government and was offered
to the U.S. military for use during the Gulf War. It continued
to be used by U.S. military personnel after Operation Southern
Watch began.
The depth of feeling among strongly conservative Saudi
elements that opposed inviting Western forces to the Kingdom in
1990 and remained opposed to our continued presence was slow to
emerge clearly. There was evidence of anti-regime activity and
a rise in anonymous threats against American interests,
especially following the additional troop deployment in October
1994. Resentment over the costs of the Gulf War and the
continued high costs of military modernization, and discontent
over strains in the social fabric of the Kingdom, even from
normally pro-Western Saudis, were recognized but not considered
a threat to American military security. Since our personnel
worked on Saudi military installations and lived in guarded
compounds, any risks were seen as manageable by maintaining a
low profile and following standard personal security practices.
Force protection was actively pursued, but in the context of a
stable and secure environment.
Following the November OPM/SANG bombing, that environment
was re-evaluated, the threat level assessment was raised to
``High'' and extensive improvements were made in all our
Arabian Gulf region facilities. In addition, we received a
number of intelligence indications that new attacks were being
contemplated against American forces and that Khobar Towers
could be a target. What these indications lacked was warning of
the specific kind of attack that occurred. However, they caused
our commanders to put in place a wide variety of new security
measures. At Khobar Towers alone, over 130 separate force
protection enhancements were undertaken--barriers were raised
and moved out, fences strengthened, entrances restricted, guard
forces increased. The enhancements were aimed at a variety of
potential threats, ranging from bombs to attempts to poison
food and water supplies. The enhancements may well have saved
hundreds of lives by preventing penetration by bombers into the
center of the compound. The approach, however, was one of
enhancing security of existing facilities despite their overall
limitations, and this proved insufficient to protect our
forces.
The climate of calm and safety in Saudi Arabia vanished
with the November 1995 bombing of the OPM/SANG office in Riyadh
and the highly sophisticated attack on Khobar Towers, which
used a bomb now estimated at more than 20,000 pounds. It became
clear that we needed to radically re-think the issue of force
protection in the region, and that our conclusions from this
effort would carry implications for the protection of our
forces around the world.
Response to the Khobar Towers Bombing: Relocate, Restructure and
Refocus
Immediately following the Khobar Towers bombing attack, we
undertook a fundamental re-evaluation of our force posture in
the Arabian Gulf region. The guiding principles were: (1) We
would continue to perform our missions; (2) Force protection
would be a major consideration; and (3) Other tradeoffs could
be made. Essentially, we looked at the mission tasks as if we
were planning the operation from scratch within a very high
threat environment. Consequently, we came to the conclusion
that a far different force posture was appropriate. After
extensive discussions with the senior Saudi leadership, I
ordered a major realignment of our force posture in Saudi
Arabia, an effort known as Operation Desert Focus. This new
posture will greatly enhance force protection, while still
permitting us to accomplish our missions. The effort, which is
nearing completion, is two-pronged.
First, with the full cooperation and support of the Saudi
Arabian Government, we began immediately to relocate our
deployed air forces (the 4404th Air Wing) from the Saudi air
bases located in urban concentrations at Riyadh and Dhahran to
an isolated location at the uncompleted Prince Sultan Air Base
near Al Kharj, where many Coalition forces were located during
the Gulf War. While our personnel will be living in tents
initially, we will be able to construct very effective defenses
against terrorist attacks. This relocation effort, which will
require over 1,400 truck loads to accomplish, is well underway.
More than 500 tents, most of them air-conditioned, have been
erected to house more than 4,000troops and provide dining and
recreation facilities, communications sites, and maintenance
and operations facilities. The refueling tankers and
reconnaissance aircraft from Riyadh were the first to arrive
last month, and the move of the fighters and other aircraft
from Dhahran is almost complete. More than 2,000 additional
military personnel were deployed to Saudi Arabia temporarily to
assist in this effort to provide security for the moves, erect
facilities, and provide services at the base until permanent
arrangements are in place. The Saudi Arabian Government has
assumed responsibility for constructing permanent facilities.
The isolated location and large size of the Prince Sultan Air
Base allows for extensive perimeters and avoids intense
concentrations of troops.
Some of the units in Saudi Arabia cannot be relocated
without degrading their effectiveness. Our USMTM and OPM/SANG
security assistance personnel who train and advise the Saudi
military must be in close proximity to their Saudi counterparts
in the capital and at various bases. Our PATRIOT missile
battery crews must be located near the urban areas and air
bases that they defend. While these units must continue to work
where they are now, we are taking steps to improve their
security by consolidating them and moving them to more secure
housing areas, providing more guards and barriers, and taking
other steps to enhance their protection and lessen the impact
of any future attacks.
Second, the Department has re-examined its personnel
assignment policies for Saudi Arabia. While the majority of the
operational forces with the 4404th Air Wing are on temporary
duty and deploy on rotational assignments for up to 179 days at
a time before returning to their home bases, many of the DoD
personnel permanently assigned to Saudi Arabia with OPM/SANG
and USMTM are on multi-year tours accompanied by their family
members. At the time of the Khobar Towers bombing, we sponsored
nearly 800 military dependents in Saudi Arabia alone. This no
longer seems prudent.
At my request, the Department of State implemented an
``authorized departure'' of all U.S. Government dependents from
Saudi Arabia in July 1996, which provides monetary entitlements
to any families who wish to leave. In addition, DoD has
withdrawn command sponsorship for dependents of most
permanently assigned military members, which had the practical
effect of an orderly, mandatory return. Nearly 300 dependents
arrived by charter aircraft in Charleston, South Carolina, on
August 18. While families are disrupted and some are
undoubtedly displeased by this change in policy, I believe it
was the correct choice. Military members understand personal
risk and accept it by the nature of their profession. That is
not true of their dependents, especially children, and we
cannot allow them to remain in harm's way.
In the future, nearly all permanent assignments in Saudi
Arabia will be one-year unaccompanied tours. There are some
assignments where the nature of the job requires longer tours
for continuity and familiarization with the host government,
and we have identified 59 billets that will be permitted to be
accompanied by dependents. School-aged children will not be
allowed under any circumstance under current conditions.
Other Regional and Worldwide Initiatives
We also looked beyond Saudi Arabia, first to the other
countries on the Arabian Peninsula where we have DoD personnel,
both combatants and noncombatants alike. In Kuwait, we will
move exposed Air Force personnel onto the Ali Al Salem Air Base
where they will live temporarily in tents, as at Prince Sultan
Air Base at Al Kharj in Saudi Arabia. In the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), we have completed moving our Air Force
personnel from an urban hotel onto a UAE air base where they
will also live in temporary facilities. In both cases we have
received strong support from the host countries.
The situation in each country in the Gulf is different in
terms of dependent numbers, threat, and security exposure. We
decided to reduce the number of family members in Kuwait
through a program of accelerated attrition. In the future,
there will be only about 30 billets designated for accompanied
tours. In Bahrain we are looking at reducing our numbers
through gradual attrition matching the normal rotation cycles
of personnel. We have decided to leave the dependent status as
is in the UAE, Qatar, Oman, and Yemen, affecting approximately
65 family members.
After the Khobar Towers bombing, I also undertook a process
to examine more closely the adequacy of our force protection
measures for our troops around the world. On July 17 I sent a
message directing all Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) to look at
force protection in their areas of responsibility and report
back to me by August 1 on how best to deal with the rapidly
escalating threat to U.S. forces. I urged them to be innovative
in their approaches to dealing with the terrorist problem. As a
minimum, I asked that they answer the following questions:
Should our troops remain in all present locations?