

agency from the Judgment Fund for payment to the owner.

(c) REVIEW OF ARBITRATION.—Appeal from arbitration decisions shall be to the United States District Court or the United States Court of Federal Claims in the manner prescribed by law for the claim under this Act.

(d) PAYMENT OF CERTAIN COMPENSATION.—In any appeal under subsection (c) in which the court does not rule for the Federal agency or department, the amount of the award of compensation determined by the arbitrator shall be paid from funds made available to the Federal agency or department by appropriation in lieu of being paid from the Judgment Fund, except that if no such funds have been made available to the agency or department such payment shall be made from the Judgment Fund.

#### SEC. 10. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to interfere with the authority of any State to create additional property rights.

#### SEC. 11. SEVERABILITY.

If any provision of this Act, an amendment made by this Act, or the application of such provision or amendment to any person or circumstance is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, the amendments made by this Act, and the application of the provisions of such to any person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.

#### SEC. 12. EFFECTIVE DATE.

The provisions of this Act and amendments made by this Act shall take effect on January 1, 1995 and shall apply to any agency action that occurs on or after such date. ●

### BITTER FRUIT OF THE ASIAN IMMIGRATION CASES

● Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, in an unusual publication called simply "Constitution," published by the Foundation for the United States Constitution, there is an article by Professor Harold Hongju Koh of Yale University titled, "Bitter Fruit of the Asian Immigration Cases."

It interested me because of my long association with the cause of civil rights and because I grew up in the State of Oregon and recall the criticism my father took when, as a Lutheran minister, he objected to the 1942 unconstitutional transfer of Japanese American citizens away from the West Coast. Another reason for my interest is that I serve on the Senate Judiciary's Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs.

Our record in the field of immigration has not always been a good one, and that is particularly true as it applies to the Asian community.

There is no question that we face problems in the field of immigration, but the answer is not passing things like Proposition 187 in California or the other abuses that we have tolerated through the history of our country.

I believe my colleagues will find the article by Professor Koh a matter of more than casual interest.

At this point, I ask that it be printed in the RECORD.

The article follows:

#### BITTER FRUIT OF THE ASIAN IMMIGRATION CASES

(By Harold Hongju Koh)

Schoolchildren everywhere can recite the Statue of Liberty's inspirational message

about "huddled masses, yearning to breathe free." Yet history shows that our national attitude toward immigrants has been as hostile as it has been solicitous—especially in hard times. One need only look at today's headlines. As we endure our latest recession, newspapers report polls showing that 60 percent of Americans believe current levels of immigration are too high. News stories tell of the government's harsh policies toward Haitian and Chinese refugees, of public concern over the illicit smuggling of aliens, of anti-immigrant sentiment spurred by the World Trade Center bombing, and of lawsuits brought by California, Texas and Florida against the federal government to recoup costs arising from the influx of undocumented aliens. Politicians, says the New York Times, call for "a get-tough effort to control immigration . . . prompted by polls showing that the issue is gaining an importance among voters . . . increasingly worried about the economic impact of immigrants and their effect on American culture."

Not only is immigrant bashing as American as apple pie, but bias against immigrants has helped shape our constitutional law. Occasionally, the bias has been overt: a proposed constitutional amendment, for example, (favored, apparently, by 49 percent of Americans) would deny citizenship to the American-born children of undocumented aliens. And "reforms" that hurt immigrants have emerged as themes embroidered on Supreme Court decisions. It has been a long time since Justice Harry Blackmun led a unanimous Supreme Court to declare that "aliens as a class are a prime example of a discrete and insular minority . . . for whom . . . heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate" *Graham v. Richardson*, 1971). His last major immigration opinion *Sale v. Haitian Centers Council*, 1993) was a solitary dissent decrying the summary return of Haitian refugees to a brutal dictatorship without first granting them a hearing. In his dissent, Blackmun laid bare the themes that run through the modern Court's immigration and naturalization jurisprudence: an obsession with sovereignty and governmental power, an unwillingness to scrutinize the immigration decisions of government officials, contempt for international law and indifference to the due process and equal protection claims of foreigners seeking entry to the United States.

Where and when did these attitudes originate? The latest volume of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise: History of the Supreme Court, Owen Fiss's impressive *Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, 1888-1910*, illuminates a source: a series of Asian immigration cases decided by the Court in the late 19th century. Before these cases, immigration into the United States went virtually unregulated, driven by the perceived need to remedy underpopulation. Indeed, the Declaration of Independence assailed the King of England for "endeavor[ing] to prevent the Population of these States; for that Purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; [and] refusing to pass others to encourage their Migrations hither. . . ." The Constitution's framers responded with the fourth clause of Article I, Section 8, which granted Congress power to "establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization." In 1790 Congress invoked new power to pass a law permitting only "free white persons" to naturalize, a right not granted to Asian immigrants until 1952.

Significantly, this language did not authorize Congress to regulate the admission of aliens who might seek citizenship. In fact, another clause of Article I forbade Congress to prohibit the "Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit" before 1808.

Designed to protect the slave trade, the clause was invoked by Jeffersonians to challenge the constitutionality of the Alien Act of 1798, which authorized the President to expel "all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States."

During the years of free immigration few Asians came to these shores. Between 1820, when immigration records were first kept, and 1849, when the California Gold Rush began, only 43 Chinese were reported to have arrived in America. But once gold was discovered, thousands of Chinese miners flooded into "Kumshan"—the Golden Mountain—as they called California. In 1850, 4,000 Chinese arrived in California. The next year the Chinese population stood at 25,000; in 1852, 45,000. These immigrants—mostly men who had left their families in China—came to work the mines. But by the mid-1860s, thousands had depleted their mining claims or been forced off them. They found work on the western slopes of the Sierra Nevada, building the Central Pacific Railroad; in one year the company procured 15,000 laborers. Other Chinese opened laundries, restaurants and small shops, or worked as gardeners, domestic servants, farmers, fishermen, mechanics and artisans. By the mid-1870s, some 115,000 Chinese lived in the United States, 70 percent in California, where one person in 10 was Chinese.

The first Chinese were welcomed with curiosity. In 1852 the governor of California claimed he wanted "further immigration and settlement of the Chinese—one of the most worthy classes of our newly adopted citizens." But by the 1860s hospitality had soured. White workers assailed the Chinese for working too hard for too little, while the popular press vilified them as lairs, criminals, prostitutes and opium addicts.

Unlike the European immigrants then flooding into the United States, the Chinese were thought unassimilable. In Justice Stephen Field's words, "they remained strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, and adhering to the customs and usages of their own country. As they grew in numbers each year, the people of the [West] coast saw, or believed they saw . . . great danger that at no distant day that portion of our country would be overrun by them unless prompt action was taken to restrict their immigration." When drought and depression hit California in the early 1860s, the Chinese were scapegoated. "To an American," the 1876 manifesto of the Workingmen's Party of California declared, "death is preferable to life on a par with the Chinaman."

California and its cities began to enact restrictive laws. The first were revenue measures (such as entry, license and occupation taxes) and other laws neutral on their face but applied harshly against the Chinese. Chinese paid 98 percent of the monies collected under the California Foreign Miner's Tax, for example, and an 1870 law authorizing the state's immigration commissioner to remove "debauched women" was quickly applied to Chinese women arriving by ship. Soon the laws became overtly racist; a San Francisco ordinance required all Chinese residents to move to prescribed ghettos, and another humiliated Chinese prisoners in the county jail by requiring them to cut their queues to one inch in length. Between 1855 and 1870 California passed acts bearing such titles as "An Act to Discourage the Immigration to This State of Persons Who Cannot Become Citizens," "An Act to Protect Free White Labor Against Competition with Chinese Coolie Labor" and "An Act to Prevent the Further Immigration of Chinese or Mongolians to This State." Chinese were denied the vote and the rights to own or inherit land, to testify in court, to attend public schools with

whites or to live in the same neighborhoods as whites. In 1879 California's new constitution asserted that "the presence of foreigners ineligible to become citizens . . . is dangerous to the well-being of the State, and the Legislature shall discourage their immigration by all means within its power."

Meanwhile, assaults on the Chinese became commonplace. In 1871 a Los Angeles race riot killed 19 Chinese. In September 1885, 28 Chinese laborers in a settlement near Rock Springs, Wyoming, were brutally murdered, and vigilantes killed several Chinese residents of the Washington territories. The next year mobs invaded the Chinese sections of several West Coast cities and forced residents out. Across Washington, Oregon and California, mass meetings demanded the expulsion of Chinese.

California's restrictiveness contrasted sharply with federal immigration policy. An 1868 act of Congress declared that the right to leave the land of one's birth and resettle elsewhere was "a natural and inherent right of all people," in recognition of which the United States "has freely received emigrants from all nations and invested them with rights of citizenship." That year the United States and China concluded the Burlingame Treaty to improve trade with China and encourage the immigration of coolies to build the railroads. The treaty recognized that free migration and an "inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance" were matters of "mutual advantage" for both nations. By its terms, Chinese could become "permanent residents" of the United States. Federal receptivity extended not just to immigration but also to citizenship by birth. In 1866, two years before the Dred Scott decision that reaffirmed the citizenship of native-born blacks. Its language was echoed in the birthright citizenship clause of Section 1 of the 14th Amendment, soon to be drafted by Congress: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." California Senator John Conness supported this language and declared his desire for equal rights for children of Chinese parentage. By accepting the clause, notes constitutional scholar Gerald Neuman, Congress "refused the invitation to create an hereditary caste of voteless denizens, vulnerable to expulsion and exploitation."

But the tide soon changed. In 1872 political pressure led President Ulysses S. Grant to call for legislation to counteract the evils associated with Chinese immigration. The resulting Immigration Act of 1875 was the first federal legislation to control immigration. It outlawed contracts to supply coolie labor, barred importation of aliens without their consent and made it illegal to bring in women for purposes of prostitution. As applied against the Chinese, the restrictionist statute seemed inconsistent with the spirit of the Burlingame Treaty. Four years later President Rutherford Hayes invoked the treaty to veto a bill forbidding ships to bring more than 15 Chinese at a time into the country. But in 1880, under pressure from Congress, Hayes renegotiated the Burlingame Treaty to recognize America's right to regulate, limit and suspend Chinese immigration. Two years later Congress enacted the first Chinese Exclusion Act, which suspended immigration of Chinese, with minor exceptions, for 10 years. That law was amended and reenacted repeatedly and was not finally revoked until 1943. The 1882 act expressly prohibited the naturalization of Chinese as American citizens and denied entry to the wives of Chinese, even perma-

nent U.S. residents—a restriction that continued for the next 60 years. This shortage of women forced many Chinese laborers to return to China simply to marry or have families. In 1884 Congress amended the exclusion law to require returning Chinese laborers to produce certificates of residence signed by two non-Chinese American citizens—a requisite designed to thwart "the notorious capabilities of the lower classes of Chinese for perjury."

The act was soon challenged. Chae Chan Ping, a Chinese laborer who had entered the United States lawfully in 1875, obtained the required certificate of residence before visiting China in 1887. In 1888, shortly before he was to return, Congress amended the Exclusion Act to revoke all reentry certificates. Chae Chan Ping was denied reentry, and he sued. He challenged the amended Chinese Exclusion Act on the grounds that it violated the Constitution's due process and equal protection clauses and conflicted with the Burlingame Treaty.

In other times his case would have seemed easy. But a unanimous Court rejected his claim and in the process laid down the five planks of our modern immigration jurisprudence. Justice Stephen J. Field wrote the opinion.

The first plank came with Field's title, the Chinese Exclusion case, an inapt name for a case that actually concerned the reentry of a longtime resident. By framing the case as an analysis of the federal government's supposed power to exclude, Field portrayed Chae Chan Ping's claim as an assault on the Chinese Exclusion Act, which he defined as the statutory expression of an inherent, unenumerated foreign-affairs power that lay beyond substantive constitutional attack. This power, he said, was an essential feature of national sovereignty. That "the government of the United States . . . can exclude aliens from its territories," he declared, "is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy. . . . The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time, when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one."

Justice Field conceded that the 1888 act violated the open terms of the Burlingame Treaty. But, he concluded, the act was "not on that account invalid," since statutes and treaties are equivalent federal laws, and the most recent controls. In effect, he suggested, laying down what became the second plank of the Court's immigration jurisprudence, Congress has the power not just to disregard but also to abrogate solemn treaty obligations.

Third, Field noted, a Chinese laborer's right to reenter the United States "is held at the will of the government, revocable at any time, at its pleasure," despite any due process claim. Although the Court did not elaborate on that conclusion, later decisions have construed it as resting on several implicit premises: that perhaps the Constitution does not apply to aliens outside the United States; that a person's right to return home is neither a "liberty" nor a "property" interest protected by constitutional due process; or that an individual's due process interest can be outweighed by the public's interest in "preserv[ing] its independence, and giving] security against foreign aggression and encroachment." As the constitutional scholar Louis Henkin has noted, "whatever the Court intended, both its holding and its sweeping dictum have been taken to mean that there are no constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to regulate immigration."

The fourth plank was an omission. In *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, decided only three years earlier, the Court had held a San Francisco ordinance invalid under the 14th Amendment, based on evidence that it was applied discriminatorily against Chinese laundrers. Here the Court never examined whether, by extension, the federal exclusion laws also offended the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.

Finally, Justice Field labeled the government's actions a "political question" that barred judicial review. "Whether a proper consideration by our government of its previous laws, or a proper respect for the nation whose subjects are affected by its action, ought to have qualified its inhibition and made it applicable only to persons departing from the country after the passage of the act are not questions for judicial determination," he wrote.

During the next decade the Court expanded upon each principle in a series of Asian immigration cases. In *Nishimura Ekiu v. United States* (1892), it backed an immigration official who refused a Japanese woman admission to the United States, relying on a statute authorizing such refusal if in the official's opinion immigrants were likely to become "public charges." Justice Horace Gray delivered the opinion upholding the act, repeating Field's language about a sovereign nation's power to exclude aliens. Since the statute had granted the officer discretionary power, Gray reasoned, "no other tribunal . . . is at liberty to reexamine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted."

A year later, in *Fong Yue Ting v. United States* (1893), Gray expanded those claims. At issue was whether a Chinese laborer, a U.S. resident for 14 years and, of course, barred from becoming a citizen, could be arrested and expelled for lacking a certificate of residence. Based on the testimony of a Chinese witness, a federal judge had found that the laborer was a permanent resident of the United States. But Gray extended Field's arguments from the *Chinese Exclusion* case. He recognized an "absolute and unqualified" governmental right not just to exclude aliens who have never entered, but "to expel or deport foreigners, who have not been naturalized or taken any step toward becoming citizens." In an incredible catch-22, Gray turned Fong Yue Ting's acceptance of a legal disability (his inability to become a naturalized American citizen) into a justification for barring him from his adopted home. In so doing he rejected both due process and equal protection claims. In Fiss's words, he left "*Yick Wo* on the books but denied it any operative effect."

In 1895 the Court added the last piece of the puzzle. Lem Moon Sing, a Chinese drug-gist permanently domiciled in San Francisco, visited his native home. Upon being denied reentry in 1894, he provided proof of his prior residence from two credible non-Chinese witnesses, but he was nevertheless restrained and confined. Writing for the Court, the elder Justice John Marshall Harlan upheld the denial of Lem Moon Sing's writ of habeas corpus, reasoning that a decision of an immigration official to deny an alien admission to the United States could not be reexamined in a habeas corpus proceeding (*Lem Moon Sing v. United States*). The decision had two startling results. First, it transformed the doctrine of plenary federal power over exclusion from a congressional power to an executive authority, once Congress had delegated it to executive officials. Second, the case made clear that courts could not intervene to examine even blatant

misuses of the exclusion power by immigration officials. Thus, as this century began, the Court viewed Congress's power to control immigration—nowhere specified in the Constitution—as complete, inherent and mandated by sovereignty and international law. That power overrode state law, prior treaties and fundamental constitutional protections, and it could be exercised virtually free from judicial scrutiny.

A doctrine so sweeping attracted criticism. The extension of the power to exclude, granted in *Chinese Exclusion*, to deportation and expulsion proved too much even for Justice Field, who not only dissented but also wrote a letter urging that additional members be added to the Court, reasoning that “where [a] decision goes to the very essentials of Constitutional Government, the question of an increase of the bench may properly be considered and acted upon.” But as Fiss reveals, the one consistent and enlightened critic of the Asian immigration decisions was Field's nephew, Justice David Brewer, who dissented in *Nishimura Ekiu*, *Fong Yue Ting* and *Lem Moon Sing*, showing the kind of clarity and independence of mind that marked him as the Blackmun of his day. The son of missionary parents in Asia Minor, Brewer was one of the few Justices who sought to understand the role of aliens in the constitutional community. In his *Fong Yue Ting* dissent, he highlighted the racist character of the law in question, asking, “In view of this enactment of the highest legislative body of the foremost Christian nation, may not the thoughtful Chinese disciple of Confucius fairly ask, Why do they send missionaries here?”

For all his enlightenment, even Brewer did not argue that the Constitution's protections applied outside the United States. To the contrary, his *Fong Yue Ting* dissent declared that “the Constitution has no extraterritorial effect, and those who have not come lawfully within our territory cannot claim any protection from its provisions.” Years later the Court would exploit that loophole by creating a legal fiction—that even aliens who have physically entered the United States remain legally outside it, thereby intentionally denying even longtime residents of this country meaningful constitutional protection.

As the century turned, the question of whether aliens outside the United States have constitutional rights was absorbed by the larger issue of “whether the Constitution follows the flag”—that is, whether the Constitution extends to the furthest reaches of the emerging American empire. The characteristic executive-branch response to this question, ascribed by Fiss to Secretary of War Elihu Root, was, “As near as I can make out the Constitution follows the flag—but doesn't quite catch up with it.”

Only one decision ran against the anti-Asian tide: *United States v. Wong Kim Ark* (1898). That case asked whether children born in the United States of Chinese parents became American citizens by virtue of the 14th Amendment's birthright citizenship clause. Given the earlier Chinese decisions, the case seemed an uphill struggle. The Chinese Exclusion Act had denied Wong Kim Ark's parents the opportunity for citizenship through naturalization, and Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting had settled that those parents could have been deported, expelled or forbidden reentry upon leaving the country. Justice Gray began inauspiciously, asserting that “the inherent right of every independent nation to determine for itself, and according to its own constitution and laws, what classes of persons shall be entitled to its citizenship. “Yet surprisingly, he went on to hold that the 14th Amendment denied the federal government the power to withhold

citizenship from children born in the United States of alien parents.

The decision rested on the birthright citizenship clause, which confers citizenship on U.S.-born persons of parents “subject to [U.S.] jurisdiction.” The Court's holding that Chinese parents of American-born children were so subject reaffirmed the themes of sovereignty and absolute territorial jurisdiction that ran through the earlier Chinese cases. Ironically, the decision also seems to have been driven by the potential impact of a contrary holding on ethnic groups other than Asians. As Justice Gray noted, “To hold that the 14th Amendment . . . excludes from citizenship the children born in the United States of citizens or subjects of other countries, would be to deny citizenship of thousands of persons of English, Scotch, Irish, German, or other European parentage, who always have been considered a citizens of the United States.

All this might seem like ancient history, made irrelevant by the New Deal, the Warren court, the Bill of Rights revolution and the global era of international human rights. Nor does it seem plausible that blatantly racist laws could survive after *Brown v. Board of Education*, the end of official racial discrimination and the advent of strict judicial scrutiny. But our government's position in recent cases reveals that immigration is caught in a time warp.

Chinese refugees, arriving on Long Island's south shore aboard the Golden Venture, fall squarely within the Chinese Exclusion holding. Poor black Haitian boat people, fleeing persecution after a coup d'état overthrew their first democratically elected government, encounter as obstacles to their entry into the United States claims of inherent sovereignty and plenary congressional power, allegedly delegated to the President and the Coast Guard. Haitians who raise due process and equal protection claims are told that the Constitution does not protect them on the high seas. Their efforts to invoke multilateral and bilateral refugee treaties similarly founder on American claims of territoriality. When Haitians challenge their summary repatriation to Haiti, our government in its defense cites grounds of foreign policy, national security and non-reviewability. Refused admission as public charges and health risks, HIV-positive Haitian asylum seekers are detained for nearly two years in a U.S. government internment camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in an eerie parallel of the government's internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. At this writing, thousands of Haitians are again detained at Guantanamo. Ironically, the question arises whether Haitian children born in the Guantanamo camp are Haitian, Cuban or perhaps even American citizens.

Other infamous decisions from the 19th century, such as *Dred Scott* and *Plessy v. Ferguson* (which legalized separate but equal), have been overruled, both at law and in the court of public opinion. But the Asian immigration cases of that era—no less shocking—still bear bitter fruit. Today, no public official would embrace the racism, hatred and nativism that drove those decisions. Yet the legal principles they enunciated still rule our borders.●

#### TRIBUTE TO GORO HOKAMA

● Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, I have known Goro Hokama, the outgoing chairman of the county council of the County of Maui, for over 40 years. In the spring of 1954, I recall meeting with him to discuss whether we should consider public service as our life's career.

For 40 years, Goro Hokama has served the people of Maui County as a member of the county council and also chairman of that same body.

I wish to share with you and my colleagues the following editorial from the Maui News, dated December 20, 1994, entitled “Goro Hokama: 40 Years of Service.”

I believe it expresses the sentiment of many of us who have had the privilege of calling him friend, and the many who have benefited from his leadership. I wish to join the people of Maui County and all of Hawaii in commending and thanking Goro Hokama for his 40 years of dedicated public service.

The editorial follows:

[From the Maui News, Dec. 20, 1994]

GORO HOKAMA: 40 YEARS OF SERVICE

1994's end will officially bring down the curtain on Goro Hokama's 40 continuous years of public service to Maui County. It's impossible to overstate the contributions he has made to this community, and in fact, to the entire state of Hawaii.

The departing Maui County Council chairman was first elected to office in 1954, the year of the great political revolution that saw the Democrats snatch the reins of power from the Republicans and by proxy from the big landowners. Hokama was Hawaii's lone remaining elected county official who had a hand in that historic housecleaning, a staying power made ever more remarkable by his having to face election every two years.

U.S. Sen. Daniel Inouye is the only person remaining from the 1954 sweep who has served in elected office as long as Hokama, but even he did not have to win 20 straight times to do so. Hokama did.

And Hokama won without ever sacrificing his principles, even when it meant risking the loss of longtime supporters. For all of his 40 years on the County Council, or its predecessor, the Board of Supervisors, Hokama held the Lanai residency seat. In more than one election he trailed his opponent when the ballots on Lanai were counted, but with countywide voting he would prevail anyway because of his broad appeal to residents throughout the county.

Seeing himself as more than just a Lanai councilman, Hokama clearly understood his role as a county councilman, and his actions reflected that understanding, even if not always to his benefit back home.

He learned early, however, not to be frightened off by the odds, working as a union organizer among the pineapple workers on Lanai in the 1940s when unions were a poison to the ruling political and financial powers. And neither was he frightened off nearly 50 years later when the ILWU shockingly refused to endorse him, one of its own, in the election of 1992 because of differences he had with the union leadership over the course of development on Lanai.

He won anyway.

That was an occasion when he opposed development, and he drew the wrath of labor. On other occasions he supported development, and he drew the wrath of environmentalists. On all of those occasions, however, Hokama acted upon what he believed was right, not on what may have been politically expedient.

Maui has repeatedly been cited by economists as the county with the firmest financial footing in the state, and that is due in no small part to Goro Hokama. Fiscally conservative by nature, he nonetheless was a leader in the bold gambles that paid off in the developments of Kaanapali, Wailea and