

world, we face the prospect of mass instability in Mexico itself. We have seen this in the Chiapas insurgency which is not yet resolved by any means. We have seen it in instances of political killings. I do not want to get in any way abrasive, but I commented on this floor at one point that Mexico is a country where you can murder archbishops and say they inadvertently wandered into the line of fire in a police action involving drug dealers, which was the equivalent of being shot while in church.

Mr. President, Mr. Paul Gigot, in this morning's Wall Street Journal, writes that if we fail to stem the crisis, we "can expect more Mexican sons and daughters to arrive in San Diego soon". Unwilling to stay in Mexico, seeking a promise of better opportunities, overwhelming the opportunities of our own people in our own country.

We cannot do that. We cannot risk undermining a reviving Argentina economy, a promising Brazilian economy. We cannot put at risk the efforts around the world of countries that moved away from centrally controlled, to use a French term, "dirigiste" regimes in which American investment is kept out, American goods kept out, autarky I think as the economists would call it, and with the result of economic stagnation.

The courage—and it takes courage—to open up, to be part of the world economy is more and more in evidence everywhere. That courage could turn into fear and retreat in a very short order if we do not act.

I would like to congratulate the majority leader of the Senate, ROBERT DOLE, and the minority leader, TOM DASCHLE, for their willingness to meet with the President, in the company of their counterparts from the House, to bring forth a bipartisan American initiative which is very much directed to the protection of American interests, and I hope it succeeds. I hope it finds support on the Senate floor with Senators generally as it has done with the leadership.

I thank my friends for their patience. Mr. President, I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.

Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.

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#### MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent that there now be a period for morning business with Senators permitted to speak up to no more than 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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#### UNPROFOR: END ITS IMPOTENCE OR END ITS MISSION

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I had the opportunity last evening to join Senator DOLE in meeting with British Gen. Rupert Smith, who will take command

of the United Nations force, known as UNPROFOR, in Bosnia later this month. A few other Senators also had a chance to meet with General Smith yesterday.

Senator DOLE and I expressed admiration for General Smith's willingness to take on this unenviable task. But we also expressed skepticism that UNPROFOR can improve its credibility in order to more effectively carry out its limited mission of facilitating humanitarian relief and lessening the violence in Bosnia. But the change in command in UNPROFOR does at least offer the opportunity to try to adopt measures to make UNPROFOR more effective.

I recall that a year ago, when UNPROFOR's leadership was rotating, American military officials responsible for the humanitarian airlift and air-drops in Bosnia proposed to take advantage of the situation to reestablish UNPROFOR's credibility and its ability to fulfill its mandate in Bosnia.

They proposed that UNPROFOR end its "'mother may I?' construct of operations," and they outlined a plan by which UNPROFOR, even with its restrictive rules of engagement and limited troops and equipment, could use force to more effectively carry out its humanitarian mission and curb Serb and other harassment of UNPROFOR. These American military officers warned that if such action were not taken, an already bad situation would quickly get much worse.

When he first took command of UNPROFOR in January, Lt. Gen. Michael Rose took actions that suggested he might follow this advice. But this initial promise faded as General Rose became even more pliable to Serb demands than previous UNPROFOR commanders had been. The results have been disastrous:

UNPROFOR has all along had difficulty supplying food, fuel, and medical supplies to Bosnian civilians suffering the privations of war. Now, UNPROFOR cannot be sure it can supply its own emaciated troops.

The United Nations declared a weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo but refused to enforce it despite routine Serb violations. Now, it has effectively become a Serb-declared exclusion zone from which humanitarian air flights are blocked at the whim of Serb forces.

In the past, UNPROFOR had been humiliated by being compelled to assist Serbs in the deportation of detained Muslims. Now, UNPROFOR has been rendered impotent by having its own forces detained and used as human shields against NATO air attacks. Some UNPROFOR troops seem to have become willing hostages who engage their Serb captors in sports and feasts.

In short, continued UNPROFOR's submission to Serb demands and threats may make it impossible for it to fulfill its mandate. While things appear to have improved in recent weeks, with relief flights resumed and U.N. forces not held hostage, this has only been at the discretion of the Serbs, who

can reverse course at any time. All sides in the conflict have sought to manipulate UNPROFOR to their own ends, but Serb forces have largely succeeded in making UNPROFOR a tool of Serb strategy, and the recent improvement should be seen in that light.

This situation will only get worse over time unless UNPROFOR can gain credibility it has never enjoyed.

Either prompt, dramatic action should be taken to establish UNPROFOR's credibility and its ability to do its humanitarian job or UNPROFOR should be withdrawn from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The plan proposed last winter by American military officers may have worked if implemented then, but it is probably too late today. Certain elements of that plan, however, are still relevant and even more critical in light of Croatia's recent announcement not to extend UNPROFOR's mandate in that country beyond March 31:

Discredited UNPROFOR leaders cannot change the situation. Any effort to revitalize UNPROFOR must be accompanied by new leaders. General Rose, the UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia, will be replaced on January 24 by General Smith. Yasushi Akashi, the U.N. Secretary General's representative for the former Yugoslavia, must be replaced, as well.

The U.N.-declared no-fly zones and weapons-exclusion zones in Bosnia, now widely flouted, primarily by the Serbs, should be enforced. This includes the withdrawal of SAM's from the zone and deactivation of SAM's in the surrounding area that threaten NATO aircraft policing the zones.

UNPROFOR should no longer tolerate checkpoints operated by belligerents nor should it pay tolls, extortion by belligerents of fuel and other humanitarian supplies. If belligerents question whether a convoy is going to its declared civilian destination, they should be permitted to ride the convoy.

UNPROFOR should organize its convoys along military lines and reject Serb demands that include armored vehicles and similar demands.

Any use of force or threat of force against UNPROFOR should be met with force. While such retaliation must be measured according to its objective, it need not be limited to retaliation against the specific offending forces, given the targeting difficulties often involved and the need for UNPROFOR to acquire the upper hand.

As for the concern that adopting such an approach would endanger UNPROFOR troops now detained by Serbs, the reality is that unless such an approach is adopted immediately, all UNPROFOR troops will be endangered—whether formally detained or not. Action can either be taken to reverse the current situation, or it will only get worse.

If UNPROFOR refuses to adopt such an approach, it should be withdrawn in