of civil rights or President Roosevelt himself.

But mostly, a woman who had experienced so much personal loss in her own life, wanted simply to care for others. So much so, that I am sure that upon hearing the news of her death, an entire city grieved not only for the loss of a great philanthropist, but also for a close friend.

In the days following her death, you often heard those describe her as being of a different era. Let us hope not. Her grace, her intellect, her sharp wit, and perhaps most important, her deep sense of compassion, are qualities desperately needed in these confusing times.

I know her life of accomplishment, commitment, and kindness will set a standard for generations of leaders to come in a city she led so well.

EXECUTIVE AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

The following communications were laid before the Senate, together with accompanying papers, reports, and documents, which were referred as indicated:

EC–715. A communication from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on base closures; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–716. A communication from the Chairman of the National Research Council, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on the F-22; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–717. A communication from the Secretary of the Air Force, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on unit cost; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–718. A communication from the Acting Secretary of the Army, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on program acquisition unit cost; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–719. A communication from the Director of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on multifunction cost comparison studies; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–720. A communication from the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, transmitting, a draft of proposed legislation entitled ''The National Defense Technology and Industrial Base, Defense Reinvestment, and Defense Conversion Act''; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–721. A communication from the Secretary of Defense, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on the Future Years Defense Program; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–722. A communication from the Secretary of Defense, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program plan for fiscal years 1996 through 2001; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–723. A communication from the Secretary of Defense, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on the National Security Education Program; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–724. A communication from the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on the selected acquisition for the period October 1, 1994 through December 31, 1994; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–725. A communication from the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on the manpower request; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–726. A communication from the Assistant Secretary of State (Legislative Affairs), transmitting, pursuant to law, the report relative to biological weapons; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–727. A communication from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on base closures; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–728. A communication from the Secretary of Energy, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on baseline environment management; to the Committee on Armed Services.

INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first and second time by unanimous consent, and referred as indicated:

By Mr. MCCAIN (for himself and Mr. LIEBERMAN):

S. 726. A bill to amend the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 to revise the sanctions applicable to violations of that act, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

SUBMISSION OF CONCURRENT AND SENATE RESOLUTIONS

The following concurrent resolutions and Senate resolutions were read, and referred (or acted upon), as indicated:

By Mr. DOLE (for himself, Mr. DASCHLE, Mr. COCHRAN, and Mr. LOTT):

S. Res. 111. A resolution relative to the death of the Honorable John C. Stennis, late a Senator from the State of Mississippi; considered and agreed to.

By Ms. SNOWE (for herself, Mr. SIMON, Mr. PRESSLER, Mr. SARBANES, Mr. D'AMATO, and Mr. DODD):

S. Con. Res. 11. A concurrent resolution supporting a resolution to the long-standing dispute regarding Cyprus; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. MCCAIN (for himself and Mr. LIEBERMAN):

S. 726. A bill to amend the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 to revise the sanctions applicable to violations of that Act, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

THE IRAN-IRAQ ARMS NONPROLIFERATION AMENDMENTS ACT

• Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, 4 years after the defeat of Iraq in the Persian Gulf war, Iran has emerged as a growing threat to the region. Bellicose statements are issued regularly from Tehran regarding the foreign presence in the Persian Gulf. More importantly, this rhetoric has been accompanied by disturbing reports of new arms shipments to Iran and the deployment of weapons which pose a direct threat to shipping in the Persian Gulf.

Today, Senator LIEBERMAN and I are introducing legislation to assist the President in his efforts to deal with this situation. The 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, which I cosponsored with then-Senator GORE, established sanctions against third parties which assist Iran and Iraq in their efforts to rebuild their weapons capabilities. It was a start, but it did not go far enough. Efforts by Senator LIEBERMAN and I last year to expand the legislation were unsuccessful.

The 1992 bill was intended to target not only the acquisition of conventional weapons, but weapons of mass destruction as well. In the process of amending the bill to the 1993 Defense Act, however, the explicit references to weapons of mass destruction were dropped.

The bill we are introducing today attempts to make these applications absolutely clear. It also removes from the proposed sanctions exceptions for assistance under the Freedom Support Act, thereby removing the benefit of the doubt Congress may have given Russia in 1992. As I will explain later in my statement, Russia has perhaps used this exception to the detriment of United States policy in the Persian Gulf.

To the current list of sanctions against persons assisting Iran and Iraq in its weapons programs, which already include procurement and export sanctions, the amendments we are offering today add the denial of visas, denial of commercial credit, and denial of authority to ship products across United States territory. To the list of sanctions against countries offering similar assistance, the amendments add the denial of licenses for export of nuclear material, denial of foreign military sales, denial of the transfer of controlled technology, denial of the transfer of computer technology, suspension of the authority of foreign air carriers to fly to or from the United States, and a prohibition on vessels that enter the ports of sanctioned countries.

The comprehensive international U.N.-mandated sanctions against Iraq make the invocation of sanctions against third party suppliers of Iraq unnecessary in the near future, unless of course, the embargo is violated or revoked. Presently, the more pressing need with regard to Iraq is for the international community to remain firm on the embargo.

But given the history of the Iraqi military buildup before the gulf war, the sanctions included in the Iran-Iraq Act may, at a later date, be as important with regard to Iraq as they are currently in the case of Iran. Once the embargo is lifted, there will be a great temptation for cash-strapped economies to resume sales of military hardware to Iraq. Outside forces may once again be compelled to maintain a balance in the region through arms sales and a dangerous escalation of firepower.

Before Iraq's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction were ended in the aftermath of the gulf war, it had made substantial progress. Iraq had several workable nuclear weapon designs, many key components, a multibillion dollar nuclear manufacturing base and a global supply network able to exploit lax Western export controls. Its Western-trained scientists had produced small amounts of weapons grade plutonium and enriched uranium. Even today, despite our best efforts, Iraq maintains the equipment and expertise that may permit it to resume its pursuit of a nuclear weapon once the embargo is lifted.

Saddam Hussein's efforts to develop chemical and biological weapons capabilities are also well known and, as with its nuclear program, there is some lingering concern about whether Iraq retains a capacity to produce these weapons.

The Congressional Research Service did two illuminating studies 2 years ago on the sources of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. The list of Iraq's nuclear suppliers included 3 French firms, 11 German firms, 2 Italian firms, 2 Swedish firms, 4 Swiss firms, 4 British firms, and 2 Russian firms. The list of Iraq's chemical weapons suppliers included 7 Austrian firms, 2 Belgian firms, 2 French firms, 34 German firms, 3 Dutch firms, 3 Italian firms, 1 Spanish firm, 3 Swiss firms, and 1 British firm.

This is all in the past now. But we should take note that so many corporations displayed an interest in supplying Iraq without regard to the consequences. These corporations must be confronted with disincentives in order to keep them from once again serving as Saddam's supplier base.

It is also vitally important to prevent the reemergence of an Iraqi conventional military threat. One need only to observe the origins of the weapons which constituted the Iraqi threat in 1990 to know that the key to any postembargo containment strategy will depend on our ability to influence Iraq's trading partners in Europe, Russia, the People's Republic of China, and North Korea.

It is my hope and intention that the sanctions detailed in this legislation help us exercise the influence necessary to prevent another dangerous arms buildup in Iraq.

The threat from Iran is more immediate. Recent reports indicate a substantial increase in the Iranian military presence in the Persian Gulf. In addition to Silkworm missiles and two Russian-built submarines, Iran has deployed on the islands, it controls in the Straits of Hormuz thousands of additional troops, surface-to-air missiles, and artillery. These reports are particularly disturbing in that they are a part of a well-established pattern. Iran is importing hundreds of North Korean-made Scud–C missiles. It is expected to acquire the Nodong North Korean missiles currently under development; and it is reportedly assembling its own shorter-range missiles.

In the course of preparing this legislation, I asked the Congressional Research Service to compile a chronology of reported arms shipments to Iran since the passage of the original Iran-Iraq bill in 1992. The record is quite disturbing. I ask unanimous consent that the chronology be inserted into the RECORD following my remarks.

Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons are public and well established. Successive CIA Directors, and Secretaries Perry and Christopher have all testified to the effect that Iran is engaged in an extensive effort to acquire nuclear weapons. In February, Russia signed an agreement to provide Iran with a 1,000-megawatt light water nuclear reactor. The Russians indicate that they may soon agree to build as many as three more reactors—another 1,000-megawatt reactor, and two 440-megawatt reactors.

I have raised my concerns regarding this sale with the administration on a number of occasions. I have maintained that under the Freedom Support Act of 1992, which the Iran-Iraq Act of 1992 was intended to reinforce, the President must either terminate assistance to Russia or formally waive the requirement to invoke sanctions out of concern for the national interest.

The State Department informed me in a letter dated April 21, 1995, that ''to the best of its knowledge, Russia has not actually transferred relevant material, equipment, or technology to Iran,'' and so there is no need to consider sanctions. I was further informed that ''they are examining the scope of the proposed Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran, and as appropriate, they will thoroughly evaluate the applicability of sanctions,'' presumably, if at a later date they can confirm the transfer.

I have no reason to question the State Department's evaluation of the facts on the ground. However, I would note that there have been public reports of as many as 150 Russians employed at the site of the proposed reactor. There seems to be a dangerously fine line in determining when material, equipment, or technology useful in the manufacture of nuclear weapons has actually been transferred, especially when, as is the case with Iran, the reactor may already be partially complete.

At what point in the construction of the reactors does the transfer become significant? Do we allow the Russians to build portions of the reactor which do not strictly involve the transfer of dangerous equipment or technology while Iran obtains the most vital assistance from other sources? Although I cannot make this determination myself, common sense and an appropriate sense of caution would dictate that any assistance provided Iran in its efforts to acquire nuclear technology is significant. If the appropriate point to make this decision is not when technicians have been dispatched to the site and construction may have begun, I hope the administration can identify an equally obvious point at which the transfer has become the grounds for sanctions.

More importantly perhaps, I would point out that although the administration may have technical grounds for arguing that it is not yet required to invoke sanctions, making a determination on the applicability of sanctions sooner, rather than later, would serve as necessary leverage in resolving the issue. My intention is not to gut United States assistance to Russia. It is to prevent Russia from providing Iran dangerous technology. Waiting to make a determination until the transfer is complete defeats the purpose of the sanctions.

Ultimately, I fear that the reason the administration has not made a determination is that it does not want to jeopardize our relationship with Russia.

Based on this assumption and anticipating that the State Department may at a later date find other ways to avoid compliance with the Freedom Support Act, the legislation we are introducing today makes the President's legal responsibility under the act more explicit.

We sent our Armed Forces to war in the Persian Gulf once in this decade. They endured hardship to themselves and their families. Some will live with the injuries they incurred in service to our Nation for the rest of their lives. And as is the case with every war, some never returned. With the cooperation of our friends in Europe, whose own sacrifices to the effort to free Kuwait should not be forgotten, we must see that the service of these brave men and women was not in vain.

Stability and security in the Persian Gulf is vital to the world economy and to our own national interests. Aggressors in the region should know that if we must, we will return to the Persian Gulf with the full force of Operation Desert Storm. At the same time, our friends and adversaries elsewhere in the world should understand that the United States will do everything in its power to preclude that necessity. It is my sincere hope that this legislation will serve as an indication of just how serious we are.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that additional material be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
Washington, DC, March 30, 1995.

To: Office of Senator John McCain, Attention: Walter Lohman.

From: Kenneth Katzman, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, and Elizabeth Dunstan, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division.

Subject: Arms and Technology Transfers to Iran.

This memorandum responds to your request to provide an unclassified chronology of reported weapons and technology transfers or agreements to Iran. Please call 7–7612 if you have any questions.

CHRONOLOGY OF WEAPONS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO IRAN USING PRESS REPORTS: OCTOBER 1992-PRESENT

10/8/92—The International Institute for Strategic Studies reported that China would supply a nuclear reactor under construction at Qazvin in northwestern Iran.

10/24/92—An editorial in the Washington Times reported Iran bought Sukhoi–24 light bombers from Russia and three diesel submarines, for $750 million per submarine. Most other sources cite a figure of $450 million a piece. Also, F–7 jet fighters were purchased from China. China reportedly agreed on September 10, 1992 to sell Iran a large nuclear reactor.

11/21/92—According to Defense Weekly, Russia delivered to Iran the first Kilo class submarine with a surface to air missile capacity in the form of manportable SA–14 Gremlin or SA–16 Gimlet.

2/10/93—According to the Jerusalem Israel Television Network, Iran recently took delivery of some Scud-C surface to air missiles with a range of about 500 km, as well as a number of launching pods, in accordance with a deal signed with North Korea. These are in addition to about 250 Scud missiles supplied to Iran before the Gulf War.

2/17/93—According to the U.S. Director of Naval Intelligence Iran has been negotiating for the purpose of five mini-submarines from an unspecified source to augment its Kilo submarines.

4/8/93—According to the New York Times, Iran was close to concluding a deal with North Korea to buy a new intermediate-range missile that the Koreans are developing. (The missile, called Nodong I, is said to have a range of 600 miles, although an extended range version may be able to reach up to about 800 miles).

5/11/93—Iran has taken delivery of eight supersonic, sea-skimming cruise missiles from the Ukraine, according to the Washington Times. The Sunburst missiles, to be based in the Strait of Hormuz, have reportedly been bought as part of a $1.5 billion barter agreement between Tehran, Moscow, and Kiev. Also included in the reported deal are 50 MiG–29, and other combat aircraft, more than 200 T–72M1 battle tanks and S–300 air defense system missiles.

8/8/93—Iran took delivery of its second Russian made Kilo-class submarine.

1/17/94—Defense News reported that Iran was negotiating with China to purchase a rocket-propelled mine called the EM52 that is planted on the sea floor until it detects a target. The report added that Iran had purchased 1,000 modern mines from Russia, including those that detect approaching ships with magnetic, acoustic, and pressure sensors.

3/28/94—China's Xian Aircraft Corporation will fly its Jian Hong-7 bomber on March 28, 1994, to Iran for a series of flight demonstrations, according to a Chinese defense industry source.

5/7/94—Iran will take delivery of its third Kilo-class diesel-electric submarine within five months, according to Jane's Defense Weekly. Iran reportedly bought an estimated 1,800 mines of various types from Russia when it received its first ''Kilo'' in November 1992.

9/19/94—Iran has acquired four or five fast attack missile (FACM) boats from China, according to US Vice Admiral Douglas Katz. The Hegu class vessel is 68 tons and is capable of being armed with C–801 and C–802 surface-to-surface missiles (Delivery of the missiles has not been confirmed).

9/26/94—Director of Central Intelligence James R. Woosley said Iran had acquired MiG29's, Su 24's, and T–72 tanks, as well as two Kilo-class attack submarines, from Russia. He added that Iran had turned to suppliers in ''both East and West,'' using intermediaries to purchase military technology clandestinely.

9/27/94—A senior U.S. official reportedly said in the Washington Post that Russia has given Iran sophisticated aircraft missiles to go along with the jets it sold to Iran.

12/14/94—Iran is trying to buy weapons technology in Germany for use in building Scud missiles, according to Reuters. In October 1994, the International Institute for Strategic Studies said Tehran had obtained 20 Chinese CSS–8 surface-to-surface missiles, armed with conventional weapons.

1/5/95—The New York Times reported that Russia had entered into a deal with Iran to provide up to four nuclear power reactors at the Bushehr nuclear reactor complex, a deal valued at nearly $1 billion. Later reports said the first reactor would be a water-pressurized reactor with a capacity of 1,000 megawatts. Russia might construct an additional 1,000 megawatt reactor and 2,440 megawatt reactors under the deal. The deal, formally announced January 8, 1995, also provides for Russia to train Iranian nuclear scientists and possibly provide research reactors as well. Russia reportedly is also required to recycle nuclear fuel for Iran. The New York Times report added that China has sold Iran two similar reactors and has provided two research reactors, but that those projects have been delayed. China reportedly has also sold several calutrons-magnetic isotope separation devices that can be used to derive uranium for an atomic bomb. In addition, according to the Times, China was setting up an assembly plant in Iran to produce intermediate range ballistic missiles (M–9's and M–11's).

1/30/95—The Washington Times reported that Iran has secured the aid of Indian companies in the construction of a poison-gas complex, according to a classified German intelligence report. The Indian companies have told authorities in Europe and elsewhere that they are engaged in building a pesticide factory just outside Tehran.

2/1/95—Belgian officials impounded a Russian-built surface to air missile bound for Iraq, according to the Washington Times.

3/2/95—The Associated Press said Israel had claimed Iran signed a contract with Argentina to buy fuel rods for reactors and then negotiated over the purchase of heavy water, considered essential for a nuclear weapons program. The report did not make clear whether or not the United States had succeeded in blocking the deal.

3/15/95—The New York Times reported that Iran had developed a vast network in Europe, Russia, and the Central Asian Republics to smuggle to Iran weapons parts and nuclear technology.

3/17/95—Poland announced that it will honor any existing contracts to supply tanks to Iran. Poland did not reveal the details of any tank sale to Iran, however.

4/3/95—The New York Times reported that the United States had provided intelligence to Russia about Iran's nuclear program, as part of any effort to dissuade Russia from providing nuclear technology to Iran. The intelligence reportedly showed that Iran is importing equipment needed to import nuclear weapons, that it has sought to but enriched uranium from former Soviet republics, such as Kazakistan, and that it is using many of the same smuggling techniques and routes that Iraq and Pakistan used in their efforts to acquire nuclear technology.●

● Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, as a cosponsor of the original Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act, I am pleased to join Senator MCCAIN as well in this amendment to the 1992 act. Regrettably, Iran and Iraq have become no more law abiding during the past 2 years than they were when this law was first enacted. On the contrary, Iraq has attempted by persuasion or force to get the international community to lift economic sanctions while preserving as much as possible its catastrophic weapons capability. Iran, meanwhile, has continued its support for international terrorism.

The United States must remain vigilant in its effort to inhibit the destructive capability of these two renegade states. We must do everything we can to prevent them from receiving assistance from any source to pursue international lawlessness.

I believe this amendment will strengthen the current legislation and send a strong signal both to the renegade states and to other states which trade with Iran and Iraq that the United States remains committed to tight economic sanctions. There will be consequences for those who trade in embargoed goods with Iran and Iraq, just as there will be consequences for us all if renegade states are able to pursue their destructive objectives without hindrance. I urge my colleagues to join us in supporting this amendment to strengthen Iran-Iraq sanctions.●

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS

S. 198

At the request of Mr. CHAFEE, the name of the Senator from Alaska [Mr. MURKOWSKI] was added as a cosponsor of S. 198, a bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to permit Medicare select policies to be offered in all States, and for other purposes.

S. 252

At the request of Mr. LOTT, the names of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. DEWINE] and the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. THOMAS] were added as cosponsors of S. 252, a bill to amend title II of the Social Security Act to eliminate the earnings test for individuals who have attained retirement age.

S. 253

At the request of Mr. LOTT, the name of the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND] was added as a cosponsor of S. 253, a bill to repeal certain prohibitions against political recommendations relating to Federal employment, to reenact certain provisions