

They met for several hours, and in the end emerged as cooperative negotiators, both signing the Lusaka accords. They agreed to work as partners to resolve outstanding issues such as consolidation of the ceasefire, resolution of military control issues, demining operations, repair of infrastructure, acceleration of the arrival of UNAVEM troops, the retreat of Angolan soldiers, and the formation of a national unity government.

Finally, the two sides demonstrated that they have the political will necessary to reach a lasting and durable peace. This meeting was a long time in coming, and we in Congress should recognize what a milestone it is. For if Lusaka fails, Angola may lose its last opportunity for peace and prosperity. We have a lot to lose if that fails.

The resolution we are offering today congratulates the people of Angola for the courageous and determined steps their leaders have taken in support of peace. It also urges all parties in Angola to strengthen their commitment to the Lusaka process, and affirms American support for both parties to abide by their commitments. Finally, because we cannot and should not do this alone, it calls upon the international community to remain actively engaged with humanitarian, political, and economic support to make this process a success.

Angola is potentially a wealthy country with soil fertile enough to feed all of sub-Saharan Africa. It is also part of a region which has had economic and stunning political success in the past few years. As Africa seeks to put the cold war behind it, and as southern Africa consolidates into a powerhouse region, the process in Angola becomes all the more important. The meeting convened last week realized many of the gains made in recent months, and hopefully will set the process on a new course.

NOTICES OF HEARINGS

COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I would like to announce that the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs will be holding an oversight hearing on Thursday, May 18, 1995, beginning at 9:30 a.m., in room 485 of the Russell Senate Office Building on the recommendations of the Joint DOI/BIA/Tribal Task Force on Reorganization of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Those wishing additional information should contact the Committee on Indian Affairs at 224-2251.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I wish to announce that the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management and the District of Columbia, Committee on Governmental Affairs, will hold a hearing on Wednesday, May 24, 1995, on Aviation Safety: Do Unapproved Parts Pose a Safety Risk? The hearing will be at 9:30 a.m., in room 342 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building.

AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEES TO MEET

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Armed Services be authorized to meet on Wednesday, May 17, 1995 at 9:30 a.m. in open session to receive testimony on the National Security Implications of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty—START II.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Finance be permitted to meet Wednesday, May 17, 1995, beginning at 9:30 a.m. in room SD-215, to conduct a hearing on Medicare solvency.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, May 17, 1995, at 10 a.m.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent on behalf of the Governmental Affairs Committee to meet on Wednesday, May 17, at 10 a.m., for a hearing on Executive Reorganization: An Overview of How To Do It.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Select Committee on Intelligence be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, May 17, 1995, at 2 p.m. to hold a closed hearing on intelligence matters.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Acquisition and Technology of the Committee on Armed Services be authorized to meet at 2 p.m. on Wednesday, May 17, 1995, in open session, to receive testimony on dual use technology programs in review of S. 727, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, and the Future Years Defense Program.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

HONG KONG

• Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I would like to address comments made in the last few weeks by two officials of the Government of the People's Republic of China regarding the United States and

Hong Kong. First, as reported by Hong Kong radio and Nanhua Zaobao, Mr. Lu Ping, the Director of the PRC's Office of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs, told a delegation of American businessmen in Beijing that he believes there is a lack of understanding in the United States regarding Beijing's attitude towards Hong Kong. Second, Foreign Minister Qian is quoted in the April 24 issue of Beijing Review as stating that the United States has no interest in Hong Kong sufficient to justify the attention we pay to the area. I am dismayed that they have reached this conclusion for two reasons. First, because I believe that the United States is all too cognizant of Beijing's attitude towards the colony and has tried to make that cognizance known; and second, because it demonstrates to me that Beijing does not really understand what our concerns are.

At the outset, let me state that I do agree in part with Minister Qian. Before the scheduled revision in 1997, Hong Kong affairs are a matter of concern primarily to Great Britain and the PRC; after 1997, they become a matter of concern primarily to Beijing. It is not our intent to instruct either London or Beijing on how best to accomplish that reversion, or on what role Hong Kong should play as a reclaimed part of greater China after 1997.

This does not mean however, that I agree with what appears to be Minister Qian's correlative argument: that other countries therefore have absolutely no role whatsoever to play before or after 1997.

As I previously noted in a statement about Hong Kong on the floor on April 3, the United States is keenly following developments in Hong Kong. This interest has two principle sources. First, we have a tremendous stake in the future economic and political stability of Hong Kong after reversion. Second, how the PRC handles this transition has far-reaching implications for our bilateral relations—and in some of China's multilateral relations which include us—in other important arenas. Let me address these in turn.

Our economic ties to the present Colony of Hong Kong are substantial. Hong Kong is our 13th largest trading partner—7th in terms of agricultural trade. In 1994, two-way merchandise trade topped \$21 billion; U.S. exports accounted for over \$11 billion. There are more than 1,000 United States firms with a presence in Hong Kong, of which about 370 have their regional headquarters there. At the beginning of 1994, United States direct investment in Hong Kong on a historical cost basis was approximately \$10.5 billion.

This strong economic tie is facilitated—in fact, made possible—by Hong Kong's friendly business climate, a stable government, an independent judiciary firmly rooted in the rule of law and a vibrantly free press. It is clearly a tie we have a very strong motive for

maintaining in its present form. And thus, it is from this point of view that we take an active interest in Hong Kong affairs now, and will most likely continue to take in the post-1997 world. How faithfully the PRC adheres to the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law is of importance to us because of the impact such adherence—or lack thereof—might have on these specific areas, and, in turn, on our economic stake.

These are the logical steps that our Chinese friends do not seem to follow. I think their failure is best illustrated by an article in the May 8 edition of the Hong Kong Chinese-language newspaper *Wen Wei Po*—a newspaper with close connections to the PRC. In commenting on a speech by the United States Consul General in Hong Kong, the newspaper reported:

In his speech, Mr. Mueller said that the United States not only has tens of thousands of citizens, over 1,000 companies, and tens of billions of dollars of investments in Hong Kong, but also exports billions of dollars' worth of products to Hong Kong. These facts, he noted, show that maintaining and developing economic and trade relations with Hong Kong is conducive to safeguarding the common interests of Hong Kong and the United States, this being indeed the point Mr. Mueller was trying to make. *What is strange is that Mr. Mueller suddenly shifted from economic topics to topics such as democracy, the legal system, and human rights in Hong Kong* * * * (emphasis added).

So, let me explain simply how desiring to safeguard our economic interests triggers a concomitant interest in those topics. If the PRC cannot or does not firmly establish and safeguard a local independent judiciary in Hong Kong after 1997, then businesses will become skittish, pull out of the area, and the economy will suffer. If the civil and human rights presently available to Hong Kong citizens are not safeguarded, and are instead limited to reflect those presently available to citizens on the mainland where the government is not known for its sterling democratic reputation, then businesses will become skittish, pull out of the area, and the economy will suffer. If the present orderly and stable bureaucracy is replaced by one such as that currently in vogue in provinces like Guangdong where family or party connections and a large amount of renminbi are more important than the rule of law, then businesses will become skittish, pull out of the area, and the economy will suffer.

We understand very well the PRC's verbal pronouncements that everything is fine and will remain so after 1997. But as I pointed out after the visit here of Lu Ping, to be credible and calming those pronouncements need to be backed-up with substantive actions. So far, in some areas, that has not been the case, and it is this lack of substantive assurances that concerns us. Let me illustrate.

A free press is one of the elements essential to Hong Kong's future as a center of international trade and finance.

China has spoken about maintaining freedom of the press, but we have seen growing signs of a move to chill the colony's traditionally raucous press—a press which has been quite even-handed at denouncing Beijing and London, but has denounced Beijing nonetheless. There have been declarations that the PRC will not allow Hong Kong to become a “nest of subversives”—which in the PRC's lexicon could well include free-minded members of the media. The PRC's Ministry of Public Security recently confirmed that it has been gathering information on Hong Kong citizens who are “against the Chinese government.” The PRC also tried in secret Hong Kong reporter Xi Yang and sentenced him to 12 years in prison for “stealing state financial secrets”—a term which could include such simple figures as production levels of consumer goods, provincial GDP's, etc. Finally, there were the not-so-coincidental hostile actions taken by the PRC against the Beijing commercial establishments of Hong Kong publisher Jimmy Lai after Lai published an open letter critical of Li Peng.

A continuation of the present common law, independent judiciary is another element of Hong Kong's continuing economic success after 1997. Businesses feel secure if they know that any commercial dispute in which they may be involved will be determined using settled points of law adjudicated by jurists beyond the influence of local politics or influence. The PRC has promised a continuation of this system, but again their actions speak louder to us. Beijing has failed to endorse the Hong Kong Government's draft legislation designed to implement the Court of Final Appeal; failure to do so soon may leave the Hong Kong SAR without such a court for the critical period just after 1997. Moreover, China's past commitment to the rule of law has been very spotty at best. Although a signatory to the International Convention on Arbitration, the PRC has blatantly violated that accord by allowing a Shanghai firm to refuse to pay an arbitral award against it in favor of a U.S. concern named Revpower. China is a signatory to several agreements concerning intellectual property rights, but their compliance until lately was almost nonexistent. The terms of contracts in general in China appear to be binding on the foreign firm, and fungible as far as the Government is concerned—witness the recent unilateral breaking of McDonald's lease for a site on Tiananmen Square with which my colleagues are no doubt familiar.

Aside from our specific interest in these specific issues and the ramifications they will have for Hong Kong's future, how the PRC handles this transition also has implications in other non-Hong Kong specific arenas. How well the PRC keeps to their word will, I think, demonstrate their dependability as they seek to accede to the WTO and other similar organizations. More-

over, it will serve as an indicator as to whether the Chinese are serious about their own commitments to foreign investors, and will be a signal to those considering future investment.

Mr. President, on May 25 the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, which I chair, will hold a hearing on this topic entitled “Hong Kong: Problems and Prospects for 1997.” I look forward to hearing from several Hong Kong specialists about the present state of the transition, where the problem areas are, and what they think the prospects are for the continuation of the colony's present economic prosperity after 1997.

In closing, let me reiterate that we are not seeking to meddle in Great Britain and China's purely bilateral affairs. But, where the actions of either party might effect the business climate in Hong Kong—and thus international investment—I believe that we have a legitimate reason for showing interest, and the parties can be sure that we will. This is our message to Beijing. ●

THOUGHTFUL HOMILY OF MOST
REV. EDWARD M. EGAN

● Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I recently came across a copy of a homily delivered last year by the Most Rev. Edward M. Egan, bishop of Bridgeport, that I believe is worthy of inclusion in the RECORD.

With so much debate of late about the quality of public discourse in this country, the words of Bishop Egan remind us of the need to be respectful of the heartfelt opinions of others, no matter how strongly we might disagree with their point of view.

The bishop's homily was delivered at the red Mass at Saint Matthew's Cathedral here in Washington on October 2, 1994. The red Mass is an annual Mass celebrated for people involved in the legal profession and the bishop urges lawyers, as “protectors of thought and its free expression,” to do all they can to protect the speech of those who utter unpopular beliefs and to ensure that all people in our society are allowed to enter the national dialogue over the issues that govern our fate. Speaking to leaders of the legal community, including the Attorney General, and members of the Supreme Court, Bishop Egan cautioned that lawyers must “insist that the unapproved point of view be heard and explored.”

Bishop Egan has provided wonderful leadership in his time in Connecticut in so many different ways. I am proud to consider him a friend. Whether my colleagues agree or disagree with all of Bishop Egan's words and examples regarding political correctness, I know they will find his homily to be eloquent and thought-providing. It is in that spirit that I ask that it be printed in the RECORD.

The homily follows: