

included, accepted and supported by other Members that have virtually nothing to do with the fundamental issues of violence and terrorism, but the Members understand that and know it and the RECORD reflects it.

This is dealing with an instrument which law enforcement officials believe can be extremely important and significant in helping to protect American citizens. It is a simple concept to continue those kinds of records so that law enforcement, both local and State officials, that are investigating crimes and violence will have an additional tool to make these kinds of arrests and prosecutions and to keep this country a safer place.

Mr. President, I hope that we would at least be given the opportunity to have a vote on this measure. I just point out this issue is not going to go away. I also take umbrage with the fact that we have been on this for 2½ days. We spent this morning debating another gun issue where the majority could not decide whether they wanted to vote for it, against it, or accept it. And then after they had their caucus, they decided that they would go ahead and accept it.

I take umbrage with the fact that this is a desire to delay by any of us. The measures which have been debated have been extremely important. We are prepared to cooperate with the managers in any way to get an early resolution. But this matter is of importance to law enforcement officials and to the safety and security of the American people. That is what this measure is about—terrorism. This amendment, a modest amendment, ought to be accepted.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the majority leader.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, it had been my hope following the policy luncheon that we would have a major shortening of the list of amendments on the other side of the aisle. As I understand, there has been really no effort to limit the amendments, except they picked out five or six amendments which are not germane and suggested time agreements on the nongermane amendments. I do not know the merits of this amendment. It may be a very good amendment. I do not debate the Senator from Massachusetts. I do not believe it was suggested in the President's bill—in any of the President's bills. Again, the President sent me a letter on May 25 outlining his objectives for an antiterrorism bill. There is nothing with reference to this amendment in it.

The President did change. We had a vote on the taggants amendment yesterday. We accepted another gun amendment. I think what this has become is the Democrats are bringing up all the gun amendments they have been keeping in their closet.

Mr. President, we are not going to play that game. I made the best effort I could to work with the White House in an effort to pass antiterrorism legis-

lation, but the Democrats just insist they do not want to do that. They do not want to pass antiterrorism legislation. They have already forgotten what happened in Oklahoma City. They want to have a big debate out here, a big political debate to try to score a few political points, and that is not going to happen.

If we want an antiterrorism bill, we will vote for cloture tomorrow morning. If we do not, that is it, we will go on to telecommunications. The majority is not going to play this game for the benefit of a few Democrats who want to continue to try to make political points. It is almost impossible to work with this White House when you have Democrats in the Senate not willing to work with the White House. How do they expect Republicans in the Senate to work with the White House?

We are not going to play these games. We were told we were going to get a big list of amendments that were going to be eliminated. None has been eliminated. So I am going to suggest that we have a period for the transaction of morning business for the next 45 minutes, and we are going to try to determine what is going to happen. If nothing is going to happen, then we will just recess for the day, have a cloture vote tomorrow, and if the Democrats vote against cloture, that is fine. I want all of them to explain to the President why they did not support an antiterrorism bill, a bipartisan antiterrorism bill.

We began this bill on Thursday. We were delayed 1 day because the Democrats had 60-some votes on the budget bill. We have had filibuster by amendment around here all year long, bill after bill after bill. "Oh, do not file cloture, we will just propose 50 or 60 amendments." We had a record 32 votes in 1 day on amendments on everything they could think of.

So we began on Thursday, and we were on it on Friday and Monday, and now it is Tuesday. Now I understand they do not want to do anything tomorrow. They want to wait and get all these time agreements on habeas corpus. Tomorrow is Wednesday. We are just eating into the August recess day by day, and if nobody cares, it does not make any difference to this Senator, because I assume we will probably be here in any event.

Either we are going to get cooperation on the other side of the aisle or we are going to pull the bill down. I think the best thing to do is wait and have a cloture vote. Stop playing the game. Let us have a cloture vote tomorrow morning, and if Members on that side want to support their President with an antiterrorism bill, they will vote for cloture. If they do not want to support their President, they will vote against cloture. It is all right with this Senator, but we will have kept our word with the President of the United States to deliver him an antiterrorism bill, not a bill with a lot of amendments on it to make a political point for someone on the other side.

So I have just reached the limit of my patience on this particular measure.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be a period for the transaction of morning business until the hour of 4:30, with Members permitted to speak therein for 5 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD BOSNIA

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, at this moment, several thousand United States troops and their equipment are headed for Europe to positions near Bosnia and Herzegovina. Tomorrow the Armed Services Committee will hold hearings on this deployment and U.S. policy. On Thursday the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will also conduct hearings to learn about current United States policy toward Bosnia.

These hearings are of critical importance—not only because of the seriousness of sending American ground forces into harm's way, but because of the continued confusion over U.S. policy.

Last Wednesday, at the Air Force Academy, the President stated, and I quote:

I believe we should be prepared to assist NATO if it decides to meet a request from the United Nations troops for help in a withdrawal or a reconfiguration and a strengthening of its forces.

But, a few days later, in his weekly radio address, the President stated that in addition to assisting in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, the United States may send ground troops in the "highly unlikely event" that part of the U.N. force became "stranded and could not get out of a particular place in Bosnia" and need "emergency extraction." The President added that such an emergency operation would be "limited and temporary."

The first question each of the committees must ask is what is U.S. policy today. Is it to help strengthen and reconfigure U.N. forces, or is it to assist in "emergency extraction"? Furthermore, what is the difference between reconfiguring forces and emergency extraction? What is the relationship between emergency extraction and total U.N. withdrawal? Would such an extraction be a prelude to full withdrawal? In other words, what is the mission of U.S. ground forces if they are deployed for contingencies other than participating in a complete withdrawal of U.N. forces.

Then the committees will need to turn to basic operational questions:

What is the NATO-U.N. relationship? When does NATO command begin? How far does it extend—to all air and ground forces in Bosnia?

What is the command structure and its relationship with U.N. commanders?

What are the rules of engagement? Are they robust?

What are the threats to our forces? How will they be addressed?

What is the estimated duration of the operation? Last August during DOD authorization conference former U.S. Envoy Chuck Redman told conferees that Pentagon estimates were that a withdrawal operation would take 3 months—to include equipment. If the current plan anticipates a longer duration, why is that the case? If the duration is lengthy, is this because of demands by UNPROFOR contributors to take all of their equipment—not just lethal equipment? And will U.S. lives be risked to save equipment?

With respect to emergency extraction operations, how are the terms “limited” and “temporary” defined?

What will the United States role be in U.N. decisions which could lead to such emergencies, for example if Bosnian Serbs retaliate for an UNPROFOR action by overrunning Gorazde?

In addition, the committees will need to pursue the administration's decision to provide close air support to the quick reaction force. Reportedly, Secretary Perry has agreed to make helicopter gunships part of potential close air support operations for the quick reaction force. AC-130's, unlike our F-16's, fly slow and close to the ground—therefore they are more vulnerable.

What actions will NATO take to suppress the threats posed by surface to air missiles [SAM's]?

When will such action be taken?

An American pilot was shot down by a SAM and is missing. Last December, Adm. Leighton Smith, our NATO Commander in Naples wanted to take out Bosnian Serb SAM sites because of the threat they posed to pilots patrolling the no-fly zone. But, NATO did not take out those SAMs because the U.N. commanders said “no.” Had NATO acted 6 months ago, our pilot may not have been shot down. So the question now is, are we going to send more Americans into harm's way without taking measures to reduce the risk?

On the diplomatic front, there are also many questions.

What is the diplomatic strategy with respect to Serbian President Milosevic? Are we sure there is a split between Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic, or is Milosevic playing good cop and Karadzic bad cop? If there is a split how do we explain Milosevic's role in releasing some of the U.N. hostages? Has Milosevic been promised anything in return for his assistance in securing the release of hostages? I understand this afternoon there may be another 50 or so released.

Are we going to agree to lift most sanctions on Serbia in return for recognition of Bosnia and what does recognition mean—really closing the borders and cutting off supplies and military contact with the Bosnian Serbs?

If we lift sanctions on Serbia now, how do we maintain any leverage over Serbian actions against the Albanians in Kosova and Serbian support for militant separatists in Croatia?

Mr. President, I have not listed all of the questions that need to be asked at the hearings this week. Furthermore, these matters need to be placed in a larger context—namely, what is the objective of these actions: Is it to remove U.N. forces or to keep them there? Are we serious about withdrawal or not? If not, why not?

This bigger picture should be the focus of administration consultations with the Congress. We should not only be informed about NATO planning and operations. We should be engaging in a dialog about where we are going. Are we at last going to lift the unjust and illegal arms embargo on Bosnia?

I believe that the United States has interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As George Will said this week in *Newsweek* in response to the charge made by some that the United States has no “dogs in this fight,” that, and I quote,

But those in the fight are not dogs and by the embargo we have helped make the fight grotesquely unfair. What would be the consequences on our national self-respect—our Nation's soul—of a preventable Serbian victory followed by “cleansing” massacres? Bosnian Serbs have seized 70 percent of Bosnia but they are not a mighty military force and will become even less so if the Serbian Government in Belgrade can be pressured into leaving Bosnia's separatist Serbs isolated in combat with a Bosnian army equipped at last with tanks and artillery. The Serbs fighting in Bosnia are bullies led by war criminals collaborating with a dictator. If we don't have an interest in this fight, what are we?

Mr. President, I believe that we need to assist our NATO allies in the event of U.N. withdrawal. However, I also believe that we need to recognize that U.N. efforts in Bosnia have failed—failed to stop aggression, failed to bring peace, and failed to protect the Bosnians.

The *New Republic* in its June 19 editorial states that, and I quote,

There is another Bosnian crisis this week. Not in Bosnia, of course. In Bosnia things are the same, only more so. A greater Serbia is slowly and steadily emerging by means of a genocidal war. No, the crisis is taking place in the capitals of the Western powers, which are finding it harder and harder to escape the consequences of their policy of appeasement.

The European decision to create a quick reaction force [QRF] is in itself an admission of failure. The QRF is intended to protect UNPROFOR, not the Bosnians. And the very tasks the QRF envisions being engaged in, such as securing the Sarajevo Airport, are tasks that were originally given to UNPROFOR by the U.N. Security Council. Therefore, there is a real question of whether or not sending more forces—even with more equipment—will do anything more than supply the Bosnian Serbs with more potential hostages.

The bottom line is that keeping UNPROFOR on the ground indefinitely

will not bring us to a solution in Bosnia. Indeed it will prevent a solution by reinforcing the failed status quo. As the *New Republic* points out, and I quote,

It cannot have escaped the notice of our policymakers that the U.N. is providing cover for the Serbs, except that the U.N. is providing cover for our policymakers, too. It saves them from the prospect of action.

Mr. President, withdrawing the U.N. force is the first step away from failure and toward a solution. I support United States participation, to include ground troops, in a NATO operation to withdraw U.N. forces from Bosnia provided certain conditions are met.

Therefore, sometime over the next few days I intend to introduce a resolution to authorize the President to use United States ground forces to assist in the complete withdrawal of U.N. forces from Bosnia under the following conditions:

First, NATO command, from start to finish, no U.N.-NATO dual-key arrangement;

Second, robust rules of engagement which provide for massive response to any provocation or attack on U.S. forces;

Third, no risking U.S. lives to rescue equipment; and

Fourth, prior agreement on next steps, to include lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Mr. President, we need to support our allies. But we must make sure that in so doing, we are neither prolonging a failed policy or leaping into a quagmire. I believe that this resolution will provide the President with essential support of the Congress and will help put us on the right policy track.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the complete article by George Will and the article in the *New Republic* be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

“A DOG IN THAT FIGHT”? THE SECRETARY OF STATE, A SWEET MAN SADLY MISCAST, IS PUZZLED

(By George F. Will)

When Hitler sent Ribbentrop to Moscow in August 1939 to sign the nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union, he sent along his personal photographer with instructions to obtain close-ups of Stalin's ear lobes. Hitler wondered whether Stalin had Jewish blood and wanted to see if his ear lobes were “ingrown and Jewish, or separate and Aryan.” This historical nugget (from Alan Bullock's “Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives”) is offered at this juncture in America's debate about Bosnia, as a reminder of a quality European politics has sometimes had in this century. Some American policymakers need to be reminded.

When Serbians took hostages from U.N. personnel in Bosnia and chained them to military targets as human shields, Warren Christopher was puzzled: “It's really not part of any reasonable struggle that might be going on there.” While the Secretary of State, a sweet man sadly miscast, searches for reasonableness amid the Balkan rubble, there are “peacekeepers” where there is no peace to be kept and “safe zones” where slaughter is random. UNPROFOR (the U.N.

Protection Force) is akin to the Holy Roman Empire, which was neither holy nor Roman nor an empire. The U.N. force isn't forceful, so it needs more protection than it offers.

This war has been misdescribed as Europe's first civil war since that in Greece in the 1940s and the most portentous civil war since republicans fought fascists in Spain in the 1930s. Actually, this war now churning into its fourth summer is a war of Serbian aggression. It has been a war of aggression since 1992, when the European Community recognized Bosnia as a sovereign state, and since Bosnia became a member of the United Nations. Perhaps Bosnia's inconvenient existence is unfortunate, and perhaps Bosnia will yet be sundered by partition. But it is a state and that is why Pat Moynihan, carrying Woodrow Wilson's torch for international law and collective security, says of Bosnia. "Everything is at stake here, if principle is everything." Says Moynihan, if neither NATO nor the United Nations can summon the will to cope with Serbia, "what have we gone through the 20th century for?" We went through it because we had no choice, but you know what he means: A century that began, in effect, at the Somme and went downhill from there to Auschwitz is ending with a wired world watching rape camps used in the service of "ethnic cleansing." All this 80 minutes by air from Rome.

Europe's first war between nations since 1945 illustrates an astounding fact: In this century of European fighting faiths—communism, fascism, socialism, pan-Germanism, pan-Slavism and more—the one hardest to extinguish turns out to be the variant of fascism fueling the drive for Greater Serbia. Like pure fascism it asserts the primacy of the primordial and the goal of perfect national unity achieved by the expulsion or murder of "unassimilables." This explains the violent Serbian loathing of Sarajevo, where Christians and Muslims have peacefully coexisted. Hitler and Mussolini thought they were defending old Europe against the modern menace of Bolshevism. The Serbs think this is the year 732 and they are with Charles Martel saving Christian Europe by stopping the Moslem advance at Tours. Or it is 1529 and they are stopping Suleiman at the gates of Vienna. The Ottoman Empire is long gone, but the gunners in the hills surrounding Sarajevo refer to their targets—civilians dashing from doorway to doorway—as Turks.

Serbia is a raw reassertion of pre-modernity, the idea that uniform ethnicity and shared myths are essential to a political community. This war, which mocks the notion that Europe has become a supranational society, began in 1992, the year the Maastricht Treaty was signed, supposedly to make "Europe" a truly political as well as geographical expression. The United Nations, embodiment of the modern aspiration of a morality of nations, has been no match for Serbia. And the U.N.'s arms embargo against both sides—high-minded, scrupulous neutrality between Serbian slaughterers and their victims—has been a policy of gross immorality.

The embargo was imposed in 1991 against the whole of disintegrating Yugoslavia. When Yugoslavia disappeared the embargo was continued. That favored Serbia, which had ample weapons from the former Yugoslav army and had a large armaments industry. Now the embargo violates the U.N. Charter, which acknowledges every nation's "inherent" right of self-defense. President Bush defended the embargo with a flippancy about the problem in the Balkans not being an insufficiency of weapons. Today defenders of the embargo say it economizes violence because lifting it would prolong the fighting. This argument is especially unpleasant when

used by the British, who today might be obeying German traffic laws if Lend-Lease had not prolonged the fighting.

So far the NATO nations have insufficient political will to impose a solution or use force to help restore the integrity of Bosnia. The Serbs are what the NATO nations are not: serious. The NATO nations want to end the game, the Serbs want to win it. Other people with ancient animosities and modern weapons are watching. It probably is not just coincidental that Russian revanchism became bold regarding Chechnya as the NATO nations became, through the embargo, collaborators with Serbian irredentism. If the irredentism goes unopposed when the UNPROFOR charade ends, the irredentism will become, even more than it already is, genocidal.

Secretary of State James Baker famously said of the Balkan conflict, "We don't have a dog in that fight." But those in the fight are not dogs and by the embargo we have helped make the fight grotesquely unfair. What would be the consequences on our national self-respect—our nation's soul—of a preventable Serbian victory followed by "cleansing" massacres? Bosnian Serbs have seized 70 percent of Bosnia but they are not a mighty military force and will become even less so if the Serbian government in Belgrade can be pressured into leaving Bosnia's separatist Serbs isolated in combat with a Bosnian army equipped at last with tanks and artillery. The Serbs fighting in Bosnia are bullies led by war criminals collaborating with a dictator. If we don't have an interest in this fight, what are we?

THE ABDICATION, AGAIN

This year is the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. The celebrations will go on and on, as politicians make banal speeches to command-performance audiences. It is unlikely that Bosnia will appear among their banalities. For it is in Bosnia that the debility of the United Nations has finally been revealed.

There is another Bosnian crisis this week. Not in Bosnia, of course. In Bosnia things are the same, only more so. A Greater Serbia is slowly and steadily emerging by means of a genocidal war. No, the crisis is taking place in the capitals of the Western powers, which are finding it harder and harder to escape the consequences of their policy of appeasement. The doves, you might say, are coming home to roost. And they still don't get it. When the Serbs made hostages of hundreds of United Nations troops last week, a spokesman for the U.N. thundered that "the Bosnian Serb army is behaving like a terrorist organization." But the Bosnian Serb army is a terrorist organization, unless you wish to include systematic rape among the terms of military engagement. And the general in command of the U.N. forces in Bosnia demanded of General Ratko Mladic "that he treat the United Nations soldiers in a manner becoming a professional soldier." But General Mladic is not a professional soldier. He is a man wanted for war crimes.

Here is what happened last week. The Serbs moved heavy weapons closer to Sarajevo and fired upon it. They have done so before. NATO issued warnings. It has done so before. The Serbs ignored the warnings. They have done so before. NATO launched a trivial attack against a Serb position. It has done so before. The Serbs responded by taking U.N. troops hostage. They have done so before. The only thing that changed last week, in short, was that the latent became manifest. De facto hostages became de jure hostages.

Also the iconography of the conflict was enriched. There have been many indelible

images of the slaughter in Bosnia; last week's pictures of the scattered limbs in the Tuzla café were only the most recent ones. What was lacking, until last week, were images of the West's weakness. Now we have those photographs of those U.N. soldiers chained to those poles. Not exactly a picture of a helicopter lifting off the roof of an American embassy, to be sure; but surely a picture of our humiliation, of the forces of order flouted, of the triumph of tribalism over pluralism, of the lupine post-cold war world in full swing. No amount of "pragmatic neo-Wilsonianism" (the empty locution of Anthony Lake, who prefers the devising of bold foreign policy rationales to the devising of bold foreign policy) will erase these images of Western impotence from the memories of warlords and xenophobes around the world. They have been instructed that this is their time.

Two conclusions are being drawn from the success of the Serbs. The first is that the use of force has failed. "The Bosnian Serbs have now trumped our ace," as former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger told *The Washington Post*. Eagleburger's pronouncement is utterly self-serving; the man was one of the architects of American appeasement in the Bush administration. Still, the Clinton administration will not exactly recoil from an analysis that refuses to entertain the serious use of real force. For this reason, it is important to understand that we did not play our ace in Pale last week.

Though the West has occasionally acted militarily against the Serbs in Bosnia, the West's response has been fundamentally unmilitary. No sustained air campaign against the war-making ability of the Serbs in Bosnia was ever really considered. (The precision of the wee assault on Pale, by the way, shows what can be accomplished by air power.) Like NATO's previous strikes, NATO's strike last week was more a demonstration of inhibition than a demonstration of the lack of it. This was not what the Serbs were fearing. It was what they were counting on. This trifling retort to the Serbs' violation of the Sarajevo arrangement played right into the Serbs' hands: it was a military response so predictably puny that it could serve only as a pretext for a Serb provocation. It also reassured the Serbs that they will never experience punishments proportionate to their crimes, and they assassinated the Bosnian foreign minister.

The second conclusion is that we must act forcefully against the Serbs to help . . . the United Nations. The ministers of the Contact Group (including the foreign minister of Russia, who must have been chuckling) announced at The Hague that they intended to expand the size of the U.N. mission and to fortify it with heavier weapons. They said nothing about the nature of the mission itself. For all with eyes to see, of course, the essential absurdity of the U.N. mission was made brutally plain last week. The blue helmets are "peacekeepers" where there is no peace in "safe areas" that are not safe. They have not impeded the war or the genocide. They have impeded only a powerful and decent response.

Recall that the "safe areas" of Bosnia were supposed to be made safe by the U.N. There are six such enclaves: Sarajevo, Bihać, Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, Tuzla. The list of their names is a litany of lament. The U.N. has brought them little respite. When the Serbs attack, the blue helmets retreat. On May 21, *The New York Times* described a videotape that captured a Serb atrocity on a Sarajevo street: "The crack of a shot echoes in Sarajevo's valley. He [a young Bosnian man] falls. He lies on his side. He is curled in an almost fetal position. A United Nations soldier looks on." In Bosnia, a U.N. soldier

always looks on. Bystanders or hostages: that is what the "peacekeepers really are.

It cannot have escaped the notice of our policymakers that the U.N. is providing cover for the Serbs, except that the U.N. is providing cover for our policymakers, too. It saves them from the prospect of action. That is why the plight of the U.N. stirs them more than the plight of Bosnia. And nobody is less stirred by the plight of Bosnia than the aloof Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who put an early damper on international outrage when he called this a "rich man's war." The Bosnians, he said, were less deserving than those under siege, by hunger and by arms, in Africa. And the United States followed the secretary general's recommendation. We sent troops to Somalia and we sent no troops to Bosnia.

It is hard to think of a major crisis since the Second World War in which the president of the United States has wielded less moral and political authority. There are 22,470 U.N. troops in Bosnia, from eighteen countries. Britain has 3,565 men under arms; France has 3,835; Pakistan has 2,978. The United States has none, and the Clinton administration, the same administration that denounces the Republicans as isolationists, regularly boasts about it. In such circumstances, it is impossible for the president of the United States to lead. But he is not chafing. He does not wish to lead. He isn't terribly interested. When his national security advisers met last week in the West Wing, he stayed in the East Wing. He did tell a reporter, though, that "the taking of hostages, as well as the killing of civilians, is totally wrong and inappropriate and it should stop." And also that "I would ask him [Boris Yeltsin] to call the Serbs and tell them to quit it, and tell them to behave themselves."

To behave themselves. And if that fails, to go to their room. Does Clinton grasp that there is evil in the world? And does he understand that he is not the governor of the United States? It is a requirement of his job that he care about matters beyond our borders, matters such as war and genocide and the general collapse of America's role in the world, matters that will not gain him a point in the polls. The joke on Clinton is that he is almost certainly about to be hoist by his own isolationism. The result of the Bosnia policy that was designed to spare the United States all costs in lives and dollars may be a U.N. "extraction operation" that will require the deployment of many thousands of American troops and the expense of many millions of American dollars. And Bosnia will have been destroyed. Nice work.

It is time to conclude this sinister farce. The U.N. should get out of the way. Its forces must be withdrawn, so that the Serbs may no longer hide behind them, and then the Bosnians must be armed, so that they can fight their own fight, which is all that they are asking to do. Withdraw and strike, lift and strike. Obviously this is not as simple as it sounds. The withdrawal of the U.N. will mean war; and unless NATO provides protection from the air, for the departing U.N. troops and for the training of Bosnian troops, the U.N. withdrawal will expose the Bosnians to the Serbs as brusquely as it will expose the Serbs to the Bosnians, and Bosnia will fall. But there already is war and Bosnia already is falling. Anyway, Bill Clinton and Boutros Boutros-Ghali and John Major and the rest are not keeping the U.N. in Bosnia to spare it horror. They can live with its horror. They are keeping the U.N. in Bosnia to spare themselves a reckoning with their own failure. For it is they who ordained that Bosnia become a place where it is always too late for justice.

THE ANTITERRORISM BILL

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I did not get the opportunity to respond to the majority leader prior to the time he made his statement on Bosnia.

Let me say I am disappointed that the majority leader would come to the floor and make the statement that Democrats do not care about what happened in Oklahoma. I hope he does not mean that. I hope he did not really mean to say that, because that is wrong and in my view it is uncalled for.

We care just as deeply as anybody on the other side about what happened in Oklahoma. I hope we do not have to hear a statement like that again on the Senate floor. We care just as deeply about responding to this issue, and we will respond to it. But we also care very deeply about our right to offer some fundamental amendments to this bill.

Let me remind everyone this bill did not go through committee. This bill was not the subject of hearings. We went straight to the floor, brought this bill up on Friday, offered some amendments and took a week's break. If we care so much about this legislation, why in the world did we have to take a week off before we came back? Now we are on it, and this is the third day.

Mr. President, I have worked on our side to bring the list of amendments down, as I said I would. We have gone from over 60 amendments to, as I understand it, 15 or 16. We have come to a point where we can finish this entire bill—and we can stay in as long as necessary to do it—in less than 12 hours. We will get all of the amendments up. We will have votes on them and very short time agreements. We will finish this bill tomorrow at whatever time we want to. We can do it.

Everybody can respond. We can make our political points on both sides, if we have to, but we are going to complete action on this bill.

But let me tell you, if we do not have a right to offer amendments on this bill, of if in some way we are prevented from doing so tomorrow and the next day, and this bill is pulled from the floor, I want to put everybody on notice that we will offer it to the telecommunications bill and every other single piece of legislation that comes on this floor until we resolve it. So this is not going to go away. Our rights are going to be protected. I want everybody to understand that.

So, Mr. President, I hope we can work through this and I believe we can. I hope that in the course of the next hour or two, we can work through this, come up with an agreement, resolve our differences on procedure here, and finally come to a point where we can vote on final passage. We can do it. We need to work together.

I know patience is strained on both sides. But I believe we have to accommodate Senators' rights here, and a Senator has a right to offer an amendment on this bill, as we have attempted

to do. We are down to a short list, and I believe we ought to work through the amendments on it.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, well, we had hearings on wiretap authority, and we had general hearings before the FBI Director Freeh. We have had numerous hearings on habeas corpus reform. We have had hearings on alien terrorist removal and posse comitatus. We have had a lot of hearings. But, again, I remind the Democratic leader that the President of the United States, who happens to be a Democrat, wants to get this bill passed. Does he want 16 amendments or 26 amendments or 36 amendments? He wants the bill passed.

You cannot have it both ways. You cannot criticize Members on weekends for not passing a bill, saying there are too many amendments, and saying he wants to cooperate and have 16 amendments. Members do not need 16. They probably do not need six. They probably do not need five amendments.

This happens to be your administration, your President, who is taking credit for the antiterrorism bill, and the Democrats will not let it pass because they have to have all of their amendments. They have to have 16 amendments. Why do they need 16 amendments?

This is an antiterrorism bill, not a gun bill and not any other kind of bill. We ought to pass it. We ought to pass it in the next couple of hours. We probably will not. We probably will not pass it at all. We will have a cloture vote tomorrow. If the Democrats vote against cloture, that is fine. Then they will have spoken. They will have made a statement on how they feel about antiterrorism legislation.

If the President were on their side saying, "Gentleman, we have to have all these amendments," I can understand. But he is on our side. He is on our side. He said he was last night on Larry King. He wants habeas corpus reform. He wants what is in this bill. He wants the terrorism bill. "The majority leader is right saying there are too many amendments." We have gone back to our people and said they cannot offer these amendments. Offer them some other time.

We will be in session for a long, long time. I was told we should have stayed here during the week. Do not give me that stuff. Sixty-seven amendments offered by the Democrats, and I was told by the manager on the other side they would work all these things out over the recess. In fact, I asked the question. Let Members not come back on Monday and say we just got back from recess, we have not made any headway.

It is very frustrating. I know the Senate is a different place. I know one Senator can delay as long as they can, and two or three Senators can delay for days and days.

This is something that the President of the United States wants very badly. It is something I assume that the Democrats want badly. If they want it