

open financial markets. Under such a plan, the United States could immediately sign agreements with the European Union, Switzerland, Norway, and other countries that are offering national treatment. We could then continue to negotiate with other nations, using access to our lucrative American market as a lever to get them to open their own.

There is no question the United States is under strong international pressure to surrender our MFN exemption. Earlier this year, a senior British trade official flew to Washington to pressure United States Treasury officials to sign an agreement in Geneva—regardless of whether it makes sense for the United States. And the head of the WTO argued recently that the United States must make the right decision and sign whatever agreement is on the table when the deadline rolls around.

Proponents of a deal argue that failure to conclude an agreement will weaken the WTO. But that argument is hogwash. To the contrary, the worst thing we could do would be to sign an agreement that sanctions closed markets and unfair barriers. That would weaken support for the WTO far more than failure to reach an agreement in Geneva. The American people rightly expect that free trade must be a two-way street.

In recent days, some have proposed an extension of the talks as one way to deal with the lack of progress. I believe an extension makes sense since it will allow us to build on the progress that has been made to date. I believe strongly, however, that for the United States to maintain its leverage during any extended talks—whether in the multilateral WTO forum, or on a bilateral basis—the United States must exercise its MFN exemption. To do otherwise would remove any incentive for countries such as Korea, which wants to expand in our market, to negotiate in good faith. Exercising our MFN exemption would not require the United States to retaliate against other countries or to, in any way, close off its market. It would merely give us the right to do so at a later date, if we decided it was in our best interest to do so. Granting MFN, on the other hand, would lock our market open—and thereby remove our leverage in the talks.

U.S. negotiators should stand firm. The United States has played the sucker far too many times in international trade negotiations. The stakes this time are simply too high. Handshakes and promises of future action are not good enough. If the final written offers are not significantly better than those on the table today, U.S. trade officials should act in our clear national interest, and walk away from the table.●

RECOGNIZING RECIPIENTS OF THE GIRL SCOUT GOLD AWARD FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND

● Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, each year an elite group of young women rise above the ranks of their peers and confront the challenge of attaining the Girl Scouts of the United States of America's highest rank in scouting, the Girl Scout Gold Award.

It is with great pleasure that I recognize and applaud two young women from the State of Maryland who are some of this year's recipients of this most prestigious and time honored award.

These young women are to be commended on their extraordinary commitment and dedication to their families, their friends, their communities, and to the Girl Scouts of the United States of America.

The qualities of character, perseverance, and leadership which enabled them to reach this goal will also help them to meet the challenges of the future. They are our inspiration for today and our promise for tomorrow.

I am honored to ask my colleagues to join me in congratulating these recipients. They are the best and the brightest and serve as an example of character and moral strength for us all to imitate and follow.

Finally, I wish to salute their families and Scout leaders who have provided these young women with continued support and encouragement.

It is with great pride that I submit these two names as recipients of the Girl Scout Gold Award.

GIRL SCOUT GOLD AWARD RECIPIENTS

Miranda Jean Buck of Frederick, MD
Carla R. Williams of Union Bridge, MD.●

TRIBUTE TO JEFF DURHAM

● Mr. COATS. Mr. President, when America celebrates its independence, it celebrates the courage and sacrifice of the men and women who defend it—people who pay a price of pain, inconvenience, and danger.

Jeff Durham has shown that courage, paid that price, and earned our thanks.

Millions of Americans were inspired by the dedication and boldness of the team that rescued Scott O'Grady. When Captain O'Grady returned to America, he gave the lion's share of praise to both God and those soldiers who saved him. As a vital part of that dramatic and successful mission, Jeff Durham is an example of courage and commitment.

There is no virtue more generous than courage. It values duty over comfort, honor over safety, others over self. It is the hallmark of heroes.

From moment to moment our Nation depends on people who will stand guard for American interests and American ideals. That is a lonely watch in a dangerous world. It is a privilege to praise someone who fulfilled that duty with such skill and distinction.

Thank you, Jeff, from all of us in Indiana, for serving God and your neighbors by serving your Nation so well.●

PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE-MAKING: THE FUTURE CHALLENGE

● Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I was recently privileged to address the convention of the United Nations Association during its conference in San Francisco, coinciding with the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations. I took the opportunity to make some observations about the past, present, and future of U.N. peacekeeping, and I offer them here for the record.

THE U.N. MISSION: A TREND TOWARD PEACEKEEPING

When we look at the 50-year history of the United Nations, certain facts and trends become evident. One of these is the increasing trend toward peacekeeping. In the first 43 years of its existence, from 1945 to 1988, the United Nations launched 13 peacekeeping missions in places such as Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, the then-Congo, Cyprus, between India and Pakistan, and along Arab-Israeli borders. While the results of these missions were not uniformly successful, the United Nations proved it was able to play an important role in resolving, or at least containing, a number of dangerous conflicts.

And yet, during this period, the United Nations faced certain realities, the largest of which was the superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. As conflicts developed, the countries involved were forced, either through external or internal forces, to align themselves with one superpower or the other. In this environment, the United Nations was often left on the sidelines. When United States and Soviet interests collided, each could cancel out the other's initiatives with their Security Council vetoes. When conflicts involved vital United States and Soviet interests, the two powers did not hesitate to take it upon themselves to try to resolve the conflict in their favor rather than seeking a negotiated resolution through the United Nations.

There is no question that the cold war was a time of serious international insecurity. The specter of two superpowers, with weapons of immense destructive capability aimed at each other, competing for influence across the globe, lasted for nearly 45 years, ending startlingly in 1990 with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Even today, many people share the misconception that the demise of the Soviet Union has created a more secure world. I do not believe that this is necessarily the case.

The cold war, for all its dangers, had the unintended effect of discouraging many smaller countries, nationalities, and ethnic minorities from fighting one another. The danger that any uprising could, and would with certainty, be put down brutally by the Soviet Union, clearly contained insurrections and civil wars in areas like the former Yugoslavia. If Tito were in power

today, under Soviet control, the civil war would most probably not have happened. A dying vestige of this cold war control is seen today in Chechnya, where a weakened Russia is brutally struggling to contain and vanquish Chechen rebels.

However, the potential for nuclear war also had a deterrent and stabilizing effect on both major superpowers in their dealing with each other.

Today, with these cold war constraints gone, an equally, if not more dangerous scenario has developed whereby smaller conflicts that had been festering just beneath the surface have now emerged, many erupting with unprecedented force and brutality. Though the numbers vary almost weekly, through most of 1994 and 1995, there have been over 30 wars raging simultaneously across the world.

Trouble spots seem to crop up everywhere. Some fizzle quickly, while others spread into larger regional conflicts. Once again, genocide, starvation, ethnic cleansing, mass rape, torture, and millions of homeless people confront all of us. From Bosnia and Croatia to Rwanda and Burundi, from Afghanistan to Algeria, and from Sudan to Tajikistan, ethnic, religious and national grievances are taking a tremendous toll in human life. And whether these conflicts are internal or across borders, they all contribute to the deepening sense of international insecurity.

In this increasingly complex and dangerous environment, there has never been a greater need for the United Nations to provide leadership. No other body, and certainly no single nation, is equipped to deal with the problems of ancient territorial disputes, ethnic and religious rivalries, inherent in the host of newly emergent independent nations, many with ruthless dictators.

For this reason, peacekeeping is fast becoming the most important and significant function of the United Nations. As the world community grapples for ways to deal with these burgeoning conflicts, multilateral peacekeeping is increasingly seen as the best or the only viable recourse. As such, the United Nations alone is also seen—and rightfully so—as the only body with the structure, the experience and the international mandate to make a nonpartisan peacekeeping effort succeed.

The numbers bear out this trend: After 13 peacekeeping missions in its first 43 years, the United Nations has performed 25 such missions in the last 7 years alone. Today there are 16 concurrent peacekeeping missions underway. In 1988 there were 9,000 soldiers from different countries participating in peacekeeping missions. Today there are more than 61,000 from over 80 countries.

I believe that on this anniversary, we should pause, take stock, and reevaluate where events mandate change in both the role and mission of the United Nations. Clearly, peacekeeping has be-

come a major and expanding role. The question is: Can the blue-helmeted observer of the past and present effectively be the peacekeeper of the future?

For a moment, let us look at some peacekeeping successes.

In Cyprus, U.N. peacekeepers have helped since 1964 to prevent a resumption of hostilities that could lead to war between two of our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey.

On the Golan Heights, U.N. peacekeepers have helped make the Israeli-Syrian border one of the quietest in the Middle East for the last 21 years.

In El Salvador and Cambodia, U.N. peacekeepers helped to safeguard the reconciliation process at the end of those countries' civil wars, and helped provide the order necessary to conduct free and democratic elections.

Clearly, these were, and are, successful missions. When peacekeeping works, it can stabilize, reduce tension and hostility, and provide the backdrop needed before which peacemaking can succeed.

It is worth noting here that, today, even with the dramatic increase in peacekeeping missions, U.S. troops constitute only about 5 percent of total U.N. peacekeeping efforts around the world—about 3,300 out of over 61,000.

Now let's look at some of the problems.

As peacekeeping missions increase in numbers, more funding is required to keep it going. In 1988, the [U.N.] peacekeeping budget was \$230 million. In 1994, the budget grew to \$3.5 billion.

Here, the United States makes its primary contribution to U.N. peacekeeping in financial terms, paying 31 percent of all assessed costs, although Congress has mandated that the U.S. share be reduced to 25 percent this October. In 1988, the U.S. contribution for assessed peacekeeping cost was \$36.7 million. In 1994, the U.S. share rose to \$991 million—a huge increase.

Clearly not all peacekeeping operations have been successful. We can and should learn from the tragedies of Bosnia and Somalia—perhaps the two most difficult examples of U.N. peacekeeping in the last 50 years. Why have they been so difficult? I would submit that not all peacekeeping missions are the same, and they often become confused. Different peacekeeping missions require different types of peacekeeping efforts. You cannot lump them all together.

For example, in Somalia, the United Nations started out engaged in a successful humanitarian mission to prevent hundreds of thousand from starving to death, but the mission soon changed into one of nation-building and political involvement, finally resulting in confrontations with the warring factions.

The U.N. forces in Somalia proved unable to respond to a shifting set of dynamics. The dynamics in one country are not going to be the same as the dynamics in another, and the dynamics

within a country can change overnight. The blue-helmeted observer that cannot fire back to protect himself or civilians, without a convoluted approval process, cannot maintain peace when warring factions want to have at each other.

Somalia was a classic lesson in that regard. We saw a renegade warlord who was prepared to circumvent the peacekeeping mission one way or another. The U.N. forces, when challenged, could not fight back effectively. The result was more than 100 U.N. peacekeepers and 18 U.S. Army Rangers killed during that 24 month mission, and the United Nations and the United States pulled out with mixed results.

But the ultimate challenge in this century to peacekeeping has been the war in the former Yugoslavia. There the United Nations faces insurmountable problems and dilemmas. Literally, more than 800 year of animus, hatred, and territorial disputes have combined to provide UNPROFOR its most difficult and challenging mission in U.N. history.

Perhaps in 1878, Benjamin Disraeli said it best when he offered these words, in the British House of Lords:

No language can describe adequately the condition of that large portion of the Balkan peninsula—Serbia, Bosnia, Hercegovina and other provinces—[the] political intrigues, constant rivalries, a total absence of all public spirit . . . hatred of all races, animosities of rival religions and absence of any controlling power . . . nothing short of any army of 50,000 of the best troops would produce anything like order in these parts.

And that was 117 years ago.

On one hand, there has been a dramatic decrease in civilian casualties in that terrible conflict—from 130,000 in 1992 down to 3,000 in 1994. On the other hand, it is in Bosnia that we begin to see the major shortcomings of United Nations forces as peacekeepers.

We saw it on May 25 in Tuzla, a "U.N. Safe Area" when 71 young people, all under age 28, were killed by a single Serb shell—one of many instances when Serb forces have eroded safe areas with attacks—without any retaliation, despite a Security Council resolution authorizing such responses.

We saw it when 377 U.N. troops were recently taken hostage after a NATO airstrike on a Serbian ammunition dump.

We saw it when Captain O'Grady's F-16 was shot down, the second plane lost in Deny Flight operations, without response [as] scores of hostages were still held captive.

We see it every day, as U.N. peacekeepers attempt to protect innocent civilians, sometimes successfully, but often not.

And we saw it, most poignantly, on June 10, when the United Nations mission in Sarajevo announced it would not respond to protect Muslim enclaves from attack without the consent of the Bosnian Serbs.

I believe it is fair to say that U.N. forces have neither the training, the

equipment, nor the rules of engagement, to allow them to sufficiently respond to attacks against them or against civilian populations. They are meant to be observers—not fighters.

These problems have taken their toll on U.S. congressional support. And they have taken their toll, I think unfairly, on support for the UNPROFOR troops. In the Congress, there has been continuing debate over whether a unilateral or a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia, or the withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops altogether is the humane or the inhumane action to take. And, because the United States has no troops on the ground in Bosnia, we have less leverage in influencing nations that do have troops on the ground.

It is my belief that the United Nations must address peacekeeping efforts more realistically in view of the variety of situations they find themselves in, and provide a speedy and effective response dependent on the individual situation. The rapid reaction force recently created for Bosnia should help. We all hope they can be moved into the scene speedily, and that they will be properly empowered and commanded, in order to have an effective and immediate impact.

The idea of rapid response units has been discussed repeatedly over the past 50 years. At the international seminar hosted by the Netherlands Government in the spring of 1995, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Mr. Hans van Mierlo, presented a proposal of how such a force might work. Mr. van Mierlo's plan proposes a permanent rapid response nucleus, which would be able to be sent to a critical area of the world on very short notice. Such a force, if headed by a well-trained commanding officer with field experience, could provide a robust response to any aggressive action.

So my first point here today is that the entire United Nations peacekeeping structure must be reexamined, and perhaps redefined and restructured. Those of us who consider ourselves friends of the United Nations, and who believe that the world needs the United Nations, and vice versa, are prepared to make a case for continued U.S. participation, even for payment of our dues, but our success depends upon the willingness of the U.N. leadership to meet and discuss these issues with the Congress, and on their willingness to make improvements in the way peacekeeping is conceived and carried out.

PEACEKEEPING VERSUS PEACEMAKING

The second point I would like to make here involves peacekeeping versus peacemaking. Clearly the record on peacekeeping over 50 years has been, by and large, successful. The record on peacemaking is less clear.

I believe that the United Nations has an important and viable role in peacekeeping. And at times, the U.N. leadership has proven to be able mediators, and have helped parties in conflict reach a negotiated settlement. At

other times it has been unsuccessful. But I do not believe that the United Nations is set up for peacemaking, because sometimes peacemaking requires force, or at least the ability to bring force to bear. The United Nations generally lacks the ability to bring such force to bear—whereas states, and alliances of states, have a greater capacity to do so.

So, I would suggest that peacemaking efforts also be reevaluated. This reevaluation should begin with an assessment of regional and political imperatives that lend themselves toward specific peacemaking alliances. Regional political forces, in the form of strong geographically based alliances, can more effectively spearhead diplomatic and military efforts to promote peacemaking than can the United Nations alone.

For example, peace has reigned in Europe for five decades since World War II, primarily because of the strong NATO alliance. NATO has been an important framework for making and maintaining peace between longtime adversaries—like Greece and Turkey, or Germany and France, and it has deterred aggression and conflict between East and West.

When peacemaking, rather than peacekeeping is called for, the United Nations needs to work with alliances like these to bring about the desired result. The United Nations can even foster the creation of such alliances, as indeed it did through a series of resolutions during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis. When the situation calls for peacemaking, the United Nations must understand whether diplomacy is sufficient, and where it is not, the United Nations must cooperate with individual states and alliances of states that can bring the necessary force to bear.

I am one that believes that the solution in Bosnia must be a negotiated one. In other words, a diplomatic solution rather than a military solution. Why? I can think of no military solution that would solve these 800-year old animosities without enormous bloodshed and loss of life. Nor can I think of a diplomatic solution that will work without the force of military action to compel it and, perhaps, to maintain it.

Warren Zimmerman, former Ambassador to Yugoslavia, in a recent article in the Washington Post, laid out what I believe is the only realistic goal: Give the Bosnian Serbs a limited time and certain deadline to agree to the plan advanced by the so-called contact group of five nations—a plan to which Mr. Milosevic has already agreed—which divides Bosnia virtually in half between the Serbs and their adversaries. But, as Ambassador Zimmerman correctly concludes, this outcome is only realistic if the Bosnian Serbs believe the West means business.

If this solution remains unacceptable to the Bosnian Serbs, there appears to be no other choice but a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo and an expedited removal of UNPROFOR forces.

Based on briefings I have had, I can find no acceptable rationale for a unilateral lifting of the embargo that would not involve the massive loss of life, or one without America being forced to arm and train Muslim forces, with the probability of a major spread of conflict in Croatia, Kosovo, and Macedonia.

In Bosnia, the single biggest problem for UNPROFOR has been that it is trying to carry out its mission with its hands tied. I truly believe that if a U.N. peacekeeping operation is unable to respond to hostile action taken against it, then it is unlikely to succeed.

UNPROFOR troops, through no fault of their own, have had to stand by and watch civilians get picked off by sniper fire, have their own equipment stolen and used against them, and finally, have 377 of them become hostages themselves.

The primary lesson of Bosnia for U.N. peacekeeping is that U.N. military commanders on the ground must have the authority, the weapons, and the trained fighting personnel to respond to hostile action with sufficient force to protect civilians and peacekeepers, and deter attack. This may require the establishment of permanent rapid response teams within U.N. peacekeeping missions, which will protect the mission and enable it to carry out its mandate.

In addition, peacekeepers need to be able to adapt to changing conditions. No matter how well a mission is planned, warring parties can force the United Nations to change its mission, and U.N. troops need to be able to respond. In this case, NATO's military response in the form of airstrikes is based on a "dual key" decisionmaking process, whereas both the United Nations and NATO commanders decide upon and coordinate the response. Targeting and execution are joint decisions by United Nations authorities and NATO military commanders.

The final point I'd like to make is that there is a need to develop alternative structures and alliances that can be employed both for peacekeeping and peacemaking.

Neither the United States, nor any other member state, can participate in every U.N.-sponsored effort to resolve every conflict. But I do believe that the United Nations can proceed most effectively if it is able to develop solid back-up among regional groupings and alliances.

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali has suggested that regional groupings like NATO, the Organization of the American States [OAS], and the Organization of African Unity [OAU] could appropriately take on peacekeeping responsibilities for certain types of missions in their regions. Other organizations that might contribute include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] and the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet

Union. There is a healthy logic to putting together specific alliances in specific areas of the world, so that peacekeeping is carried out with some geographical relationship. Such missions would be strengthened by the political determination of neighbors—who could be affected should a war spread—to see that peace is the only result.

There are successful models that should be considered. One such case involved the United States, Israel, and Egypt, who, in the 1979 Camp David Accords, jointly established a private, United States-led peacekeeping operation in the Sinai peninsula—the Multinational Force and Observers [MFO]. This successful mission, undertaken without U.N. involvement, goes on to this day. It might serve as a model for other missions.

I have little doubt that the value of the United Nations to the international community and the United States will continue to grow. The United States simply does not have the support of its people, nor the resources, to assume the role of world-caretaker for the settlement of all disputes. The recognition of this fact will always bring people back to the conclusion that the United Nations is the best institution we have for dealing in a collective way with problems that affect the security of the United States and others.

Therefore, the United States has an obligation to work with the United Nations—not against it—to improve it, strengthen it, and make it more successful. With U.S. leadership, U.N. peacekeeping can indeed become more effective, better defined, and more realistically employed. ●

TRIBUTE TO VAN VANCE

● Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I stand today to pay tribute to Van Vance, the “Voice of the Cards.” Van Vance has kept University of Louisville basketball and football fans tuned in on WHAS radio since the 1981–82 seasons. And today, I’m saddened to announce that one of the biggest Cardinals fans is giving up two of his true loves; play-by-play for U of L basketball and his “Sportstalk” radio show.

Van’s voice will surely be missed by U of L basketball fans next season. He will also be missed by his old buddy and cohost, Jock Sutherland. For Cardinal fans, Jock and Vance are like the Siskel and Ebert of basketball, they have been inseparable for the past 13 seasons. Jock describes Van as “an absolute total professional.” In a recent article in Louisville’s Courier Journal Jock called Van “the Walter Cronkite of Louisville Sports. They can replace you and replace you with a good man, but there’ll only be one Walter Cronkite.”

Van’s love for basketball started at an early age. He earned the nickname “Hawkeye” while playing basketball at Park City High School. He led the team in scoring during the 1951–52 season, and even though his career high

was 39 points, Van most remembers a 34-point performance that included a perfect 18 of 18 from the free throw line. Those are just several reasons Van earned letters in four sports and an athletic scholarship to Western Kentucky University.

His first job in radio came after a station manager in Glasgow, KY, heard his delivery of an “I Speak for Democracy” speech. He wasted no time getting to work, he started the job just hours after his last basketball game at Park City High in 1952. Van still had “Hoop Dreams.” He went to play basketball for legendary Ed Diddle at Western Kentucky, but when the coach made him choose between basketball and radio, Van gave up the courts for the studio.

After several radio jobs, Van finally landed at WHAS-AM in Louisville. He started as a staff announcer in 1957, and then joined the sports staff in 1970. That same year, WHAS acquired the rights to broadcast the Kentucky Colonels’ games of the American Basketball Association. Van did play-by-play for the Colonels until the franchise disbanded in 1976. Then in 1981, WHAS-AM was awarded the rights to U of L football and basketball games, and Van Vance was back on the air. The rest is Cardinals sports history.

Mr. President, I ask you and my fellow colleagues to pay tribute to the career of Van Vance. It has been a memorable one, highlights include; doing play-by-play for the Louisville victory over Duke in the 1986 NCAA championship, the Kentucky Colonels’ victory in the 1975 ABA championship, the first basketball “Dream Game” between U of L and UK, and the football Cardinals big win in the 1991 Fiesta Bowl. A recent quote from Van sums it up best: “I’ve always said a play-by-play announcer is like a surfer—the better the team, the better the game, the better announcer you can be. If you have a good wave, just ride it.” Let’s hope Van catches the “Big Kahuna” and the “Voice of the Cards” lives on in the hearts of cardinal fans young and old. ●

ORDER OF BUSINESS

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE INFORMATION AGE

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, 2 weeks ago the Senate took a dramatic step toward transforming our telecommunications laws for the 21st century.

CONGRESS SETS TELECOM POLICY

There were many important issues addressed in that debate. But today, I would want to hit on one of the bill’s main themes. It is simple, but important—Congress will not play second fiddle to the courts, or any other branch of Government, when it comes to establishing telecommunications policy. Despite heavy opposition by the White House, I believe the final vote of 81 to 18 clearly demonstrated that Congress is now in charge.

This is not just a simple turf battle. Although, I seem to recall, that legislating is a function of Congress, sometimes the courts have forgotten this constitutional separation of powers.

No other branch has greater accountability than ours. Voters have the power to elect us, and they have the power to send us home. We serve at their pleasure.

So in effect, when Congress sets policy, it is set by the people. Neither the courts nor the executive branch can make that claim.

That is why I found it so troubling when the courts usurped Congress’ authority to set telecommunications policy in the early 1980’s. Instead of the voices of 535 Members of Congress, any judge in the country could unilaterally set telecommunications policy. And they have done so often, sending conflicting signals.

EXPANDING DOJ’S ROLE

The reason I raise this point is some Members of this body wanted to give the Department of Justice the same decisionmaking role as the courts. Under existing antitrust statutes, the Department of Justice prepares an analysis that it must defend and prove in court. In effect, it is the prosecutor. What DOJ wanted in the telecommunications bill, however, was to be both prosecutor and judge. Sort of one-stop shopping.

Mr. President, I did not support this expansion of power. To me, this was not an issue of whether you were pro-Bell or pro-long distance. Instead, I thought it set bad precedent. If we expanded DOJ’s authority over Bell companies, someone could legitimately ask: “Why shouldn’t this so-called one-stop shopping be extended to the entire telecommunications industry? And why stop there. Maybe we should give DOJ such authority over all sectors of our economy.”

I do not believe that was the intent of my colleagues who supported giving the Department of Justice a decisionmaking role, but what I did hear, however, was that many colleagues believed that current antitrust standards were not sufficient.

AN OVERZEALOUS DOJ

Mr. President, antitrust standards are not only sufficient, but it seems to me that the current Department of Justice is overzealous in its use of these statutes.

Just take a look at an article entitled, “Microsoft Corporation Broadly Attacks Antitrust Unit” that appeared in the June 27 edition of the Wall Street Journal. It outlines Microsoft’s latest problem with the Department of Justice’s antitrust division.

More importantly, it sheds some light on how the Department of Justice intends to use its antitrust authority to regulate the information age. And to me it is frightening.

The article chronicles Microsoft’s latest run-in with the Department of Justice and reports that DOJ is considering blocking Microsoft’s efforts to