

and yet we persist in following the same discredited course.

UNPROFOR has been emasculated and cannot protect its own forces, much less the U.N. protected areas, which are becoming traps for desperate Bosnians who relied upon U.N. promises. Humanitarian aid is being blocked. It is clear that the Bosnian Serbs are in control of the situation, and the United Nations is allowed to carry out its mission only when the Bosnian Serbs allow it. In short, UNPROFOR cannot carry out the U.N. Security Council mandates that justify its presence. Despite good intentions and valiant efforts, UNPROFOR has failed—failed on its own terms. Now humiliation and disgrace are compounding the failure.

What does it take, Mr. President? When will the U.N., the United States, and our allies accept the reality that the Bosnian crisis has deteriorated beyond our ability to salvage it?

Britain, France, and Holland have pinned their hopes on the new rapid reaction force. They are sending in 12,000 more troops to support UNPROFOR. Out of solidarity with our allies, the United States is providing sealift, airlift, and military equipment. But in my view, the rapid reaction force is not going to prevent the situation from deteriorating further, or stop the Serbs from overrunning of the safe havens. The rapid reaction force has been rendered ineffective before it ever got off the ground. As long as it remains under U.N. operational control it will not be rapid, nor reactive, nor even a force.

I do not understand why the administration persists in supporting the status quo no matter how discredited the current policy becomes. Administration officials have testified numerous times that the United States does not have sufficient national interests at stake in Bosnia to justify sending American ground troops and becoming a combatant in the conflict. I agree completely, and so do the American people. Administration officials have also testified that the best way to serve the national interests of the United States is to keep UNPROFOR in Bosnia so that it can work to limit the suffering of the innocent, and to keep the conflict from spreading while the contact group seeks a diplomatic solution.

I wholeheartedly support the goals of relieving the suffering and containing the conflict. What I can no longer support is the proposition that the status quo, which relies upon an ineffectual U.N. peacekeeping mission and more diplomatic efforts, is the best way to achieve these goals. I am forced to ask: How many more diplomatic discussions have to take place? Intense diplomacy has been going on for years without any resolution.

The Administration appears to believe that the responsibility for any resulting disaster will fall on the United States if UNPROFOR withdraws. I do not agree. The world community

placed the fate of Bosnia in the hands of the United Nations, but the United Nations has been unable to keep a non-existent peace. That is no more the fault of the United States than of any other U.N. member. In any case, the world cannot be blamed for trying a collective approach. But there is plenty of blame to go around if the United States and our allies persist in following a course that has clearly failed. Increasing the number of U.N. peacekeepers or keeping UNPROFOR in Bosnia will only prolong the agony, complicate matters further, and block the possibility of other solutions.

Mr. President, the situation in Bosnia is terribly complex, and there are no easy answers. Any course of action has potential pitfalls. But there is also a penalty for doing nothing, or for remaining mired in the status quo.

In my view, the administration has failed to properly evaluate the damage to U.S. leadership and credibility, and to the Western alliance, from supporting the status quo. The credibility of NATO as well as of the United Nations have been severely undermined. It is a serious mistake to continue subordinating NATO to the United Nations out of a misguided desire to restore the United Nations lost credibility. The longer the present situation continues, the greater the damage to the health and solidarity of the Western alliance. We cannot afford to let NATO to become a casualty of the Bosnian tragedy.

The fall of Srebrenica and the imminent fall of Zepa make it quite clear—UNPROFOR has become impotent and must withdraw. There is no excuse for leaving U.N. troops in such a dangerous and untenable position any longer. There is no excuse for continuing to incur the huge expense of the failed U.N. mission. We can no longer tolerate a policy based on denial and avoidance of reality.

I believe it is past time for the Congress to focus its attention on getting the U.N. out of Bosnia. If the administration is reluctant to support a U.N. withdrawal because it fears a negative political reaction, then now is the time for Congress to show leadership, and to make it clear that the United States will assist in extricating our allies from the Bosnian quagmire. But we must work together—the executive branch and Congress—and reach a consensus as soon as possible. Further delays in getting ready to execute the NATO withdrawal plan will push the plan's execution into the winter months, making it far more difficult and dangerous for United States and NATO troops to carry out.

Mr. President, Congress needs to send a clear signal now to the President that we will support the participation of U.S. troops in a U.N. withdrawal operation. Of course, as the President has agreed, it must be totally under NATO command. Once our troops are committed, there can no longer be any dual-key arrangement between the

United Nations and NATO. There must also be robust rules of engagement, allowing the use of overwhelming force for any attacks on NATO or on UNPROFOR. The scope and duration of the withdrawal mission must be limited. I do not advocate a date certain for ending it, but it must end promptly when all UNPROFOR and NATO troops are safely out. It must not be transformed at some point into a peace enforcement mission.

Mr. President, the United States cannot stand idly by while U.N. troops from allied nations are in mortal danger. The damage to U.S. leadership, honor, prestige, and credibility would be beyond calculation. These are not mere words. Credibility, prestige, and national honor are essential components of national security, as they have always been. They are especially important if we are to exercise the moral leadership expected of the world's only superpower.

If Americans want to remain secure in today's violent and chaotic world, we must never permit doubts to exist in the minds of friends or enemies that our word is good, or that we can be relied upon to stand with our allies, or that we will keep our commitments. The credibility that comes from demonstrated steadfastness of purpose is a key aspect of deterrence. It is an essential though intangible element of global power, and of the necessary relations between states. A great nation cannot remain great very long without it.

That is why we must end the charade of the U.N. presence in Bosnia, stand with our allies by assisting them to disengage, and then turn our attention to longer term solutions that will stop the agony in that troubled land.

I thank the Chair, and yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from Georgia, Senator NUNN, is recognized to speak for up to 30 minutes.

INEFFECTUAL U.N. PROTECTION FORCES IN BOSNIA

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I too want to discuss the subject which the Senator from South Carolina has just addressed.

Mr. President, I believe that the continued presence of the ineffectual U.N. Protection Forces in Bosnia is eroding the credibility of the United Nations, of NATO, and of the United States.

I agree with the points that Senator THURMOND just made. In particular, I agree that the executive branch and the Congress must work together and reach a consensus as soon as possible. This situation is bad enough without the President and the Congress being in a big fight here. So we need to find a way to work together.

The second point that I agree with that Senator THURMOND made is that now is the time for the Congress to show leadership and to make it clear

that the United States will assist in extracting our allies from Bosnia. Congress cannot duck this question.

The third point that he made that I specifically agree with: The withdrawal operation must be totally under NATO command. There can be no "dual-key" arrangement. There must be robust rules of engagement. And the scope and the duration of the mission must be limited.

And, finally, I think the key point he made related to what the United States' role must be in the withdrawal; that is, the honor and credibility of our Nation are essential components, not only to our national security, not only to Bosnia, but to deterrence throughout the world. That is essential. Honor and credibility are essential parts of national security, and of deterrence. I completely agree with the Senator from South Carolina on that excellent point.

Mr. President, I will leave to another day the discussion of mistakes leading to the current human tragedy in Bosnia. The Bosnian-Serbs have overrun the U.N.-declared safe area of Srebrenica, and they can take Zepa at any time of their choosing.

The United Nations Security Council has passed another meaningless resolution calling upon Secretary General Boutros Ghali to restore Srebrenica to its safe area status. Of course, none of the Security Council members has told the beleaguered Secretary General how to perform that task.

The French have declared their readiness to fight for Gorazde if the British will join them and if the Americans will supply tactical airlift. The French are clearly paving the way for their withdrawal from Bosnia unless there is a determined U.N. stand with British and American assistance.

The British have raised serious reservations about the French proposals and the French approach, both publicly and privately.

General Shalikashvili has met with his counterparts from Britain and France for the purpose of preparing immediate options for the national leaders to consider, and I assume that consideration will be made in the next few days.

Secretary Perry and Secretary Christopher will be meeting with their counterparts later this week.

The Clinton administration is urging our allies to remain in Bosnia, refusing to commit United States forces on the ground, continuing to distance itself from any "unjust settlement" and pledging to help extract our allies from Bosnia if they withdraw.

This week the Senate will plunge into this morass by legislating on Bosnia. I believe that Congress has an important role to play in foreign policy matters. I always have felt that. At the same time, I do not believe Congress as a rule should attempt to legislate the details of United States foreign policy. But if we do choose to legislate on Bosnia:

We must not remove the President's flexibility to react to unpredictable situations in which American lives are at stake;

We should not force our allies and our other U.N. forces to withdraw—advocating withdrawal is one thing, forcing it by legislation is another thing entirely. We need to distinguish between speeches and legislation; and

We should not and must not avoid the hard questions which will inevitably flow from congressional actions. There are hard questions that have not yet fully been considered by either the House or the Senate in my view.

Mr. President, many of our colleagues want to—I use these terms in shorthand—"lift and leave." By that I mean lift the embargo and leave the Bosnians to fend for themselves. The House of Representatives passed this type of legislation. We in the Senate debated this type legislation and passed it on one occasion last year.

This school of thought seems to believe that a simple repeal of the American export prohibition will automatically equalize the conflict. It glosses over the questions of who will pay for the weapons; who will deliver them; how will they be delivered; and who will help train the Bosnian troops.

To be fair, there are those, including the majority leader, Senator DOLE, Senator LIEBERMAN, Senator BIDEN, and others, who have advocated unilaterally lifting the arms embargo but who would also support the supply of United States equipment and United States training to Bosnian Government forces. But many of those whose votes are needed to pass the Dole-Lieberman bill are unwilling to make such a commitment, and the Dole-Lieberman approach leaves these questions unanswered. This is a large gap.

Mr. President, another view in the Senate which heretofore has been a minority view—and this has been a view that I have had—is that the embargo should be lifted but only after U.N. forces have left Bosnia.

There are also those in the Senate who have a third view, who agree with the administration that the U.N. forces should remain in Bosnia. In my view, this is a distinctly minority view.

Mr. President, the overwhelming majority of the Senate in my view support either the lift-and-leave approach or the leave-then-lift alternative approach. The Dole-Lieberman proposed legislation now seems to have moved substantially toward the leave-then-lift approach. That is important. They are moving in their resolution toward the position of leave first, then lift the embargo. That is a key distinction, and that is a distinction that has separated those of us on the two sides of this issue in the Senate for the last 12 months.

Mr. President, this is a very significant change in the Dole-Lieberman proposal that has been overlooked by most people in the press corps, many critics of the bill, and even many supporters of the bill.

The latest version of the Dole-Lieberman bill is a major improvement in my view in that it takes into account and into consideration some concerns of our NATO allies who have forces on the ground in Bosnia by delaying the implementation of the termination of the Bosnian embargo until the U.N. forces withdraw. That is a key difference from the approach that was taken in past resolutions. Additionally—and I think very importantly—the new Dole-Lieberman proposal puts the onus or responsibility on the Government of Bosnia and the troop-contributing countries to decide if the U.N. forces should stay in Bosnia.

It does this by terminating the embargo based on either of two conditions:

Condition 1: a Bosnian Government request that the U.N. forces withdraw from Bosnia; or

Condition 2: a decision by the U.N. Security Council or the UNPROFOR troop-contributing countries to withdraw the U.N. forces.

As I understand the Dole-Lieberman proposal, if condition 1 is met, implementation of the termination of the embargo would be delayed until 12 weeks after the Bosnian Government requests that the United Nations be withdrawn. If, on the other hand, condition 2 is met—that is, the troops of the contributing countries decide to leave without a request from the Bosnian Government—termination of the embargo would be delayed until such time as the U.N. forces have been withdrawn from Bosnia.

This is in my view a much different proposal than what we have debated in the past. It is much different from what has passed the House of Representatives. It is a much more responsible approach than the original proposal which lifted the embargo unilaterally without regard for the continued U.N. troop presence in Bosnia.

Mr. President, I say all of that on the positive side of the Dole-Lieberman amendment. The key missing ingredient, however, of the new Dole-Lieberman amendment is any mention of what should be obvious to all and what must be obvious during the debate on this proposal to those of us in the Senate, and I hope to the country; namely, that the President of the United States has publicly pledged to deploy up to 25,000 United States troops on the ground, if necessary, in Bosnia to help extract the U.N. forces.

Mr. President, Congress cannot responsibly legislate on Bosnia and ignore this fact. If Congress wants to prevent United States ground forces from assisting our allies in withdrawing from Bosnia, we should make that clear. If Congress wants the allies and the United Nations to withdraw from Bosnia and is willing to support President Clinton's commitment, Congress should make that clear. Congress cannot responsibly advocate a course of

action and pretend to ignore the inevitable and certain consequences of that action.

If the United Nations withdraws from Bosnia, United States participation to assist our allies to withdraw from Bosnia would be required and has been publicly committed by the President of the United States. The Dole-Lieberman bill, at this time, is silent on this crucial point. If this legislation is passed as written, in my view, it will send a loud signal by its silence. It will send a loud signal that Congress is prepared to advocate a course of action but is not prepared to back it up.

Over the last 3 years, we have witnessed a lowest common denominator approach in the United Nations, in NATO, among our allies, and in United States policymaking regarding Bosnia. Every policy decision on Bosnia seems to be reduced to what Winston Churchill, if he were with us today, would certainly describe as "mush, gush, and slush." We see this in the so-called mandates of the U.N. Security Council. We see this in the U.N.-NATO dual key command structure. We see this in the statements of the members of the U.N. Security Council who have voted for every Security Council resolution for the last 4 years but who act as though the United Nations is some outer space alien of which they never heard.

Mr. President, we see this in the position of many in this administration, in this Congress, and in the news media who for the last 2 years have decried any "unjust solution" but who have been unwilling to commit American resources for a just solution, and unwilling to admit that there never will be a just solution in Bosnia unless the United Nations and NATO are willing to impose it by force.

Mr. President, that is reality. There will never be a just solution in Bosnia unless the United Nations and NATO are willing to impose it by force.

I hope, as the Senate debates the Dole-Lieberman bill this week, that we will not continue and even add to the lowest-common-denominator approach that has been so evident in all the Bosnia decisions by international and by other bodies.

There is no good solution to the Bosnian tragedy. There is no easy solution. There is no solution that anyone can guarantee is going to work. Some approaches, in my view, are worse than others, but all have unwelcome consequences. The American people are entitled to understand the possible consequences as we debate this issue.

What would be the consequences if the U.N. forces withdraw? NATO has been putting together a plan to withdraw the U.N. forces. This plan calls for deployment of up to 82,000 troops, some 25,000 of whom would be American military personnel based on the commitment of the President of the United States pursuant to his pledge to our NATO allies. This is a sizable force but, in my view, it is a necessary force, given the topography of Bosnia and the

history of that conflict and the history of that region.

This large force may be deemed by some to be a worst-case force, but it makes a worst case much less likely to occur. Our military leaders have been candid in telling us, both in testimony and in private discussions, that this withdrawal operation could be very dangerous. I think they are right. There is also a possibility, however, that the withdrawal could be relatively unimpeded by both sides. It could proceed rapidly; it could proceed effectively. No one knows or pretends to know how dangerous this will be, but prudence and careful planning are absolutely essential.

Mr. President, we should note that the NATO plan makes no provision for the withdrawal of refugees. Everyone should understand that. There is no provision in that NATO plan for withdrawal of refugees. Our military commanders, in fact, concede that one of the most difficult aspects of a withdrawal operation will be dealing with Bosnian civilians. They may attempt to keep the U.N. forces and the NATO forces from leaving Bosnia out of fear that they will be prey to the attacking Serbs once the restraining presence of UNPROFOR is removed. They may do this regardless of what their Government may say publicly or privately.

We also must consider what will happen to the civilian population once the extensive humanitarian relief effort is no longer functioning there. A humanitarian tragedy is likely, and we should understand that as we debate this serious issue.

Both the Government of Bosnia and the Bosnian Serb leaders have publicly stated that they would assist the U.N. forces in withdrawing if the United Nations makes a decision to withdraw. But NATO military commanders, understandably, express concern about the following possibilities:

First, the sincerity and durability of these statements by leaders whose word in the past has been questioned; second, whether the warring parties will try to gain control of the tons of U.N. military equipment and supplies presently located in Bosnia; third, whether the Bosnian Serbs will be cooperative as they realize that the completion of the U.N. withdrawal will likely result in the lifting of the arms embargo on the Government of Bosnia; and fourth, the narrow and winding roads that make up much of Bosnia's transportation system. It will take little effort by a determined foe to destroy the numerous bridges and tunnels that are often the only ingress and egress to the numerous Bosnian towns and to Bosnia itself where the U.N. personnel are located. The Bosnian Serbs control much of the high ground around these roads and these towns.

From those who continue to advocate immediate and unilateral lift of the embargo, an intellectually honest approach requires facing up to the arming and training of the Bosnian Gov-

ernment forces. This course will likely require air support, assuming the Bosnian Serbs move in for the kill before the arming of the Bosnian forces is complete, which will, at best, take several weeks or months. It also requires recognition that our allies will pull out of Bosnia and hold the United States responsible for the Bosnian tragedy which may unfold if we unilaterally lift the embargo before the U.N. forces are out.

From those who advocate either immediate and unilateral lift of the embargo or, on the other hand, U.N. withdrawal followed by a lift of the arms embargo, in either event, under either course of action, intellectual honesty requires a congressional authorization or at least a congressional acknowledgment that U.S. forces will be used to help evacuate our NATO allies and the other U.N. forces.

Mr. President, from those who advocate keeping the U.N. forces in Bosnia, intellectual honesty requires the acknowledgment that these forces must be beefed up, probably with considerable United States help; that clear authority for military decisions must be delegated by the United Nations to NATO and the dual-key approach must be ended; and that exposed U.N. personnel all over Bosnia must be brought to more defensible positions so they are not simply hostages for one side. Each of these actions moves further and further away from the humanitarian mission, and each of these actions moves closer toward direct involvement in the conflict, and all should recognize that is what staying the course means.

If the embargo is lifted multilaterally after UNPROFOR departs, allied air support will be demanded by the Government of Bosnia. We already know that, those of us who have listened to them when they have been here or heard their public statements. They are going to demand that we owe them air support. That is going to be their demand.

If the embargo is lifted unilaterally before or after the date the U.N. forces depart, Congress and the American people must recognize that this burden will fall primarily on the United States because our allies, if we lift the embargo unilaterally, are not going to be anxious to participate. In either case, there is no assurance that the Bosnian Government will be able to defend their territory, even with air support.

Mr. President, as I have stated, there are no good solutions in Bosnia. I have my own views as to the approach the United Nations and the United States and our allies should follow in Bosnia.

First, there should be a final intense diplomatic effort to negotiate an end of the conflict in Bosnia. I am under no illusion that a diplomatic effort will be successful. It is not likely to be successful, but at least it should be tried, because all the other alternatives have tremendous downside consequences.

Second, the United Nations should serve notice on all parties that if a negotiated settlement is not reached within a specified period of time, the U.N. forces will be withdrawn from Bosnia. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations have urged our allies to commit their forces and to remain on the ground in Bosnia. When these forces are withdrawn, I believe the United States has a moral obligation to assist in their withdrawal. In our effort to save Bosnia, we must not destroy NATO.

Third, once the U.N. forces have been withdrawn, the Bosnian arms embargo should be lifted multilaterally, if possible, unilaterally if that is the only course. The United States and our allies should assist in arming and training the Bosnian Government forces, and that is going to cost some money and it is going to take some time. We all need to understand that.

Fourth, the allies and the contact group must devise a "containment policy" and make it clear to the government in Belgrade that it will be held fully responsible if this conflict spreads across other borders.

Mr. President, to sum up, legislating on Bosnia is fraught with danger. But if we are to legislate—and it appears that we are—we must understand the full consequences of our legislation. We must be willing to go on record as supporting or disapproving the commitment that President Clinton has made to our allies to help them withdraw from Bosnia. To do otherwise would be adding more "mush, gush, and slush."

I thank the Chair.

Mr. THURMOND. Will the Senator allow me about a minute and a half?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia has 7½ minutes remaining.

Mr. NUNN. I yield 1½ minutes to the Senator from South Carolina.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.

Mr. THURMOND. I thank the able Senator from Georgia, the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, for his appropriate and pertinent remarks on the situation in Bosnia. I strongly support the Dole-Lieberman bill and am pleased to be an original cosponsor of it.

As the Senate begins consideration of S. 21, the Dole-Lieberman bill, this week, I ask that Members consider and discuss the very important issue of U.S. support for a United Nations withdrawal. This support, with the aid of NATO, requires a very close and careful consideration and discussion by the Members of the Senate.

I yield the floor.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I am not trying to control time here, but I have a little time left, and I will be glad to yield to the Senator from Nebraska 3 minutes.

Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I wish to associate myself completely with the remarks made by my learned and distinguished colleague from Georgia. I

will oppose the Dole-Lieberman proposition, as I understand it, basically for the reasons brought forth in the carefully worded and well-thought-out statement made by the Senator from Georgia.

We have to look to the future. As bad as the situation is over there now—and I think no one feels that they have all of the right answers—we have to look to the future. I am afraid, Mr. President, that despite the good intentions of the Dole-Lieberman amendment, it clearly sows the seeds, which are ripe for harvest, for the beginning of the end of NATO.

The situation in Bosnia today is very bad, and the pictures that are coming through very loud and clear on television are horrifying, portraying the atrocities that are being taken in that most unfortunate war in Europe. However, I happen to feel that we should always try and walk in others' shoes. I simply say that if we take action today, or this week, we might regret it in the future, because it sows the seeds for the end of NATO, which has been a force for peace since World War II. And then we might look back on that action and say we probably acted in haste, we probably acted in compassion, but we probably acted in a way that would not be in the long-term best interest of peace in Europe and probably would go a long way to disrupting the NATO alliance and our friends and allies in Europe that have been a part of that.

This is a grave situation. I wish that our allies would agree to remove the peacekeeping forces because, seemingly, that is what both sides of the combatants there want. I happen to feel that the U.N. mission is doomed to failure under the circumstances that are present.

Nevertheless, unless and until our allies in NATO can be convinced of that, I say let us proceed with caution. I have grave concerns about the way we are going. I do not know the answers. I simply say that caution is a better part of valor at this particular juncture. I thank my friend from Georgia, and I yield the floor.

Mr. NUNN. I will yield whatever I have left to the Senator from Texas.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 3 minutes remaining.

Mr. NUNN. I will yield that to the Senator from Texas, and whatever she does not use, I will yield back.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. I ask unanimous consent to add 2 minutes onto the 3 minutes I have been yielded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I appreciate the fact that several of my colleagues on the Armed Services Committee are talking today about the situation in Bosnia. It is clear that we cannot sit by and do nothing. We have talked about this issue for months.

Six weeks ago, I stood right on the border of Macedonia looking into Serbia. I was visiting our U.S. troops who

were there on an outpost under the auspices of the United Nations. I saw the terrain; I talked to our troops, both in Croatia and Macedonia; I talked to the people who are running the operation there; I talked to the head of the U.N. delegation there, Mr. Akashi.

I think I have a feel for the situation that is there. Mr. President, I think we must learn from our experiences. The United Nations has a very valid role to play when there is a peace to keep. But, Mr. President, we have the best of intentions in the United Nations, but we have the worst of results. In fact, the United Nations is becoming an obstacle to solving this situation—not that they mean to be. They are trying. We give them the fact that they are trying.

But, Mr. President, they cannot function. And because they are there, we have the effect of one side being unarmed, basically, and the other side being aggressive with arms. We had the Prime Minister of Bosnia here, and he said,

I keep hearing people say there are two sides here. Yes, one side is shooting, the other side is dying.

Mr. President, he is right. We cannot sit by and let it happen by saying that we have U.N. peacekeepers sitting there on the ground and, therefore, one side should remain unarmed. They are being ravaged, Mr. President, and we must do something about it. We cannot continue to talk on the floor of the U.S. Senate while they are being ravaged across the ocean.

So, Mr. President, I hope that our leader, Senator DOLE, will bring up his resolution at the earliest possible moment to tell the President how strongly we feel that we should not get involved with this mission beyond what the President has said he will do to help extricate the U.N. peacekeepers under the auspices of NATO.

Mr. President, we have to define that mission very carefully. That mission must be extraction. I do not like all the talk of, well, extraction also means containment of troops, it also means emergencies anywhere that they might occur in Bosnia. And now we are talking about sending helicopters there—American helicopters. Will they have American troops running the helicopters, flying those helicopters?

Mr. President, there are a lot of questions, and I do not think we can afford to just say all of those things are acceptable for our American troops. I do not want American troops flying helicopters into Bosnia. I do not want American troops to be put forth for any emergency in Bosnia. That is ground combat. We are talking about potential ground combat.

Mr. President, I am representing American troops and I am going to do everything I can to make sure that they are as safe as they can be, and that they are not involved in a mission which does not have the United States' security interest.

Mr. President, that is the question here. We have gotten ourselves involved in Somalia through mission creep. We just let it evolve, and we lost Rangers—our own U.S. Army Rangers. Mr. President, we are looking at a potential for mission creep here if we are not very careful.

So I am going to appeal to the President of the United States to watch for mission creep. Helicopters with American troops is mission creep. Contraction of our forces, our U.S. peacekeepers, is mission creep. Emergencies anywhere in Bosnia is mission creep.

Mr. President, I hope that Senator DOLE brings his resolution to the floor so that the President of the United States can hear: The time has come to lift the arms embargo and let these people have a fair fight.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CAMPBELL). Under the previous order, the Senator from South Dakota, [Mr. PRESSLER], is recognized to speak for up to 10 minutes.

AIRLINE SAFETY STANDARDS

Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, yesterday morning at 6 a.m. I had the pleasure of riding on the first flight between Rapid City and Sioux Falls that provides new air service in our State.

As a member of the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, I have long been a champion of air service in our smaller cities, the safety of smaller aircraft, and the provision of air services to citizens living in non-hub airport areas.

I have also been very concerned about air fares for travel to and from our Nation's smaller cities. For example, can someone living in Humboldt, SD, get a supersaver ticket if they have to fly first into a hub airport? So often the best deal, so to speak, on airline tickets, go to those people who live in bigger cities with hub airports such as New York, Minneapolis, Denver, Los Angeles, et cetera. Frequently, we find that flying into that hub airport from the smaller city is the expensive part of the trip. Citizens living in nonhub cities should not be overlooked.

Mr. President, our air transportation system is based on the hub and spoke system. Even in New York, a State with substantial air service, citizens living in upstate New York must fly on a small carrier into a hub to be connected to their next destination. The same is true in Fresno, CA, where my sister lives. This also is the case in my home State of South Dakota.

The question is, Do the smaller planes ensure the same level of travel safety? On the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, I have been a champion of small aircraft safety. We will continue working to promote safe air travel on all sizes of aircraft.

I certainly do not advocate Government regulation, but I am constantly jawboning the big airlines where there is a coded relationship with the smaller

airline to treat the smaller airlines fairly. After all, the smaller carriers are the lifeline of many smaller communities and provide the larger carriers with many of their passengers.

Yesterday, as I mentioned, I took part in the inaugural flight providing air service between South Dakota's two larger cities, Rapid City and Sioux Falls. I am glad to say that Great Lakes Aviation, which code-shares with United Airlines, initiated that service. It will help our State a great deal.

I shall continue to be a champion of airlines in smaller cities, working to ensure we have good air service into the hubs so that citizens living in smaller communities remain linked to the Nation's air transportation system. From air safety to reasonable air fares to air service availability, our nonhub cities deserve equal attention from the airline industry.

Mr. President, I would also like to briefly discuss the important issue of international aviation. I, along with a number of my colleagues, am working on a resolution intended to aid our air carriers serving Japan.

Currently, Japan is violating the United States-Japan bilateral aviation agreement by denying our passenger and cargo carriers the right to serve cities throughout the Pacific rim from Japan. Cargo and passenger traffic beyond Japan into Malaysia and China and so forth is very lucrative. The Japanese are attempting to prevent our carriers from serving this traffic since they want to protect these markets for their own carriers which are very inefficient.

Federal Express has a new Pacific rim cargo hub they are ready to open at Subic Bay in the Philippines. They cannot open it. The Japanese will not permit Federal Express to serve routes from Japan which are necessary to make this hub operational. The Japanese are violating the bilateral aviation treaty and this is costing the shareholders of Federal Express tens of millions of dollar. Each day that passes causes these substantial damages to increase.

We must not tolerate this flagrant violation of an international agreement. The world is watching and we should not set a dangerous precedent for international aviation relations.

Our air carriers also have a problem obtaining sufficient access to both Heathrow and Gatwick airports in the United Kingdom. Access to Heathrow is of particular concern since Heathrow is the most important international gateway airport serving points throughout the world. We must continue to work to open these markets for our carriers.

The only reason that the Japanese or the British have more traffic on particular routes where they "compete" with United States carriers is due to restrictions which distort the market and protect foreign carriers from true head-to-head competition with our more efficient carriers. For example,

they use restrictive bilateral agreements, impose so-called "doing business" problems on our carriers such as putting them in terminals that are intolerable to passengers, and, in the case of the Japanese, they outright refuse to respect the clear terms of our aviation agreement.

I have been working on international aviation issues because international opportunities are critical to the long-term profitability of our carriers. Also, consumers benefit greatly by increased competition in international markets.

There is an important relationship between the issues of service to small communities and international aviation policy. I tie the two issues together because increased international opportunities will strengthen the economic health of our airline industry. In turn, this financial strength should translate into better service to all domestic markets, particularly smaller nonhub markets.

By working to strengthen our carriers abroad, it is my hope I am improving service for consumers in underserved markets. Therefore, I am urging our major airlines to give fair treatment here at home to people who live in smaller cities and rural areas. The administration, the Congress, and the airline industry should all work together to accomplish these domestic and international aviation goals.

For example, I just came from the Senate Finance Committee, on which I serve, where we were considering fuel taxes on various modes of transportation. One issue that was discussed which is of particular concern to me is the aviation fuel tax that is scheduled to go into effect later this year.

I am concerned the jet fuel tax will make the problem of air service in small communities much worse. I am also concerned this tax will adversely affect the competitiveness of our carriers in international markets.

Mr. President, we must never lose sight of the many difficult challenges facing our air carriers. Importantly, we must never forget that it is consumers and communities who have the largest stake of all.

TRIBUTE TO JIM HARDER

Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, today I pay tribute to a dedicated, brave South Dakotan who has made us all proud. Maj. Jim Harder, a native of South Dakota, is an Air Force pilot and a member of the Air Force Thunderbirds—a select group of accomplished aviators who entertain audiences with their aerial performances.

Jim is yet another living symbol of the hard working South Dakotan. He graduated from Huron High School and South Dakota State University. After college, Jim decided to use his talents in the service of his country by joining the Air Force. He first sought to become a navigator on an EC-135, but he