

(B) any similar policy being applied by the United States Government as of the date of completion of withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina, pursuant to which approval is denied for transfers of defense articles and defense services to the former Yugoslavia; and

(2) the term "completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina" means the departure from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina of substantially all personnel participating in UNPROFOR and substantially all other personnel assisting in their withdrawal, within a reasonable period of time, without regard to whether the withdrawal was initiated pursuant to a request by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a decision by the United Nations Security Council, or decisions by countries contributing forces to UNPROFOR, but the term does not include such personnel as may remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina pursuant to an agreement between the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the government of any country providing such personnel.

NOTICES OF HEARINGS

COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I would like to announce that the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs will be holding a hearing on Tuesday, July 25, 1995, beginning at 9:30 a.m., in G-50 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building on S. 487, a bill to amend the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, and for other purposes.

Those wishing additional information should contact the Committee on Indian Affairs at 224-2251.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I wish to announce that on Tuesday, July 25, 1995, at 9:30 a.m., in room 342 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management and the District of Columbia, will hold a hearing on S. 946, the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1995.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PARKS, HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND RECREATION

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, I would like to announce for the public that a field hearing has been scheduled before the Subcommittee on Parks, Historic Preservation and Recreation.

The hearing will take place Saturday, July 29, 1995 at 10:00 a.m. in the Scott Hart Auditorium of the Department of Agriculture Building in Helena, MT.

The purpose of this hearing is to review S. 745, a bill to require the National Park Service to eradicate brucellosis afflicting the bison in Yellowstone National Park.

Because of the limited time available for the hearing, witnesses may testify by invitation only. However, those wishing to submit written testimony for the hearing record should send two copies of their testimony to the Subcommittee on Parks, Historic Preservation and Recreation, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, 304 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC 20510-6150.

For further information, please contact Jim O'Toole of the subcommittee staff at (202) 224-5161.

AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEES TO MEET

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry be allowed to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, July 18, 1995, at 9 a.m., in SR-332, to mark up farm bill titles.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources be granted permission to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, July 18, 1995, for purposes of conducting a full committee hearing which is scheduled to begin at 9:30 a.m. The purpose of this hearing is to review existing oil production at Prudhoe Bay, AK and opportunities for new production on the coastal plain of Arctic Alaska.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Finance be permitted to meet Tuesday, July 18, 1995, beginning at 9:00 a.m. in room SD-215, to conduct a hearing on deficit reduction fuel taxes and diesel dyeing requirements.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, July 18, 1995, at 2:00 p.m. to hold a hearing on judicial nominees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Labor and Human Resources be authorized to meet for a hearing on Health Insurance Reform, during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, July 18, 1995, at 9:30 a.m.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources be granted permission to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, July 18, 1995, for purposes of conducting a subcommittee hearing which is scheduled to begin at 2:30 p.m. The purpose of this hearing is

to examine the first amendment activities, including sales of message-bearing merchandise, on public lands managed by the National Park Service and the U.S. Forest Service.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON YOUTH VIOLENCE

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Youth Violence of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, be authorized to meet during a session of the Senate on Tuesday, July 18, 1995, at 10:00 a.m., in Senate Dirksen room 226, on "Guns in Schools: A Federal Role?"

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

NOTICE TO AMEND RULE XXXIV

Mr. BROWN submitted the following notice in writing:

In accordance with Rule V of the Standing Rules of the Senate, I hereby give notice in writing that it is my intention to move to amend Senate Rule 34.

The amendment is as follows:

At the appropriate place, insert the following:

"SEC. . DISCLOSURE OF THE VALUE OF ANY PERSONAL RESIDENCE IN EXCESS OF \$1,000,000 UNDER THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1978.

"Rule XXXIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"3. In addition to the requirements of paragraph 1, Members, officers, and employees of the Senate shall include in each report filed under paragraph 2 an additional statement under section 102(a) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 listing the category of value of any property used solely as a personal residence of the reporting individual or the spouse of the individual which exceeds \$1,000,000, as provided in section 102(d)(1)."

At the appropriate place in the, insert the following:

"SEC. . DISCLOSURE OF THE VALUE OF ASSETS UNDER THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1978.

"Rule XXXIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"3. In addition to the requirements of paragraph 1, Members, officers, and employees of the Senate shall include in each report filed under paragraph 2 the following additional information:

'(a) For purposes of section 102(a)(1)(B) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 additional categories of income as follows:

'(1) greater than \$1,000,000 but not more than \$5,000,000, or

'(2) greater than \$5,000,000.

'(b) For purposes of section 102(d)(1) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 additional categories of income as follows:

'(1) greater than \$1,000,000 but not more than \$5,000,000;

'(2) greater than \$5,000,000 but not more than \$25,000,000;

'(3) greater than \$25,000,000 but not more than \$50,000,000; and

'(4) greater than \$50,000,000''.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

U.N. RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY

Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I learned in reading a newspaper about Canada's

leadership in providing a study on methods of improvement of the U.N. rapid reaction capability.

As many of my colleagues in the Senate know, I have had concerns in this area for some time.

I wrote to Minister of Foreign Affairs Andre Ouellet, and he sent me a letter, which I ask unanimous consent to insert at the end of this statement.

Among other things, he enclosed a background paper, that I also request be inserted at the end of my statement, because it provides practical insights into our situation.

It is interesting that the background paper mentions Rwanda. Senator JEFFORDS and I had the experience of calling a Canadian general, General Daullaire, who was in charge of the small U.N. force in Rwanda when things first started getting difficult. This was in May 1994.

General Daullaire told us that if he could get 5,000-8,000 troops there quickly, the situation in Rwanda could be stabilized.

Senator JEFFORDS and I immediately dispatched a message to the State Department and to the White House.

Nothing of significance happened until October, when the United Nations Security Council authorized action; then the French, to their great credit, immediately sent 2,000 troops to provide a little stability, but the United Nations was slow to act.

We went through a similar situation in Somalia.

Bosnia presents another example of action that is much too slow.

My colleagues know that I have introduced legislation that would authorize up to 3,000 American volunteers among our armed forces to be available on short notice, if the Security Council acts, and the President of the United States approves. I assume other nations would be willing to volunteer a similar, relatively small force.

If the Secretary General of the United Nations had such power at his disposal when authorized by the Security Council, we would not have had some of the difficulties that now threaten our world. And the great threat to the world today is instability.

After the Security Council acted in Somalia, it took 6 weeks to get 500 Pakistani troops to Mogadishu, and when I visited Somalia and found the desperate situation and called the Secretary General about it, he told me that the additional 3,000 troops then authorized would be sent by ship. When I urged that they be sent by plane and that an additional 10,000 troops be sent, he said that our government—the U.S. government—charges so much to send troops by plane that they could not afford it.

I will not go into the rest of the background, but it illustrates the wisdom of the Canadian leadership.

I commend Prime Minister Jean Chretien and Minister of Foreign Affairs Andre Ouellet for their leadership.

And I hope the United States will be an enthusiastic partner and not be a nation that is dragging its feet on this issue.

I urge my colleagues to read the background paper from the Canadian Government. I ask that it be printed in the RECORD.

The material follows:

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Ottawa, Canada, June 8, 1995.

Hon. PAUL SIMON,

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR SIMON: Thank you for your letter of February 6, 1995, regarding the Canadian study to improve the United Nations (UN) rapid reaction capability. Your words of support for our efforts are appreciated.

As you are aware, Canada has made UN reform a foreign policy priority. A key element of our position is to ensure that the UN operates with greater efficiency and effectiveness. The Government is committed to the active, continued and effective engagement of the Canadian Forces in international peacekeeping operations.

The aim of the Canadian study is to make practical proposals to enhance the UN's rapid reaction capability in the field of peace operations. My officials are consulting extensively with other interested states to ensure the widest possible support for our initiative. The findings of the study are scheduled to be tabled at the 50th anniversary of the UN General Assembly in the fall of 1995.

For further details of the Canadian study, you may wish to consult the enclosed copies of recent press releases and of my address to the International Conference on Improving the UN's Rapid Reaction Capability.

Once again, thank you for bringing your views to my attention.

Yours sincerely,

ANDRÉ OUELLET.

IMPROVING THE UN'S RAPID REACTION
CAPABILITY: A CANADIAN STUDY
INTRODUCTION

At the UN General Assembly in September 1994, Foreign Affairs Minister André Ouellet proposed a concrete step toward the goal of enhancing the UN's responsiveness in the field of peace operations. In committing Canada to making a direct contribution to this end, Mr. Ouellet said:

"The experience of the last few years leads us to believe that we need to explore even more innovative options than those considered to date. Recent peacekeeping missions have shown that the traditional approach no longer applies. As we have seen in Rwanda, rapid deployment of intervention forces is essential.

"In light of the situation, the Government of Canada has decided to conduct an in-depth review of the short-, medium- and long-term options available to use to strengthen the UN's rapid response capability in times of crisis. Among these options, we feel that the time has come to study the possibility, over the long term, of creating a permanent UN military force. We will ask the world's leading experts for their input and will inform all member states of the results of the study."

The Government of Canada has now begun this extensive study.

CONTEXT

The rapid increase in the size, scope and number of peace operations since the end of the Cold War reflects both the ongoing transformation of the international system and the new expectation that the United Nations can and should play a pivotal role in the emerging global order. There have been both startling successes and troublesome failures

among the over 21 new missions launched since 1988. However, no firm consensus has developed regarding how and why UN peace operations succeed, or on when the UN should avoid engagement in a given situation that is not yet amenable to an effective peace mission.

Certainly, there have been many recent improvements in how the UN undertakes peace operations. These range from greater political understanding of the mechanism itself in member state capitals, to enhancement of the means available to the Secretary-General in the Secretariat, to a growing sophistication organizationally and operationally at the level of field missions. Many member states remain actively engaged in promoting these improvements and in working incrementally on the full spectrum of peacekeeping issues.

One particular, seemingly intractable issue that to some extent reflects the broader problems outlined above, is that of responsiveness. A review of several missions over the past five years clearly indicates that a more rapid, coherent response to an emerging crisis could have had a much more dramatic impact on the evolving situation than that which actually occurred. The example of Rwanda illustrates the problem in bold relief. Despite various unco-ordinated indications that a crisis was imminent, even a minimal response had to await the onset of crisis. At this point, the detailed planning and mounting of the operation were excruciatingly slow, with deployment of troops taking place months after they were officially committed.

Improving the UN's rapid reaction capability is not a new theme. The first UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, raised the subject as early as 1948. Considerable attention was devoted to this issue as early as 1957 in the aftermath of the successful deployment of UNEF I in the Sinai. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping (Committee of 34) has also devoted considerable energy to the concept in the intervening years. Today, this topic is again near the top of the peacekeeping agenda, with a particular focus on the idea of a UN force as one means to achieve this end.

The resurgence of the theme of enhanced responsiveness reflects a number of recent developments in the international arena. With the end of the Cold War, there is no obvious reason why the UN cannot react more quickly to crisis. The absence of bipolar confrontation, and consequent minimal recourse to the veto on the part of permanent members of the Security Council, as well as the apparent end to rigidly defined spheres of influence, suggest that improved Great Power comity should lead to more effective and efficient international co-operation. At the same time, human rights and humanitarian concerns, once held hostage to the Cold War, have surfaced in a compelling way. This has led to a shift in political and strategic calculations from a strict emphasis on order to a more subtle one, in which the idea of justice enjoys priority. Finally, global media coverage continues to generate domestic and international pressure to act quickly, albeit on a selective basis.

These factors pose challenges to the international community. Equally, they offer opportunities to act constructively in developing the necessary instruments to deal quickly and effectively with genuine threats to international peace and security.

OBJECTIVE

The aim of the study is to make practical proposals to enhance the UN's rapid reaction capability in the field of peace operations.

SCOPE

The Canadian study will analyze the problem of rapid reaction capability from the perspective of the UN system as a whole. The

functions that need to be performed at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels will be identified. A key component of this analysis will be a clear description of the crucial interrelationships among these levels, based on the premise that deficiencies and inadequacies in any one sphere directly influence success or failure throughout the system. For example, the ready availability of an operational element remains dependent upon both the generation of political will, and adequate ongoing strategic planning and direction for its effectiveness.

The focus of the study will be at the operational and tactical levels. The greatest challenges lie here, given the virtually complete ad hoc nature of mounting today's peace operations and the slow, inefficient assembly of disparate tactical units in the theatre of operations. Even given adequate warning and the existence of strategic plans to react, there is a virtual vacuum at the operational level in the UN system. At present, there is no standing headquarters that is capable of organizing, integrating and directing forces based on common doctrine and standards.

In keeping with the requirement to make practical recommendations that respond to today's needs, as well as the achievement of potential advances in the future, the study will develop proposals for the short, medium and long terms. In this context, the study of the concept of a UN standing force will involve both its feasibility and modus operandi once established over the long term, as well as the relationship between short- and medium-term projects and their possible cumulative contributions to its ultimate creation.

Finally, the study will look at the impact of a standing force on the activities of regional organizations and their capabilities in this area. Regional actors and organizations should have a high motivation to react quickly to emerging crises in their own regions. Similarly, in some important respects at least, they should be inherently more capable of moving quickly into a theatre of operations. The comparative advantages of operating at a global or regional level will be addressed, and proposals will be developed to achieve a balanced effort in accordance with the intent of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and along the lines recently advocated by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

STRUCTURE

The study will be guided by a steering group of senior officials and military officers, co-chaired by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department of National Defense. The steering group will oversee the study and commission supporting technical studies as appropriate.

In order to provide the broadest possible international input into the study, an international consultative group is being established. This group, drawn from well-known and accomplished diplomats, government officials, soldiers and academics, will review the work in progress and exchange views as the study proceeds. Three conferences will also be organized under the aegis of the study, to which various member states, non-governmental authorities and specialists will be invited. The first two conferences will draw primarily on Canadian experts, and will focus on the operational/technical and the strategic/political levels, respectively. The third conference will be international in scope, and will be organized around a meeting of the international consultative group in April 1995. The results of all of these conferences will be incorporated into the final report.

Throughout the study process, Canada will consult on a bilateral basis with member

states interested in monitoring the progress of and exchanging views on the study. Canada would also hope to collaborate with other member states pursuing similar or complementary ideas.

A key consultative partner during the study will be the UN Secretariat. The steering group will keep the Secretary-General informed of the progress of the study, seek his views as appropriate, and invite relevant Secretariat officials to the conferences.

CONTENT

The study is intended to focus on enhancing the UN's rapid reaction capability. It is not a study on how to improve UN peacekeeping generally. Nonetheless, these two themes have much in common that must be taken into account in the overall context of the study. Therefore, the study will review past experience relevant to the aim of this project, including a review of major concepts and initiatives that represent significant milestones on the road to the present. Particular attention will be paid to developments since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, the study will be guided by the orientation and concepts articulated by the Secretary-General in An Agenda for Peace. Due regard will be accorded to non-military aspects of peace operations, such as prevention diplomacy, the political component of all such operations and peacebuilding. Peacekeeping will be treated in its broadest context.

The study will focus on the specific issue of improved responsiveness, given the structure and nature of contemporary peacekeeping. This will take account of the interrelationships among the political, strategic, operational and tactical components of any peace operation, as well as the relevance for rapid reaction of the integration of political, humanitarian, police and military elements, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Similarly, the study will address the question of command and control systems and their contribution to an improved rapid reaction capability. The conditions under which nations are willing to make their resources available to the UN are crucial to their political commitment and readiness to act. Paramount among these concerns is the nature and competence of command and control structures and relationships. The role of the Security Council in mobilizing political support and providing ongoing guidance is essential.

The study will elaborate the component elements of a rapid reaction capability in a generic sense. This section of the study will address the requirement for, and provision of, among other things, early warning, integrated planning capability, command and control systems, logistics capability and doctrine/standards/interoperability. An important element will be the nature of standing forces, options for their development and a discussion of their potential utility.

Having established the basis for rapid reaction, the study will address in concrete terms what can be done to achieve this capability. The study will outline proposals that logically fit into one of the three time frames envisaged. The implications of a given proposal at one of the four levels (political, strategic, operational and tactical) for the remaining levels will be explored. For example, the establishment of regional stocks in two or more locations has direct implications for how these stocks will be allocated and co-ordinated at the strategic level in New York.

In many cases, short-term proposals will suggest additional measures that might logically follow in the medium and long terms. For example, virtually all proposals for the medium and long term imply an increased

capability in the UN Secretariat to cope with additional responsibilities. Therefore, reform and enhancement of the UN Secretariat, a necessary stand-alone requirement to enhance the UN's rapid reaction capability, will also cumulatively establish the necessary strategic apparatus to handle a series of additional medium- and long-term improvements.

Any plan to operate a standing force presupposes adjustments at the political, strategic and tactical levels, which in many cases must be put in place on an incremental basis, starting as soon as possible.

The study will arrive at recommendations and conclusions regarding the desirability and feasibility of implementing a variety of potential measures. It will also make observations and recommendations as to their associated costs.

The study will be submitted to the membership of the UN at the General Assembly in September 1995, and presented to the Secretary-General for his consideration.

NOTICE OF DETERMINATION BY THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS UNDER RULE 35, PARAGRAPH 4, REGARDING EDUCATIONAL TRAVEL

● Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, it is required by paragraph 4 of rule 35 that I place in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD notices of Senate employees who participate in programs, the principal objective of which is educational, sponsored by a foreign government or a foreign educational or charitable organization involving travel to a foreign country paid for by that foreign government or organization.

The select committee received notification under rule 35 for Robert McArthur, a member of the staff of Senator COCHRAN, to participate in a program in Germany sponsored by the Hanns Seidel Foundation from July 1 to 8, 1995.

The committee determined that no Federal statute or Senate rule would prohibit participation by Mr. McArthur in this program.

The select committee received notification under rule 35 for Mary Parke, a member of the staff of Senator SIMON, to participate in a program in Germany sponsored by the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung Foundation from May 27 to June 3, 1995.

The committee determined that no Federal statute or Senate rule would prohibit participation by Ms. Parke in this program.

The select committee received notification under rule 35 for Jonathan M. Harris, a member of the staff of Senator D'AMATO, to participate in a program sponsored by the Korea Economic Institute of America to be held in Korea from May 28 to June 4, 1995.

The committee determined that no Federal statute or Senate rule would prohibit participation by Mr. Harris in this program.

The select committee received notification under rule 35 for Reid Cavnar, a member of the staff of Senator SHELBY, to participate in a program in Taiwan sponsored by the Tamkang University from July 1 to 8, 1995.