Our NATO allies, especially Britain and France, have substantial ground troops in Bosnia. The opposition of these governments to lifting the arms embargo reflect their justifiable concern toward the safety and well-being of their soldiers. I am very concerned, however, that continuing the status quo will only increase the tensions between the United States and our European allies.

This war is also causing tensions between members in the eastern part of NATO. While the historical resentments between Greece and Turkey are an ongoing issue within NATO, the Balkan war is exacerbating these tensions. Greece has traditionally had a strong relationship with Serbia. Turkey, a secular Moslem country which has tried to condemn the Bosnian conflict without making mention of religion, is finding it harder to keep silent on the religious aspect of this war. The implication is that if the Bosnians were Christian, the West would be doing more to protect them.

This religious argument is a very important component of how the Bosnian conflict is viewed in many circles in the Moslem world. A front page article in yesterday's Washington Post reports that moderate Moslem governments that are allies of the United States, including Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan, are under pressure from their citizens to come to the aid of the Bosnian government not because a fellow member of the United Nations is in need, but because the principal victims in this war are Moslem. Fundamentalist circles in these countries who argue in support of the Bosnian Moslems are gaining the moral high ground. The Bosnian conflict is increasingly being viewed in religious terms. It is in the national interest of the United States to minimize the perception that the West is forsaking the Bosnians because of their religion.

These tensions, coupled with UNPROFOR's failure to curb Serb aggression, or prevent ethnic cleansing and human rights atrocities, lead me to conclude that the status quo cannot be sustained.

In my view, either the international community must defend Bosnia, or we must make it possible for the Bosnians to defend themselves. And since the first option is not politically viable, the only choice left is to withdraw UNPROFOR and lift the arms embargo. In a speech this past April in Chicago, the Bosnian Ambassador to the United States, His Excellency Sven Alkalaj, was very clear: ''If we must choose between UNPROFOR and arms, we can only choose arms.'' The Bosnians are not asking the United States or any other country to defend them. They simply ask for the right to defend themselves.

There will only be an end to this conflict if aggression is met head on. As long as one side is free to wage war without meeting any counter force, the aggression will continue. UNPROFOR has no mandate to counter the attacks against civilians. Worse, the presence of UNPROFOR provides a shield against NATO air strikes. UNPROFOR's presence on the ground prevents the one thing that could make the fighting come to an end, and bring both sides to the negotiating table—the balance of power.

Only if there is a balance of power can there be a political solution in Bosnia. This cannot be provided by the United Nations, or the countries of the West. Only the Bosnians themselves, properly armed, can provide a balance of power.

The Bosnian Serbs will not negotiate as long as they think they are winning on the battlefield. As long as UNPROFOR remains in Bosnia, one side is in a position to use aggression without consequence.

Mr. President, we need to change that equation. The Serbs must learn that they cannot wage war on noncombatants in markets and bread lines with impunity. They need to know that they are not going to be protected from the horrendous human rights violations they are committing.

Mr. President, pulling out UNPROFOR and lifting the arms embargo is not without significant risk. These consequences have already been outlined on the floor. The President has committed up to 25,000 U.S. troops to help extricate UNPROFOR. Our troops would go into Bosnia for a short, well-defined mission, under NATO command. The possibility of casualties, however, cannot be underestimated. Removing UNPROFOR will leave Moslem refugees at immediate risk. Under this scenario, the humanitarian situation will certainly get worse before it gets better. And, finally, the increased intensity of the fighting between Serbs and Moslems escalates the possibility of a wider regional war.

I believe that these serious consequences must be weighed against allowing the present situation to continue. The current Serb policy of taking UNPROFOR soldiers hostage, and overrunning safe areas cannot be allowed to continue. Two years ago, these actions, in total defiance of the United Nations, might have meant a considerable escalation that the international community would have wanted to avoid. But today, these acts have not only occurred, they have not met any counter force.

Mr. President, the UNPROFOR mission is untenable. It does not have the resources or the armaments to enforce peace. It does not have the will to enforce peace. The mission, as it has been mandated, can only function if all sides are willing to stop fighting. UNPROFOR cannot keep the peace when one side wants war. UNPROFOR cannot protect the enclaves from serious assault. UNPROFOR cannot protect women from rape or men from disappearing. There is no consensus to turn UNPROFOR into a military unit capable of defending the enclaves or the innocents. The only conclusion is to lift the arms embargo.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, in considering the legislation pending before the Senate today which requires the President to unilaterally lift the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina, I am struck by the following question: What is our goal?

My colleagues have stated that we can no longer stand by and watch the Bosnians continue to be slaughtered by the Serbian army. By lifting the embargo, we are giving the Bosnians the means to stand up and fight the Serbs on an even footing. In their minds, we are helping to prevent further killing of Bosnians. But are we really doing that or are we contributing to more bloodshed, more killing, and more ethnic cleansing?

As I have said several times in the past when the Senate has been faced with this issue, lifting the arms embargo will not guarantee peace. It will only widen the war and guarantee more deaths on both sides. Lifting the arms embargo contingent on the removal of United Nations Protective Forces does not take into consideration humanitarian concerns. It will not lead to greater protection of civilians and refugees in the safe areas. Rather it will lead to further violence against them.

While I agree that the international efforts of the United Nations have faltered in recent months, I do not believe that lifting the arms embargo is the appropriate response. To be honest, short of full scale military intervention, no one in the international community has a comprehensive solution to ending the conflict in Bosnia. Although some may see lifting the arms embargo as the only solution right now, it does not get us any closer to finding a comprehensive solution or to bringing the war to a close.

It is still my opinion that the only way to end the war in Bosnia is to bring economic and diplomatic pressure to bear against the Serbs and their allies. We must begin by making a greater effort to cut off Serbian access to arms. Only by choking off their ability to conduct the war in Bosnia will we be able to bring them to the negotiating table.

Again, I return to my original question: What is our goal in lifting the arms embargo? What are we trying to achieve? I do not believe anyone in this body truly believes that any kind of humanitarian or peace-bringing goal is accomplished by this ill-fated action. For that reason, I will once again oppose this legislation.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, notwithstanding the consent agreement of July 20, 1995, the following amendment be the only first degree amendment in order to the Dole substitute to S. 21, and subject to a second degree to be offered by Senator COHEN, with all time for debate to

be consumed tonight except for the time between 8:30 a.m. and 10:40 a.m., and 90 minutes beginning at 12 noon, with all that time to be equally divided between the two leaders or their designees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that at 1:30 Senator DASCHLE be recognized to use his leadership time, followed by Senator DOLE to use his leadership time, and the Senate then proceed to vote on the Cohen second degree, to be followed immediately by a vote on the Nunn amendment, as amended, if amended, to be followed by a vote on the Dole substitute, as amended, if amended, to be followed immediately by a third reading and final passage of S. 21, as amended, if amended.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

JOINT MEETING OF THE TWO HOUSES—ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President pro tempore of the Senate be authorized to appoint a committee on the part of the Senate to join with a like committee on the part of the House of Representatives to escort His Excellency Kim Yong-sam, President of the Republic of Korea, into the House Chamber for the joint meeting tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDERS FOR WEDNESDAY, JULY 26, 1995

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today it stand in recess until the hour of 8:30 a.m. on Wednesday, July 26, 1995, that following the prayer, the Journal of proceedings be deemed approved to date, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day, and the Senate then immediately resume S. 21, and that Senator DODD be recognized.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, the Senate will be in controlled debate between 8:30 a.m. and 10:40 a.m. on the Bosnia legislation.

I ask unanimous consent that at 10:40 a.m., the Senate stand in recess until 12 noon in order to hear an address by President Kim of the Republic of Korea.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROGRAM

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, under the previous order, the Senate will begin voting on amendments and final passage of S. 21 at approximately 1:45 p.m. Therefore, Senators should be on notice that at least two votes will occur at that time. Following those votes, it will be the intention of the majority leader to begin the State Department authorization bill, and if consent cannot be granted the leader will move to proceed to S. 908.

ORDER FOR RECESS

Mr. ROTH. If there is no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask that the Senate stand in recess under the previous order following the conclusion of the remarks of Senator DASCHLE.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Democratic leader.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, let me describe for our colleagues briefly what this unanimous-consent agreement entails so everyone has a clear understanding of what the situation is.

We will come in at 8:30 in the morning. At that time, we will have debate for 2 hours and 10 minutes, to be equally divided. We will then recess to attend the joint meeting to hear the speech from the President of South Korea, reconvene at noon, and have an additional 90 minutes of debate, again to be equally divided, followed then by recognition of the two leaders for one-half hour under which leadership time will be used, and with the completion of that time, an immediate vote first on the Cohen amendment, and then on the Nunn amendment, and then finally on final passage.

So there will be two blocks of time, an hour on either side approximately in the morning, 45 minutes on either side beginning at noon.

What that means is that there is very limited time, and I encourage my colleagues to keep their remarks brief. We have already had a number of requests for time tomorrow morning on this side. I urge my colleagues to be accommodating and to take into account the fact that a number of Senators will wish to be recognized and to be heard. It is not my intent to allocate any time beyond 10 minutes tomorrow morning to any Senator except Senator NUNN, who has an amendment pending or during that period beginning tomorrow noon.

So this accommodates a number of concerns raised and certainly allows us to reach a time for final passage sometime in early afternoon, and I appreciate the cooperation of the Senators on both sides.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SELF-DEFENSE ACT OF 1995

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, let me make a few comments tonight—I have waited to allow other Senators to be heard—and I intend again to speak briefly tomorrow prior to the vote, but I wish to take some time this evening to express my personal position with regard to this issue and explain why I will be voting as I will tomorrow afternoon.

We are again, as others have indicated, in a crisis in Bosnia. Just today, as was reported several hours ago, in open violation of the United Nations mandates, the Bosnian Serbs have seized another safe area, Zepa, under the protection of UNPROFOR, the United Nations protection forces.

This despicable act of aggression by the Bosnian Serbs is now being followed by a brutal wave of ethnic cleansing that is forcing thousands of Bosnian women and children and elderly to flee for their lives. United Nations peacekeepers now find themselves under attack in a land where there is little peace to keep.

This is not the first time the Senate has debated whether to terminate the arms embargo in Bosnia. In the 103d Congress, the Senate voted on the matter seven different times.

Less than a year ago, on August 11, 1994, the Senate adopted two competing amendments to the fiscal year 1995 Department of Defense appropriations bill. The first of those amendments was offered by Senators DOLE and LIEBERMAN. It set a deadline of November 15 of last year for the President to break with our NATO allies and unilaterally end the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government. It passed by a vote of 58 to 42.

The second amendment, offered by Senators Mitchell and Nunn, proposed a different scenario for lifting the arms embargo. It said first that if the Bosnian Serbs refused to accept a peace plan developed by the five-member contact group by October 15, 1994, then the United States would introduce and support a resolution in the United Nations to end the embargo completely.

Second, the Nunn-Mitchell amendment said that if the United Nations failed to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia by November 15 of 1994, and if the Bosnian Serbs continued to reject the peace plan developed by the contact group, then no Department of Defense funds could be used to enforce the arms embargo against Bosnia. In addition, the President would be required to submit a plan to equip and train the Bosnian armed forces and consult with Congress regarding that specific plan.

The Nunn-Mitchell language was included in the 1995 defense appropriations bill and signed into law on October 5 of last year.

The administration has been unable, unfortunately, to convince the United Nations Security Council to lift the arms embargo multilaterally. But in keeping with the congressional mandate, the United States last November ceased participation in the enforcement of the arms embargo against the