the same airplane. We build a plane that has long-range, enormous carrying capability and is stealthy and would look a lot like the B–2.''

Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman will yield further, let us explain that for a minute.

People need to know that in the old days, when we built these conventional bombers, they were not a lot different from the domestic aircraft that we build, so we could go to the gentleman, who is one of the greatest representatives that area has ever had in Washington, my colleague, and go to his hometown and talk to the Boeing management and Boeing workers, we could have gone back in the 1950's and the 1960's and said, ''We need a new bomber line and can you change your jigs and your tooling a little bit and build us a bomber,'' and they say, ''Yeah, we can do it,'' because the conventional bombers were not that much different from conventional aircraft, the type you use for commercial airlines.

□ 1645

If you have got a picture of that B–2 bomber, everybody knows it looks like a bat. It is very, very different from anything. I have got a poster that has got it on this side, if the gentleman would put that up for us. I have a poster right here.

The B–2 looks different and is different from any conventional aircraft by a very, very wide margin. So the suppliers, if you look at that bat-shaped aircraft and all the different composites and components and things that allow it to evade radar, you do not want your commercial aircraft to evade radar, you want them to use radar because you want your flight control people to know where that plane is at all times. So it is a totally unique, different aircraft.

We did not do what we did in the 1940s and 1950s and 1960s and go to our domestic aircraft companies and tell them to reconfigure their domestic production line a little bit, just like Rosie the Riveter did in World War II, and make a bunch of war planes. We have a very unique set of suppliers that make the thousands and thousands of various components that comprise a B–2 bomber.

If we close down that line, those people and a lot of them are small businesses, are going to go off and do other things. And if we get on the phone and call them up 10 years from now and say, It looks like we made a mistake; we need more B–2's, it is going to be enormously expensive to get that line started up again.

Mr. DICKS. General Skantze, who was one of our best procurement people in the history of the Air Force wrote me a letter, a very strong statement saying:

There are no bomber engineering design teams left at Rockwell or Boeing. Nor can you assemble them overnight, nor do they come up with a sophisticated design in less than 2 or 3 years at best. Building Boeing 747's is no more like building B–2's than building Cadillacs is like building M1A2's.

Ask the Boeing people who build the After Center Section and the Outboard (Wing) Sections of the B–2. The Aft Center Section of the B–2 begins manufacturing and parts fabrication; assembly of bulkheads, skins, panels, and beams. Then it goes into sub assembly of spars, carry through assembly, keel beams, upper panels and ribs. Most of this work involves careful layups of special composite materials. The final assembly goes through clean, seal, paint, installation, test, and preparation for shipment.

Most of this is very sophisticated composite work and assembly with tolerance of thousandths of an inch. The process takes 37.5 months. When this assembly comes together with the Outboard Section, the Intermediate Sections, and the Forward Center Section at the B–2 final assembly at Palmdale, California, the buildup goes through an excruciatingly accurate mating process to ensure the careful laser-measured joining preserves the aircraft outer mold line, which is fundamental to the very low radar signature.

The resulting total flow time from the B–2 from lead time to rollout is currently 6 years.

Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman will yield, I want to say to the gentleman he has made a tremendous presentation for B–2, and I hope that all Members of the House, whether they are here or in their offices, have been watching this.

I have two colleagues that have a colloquy to do. They are two strong B–2 supporters, so I am going to break off my comments at this time. I want to thank the distinguished gentleman from Washington, who is a conservative Democrat who stands for a strong national defense and he has done a great service in trying to keep American air power alive. We appreciate you.

Mr. DICKS. I want to say one final thing. This is a bipartisan effort and the support for the B–2 has always been bipartisan. I just hope that the people who are watching C–SPAN all over this country will let their Members know and then tell them what they think about this.

This is not just some pork barrel project. This is the future security of our country. I enjoy working with the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER], because I know he too cares about the future of our country; he too has seen too many body bags come home and know we have a way to prevent that, to save American lives, and to have a less expensive program. Because we can have fewer people in the military if we have this technological superiority and we can save money for the taxpayers; we can save American lives in future conflicts, and we can, I hope, some day have a conventional deterrent in the B–2 that will prevent a future war. Then everyone will recognize why we fought so hard to try and save this capability.

Mr. Speaker, I submit the following:

JANUARY 4, 1995.

The PRESIDENT,
*The White House, Washington, DC.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We are writing you to express our concerns about the impending termination of the B–2 bomber production line. After spending over $20 billion to develop this revolutionary aircraft, current plans call for closing out the program with a purchase of only twenty bombers. We believe this plan does not adequately consider the challenges to U.S. security that arise in the next century, and the central role that the B–2 may play in meeting those challenges.

At present the nation's long-range bomber force consists primarily of two aircraft: the B–52 and the B–1. The 95 B–52's are all over thirty years old, and their ability to penetrate modern air defenses is very doubtful. The 96 B–1's were procured as an interim bomber until B–2's were available.

Even after all twenty B–2's are delivered, the inventory of long-range bombers will total barely 200 aircraft. This is not enough to meet future requirements, particularly in view of the attrition that would occur in a conflict and the eventual need to retire the B–52's. As the number of forward-deployed aircraft carriers declines and the U.S. gradually withdraws from its overseas bases, it will become increasingly difficult to use tactical aircraft in bombing missions. It therefore is essential that steps be taken now to preserve an adequate long-range bomber force.

The B–2 was originally conceived to be the nation's next generation bomber, and it remains the most cost-effective means of rapidly projecting force over great distances. Its range will enable it to reach any point on earth within hours after launch while being deployed at only three secure bases around the world. Its payload and array of munitions will permit it to destroy numerous time-sensitive targets in a single sortie. And perhaps most importantly, its low-observable characteristics will allow it to reach intended targets without fear of interception.

The logic of continuing low-rate production of the B–2 thus is both fiscal and operational. It is already apparent that the end of the Cold War was neither the end of history nor the end of danger. We hope it also will not be the end of the B–2. We urge you to consider the purchase of more such aircraft while the option still exists.

MELVIN LAIRD.
JAMES SCHLESINGER.
DONALD RUMSFELD.
HAROLD BROWN.
CASPAR WEINBERGER.
FRANK CARLUCCI.
DICK CHENEY.

## REPORT ON RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF S. 21, TERMINATING THE UNITED STATES ARMS EMBARGO ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Mr. DIAZ-BALART, from the Committee on Rules, submitted a privileged (Rept. No. 104–213), on the resolution (H. Res. 204) providing for consideration of the bill (S. 21) to terminate the United States arms embargo applicable to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.