

While we may never learn or understand why this ebullient man should end his life, we can never subtract from his accomplishments.

We may never fathom the why of death, but we shall always be thankful for the fullness of his life.

Outwardly, Duane was the epitome of confidence and elan, seemingly so impregnable. Whatever pain he felt, or doubts he had, remained concealed behind the customary lift of his head and broad smile.

What drove him to that final, solitary walk on the Golden Gate Bridge may elude us, but what we shall always know is his love for his family and his zest whenever he was on the other end of the phone, or sitting in the living room or booming his opinion on radio or television.

His life is what matters. His death is mere punctuation that makes clear the substance and meaning that came before.

Indeed, Duane seemed to have it all, and for those of us who knew him he endlessly seemed to give his all.

So very much alive, so bursting with ideas, so expressive, so reaching out to help others, Duane, even now that he is gone, reverberates in our mind in endless reminders of the vigor and principle he brought to politics and other endeavors.

Campaign manager, advisor, counselor, invariably shrewd and insightful, always helpful, thoroughly unselfish, unfailingly available and generous with his time, Duane Garrett was always there.

And always shall he be.

FOREIGN RELATIONS REVITALIZATION ACT

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, I intend to offer an amendment to the Foreign Relations Revitalization Act of 1995 to assist the President in his efforts to deal with the growing threat to American interests from Iran. President Clinton clearly sought to address this threat with his May 6 Executive order establishing a full United States embargo of Iran. It is my hope that short of successfully encouraging other nations from trading with Iran, an extremely challenging task, the President will be able to use the authority in this amendment to encourage other countries to at least refrain from contributing to Iranian weapons capabilities.

The 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, which I cosponsored with then-Senator GORE, established sanctions against third parties which assist Iran and Iraq in their efforts to rebuild their weapons capabilities. It was a start, but it did not go far enough. Efforts by Senator LIEBERMAN and me last year to expand the legislation were unsuccessful.

The 1992 bill was intended to target not only the acquisition of conventional weapons, but weapons of mass destruction as well. In the process of

amending the bill to the 1993 Defense Act, however, the explicit references to weapons of mass destruction were dropped.

The amendment I am offering today attempts to make these applications absolutely clear. It also removes from the proposed sanctions exceptions for assistance under the Freedom Support Act, thereby removing the benefit of the doubt Congress gave Russia in 1992. As I will explain later in my statement, Russia has used this exception to the detriment of United States policy in the Persian Gulf.

To the current list of sanctions against persons assisting Iran and Iraq in its weapons programs, which already include procurement and export sanctions, the amendments we are offering today add the denial of visas, denial of commercial credit, and denial of authority to ship products across United States territory. To the list of sanctions against countries offering similar assistance, the amendment adds the denial of licenses for export of nuclear material, denial of foreign military sales, denial of the transfer of controlled technology, denial of the transfer of computer technology, suspension of the authority of foreign air carriers to fly to or from the United States, and a prohibition on vessels that enter the ports of sanctioned countries.

The threat from Iraq is not an immediate concern. The most important aspect of our policy with regard to Iraq must be to remain firm on the U.N. embargo. But given the history of the Iraqi military buildup before the Gulf war, the sanctions included in the Iran-Iraq Act may at a later date be as important with regard to Iraq as they are currently in the case of Iran. Once the embargo is lifted, there will be a great temptation for cash-strapped economies to resume sales of military hardware to Iraq. Outside forces may once again be compelled to maintain a balance in the region through arms sales and a dangerous escalation of firepower.

It is also vitally important to prevent the reemergence of an Iraqi conventional military threat. One need only observe the origins of the weapons which constituted the Iraqi threat in 1990 to know that the key to any post-embargo containment strategy will depend on our ability to influence Iraq's trading partners in Europe, Russia, the People's Republic of China, and North Korea.

The threat from Iran is more immediate. The Iranian buildup in the Persian Gulf is common knowledge. Its importation of hundreds of North Korean Scud-C missiles, its intention to acquire the Nodong North Korean missiles currently under development, and its efforts to develop nuclear weapons are well established—as is its conventional weapons buildup.

Successive CIA directors, and Secretaries Perry and Christopher have all testified to the effect that Iran is engaged in an extensive effort to acquire

nuclear weapons. In February, Russia signed an agreement to provide Iran with a 1,000 megawatt light water nuclear reactor. The Russians indicate that they may soon agree to build as many as three more reactors—another 1,000 megawatt reactor, and two 440 megawatt reactors.

I have raised my concerns regarding this sale with the administration on a number of occasions. I have maintained that under the Freedom Support Act of 1992, which the Iran Iraq Act of 1992 was intended to reinforce, the President must either terminate assistance to Russia or formally waive the requirement to invoke sanctions out of concern for the national interest.

The State Department has informed me that “to the best of its knowledge, Russia has not actually transferred relevant material, equipment, or technology to Iran,” and so there is no need to consider sanctions. I have been further informed that they are “examining the scope of the proposed Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran, and as appropriate, they will thoroughly evaluate the applicability of sanctions,” presumably, if at a later date they can confirm the transfer.

I have no reason to question the State Department's evaluation of the facts on the ground. However, I would note that there have been public reports of as many as 220 Russians employed at the site of the proposed reactor. There seems to be a dangerously obscure standard for determining when material, equipment, or technology useful in the manufacture of nuclear weapons has actually been transferred, especially when as is the case with Iran, the reactor may already be partially complete.

At what point in the construction of the reactors does the transfer become significant? Do we allow the Russians to build portions of the reactor which do not strictly involve the transfer of dangerous equipment or technology while Iran obtains the most vital assistance from other sources? Although I cannot make this determination myself, common sense and an appropriate sense of caution would dictate that any assistance provided Iran in its efforts to acquire nuclear technology is significant.

The administration declined to identify the dispatch of technicians to the site as sufficient proof that a technology transfer was occurring. However, now that we are approaching the completion of site inspection and preparation, and nearing the start of the actual construction, it is my hope that the President will make another assessment of the situation.

I would point out that although the administration may have technical grounds for arguing that it is not yet required to invoke sanctions, making a determination on the applicability of sanctions sooner rather than later would serve as necessary leverage in resolving the issue. My intention is not to gut U.S. assistance to Russia. It is

to prevent Russia from providing Iran dangerous technology. Waiting to make a determination until the transfer is complete defeats the purpose of the sanctions.

Ultimately, I fear that the reason the administration has not made a determination is that it does not want to jeopardize our relationship with Russia.

Based on this assumption and anticipating that the State Department may at a later date find other ways to avoid compliance with the Freedom Support Act, the legislation we are introducing today makes the President's legal responsibility under the act more explicit.

We sent our Armed Forces to war in the Persian Gulf once in this decade. They endured hardship to themselves and their families. Some will live with the injuries they suffered in service to our Nation for the rest of their lives. And, as is the case with every war, some never returned. With the cooperation of our friends in Europe, whose own sacrifices to the effort to free Kuwait should not be forgotten, we must see that the service of these brave men and women was not in vain.

Stability and security in the Persian Gulf is vital to the world economy and to our own national interests. Aggressors in the region should know that if we must, we will return to the Persian Gulf with the full force of Operation Desert Storm. At the same time, our friends and adversaries elsewhere in the world should understand that the United States will do everything in its power to preclude that necessity. It is my sincere hope that his legislation will serve as an indication of just how serious we are.

DON'T ABANDON HANFORD

Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, the Nation's nuclear facilities are being singled out for strident criticism these days. The Hanford site in Washington State is one of those pointed to for its alleged waste and inefficiency. In fact, some of my distinguished colleagues have proposed legislation that would dramatically, fundamentally, and perhaps dangerously affect the principles which govern cleanup at Hanford.

I am troubled by these criticisms, Mr. President, not because they do not make some good points—for certainly, Hanford's cleanup operation is not perfect—but because they ignore two important factors: first, that cleanup operations at Hanford are actually progressing; and second, that this Government has an obligation to help communities which contributed in no small part to our victories in World War Two and the cold war.

The massive undertaking to clean up nuclear waste at Hanford is overseen by what is known as the Tri-Party Agreement. This agreement, forged in 1989, includes the Department of Energy, the Washington State Department of Ecology, and the U.S. Environ-

mental Protection Agency, and is showing itself to be an effective means for guiding cleanup. As a recent article in the Tri-Cities Herald noted:

Many in the Northwest, including former adversaries, say the pact is the engine driving cleanup and, while slow in the beginning, it now is speeding the work along.

From safety to new technology to administrative savings, Hanford has made great strides. I submit for the RECORD a list of Hanford's recent accomplishments from the Tri-Cities Herald. It shows how far Hanford has come, and how the Tri-Party Agreement has influenced and moved cleanup efforts.

The Blush Report, a review of Hanford commissioned by my distinguished colleague Senator JOHNSTON, cited the Tri-Party Agreement as the primary obstacle to efficient cleanup. But that report was wrong. Just ask the people who signed the Tri-Party Agreement, the contractors who follow its guidelines, and the people of Washington State who benefit from its success. For all its faults, the Tri-Party Agreement serves as a constant reminder to the Federal Government that cleanup at Hanford is a top priority.

And officials at Hanford are now looking to move 2,300 tons of spent nuclear fuel away from the Columbia River three years earlier than originally planned. This is not only good for the environment, but for the taxpayer as well—it may save as much as \$120 million. Would the Federal Government, on its own, take the initiative like this and actually try to finish a project ahead of schedule? I have my doubts.

A unique example of innovation at Hanford is the use of microorganisms to get rid of pollution. These microscopic creatures are, according to DOE News, "stimulated with a vinegar-like solution to 'eat' chemical pollutants such as carbon tetrachloride and nitrates." Mr. President, surely no one can say that Hanford is in the grips of bureaucratic sclerosis when it enlists what one local paper calls "vinegar-swimming microbes" in the fight against pollution.

I recently received a letter from Mr. Kenneth Kensington of Viatch, Inc., in Hastings, MI. Viatch is cooperating with the Department of Energy on certain aspects of the cleanup, and Mr. Kensington writes that such cooperation is valuable not just to Hanford, but to the private sector and the advancement of research and development as well.

Administratively, Hanford is also making great strides. Last April members of the Tri-Party Agreement met in St. Louis to create a "Blueprint for Action and Cost Control." As the Tri-City Herald reports, "[t]he officials at the St. Louis meeting examined how to better manage projects, reduce costs and increase competition, track savings and streamline the regulatory process."

Mr. President, this strategy goes hand-in-hand with the legislation my

fellow members of the Washington State delegation and I have introduced to reform cleanup at Hanford.

There is, Mr. President, another aspect to this issue, and that is the responsibility the United States of America has for supporting facilities like Hanford which provided the manpower and the materials that helped fight and win both World War Two and the Cold War.

Beginning in the 1940's, the Federal Government asked the Hanford community to join in the effort to combat Japanese, then Soviet, aggression. Hanford responded to the country's call, and performed its task magnificently, producing the materials to build up our Nation's defenses and face up to first the fascist and then the Communist threat. Tens of thousands of men and women worked on this mission, each contributing in their own way to American strength and security.

Now, Mr. President, as we all know, the cold war is won, communism is vanquished, and we should all be thankful for the hard work and dedication of people in communities like Hanford. After all, these communities sacrificed a great deal. At Hanford, thousands of tons of nuclear waste lie underground, the result of a decades-long nuclear effort. I understand, Mr. President, that some of my distinguished colleagues may be concerned by the cost of cleanup at Hanford, but I cannot believe they would suggest that we simply turn our backs on the people who never faltered in their duty to their country.

On Tuesday, the Senate Energy and Water Subcommittee approved funding for Hanford for 1996. I was very pleased by this, Mr. President. But I am still concerned about Hanford's long-term situation. I am very concerned that we stand by our commitments.

Mr. President, I hope my colleagues will consider this issue carefully. I hope they will do what is right by the people of Hanford, and not, in their rush to save dollars, forget Hanford's invaluable service to America.

Mr. President, I ask that this article from the Tri-City Herald be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Tri-City Herald, July 2, 1995]

SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE, MILESTONES REACHED SINCE SIGNING OF TRI-PARTY AGREEMENT

Here's a rundown of major accomplishments at Hanford since the Tri-Party Agreement was signed in 1989:

Hanford's highest risk—the "burping" tank 101-SY—was resolved by installing a giant mixer pump that controls releases of hydrogen gases from the tank.

Fabrication was completed on a spar pump, the second of its kind for waste tank use.

Contaminated liquid discharges to the soil were eliminated.

K Basins, which hold highly radioactive used nuclear fuel, were made earthquake-proof.