

NAYS—45

Akaka	Feingold	Leahy
Baucus	Feinstein	Levin
Biden	Ford	Lieberman
Bingaman	Glenn	Mikulski
Boxer	Graham	Moseley-Braun
Bradley	Harkin	Moynihan
Breaux	Heflin	Murray
Bryan	Hollings	Nunn
Bumpers	Inouye	Pryor
Byrd	Johnston	Reid
Conrad	Kennedy	Robb
Daschle	Kerrey	Rockefeller
Dodd	Kerry	Sarbanes
Dorgan	Kohl	Simon
Exon	Lautenberg	Wellstone

The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 55 and the nays are 45. Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn, not having voted in the affirmative, the motion is rejected.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Washington is recognized.

Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 5 minutes as if in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GORTON. I thank the Chair.

(The remarks of Mr. GORTON pertaining to the introduction of S. 1099 are located in today's RECORD under "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.")

Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

FOREIGN RELATIONS REVITALIZATION ACT

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.

AMENDMENT NO. 2033

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, what is the pending business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is amendment No. 2033 offered by the Senator from Texas.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, Senator HUTCHISON's amendment providing guidance to the U.S. delegation to the U.N. Conference on Women in Beijing is important for the signal it sends to the administration—and to the United Nations.

The upcoming Beijing Conference offers a smorgasbord for radicals who are constantly fighting against traditional family values—paid for, in part, by American taxpayers. Organizers of this

U.N. Women's Conference are determined to peddle their bizarre views of the family and the role of women. There is already too much kowtowing to fringe elements at the United Nations in New York and that is why this amendment is necessary.

The Senator from Texas and the Senator from Indiana clearly explained the amendment yesterday. It simply urges the U.S. delegation to the Beijing Conference to promote genuine women's rights and traditional family values, and not the agenda of a few activists who have captured the hearts and minds of U.N. bureaucrats.

In all honesty, Mr. President, it is astounding that an amendment even needs to be offered to protect the institutions of motherhood and the family. But, experience has shown that if Congress ignores the Beijing Conference, the United Nations will soon be pushing every country in the world to accept the United Nations strange notion of motherhood and family and even gender.

Some ideas promoted in the Beijing Conference "Platform for Action" are too bizarre to be believed, as I will explain in a moment. But, the American people know exactly what is going on, thanks to a multitude of news stories in the Christian and secular media.

You may remember, Mr. President, that some folks—but not this Senator—were sold a worthless bill of goods before last year's U.N. Conference on Population Control in Cairo. Senators and Congressmen were assured, promised, and guaranteed that Cairo Conference organizers and the U.S. delegation would not promote abortion-on-demand as a so-called international "reproductive right." But that is exactly what happened thanks to Tim Wirth, who was being advised by former Congresswoman Bela Abzug.

Senator HUTCHISON's amendment does not address this issue. But, it should come as no surprise that organizers of the Beijing Conference are determined to repeat what happened at the Cairo Conference—that is, they will attempt to coerce prolife foreign governments into creating a so-called "right" to abortion-on-demand.

Making matters worse, Mr. President, is the fact that this conference on women's issues is to take place in China of all places, where women are routinely forced to undergo abortions and sterilizations against their will, in the name of population control. Holding the Conference in China is nothing less than a slap in the face to women everywhere. It sends the clear signal that the United Nations finds China's grotesque behavior acceptable.

Lest anyone think that I have exaggerated the extent to which the United Nations has pandered to extremists, ask yourself why the word "mother" is virtually nonexistent in the Conference "Platform for Action" document. This is a conference on women, after all. Conference organizers prefer "care-

taker." The reason: because they dare not condemn—indeed they probably endorse—so-called homosexual marriages.

Ask yourself, Mr. President, why Beijing Conference organizers refuse to agree to a definition of the word "gender" as meaning only male and female. The United Nations apparently has decided that the world is made up of five genders: male, female, homosexual, bisexual, and transsexual—whatever that is. The U.N. Conference Secretariat stated that, "gender is relative." What in the world does that mean?

This administration is also on record stating that "gender differences" are "cultural—changeable, variable." [AID "Gender Analysis Tool Kit"]. And what is worse, Mr. President, they arrogantly want to shove this nonsense down the throats of American taxpayers, and ask them to pay for it.

It is obvious what is going on. These strange ideas and values may be acceptable to U.N. bureaucrats or even to some in this administration, but they are not acceptable to the American people, and that is why this amendment is important. I urge Senators to support Senator HUTCHISON's amendment.

It is my understanding that the distinguished Senator, the manager on the other side, is willing to accept the amendment.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, we have looked at this amendment. We will be happy to accept it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment (No. 2033) was agreed to.

Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.

AMENDMENT NO. 2041

(Purpose: To express the sense of Congress regarding the consolidation and reinvention of the foreign affairs agencies of the United States)

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask it be stated. It is already at the desk. I ask that the clerk read it slowly because the amendment speaks for itself.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to setting aside the pending amendment? Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will report the amendment. The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from North Carolina (Mr. HELMS) proposes an amendment numbered 2041.

At the end of the bill, add the following:

SEC. . SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CONSOLIDATION AND REINVENTION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AGENCIES.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that it is necessary in order to make the Government more efficient and to realize significant budgetary savings for the American taxpayer—

(1) to consolidate and reinvent foreign affairs agencies of the United States within the Department of State;

(2) to provide for the reorganization of the Department of State to maximize efficient use of resources, eliminate redundancy in functions, and improve the management of the Department of State;

(3) to assist congressional efforts to balance the Federal budget by the year 2002;

(4) to ensure that the international affairs budget function shoulders an appropriate share of the reductions in United States Government spending necessary to eliminate the \$4,800,000,000 budget deficit; and

(5) to strengthen—

(A) the coordination of United States foreign policy;

(B) the leading role of the Secretary of State in the formulation and articulation of United States foreign policy;

(C) the authority of United States ambassadors over all United States Government personnel and resources located in United States diplomatic missions, in order to enhance the ability of the ambassadors to deploy those resources to the best effect that will attain the President's foreign policy objectives; and

(D) the United States Foreign Service, as the forward deployed civilian force of the United States Government, through renewed emphasis on the original principles which undergird the distinct Foreign Service personnel system. These include worldwide availability, assignments based on the needs of the service, rank in person, and merit-based advancement.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the President should—

(1) consolidate within the Department of State, or eliminate, such duplicative, overlapping, or superfluous personnel, functions, goals, activities, offices, and programs that the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the United States Information Agency, and the Agency for International Development have in common with the Department of State in order to realize a budgetary savings to the American taxpayer of at least \$3,000,000,000 during fiscal years 1996 through 1999;

(2) encourage the United States foreign affairs agencies to maintain a high percentage of the best qualified, most competent American citizens serving in the United States Government while downsizing significantly the total number of people employed by these agencies; and

(3) ensure that all functions of diplomacy be subject to recruitment, training, assignment, promotion and egress based on common standards and procedures, with maximum interchange among the functions.

Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, if ever an amendment submitted in this Senate spoke for itself, this one does. That is why I asked the able clerk to read it in its entirety. And if there is a Senator who can offer an equivalent savings while preserving foreign affairs programs, I ask that Senator, whomever he or she may be, to do so.

The point is, and the fact is, they cannot do it. It cannot be done. So we are playing games with this business of not voting cloture and proceeding on this bill in concert with the administration, which has set out at the outset to say we will delay, we will obfuscate, we will do everything to block this bill. That is what is going on.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays. We do not need anybody except the two managers.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from North Carolina yield the floor?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I yield the floor, of course.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from North Carolina. Let me say to my friend from North Carolina that I think it is unfortunate that within a mere matter of hours on a bill we proceed to a cloture vote and behave as if somehow there is a major effort to delay a bill. I think there are 139 amendments on this bill—139 amendments; 94 of them—it is now 144 amendments—94 of them are from the Republican side of the aisle. Most of them are from my colleague from North Carolina.

So to suggest that a bill that was laid down yesterday—was laid down Friday afternoon, to be technically correct—but first debated yesterday for a few hours, beginning at 2 o'clock in the afternoon is now suddenly, on Tuesday morning, the subject of some kind of delay confuses me and, in fact, I think sort of does an injustice to the legislative process.

This is a very important bill. It represents a major overhaul of the means by which the United States of America delivers all of its foreign policy effort in the world. It has the most significant reorganization in it in modern history. It has some \$3 billion-plus of cuts. It is a very significant altering of the mechanism of foreign policy.

There are many people in the U.S. Senate, Mr. President, who feel that it runs roughshod over the constitutional prerogatives of the President of the United States. Let me give you an example. I think every word of the amendment that the Senator just put in, with the exception of maybe five, I would support.

I think it is a very strong statement of what the Secretary of State ought to do. It is a very strong statement, an exhortation to reorganization, we should do that. But it has a specificity as to a particular department or a particular movement that we have suggested in keeping with constitutional prerogatives of the President ought to be decided by the President.

All we are suggesting is give the President a mandate from the Congress to make the cuts, but allow the President to determine exactly how they are going to be made.

I can remember my friends on the other side of the aisle over the years that President Reagan and President Bush were in office consistently coming to the floor and saying, "Get the cotton-picking micromanaging hands out of the administrative process. Congress shouldn't micromanage. Congress shouldn't decide every single move-

ment of personnel. There ought to be some administrative capacity here."

Here we are suddenly, because President Clinton is in office, and we are going totally role reversal back on all of those restraints on micromanagement, and we are telling them, "You have to specifically get rid of this department, you have to put it here; you have to get rid of this department, you have to put it here; you have to get rid of this department, you have to put it here."

Now, all we have suggested is this would not be a problem if we came to the floor and adopted a compromise that was proposed by the administration and Democrats, which would have suggested, look, give the President a mandate for consolidation, but allow the President to decide what he wants to consolidate and where, how it best will function.

Here there is a mandate that you put certain departments within the Department of State when all of the former Secretaries of State have said, while they may be in favor of the concept, they have no confidence that the current State Department has the capacity to effect it. We have not addressed that here. There is nothing that deals with the capacity of Foreign Service officers to pick up these particular missions. There is nothing that deals with the capacity of these missions to be effected within the context of the State Department. So while, on the one hand, you are making this enormous shift, there is no commensurate administrative capacity or enablement to be able to actually implement the shift.

So I just say to my friend, this is an effort to legislate, not an effort to delay. Legislating is what we ought to do. We are supposed to come to the floor of the Senate and make some wise decisions about how to best demand change or mandate it and how best to make these savings.

I wonder if my friend from North Carolina would be willing to mandate the savings but take out the specificity and simply say we are going to try to find X amount of savings within this Department in order to try to reduce the budget, but leave up to the President the capacity to be able to choose where that might occur.

May I ask my friend from North Carolina—turning to his sense-of-the-Senate request on page 3, reading at line 15, paragraph 1, the Senator says, "It is the sense of the Congress that the President should consolidate within the Department of State or eliminate * * *."—I wonder if the Senator intends that it be an option of one or the other, just to clarify.

Mr. HELMS. Well, I say to the Senator, I have a corrected amendment here, and to call for the regular order on amendment 2031, I will send a second-degree amendment—

Mr. KERRY. I have asked a question of the Senator. But I do have the floor.

Mr. HELMS. Of course you do. But I thought you wanted a remedy.

Mr. KERRY. I wanted to know what his intention was before I give up the floor for any further action. I am trying to find out the status of the amendment.

Mr. HELMS. I will answer that in due time, I say to the distinguished Senator. If he yields the floor, I will do it right this minute.

Mr. KERRY. I would like to just pursue a few thoughts, Mr. President, before we perfect this. I gather now that it does need an amendment, needs to be perfected. I may not object to that. I want to clarify what it is we are precisely talking about.

Mr. HELMS. If the Senator will yield, why do you not put in a quorum call, we will discuss it, and I think he will agree to the modification.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I will do that in a moment in order to try to see if we can make an agreement on this. The Senator from Connecticut was here a moment ago. I know he wanted to address this particular amendment. So I am hopeful to give him that opportunity. I simply say to my friend again—and we can discuss this privately while in a quorum call—it is something we have had some discussion on in the past. I personally am not averse to some kind of consolidation, and I have said that to the Senator. I personally think that there are ways to more effectively deliver the interests of the United States through our foreign policy establishment.

I do not think that this particular recommendation ought to be treated lightly, and I have never suggested that. What I do think is that we should try to construct a mechanism which affords the administration the maximum amount of flexibility in keeping with the notion that it is really their responsibility to decide which “t” to cross and which “i” to dot. I think, as the Senator from Connecticut will demonstrate, there are very strong feelings here about one particular shift versus another. So I ask my friend if, rather than putting in a quorum call, he and I could spend a minute visiting while the Senator from Connecticut addresses the amendment.

Mr. HELMS. That is a call of the Chair. We have two Senators seeking recognition. I will leave that to the Chair.

Mr. KERRY. I yield the floor.

Mr. SANTORUM. The Senator from Maine is recognized.

Ms. SNOWE. I certainly want to speak to this amendment and to the issue of consolidation, because I think it is more. As I said yesterday in my opening statement, I thought it was essential that there should be bipartisanship on this consolidation. This is not a new issue. In fact, Secretary of State Christopher had recommended this originally, only to be rejected in the inner-agency process. The Vice President has said through the process of reinventing Government he recommended and, in fact, said they would submit a proposal to the Congress that

would yield \$5 billion in savings through the consolidation, through the merging and streamlining within the State Department and its related agencies. We have yet to see that proposal.

There has been no proposal forthcoming from the administration to achieve the goals that are outlined in the authorization in this amendment before us today, or as mandated by the budget resolution that passed the Congress. We have a certain mandate to meet specific funding levels for the 150 account, and the consolidation helps us to reach that goal. So the administration, for the last 5 or 6 months, has not worked with the committee on this consolidation proposal in any fashion. They have not been proactive; they have not made recommendations. They simply rejected the idea of any consolidation. This is not a new issue.

Five former Secretaries of State did support this proposal. The fact is, they were not reticent in their support for this proposal. Former Secretary of State Eagleburger said that this consolidation was necessary in order to change the focus at the top within the State Department. This would be the impetus for creating the change that is necessary for this consolidation to work and that it was vital because the State Department was going to have to approach its own agenda differently in advancing foreign policy goals.

After rejecting the Secretary of State's plan within the administration, the only proposal the administration made with respect to consolidation and merging were two small elements within the department. One was consolidating the State Department and the USIA Office of Inspector General and a merger of the State Department Office of Foreign Missions and the Bureau for Diplomatic Security. That was it.

So we are now saying that we are going to move forward with the proposal. But that still could include the administration's proposal because the mechanism that is included in this legislation allows the President to propose alternatives or refinements to this plan and is required to submit a reorganization plan for each agency that would be considered by Congress by a resolution of approval under expedited procedures.

So we give the President the opportunity to address this particular consolidation plan. But today they have been silent. So I think that we have an obligation to move forward on this issue because five former Secretaries of State said this is the direction we should take in order to reintegrate these policy functions, but also to make sure that we revitalize these agencies and these functions. That is what is important.

We have provided a detailed way in which to streamline and consolidate the funding and personnel of foreign affairs agencies.

We need to take that approach. The administration, and I know that no one thinks that we should dictate to the

administration as to how we should consolidate, but the President has a right to offer a plan. It is not just going to be this President who will be affected by this consolidation. It is not aimed at a Democratic President by a Republican Congress, because future Presidents—certainly I hope there will be future Republican Presidents—will also have to live under this consolidation proposal.

I said yesterday it is not a Republican plan, it is not a Democratic plan. It is an American plan as to how to make the State Department more efficient and function more effectively in administering our foreign policy goals.

I hope we can support this consolidation. I think it is worthwhile for the future. We have had a number of people who testified before the subcommittee, suggesting this would be the appropriate approach to take. We have to look differently at the way in which we handle our goals within the State Department.

It is the end of the cold war. We have to make a transition to a balanced budget. We have to consider new approaches.

This requires us to look at the kind of consolidation and integration in our foreign affairs infrastructure that will be more flexible and cost effective. I think that is what is so important. We need a more flexible foreign policy structure. That is why it requires us to integrate our program decisions with changing, and frequently changing, policy goals.

It was less of a problem before the cold war ended. We had a single particular focus. Today, that is not the case. What was the rule is now the exception. What was the exception is now the rule. That is why this consolidation is so essential.

I hope that rather than engaging and saying this is a partisan approach, we want it to be a bipartisan approach. Unfortunately, the administration was unwilling to be forthcoming in any suggestions, other than to say they were opposed to it. I yield the floor.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Frederic S. Baron, a Pearson fellow in my office, be permitted privileges of the floor for the duration of the debate on S. 908 and S. 961.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. THOMAS). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, a number of Senators on both sides of the aisle have focused with some seriousness on the questions raised in this bill. The amendment currently before the Senate, offered by the Senator from North Carolina, is, of course, a serious proposal and deserves the kind of reasoned consideration that our colleague from Massachusetts has described.

I rise to speak about the impact of the bill before the Senate on one particular agency, which is the U.S. Information Agency, and to make the case,

respectfully, to my colleagues and to the chairman of the committee and members who come forth with this proposal, why I believe the USIA uniquely should not be consolidated as part of the State Department, although the general request for consolidation I think is a very worthy one.

Mr. President, I suppose I could spend this time explaining and defending the work of the USIA. It is a modest but highly effective foreign affairs agency. I do first want to say that I believe more is at issue here than just the work of the USIA.

The proposal to consolidate or perhaps to abolish the USIA presents another opportunity in this debate to address the choice that has been referred to here on the floor that we face at this juncture in our history between two profoundly different views of America's role in the post-cold-war world.

The choice, put simply, is this: Will America remain involved and lead in shaping the values and ideas, the military realities and the markets of the modern world? Will we continue to reach out in search of economic opportunities, cultural enrichment, and the alliances that strengthen our national security? Or will we step back and become a detached and reactive power that regards the wider world chiefly as a source of difficulty and danger?

Mr. President, I am convinced that on both sides of the aisle here the overwhelming majority of my colleagues have chosen the former course, which is to say staying involved in the world, exercising America's leadership role in the world, because that is not only the correct course but the realistic course.

Having made that choice, it seems to me that we are then left with the question of methods. What is the method we choose to remain involved and to remain the leader of the world, not just the free world, but the world overall?

Mr. President, I understand that some of my colleagues who share my concern for maintaining America's involvement and leadership have reservations about some aspects of our foreign aid program, including our involvement in the United Nations and other international institutions.

Mr. President, I want to respectfully suggest that for anyone who thinks that America must lead in today's world, it does not make common sense to favor the consolidation of the functions of the USIA to the Department of State, or certainly not to favor the abolition of the USIA. In fact, if we reduce our foreign aid and scale back our involvement in other multilateral organizations, as other parts of the bill before the Senate would do, I suggest that we will even have a greater need for a more robust, and I might say agile, USIA.

Mr. President, the distinguished chairman of the committee, Senator HELMS, and his committee, I say, have acted on a sound impulse, which is that we do need a searching reappraisal of the way we conduct our foreign policy

in the post-cold-war era. The committee has produced a coherent, centralized, new architecture for our foreign affairs agencies.

However, no organization is an end in itself. Organizations are tools that we create to carry out our strategic and moral purposes as a nation. What are the goals? What is the strategy that the new centralized foreign affairs edifice laid out in this bill is meant to serve?

It is, indeed, an impressive organization, but I think we have to continue to come back and ask, What is its purpose? In that sense, what is our purpose—our American purpose—in the world, after the cold war?

Today, the cold war that possessed our thinking and our energies for four decades is over. The period of conflict with aggressive global totalitarianism reaches back another generation even beyond the beginning of the cold war. That is at an end. We are grappling with large and difficult questions about what role America should play in the world that go deeper than our country has faced for over a half century.

Now, the problems we face in developing a broad foreign policy to guide us into the next century are extraordinarily difficult. As was clear on the Senate floor last week in the debate on Bosnia, we have not yet reached a universal consensus about just when and how and under what circumstances the United States should exert its power and prestige in world affairs.

But disagree as we may about the specifics, so far as I have suggested a moment ago, I think we have maintained a remarkably broad consensus about one thing; that is, that the United States must continue our engagement with the world and must retain the capacity to lead, not out of the goodness of our hearts, but in the interests of our security and our principles.

That brings me back to the proposed consolidation or abolition of the U.S. Information Agency. Why is this such a key matter—an issue that I personally regard as a fork in the foreign policy road?

Mr. President, although we are searching for a new course for the future, I want to argue here that we should not abandon existing institutions just because they were developed during the cold war. Rather, we should profit from our experience in the cold war, which was, obviously, a very difficult and trying experience, but it was ultimately a successful experience. Where once we faced the Soviet Empire and feared a third world war, now, democracy and free market systems are establishing themselves from Vilnius to Vladivostok.

It is clear our military might was central to our success in the cold war. So, too, was the skill and perseverance of our diplomats and negotiators, and our political leaders. But what else ultimately helped us win this struggle that we sometimes overlook? My an-

swer to that is that we engaged people, not just governments, but the people of the nations who were our potential adversaries in debate and discussion about the values, ideas and interests that guide the United States in world affairs. Our not-so-secret weapon here in the cold war was information and contact with people throughout the world, particularly those living under totalitarian regimes with the democratic world.

I think that had an enormous influence and helped and inspired peoples who were captive behind totalitarian walls to sustain their hopes and ultimately to rise up and create the pressure that miraculously crumbled the Berlin wall and all that it represented.

Mr. President, rather than wiping our foreign policy slate clean, I think we should draw upon the successes of the past to develop the foreign policy strategies for America's future. We must do this work together. Republican administrations can and should take credit for some of the great successes of public diplomacy which have enduring relevance today. The Reagan administration revived our understanding of the importance of values, ideas, and information in international affairs, and strongly supported the independent role of the USIA in conveying those values, ideas, and information. Far from losing importance, our values, ideas, and information—and an independent USIA—I think will be even more crucial as we chart our course in the next phase of world history after the cold war.

This new world is ever more democratic, ever more integrated into a global market economy, ever more linked by electronic communications. In such a world, relations among governments obviously remain important. But, frankly, such government-to-government relations simply do not matter as much as they did before. Increasingly, I believe, relations between countries will depend, as they have in the recent past, upon the perceptions and interests of the public within those countries, and particularly of what might be called key subsections of the public within those countries—political and intellectual elites, are two examples.

So, U.S. foreign policy in the next phase, with communications particularly growing as rapidly and in as revolutionary a fashion as they do today, must go beyond government-to-government relations and reach the people of the world.

We always say the world is a small world. It is a dramatically smaller world today. When I can sit at my personal computer—I have just been educated in the last several months—and try to reach one of my children who is at school in Boston, in the State of my colleague from Massachusetts, and find I cannot get into the so-called "Gopher" index to Massachusetts, so I go to the worldwide index of indexes and I am instructed to go through the index

of the University of Southern Australia in Perth, find an opening there, then go to North America, then to the United States, then to Massachusetts, then, at the risk of offending my colleague and alumnus of Yale, to Harvard, then to my son's room—and all of that happening in about 20 seconds—it is a very, very small world indeed.

We all know one of the forces that brought the Berlin wall crumbling down was the availability of knowledge within the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe about what was happening elsewhere, knowledge that they obtained in ways that could not be stopped by the dictators. They obtained it over the radio and they obtained increasingly over the fax machine and the personal computer.

So the central roles of the Department of State as I see them are to develop our overall foreign policy and manage the relations our Government has with the governments of other countries. The Department of State, obviously, has extraordinary experience and skill at the work of government-to-government relations. But, as a recent statement by Freedom House put it: "Public diplomacy—which is to say—our open efforts to win understanding and support among the peoples of foreign countries on matters that affect U.S. national interests—suffers when it is subordinated to the demands of formal diplomacy."

This Freedom House statement is a remarkable statement for its content and those who have signed it. It lays out in greater detail the argument for the separation of public diplomacy from formal diplomacy.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Freedom House letter on the USIA be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, this statement is especially impressive for the list of leaders in America's foreign affairs community who have endorsed it—a list that includes Democrats and Republicans, conservatives and liberals. The signatories include, and it is a large list, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Adviser in the Carter administration, Dr. Edward Feulner of the Heritage Foundation, our distinguished former colleague, Senator Malcolm Wallop, Lane Kirkland, President of the AFL-CIO, Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr., and Ambassadors Jeane Kirkpatrick and Andrew Young, all signing this statement. A remarkable group, reflecting a broad consensus across ideological and partisan lines in the foreign policy leadership of our country, in favor of keeping the USIA independent and strong, not consolidating it into the State Department.

These opinion leaders base this judgment on long, practical experience in the tough work of international relations. They recognize, and I quote

again from their statement: "The culture of the State Department differs substantially from the culture of USIA." Formal diplomacy requires quiet, sometimes even secret negotiation; careful attention to consistency, nuance and form; and a willingness to continue even when the pace is painfully slow. That is the work of the State Department. Public diplomacy—the work of the USIA—requires openness, rapid response, and a willingness to put aside differences in order to make the most of agreement on broader themes that are shared by people throughout the world.

It says the obvious to say I have the highest respect for the foreign policy and diplomatic professionals of the Department of State. But their training and their experience, in my opinion, does not prepare them for the work in the informational environment, in the communications environment, the public-to-public environment, in which USIA and its officers and employees operate.

Let me say, responding to what has been said here a while ago, that the President and the Secretary of State should clearly determine the foreign policy of the United States. It is in the management and implementation of that policy that I believe the distinctions between formal and public diplomacy, between the State Department and an independent USIA, have their importance. It is in the management and implementation that the differences in organizational cultures add their respective values to the product.

The value of distinct organizational cultures is no novel, New Age idea. It was grasped by President Eisenhower when he founded USIA, and has proven itself in foreign affairs, now, for more than 40 years.

Operational autonomy is increasingly followed by corporations and other large financial institutions in the private sector. Centralized, pyramidal structures are what modern management is, frankly, trying to avoid. Teamwork is a recipe for success in both the public and private sectors. And the essence of teamwork, as it is understood in the modern organizational context, is in using the different talents of the different members of the team in working to achieve a common goal. That is why I believe, here, organizationally, the better course is to leave USIA independent.

As so many have said before me in this debate, victory in the cold war presents the United States with rare new opportunities. To grasp these opportunities, to advance our national interests and our moral principles, a more forward-positioned, engaged in aggressive economic, political, cultural, and communications, stance is required. The new world we face also holds many challenges and dangers and obviously we must be prepared to meet them. But I think we can best overcome those challenges and avert or mitigate those dangers and build a

more stable, peaceful, and democratic international environment through purposeful engagement—engagement which is enhanced by the kind of active public diplomacy that an independent USIA can carry out.

What we now have is a plurality of means for engaging the wider world, and presenting American policy and projecting American interests and principles to different audiences, and one might say different consumers, worldwide. USIA inhabits the realms of the media, of education, of what we are happy to call in this country civil society, and what we are hoping to help develop in many of the fledgling new democracies that were former wards of the Soviet Union.

The USIA, incidentally, Mr. President, serves all agencies of the U.S. Government, not just the Department of State—but Commerce, Justice, Treasury, Defense, and others.

It is useful, I think, to all involved, that the USIA's program stand at one removed from the government-to-government functions carried on by the Department of State. When the Voice of America carries a news broadcast on a subject that is of some discomfort to a foreign government, is it not a good thing that our Ambassador can honestly say that the Voice of America is not controlled by—or organizationally aligned with—the Department of State?

Or to give another example, when one of our exchange programs brings a scholar from a foreign country to the United States who may be out of favor with the government of his country, is it not helpful that our ambassador can point out that the USIA, which has brought this scholar to America, is separate from the Department of State? And when that dissident goes home, will he or she not find it useful honestly to assert that their visit to the United States was not a foreign policy mission in behalf of the Department of State?

Mr. President, this formal separation is central I think to the credibility of our exchange and broadcast programs which have so well served America's interest in the cold war, which have so well served the interests and the aspirations of people living behind the Iron Curtain during the cold war and can so well serve people throughout the world who still yearn to be free?

People listening to USIA broadcasts around the world know that they are not hearing a propaganda instrument of the State Department but an independent voice—incidentally, a voice speaking so often in their language—reporting on world events and reflecting the views and values of the American people and helping make links between them in this country and the people of this country.

Mr. President, the United States Information Agency should not be part of the reorganization of foreign affairs agencies that are central to this bill. I say that respectfully. One of the

amendments that I have filed among the 144 that are filed would remove the USIA from the consolidation aspects of this bill, with the minor exception of the consolidation of inspector general functions, and would maintain the USIA as an effective and independent agency.

We learned in the cold war that persuasion and involvement with peoples is the most powerful instrument that American democracy has in foreign affairs. The power of an idea, the power of an American idea, of the American idea conveyed to people around the world, ultimately is what cracked the Berlin wall. The kind of engagement USIA had, for instance, with Solidarnosc—not just with people generally, but with specific heroes in the fight for freedom—with Solidarity in Poland or with the pro-democracy movements in Central America is the kind of engagement we need today throughout the world, and particularly, may I say, with the coming generation of leaders in China and with the modernizers in the Islamic world.

This is no time to pull back and stop speaking to the people of the world and their future leaders. This is the time to continue effective public diplomacy through the USIA—*independent and strong*—to meet new challenges, seize new opportunities, and advance America's principles and strategic interests throughout the world.

I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.

EXHIBIT 1

[From Roll Call, May 11, 1995]

THE FUTURE OF U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

New proposals have been advanced to place the United States Information Agency (USIA)—long the chief instrument of American public diplomacy—under the centralized control of the State Department. We believe this proposed consolidation and centralization would weaken American public diplomacy.

Why should the USIA remain independent? Through its broadcasting, numerous exchange programs and links with people throughout the world, it already is highly successful in promoting American interests and articulating who we are and how our policies and values are shaped. The State Department has a different though related role. It explains U.S. foreign policy to Americans and presents our government's official positions to foreign governments. The State Department values quiet negotiations, government-to-government contacts, protracted discussion, compromise and sometimes secrecy. A credible public diplomacy, by contrast, requires openness, the ability to respond quickly to rapidly changing world events, and independence in reporting, analysis and comment. In short, the culture of the State Department differs substantially from the culture of the USIA.

There are other important reasons to retain the USIA's present status.

Public diplomacy and formal diplomacy. While formal diplomatic relations conducted by the State Department are an important aspect of our government's diverse engagement with other societies, public diplomacy—our open efforts to win understanding and support among the peoples of foreign countries on matters that affect U.S. national interests—suffers when it is subordinated to the demands of formal diplomacy.

We have long-term interests in developing flexible relationships with foreign educators, journalists, cultural leaders, minority and opposition leaders that must not be subjected to the daily pressures of official government-to-government affairs. USIA has filled this niche by setting up exchanges that introduce foreign representatives to U.S. governmental, nongovernmental, private, business and cultural institutions.

American values: independent voices, one theme. The promotion of American political and economic values has been an auspicious aspect of our foreign policy in recent times. The spread of democracy and the global communication revolution indicate that this form of engagement in foreign affairs will be of great importance in the future. Diversification and independence—not centralization and uniformity—make the U.S.'s message more meaningful and credible. The USIA's broadcasting and exchange programs should remain free of interference from officials with responsibilities in other areas. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Voice of America and Radio Marti remains vital sources of information around the world. In East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union (where independent media continue to face difficulties) RFE/RI is trusted precisely because of its journalistic integrity. This would be seriously compromised if they were perceived as official organs of State Department policy.

Re-orientation before re-organization. The structure of our foreign affairs agencies needs to be considered in light of America's global strategy in a rapidly changing international environment. Reorganization not rooted in a clear and comprehensive understanding and consensus about goals and missions cannot work or last. The USIA and federally-funded international broadcasting have track records of success and will continue to work. Indeed, with today's menacing phenomena of international criminal activity, terrorism, inter-ethnic hatreds and anti-democratic forces around the world, the work of USIA is more critical than ever.

We understand that there will have to be some significant reorganization and reprioritization in foreign policy. Those who have offered proposals for change have done some service. The world has changed, in no small measure because of our multilayered and multi-faceted foreign policy structures. Our goal should be coordination between agencies, not the kind of consolidated administrative centralism that will not work. The task of the State Department and the public diplomacy agencies should nurture one another, but must remain separate to be truly effective.

Ned W. Bandler, Vice Chairman, Freedom House; Saul Bellow, Author; Hon. Michael Barnes, Former Congressman, Chairman, Center for National Policy; Walter Berns, American Enterprise Institute; Daniel J. Boorstin, Librarian of Congress Emeritus, Historian; Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former National Security Advisor, Center for Strategic & International Studies; Hon. John H. Buchanan, Jr., Former Congressman; Hon. Richard R. Burt, Former Ambassador to Germany; Hon. Henry E. Catto, Chairman of the Board Catto and Catto, Former Director, USIA; William Van Cleave, Director, Center for Defense & Strategic Studies, Southwestern Missouri State University; Kerry Kennedy Cuomo, Executive Director, Robert F. Kennedy Memorial, Center for Human Rights; James S. Denton, President, National Forum Foundation; Patricia Murphy Derian, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian

Affairs; Vivian Lowery Derryck, President, African American Institute; Larry Diamond, Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution; Hon. Paula Dobriansky, Former Associate Director, USIA; William C. Doherty, Jr., Executive Director, American Institute for Free Labor Development.

Thomas R. Donahue, Secretary-Treasurer, AFL-CIO; Susan Eisenhower, Chairman, Center for Post Soviet Studies; Hon. Dante B. Fascell, Former Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee; Hon. Geraldine A. Ferraro, Former Congresswoman; Edward J. Feulner, Jr., President, The Heritage Foundation; Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr., Former Chairman, Board for International Broadcasting, Forbes Magazine; Al From, President, Democratic Leadership Council; Alton Frye, Senior Vice President & National Director, Council on Foreign Relations; Hon. Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., President, Center for Security Policy; Hon. Bruce Gelb, Former Director, USIA; Ernest Green, Chairman, African Development Foundation; Samuel P. Huntington, John M. Olin Center for Strategic Studies of Harvard University; John T. Joyce, President, International Union of Brick Layers & Allied Craftsmen; Hon. Max M. Kampelman, Former U.S. Ambassador, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Lane Kirkland, President, AFL-CIO; Hon. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations; Bette Bao Lord, Chairman, Freedom House Board of Trustees; Bruce K. MacLaury, President, Brookings Institution.

Hon. Leonard H. Marks, Marks and Cohn; Will Marshall, President, Progressive Policy Institute; Adam Meyerson, Editor Policy Review; Charles Morgan, Jr., Attorney; John Norton Moore, Director, Center for Law & National Security, University of Virginia School of Law; Steven W. Mosher, Director, Asian Studies Center, The Claremont Institute; Joshua Muravchik, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute; Father Richard John Neuhaus, Executive Director, Institute for Religion and Public Life; Michael Novak, American Enterprise Institute; Hon. Charles H. Percy, Former Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University; Richard Ravitch, Attorney; Walter Raymond, Jr., Former Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; William S. Reese, President, Partners of the Americas; Peter Rodman, Director, National Security Program, Nixon Center for Peace & Freedom; Burns W. Roper, Former Chairman, Roper Starch Worldwide; Hon. Eugene V. Rostow, National Defense University; John Seiganthaler, Chairman, Freedom Forum First Amendment Foundation, Vanderbilt University.

Al Shanker, President American Federation of Teachers; Walter J. Schloss, Chairman, Walter J. Schloss Associates, Inc; Nina Shea, President, Puebla Institute; Marvin L. Stone, Former Editor, US News & World Report; R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., Editor-in-Chief, The American Spectator; Hon. Malcolm Wallop, Former U.S. Senator; Ben J. Wattenberg, Syndicated Columnist; George Weigel, President, Ethics and Public Policy Center; Allen Weinstein, President, The Center for Democracy; Hon. Charles Z. Wick, Former Director,

USIA; Jacques D. Wimpfheimer, Chairman, American Velvet Company; Hon. Andrew Young, Former Ambassador to the United Nations; James J. Zogby, President, Arab American Institute.

Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. KERRY. Thank you Mr. President.

Mr. President, I would like to thank the Senator from Connecticut for a very thoughtful statement not just about USIA, but most importantly about the overall changes that are taking place in the world and the implications for the United States and for our foreign policy.

I think he has demonstrated the vision that is essential to any kind of decisionmaking with respect to the shuffling of the parts of our foreign public diplomacy effort. So I thank him for having shared those thoughts with us and I think provided a very important and credible statement with respect to this issue.

Mr. President, I would like to express further, following up on some of the things that the Senator from Connecticut has said, I think it is really important for us to understand, the United Nations particularly—and for a lot of appropriate reasons, I might add—the administration of the United Nations has been just sort of a morass without any seeming sense of concern or culpability, although I think in the last year perhaps the message may be beginning to get through.

But clearly, the ineffectiveness of the United Nations with respect to certain concerns, notwithstanding great successes, has clouded the image of that institution in its 50th anniversary so that for a lot of Americans, it is a very quick take. They think of foreign policy and they tend to think not of a global climate change treaty, not of the Montreal protocol which will reduce CFC's in the air and help to preserve the ozone layer, they do not think about the treaty to preserve Antarctica or the treaties with respect to arms control through the years that made an enormous difference in helping to win the cold war; they tend to think of the big symbols, and generally speaking, the symbols of either confusion or sometimes failure.

The result is, if you want to get a good applause line when you go home and give a speech, you can very quickly pick up a line that talks about how you should not be giving aid to other countries, that the aid ought to be coming back, you know, to whatever city in one State. If you say that when you are in a particular place, people are quick to respond and say, "Boy, that is right. We ought to be getting that money, not these other folks." And in some cases, unfortunately, it is true. AID and others have had some programs sometimes that lack accountability.

But name for me the corporation in America that has not sometimes had an advertising campaign that has been

overboard or an excess of expense accounts or an excess in departments. Most of the great buy-outs of the 1980's were predicated on a lot of those far too expansive corporate budgets where value was not limited and people saw that they had an opportunity to come in, pare down, create a far more productive entity, raise the share value, and sell it for a killing. Indeed, that happened over and over again.

This is no different. There is no bureaucracy on the face of this planet that does not have organizational problems. The question is, what are we trying to do here, and what are the interests of the United States?

Foreign policy is not some foreign engagement exclusively. Foreign policy is the art of achieving our interests abroad. It is really an extension of the interests in every community here in our country. It is not really a foreign affair. It is a domestic interest that is represented through whatever happens abroad.

So when we engage in Latin America in an antidrug program, we are representing the interests of people in Kansas City, in San Francisco, in Boston, in New York, in Los Angeles, and all across this country. And to whatever degree we can get the cooperation of Colombians or the cooperation of Ecuadorians or Panamanians or the Caribbean countries in helping us to prevent the flow of cocaine or helping to prevent the flow of laundered money, we are representing our interests. That helps us here at home. It keeps perhaps 1 kid, 20 kids, hopefully 1,000 or a million kids out of trouble.

It seems to me that in the same way, Mr. President, in dozens of other ways, our interests are represented through the diplomatic efforts of our State Department in ways that a lot of Americans just take for granted on a daily basis. Take, for instance, the interests of New England in fishing. We have two of the most important fishing ports in all of the country in Gloucester and New Bedford, MA. Until recently, our fishermen were able to go up and drag off the coast of Canada for scallops. Now, because of an international treaty, we are not allowed to do that anymore, and we have huge tensions with Canada over the questions of fishing. We have huge tensions over the fish that are caught there, that are sold in the United States at a lesser price, that take away from our fishermen and their livelihood.

So these are the relationships. This is not a foreign interest. This is not an expenditure of money somehow that goes to someone else's benefit abroad. It goes to our benefit, Mr. President. Hopefully, if well represented and well negotiated, it goes to our benefit.

There are dozens of other ways in which examples abound about how our interests are or are not represented. We have millions of Americans traveling abroad every year, millions probably even as I speak right now. They expect to be able to walk into an embassy or

a consulate office and get answers. They expect to be able to get a visa. They expect to have their interests represented. If they get in an accident abroad, if they have a sickness abroad, if something happens where they are falsely arrested or some other event takes place, we need to be able to represent the interests of those citizens abroad.

Increasingly, Mr. President, in every single sector that is important to the interests of Americans, we have been cutting over the last few years.

We made an enormous cut in the foreign affairs budget just 2 years ago. We made a cut 2 years before that. It has become sort of the whipping boy, if you will, of the budgetary process because there is no easy, quick constituency in the United States that leaps up and says, "Oh, yes, I identify with that money."

Already out of a \$1.5 trillion budget, we spend less than 1 percent of the total budget on all of our foreign affairs interests, including foreign aid, and most of the foreign aid of this country, as we know, goes to two countries: Egypt and Israel. So, if you take the almost \$12 billion, I think it is, that goes to Egypt and Israel, we are leaving ourselves something like \$8 billion for everything else that we wind up doing around the world in respect to all of our treaties, all of our negotiations, all of our representing of our citizens, all of our efforts to try to deal with international crime, with international customs problems, with all of the other interests that we have across this planet.

I inform my colleagues that overseas workload has increased dramatically. My colleague from Connecticut was talking a few minutes ago about what has happened with respect to the sort of closing in of the world. The fact is that because the world is now smaller, because there are more airlines flying more places, because communications are easier, because there is a much broader middle class, not just in America, but in many other countries, people are traveling more. And because of that travel, there is far more of a relationship between nations than there was previously, much more commerce, much more just to keep track of.

The workload for our embassies in just issuing passports, the workload in this country in issuing passports, is a 60 percent increase in the last few years. The overseas consular operations have exploded—visas, increased services to Americans, refugee admissions. We have opened 30 new posts in the last 3 years because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Europe. And yet, notwithstanding all of that increase, there has been no financial increase whatsoever. All of these new posts, all of this new work has been taken up by virtue of consolidation, cuts, deferred maintenance, reductions.

Mr. President, I respectfully suggest that a hard analysis of what has been happening to the budget with respect

to the State Department and the capacity of our Foreign Service entities to do their jobs over the last years has been such a significant reduction that we are getting to the point where we are losing our capacity to represent our own interests.

This is not smart anymore. This is the old story of cutting off your nose to spite your face. This is shooting yourself in the foot. It is reducing our own influence. I suggest that we ought to think hard about where we are going.

The State Department's budget has been frozen in recent years. In fact, the fiscal year 1996 request is underfunded by over \$200 million, or by 10 percent when inflation and the exchange rate losses are factored in. That is an important thing to recognize, Mr. President. We operate our foreign offices, obviously, in a lot of places where the currency is fluctuating. So we send people there with an expectation that we are going to spend x amount of dollars. But because the dollar may go down, you wind up having a huge increase in expenses and it costs you a lot more to do the same business.

Have we increased the amount of money to represent that kind of increase in costs? No. We have taken it out of the building fund, we have taken it out of maintenance, we have cut other sectors, and we are beginning to get to the point where we are reducing our own capacity.

The State Department has already reduced its work force by 1,300 positions, and it has cut administrative expenses by almost \$100 million. We have reduced the size of the senior Foreign Service already by 10 percent, and we have cut diplomatic security programs by 15 percent. This is what has already happened.

Now we approach this bill, and I want to share with my colleagues why I think there is such a problem in this bill.

Despite the fact that this bill meets the administration's 1996 appropriations accounts for the State Department and the USIA, the aggregate funding in this bill for 1996 is \$450 million below the 1995 enacted level, and it is \$330 million below the President's 1996 request. The total funding in the bill decreases sharply over the next 3 fiscal years. The authorized funding under this bill for fiscal year 1999 is over \$1.3 billion below the 1995 enacted level.

I will add, Mr. President, that those cuts, that \$1.3 billion by 1999, does not reflect the steep reductions in foreign aid funding levels for fiscal years 1996 and 1997 that are in the foreign aid bill. So when you add those cuts to the foreign aid bill, you wind up with the most significant reduction; in fact, you go below the function 150 budget resolution figures for the next 2 years. I do not think we ought to go below the budget resolution figures in the 150 account for those next 2 years, given the

reductions that have taken place in the last years.

Mr. President, 10 years ago, in the height of the cold war, when you had a bipolar world with this intense focus on basically the Soviet bloc and China and whatever satellite countries of theirs were creating havoc in other parts of the world, our total international affairs budget was 2.44 percent of the total budget of our country—2.44. Today, it comprises only 1.3 percent. And in the last decade, the appropriations for function 150 have declined by \$15.6 billion in fiscal year 1996 dollars. They have gone from \$36.8 billion in 1985 down to \$21.2 billion in 1995, all of that cut, notwithstanding what the Senator from Connecticut and I have just said with respect to an increase in responsibility, an increase in the number of relationships and an increase in the numbers of issues that we now face.

I might add, Mr. President, now that you have a world where you do not just deal with the Soviet Union and the whole focus is not on arms control and the arms race, you actually have unleashed a whole set of additional forces that make diplomacy far more complicated. In many ways, when you had the Soviet Union and the United States and people were dividing up along those lines, you had a much easier dynamic to work with than the current international economic competitive structure, with all of the attendant environmental, crime, refugee, ethnic conflict and other issues that have been liberated.

I respectfully suggest that the world we face today requires a knowledge of what is happening in countries, an understanding of that ethnic force, an understanding of who is who within the criminal constellation, an understanding of the dynamics of how we can assist other countries to move toward sustainable development—a host of issues that are far more difficult to leverage and that require personal relationships in the leveraging. Yet, here we are withdrawing ourselves from the very capacity to create those kinds of personal relationships.

Under the budget resolution, discretionary funding for the international affairs budget is reduced by \$2.1 billion in fiscal year 1996 alone. And by fiscal year 2002, the Budget Committee's target date for the balanced budget, the mark for the function 150 discretionary funding is \$14.7 billion.

Mr. President, we are going to go from \$36.8 billion in 1985 to \$14.6 billion in the year 2002, and we are somehow going to pretend that we are going to represent the domestic interests of the United States abroad with that budget while simultaneously meeting the needs of a country that prides itself in being the leader of the free world. I do not think it makes sense. I think it is ill considered. I think it is short-sighted. I think it is contrary to our national interests, and it may not be hyperbole to suggest that it is even

dangerous for the interests of this country.

I recognize that economies have to be achieved in all respects, with respect to the Federal budget, including international affairs. But the dollar alone cannot be the sole measurement with respect to what we are doing. We do not just have a fiscal deficit, Mr. President, we have a leadership deficit, we have an involvement deficit, we have a presence deficit.

If you travel to Asia today, you will find greater presence of French and Germans and Japanese than you will Americans. I am consistently asked by foreign businessmen when the United States of America is going to get its act together and have the kind of presence necessary to signal our determination to be a real player beyond what our weaponry gives us.

It seems to me that those are the kinds of things we ought to be thinking about as we arrive at a budget, not just an arbitrary 602(b) figure that is thrown out by a couple of people sitting around saying, "We will give this much to this committee and that much to that committee," without a real measurement of what the real impact is in the overall interest of our country.

In addition to the problematic budget areas, Mr. President, this bill also contains several provisions that are designed to undermine and place restrictions on the United States' participation in the United Nations system. For example, the bill mandates that the United States withdraw from several international organizations, including the International Labor Organization, and it eliminates funding for U.S.-assessed contributions to these organizations.

In addition, the bill places conditions on the full payment of the U.S.-assessed contributions to the United Nations and to peacekeeping operations that serve to weaken our leverage at the United Nations at the very moment when our leadership is needed.

It is very difficult to go to Mr. Akashi and Boutros Boutros-Ghali and suggest to them that the role of the United Nations ought to be different, and they ought to heed our advice at the same time we are pulling back from an obligation, as well as from other involvement and efforts of the United Nations. If ever we wanted to invite others to begin to spur whatever leadership we might be offering, it seems to me that that is one of the ways to do it.

So, Mr. President, I would hope that in the course of the deliberation on this bill we can try to rectify, to whatever degree possible, some of these things, so that we get back to the spirit of bipartisanship that governed the movement of this bill in the last 11 years that I have been here. There was an unfortunate vote along party lines sending this bill to the floor. It is my hope that we can use this time now in the legislative process to harmonize

and bring together a bipartisan effort when I think the Congress is most well-served and certainly when the interests of the country are served. Everybody knows that this country has been strongest when its foreign policy is bipartisan. The great standard was written by Arthur Vandenberg. In recent days, we have had joint efforts—whether it was Senators LUGAR and NUNN, who joined together with respect to Russia, or whether it was Senator MCCAIN and others here, who joined together with respect to Southeast Asia—and we have been able to show that bipartisanship makes a difference and it makes this country strong. I hope we can find that in further efforts with respect to this legislation.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, Senator KERRY is one of the most articulate human beings I have ever heard. I wish that he had somehow recognized in his eloquent comments the many efforts that we made—when I say “we,” I mean the Foreign Relations Committee majority—to work with the administration.

I myself pleaded with the Vice President of the United States to let us get together, as the Senator has recommended. The bureaucracy prevailed in the Vice President's office. I am not being personally critical of the Vice President. He has many things on his plate. But, in this case, the ball got away from him, and the heads of three agencies, which were going to be rolled into the State Department where they belong, prevailed.

Warren Christopher, the Secretary of State, went through the same agony last fall after the election when he recommended the sort of reorganization that the pending legislation represents. Secretary Christopher got his comeuppance, and he took it like a man. He is a faithful, loyal member of the administration. He wrote a letter the other day to Senator DOLE, which was amazing to me. Sometime during this debate, I am going to put his letter in the RECORD and my response to it.

I wish we could get together, but at this moment, the White House is calling the tune. There is nothing wrong with that. That is the way the administration works. But they cannot have it both ways, that we want to do this and that, when in fact they have done everything in this world, including personal invective, to undermine the pending legislation. There were news conferences at the National Press Club downtown. One of the bureaucrats made all sorts of remarks, including one that I had written this bill on the back of an envelope. The press came to me and said, “What do you think about that?” I said, “Well, Abraham Lincoln did pretty well on the back of an envelope. I hope I have done fairly well.”

But it has been a personal affront to these people that anybody could suggest that their bureaucracies be trimmed. Let me tell you something about the U.S. Information Agency. There is a great push to keep it like it

is. But let me tell you, Mr. President, if you retain the U.S. Information Agency as it is, it will cost \$320 million over the next 2 years and \$600 million during the 7-year effort to balance the budget.

Now, all the people who have been lobbied to keep the USIA just like it is better bear in mind what the Budget Committee is going to say about that. And all sorts of suggestions have been made that, well, we are doing well, we just need to do better.

Well, tell me about the 600 people, Federal employees, in the U.S. Embassy at Cairo, whose sole responsibility is to give away the American taxpayers' money. What sense does that make? It costs \$200,000 a year to post one Federal employee overseas. They have 600 of them at Cairo alone.

Mr. President, I have several dear friends among the heads of State of other countries who come to Washington, and they come to see me in my capacity with the Foreign Relations Committee. If I had to pick a favorite, I guess it would be Eugenia Charles, who is the former Prime Minister of Dominica. I am sad to say that the Prime Minister is not running for reelection. She is a pleasant, down-to-earth lady. She always comes in my office with a smile on her face. The last time she was here, which was about 3 or 4 weeks ago, give or take, she walked in and said, “Well, Senator, I see you are trying to do something about your foreign aid program.” I said, “Yes, ma'am, I am.” She said, “Well, it is none of my business, but something ought to be done. Do you realize, Senator, that it costs you more money to give away money than you give away?” And that is it. It is the bureaucracy that just grows and grows and grows, and these efforts with the pending legislation, from the administration that has not cooperated with the committee at all—JOHN KERRY tried to. I do not know what sort of instructions he got from the people downtown to the contrary. But I wish we could sit down and work out the difficulties. I am not going to give away the store. I am not going to change this bill so that it does not meet the budget resolution which was adopted by this Senate and the House of Representatives. No, sir, I am not going to do that.

But if we can have an understanding that we are working on the same team, being the Senate of the United States, trying to get a job that needs to be done and needs badly to be done, then we can pull this bill down and we can operate in good faith. But I cannot have Bill Clinton's people looking over somebody's shoulder, because Bill Clinton already said he is going to veto it, and he does not even know what is in the bill. He wants to keep the status quo. He does not want to save any money on foreign aid. Otherwise, he would have sent somebody in good faith up here to work with the committee, which we urged him to do, which

we urged his Vice President to do. But we were stonewalled.

So do not give me all this stuff about the administration has not been consulted. Later on in the debate, we will talk about this business of micromanagement. There has been plenty of what some would call micromanagement in the past.

AMENDMENT NO. 2042 TO AMENDMENT NO. 2041

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I send a second-degree amendment to the desk to amendment No. 2041.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. HELMS] proposes an amendment numbered 2042 to amendment No. 2041.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

Strike all after the word “SEC.” and insert the following:

SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CONSOLIDATION AND REINVENTION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AGENCIES.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that it is necessary in order to make the Government more efficient and to realize significant budgetary savings for the American taxpayer—

(1) to consolidate and reinvent foreign affairs agencies of the United States within the Department of State;

(2) to provide for the reorganization of the Department of State to maximize efficient use of resources, eliminate redundancy in functions, and improve the management of the Department of State;

(3) to assist congressional efforts to balance the Federal budget by the year 2002;

(4) to ensure that the international affairs budget function shoulders an appropriate share of the reductions in United States Government spending necessary to eliminate the \$4,800,000,000 budget deficit; and

(5) to strengthen—

(A) the coordination of United States foreign policy;

(B) the leading role of the Secretary of State in the formulation and articulation of United States foreign policy;

(C) the authority of United States ambassadors over all United States Government personnel and resources located in United States diplomatic missions, in order to enhance the ability of the ambassadors to deploy those resources to the best effect that will attain the President's foreign policy objectives; and

(D) the United States Foreign Service, as the forward deployed civilian force of the United States Government, through renewed emphasis on the original principles which undergird the distinct Foreign Service personnel system. These include worldwide availability, assignments based on the needs of the service, rank in person, and merit-based advancement.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the President should—

(1) consolidate and eliminate, such duplicative, overlapping or superfluous personnel, functions, goals, activities, offices, and programs that the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the United States Information Agency, and the Agency for International Development have in common with the Department of State in order to realize a budgetary savings to the American taxpayer of at least \$3,000,000,000 during fiscal years 1996 through 1999;

(2) encourage the United States foreign affairs agencies to maintain a high percentage of the best qualified, most competent American citizens serving in the United States Government while downsizing significantly the total number of people employed by these agencies; and

(3) ensure that all functions of diplomacy be subject to recruitment, training, assignment, promotion and egress based on common standards and procedures, with maximum interchange among the functions.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, let me get back to one of the most heavily lobbied portions of the pending bill.

I said a while ago that keeping the U.S. Information Agency as it is will cost \$320 million over the next 2 years, and \$600 million during our 7-year effort to balance the budget. Those who do not care whether the budget is balanced or not in 7 years, do not care very much one way or another.

The effort to keep the U.S. Information Agency independent of the Department of State is misguided and it is out of step. The time has come to recognize the problem and to reorganize our entire foreign relations apparatus.

As JOHN KERRY has said with his customary eloquence, public diplomacy is an extremely important part of the way this country conducts business with other countries. It is, after all, the way we convey American values and interests, and the way that we communicate the American dream to the people around the world.

Accordingly, Mr. President, it ought to be part and parcel of the larger foreign policy effort, not shunted away out of sight, out of mind. As the single agency charged with the conduct of U.S. foreign relations, the Department of State must be given a clear mandate and must be provided with all the tools of the trade. Diplomacy can be a most effective tool, but its effectiveness can be truly realized only when it is synchronized with all the rest of the diplomatic initiatives.

That is just not the opinion of JESSE HELMS, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. Five Secretaries of State have said the same thing. They have endorsed this bill which President Clinton, Vice President GORE, and now poor Warren Christopher, who is caught in a bind, say they oppose.

Now, S. 908 acknowledges what has to be the centrality of public diplomacy of foreign affairs, by putting public diplomacy at the center of the foreign affairs apparatus.

I ask, what is a better way to make sure that this tool gets used frequently, than to provide it to those who need it and to those who will use it, by creating an Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy within the Department of State, as this bill proposes? We will strengthen our core foreign policy apparatus, and 5 former Secretaries of State have testified and written letters of endorsement of this very proposal that is the pending business in the U.S. Senate.

As for the U.S. Information Agency, its consolidation into the State De-

partment will allow us to stretch our dollars devoted to foreign policy. It will cut out the waste. It will cut down on the bureaucracy. It will cut out functions that really are not essential to our foreign policy. They may be desirable, but they are not essential.

Now, in the case of international broadcasting, the irony is that S. 908, the pending bill, is the best deal in town. They will not find a better one—not from Bill Clinton, not from AL GORE, not from anybody else. Right here, it is pending before the U.S. Senate.

S. 908, Mr. President, assures the continuation of the restructuring, the reduction, and the consolidation of broadcasting elements that began last fall. This bill will ensure that the Congress and the administration keep their commitment to support broadcasting around the world. Some of the people—lobbyists—who are opposing S. 908 would have you believe otherwise.

Broadcasting, under this bill, will remain independent and will be operated by the Broadcasting Board of Governors, which is a nonpartisan board that sets the broadcasting policy.

In a very real way, S. 908, despite the protests of people who will save it, passes the litmus test of USIA itself. It strengthens the role of public diplomacy in our foreign policy apparatus by integrating it with larger foreign policy concerns.

As has been shown, S. 908 in no way eliminates or reduces the capabilities needed to convey the American message to foreign populations. That is the job it was created to do in the first place.

It preserves those capabilities, but it also makes a strong move to abolish waste and needless bureaucratic duplication. That is where some nerves have been rubbed raw.

Make no mistake, the amendment to retain USIA, any effort to retain USIA independently, is a proposal to retain wastefulness and inefficiency. It is a tired old litany. I hope the Senate, if and when we are given an opportunity to vote on the matter, will understand what it is all about.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ASHCROFT). The Senator from Maine.

Ms. SNOWE. Thank you Mr. President. I think the chairman has accurately stated the dilemma that faces members here in terms of making decisions about whether or not to move forward with a specific consolidation proposal.

The real question is whether or not there is support—bipartisan support—for a consolidation proposal.

We heard from Senator KERRY this morning, who said that he supports consolidation, the idea of consolidation. He basically said the same thing in committee.

The problem is, there has been no specific proposal forthcoming to achieve the goals of consolidation. That is the problem. Everybody talks

about consolidation, eliminating duplicating functions and responsibilities, but there is no specific plan that has been put forward by the minority, on the committee or here on the floor, that achieves the goals that are necessary and indeed mandated by the budget resolution.

Even the Vice President said, back on January 27, that he would come forward with a plan for reinventing Government and these agencies in the State Department that would achieve a savings of \$5 billion. We have no such plan.

The only recommendation the Vice President has made is eliminating 6 missions and streamlining the contracting services within the agencies. That is it. That will not achieve \$5 billion. Even our savings are less than \$5 billion. The fact is the budget resolution requires us to achieve \$3.6 billion.

Now, somebody can say how we do it differently. I cannot understand, frankly, why the minority could not accept the principles that are embodied in the amendment that is before the Senate. It says, and it is a sense of Congress, that the President should consolidate and eliminate duplicative, overlapping or superfluous goals, activities, offices, and programs that the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Agency for International Development have in common with the Department of State, in order to realize budgetary savings to the American taxpayers. That leaves \$3 billion during fiscal years 1996 through 1999.

That is the essence of the amendment now pending before the Senate. It incorporates the principles of consolidation.

It is obvious that there is not an interest in working together in a bipartisan way to come up with a consolidation plan that can get a majority of support here.

Now, the President—and I can understand, there is a dilemma here for those on the minority side—the President proposed in his budget to increase the 150 account by \$1 billion. The budget resolution that passed this Congress requires us to cut by \$3.6 billion. That is what we have to do.

The President does not want to cut the foreign affairs account. He is asking for a \$1 billion increase.

That is why I think we are meeting the resistance from the other side with respect to consolidation, because they do not want to consolidate. They do not want to eliminate. They do not want to do anything to change the status quo. That is what last year's election was all about—to change the status quo on how we conduct our business. That is what we have to do. That is our mandate here. It surprises me in a lot of ways to suggest that there are not ways in which we can do that. I happen to think that consolidation is necessary because I think it will reinvent the departments and the agencies. I think it will reinvent the

State Department in the way it conducts its foreign policy decisionmaking. I think it is necessary.

Does anyone here suggest that we should not look at the exchange programs? I am a strong advocate of the exchange programs. But, believe it or not, the exchange programs have doubled. They have actually doubled since 1990. They have doubled in the 1980's. So they doubled in the 1980's and they have doubled since 1990. We are proposing that we cut \$400 million in the exchange programs that are duplicative. They are spread out all over the U.S. Government. We are saying we should consolidate and manage them because we do think they are important, especially in this post-cold-war period. It is important for our young people to have a chance to understand the cultures of governments of other countries. But does anybody think that we should not do it a little bit differently, given the proliferation of those exchange programs? I say not.

What about the Agency for International Development? As I said, the Director has done an outstanding job since he has been in that position. But there is much more to be done. Even he said, several years ago before he took that position, that the agency was a disaster. We have spent on development assistance since the agency was created \$144 billion, and we still provide countries with assistance. Countries have received development assistance from 35 to 51 years consecutively. We have not made any headway.

The point is, we have to do things somewhat differently. We should tie development assistance to our foreign policy goals. There is nothing wrong with that. Indeed, I think we will maximize the benefits for our taxpayers, but also for our specific goal.

Sixty percent of the employees of the Agency for International Development work here in Washington, DC. There are 9,000 employees in the Agency for International Development—9,000. Just the administrative costs alone represent 25 cents on every development dollar we spend, but that does not take into account the grants. That is where the other 4,000 employees come in. We have 5,000 under the traditional administrative costs and overhead, and then we have another 4,000 employees that are paid through the grants that we issue through development assistance in the Agency for International Development.

Is anyone suggesting that we should not cut or reform those programs to maximize the benefits for the American taxpayers and, indeed, the program? No one is saying that the essence of development assistance and helping countries for sustainable development for the future to become independent economically is not essential. It absolutely is. The question is how we achieve those goals.

That is what we are attempting to do with this legislation: To consolidate

and to improve the way in which we deliver these programs.

Public diplomacy—I have been a very strong proponent of the broadcasting functions under the USIA. Again, the question is whether or not we can move those functions within the State Department. I had concerns about maintaining the independence and integrity of the broadcasting functions of radio, for example. But we maintain that critical firewall in this legislation because we have a broadcasting board of governors. So we will maintain the independence and integrity of radio. But there is not anything to say that we cannot do things differently in bringing them into the State Department hierarchy.

Edward R. Morrow, who was once the USIA Director, said that oftentimes the agency was always brought in when a policy crash landed, but was never there when there was a takeoff. I think they will correct that longstanding problem. I think it is our responsibility to reform the public diplomacy structure. We create an Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy. We create a fifth person so that preserves the Foreign Service officers and their skills, because I have a great deal of respect for their professionalism and their dedication to their job. There is no greater demonstration of the way in which they perform than at the various embassies around the world. In fact, they are integrated fully into the process within the embassy. That is exactly the same kind of procedure we want to duplicate here in Washington, DC. Everybody works together.

Today, in a more democratic world than ever before, the foreign policy in those countries is very, very essential to the formation of policy in this country. That is what public diplomacy has become, an essential responsibility. I think we can emphasize that even more by taking the USIA and putting it into the State Department. We are not here to deemphasize it or say it is a lesser priority; absolutely not. We are saying it is very much a priority, and we are going to protect the integrity and the independence of broadcasting. In fact, we had the nomination hearing for the eight individuals who serve on that board, a very distinguished group of individuals that will bring a broad array of experience into the public and private sector to manage this board in this transition. I have a great deal of confidence in their ability to manage a very crucial change in the broadcasting function.

I hope, as generally can be the case, that we just do not have this natural visceral reaction in opposition to any kind of change. I am certainly willing to consider any proposal and any ideas to reform the consolidation that we have before us. I think we have to make a decision that consolidation is very, very essential. But we are not getting any specific or concrete ideas from the other side as to how to achieve it. We keep hearing, well, we

support consolidation. But we have been hearing that for 6 months, and nothing has come forward that would suggest that they have a plan or indeed actually support any kind of plan for consolidation.

We will hopefully go through this legislation and hopefully we will have a vote, which I am going to ask for in a moment on the pending amendment, because I think it is important that we find out where everybody stands on the principle of consolidation of the State Department and its related agencies.

We are here today because we need to change the way in which we handle the organizational structure of the State Department and other agencies. But we certainly want to do everything we can to make it right.

Senator KERRY mentioned the fact that we have increased responsibilities on the embassies and our diplomatic corps. That is certainly true. In fact, this last year, I attempted to mandate a cost sharing so we apportion the costs within each embassy among a variety of agencies, because the State Department is not the only one that creates costs within our embassies. We have the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, and other agencies that have responsibilities for those embassies, and yet they do not pay their fair share of cost.

Unfortunately, I was not successful. I am not saying that we just should cut. I am saying that we should cut in a responsible way through consolidation. I do not think anybody can disagree on the purpose of consolidation.

So as we move forward in this debate, perhaps there will be some interest on the other side, and most specifically the administration, which obviously is governing the course and the direction of this legislation, with respect to accepting the idea of consolidation or not.

OPPOSITION TO ABOLISHING AID

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I oppose abolishing the Agency for International Development and merging its programs and personnel into the State Department. This proposal will do more than simply move some boxes around on an organizational chart; it will make fundamental changes in the ability of AID to perform its mission. As a result, it threatens our ability to protect and advance important American interests.

Let me begin by identifying three primary elements of AID's mission.

First, there is a clear and compelling humanitarian interest. AID's programs tells others, and reminds us, that the United States is a caring and compassionate Nation. That compassion and caring reflect both our character as a country and our recognition that we have the resources and the responsibility to do what we can to help those in need. Compassion has a place in foreign policy and our main instrument in this regard—in feeding children, providing housing and medical care, building

roads and sewers, and so much more—is AID.

Second, AID is the instrument through which we get on with the task of building functional democracies around the world. What we sought to preserve throughout the cold war, we can now expand. Country after country, on continent after continent, want to establish representative governments, democratically elected and based on the rule of law and a respect for human rights and liberties. The development assistance and expertise developed by AID is the way to get them the resources they need to achieve a result we all want. While there is an element of altruism in such programs, there is also a cold calculation that it serves our national interest. Wherever we are successful in ensuring that democratic principles take root, we are less likely to face the prospect of intervention in a political crisis, with it the high costs of peacekeeping and emergency relief operations.

Third, AID's overseas assistance efforts provide for both immediate and long-term economic benefits to the United States.

In the short run, nearly 80 percent of AID's grants and contracts go directly to American firms and private organizations. This creates American jobs, encourages American exports, and expands domestic prosperity. Over the longer run, our current and prospective foreign assistance efforts help to create future overseas markets for American goods and services in developing countries. A built-in, long-term preference for American exports bodes well for continued employment and prosperity here as well.

So, Mr. President, the functions that AID performs are important. And the question now is whether we can continue that work in a new organizational structure.

I do not think we can or need to for three reasons.

First, AID is already reorganizing. The Agency is reinventing itself in order to become both more efficient and effective. Under the leadership of its Administrator, Brian Atwood, AID has already cut its costs. Overseas, AID will have closed 21 missions between 1994 and 1996. In its domestic operations, AID has eliminated 90 offices in Washington. Overall, AID has cut 70 senior positions and reduced total staff by over 1,200. Moreover, AID is adopting a new development strategy. Recognizing that its limited resources make it impossible to be all things to all people, it is targeting fewer countries for more intensive assistance. While some may criticize this almost triage-like approach, it certainly reflects a willingness to adopt a leaner focus to the problems it confronts.

Second, the suggestion that the savings will come out of "administrative reforms" is simply not credible. As I have indicated, AID has already scaled back. I do not believe there will be significant additional administrative sav-

ings from this consolidation. The reality is that AID's overseas operations, like all U.S. Government agencies and departments operations in our embassies and consulates, already are fully integrated into State Department administrative services on a reimbursable basis. So, the proposed consolidation would not save any money abroad. And domestically, there is no room in the State Department to house AID's employees and functions, so we will not save on building costs here in Washington, either.

The net result, I fear, is a further reduction in our developmental programs. Some may say "well its about time." But that kind of response is usually based on a profound misunderstanding of just how much we spend on foreign aid. While many believe that such programs account for 8 to 10 percent of all Federal spending, in reality they now constitute only 1/2 of 1 percent of all spending by the U.S. Government. This level of spending already places us in the lowest ranks of the developed world in terms of per capita spending on foreign aid and assistance programs. Indeed, from 1956 to 1993, our share of official development assistance worldwide has dropped from 63 to 17 percent. Our current effort, then, is inadequate. This bill makes it even worse. And, as a result, it threatens our ability to protect the national interests I identified at the beginning of these remarks.

Finally, Mr. President, I have to note the major irony involved in this proposal. This proposal to augment and centralize the State Department is made by precisely the same people who profess to believe that "big government" should be decentralized and made more flexible.

Let me conclude, Mr. President, with this simple observation. Destroying AID is not the way to accomplish our foreign policy objectives. It would not be efficient or effective, and we should not do it.

OPPOSING CONSOLIDATION OF USIA

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I oppose consolidating the U.S. Information Agency.

We need to ask two questions about this proposal to abolish USIA and merge its functions and personnel into an expanded State Department. First, will it result in a less costly set of information, cultural and exchange, and broadcasting programs in support of American foreign policy objectives? Second, will it enhance the effectiveness of these programs as we continue to readjust and redirect our foreign policy interests?

Mr. President, the answer to both questions is "no."

Let us look initially at the purported cost-savings of merging USIA into the State Department.

There is a seductive logic to the argument that merging USIA into the

State Department would result in substantial administrative cost-savings. But the facts reveal otherwise.

Managerially, USIA's overseas operations currently are well-integrated with State's. USIA—like all departments and agencies operating from our Embassies and consulates—already reimburses the State Department for administrative support services, such as housing, computers, motor pools, and the like. Consolidation will not save any money overseas.

Would there be savings in U.S. operations by merging USIA into the State Department? I do not believe so. Aside from its foreign press centers, the Agency by law has no domestic charter, no domestic presence. And we would not be able to eliminate the need for some sort of separate office space to house USIA's personnel and functions, since the State Department has none to spare.

In fact, USIA on its own and in response to the President's and Vice president's reinventing Government initiatives has already achieved major and substantial cost-savings. In this regard, I believe that it is important to remember that the Agency constitutes only 6 percent of the total function 150 budget but accounts for 58 percent of the total savings wrung from the 150 account in the past 2 years.

USIA has accomplished these savings by consolidating and restructuring its own activities. USIA now has RIF authority and is in fact closing overseas posts and bringing officers home, as well as cutting overseas and domestic positions and staff.

By bringing together all of the U.S. Government's international broadcasting activities, USIA will save more than \$400 million by fiscal year 1997 and eliminate 1,250 staff positions. By creating a new Information Bureau, USIA has reduced its policy and program staff by 30 percent for an annual savings of \$10 million. And by streamlining and downsizing its educational, cultural, and management functions, USIA has wrought savings of almost \$15 million and eliminated 186 positions this year alone.

The fact is, Mr. President, significant, real cuts are being made by USIA right now without consolidation. We cannot extract more savings by merging USIA into the State Department without sacrificing the very programs that support our foreign policy worldwide in the new information age.

Will consolidation enhance the effectiveness of the U.S. Government's information, broadcasting, and cultural and exchange programs? I do not think so for at least two reasons.

First, the budget cuts raised by this bill for USIA—\$118.6 million in fiscal year 1996 and an additional \$81 million in fiscal year 1997—are general reductions. In fact, they have nothing to do with consolidation and cannot be achieved by merging USIA into the State Department. To meet these spending levels, the Agency will have