in the 1960 constitution. United States Secretary of State George Ball visited Cyprus in February 1964 and concluded that Greek Cypriots ''just wanted to be left alone to kill Turkish Cypriots.'' Turkey waited for 11 years for help from the world community. None came. By 1974, Turkey could no longer stand by and watch innocent Turkish Cypriots be slaughtered by Greek Cypriots. So Turkey intervened militarily on the island which was completely legal under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee signed by the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey, Britain, Greece, and the Greek Cypriots. It clearly stated that any of signatures had the right to intervene on Cyprus should the sovereignty of the island be threatened.

Let me emphasize that these troops pose no threat to the southern part of the island. Since the Turkish military intervention concluded in 1974, these troops have never attacked or threatened to attack the south. They are there simply to deter aggression against Turkish Cypriots. Let me also add that unlike Government officials from Greece, who have often made statements saying that Cyprus is rightfully part of Greece, no Turkish officials have ever suggested that Turkey should attempt to annex the whole of Cyprus.

Unfortunately, House Concurrent Resolution 42 completely dismisses the history of Cyprus.

For Turkish Cypriots, the memories of 1960–74 remain vivid. It is absurd to suggest that they should lay down their arms and suddenly trust their age-old nemesis, especially when Greek Cypriots are continuing to try to impoverish them through an economic embargo. I cannot think of another conflict in the world where this committee would put forth such a solution.

I call on my colleagues to reject House Concurrent Resolution 42. This resolution is biased against the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey. It makes no demands whatsoever of the Republic of Cyprus like lifting its economic embargo against the north, and it completely ignores the history of the island and who is to blame for its division.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. CLINGER). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER] that the House suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution, House Concurrent Resolution 42, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended and the concurrent resolution, as amended, was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the resolution just agreed to.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Nebraska?

There was no objection.

RELATING TO THE UNITED STATES-NORTH KOREA AGREED FRAMEWORK

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 83) relating to the United States-North Korea Agreed Framework and the obligations of North Korea under that and previous agreements with respect to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and dialogue with the Republic of Korea, as amended.

The Clerk read as follows:

H.J. RES. 83

Whereas the United States-Democratic People's Republic of Korea Agreed Framework (''Agreed Framework''), entered into on October 21, 1994, between the United States and North Korea, requires North Korea to stop and eventually dismantle its graphite-moderated nuclear reactor program and related facilities, and comply fully with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in exchange for alternative energy sources, including interim supplies of heavy fuel oil for electric generators and more proliferation-resistant light water reactor technology;

Whereas the Agreed Framework also commits North Korea to ''consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula'' and ''engage in North-South'' dialogue with the Republic of Korea;

Whereas the Agreed Framework does not indicate specific criteria for full normalization of relations between the United States and North Korea, and does not link the sequencing of actions in the Agreed Framework with any time-frame for carrying out the provisions of the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and carrying out the dialogue between North Korea and the Republic of Korea;

Whereas the commitment by North Korea to carry out the letter and spirit of the Agreed Framework has been put into doubt by actions of North Korea since October 21, 1994, including the suspected diversion of United States heavy fuel oil in apparent contravention of the agreed purpose of the interim fuel deliveries, the resistance to accepting light water reactors from the Republic of Korea, the harsh denunciations of the Government of the Republic of Korea and other actions contrary to the commitment by North Korea to engage in a dialogue with such Government, and the continued conduct of provocative, offensive oriented military exercises; and

Whereas the nuclear threat posed by North Korea is just one of a number of security concerns of the United States arising out of the policies of North Korea: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CLARIFICATION OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION OBLIGATIONS OF NORTH KOREA UNDER THE AGREED FRAMEWORK.

It is the sense of the Congress that in discussions or negotiations with the Government of North Korea pursuant to the implementation of the United States-Democratic People's Republic of Korea Agreed Framework (in this joint resolution referred to as the ''Agreed Framework'') entered into on October 21, 1994, the President should uphold the following minimum conditions relating to nuclear nonproliferation:

(1) All spent fuel from the graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and related facilities of North Korea should be removed from the territory of North Korea as is consistent with the Agreed Framework.

(2) The International Atomic Energy Agency should have the freedom to conduct any and all inspections that it deems necessary to fully account for the stocks of plutonium and other nuclear materials in North Korea, including special inspections of suspected nuclear waste sites before any nuclear components controlled by the Nuclear Supplier Group Guidelines are delivered for a light water reactor for North Korea.

(3) The dismantlement of all declared graphite-based nuclear reactors and related facilities in North Korea, including reprocessing units, should be completed in accordance with the Agreed Framework and in a manner that effectively bars in perpetuity any reactivation of such reactors and facilities.

(4) The United States should suspend actions described in the Agreed Framework if North Korea attempts to reload its existing 5 megawatt nuclear reactor or resumes construction of nuclear facilities other than those permitted to be build under the Agreed Framework.

SEC. 2. ROLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA UNDER THE AGREED FRAMEWORK.

It is further the sense of the Congress that the Republic of Korea should play the central role in the project to provide light water reactors to North Korea under the Agreed Framework.

SEC. 3. FURTHER STEPS TO PROMOTE UNITED STATES SECURITY AND POLITICAL INTERESTS WITH RESPECT TO NORTH KOREA.

It is further the sense of the Congress that, after the date of the enactment of this joint resolution, the President should not take further steps toward upgrading diplomatic relations with North Korea beyond opening liaison offices, or relaxing trade and investment barriers imposed against North Korea without—

(1) action by the Government of North Korea to engage in a North-South dialogue with the Government of the Republic of Korea;

(2) significant progress toward implementation of the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; and

(3) progress toward the achievement of several long-standing United States policy objectives regarding north Korea and the Korean Peninsula, including—

(A) reducing the number of military forces of North Korea along the Demilitarized Zone and relocating such military forces away from the Demilitarized Zone;

(B) prohibiting any movement by North Korea toward the deployment of an intermediate range ballistic missile system; and

(C) prohibiting the export by North Korea of missiles and other weapons of mass destruction, including related technology and components.

SEC. 4. RESTRICTIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 1 of part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

''SEC. 620G. ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION.

''(a) IN GENERAL.—No assistance may be provided under this Act or any other provision of law to North Korea or the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization unless—

''(1) such assistance is provided in accordance with all requirements, limitations, and

procedures otherwise applicable to the provision of such assistance for such purposes; and

''(2) the President—

(A) notifies the congressional committees specified in section 634(a) of this Act prior to the obligation of such assistance in accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications under that section, irrespective of the amount of the proposed obligation of such assistance; and

''(B) determines and reports to such committees that the provision of such assistance is vital to the national interests of the United States.

''(b) EXCEPTION.—The requirement of subsection (a)(2) shall not apply with respect to assistance authorized to be appropriated and appropriated for North Korea or the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization.''.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Section 620G of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as added by subsection (a), applies with respect to assistance provided to North Korea or the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization on or after the date of the enactment of this joint resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER] will be recognized for 20 minutes, and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] will be recognized for 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER].

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, the behavior of the isolated, authoritarian Communist regime in North Korea continues to remind us that important American nonproliferation and regional security interests remain at great risk notwithstanding the October 1994 United States-DPRK Agreed Framework. North Korea remains an outlaw state that will not easily adapt itself to international norms. This has been underscored by Pyongyang's bitter resistance to accepting light water reactor technology from South Korea under the October 1994 accord, recent steps by North Korea that would have the effect of unilaterally undermining the Military Armistice Commission [MAC] that supervises the truce along the demilitarized zone [DMZ], and continued refusal to engage in normalization talks with the Republic of Korea, in the South.

In theory, the October 1994 framework agreement provides a mechanism for reining in Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program and addressing other United States security concerns regarding the Korean Peninsula. With the North Koreans, however, nothing is ever simple or settled. In June, Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord noted at a regional security hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific that ''We're going to have a very arduous journey in the next 10 or 15 years in implementing the Agreed Framework.''

North Korea's confrontational behavior continues to raise fundamental questions about whether Pyongyang is acting in good faith. North Korea has diverted some of the United States-supplied heavy oil that we already have delivered under the terms of the agreement, and the North has continued its relentless political attacks against our ally, South Korea. North Korea continues to make new and outrageous demands, including a demand for a billion dollars in additional assistance to enhance its power grid and for other purposes. Its implicit agreement that a South Korean firm will be the prime contractor for the project under the management of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization [KEDO], negotiated at Kuala Lumpur this summer, remains to be tested.

House Joint Resolution 83 was introduced by this Member, together with my friend and distinguished subcommittee colleague from California, Mr. KIM, and was marked up by the full House International Relations Committee on June 29, The resolution provides policy guidance to the administration as it seeks to engage with North Korea. Not incidentally, the resolution will also send a signal from the Congress to Pyongyang that there can be no deviation from the terms of the United States-DPRK agreement. The resolution is similar to language adopted by the full House in action on H.R. 1561. The most important exception is a small but important change to section 4, which is intended to alleviate the administration's concerns that the resolution not impose a reprogramming notification requirement in regard to funds specifically authorized and appropriated by Congress for KEDO.

Despite the fact that the resolution is imbedded in the American Overseas Interests Act, there are compelling reasons to adopt it separately. Passage of the resolution will be a fitting expression of congressional support for our ally of more than five decades, the Republic of Korea, recently commemorated during the visit of President Kim Yong-sam to attend the dedication of the Korean War Veterans Memorial last July.

I believe that there is nothing on this issue that we in Congress can do which is more important than to go on record to emphasize the continuing concern of the United States for maintaining the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula, and to categorically insist that South Korea must be allowed to play a central role in arrangements negotiated by the United States to address the problem of North Korea's nuclear program.

Because this issue is so important, this Member will take a moment to explain more precisely what this legislation does.

House Joint Resolution 83 has 4 major sections, addressing 4 concerns:

First, it spells out minimum objectives for United States nonproliferation policy in regard to North Korea's obligations under the United States-DPRK Agreed Framework. This is necessary to make explicitly clear that there can be no retreat from what is in the agreement regarding North Korea's obligations, and to clarify where Congress stands on issues that the administration may possibly consider as still subject to future negotiation.

Second, it insures that our longstanding ally South Korea remains a key player in the accord by reaffirming that the Republic of Korea is the only acceptable source for the light water reactors that are to be provided to North Korea under the accord.

Third, House Joint Resolution 83 establishes minimum preconditions for further moves toward relaxing United States trade sanctions and normalizing relations with North Korea. These include a requirement that North Korea engage in dialog with the South per a 1992 North-South Agreement, and also the North-South agreement on Korean Peninsula denuclearization. It also conditions further steps toward normalization on progress toward the achievement of longstanding United States goals of reducing the military threat posed by North Korea's excessive military forces, its ballistic missile programs and its exports of ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction.

This latter point is important. In my view and that of many other Members of Congress and security policy experts, the administration has been understandably focused but unduly focused on containing North Korea's nuclear program and avoiding the need to seek international economic sanctions, and not enough focused on broader United States security concerns regarding the North.

Fourth, House Joint Resolution 83 imposes notification requirements on the use of reprogrammed funds to support the agreement, by establishing the same terms and conditions regarding authorizations and appropriations from non-Foreign Assistance Act sources as would apply to assistance provided to North Korea under the Foreign Assistance Act. This includes the notification of any reprogramming actions to the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, no matter from what source the funding is obtained, and full justification for assistance provided under waiver authority to provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act that otherwise would prohibit such assistance.

Mr. Speaker, this Member thanks the chairman of the International Relations Committee, the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], for his support and assistance in crafting this legislation. The chairman's staff provided invaluable assistance in addressing many of the issues in House Joint Resolution 83.

In addition, this Member would assure all of his colleagues that every effort has been made to make this a bipartisan initiative. This Member would point to the very constructive additions made by the ranking Democrat

on the Asia and Pacific Subcommittee, distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. BERMAN].

Mr. Speaker, this is indeed a very important, long-term policy issue that merits a firm statement of congressional will. The North Korean nuclear issue is certainly, quite arguably, the most dangerous and unpredictable challenge facing us today. The resolution provides needed policy guidance to the administration, protects the interests of our ally, South Korea, broadens the scope of United States policy concerns, and protects the jurisdictional interests of this body.

I urge the House to adopt the joint resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. HAMILTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this resolution. I regret the necessity to do that. I do think that the distinguished gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER], the author of the resolution, has really worked very hard to meet many of the objections of our side, and I think he has met a number of them that we originally had. Nonetheless, for my part at least, the resolution still amounts to a unilateral rewriting of the United States-North Korean agreed framework.

It is important to point out, I think, that the administration opposes this resolution. It is also important to point out that the agreement, the North Korean agreed framework with the United States, has served United States interests very well. It perhaps is worth remembering that before the negotiations got under way, there were many respected voices in this town calling for bombing North Korea, but that agreement has been struck, and it serves United States interests well. Because of this agreement North Korea has shut down its only operating reactor. It has halted construction on two new reactors. It has sealed its reprocessing facility and stopped construction on a new reprocessing line. It has refrained from reprocessing the spent fuels in its possession. It has given the IAEA inspectors and U.S. technicians access to nuclear facilities, and it has agreed not only to resume IAEA inspections, but to go beyond its obligations under the nonproliferation treaty and forgo reprocessing altogether.

Mr. Speaker, dealing with North Korea of course is never easy, but this resolution makes the President's job all the more difficult. House Joint Resolution 83 adds new conditions which North Korea must meet before the United States can take further steps to upgrade our diplomatic relations or economic relations with the North.

Now all of us want North Korea to take those steps, and all of us hope that North Korea will do so. But these steps, it should be very clear to all, go beyond what is called for in the agreed framework by loading up the agreement with new unilaterally imposed conditions. This resolution lessens the prospects of that agreement's success, and then we could be back in the midst of a full-scale nuclear crisis with a North Korea leading to sanctions, escalation, and perhaps the bombing that some people were asking for only a few months ago.

I urge my colleagues not to allow the pursuit of an ideal outcome to destroy a good agreement that is working and working in the interests of the United States. Remember, since October 1994, North Korea's nuclear program has been frozen in its tracks. I do not thank we should jeopardize the agreement that has achieved this success, and I urge a ''no'' vote on this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, my colleagues, I have great respect for the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON], the ranking minority member of the committee. I regret the fact that he rises in opposition to the resolution, but I appreciate his kind words, and I would have to say in response just a reminder to my colleagues.

The gentleman from Indiana; I know he is aware of this fact, that the elements to which he objects are contained in a sense-of-the-Congress section, section 3, and in fact those items that we list as being important, things that should not be forgotten in this whole process, such as the continued focus on accelerating North-South dialog, all of these are existing policy supported by this administration and previous administrations, and I dare say the majority in Congress, and I would say further that in a sense-of-the-Congress resolution, it does not in any fashion object to the diplomatic relations that have been established with North Korea, although many Members do object to that fact. It says that the President should not take further steps toward upgrading diplomatic relations.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I would say that I regard this resolution as strengthening the hand of the administration in negotiating with the North Koreans and assuring that we keep their feet to the fire and that we do verify their compliance with the agreement. I think it strengthens the hand of the administration in this respect. In fact, I would not offer it if I did not feel very strongly that it was the case, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ROTH], who by his experience and involvement is quite an expert on the Korean Peninsula.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman's kind remarks, and I compliment him for the fine job he is doing in managing this legislation. I, too, am sorry to hear that the administration is opposed to this resolution. The reason I say that is this resolution, as I see it, only reemphasizes the points in our agreement with North Korea, and all we are saying is that we expect the North Koreans to live up to that agreement, and so I cannot see why the administration would be opposed to this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, all of us in this House would like to think that this resolution is unnecessary. But the North Koreans have displayed, time after time, that they cannot be trusted. Now they have lied, they have stalled, and they have cheated for too many years, and for us not to be alert to this skullduggery I think would be unwise.

It is important for the Congress to send a clear message, and this is a message to both the North Koreans and to our allies in the South. Basically what we are saying is that this resolution underscores that Congress is steadfast in that first, the terms of last October's agreement are the absolute minimum acceptable; secondly, that North Korea will not be allowed to divide us from South Korea. In this regard any further steps toward normalization must be linked to real progress in North-South dialog. Third, the only acceptable source for two nuclear reactors is South Korea; and, fourth, our other military and political objective for the Korean Peninsula will not be neglected or even bargained with. Fifth, Congress retains final authority under any expenditures in support of this agreement.

Apparently this last point has caused some controversy with the administration, and, to be honest with my colleagues, I am surprised. Under the current law we already require congressional notification and a waiver for any such use in the 150 account. It is natural that we require the same here. this resolution simply insures that the President is up front with the congress and with the U.S. taxpayers. this is what I call a sunshine provision. Everyone should know what is in it; everyone should live up to the terms.

Mr. Speaker, I cannot see any reason why anyone would be opposed to this resolution, and so I want to, in conclusion, thank my friend from Nebraska for bringing this resolution to the floor. He has presented and provided a needed opportunity to underscore the underlying and unyielding support for South Korea and for the United States vital interests in the Korean Peninsula. North Korea should have no delusions. We are resolute as a Congress, and as a people we will live up to these commitments, and we expect the North Koreans to live up to those commitments also.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

First I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ROTH] for his kind remarks and for the information that he conveyed to our colleagues, which is

very important, about our resolve to see that North Koreans live with the agreement and that we not backpedal in any way on our commitment that there be a North-South dialog and that we not permit the North Koreans to divide the Republic of Korea, South Korea, and the United States.

Mr. KIM. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of House Joint Resolution 83, the resolution relating to the United States-North Korea Agreed Framework. As the only Korean-American in Congress, I am proud to have sponsored this measure with Asia Subcommittee chairman DOUG BEREUTER.

In October 1994, when the administration first unveiled the United States-North Korea Agreed Framework, many praised it as the beginning of the end to a perilous nuclear crisis in the Pacific rim. Unfortunately, I did not share that same optimism. In fact, I felt that the agreed framework was yet another effort to appease North Korea at the expense of the national security interests of both the United States and our ally, the Republic of Korea. It looked to me like the United States was obligated to give more than it received in return.

In that regard, I was pleased to help sponsor House Joint Resolution 83 because it defines the specific direction which the administration must follow in its dealings with North Korea, rather than allowing that direction to be dictated by the leadership in Pyongyang. Most important of all is the stipulation that a North-South dialog be of the highest priority to ensure a reduction in the hostilities between the two governments in the hopes of long-term peace on the peninsula.

I think it is important that this Congress, and this administration, send a clear message to North Korea by setting forth a blueprint of what we will accept as positive progress. And, with House Joint Resolution 83 we make it clear that without such progress, we will not provide North Korea with the economic and political benefits they want. Therefore, I ask all of my colleagues to support the immediate passage of House Joint Resolution 83 so that we set a clear plan of action with respect to North Korea.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I commend the distinguished chairman of our subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Mr. BEREUTER, for bringing this resolution before the House. I also commend the distinguished ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. BERMAN, for his helpful contributions.

The substance of the resolution has, of course, already passed the House as part of H.R. 1561, the American Overseas Interests Act, and so I expect it to receive broad bipartisan support today.

The resolution serves two useful purposes. First, it articulates the views of the Congress with respect to the October 21, 1994, agreed framework between the United States and North Korea under which North Korea is to suspend and then dismantle its nuclear program in exchange for deliveries of heavy fuel oil and construction in North Korea of two 1,000 megawatt light water nuclear reactors.

The resolution does not criticize or reject the agreed framework, but it does sound several cautionary notes about implementation of the agreement. In particular, it urges that the agreed framework be implemented in a manner consistent with United States interests; that South Korea have a central role in implementing the agreed framework; and that the United States not take further steps to normalize our relations with North Korea until North Korea improves its behavior in other areas of concern to us, such as implementing the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, curtailing ballistic missile exports, and reducing tensions along the DMZ.

The second purpose of the resolution is to ensure that all United States foreign assistance that is provided to North Korea or the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization pursuant to the agreed framework is provided under the same terms and conditions that govern all other United States foreign assistance. This is necessary because the administration has already on two occasions sought to deliver assistance to North Korea from funds not subject to the terms and conditions of the Foreign Assistance Act—in one case from Defense Department funds, and in the other from Energy Department funds.

House Joint Resolution 83 will make an important contribution to the Congress' ability to oversee implementation of the agreed framework, and I urge its adoption.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I, too, have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER] that the House suspend the rules and pass the joint resolution, House Joint Resolution 83, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended, and the joint resolution, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the joint resolution just passed.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Nebraska?

There was no objection.

□ 1259

MEDAGOGUES

(Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, it is not only House Republicans that are questioning the barrage of scare tactics on Medicare that are being presented by the Democrats and certain of their special interest associates. Last week's Washington Post editorial entitled ''Medagogues'' puts the entire Medicare debate into perspective by comparing the two parties on this critical issue.

Mr. Speaker, as you may be able to see from this copy, the Post finds the Republican plan to be credible, gutsy, and, in some respects, inventive. It addresses a genuine problem that is only going to get worse, as we all know. What the Democrats have, instead, is a lot of expostulation, TV ads, and scare talk, so says the Washington Post.

The Post is not generally given to commenting so harshly about Democrats. The Post goes on to wonder about how the Democrats propose to finance Medicare without real structural change. They conclude that they are listening in vain for a real response from the Democrats.

Mr. Speaker, I join with the Post to call on my Democratic colleagues to abandon the politics of fear and join us in saving Medicare for current and future beneficiaries. The country needs it and we can do it.

RECESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. CLINGER). Pursuant to clause 12 of rule I, the Chair declares the House in recess until 3 p.m.

Accordingly (at 1 o'clock p.m.), the House stood in recess until 3 p.m.

□ 1500

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the House was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. FOLEY) at 3 p.m.

RYAN WHITE CARE ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1995

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 1872) to amend the Public Health Service Act to revise and extend programs established pursuant to the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, as amended.

The Clerk read as follows:

H.R. 1872

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ''Ryan White CARE Act Amendments of 1995''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

Whenever in this Act an amendment is expressed in terms of an amendment to a section or other provision, the reference shall be considered to be made to that section or other provision of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.).

TITLE I—EMERGENCY RELIEF FOR AREAS WITH SUBSTANTIAL NEED FOR SERVICES

SEC. 101. ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM OF GRANTS.

(a) NUMBER OF CASES; DELAYED APPLICABILITY.—Effective October 1, 1996, section 2601(a) (42 U.S.C. 300ff–11) is amended—

(1) by striking ''subject to subsection (b)'' and inserting ''subject to subsections (b) through (d)''; and

(2) by striking ''metropolitan area'' and all that follows and inserting the following: