

and of itself is a recipe for disaster given the nature of the warfare. And anybody who understands the enmity that exists between the parties, and the conflict over who owns what land, knows that the American troops being out longer than a year is likely to just promote and produce a situation in which the parties wait out the situation, and then would return to the status quo, which is obviously not something that any of us looks forward to.

There are a couple of other concerns that I have. One is the question of neutrality. It is one thing to send troops into a situation when those troops are viewed—and that nation sending the troops is viewed—as a truly neutral partner in the process. In this case, we have decidedly sided with one faction in this conflict—the Bosnian Moslems. While we have not seen the final details of the peace agreement, the United States has indicated that one of our objectives in this deployment will be to arm the Moslems, will be to bring them to “a level of parity” with the other factions. That may be comforting news to the Bosnian Moslems. I doubt that is very comforting to the other parties in the conflict, and certainly not the Serbs.

So what our goal should be is a disarming of all parties involved, to reduce the level of tension and reduce the level of potential conflict rather than build up the capacity of one of the parties but, in doing so, even if that were an agreed upon military strategy, I think that is a terrible political strategy because we will not be viewed as a neutral party. The United States, which is already by the very nature of its—I ask unanimous consent for 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COATS. The United States which is already viewed by a number of countries as not necessarily a neutral entity, and which has become a target, unfortunately, over the years for terrorists and extremists and others that want to disrupt either the peace talks or simply make a point, I think would clearly be identified as a party which was not neutral in this conflict and clearly would be a potential target for terrorism.

I had the experience nearly a decade ago of traveling to Beirut visiting the marines that were encamped between warring factions, and witnessed the aftereffects of the tragic bombing of the marine barracks that cost the loss of several hundred lives. Those that perpetrated this incident wanted to make a point, and by making that point they felt that they could influence the course of that conflict. And they did. I think the very same something—maybe not the very same but something similar—happened in Somalia.

So we at great risk put our troops between the warring factions.

My final point is that I think we need to be very, very careful about what a

peace agreement says and means that might come out of Dayton. Dayton could very well produce a “peace”—I put that word in quotation marks. Again, I am referring to the Krauthammer piece—a “peace” that is unstable and divisive, and largely unenforceable. It may be a peace imposed rather than a peace sought and agreed to by the warring factions; imposed by outside forces. If that is the case, we are likely to have a situation where, as Krauthammer says, this lowest common denominator peace plan commands three grudging, resentful signatures from unreconciled parties. That is a disaster for American troops on the ground. And particularly, if the President has not sought the support of the American people, the support of their elected representatives, and defined for the American people just why it is necessary to utilize American troops on the ground. We need to make sure.

I ask for one additional minute, and I promise to quit even if I am not finished.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

We should make sure that we have an ironclad commitment from the three parties involved that they not only are seeking a true peace but they are willing to self-enforce a true peace; that they will do so with a build-down of forces instead of a buildup of forces; that they will do so with wide zones of separation between them; that the peace will be essentially self-enforcing; and that they will be committed to bringing about that cessation of hostility and conflict between them.

If that is the case, one has to ask themselves the question, why are 60,000 troops needed to enforce that? If that is not the case, I think we have a very serious question.

My time has expired, and I promised to quit, and even though I have more to say, I will say it later. I thank the Chair and the patience of my colleague from Nebraska.

Mr. KERREY addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GREGG). The Senator from Nebraska.

PEACE IN BOSNIA

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, with additional time, I would love to discuss this situation with the Senator from Indiana. It is a very difficult situation. I was in the Krajina Valley a couple days after the Croatian Army had driven back the Croatian Serbs and several hundred thousand estimated, a couple hundred thousand civilians left that valley, and a day later 120 millimeter rockets came into a market in Sarajevo and killed another 40 civilians. And not long after that a President Clinton-led NATO engaged in airstrikes, and it was not long before you could fly into Sarajevo.

We see the makings of peace in the region. It is an unprecedented event with the United States leading in a dip-

lomatic effort, Ambassador Holbrooke going around the clock with unimaginable stamina to try to negotiate a settlement.

I listened to the House debate last night on this subject, and I must say I hope our own words do not make it more difficult to get an agreement and we do not find ourselves right back in the soup. I think it is a long shot to get a peace agreement. No question it is going to be difficult to get, but I think in any evaluation of what has gone on in Bosnia in the last 60 days you almost have to begin and end with praise for President Clinton's ability to lead NATO and to lead to where we are today, which is a significant reduction of violence in that part of the world.

DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, as to the Deficit Reduction Act, I would like to make a few comments.

First, we need to sort of check our own rhetoric and ask ourselves why. A lot of people come down and say we have unprecedented debt mounting on top of record debt. We do not have record debt. Our percentage of debt to GDP is going down. A lot of people say we have to do what we did in the cold war. During World War II, we accumulated almost 130 GDP of debt and won the war as a consequence, did the Marshall plan after that, rebuilt our own country as a consequence of a willingness to go into debt, no matter how we used that debt. I will get to that later.

I am very much concerned that a growing portion of our outlays is going not to investments but going to current consumption. I think it is a significant problem. It is not a problem, by the way, caused by the poor. I voted against this proposal for a number of reasons. I do not think it is fair. I do not believe it asks people like myself with higher income to participate in deficit reduction, which I think is terribly important. I receive very little in the way of Government services. People with lower incomes do receive more in Government service. I am asking them to shoulder a disproportionate share of eliminating this deficit.

Second, not only does it rend the social safety net, but it does not start us on the road to evaluating what kind of safety net do we need. I think most of us in this body now believe that we have to have economic growth, that our tax policies, which I do not think encourage savings and investment, need to be written so that we get the kind of investment and economic growth the country needs; that we have regulatory policies that are mindful of the risks that people take when they invest money.

Most of us understand that we have to have an economy that is growing, but if you are going to have a vibrant market economy where people are making business and bottom line decisions, you also have to have some kind of safety net out there. We ought to be