

the wrong public relations signal. That was the word that came out: We did not want to send the wrong signal. Public relations was apparently more important than the lives of the American servicemen that were on the line.

In case anyone has forgotten, that helicopter went down and they defended themselves from attack and they called for reinforcements. And reinforcements tried to come from the airport compound but they did not have armored personnel carriers. And when people shot at them from both sides they pinned down the reinforcements, they could not get through to help them. American forces held out as long as they could and, when their ammunition ran out, when their Somalis came and hacked them to pieces. And the armored personnel carriers that they requested and had been turned down by the Secretary of Defense for PR reasons, could have saved their lives.

We are not playing games. This is not a PR move. These are real troops and real bullets in a real civil war. We are risking American lives. For what? Because you are going to end a 500-year-old conflict? Do not be silly.

Because these people, with American troops' presence, will suddenly honor their peace commitments that they have never honored in 500 years? Somebody would like to sell you some land in Florida, if you really believe that.

The truth is, I do not believe we have placed a high enough value on the lives of the Americans who serve our country in uniform. The question is not whether or not they should ever risk their lives. No one should go in the military not knowing they do that. Americans are willing to risk their lives and we are willing to shed our blood for freedom around the world, and we have done it more effectively and more efficiently than any people in modern history. But the line is drawn when you ask Americans to give their lives for nothing. I believe that is morally wrong, I believe it is morally wrong, to have Americans give their lives in Somalia when you do not have a clear military mission and you will not stand behind them.

It is not wrong to ask them to give their lives and shed their blood. It is wrong to ask them to do it for nothing, and that is what we did in Somalia. It is wrong to ask them to do it for nothing in Lebanon, which is precisely what happened. It is wrong to ask them to do it for nothing in Vietnam, when our very leaders would not stand behind the men and women who risked their lives.

I believe it is wrong, it is morally wrong for us to send young people to Bosnia to risk their lives in the middle of a civil war among people who have not honored a peace agreement.

Some would say, if we do it, at least they have had their chance. Tell me how you would feel, looking into the eyes of a parent who had lost his or her only child. "Yes, your son or daughter

died, but at least we gave them a chance." Would it not be fair and reasonable to ask, "Was it a good idea? Did it have reasonable prospects to succeed? Did you do everything you could to protect them?"

Mr. President, what we are faced with is a decision that degrades the value of American servicemen and servicewomen. It says that their blood can be shed on a whim; that they are pawns in a chess game; that their lives are not important enough for us to take seriously.

I believe every person who puts on a uniform has an obligation to this country, and the obligation goes to laying down their very lives. But I think it is wrong for us to think that obligation runs in only one direction.

This country has an obligation to those who serve it as well, and that obligation is to make sure we never put them in harm's way unless it is on a clear, achievable, military mission, one that we are committed to win. Then I think we have the right to ask everything in the world from them, everything they can give, because the existence of freedom in this world depends on them. What we see is an effort to cheapen the value of the lives of young Americans who are willing to serve this country. I, for one, will not vote to authorize it.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.

VISIT TO THE SENATE BY ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER SHIMON PERES

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I have the honor, along with Senator PELL from the Foreign Relations Committee, of presenting the new Prime Minister from Israel, Shimon Peres.

I ask unanimous consent the Senate stand in recess for 6 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RECESS

Thereupon, at 5:45 p.m., the Senate recessed until 5:52 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. GRAMS).

Mr. NICKLES addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.

THE VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER SHIMON PERES

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I would like to join with my colleagues in complimenting our distinguished guest, Prime Minister Peres, for an outstanding speech to a joint session of Congress. I have heard several of them in my years in the Senate. But the Prime Minister's speech, which called for peace and continuing movement in the peace arena, I think is certainly to be complimented. And we are delighted to have him as our guest both in speaking

to a joint session of Congress, but also as our guest this evening in the Senate.

It is an honor to have him in the Senate.

THE BOSNIA ISSUE

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I wish to speak in opposition to the President's decision to deploy ground troops and ground forces in Bosnia.

I first would like to compliment Senator HUTCHISON, Senator INHOFE, Senator BROWN, and Senator THOMAS as well for outstanding speeches. Some of the best speeches that have been made in the Senate have been made this evening. Senator BROWN just concluded with a very moving speech detailing his opposition to the President's move. I agree wholeheartedly with their comments.

I also will make a comment. I have been to Yugoslavia with Senator DOLE. Some people are saying these resolutions are in opposition to each other. I would take issue with that fact. One of the resolutions we are going to be voting on that I had something to do with, or was involved with, said that we state our opposition to the President's decision to deploy ground troops in Bosnia—very clear, very plain, very simple. We think the President is making a mistake, and we want to be on record of it.

Mr. President, I will go further. I wish that we would have had a similar resolution when the President made the decision to deploy our Armed Forces into Haiti. I think he made a mistake. I have heard others in the administration say that was a success, and maybe that is the way they would define success. But I thought it was a mistake to have the invasion and occupation of Haiti.

I wish that we would have had a chance to debate that and that we would have had a sensible debate on it. We did not have that.

So I am pleased that we are going to have debate on these two resolutions today and tomorrow. Some of my colleagues said, "Well, we wish we could have had more extensive debate." I would agree with that. But the President is going to Paris tomorrow evening to sign an accord on Thursday, and not only will the Senate be taking this up but the House will be. So it is important for us to take it up today and dispose of these two resolutions—maybe three resolutions—by tomorrow.

Also, Mr. President, I want to make just a couple of comments on how we got here and why I have decided to oppose the President's decision to deploy these troops.

In the first place, I mentioned my opposition to the President's decision on sending troops into Haiti. Senator BROWN commented on the President's mistaken mission in Somalia where the mission moved from a humanitarian mission into that of peace enforcing, or peacekeeping, and a greatly expanded humanitarian role that resulted in the loss of 18 American lives.

But I want to go back a little bit further. I read in President Clinton's book in 1992, "Putting People First"—then candidate Bill Clinton. He stated his administration would "support the recent more active role of the United Nations in troubled spots around the world, and pursue the establishment of a voluntary U.N. rapid deployment force to deter aggression, provide humanitarian relief, and combat terrorism and drug trafficking."

That is on page 135.

In 1993, the President's proposed PDD-13, an expansion of the U.S. role in U.N. operations, and multinational U.S. forces under a foreign multinational U.N. military command. He proposed creating in the office of the Secretary of Defense an Office of Peacekeeping and Democracy at the Pentagon, talking about having this post be used to coordinate international peacekeeping forces.

I think that is a mistake. I have debated that and raised that on the floor of the Senate in the past.

Let me talk a little bit about my opposition to the President's use and deployment of ground forces in this area. I heard the President's speech to the Nation, and he talked about this is going to be a "clearly defined military mission." I do not see any way that anyone can call this a clearly defined military mission. Maybe I am thinking in more simple terms. But clearly defined military mission would be similar to the Persian Gulf where you had Iraq invade Kuwait, and we said that invasion will not stand, and we are going to kick them out of Kuwait. An army invaded. We are not going to allow that to stand. We are going to knock the army out. That is what we did. President Bush said that is what our objective was. It had a clearly definable military objective. We built the forces necessary to make that happen, and we executed it. Then our forces came home.

That is not the case in Bosnia. This is a map of Bosnia. This is the country of Bosnia. It is under control partly by the Serbs. It is under control partly by the Moslems. It is under control partly by the Croatians. Each of these areas have different ethnic groups that have been fighting for centuries.

So now we are going to have military forces serve as a buffer all around, all throughout Bosnia. That is going to be a very difficult goal.

How is that a clearly definable military objective? We are going to insert our troops between fighting factions. But we are going to allow people to move back and forth. And then there are all kinds of missions and roles. We are going to allow refugees to return to their homes. In some areas right now they are not complying with the accord that has already been signed. We are going to enforce the Dayton agreement. This was a U.S.-led agreement, the Dayton accord. And all three Presidents signed it. The leaders of the Serbians, the leaders of Bosnia, and the

leaders of Croatia signed that agreement. They are not complying with it now. But we are going to put U.S. forces in—almost an Americanization of this conflict. And we are going to have U.S. forces in charge of carrying out the Dayton accord.

Since that accord has been signed, I hope my colleagues are aware of some of the violations that have taken place. Bosnian Croat soldiers have defied the peace plan by looting and setting ablaze a couple of towns. Those towns are to be shifted from Croatian control to Bosnian Serb control. They are burning the town. That is not in the Dayton accord, but they are doing it. I guess our troops are going to stop that.

Last week the Croats released from jail Ivica Rajic, who was indicted by the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. Such action is in direct violation of the Dayton accord where all sides pledged to cooperate with the tribunal. They released him.

Mr. President, President Clinton has said, well, we are going to put our troops in. Originally, some time ago, he said we would put U.S. troops in. Then, earlier this year, he said we would put in troops for a reconfiguring and strengthening of U.N. forces in Bosnia. The United Nations has had 30,000 troops there in the Bosnia area. They were not bringing about peace. All sides continued to fight, to move the map around. He said we would commit U.S. forces. He did not ask Congress. He said we will commit U.S. forces to redeploy and reconfigure. Well, that was a mistake.

Mr. President, if you look at this goal, are U.S. forces and the rest of NATO forces now going to be in charge of policing? Are we going to go in and arrest people who are guilty of war crimes?

It seems to me that is what we were trying to do in Somalia. We tried to get General Aideed because he was guilty of some crimes, and the net result was, yes, we had troops going in harm's way and we lost a lot of lives, as Senator BROWN alluded to. We did not provide the military support.

Now the President said, I understand, we are going to send in military support. Is that one of our goals? Are we going to be policemen? Are we going to go and arrest people for crimes against the other sides? Are we going to enforce refugee resettlements? Are we going to tell Serbs in Croat homes they are going to have to get out of those homes, and vice versa, and use force of bayonets?

Are we going to use our forces strictly as a buffer zone in dangerous areas, targets on both sides, allowing people to move back and forth that may have a violent intent either against the other side that they have been fighting for years or maybe against the United States? Are we going to use U.S. forces to clear mines?

And I know I have some Oklahomans now that are trained in that area, so they are going to go in. We are going to

use them to clear certain areas for mines. And what if somebody runs away that is guilty of firing on our troops and happens to evade them over a mine field and so we risk more lives? And what about this idea—the President said, well, this is a NATO mission, and I have heard people say this is a vital role for NATO because if we do not do it, this is going to show that NATO has no valuable purpose.

NATO was created as a defensive alliance to deter invasion or aggression from Russia. And now we are taking NATO troops from the NATO allies and saying we are going to put NATO in a peacekeeping force in a non-NATO country. Bosnia was not invaded by Russia. It was not invaded by other non-Yugoslavian countries. The Serbs certainly did take their fair share of the territory and the Croatians are in there as well, but this is Yugoslavia's civil war. But we are now putting an expansion of the NATO role into moving from a defensive alliance, which we have been the leader and the supporter of, that has proven to be so successful for the last 40 or 50 years, now we are putting it into a peacekeeping role, into a non-NATO country, into an area where the U.N. peacekeepers were not successful and so now we are going to greatly expand NATO's role.

I think we need to discuss that and debate it. Is this what NATO's mission is going to be in the future? It looks like NATO creep, mission creep, to me. And one that I have serious reservations about, very serious reservations about.

Some have said, well, this is important; we need to make sure that this war does not expand. There is lots of potential for this war to expand as a result of this effort. Now a lot of the Serbian areas are going to have Russian troops in them, and a lot of Moslem areas are going to have Western troops including the United States. What happens if some Serbs happen to fire on some Moslems and we try to interject, and so we return fire against the Serbs, and maybe the Russians are in that quarter—and so there is the possibility of some conflict between United States and Russia.

I hope that does not happen. I pray it does not happen. But I see a lot of potential where there can be some spill-over from this so-called peacekeeping force.

Mr. President, we call this peacekeeping, but really what this is is peace enforcing, so it has moved a giant step against peacekeeping. If it is really peacekeeping, they would not have to be there. If there was peace, they would not have to be there. As Senator BROWN mentioned, they have been fighting for hundreds and hundreds of years. How in the world are we going to go in and solve this problem in 12 months and then go out?

And what about the 12-month timetable? Is that to say our military objective is going to be totally complete

in 12 months or is that a political timetable: Oh, we better get them out before the next election. It sounds a lot more political to me than it does a militarily definable, achievable objective. Oh, in 12 months we are going to be gone regardless of what happens.

Well, that does not seem to make sense. Is there a militarily definable objective? I do not think so. I think we are in the process of getting bogged down in a lot of nation building.

You say, oh, well, how could that be? If you read the Dayton accord, it talks about a lot of things. It talks about policing the agreement. It talks about buffer zones. It talks about refugees and resettlements. It also talks about establishing a constitution and a democracy and a revolving presidency, a revolving presidency between the Croats, the Moslems, and the Serbs.

That may sound nice and look kind of good on paper in Dayton, OH, but I question whether that is going to work. If you go back a little bit in history in the former Yugoslavia, where you had several republics, they were supposed to have revolving presidencies. Guess what. The Serbs ended up getting control and they revolved or rotated the presidency. They still have it. Mr. Milosevic was still running Greater Serbia, and he wanted to expand Greater Serbia. That is the reason they moved into Bosnia. So this idea of a revolving presidency certainly is nation building, i.e., and that sounds a lot like Somalia. That does not sound like a militarily achievable objective, at least in my opinion.

And so we look at the resolutions that are before us. The resolution that I am speaking on behalf of as well as Senator HUTCHISON and Senator INHOFE Senator BROWN, Senator KYL, and others says we oppose the President's decision to send ground forces into Bosnia to carry out the Dayton accord. I look at the arguments for it, and I think if you look at this map, it looks like a congressional district in Louisiana. And you see a lot of areas. Well, while there are Serbs in this area, they have to move back and the Bosnians will have to take control and Sarajevo Serbs have control in some areas and they say they are not going to give it up.

Does that mean U.S. forces or other forces are going to come in and enforce that agreement? And what if they do not give it up without a fight? And on and on and on. And this is throughout. What if they say, well, before we leave, we are going to raze it or we are going to burn it. And that is what they are doing right now. Or what if there are war criminals and they say, instead of apprehending them, we are going to let them go, as they just did in one case where the Croats released a person indicted by the international tribunal.

In other words, there are already big, large, gross violations of the Dayton accord, and now we are going to be putting U.S. forces in. Now, U.S. forces, or at least a lot of U.S. forces that I know

from Oklahoma, they will not know the difference between the Serbs and the Moslems and Croats, who are the good guys and bad guys. I tell you, there are lots of bad guys around on all three sides, but yet we are going to be putting U.S. forces under an American general to be making decisions. So we are almost Americanizing this war. But we say we are going to be out in 12 months. I do not see it adding up. I do not see it working. I do see us risking a lot of U.S. lives and a lot of prestige for something I think is clearly not definable.

Now, look at Secretary Christopher's words. He testified in April 1993 before the Appropriations Committee. He said four criteria have to be met before American troops will be deployed.

Now, this proves a couple things. One, they were talking about deploying American troops 2½ years ago. Well, now they have been successful. But they said the goals must be clear and understandable to the American people. Well, that has not happened. That is a big no. You ask the American people, what are our goals? Well, we are going to get out in 12 months. We want to speak for peace, but if we look at all these guidelines where we are going to be the buffer, no, I do not think so. If you say we want American forces to be clearing mines, something like 5 or 6 million mines, landmines, hopefully we will not lose any American troops to landmines, but I am sure that we will.

And Americans are going to start questioning those goals. "Wait a minute. Why are we there? The chances of success must be high." I do not think they are high. I hope they are. I hope there is peace.

But I think just because we have deployed ground forces, what happens when we leave? We may be somewhat successful with 60,000 troops. Putting them into an area smaller than the State of West Virginia, that is a lot of troops for an area that size. Bosnia is a small area, about 60 percent of the size of South Carolina, a little smaller than West Virginia. It has about 4.5 to 5 million people, so it has a lot of people. But we are going to put 60,000 troops in there.

We may be successful in restoring some degree of peace for a while. What happens when we leave? We said we are going to be gone in 12 months. I am afraid the war is going to start again. If so, then I say, hey, that has not been successful. If we leave, like we did after Lebanon or like we did after Somalia, I would say that is not a success. We may have alleviated some of the fighting or some of the starvation for a short period of time, but if they start fighting, as they, I am afraid, will in this case, I do not think that we have been successful.

Third, this is Secretary Christopher's criterion: The American people must support the effort. The American people do not support this effort. I do not believe you should manage foreign policy by polls, but I do think, before you

commit U.S. ground forces and make a commitment where we are going to be committing U.S. forces and lives, you should have some support of the American people.

The American people are opposing this action by a two-to-one margin. That has not changed since the President has tried to make his case, and the administration people have tried to make his case.

And then, an exit strategy for getting the troops out must be established from the beginning. We do not have an exit strategy. We have a timetable that says we are out in 12 months, not that we accomplished our objective, because our objective is not that clear, is not that definable. It just says we are going to be out. That is a timetable for exit, but it does not say anything has to be accomplished. Again, I think it is a mistake. Under Secretary Christopher's own criteria I think it fails on all four categories.

Mr. President, I do not think we should send U.S. ground forces. I think President Clinton has made a mistake. I think if you look back at the statements that this administration has made, even as a candidate, as the policies go back for the last 3 years, they have been talking about putting U.S. ground forces in international peacekeeping efforts. I am afraid we are making a mistake, like at the date in the accord, the date in the agreement.

I see lots and lots of areas that are nation building. So we are going to be committing United States ground forces into rebuilding a democracy or a government in Bosnia, a government that is very fractured, a government that is very divided, with ethnic divisions, one where there is a lot of hatred, a lot of animosity, and putting United States forces right in the middle. That is not a clearly definable military objective.

Again, I think it is a serious mistake. So I hope that our colleagues will support this resolution.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article by Judge Abraham Sofaer that was in the Wall Street Journal, which points out many of the shortcomings of the Dayton accord, be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CLINTON NEEDS CONGRESS ON BOSNIA

(By Abraham D. Sofaer)

President Clinton has appealed to Congress and the American people to support his policy committing 20,000 ground troops to implement the peace agreement reached between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia. It is a tribute to the American people that the president is accorded the greatest deference when he calls for the greatest sacrifice. Americans respond, at least initially, to such appeals from their president.

But Mr. Clinton is exploiting this quality. He has presented the agreement and the American role in its enforcement as an accomplished fact, though the documents have yet to be signed by the parties, and numerous preconditions to U.S. involvement have

yet to be fulfilled. He is consulting with Congress, but he is already sending troops to the area without any form of legislative approval. Indeed, he claims that, while he would welcome Congress's approval, he plans to go ahead regardless.

Presidents often try to get what they want by leading aggressively. Congress nevertheless has a duty to study carefully the proposed operation and then express its view. The essential first step in that debate is to read the documents signed recently in Dayton. The complex agreement, with 12 annexes, calls for Bosnia to remain a single but divided nation, and all the warring factions to withdraw to specific lines. The agreement covers virtually all aspects of future life in Bosnia, including the division of its governments, the contents of its constitution, the selection of its judges, and the manner in which its police force is to be chosen and trained. Of principal interest to Congress, though, are those aspects of the agreement that create obligations and expectations for the U.S. to fulfill.

OUR OBLIGATIONS

These obligations, when carefully examined in context, carry to the ultimate extreme the policy of forcing a settlement on the Bosnians, rather than attempting to create an internal situation that is militarily balanced. Most significantly, the agreement makes the U.S., through the "implementation force" (IFOR), the military guarantor of the overall arrangement.

The role of U.S. troops cannot be characterized as "peacekeeping." Even "implementation" understates our obligation, IFOR will be close to an occupying army, in a conflict that has merely been suspended. We are likely to have as many difficulties acting as occupiers without having won a victory as the U.N.'s war crimes tribunal is having in attempting to apply its decisions in Bosnia without the power to enforce them.

IFOR's principal responsibilities are set out in Annex I(a) of the agreement:

The parties agree to cease hostilities and to withdraw all forces to agreed lines in three phases. Detailed rules have been agreed upon, including special provisions regarding Sarajevo and Gorazde. But IFOR is responsible for marking the ceasefire lines and the "inter-entity boundary line and its zone of separation," which in effect will divide the Bosnian Muslims and Croats from the Bosnian Serbs. The parties agree that IFOR may use all necessary force to ensure their compliance with these disengagement rules.

The parties agree to "strictly avoid committing any reprisals, counterattacks, or any unilateral actions in response to violations of this annex by another party." The only response allowed to alleged violations is through the procedures provided in Article VIII of the Annex, which establishes a "joint military commission"—made up of all the parties—to consider military complaints, questions and problems. But the commission is only "a consultative body for the IFOR commander," an American general who is explicitly deemed "the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of this agreement. . . ." This enormous power—to prevent even acts of self defense—will carry proportionate responsibility for harm that any party may attribute to IFOR's lack of responsiveness or fairness.

IFOR is also given the responsibility to support various nonmilitary tasks, including creating conditions for free and fair elections; assisting humanitarian organizations; observing and preventing "interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons"; clearing the roads of mines; controlling all airspace (even for civilian air travel); and ensuring access

to all areas unimpeded by checkpoints, roadblocks or other obstacles. Taken together, these duties essentially give IFOR control of the physical infrastructure of both parts of the Bosnian state. It seems doubtful that the 60,000-man force could meet these expectations.

Article IX of the agreement recognizes the "obligation of all parties to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law." This is an especially sensitive matter. Yet there is no mechanism in the accord for bringing to justice men who haven't been defeated in battle and who aren't in custody. This means that IFOR is almost certain to come under pressure by victims and human rights advocates to capture and deliver up the principal villains. Will it do better than we did in fulfilling our promise to capture Mohammed Farah Aidid in Somalia?

The agreement makes vague promises about reversing "ethnic cleansing" by guaranteeing refugees the right to return to their homes. Since this is in practice impossible, the West will end up paying billions in compensation awards promised in the agreement.

The agreement contains numerous provisions regarding the manner in which Bosnia is to be governed, with checks and balances built in that are based on ethnic or geographic terms. But Americans traditionally have not believed in such divisions of political authority. We fought the Civil War to put into place an undivided nation based on the principle that all people are of equal worth, and all must live in accordance with the law. It took a Tito to keep the ethnically divided Yugoslavia together. Will IFOR now assume his role of enforcing a constitution based on principles abhorrent to Western values? Even if the basic structure of the government works, what role will IFOR have to play in resolving disputes over the numerous sensitive areas that the parties have seen fit to write into the accords? If the parties don't resolve some matters successfully, they are likely to blame IFOR for these failures.

Finally, the agreement draws a vague distinction between "military" and "civilian" matters. Ultimate authority over the latter is allocated to a U.N. high representative, who is to act through a "joint civilian commission" consisting of senior political representatives of the parties and the IFOR commander or his representative. The high representative is to exchange information and maintain liaison on a regular basis with IFOR, and shall attend or be represented at meetings of the joint military commission and offer advice "particularly on matters of a political-military nature." But it is also made clear that the high representative "shall have no authority over the IFOR and shall not in any way interfere in the conduct of military operations or the IFOR chain of command."

This may seem a reassuring confirmation of IFOR's power to avoid U.N. restrictions on the use of force. Ultimately, however, IFOR's role could be made untenable if it finds itself in a confrontation with the U.N.'s designated representative and the proper handling of a "political" matter. What would happen, for example, if the U.N. high representative determined that U.S. forces had gone too far in defending themselves under President Clinton's policy of effectively responding to attacks "and then some"?

EITHER/OR

Congress cannot redo the agreement reached by the parties. But there is no need for lawmakers to accept President Clinton's either/or approach—either support his plan to implement the agreement, or pull out entirely. If the agreement represents a genuine

desire for peace among the warring parties, then presumably the accord is not so fragile as to depend on the oral commitment of U.S. troops made by the administration (and which isn't even part of the agreement). Congress can and should consider other options. The U.S., for example, could assist European forces in demarcating the boundary lines, and could enforce peace in the area through the threat of air strikes on important targets. Or the U.S. could offer greater monetary and diplomatic support for the agreement but not any ground troops.

Whatever happens with the troop commitment, Congress should insist that the agreement's provisions allowing the training and arming of the Bosnian Muslims be rigorously adhered to. A balance of power among the hostile parties is ultimately the only basis for long-term stability in the region. And if American troops are sent to Bosnia, they will be unable to leave responsibly until such a balance has been developed. That would certainly take longer than the yearlong limit imposed by the administration.

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. GLENN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I listened very carefully to the last several speakers here on the floor, and I find myself almost at a loss as to where to start. If we go through a factual reality check here, on how this situation developed, I do not find it much like what I hear being discussed here on the floor.

One of the speakers this evening talked about our entry into combat and equated it with Vietnam, equated it with Lebanon, where President Reagan—whose name has not been mentioned here although Clinton's has this evening, that is for sure—put 1,600 troops into Lebanon and said, "We're going to stabilize Lebanon by making an example there, and that will bring them around." That is what got us into the trouble, not thinking the thing through, and thinking that a little bitty show of force would bring an end to what had been very lengthy combat in Lebanon.

So I think we need a reality check here. To equate this whole effort as just some sort of a PR stunt does a disservice to the floor of the U.S. Senate and to our Government. It was even questioned as to whether we would stand behind our troops in Bosnia once they are in there. What a ridiculous statement. I find that abhorrent.

Now, statements were made that we were injecting our people into a civil war, we are putting our people into combat. Now, let us get back to reality here.

I agree completely that there have been long and historical difficulties in the Balkans. We do not need to run through all those this evening except to say some of these problems literally go back to the time of the Caesars. They are that old. The ethnic, political, and religious differences in that area led one of the Caesars to split the area that later became Yugoslavia into the East Roman Empire and West

Roman Empire. That is how the orthodox influence came up into that part of the world.

It has been a caldron of problems that contributed to the beginnings of two world wars. We have always had an interest in that area. We have a lot of people in our own country, a lot of people in my home State of Ohio representing the different ethnic groups in that part of the world.

President Clinton said we would send 20,000 people in if—these were big “if’s”—if we could get arrangements for fighting to be stopped, so we could move in. We are not going to fight our way in. We did not make a commitment to actually send them in until some other things happened.

What were those other things? And these are very, very important. What happened was that over the past 4 years the war has become so difficult for people in that area, that they wanted peace. They asked us to broker the peace. We did not suggest fighting our way in there. President Clinton has not said we are going to fight our way in there. Quite the opposite. They came to us and said they are tired of war.

My colleagues have asked how can we believe these people who have been fighting all these hundreds of years are not just going to keep on fighting. Well, the big difference now is that they are tired of war. Should we believe them or not?

Bosnia-Herzegovina is an area about one-half the size of the State of Ohio—we are not a huge State; we have about 41,000 square miles of territory in Ohio—Bosnia-Herzegovina is almost 20,000, 19,776 square miles, about half the size of Ohio. In other words, think of Ohio, and Interstate 70 goes across the middle.

If, in that area down between that Interstate 70 and the Ohio River, we had had 250,000 deaths in the last 4 years and we had two million refugees in the last 4 years, would we be ready for peace? That is what occurred over in Bosnia. Even the most ardent warriors over there have become tired of war, of the slaughter and the dislocation of people.

While every individual may not be signed on, 100 percent going to lay down their arms, this is what happened. They came to us. Diplomatic channels said all parties seemed to be ready to have us broker a peace if it was possible.

I must commend Ambassador Holbrooke. I think he did a masterful job over there, stayed at it, stayed at it, stayed at it, back and forth, one capital to another, one group to another until they had an agreement to go to another place and try to negotiate peace. They came to Dayton. Wright Patterson was selected because the facilities were there providing security, some place to live, some appropriate barracks, and so forth. So they came to Dayton.

Let me give my view. I was very dubious of this whole process at that

point. I thought they would come to Dayton and it would be a short-lived conference. And what happened? Well, they not only asked to negotiate, but they, the parties involved, came to Dayton. They, the national leaders, the heads of state, did something I would not have thought possible: They stayed at Dayton for 21 days, the heads of state stayed there for 21 days negotiating. They finally hammered this thing out, and they initialed an agreement there, all of them. And they will sign it the day after tomorrow in Paris.

So it is not our peace, it is their peace, with us making suggestions. But they are the ones who initialed it. They are the ones who asked to negotiate to begin with.

What is our part in it? Our part is to help implement what they have agreed to.

Much was made on the floor a few moments ago about what if they back out and the fighting starts again? They back out and what happens? I will say this, if that happens and if they break the peace agreement that they signed, that they wanted, that we brokered, that they agreed to, it is their failure, not ours. We are not there, as the President has said, the Vice President has said, the Secretary of Defense has said, General Joulwan in Europe briefed us, to enforce a peace by forcing anyone back across a border. If they have decided this peace is no longer for them and they are going to start fighting again, our commitment at that point is we tried, we gave you people your chance at this thing, and we are out of there. We are not there to conduct large-scale combat. If that were the case, we would be going in with far more than 20,000 people, in my view.

But let us say they do not back out and peace comes to the Balkans. We will have avoided the possibility of this conflict spreading over into Macedonia, down toward Turkey, with all that might entail. We have avoided the possibility of it breaking across borders up toward Europe, maybe into Eastern Europe. And we will maybe, possibly, have peace in that area because they asked for it, they wanted it.

I had doubts when they came to Dayton and I wanted to see two things happen. I said this publicly at the time and talked to the President about it, talked to the Vice President about it, and talked to the Secretary of Defense about it. Two things: First, this agreement could not be wishful thinking. This agreement could not be something where we say, Well, yes, we’re going to go in over there, and, yeah, since they want peace we will be able to settle in down there and we’ll draw some borders once we get there and then we’ll provide some peace.

No, we could not do it that way. I felt that would be a recipe for disaster. I would have bet a sizable amount against the parties at Dayton really drawing up an agreement in sufficient detail that, as I said one night in a

meeting at the White House, we have to decide which peach orchard is in what entity when you draw these lines. It had to be in that kind of detail.

A second element was that the firing had to have stopped. That was a commitment agreed to by everybody. The parties had to see that the irregulars also will have stopped firing. And then we go in to maintain the peace.

What came out of the negotiations, as far as detail? I brought along a chart. This is a chart they agreed to in Dayton. The detail was to be 1 to 50,000 scale. This is a brandnew map, just a few days ago. This is the separation zone. This area in here is an area that is an interim zone which the troops will move out of and back to these lines, and that is to occur within a stated time period.

What is the accuracy of this? An inch on this scale would be somewhere around 4,000 feet, and the center line that is the demarcation line that we will monitor, shown in the center of this zone, accurate on this scale map to within 50 meters, close to 160 feet. Now, that is pretty good accuracy.

We have the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina. All of that area has this kind of a map. I could not bring all the maps, because 1 to 50,000 would have an area about half the size of that wall at the end of the Senate Chamber. But our section will be up in this area, around Tuzla, up in this northeastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, depicted here.

This is Tuzla, which will be the American headquarters out of which we will operate. We will be operating to keep these zones clear in here. Why do we need to do that? If they said that they wanted peace, they are tired of war, 250,000 people killed, 2 million refugees in a small area, why can they not all just sit down and say, Stop fighting, and that takes care of that?

One very good reason. The previous cease-fires that they have had in that area have been broken, for the most part, by what are called the irregulars. We were briefed on that when we were over there a few weeks ago. At least 20 percent, and some estimates run as high as 50 percent, of the combatants in this area are what they call irregulars. They are the farmers who go up and shoot, are up there manning a rifle or machinegun a few days, go back to their farm and somebody relieves them. They are not the people who are used to the usual military commands up and down the military structure.

What has happened on most of the past cease-fires, and they have had over 30 of them in these 4 years of war and they have always broken down, is that somebody gets up there, triggers off a few rounds, the firing spreads and pretty soon the cease-fire has broken down.

So the situation we find ourselves in is we have an agreement. I would not have thought it was possible to reach

the kind of agreement they did in Dayton. It is detailed. The borders are established. It has been initiated. It is laid out on the 1 to 50,000 chart right here. In the local areas, they will have charts to a bigger scale, of course. The firing must have stopped, and the cease fire held while these negotiations were underway, by and large.

When we go in, it will not be to fight our way in. It will be to go in and man these zones that keep the combatants apart. One reason that is a 4-kilometer wide area is so the small arms fire cannot be used across a zone. There are 2 kilometers on each side of that center mark down the middle of that zone.

We will keep the forces separate. They say—they say, not us—they say that they want peace. We have helped them negotiate an agreement, and surprisingly, it is in enough detail that you can pick out which orchard is going to be where and which road intersection is going to be where. It is in that kind of detail. When we get over there, we will not go into areas where there is any active fighting that may have popped up again. We are not going in to squelch someone, we are not there to fight a war on one side or the other. We are there to set up a separation zone and enforce it.

The question was asked on the floor here, what is our military task? Military tasks were agreed to at Dayton. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State have repeated these things over and over again. All parties have agreed that they will cooperate with us in these things that they asked us to enforce.

Let me add one thing here. Why us? Why do they want our involvement? Why did they say they would not go along with just the other members of NATO unless we were involved? It is rather simple. They trust us and they do not trust the Europeans in NATO, and they have said that. This was stated to us in numerous briefings. They do not trust the others, but they do trust the U.S.

Our job will be, first, to go in and supervise the selective marking of cease-fire lines, inter-entity boundary lines, and zones of separation, which is what we are talking about here. First zones will be marked, then military forces will begin moving out of the zones back into these permanent areas here.

Once that has occurred, we will monitor and, if necessary, enforce withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within an agreed period. We will ensure that they have withdrawn behind the zone of separation within 30 days of transfer of authority. That is a clear military task.

Then we will ensure redeployment of forces from areas to be transferred from one entity to the other within 45 days of transfer of authority.

Further, we will ensure no introduction of forces into transferred areas for an additional 45 days, establish and man the 4-kilometer zone of separa-

tion, outlined here on the chart, 2 kilometers on either side of the cease-fire interentity boundary line. We will establish liaison with local military and civilian authorities, and we will create joint military commissions to resolve any disputes that there may be between the parties.

Now, the statement was made a while ago on the floor that it smacks of nation building for our military in there. That is not true. Nationbuilding tasks are specifically not included as I-For tasks in the Dayton accords.

Things that will not be I-For tasks are the humanitarian operations. Those will be handled by other international agencies. Nation building, economics, and infrastructure will be handled by others, not by our military. Disarming everyone is not an I-For task. Moving refugees is not a job for our military, nor is policing local towns, and so on.

So this idea that we do not have clearly defined military tasks is just not true.

Once again, I am still somewhat amazed that everybody agreed to all these things in Dayton and has said that they will abide by these commitments. If the parties decide that they want out of the agreement—we are already agreed, the NATO Ambassadors have said, General Joulwan told us during our briefings, and Secretary Christopher and Secretary Perry said, we are not there to fight on one side or the other. We would say that we successfully did our part. We would define our part as being a success if we went in there and manned these zones and kept them apart for a period of time, and they will have failed, not us. They will have failed the peace agreement that they asked us to negotiate, that they came to Dayton for, for which they stayed 3 weeks, 21 days, and they will sign in Paris the day after tomorrow.

Now, where does this leave us? Well, it leaves us, I think, with reasonable risk. Nothing is without some risk, that is true. Even when we have maneuvers in this country, military maneuvers, sometimes something happens. Someone slips off a tank and they are hurt. Nothing is absolutely safe. It is like an old saying in aviation, "The only way you have absolute, complete flight safety is to leave the airplanes in the hangar." I guess that is the situation we find ourselves in.

Will there be some risk? Yes. Will it be tolerable? I think so. If it becomes intolerable and forces build up, and there is a push, we are out of there. I will not see that as being a failure. I will see that as, we did our level best. This year period we are talking about is time enough. If they really want peace and they are serious about it, then all these other humanitarian groups and nationbuilding groups—not our military—will come in immediately after our presence is felt to try to help those people get their country going again. Within a year, the people of Bosnia are certainly going to see the

benefits of peace, as opposed to continuing the slaughter, which has been their norm for the last several years.

Can 20,000 troops do it? Yes, I think they can. The 20,000 is not a force to come in for a big military operation. We are not going into a situation like the Persian Gulf, where we knew we were going into combat. It is the opposite. We are going in to help the parties and these irregulars to stay apart for a short period of time while we try, for the first time, to get lasting peace in that part of the world.

Now, what are some of these groups that will be coming in? Well, those are being worked out right now, as to who will do what. But NATO itself will not be responsible—the NATO troops there will not be responsible for all the nationbuilding efforts.

I might add that, as far as risk goes, you know, I wondered one day how many people in the Peace Corps we had lost overseas, so we made an inquiry. It turns out that through all the years of the Peace Corps, which obviously includes many thousands of people and many places around the world, we have lost 224 people in the Peace Corps that have died overseas in accidents, of disease, or whatever. I think that is interesting. I would not have thought it was that high. So we take some small risk any time our people move out on any endeavor anywhere in the world. But the risks, to me, are minimal.

The benefits that can occur for the future are huge. NATO, for the first time, will have been moving out of their normal area. So, in that respect, it is an experiment. What has happened is, our military area that we are going to man as part of this force will be up here in this northeastern part. The British will be up in here. The French will be down around Sarajevo and down in this particular area down here.

So it is not, as was said on the floor a while ago, that we are mixing up our troops all over Bosnia. That is not true. We are responsible for manning a certain area, and that is it.

Now, I was afraid of one other thing. In the Balkan area we had the Soviet Union that through the years has had a special kinship with Serbia. It dates back a long time, a historical connection of heritage there.

I was afraid that if we went in there, and NATO went in there, and we found the Russians having an interest in coming down and supporting people over on the Serbian side, we could wind up with us in this area here with Russia supporting the Serbs in here. We would have had a possible confrontation there between Russia and our forces. That would have been a confrontation with the potential for very major disaster.

Now, what happened? Well, we got the Russians in. The Russians are going to be part of this. They will be manning some of this zone here adjacent to us, and they are cooperating in this effort. I think they, too, realize that if we do not get peace in that part

of the world, it is liable to erupt again sometime in the future, and that would not be good for them, or us, or anyone else.

If we cannot begin to see the benefits of peace in a year, then maybe it is impossible. I do not know. Maybe those countries go back to fighting again. But I think we will have been proud at that time that we at least were willing to take the small risks to let peace try and take root in that area of the world.

I would think that some risk now may enhance the long-term leadership of the United States toward peace and freedom around the world and, in the long run, actually save lives.

We have not been hesitant about taking jobs on around the world, and people trust us when we do this, by and large. We have many examples. We stayed in Korea since the Korean war.

With the Marshall plan, the Truman doctrine, back in the post-World War II days, we did not try to take over Europe and make it a 51st, 52d, 53d, or 54th State over there. We helped them. We had the Truman plan, the Marshall plan, all these things to help nations recover from war.

In other words, we have had a history of standing for peace and freedom around the world and, really, to take some minor risks to see that we encourage peace and freedom around the world. It does not always go perfectly.

Did we lose some people we wish we had not lost in Somalia? Of course. I think we probably also in the long run saved a million lives in Somalia with the effort that we were willing to make.

Are we wrong in trying to broker a Mideast peace? We had Prime Minister Shimon Peres here not 20 minutes ago on the floor of the U.S. Senate. He was here and gave a brilliant speech today. We have helped Israel and the Palestinians to bridge some of their differences. We have tried to broker peace in that area.

We did not try to take Japan after World War II. We have tried to advance peace and democracy throughout South and Central America. We have a lot of budding democracies in that part of the world, Cuba being the major exception. We went into Haiti. It was criticized here on the floor a little while ago, but I think we are seeing Haiti come around, it is up and down, up and down, but generally up. It is a more peaceful situation than we might have thought was possible.

Northern Ireland. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty we got permanently extended. We have tried to be a force for good around this world to our everlasting credit.

To those who say we should not even risk going into this area I would say—they wanted the peace, they asked us to broker it, they have initialed it, they are the ones who will sign it in Paris. It is their peace, not ours. We are just trying to help them implement it. So to bring up all these what ifs and dire consequences—I think it is good to

think about those things and be prepared for some of these things. But to stay out of that area because some of the things mentioned here on the floor might possibly remotely happen, I just do not think that should be done.

We are, indeed, a nation that wants peace and freedom around the world. We have stood for that and stayed involved around the world. That does not mean at all that we try to take on all the problems of the world. We cannot be the world's policemen. I agree with that. But where we have an area of such historical conflict and importance to Europe, to not seize this opportunity—and I do view it as an opportunity—to not seize this opportunity to try to help them implement the peace that they say they want, I think would be wrong.

I think we are well justified in going in, and I would not have thought this was possible 7 or 8 months ago. I would not have thought we would have such a detailed agreement, that I could stand here with a chart like this on the floor of the United States Senate and say these details have been signed onto by all parties in the Balkans. This is one small part around Tuzla, and the total map on this scale in the Senate would be the whole size of the wall; 50 charts cover Bosnia and Herzegovina.

What we are doing is providing them a structure for implementing the peace they said they wanted and they agreed to. If they decide to opt out, then we are opting out, too. We will have done our job. I personally declare it a success that we tried. If they are dumb enough to break up the peace after all this effort, and all the nation building that will be going on in that area, then I must say I do not have much sympathy for them from that point on. We will not fight our way in. We only go in if all firing has stopped.

Are we do-gooders, trying to do too much around the world? I do not think so myself. We take some risks for potentially huge benefits. The rest of the world looks at us as a nation that has no territorial designs. They trust us. I think we just might be able to implement this agreement and see peace break out in that area for an indefinite time into the future. If so, we will have done a great, great service for the rest of the world and particularly for that particular area.

I know we will be debating this question tomorrow here, I do not think there is a final agreement yet on exactly how long tomorrow we will be debating these issues. But I think if this works out, then we will avoid the possibility of an encroachment down through Macedonia or toward Turkey. We will not see fighting spread across borders into eastern Europe.

We will maybe have been a real instrument for peace. That is the objective here—not another Vietnam, not another Lebanon, not all the things that were mentioned here on the floor a little while ago. Maybe, just maybe, we can be a force for peace in that part of the world. That is the objective.

I think we stand a very good chance of doing that. I support the President's move, and I hope that we can send an overwhelming message of support, because I do not want to have the people over there thinking that we are a divided nation back here. That would be the worst situation that we could possibly have.

Mr. President, I am optimistic at this point. I think we have come a long way. We went through negotiations we did not think were possible. They have agreed to it. Heads of state stayed in Dayton 21 days, something we would have thought was absolutely impossible. They will sign this in Paris. It is their peace. All we do is help them implement it. It is their peace. If it breaks down, it is not our failure; it is their failure. I look forward to the continued debate tomorrow morning.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BENNETT). The Senator from Alaska.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am one of the cosponsors of the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution. It is a brief measure. It makes clear the views of this Senator and, I hope, the majority of this body in opposition to the actions and the decision by the President concerning Bosnia.

In clear and unambiguous language, our resolution presents absolute support for the men and women of the Armed Forces who are being deployed under the President's order related to Bosnia. They are and will do their duty, and they have earned and deserve our country's unqualified support to meet their needs.

We also have to support their families while they are away, and no matter what we do or say regarding Bosnia, it is the duty of this Congress to provide for the security and welfare of the families of these men and women in the defense forces.

Now, virtually every Member of this body, I think, has spoken at least once on this tragic situation in Bosnia. What the Senate is doing now is to focus on the challenges and the threats involved in this Dayton plan for the United States and to determine whether we should, for the first time, mire ground forces in this centuries-long conflict in the Balkans.

I have listened with interest to my friend from Ohio. There is no one for whom I have greater respect and fondness. I find that we have come away from the Balkans—we traveled the Balkans together—we have come away with diametrically opposed views.

I was interested in particular when he mentioned that Bosnia and Herzegovina is 20,000 square miles. Mr. President, my State is 586,000 square miles and we are one-fifth the size of the United States. In other words, I think we should focus on the size of the area involved in this conflict.

More than 2 years ago, I spoke to the Senate on the nature of the conflict in

Bosnia, and I paid particular attention at that time to the remarks of General MacKenzie, who was a Canadian and the commander of the U.N. forces that were then struggling to end the fighting.

In an interview about that time, when he was asked what he thought about the calls from some in the Congress to take military intervention, or at least send a strong military backup to the Bosnia area, this is what he said, quoting Gen. Louis MacKenzie:

Well, what I have to say is that if you're going to jump from chapter to chapter 7 of the U.N. charter and move from peacekeeping to force, then you better get the peacekeeping force out first.

Mind you, Mr. President, you better get the peacekeeping force out of there.

Otherwise, you got 1,500 to 1,600 hostages sitting there 200 kilometers from the nearest secure border. You can't combine these two.

And if you're going to get involved in the Balkans, then we better read a bit of history, because we're talking about an area that gobbled up 30 divisions during the last war. Unsuccessfully, by the way, in keeping the peace in Yugoslavia. Unsuccessful in tracking down Tito and finding him in Macedonia. So you're talking about a very, very major undertaking.

Not only that; when they leave, with the amount of hate that's been generated on both sides, it's going to break out and start all over again unless you come to some sort of political constitutional solution for that country.

Mr. President, there is no constitutional solution in Bosnia. There is no peace, really, in Bosnia.

It is discouraging that, after the 2 years that this has gone on, and the incalculable suffering by the people of Bosnia, the President has finally acted. And in my view he has made the wrong decision.

Two years ago, following a mission in Bosnia with a delegation of Senators to the NATO south headquarters and the Bosnia region and Croatia, I came to the conclusion that only a military balance in the region would bring a permanent end to the fighting. This administration consistently opposed that strategy, long advocated by the majority leader, Senator DOLE. Now, administration officials define a military balance as a key component of our exit strategy from Bosnia. How is it that aiding the legal Government of Bosnia to defend itself was wrong for so long, and now defines success for this deployment?

American soldiers, air crews, marines, and sailors will now be placed in harm's way because this administration failed to do what so many of us urged—permit the legal Government of Bosnia—permit the people of Bosnia—to defend their country, and their lives. The question now is whether we will approve putting the men and women of our Armed Forces at risk, to recover from the mistakes and errors of the past 3 years.

In October, Senator INOUE and I led a bipartisan delegation to review the NATO peace enforcement plan, and evaluate the situation on the ground in

Croatia and Sarajevo. Let me state now that our discussions with military leaders at the United States European Command headquarters in Stuttgart made clear that our troops have been well-trained and well-prepared for what they may face in Bosnia. While I do not agree with the President's decision, I applaud the leadership exercised by General Shalikashvili, Admiral Smith, General Crouch, and General Hawley—they have done everything in their power to prepare our troops to protect their own lives.

We may face casualties in Bosnia—every military commander we met addressed the risks there. But we were assured that those casualties will not be the result of indifference or failures by the Department of Defense to do its job to make the force ready. This is a superb force that the President has ordered to Bosnia, will bring credit to the military, and to our Nation, regardless of the challenges of the Balkans, of that I am sure.

But, if the situation in Bosnia was unique, a compelling case for United States intervention might be made. Sadly, the killing, the suffering, and the devastation in Bosnia represents only one chapter in the growing record of civil strife around the world. Even more troubling is that Bosnia may be only a warning bell for severe disruption and conflict in other former Communist nations, including the former Soviet Union itself. We must not forget the fact that we are watching the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

In Africa, Central Asia, and the Far East, we have witnessed, without deploying United States troops, slaughters and tyranny in Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, Mozambique, and Angola. Where we did intervene, in Rwanda and Somalia, our efforts resulted in only a temporary lull in the killing, or in the end, completely failed, as when we tried to mix humanitarian aid with nation building in Somalia. In Asia, we turned away from any responsibility despite the terror in Sri Lanka, in Burma, and the decade of killing in Cambodia. In Cambodia, peace was accomplished when the parties were tired of fighting, and the United Nations provided a framework for reconstruction, led by Japan and Australia—key regional powers.

The former Soviet Union and associated states present an entirely separate category of potential future conflicts. Already, we have witnessed fighting in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Armenia, and Chechnya. We in Alaska watch closely developments in Siberia, and I predict to the Senate that we will see unrest and perhaps the fragmentation of that corner of the former Soviet Empire before the end of this decade.

Many of these nations are artificial. We should remember that. Within the former Soviet Union, within the former Warsaw Pact, and within the former Yugoslavia, these are not natural nation states. Today in many of the

states long simmering rivalries, feuds, and clan conflicts that were suppressed by brutal, authoritarian regimes continue to surface. People did not accept Communist dictatorships, they lived in fear of them. They chafed under that tyranny, under the control of entirely different nation, a nation that erased their traditional boundaries. And now they are acting on desires for self-determination to try to restore the past.

Bosnia is not the first nor will it be the last of such civil wars in former Communist nations. The precedent set by the President on how the United States will respond to these conflicts will haunt the United States for years to come.

I do not know how this administration reached a value judgment that a life in Bosnia is more significant than a life in Chechnya or Armenia. And I would ask, are the threats to Turkey from unrest along the Black Sea of less vital interest than the imagined threats to Greece from the unrest in the Balkans?

I really do not know how the President's equation works yet, Mr. President. What future commitments has the President made by this decision to dispatch forces to this region? Based on our discussions with U.S. military leaders in Europe and the hearing before the defense appropriations subcommittee, which I chaired, I found no basis for any claim that a broader war in Europe could emerge from this conflict. We have heard that again here today.

There is simply no likelihood that troops from this 20,000 square mile area will march on Greece, or that Croatia will march on Italy, as a result of this centuries-long hatred in the Balkans.

Any suggestions that this civil conflict will ignite world war III to me is farfetched and irresponsible. And I say this with no disrespect to Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili. I told them of my conclusions following our trips to Bosnia, in private meetings and public hearings.

This deployment may be more about fulfilling the President's hasty commitment to NATO leaders. It may be one to assert a new dominating role for the United States in NATO affairs.

To me, it is not a deployment to prevent the spread of war to Southern Europe. I find it very interesting that in the past, many on the other side of the aisle scoffed at the domino theory when it was raised with regard to Europe, Southeast Asia, or the even the Middle East during the gulf war. It is remarkable now to hear that this civil war in 20,000 square miles of Bosnia may spill over and proliferate into conflict in Greece, Turkey, Hungary, Romania, or Albania. All have been mentioned here on the floor, Mr. President.

Procedurally, there is no basis in the NATO Treaty for this mission. The North Atlantic Treaty defines a defensive relationship between the signatories focused on mutual defense. This action takes NATO in a new and uncharted direction. The President does

so now under circumstances where the NATO alliance is described as so weak that America choosing not to participate in this mission could destroy that alliance. Those are not my words. That is what we were told at the NATO headquarters when we visited Brussels.

NATO officials told our delegation that defense spending cutbacks by some NATO members have so reduced their military forces that they simply cannot do more than provide token units to the NATO implementation force. NATO ministers presented us a stark choice in Bosnia. We were either to provide a military force for Europe or see NATO collapse.

I do not see why we should provide a military force for Europe because of the threat that NATO would collapse. I think that is one of the most remarkable statements I have heard.

Is it true that our allies that we joined together to defend against the monolithic Soviet Union are incapable of containing a small conflict in 20,000 square miles of Europe?

We are the world's only remaining superpower. The budget that I helped present to the Senate that the President approved for the Department of Defense is a good one, but it does not keep pace with inflation. And I say to the Senate that the bottom line is this Nation cannot provide for Europe's defense and Asia's defense and the Middle East's defense. The American taxpayers should not, cannot, and will not shoulder this burden alone. If NATO cannot do this without us, what is it that NATO can do now?

I have probably attended more NATO meetings than any Member of the Senate still here today, and I have been a firm supporter of NATO all along. But I was appalled to be told by leaders of NATO that if we did not participate in this mission, NATO would collapse.

Mr. President, I will vote for the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution, and I am proud to have worked with them and so many of my colleagues to bring this matter before the Senate. I hope to be able to support also the leader's resolution. I hope it will come before the Senate because I think we must not only make a clear commitment to our Armed Forces, which the leader's resolution will do, but I think we must have a resolution that will go to the President and that he must sign that defines not only our role vis-a-vis the Bosnian Moslems, but also the exit strategy that we should pursue.

I do not enjoy finding myself in opposition to any President. Our Constitution makes the President the Commander in Chief of our military forces, and he has the authority to command. He has the authority to deploy these forces. But the Constitution gives the Congress responsibility also to provide for our common defense.

How can we provide for our common defense if Presidents continue to send our forces throughout the world for humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts to Haiti, to Somalia, or wherever it might

be? I believe we are weakening our defense every time we use defense money for peacekeeping measures, and we will pay the price.

I only need to point out the number of ships we are able to build a year. Figure it out someday, Mr. President. We build about six or seven now, and they have about a 20-year average life. How can we possibly keep a 350- or 400-ship Navy with the current rate of procurement for Naval forces? Or look at the Air Force; it is coming down so rapidly. Or look at our tanks; it will not be long until we will have tanks to send people to war that were built by their grandfathers.

The defense budget is not, as the President said, an overloaded budget. It is an underfunded budget from the point of view of modernization, and that is really the problem we have here.

I do not believe the American people want our troops in Bosnia. I think they want a very good defense force. They want us to be able to keep our commitments abroad.

I do not believe a majority of the Congress should support the President's decision to send troops to Bosnia, and I regret the President did not consult the Congress, or consider our views—particularly the views of some of those who were sent to Bosnia to bring back a report to him.

This decision sets a very disturbing precedent for me, Mr. President. I do not think the debate will change the policy the President has embarked on. I hope that some of our allies are listening, and I hope more people question our becoming involved to save NATO rather than to defend our national interest. They are not synonymous any longer, Mr. President.

I believe that the debate should cause our allies in Europe to recognize that our commitment to NATO is not without limits and hinges upon Europe's willingness to act as a full partner in any military or political function.

My hope is that the debate will caution the President also—will caution him not to commit us further without closer consultation with the Congress and its leaders, and without the support of the American people.

It is my fervent hope that the debate will result in policies that will bring these troops home as soon as possible.

I can only say as I started, Mr. President, that I regret deeply the decision to send them there in the first place.

Mr. THOMPSON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, thank you.

Mr. President, I rise in support of the Hutchison-Inhofe amendment in opposition to the President's decision to send troops to Bosnia.

I, like the Senator from Alaska, would like to be able to support the President in regard to this matter. I think the politics should end at the water's edge whenever possible. I regret

that I am not able to do so. But after extensive hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee and others, and after carefully examining all of the arguments and all of the information that is available, I have concluded that there are several reasons for being opposed to the President's action.

I do not believe that they have made a convincing case that it is in our national interest to take this action. I think that policy rewards the aggression that has taken place over the last 4 years in that country. But I think probably the most definitive problem, as presented by the President's action, is that there is no indication—not only have they not carried the burden of proof, in my opinion, but there is simply no indication—that this action will meet with any success. I think the first thing we have to do with regard to that point is define success.

It was pointed out a little earlier this evening that we would be successful even if hostilities broke out before the 12-month period and we left. I respectfully disagree with that assertion. Once you think about it, it is certainly not that simple. If we were there for 2 months, 3 months, or 4 months and hostilities broke out, and we simply took the position that, well, we tried and the people who we are here to help do not want to be helped so we will leave, we would be accused of cutting and running as we have been accused of before. That would be disastrous, Mr. President, for the United States of America.

If, on the other hand, hostilities broke out, we were involved in hostilities before the expiration of the 12-month period, and we stayed, and we were in the middle of those hostilities and engaged in those hostilities, we would be in danger of being in a quagmire, and Vietnam would be talked about a whole lot more than it has been here tonight. So it is not a simple proposition. If this breaks down before the 12-month period, it is not a simple proposition for us to just turn around and leave. It would be a very big black mark as far as the credibility of the United States of America is concerned.

I tend to believe that with the forces that we are putting in there and with the forces that NATO and other countries are putting in there, we can probably keep the lid on it for 12 months. I think there is a much greater likelihood that the day we leave hostilities will resume. They say, well, again, we have tried our best. We will come out all right if that is the case.

I respectfully disagree with that argument. That is not a definition of success either. We will have expended lives, Mr. President. They talk about the estimate of 6 million mines being scattered around in terrain like most of us have never experienced. Our colleagues come back and say you cannot even get a truck, much less a tank, in most of these places. The terrain is vertical. It is not horizontal. We would expend, some people say, upward of \$5

to \$6 billion, not counting what some people believe will be an extensive foreign aid package as we leave.

Now, I think we would have spent something that is equally important, certainly more important than the money part, and that is our credibility. It would have been in vain. We would have paid a price. We would have had another failed mission, Mr. President, at a time when the U.S. military does not need another failed mission because of the leadership that has been provided to them.

So with that definition of success, what is the likelihood of success? I think that if you look to the past or you look to the present or you look to the future, there is very little, if any, likelihood of success. These people have been warring with each other for hundreds of years. We have had 34 cease-fires before this one. No one has made a credible case yet that they are not just taking another pause in the hostilities to reinforce themselves during the time of a bitter winter when they could not do much anyway.

Also, apparently, none of the parties engaged in this process believe that the other side wants peace. We can never create a peace, Mr. President, until the parties themselves want peace, regardless of the actions that we take. Historically, they have not wanted peace for a long time. With the mass murders that have taken place just within the last few months, apparently, over there and the continued atrocities and ethnic cleansing that continue to go on, those feelings are not going to subside overnight, regardless of what has been put on a piece of paper in Dayton, OH. They are still there. They are going to linger there. Evidently the Croats and the Bosnians did not think that the Serbs wanted peace. They would not even sit down to the table unless the United States was there. Evidently we do not think the Serbs want peace because one of the conditions that is being talked about so much is that we must equalize the forces. We would not need to be so concerned about that if we did not think the Serbs still had aggressive tendencies and would exercise those tendencies the moment that we left.

What about present circumstances? Are there any indications of success from this policy under present circumstances? You can just look and see what has happened since Dayton and come to the conclusion the answer is no to that particular question. We have the leaders over here, some of whom probably are trying desperately to keep from being branded war criminals, making policies and putting things in an extensive document that their very people back in Sarajevo and other places in the area are denouncing and saying they will never live under—certainly not encouraging conditions.

We are debating whether or not we are nation building, and everyone seems to agree that we certainly do not want to get into nation building. I

would suggest it is more than that. It is apparently nation creating. Apparently the document calls for the creation of a new nation, basically divided in half, populated by three ethnic groups which have been warring with each other for centuries.

What is the likelihood that we can go in there and create that kind of new government—or not create it. In all fairness, I must say, it is not our job to create it, but it is our job to monitor and enforce the agreement, whatever that means. Monitor and enforce the agreement. As I understand it, one of the goals is to build down, as they say, the arms on one side of this conflict and build up the arms on the other; presumably those folks who are losing the arms are going to sit back and allow that to happen. Apparently we are to monitor and enforce the understanding with regard to the refugees. As we know, some of these areas and some of these very homes have changed hands. We are going to have people in one group being pushed out by people of another group, going to courts that are being run totally by one group.

That is not going to be a very satisfactory resolution to the people who are kicked out. And then we are supposed to leave a balance of power. If there has ever been an indication where the United States or another country has gone into another area and figured this out from a piece of paper, got the top help involved and figured out how to create and enforce and leave a balance of power, I would like to know what it is.

Nobody seems to ask the other question, too: What does a balance of power do? Does that cause people to lay down those arms? Does it cause them to say we cannot fight now because we have a balance of power? I would not think so.

Some points that really must cause one to think have been made because we are told that this is significant as far as supporting the President's concern but also supporting NATO. I think the Senator from Alaska makes a very good point when he raises the question whether or not this is something that is in our national interest or is it something that is in NATO's interest and we have an interest in NATO, and therefore it is in our national interest.

If that is the logic, it is very questionable. For some time now NATO has acted as if this particular conflict and the resolution of it was not even in the national interest of the countries involved, much less NATO. For some time now they have resisted our attempts to lift the arms embargo, to try to reach some kind of resolution along the lines, as I read it, of what the Dayton accord seeks to do with regard to the arms portion of the agreement.

I think it is important that we have a strong NATO. I think it is important that we cooperate with NATO. But I think it is also important that NATO cooperate with us. And they failed to cooperate with us. The Secretary of State went around to the NATO coun-

tries hat in hand and asked for support and help to get this policy through that the U.S. Congress, I believe, was very firmly in support of, the President said he was in support of, and I think the American people were in support of. They turned a deaf ear to us.

Now they have taken the position where apparently they have not seen their own national interest and vital interest of these countries very directly involved and convinced us in one fell swoop that it is in our national interest to send ground troops over there. Not that we do not have any interest at all, but is our national interest sufficient for us to send ground troops? I think probably what this conflict did was catch us in mid-redefinition of the role of NATO and our role in NATO. We have built down from over 300,000 troops in the NATO countries to around 100,000 or so now. Obviously, we see a different situation now that the cold war is over. We do not have that big threat of aggression to the NATO countries from the one superpower. It is a different world that we live in, no less dangerous world but a different world that we live in.

And the question here is a new one for us. That is, what happens, first, when you are engaging in not an aggression situation but a so-called peacekeeping situation and, second, it does not involve a NATO country? It does not involve a NATO country.

I certainly believe a case can be made that we can become involved and we could supply logistics, intelligence, and other areas that we obviously have capabilities that some of these other countries do not have, without supplying ground troops.

Should we be the one to initially step forward with a commitment to supply ground troops simply because we want to have some involvement or support in NATO? I do not think so.

So it is too late now with regard to this particular venture. But I think we are going to have to step back and re-define our role there because we cannot afford to let NATO pull us into any kind of conflict over there in another part of the world, that if they had done the right thing in this particular instance we would probably be in much better shape than we are in right now.

Another argument that has been made, that is pause for concern to those of us who are opposed to the President's policy here, is the charge of isolationism. And the charge is made that those who do not support the President are isolationists and do not see our country's interests go past our own borders. That is not the case. That is not the case at all.

I certainly believe that we must exercise a strong role. One of the things that can be said positively about what the President has done is that he has taken a strong stand. Unfortunately, I think that it is an incorrect stand. But I kind of admire the fact that he has taken a strong stand.

If we had taken a strong stand somewhat earlier in this country with regard to this particular area, and others I might add, we would be in a whole lot better shape. We would have a whole lot more credibility, and so would NATO right now.

So I think many of us see that we have to exercise a leadership role. We do live in one world. We say that we do not want CNN running our Nation's policy, and it should not. But CNN is there. It has arrived. When we watch atrocities in parts of the world, it affects us. It does not mean that we have to be involved in each and every one, but it affects us as a nation. And when we see in an area where we can take some action, such as lifting an arms embargo, for example, and we sit back year after year and do nothing, I do not think that helps us. I do not think that helps the United States of America and what we are supposed to stand for and what we are as a people. It does not do us any good, I do not think.

So all of that is true. But I feel like the policy here at hand is not only misguided, but will wind up fueling the very isolationist tendencies that the supporters of this policy decry. Because if, in fact, it is isolationism that got us here, because we did not have the strong effort by NATO—and we as a country perhaps made some mistakes in not having a firmer hand in many different respects with regard to this part of the world some time ago.

But now if, as all indications would point toward, this turns out to be a failed policy, if hostilities resume, if we have to leave prematurely or hostilities resume after we have left, having spent billions of dollars and many lives of our young people, that is going to cause people to be very, very reluctant, much more reluctant than otherwise to get into the next conflict where we might have some national interest.

So we must husband our resources with a certain amount of wisdom, discretion. And the President should not come to the U.S. Congress and say that this is a fait accompli, and you should not look to the underlying policy. That is what we are faced with here.

The role of Congress has been rendered essentially a nullity. As far as these resolutions are concerned, I feel like it is important that we express ourselves. But I think it is even more important for this reason. If we express ourselves here and the President knows that we do not take to the idea that we are not entitled to look at the underlying policy, if he knows that underlying policy will be debated—any President—and will have to see the light of day and the details will be examined and will not be rubberstamped, even if the troops are on the way, then perhaps it will change some Presidential actions in the future because those things are going to continue to occur throughout the rest of our history, I would assume. It is a much more dangerous world in many respects that we live in today than ever before.

So we have been presented somewhat with two bad alternatives. One is to support a bad policy; and the other is to do something which the administration would urge might somehow undermine the effort. And none of us want to do that. And I do not like that policy. I mean I do not like that choice, that Hobson's choice.

But on balance, I think it is much worse to establish a precedent that if a President can quietly enough and rapidly enough make commitments and come to the U.S. Congress and say it is a fait accompli, the Congress does not have the right or the obligation to look into the underlying action, that is a bad policy and I do not think we should subscribe to it, and therefore, I will support the resolution. I thank the Chair.

Mr. GORTON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington.

Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, from the beginning of the present Bosnian conflict during the Presidency of George Bush, I have opposed an immediate American participation in it in any fashion that would risk the lives of young American men and women.

From the beginning of that conflict, during the Presidency of George Bush, I have favored the lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian victims of Serbian aggression, on the premise that it was not only unfair, but immoral to treat identically the aggressors and the victims of that aggression.

The Bosnians, it seemed to me, as it did to most Members of this body, deserved at least the right to fight for their own freedom—a right which they have effectively been denied.

Everything in history and logic and our intuitions told us to oppose the kind of action in which the President is engaged in at the present time. Even the peace treaty we are there in part to enforce is an unjust treaty which leaves the aggressors in possession of most of the areas which they conquered and in which they engaged in some of the most horrible war crimes in recent history.

In 1993, some 2 years ago, President Clinton made what appeared to be a casual remark to our Europe allies. He promised that American Armed Forces, specifically ground troops, would participate in a Bosnian peacekeeping effort as and when such a peace were reached. I am convinced that then, as today, President Clinton did not understand the consequences of that promise, especially as it came as a promise from the leader of the free world.

Mr. Clinton's proclivity to tell people whatever they want to hear at the time in which they want to hear it is well documented here in the United States. But what the American people will perceive simply to be a flaw in the President's character in the rest of the world could precipitate a catastrophe in our foreign policy.

And so, Mr. President, as we meet here this evening, after the President's

commitment, not only in abstract terms in 1993, but in concrete terms just a few weeks ago, the question is no longer whether or not we as individual Members of the Senate agreed with that promise or supported the President's policies.

Charles Krauthammer wrote in the Washington Post last Friday:

It does not matter that we should not have gone into Bosnia in the first place. It now matters only that we succeed.

Regrettably, I find that to be the absolute and incontrovertible truth. Let us not fool ourselves that this is an easy task. We are going into Bosnia to create or perhaps to preserve in part a pause in fighting between bitter, 600-year-old enemies. Success will not be easy. But now that we are there, now that we are the leaders of the NATO forces in Bosnia, it is absolutely essential for the future of this country, as well as for the future of NATO, that we succeed. As a consequence, our first task is to define success.

Are we going to build a parliamentary democracy in Bosnia?

Of course not. Are we going to reconcile six-centuries-old enmities after hundreds of thousands of people have been killed and millions displaced in a 1-year period? Of course not.

Then, Mr. President, what is the definition of "success," assuming that the President keeps his commitment to withdraw our troops at the end of a 1-year period? The only possible definition of success, it seems to me, is that when we leave, the Bosnians are able to defend themselves against further aggression; that a peace, not arising out of reconciliation, can at least arise out of a balance of power and a feeling that the acts of the last 5 years cannot be repeated.

It is exactly at that definition of success that the resolution proposed by our distinguished majority leader, ROBERT DOLE, is aimed. The vague and uncertain promises that the Bosnians be equipped in such a way that they can defend themselves in the agreements in Dayton are sharpened and strengthened in this resolution by the insistence that we assure that these people, these victims, be able successfully to defend themselves at the end of a 1-year period.

If that is the case, Mr. President, and only if that is the case, will we and our NATO allies be able to leave Bosnia without an automatic renewal of the civil war. And only if we are able to leave without that automatic renewal taking place, can either we or NATO claim to have been successful.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been the centerpiece of the foreign policy of the United States since 1948. It has been and it remains vital to the peace not only of Europe but to the rest of the world that NATO continue and that it be credible. As a consequence, even though NATO may have, as I believe it has done, made an erroneous and unwise commitment, and even though the President of the

United States may have done and has done, in my view, an unwise thing in entering into this commitment, we now must honor it. We must honor it in a way that protects, to the best of our ability to do so, the security of our troops on the ground during the time that they are there and gives some reasonable degree of assurance that the war will not recommence immediately upon our leaving.

Mr. President, every one of us in this body knows that the Congress of the United States will not and cannot exercise the only full authority it has, and that is to cut off any funding for this Bosnian venture. A Presidential veto on the assumption that there might be a majority in both Houses for cutting off that funding would not be over-ridden. The President has committed our troops to Bosnia. He is going to carry out that commitment, whatever the oratory on this floor, whatever the resolution that passes this body. We, therefore, if we are to be wiser than the President has been, must try to see to it that the troops who are there are there under the best possible circumstances, as undesirable as those circumstances may be. We must try to see to it that they are there for the shortest period of time possible, and that when they leave, the world can say that their intervention has been a success.

Mr. President, I believe that the distinguished majority leader and those who have worked with him on his resolution have charted the only possible course of action that can meet those goals.

We, as Americans, can have only one President at a time. All Presidents are fallible and, I must say, I think this President is particularly fallible. As a Member of this Senate, I supported President Reagan when he ordered air raids on Libya. I supported President Reagan when he liberated Grenada. And I supported President Bush when he proposed, ultimately successfully, to liberate Kuwait. I must say that none of those decisions was nearly as difficult as this one is, because in each case, I believed that the President was doing the right thing. But in a certain measure, even then that support was granted because the President, who was in charge, was our Commander in Chief and deserved every benefit of the doubt.

I do not believe we can appropriately grant that benefit only to a President of our own party or a President with whom we agree. As a consequence, as reluctant as this assent is, I believe we must assent to what the President has done, at least to the extent of strongly supporting our troops who are faced with an extraordinarily difficult challenge, giving them the greatest possible opportunity to carry out their mission successfully from the perspective of defending their own lives and security and successfully from the perspective of defending their own lines and security and successfully from the

perspective of leaving Bosnia at least not as terrible a place as they found it. The only way I have discovered at this point to do that, Mr. President, is to support the initiative of our distinguished majority leader.

Our constituents—all of our constituents—are frustrated by this venture. It has not been appropriately defended by the President. His casual promise of 2 years ago should never have been made. But each of these is a bell we cannot unring and, at this point, we must look forward and do the best we can for our troops, our country, and our alliance. That, I am convinced, we will do by supporting Senator DOLE's resolution.

Mr. SMITH addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Hutchison resolution in opposition—strong opposition—to sending American forces into Bosnia. I was quite interested in the remarks of my friend from the State of Washington. In listening to his remarks—and I know other Senators on the floor, Senator BROWN, served with me in Vietnam—I could not help but think of terms like "Vietnamization." I remember the charts, the McNamara charts and the pointers, how, if we would just supply a little help, we could be there a little while and the South Vietnamese would soon be able to take over the war and fight their own battles; if we could just secure the peace, everything would be all right.

Mr. President, 58,000-plus lives later, we gave it back to the North Vietnamese.

I remember then, very much so, as a young man of draft age volunteering in the Navy to serve, I remember then Presidents making commitments. And although this is not Vietnam per se, the parallels are very similar because, as the President must know, and as all of us participating in this debate know, and as the American people know full well, the majority of the American people do not support our involvement here. The difference is that we can stand here on the floor and debate this, and we know that, regardless of what we say here or what we debate here, the President is going to—indeed has already begun—proceed to send troops to Bosnia. So perhaps we are wasting our time.

I think it is important that people understand that, yes, we are debating it and, yes, the President made this commitment 2 years ago. But there is somebody's son and there is somebody's daughter that, probably prior to Christmas, is going to be off somewhere in this far-off land without the full support of the American people for having them go there. They will have the support of the American people and this Senator's support when they get there, but that does not mean we have to endorse the policy of sending them there.

I do not take participation in this debate lightly. There have been three or

four major issues that I have been involved in since I have been in the Senate for some 5 years and in the House 6 years before that. One was the Persian Gulf war. It is not easy when you stand here, knowing the vote you make may cost American lives. It troubles me very much to take the floor of the U.S. Senate in opposition to any President, including President Clinton.

I served in the Vietnam war under President Johnson. I disapproved of President Johnson's policies. I did not think he conducted the war properly. But I was proud to serve in the military and do my duty. I never had a second thought about that, as most military people do not. But I cannot sit idly by and say nothing and watch our troops being sent into harm's way, Mr. President, without a coherent policy and without a compelling military mission. And there is no coherent policy and there is absolutely no compelling military mission.

These men and women are not trained to be 911 response teams. Police departments do that pretty well. These men and women are trained to fight for the national security of the United States. That is not why they are going there. So they are going to be put in harm's way, doing things they were not trained to do.

Over the past 3 years, many of us in this body have spoken out loudly and clearly on lifting the arms embargo, which has denied the Bosnia Moslems the ability to defend themselves. They have a right to do that. Bosnia is their country. Those of us who have advocated lifting the embargo believe that because it is their country, the Moslems deserve the opportunity to defend it, to protect their families, their property, their culture, against a Serbian onslaught. Do you remember the safe havens? They were not very safe, but they were told they were safe. They were herded into them and executed by the Serbs.

If the President, President Clinton, had accepted this recommendation that many of us made, including the majority leader, here on the floor and exerted firm leadership, we would not be having this debate. We would not be sending troops to Bosnia. They would not be giving up Christmas with their families to go to this far-off land, to be put in harm's way. We would not be doing it. Why? Because the Moslems would have been able to defend themselves if we had just—we did have to arm them. All we had to do was step out of the way and let them be armed. But we did not do it. So I am not swayed emotionally or any other way by the fact that this President made some commitment 2 years ago to NATO allies. I am not swayed in the slightest, because if things go wrong, if it looks bad not to go, how bad is it going to look when we leave, after things get rough?

Are my colleagues here prepared to come down on the Senate floor if, in fact, something goes wrong—and I pray

it does not—and when casualties occur? I remember that, too, in Vietnam, Mr. President, very clearly. I remember when there were 2 or 3 a week, and I remember when there were 350 a week coming home dead. The American people then lost interest in the war because they never supported it in the first place, and brave young men and women died because of that. That could happen this time, and I cannot believe that we are allowing it to happen again.

When will we ever learn from history? A year ago, it was widely reported that the President offered up to 25,000 American troops to help withdraw the U.N. protection forces from Bosnia. I joined many of my colleagues right here on this floor voicing serious reservations with that proposal. It is strangely ironic that 1 year later the President has committed roughly the same number of troops from the same service elements to enforce a peace agreement that, as of today, has not even been signed. Maybe it will be signed in the next day or so; maybe it will not. But we are already going to send troops, are we not? We already made the commitment. We hear people from all sides saying we are not going to support it. So we are going to put our American forces there in harm's way, without a peace treaty that we know will work.

Is that our responsibility? Why? Because CNN carries bloody footage every night from the war? There are other places where blood is let every day, and we are not there—Ethiopia, Somalia. We were in Somalia, but we should not have been there either. There is at least the appearance that when Congress closed the front door on Bosnia deployment, the President decided to sneak around the back door to get the American troops involved. That is what he did. He made an incorrect decision.

The President has stated that our troops will only be deployed to Bosnia for a year. He has not articulated what the specific mission will be. He has not defined a concise timetable or sequence of milestones for achieving our military objectives. How can he possibly say that American forces will be there for a year? He does not know that. Sure, he can pull them out in a year, regardless. All sides know that. So if I were an adversary in Bosnia, I would do one of two things. One, I would absolutely harass American forces to try to create as many casualties as I could and get us out, or I would sit back and do nothing and wait for a year. And, in the meantime, during that year, how many landmines do American forces step on? How many people die in simple motor vehicle accidents, or airplane accidents, or other combat-related accidents, in the line of duty?

This is not a safe venture. When you deploy 20,000 troops anywhere in one big operation like this, it is a high-risk operation. I am not sure the President of the United States, to be very blunt

about it, who never served in the military, and specifically avoided serving in the military, understands that, to be candid about it. The only argument I hear coming from the White House spin doctors in support of the President's policy is the assertion that President Clinton has made a commitment to our allies, and if Congress were to reject this commitment, it is going to destroy our credibility and destroy our reputation in the international community. That is no consolation, is it, to the mothers and fathers, brothers, sisters and kids of the American personnel that are being sent to Bosnia? Frankly, I think it is a disgrace.

I hope the President will think, as I am going to think, before I vote tomorrow on this. If I have to make that phone call—and I pray to God nobody ever has to make it—or I have to look a mother, or a father, or a brother, or another loved one in the eye, I have to be able to say to that person: Your son, your daughter, your brother, your sister, whatever, died for a good reason.

There was a good reason for us to be there. Can we really say that? I sure cannot. I could not say it. I cannot look that parent or sibling in the eye and say, "Your son or daughter died for a good cause, a good reason, died bravely, yes, died courageously, yes, or was injured in the line of duty, courageous, absolutely."

Know why? Some feel sympathy. Some who have never served in the military do not understand. They feel sympathy toward those people who go. They do not want your sympathy. They go where they are asked. They are the bravest, best, most ready military force in the world, and they do their duty. They do it better than anyone else in the world. That is why we stopped Nazi Germany in World War II.

They do it because it is their duty to do it. It does not mean we should ask them to do it. That is a different story.

The American forces, the Armed Forces, again, are not to be subcontracted out all over the world whenever some crisis erupts. They are the guardians of our security, our liberty, our national security. We ought not to allow them to be needlessly or recklessly endangered, even if the President has boxed himself in a corner.

What is the President supposed to say to Mrs. So-and-so when she loses her son? "I got boxed in a corner, Mrs. Jones. I am very sorry. I made a commitment. I should not have made it, but I sent your loved one anyway, to be killed. I am sorry." That is not good enough, folks. That is not good enough. That is not good enough.

Bosnian peacekeeping is not an appropriate role for the Armed Forces of the United States. It is not what they are trained to do. It is not what they are trained to do.

Now, the administration has also suggested that those of us who do not support turning the American military into a Bosnian police force are somehow isolationists. I resent that charge

very much. The issue here is not whether our Armed Forces should be called upon when necessary to defend our interests abroad; rather, the issue is, when, where, and under what circumstances is it appropriate to deploy U.S. military personnel in and out of area operations? That is what the military is all about. It is troubling to me that even after 3 years of on-the-job training the President still—still—does not understand the proper role of our Armed Forces.

I just left a meeting 15 or 20 minutes before I came here to the floor. We were talking about the Defense budget. We were talking back and forth, back and forth among Members of both sides of the aisle. A couple of comments were made. Well, we do not think the President will sign this bill. The President is not going to sign, we are hearing, he is not going to sign the Defense authorization bill which provides the support, increases the pay, by the way, of our military, the people that he is asking to go to Bosnia. He is not going to sign a bill to give them a pay raise. That is what is being threatened, hung over our head every day. But he made a commitment to somebody in NATO without the consent of Congress, without consulting the American people. Without consulting anybody, he made that commitment.

I think he has a commitment to those he is sending that he ought to support. If he vetoes a Defense bill, he is not supporting them. Anybody that says he did not like everything in it, let me tell you, what is in it is the funding for those people that he is sending.

So when we debated here—I do not want anybody to accuse me or anyone else who takes the other side that we are isolationists. I was not an isolationist when I served in Vietnam, and I was not an isolationist when I supported every Defense budget to support our American troops since I have been in the Congress, and when I supported pay raises when he would not support pay raises for members of the military.

We have no military or economic interests—none—in Bosnia. The American people overwhelmingly oppose this policy. They oppose the commitment of 20,000 ground troops. Everybody knows that. Look at any poll. That is the issue. The White House spin does not cut it. Public relations gimmickry does not cut it. It does not work. Nothing is going to change them.

Let me briefly, for the benefit of my colleagues, highlight what I see to be the critical unanswered questions associated with the President's Bosnia policy.

First, what is our exact mission in Bosnia? What are we supposed to do? Are we there to make peace? I ask everyone to listen, are we there to make peace, keep peace, enforce peace, or monitor peace? Which is it? Are we neutral? Are we evenhanded, or are we realigned with the Bosnian Moslems? Which is it: Keep peace, enforce peace,

monitor peace, make peace? Are we neutral, are we even handed, or aligning with the Moslems? Does anyone know the answer to that question? No one knows the answer to that question.

What is the difference between making peace, keeping peace, enforcing peace, or monitoring peace? No one knows the answer to that question. The President does not know the answer to that question. It has never been clearly delineated.

Second, why are we deploying for 1 year? Where did that come from? One year—we just pick these guys up, 9-1-1 force, send them over there for 1 year. Why not 10 months? How about a year and a half? Fourteen years, 14 days, 2 years, 11 years—where did 1 year come from?

Can you imagine if Franklin Roosevelt had said after Pearl Harbor, "We will take your boys and send them out for 1 year. If we win the war, we will come back in 1 year. If we lose the war, we will come back in 1 year."

This is not Franklin Roosevelt in the White House right now. He does not understand, you cannot make a commitment like that. You do not tell your enemies what you are going to do ahead of time. If we do not know exactly what the mission is, how do we know how long it will take to complete it? What sequence of milestones have we established to determine our progress?

What happens if after this year, this little arbitrary year goes by, what happens if we have not achieved our objectives—we do not know what the objectives are, but assume we have not achieved them whatever they might be—what do we do then? Pull the plug? Leave and concede that the whole operation was a waste?

How about that phone call? "Mrs. Jones, we stayed there a year, we took some casualties. Unfortunately, your son was one. We did not get it done. Unfortunately, they still want to fight, so we are leaving." Maybe Mrs. Jones should know that now—not tomorrow, not after her son is injured or killed—today. Maybe Private Jones ought to know that now, too.

Are the antagonists not likely to wait us out and launch hostilities as soon as we leave? Is it all for nothing if we have not achieved our goal in a year? Mr. President, 1,000 years these people have been fighting over there, and we will decide it all in a year. We will take care of it all in 1 year. We will come home in 1 year, and that will be it. All that fighting will end, all that 1,000 years, century after century, we will take care of it in a year. Very ambitious.

Maybe the President reneges on his 1-year commitment and he decides to keep the troops there a little longer. How long is a little longer—14 years? How many years were we in Vietnam? The Senator in the chair knows we went there in 1961 to help the South Vietnamese get control of their government against the communist onslaught

from the North, and 12 years later we left. And 2 years after that, the North Vietnamese tanks rolled back into South Vietnam.

We saw it in Somalia. If you do not like the Vietnamese example, you think that is too hard on the President, to look at. It is easy to get the troops in. It is a little tough to get them out, though.

The troops are deploying to this treacherous terrain in the middle of the winter, dead winter. There is no infrastructure to support tens of thousands of soldiers. Towns that are being vacated by the Serbs under the peace agreement, told they had to vacate, are being burned and sacked and ravaged. Shermanesque; burned. What are they going to be living in? Tents? Is there housing over there?

If they are not going to live in tents, and many of the houses are being burned, and we have thousands of refugees that the President says are going to come back home, with a shortage of housing, where are we going to quarter our troops? Did anybody think about that?

How are we going to transport the heavy equipment in and around Bosnia with very few roads that are in shape to be able to pass on? Are we going to have to build those roads and build those bridges? While we are building roads and building bridges, who is going to be protecting the folks that are doing the building of the roads and bridges?

The Senator from Tennessee a short while ago talked about this. At what point do we get sucked into the role of nation building? Nation building? He even used the term, the Senator from Tennessee, Senator Thompson, said "nation creating." Arbitrarily, we take a map in Dayton, OH, and we say: "Here is a line here. Here is a line over here. If you are a Serb, you live on this side of the line. If you are a Moslem, you live over here. If you are a Croat, you live here. If three of you live in the same town, we will split the town up a little bit." That did not work in Berlin and it is not going to work here. It is not going to work here. So we are going to have to nation build. What happens when we leave?

What about the Russian brigade that will be serving alongside American forces? There is going to be a Russian brigade of soldiers serving alongside American forces. I can hear the President now. "That's great. We can work with the Russians." Whose side are the Russians on? Who have they been sympathetic to all these years? The Serbs. What have we been doing to the Serbs for the past few months under this President's policy? Bombing the blazes out of them. Are the Russians going to sit back and allow the Moslems the opportunity to achieve military parity? Are they going to let that happen with their clients, the Serbs? I don't think so.

And what happens—I am asking a lot of interrogatories here, but there are a

lot of lives at stake, and we ought to ask these interrogatories. If we had asked them in the Vietnam war, we would not have lost 58,000 people.

What if the Russians do not view us as being evenhanded, and they take action to enhance, to boost the Serbs? What happens then? What happens when the Russians and the Americans have a flareup over who is supporting whom? What happens then? How do we increase the military capability of the Moslems without involving or jeopardizing the security of American ground forces?

I remember this debate a couple of years ago. We were talking about it during the Bush administration. We were talking about it during the Clinton administration. The words "ground forces in Bosnia" was like raking your fingers across a blackboard. It just sickened you to think of. You could just feel how much it hurt just to think about it. I never believed that we would get to this point. Yet here we are.

Even if the U.S. forces are not actually delivering the weapons, and even if they are not training the Moslems, how do we avoid being linked to the Moslems? The Serbs know we are linked to the Moslems. They know that. So, ironically, you have a situation where it could be beneficial to the Moslems to instigate some attack and blame it on the Serbs. Or vice versa. It could happen. What do we do then? Is this Lebanon all over again? Do you remember Lebanon?

(Mr. BROWN assumed the chair.)

Mr. SMITH. Another question. What about the thousands—and I mean thousands—of Iranian fundamentalists who are already in the region supporting the Bosnian Moslems? They are not exactly our best friends, Iranian fundamentalists. How do we defend against terrorism or sabotage from these professed anti-American forces?

Do you see what we have put our American troops into? Is that what they are trained to do? Is that why they went to Ranger school? Is that why they joined the Marines and became pilots and learned to fight for the security of their country? Is that what they did it for? Is that what they were trained to do?

Since I have had a lot of "what abouts" here, what about the Croats? How do they fit into this mix, a very fragile mix? How will they view the buildup of Moslem military capabilities? Are they going to be supportive? Or are they going to be threatened? Will they be emboldened to reignite hostilities against the Serbs, knowing that U.S. troops are in their corner either directly or indirectly? Who knows?

Let me go to the final question. What about the cost, not only in American lives or the possibility of lost American lives—and one life, one, is too many; one life. We have already spent billions on military operations in and around the Adriatic. Navy steaming

hours, rescue operations, no-fly-zone enforcement, offensive military operations, and now the preliminary ground deployments have been enormously expensive. This has been taxing the military over and over again. Mr. President, 911 in Somalia, 911 in Haiti, 911 in Cuba, 911 now in Bosnia. You think those dollars do not come from somewhere? You think they do not come out of training? Or housing? Or something? Some military equipment? Flying hours? You bet they do.

What does this President want to do? Cut the defense budget. Do not give them the \$7 billion; we do not need it. Cut it. Do not sign the defense bill. Threaten us. We have been threatened for the last 3 months by administration personnel here, and I know because I am on the Armed Services Committee and I have been involved in those threats. "We are not going to sign it if you do not do this or you do not do that."

The administration estimates the 1-year cost in dollars will be an additional \$2 billion. How are we going to pay for this? What other programs will become the bill payer? How is readiness being affected? How will this deployment affect our ability to fight and win two major regional contingencies, as called for in the Bottom-Up Review conducted by this President? That means two major contingencies. It means, for example, if war broke out in the Persian Gulf and war broke out in Korea, just to use an example, that is two different regions of the world. We are supposed to be able to go right out there and take care of ourselves and protect our interests in both of those regions, while we are cutting the military, while we are cutting readiness, and cutting operation and man-hours. And if the President does not sign the authorization bill, even giving these kids a pay raise to go risk their lives in Bosnia—we are not talking about a big raise either. The American people need to understand that some of the kids who are going to Bosnia are probably on food stamps because they do not make enough money, so they are eligible for food stamps. It is food for thought, Mr. President, before you send them over there.

I just listed a few dozen of the unanswered questions surrounding this debate, and we will not get the answers before we send our troops over there because they are already being sent there. We are supposed to rubber stamp it. Without substantive answers to these questions, it is irresponsible for the Clinton administration to be committing—let alone actually acting to deploy—thousands of United States troops in Bosnia.

If you think of the Somalia situation, when we lost a group of Army Rangers because we did not even have basic equipment because we did not have access to it, we had to ask for it from one of our allies. That was a small operation—a small operation. This is a big operation with thousands

of American troops in harm's way without having basic questions answered.

Do you think that President Roosevelt would have sent troops in World War II or President Truman would have sent troops to Korea without having these questions answered? Of course not. Of course not. President Bush in the Persian Gulf had the questions answered before he went. He knew what the mission was. That mission was very simple: drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait. And he was criticized for not going into Baghdad and killing Saddam Hussein. That is easy to criticize after the fact, but that was not the mission. The mission was to drive them out of Kuwait, which is what they did.

Can somebody tell me what the mission is here? Again, peacekeeping, peacemaking? What is it?

I oppose as firmly, as adamantly, as strenuously, and as strongly as I can sending American soldiers on the ground into Bosnia. I do not believe the President has articulated a clearly defined mission. I do not believe he has articulated a rationale. And I believe as deeply in my heart as I can that it is a terrible, terrible mistake to send America's finest to police this region, to intercede and to take sides in a centuries-old conflict.

And if we get out of there and we do not take casualties and we accomplish it, God bless us. I hope that happens. But is it worth the risk? And the answer is, no, it is not, and the American people know it.

We are taking sides in this case. We are not going in there as strictly peacekeepers. We have already taken sides, just as we did in Somalia, and we paid for it when one of the warlords, Aideed, attacked our troops, just as we did in Lebanon when we took casualties. In each case, we paid a terrible price—a terrible price.

When are we going to learn from the mistakes of the past? When are we going to learn from history?

I hate to say this, but I like to call it like it is. It is something that just makes it worse for me, and people are going to accuse me of taking a cheap shot. And I am not; I am just stating a fact.

This President, when he was called to go to Vietnam, went to Europe and protested the war. He now is ordering these people into combat—possible combat, possible harm's way—without a mission clearly defined and without the support of the American people. There is no small irony there, Mr. President.

If we authorize this misguided deployment, and I know we will, or, even worse, if we acquiesce in it, and I know we will, we are just as culpable for its consequences as the President who sent them there—just as culpable.

I ask my colleagues to think it over very carefully. Are you prepared to accept the responsibility for what may occur there? Are the potential costs worth it in dollars, in lives? What do

we gain? If we are successful—and I think any reasonable person would say we might have a few years of peace, maybe, if we are lucky—we have a lot to lose, a whole lot to lose.

I have two teenaged sons. I can tell you I have weighed the pros and cons. They are not of military age yet, but they are not far away. No matter how I do the math, no matter how I do the math, each time I come up with one inescapable conclusion: We should not be sending America's finest to Bosnia. And I have to ask myself, would I want to send them there? If the answer to that question is "no"—and it is—then I am not going to send anybody else's there with my vote.

Bosnia is not our home. It is a terrible tragedy. It is not our security in jeopardy. It is not our fight.

When I think of the blood that we shed for Europe over the years, what we did in literally liberating the continent of Europe, half of it, how could we be criticized for passing on this one, Mr. President? Does that make us isolationist? Give me a break. We cannot afford, nor do we have the moral authority, to be the world's policeman. The world's leader, yes; the world's policeman, no.

This is a European conflict. The Europeans themselves ought to resolve it, and they can resolve it. It has nothing to do with NATO—nothing at all to do with NATO. It is a phony issue. The NATO charter does not even mention Bosnia. They are not members of NATO. NATO talks about collective security, collective response when one of the nations of NATO are attacked. It has nothing to do with NATO.

Do not listen to that phony argument. It is not about isolationism. It is not about internationalism. It is about the proper role of the Armed Forces in international affairs. That is what it is about: the proper role of the Armed Forces in international affairs. It is about keeping faith with the men and women who so selflessly serve our Nation in uniform day in and day out, deployed all over the world. That is what this is about.

During this century, we spent hundreds of billions dollars defending Europe against communism and against fascism. We sacrificed hundreds of thousands of American lives in Europe in World War I and World War II. Then, after we finished, we spent billions more under the Marshall Plan to rebuild it, and then we fought the cold war. We maintained a robust military presence in Europe throughout that cold war, and we equipped our NATO allies with sophisticated state-of-the-art aircraft and weaponry. And they can use it along with their forces to end this conflict, if they think they can end it.

We have done our part. We have done it. How can anybody accuse us of being isolationist because we do not support sending American forces into Bosnia after all we have done for Europe? We have earned the right—we have earned it—to sit this one out.

There is no reason that our allies cannot begin assuming a more direct role in European security, and certainly no reason they cannot handle the Bosnian peacekeeping mission on their own. It is another 20,000 of their troops. That is all. And, if not, if this operation requires the full combat power of the United States of America because somehow this threatens the security of Europe, then we are really talking about something much larger than a peacekeeping mission, are we not?

My colleagues, please, consider this very carefully. The American people are watching. Lives hang in the balance. Perhaps the moral essence of America hangs in the balance, just like it did when we deserted our people in Vietnam while they died and we protested in the streets.

They are the ones who will be in harm's way. They are the ones who are going to be in the mud and the cold and the slush while we stand on the floor of the Senate debating. They are the ones who will be away from their families at Christmas, missing their kids—not us. They are the ones who will be vulnerable to millions of landmines all over that country, put out there by all sides of the conflict. They are going to be vulnerable to anti-American fundamentalists roving the countryside. They are the ones who are going to be subjected to bitter hatred of combatants who have seen their friends and families butchered before their eyes.

Peace and reconciliation in Bosnia is a lofty goal, and I give the President credit for wanting it, as we all want it. But is it something that American sons and daughters should die for? Is it? Because that is the question. There is no other question that we deal with in this debate that matters except that one when you make that vote.

Is it something that those men and women should die for, whether they do or not? And let us pray they do not, but the question is, is it something they should die for? And I submit with the greatest respect to the President, the Commander in Chief, and to my colleagues, the answer to that question is no, it is not.

Let me end on one final observation. I vigorously oppose this policy, as I have said. But irrespective of the outcome of this debate, I will do everything in my power to ensure the safety and security of our troops. Reasonable people can disagree on policy, as many of us do here today, but I will tell you one thing, if this President sends them there, which he is going to do, this Senator is not going to be silent if he hoists that veto pen and decides to veto the defense bill of the United States of America.

No, this Senator is not going to be silent. This Senator is going to speak up head to head with this President if he pulls that stunt. That is not going to happen without the American people being fully aware of what is going on. As Americans, we must support these

men and women, whether we disagree with the policy of the President or not. If he sends them there, we have to support them. But we do not have to give him cover by saying he said he was going to send them there; therefore, let us vote and give him the cover. We need to make the President understand it is a mistake. Maybe he will change his mind. This is the chance we have, the only chance we will have. We must support them and provide a unified base of support to ensure their safe and expeditious return home, not like when I was in Vietnam and read about the protests. They have earned it. They are the best.

That is the sad, bitter irony of this whole debate. These are the best, the best of America that are going into harm's way. These are not criminals. They are not people who are dregs of society somewhere, castoffs, failures. These are the best. These are the people who go to the military academies, and I nominate them every year, as do all of my colleagues. These are the best that we are sending into harm's way, and they will have my support if they go, but I will be doggone if I am going to cave in because somebody made a commitment 2 years ago that was wrong, that will put them in harm's way.

Mr. President, in closing, just let me say, I pray that God watches over our men and women in this policy that I bitterly oppose, and I hope that my colleagues will rise to the occasion and send a very strong message, and that message is sent here in this Hutchison resolution because it says very clearly that we oppose you going, we oppose sending troops, Mr. President, but we will support them if you send them.

That is a responsible action, and I hope that the President will heed the debate here and change his mind before it is too late.

I yield the floor, Mr. President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho is recognized.

Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I thank you very much.

I think it is very important on an issue of this magnitude that Members of the Senate take the time to outline why they have come to the conclusions they have. I serve as a member of the Armed Services Committee. We have had a number of hearings dealing with Bosnia. Like the Presiding Officer of the Senate who is currently in the chair, I have gone to Bosnia, to Sarajevo, and have seen the area.

At one of our recent Armed Services hearings, I referenced a Time magazine where it had on the front cover a photograph of a young soldier. There was a caption on the front of Time magazine, and the question was, "Is Bosnia Worth Dying For?"

So I referenced that and asked that question to the witnesses who were there who were advocating that they supported this decision. And they told me that we are beyond that question, that that is not the question today.

I do not believe that a lot of Americans, nor do I believe that a lot of American parents who have sons and daughters in the military, believe we are beyond that question. But in the discussion that took place at that Armed Services hearing, we were told the two vital interests that do require us to send our American military personnel to Bosnia are, No. 1, United States leadership, and, No. 2, European stability. Those were the two vital interests. It was not the question of whether Bosnia is worth dying for.

With regard to leadership, approximately 2 years ago, members of the Armed Services Committee sat down with counterparts of ours from other European parliaments. We met here in Washington, DC, and I remember asking specifically the question of our European counterparts, with regard to Bosnia, the conflict that is taking place there, is that a situation in which you feel the United States should take a leadership role? Are we supposed to go in there and resolve that? And I am paraphrasing, but they said no, that is our problem. That is in our European backyard. We, the European countries, must solve this problem, not the United States.

Then we saw how the United Nations policy began to be implemented. They placed the European peacekeepers in Bosnia. And as we watched, we saw routinely these peacekeepers being taken hostage. We saw these peacekeepers that were being handcuffed to potential target sites that bombing efforts might take out. But here were the peacekeepers handcuffed, held hostage. There was no peace that they were able to keep. Also, Mr. President, tragically, many of these peacekeepers watched as atrocities were inflicted upon different groups in Bosnia because the U.N. rules of engagement did not allow them to do anything else, so they watched these atrocities take place. This policy that was designed to resolve the problems of Bosnia was an absolute failure, a terrible failure.

Congress has been passing resolutions saying lift the arms embargo because one thing that Americans believe in is self-defense. Unfortunately, the effort of passing in both Houses the measure to lift the arms embargo was rejected by the White House.

The allies said, "Absolutely not. You must not lift the arms embargo because that could put our European peacekeepers in peril." Tell me, what greater peril could there be than what was happening to those peacekeepers? But the allies insisted that that would be a mistake to lift the arms embargo.

Just some months ago, Senator DOLE hosted a gathering of Senators with the Prime Minister of Bosnia. I remember very clearly the Prime Minister of Bosnia saying, "We don't want your boys to fight on our soil. We have boys to fight. What we need are weapons." And he said, "We can respect the United States taking a neutral position. We can respect that. But it is not neutral

to deny us the weapons for our boys so that they can defend themselves and their families on our soil." But that is what the United States was doing. So much for neutrality. But the allies continued to say, no, no to lifting the arms embargo. So they stayed with a failed policy.

Here is the incredible leap of logic that I just have a hard time grasping. And that is that with this failed United Nations policy, as carried out by our allies, the same ones who said that it was their problem to solve, we are now told causes a real question of U.S. leadership. The failed policy in Bosnia is carried out by the allies, but now we are told it is a U.S. leadership dilemma.

Warren Christopher, the Secretary of State, in fact, said the placement of our troops into Bosnia is the acid test of U.S. leadership. Well, I have to question why we must put 20,000 troops into Bosnia to meet the acid test of U.S. leadership. If there is any question about U.S. leadership in the world, let me just discuss a few items that the United States is doing.

American forces are enforcing the no-fly zone and economic sanctions in the Balkans. American military personnel are enforcing the no-fly zone and economic sanctions against Saddam Hussein. The American troops are helping to restore democracy in Haiti. And 40,000 American troops are preserving peace on the Korean peninsula. Also, 100,000 American military personnel are in Europe fulfilling our commitments to NATO. America took the lead in negotiating the Bosnian peace agreement. And that is significant.

When I was in Bosnia, I saw Ambassador Holbrooke, and I saw his tireless efforts to bring about the settlement. We are the world's only military superpower. We are the world's largest economy. So how in the world does someone then, from this list, draw the conclusion that our placement of 20,000 troops into a piece of real estate called Bosnia is the acid test of United States leadership? And also how can anybody, after reviewing this type of list, which is simply a partial list, state that somehow we are advocating isolationism? This is not the list of isolationists.

Mr. President, we are told that the key to success of the mission is establishing military equilibrium. In other words, in order for us to ultimately complete the mission and return our troops home and the allies to go home, the Bosnians must have military equilibrium with Serbs and the Croats because even as late as today we are told that is the only way they can defend themselves and, if they are not allowed to defend themselves, then it will not work. That is what the administration said.

That is exactly what many of us have been saying for months, that if you do not allow the Bosnians to defend themselves, it will not work. That is why it has not worked. And now we are told that the key to success on this mission

is that we must have this rebuilding of the Bosnians. In other words, we need to lift the arms embargo.

Previously, our allies said no, you must not lift the arms embargo. But now apparently by paying the price of putting 20,000 American troops on the ground in Bosnia, now everybody says, this is the right way to go. Now we can achieve military equilibrium, which again is what we have been advocating for months in this body and in the body across the rotunda.

I fail to see why this proposed deployment is the acid test of United States leadership when you consider how we got here. We did not need to get to this point. There were other options, options such as lifting the arms embargo as passed by Congress.

With regard to the second point, on European stability, the argument there is that, if we were to allow this conflict in Bosnia to continue, it would spread, it may spread to Greece, it may spread to Turkey, and then we have vital United States interests, and, therefore, we must contain this conflict, we must not allow the fighting to go on; therefore, we are going to send an overwhelming force into Bosnia so there would be no fighting.

But ironically we are told, if fighting does break out again—and there is that possibility—then the United States will immediately leave and the NATO allies will immediately leave. So the very reason we are going in there is to make sure there is no fighting, but if fighting breaks out, we leave. If that is not a paradox.

I asked the administration if there would not be a great temptation in that instance, with an overwhelming force, if they would not feel compelled to snuff the conflict right then, because if that is the mission, you do not want this to spread, perhaps you need to snuff it right there. But, no, they would not do that.

Therefore, I think that shows you the flaw of this strategy. Instead of putting the troops in there that says, if there is a fight, we would immediately leave, we should have a containment strategy in the surrounding area so it cannot leave. You lift the arms embargo and you allow the Bosnians to defend themselves and, if it spreads, you have the borders and you stop it. We had options, Mr. President.

We are told also with regard to an exit strategy—I asked former Defense Secretary Schlesinger at a recent hearing in the Armed Services Committee, "Do you believe that we have an exit strategy?" And he said, "No. We have an exit hope." That has been the dilemma of so many of our actions that we have taken. We have not had an effective exit strategy.

When we talk about this, again, that the military equilibrium is a key to the exit strategy, with all of the different annexes that were developed in Dayton that have been initialed, which will soon be signed in Paris, volumes of written agreements between these war-

ring factions, is it not ironic that that element dealing with the potential buildup of Bosnian arms is only verbal? It is not in writing. To me that is amazing, if that is the key to the mission and that is the only thing that is verbal.

Mr. President, I do not feel that on an issue like this there is any room for partisanship. I remember when I arrived here approximately 3 years ago, one of the very first pieces of legislation that I embraced and was proud to cosponsor was the legislation by Senator FEINGOLD, a member of the Democratic Party. I am a Republican. It did not bother me at all because he was right. And his legislation was to lift the arms embargo.

I felt passionately about that. I still do, and it was a bipartisan effort. It was passed in a bipartisan effort.

I believe in this current situation, Congress has been brought in too late. The commitment has been made. But I will just add, this Bosnian problem did not just happen when the new administration came into power. It had been there, and we had not dealt effectively with it.

I ask myself to cast my votes based upon what I think is the right thing for the country, the right thing for the troops and what sort of precedent I am establishing for myself in future votes of this nature.

Tonight, we had a meeting at the White House, eight Senators met with the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Adviser, and I appreciate that invitation to have that sort of discussion in that sort of a setting so that we could ask the questions. But I will tell you, Mr. President, after approximately 1 hour and 20 minutes in that setting asking the questions, I came out convinced that we are following the wrong policy, we are following the wrong strategy. We did not exercise the options that I believe firmly we should have exercised and, in a funny, roundabout way, we are beginning now to try to implement those but we are going to put 20,000 troops in there to accomplish, in essence, the lifting of an arms embargo.

But with regard to this situation, like Senator SMITH stated, there will be no question, there will be no doubt about my support of the United States troops, the finest military personnel in the world. They are the finest, and we will do all that is necessary, in the event that they are sent to Bosnia, to make sure they have the equipment, to make sure they have whatever they need. In Somalia, we saw a problem because, for political reasons, they were not given the equipment they needed. That will not happen. We support our troops wherever. We support them.

I believe that the Dole-McCain amendment will be that perfecting resolution that says in the event the troops are sent, then there is going to be a list of reporting requirements to

Congress so that we are not left out of milestones that must be met so that mission creep does not happen. I have not seen the final language of that because I believe it is still being worked on, but I believe that will be the intent.

I am a cosponsor of the Hutchison amendment because, Mr. President, the terrible dilemma that we are in is that the options that had merit were not exercised with our allies. And I underscore "with," because we must work with our allies. We have been through too much together for us to not work today and in the future with our allies. But we now find ourselves in the situation where a commitment has been made, and I respectfully and strongly disagree with that action.

With that, Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KEMPTHORNE). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I want to share some additional thoughts with Members of the body with regard to the deployment of troops in Bosnia.

Some Members in their busy schedules may have missed articles that appeared in the New York Times and Washington Post, but for those who continue to probe this question and try and analyze whether or not this is a wise move, I wanted to share these quotes.

The first one is from the New York Times, December 3, 1995. It is a page-1 story. The headline is: "Foreign Islamic Fighters in Bosnia Pose Potential Threat for G.I.'s."

The second paragraph reads:

"The American tanks do not frighten us," said a fighter, standing under a black flag covered with white Arabic script. "We came here to die in the service of Islam. This is our duty. No infidel force will tell us how to live or what to do. This is a Muslim country, which must be defended by Muslims. We are 400 men here, and we all pray that we will one day be martyrs."

The article continues:

They are even suspected in the shooting death last month of an American civilian employee of the United Nations.

I do not think it was widely covered in the United States, however, the week in which I visited Bosnia, specifically the day before I went up to Tuzla, an American had been killed.

The article continues:

The mujaheddin have also vowed to kill five British citizens in retaliation for the October 5 killing, by British United Nations troops, of a mujaheddin fighter who pointed a loaded pistol at them.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed a copy of the article in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Dec. 3, 1995]
FOREIGN ISLAMIC FIGHTERS IN BOSNIA POSE A POTENTIAL THREAT FOR G.I.'S

(By Chris Hedges)

PODBREZJE, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, Dec. 2.—On a bleak, wind-swept hilltop, bearded Arab soldiers, many in the traditional black garb of Afghan fighters, stomped their feet to ward off the bitter chill, shifted their automatic rifles and cursed the impending arrival of American soldiers.

"The American tanks do not frighten us," said a fighter, standing under a black flag covered with white Arabic script. "We came here to die in the service of Islam. This is our duty. No infidel force will tell us how to live or what to do. This is a Muslim country, which must be defended by Muslims. We are 400 men here, and we all pray we will one day be martyrs."

With the cease-fire in Bosnia, these militantly Islamic volunteers known as mujahedeen, who fought alongside Bosnian Government soldiers against Serbs and Croats for much of the war, have turned their attention to what they see as the other, often internal, enemies of the faith.

They are even suspected in the shooting death last month of an American civilian employee of the United Nations.

Many of these 3,000 to 4,000 men are veterans of the war in Afghanistan and are often wanted in their own countries, linked to violent Islamic groups struggling to overthrow the Governments in Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. In their zeal to enforce a militant form of Islam that most Bosnian Muslims themselves do not espouse, the fighters, distinctive in their flowing black beards, force United Nations vehicles off the road, smash bottles of alcohol in shop windows and warn Christian families at gunpoint to leave Bosnia.

The mujahedeen have also vowed to kill five British citizens in retaliation for the Oct. 5 killing, by British United Nations troops, of a mujahedeen fighter who pointed a loaded pistol at them.

The killing of the fighter, a Bosnian Muslim named Elvedin Hodzic who had joined the mujahedeen, is the kind of event United Nations officials say could easily trigger violent clashes between the Islamic militants and American troops. The British are now locked in a war of nerves with the mujahedeen troops.

Five days after the shooting, a rocket-propelled grenade was fired at a United Nations military observer team along a mountain road. The team's armored car was destroyed, but those inside escaped with slight wounds. Two weeks later a British United Nations patrol in the town of Zavidovici was surrounded by about two dozen heavily armed mujahedeen who threatened to kill the soldiers until Bosnian Government troops intervened.

On Nov. 18, William Jefferson, a native of Camden, N.J., employed by the United Nations, was found shot twice in the head near Banovici. United Nations officials strongly suspect that he was killed by the mujahedeen, who may have mistaken him for a British citizen.

Most British aid workers, whose homes have been attacked and spray-painted with Arabic slogans, have left Zenica. The few who remain ride in unmarked convoys, change their routes and never go out at night. And the British Overseas Development Administration office in Zenica has placed armed guards out front and removed its signs.

"This is worse psychologically than the shelling," said Fred Yallop, the administration director.

The clash with the British has also pointed out to many aid workers the strength of the

mujahedeen and the weakness of the local authorities.

"The problem," a senior United Nations official said, "is that the local authorities have no control over the mujahedeen. The mujahedeen are protected by the Bosnian Government. They operate with total impunity. We do not know who controls them, perhaps no one."

Many mujahedeen fighters carry Bosnian identity cards and passports, although they often do not speak the language. And Western aid workers who report the frequent theft of jeeps and vehicles by mujahedeen troops say the Bosnian police are powerless to enter their camps to retrieve the vehicles.

"We see them drive by in vehicles that were stolen from international organizations and the U.N.," said a British aid worker, who insisted on remaining unidentified.

The mujahedeen here are based in a four-story yellow building that was once a factory in the village of Podbrezje, three miles north of Zenica, in what would be the American sector of Bosnia, and they are among the Muslim volunteers who came to Bosnia shortly after the war started in 1992. The fighters are revered in the Arab world, and videotapes that extol their bravery and dedication are sold on street corners from Aden to Cairo.

The mujahedeen served as shock troops for the Bosnian Army and have suffered severe casualties in frontal assaults on Serbian and Croatian positions. All view the West, despite the scheduled deployment of some 60,000 NATO-led troops, as an enemy of the faith they have vowed to give their lives defending.

"The American soldiers will be just like the U.N. soldiers," said a fighter wearing green combat fatigues and speaking in heavily accented Persian Gulf Arabic. "They will corrupt the Muslims here, bring in drugs and prostitution. They will destroy all the work we have done to bring the Bosnians back to true Islam. The Americans are wrong if they think we will stand by and watch them do this."

The Bosnian-Croat Catholics who live near this mujahedeen camp, one of about 10 in Bosnia, have suffered some of the worst harassment. Many have been beaten by mujahedeen fighters and robbed at gunpoint. More than half of the Catholic families in this village have been driven from their homes. When they flee, their houses are promptly seized by the Islamic militiamen.

Jazo Milanovic and his wife, Ivka, sat huddled by their wood stove one recent evening waiting for the police. At the house of their next-door neighbor, mujahedeen fighters were carting out household items. The fighters would finish their looting before the police arrived.

"They walk in and take what they want," the 68-year-old farmer said, "and the one time I protested to them they fired a burst over my head. The bullet holes are still in the wall. We will all be forced out soon."

But it is not just the mujahedeen who have gained a foothold in Bosnia. There are at least 10 Islamic charities in Zenica, including one run by the Iranian Government, that many Western governments view with deep suspicion. The charities have budgets in the tens of millions of dollars and work to build militant grass-roots organizations in Bosnia.

Human Relief International, an Egyptian foundation that is outlawed in Egypt, is one such group.

The 40 Egyptians who work for the charity in Bosnia are all wanted in Egypt on terrorism charges. Western diplomats and United Nations officials say the charities, along with the mujahedeen, have combined to create a powerful militant Islamic force in Bosnia that could be inimical to American interests here.

"We are all code red," said Airman Elhamalaway, who works for the Egyptian charity. "If we ever go back to Egypt, which we will not, our names come up bright red on a computer so the police know we should be immediately arrested."

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, the point of the article, and the reason I share it with Members, is simply to make a clear point. This is not a benign action. This is an area where there are serious problems that have not been resolved by the peace agreement and where there are forces that can inflict harm on American troops.

I understand and appreciate American troops are willing to face dangers, face combat, but it would be foolish for any Member of this Senate to think that we are sending people into an area that has been cleared of danger because of the peace agreement.

Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a similar article from the Washington Post dated November 30.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 30, 1995]

FOREIGN MUSLIMS FIGHTING IN BOSNIA
CONSIDERED "THREAT" TO U.S. TROOPS
(By Dana Priest)

The Pentagon is seriously concerned about the threat posed to American peacekeeping troops in Bosnia by several hundred Islamic fighters who come from outside the country but are based in the Bosnian region that the U.S. military will control, officials said yesterday.

While land mines, bad roads, soupy weather and disgruntled rogue paramilitary groups also are listed as likely hazards for western troops, it is the freelance groups of religious zealots that particularly worry military planners.

U.S. officials called the non-Bosnian Muslim fighters "hard-core terrorists." Some U.S. officials said they believe some of those Muslims were the ones who killed an American civilian working for the United Nations on Nov. 19 in the northern city of Tuzla, where the U.S. headquarters is to be based. The investigation is continuing.

"Many [of the Muslims] are very brave fighters," one Defense Department analyst said. "They have taken large casualties. They have taken on some important operations and are willing to take some tough action."

They are, in short, the men willing to drive car bombs and take part in other suicide attacks against western soldiers. Worse, there is no obvious way to make them leave the region.

Defense officials estimate that throughout Bosnia, there are "a couple thousand" fighters from Islamic countries—including Algeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Libya, Pakistan and Egypt—who have fought with the army of the Muslim-led Bosnian government against separatist Serbs.

Many of the foreign Muslims are based around Tuzla, which is to become the headquarters for "Sector North" of the NATO-led operation, the area to be controlled by American troops. Many also operate from three towns to the north of Zenica, which is likely to define the southern border of the U.S. sector.

The foreign Muslim groups usually carry small arms and antitank weapons. Some, like the Iranians, are organized into their own brigades. Others have been blended into

the regular armed forces and paramilitary groups.

Within the last several weeks, non-Bosnian Islamic troops have stepped up attacks on western troops and civilians. They fired a rocket-propelled grenade at one U.N. vehicle and attacked several others with small arms fire.

Also recently British soldiers who are part of the U.N. peacekeeping mission killed a member of one Islamic group, who they said pulled a pistol on them. Shortly afterward, the group retaliated by killing American civilian worker William Jefferson, 43 of Camden, N.J., whom they mistook for a Briton because he spoke with an accent, defense analysts said. The Bosnian government told United Nations officials it had captured and killed the three Islamic soldiers involved.

Although the Dayton accord calls for all foreign fighters, including mercenaries and trainers, to leave Bosnia, defense officials acknowledge that they have little hope that any of the parties can, or are willing, to persuade the Islamic groups to leave. The Bosnian government has given them tacit approval to operate in its territory because they are good fighters and have helped it win battles.

"There are certain elements of the Bosnian government who don't want to separate themselves from these particular elements," said the defense analyst, who spoke on the condition he not be named. "They will find a way of hiding these elements, to merge them into" the regular armed forces.

A civilian who has worked with the Bosnian government said the United States is trying to "put some heat" on Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other countries with some financial influence over the groups, to make them leave. "These guys are mean," he said. "You've got to control them."

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I want to share with Members a concern that I had early on when we began to deploy U.S. forces into Bosnia by the way of aircraft. I was concerned about the ground rules and the rules of engagement with regard to aircraft. I specifically raised with the administration a series of questions as to what we would do if Americans were attacked while they were performing routine air patrols. Frankly, my concern was that we would end up duplicating what happened in Vietnam. Because our actions in Vietnam is relevant, let me summarize that briefly.

U.S. troops were deployed in Vietnam but not given the rules of engagement that allowed them to quickly respond. If a forward air patrol spotted enemy troops on the ground no action against those troops could be taken unless you had been fired on. They could be carrying in supplies or ammunition that would be used against our troops. I recall one particular unit was carrying the North Vietnamese flag. That was not enough to allow engagement of combat or use of airstrikes and naval gunfire in the coastal regions.

What was required was for the air patrol plane to fly low enough so the troops were attempting to fire on you. Once the troops fired on you, then you were allowed to call in an airstrike.

That airstrike called for approval by a variety of commands before a response could be made.

The quickest I ever had a response that allowed action was 2 hours. One

time it was over a day before we got a response. In the north, when our fliers went on missions, we had the Pentagon schedule the majority of those flights, and they dictated the road of ingress and the path of egress, and dictated the flight level at which you could come in. If you did not finish a target, you would go back into the cycle for retargeting, done in Washington, not in the field. Generally, the Vietnamese knew how long that cycle took and they knew when you would be coming back, they knew the altitude you would be coming in at, the altitude you would be addressing at, the course you would be taking into the target, and the course you would take away from the target. Mr. President, we set our people up for turkey shoots.

So I thought it was a legitimate question to ask specifically what the rules of engagement for our missions into Bosnia would be. As Members will recall, in Vietnam we ruled out of order some of the best targets. I know of Secretary McNamara's book. I read it. He goes to great length to talk about all the targets he allowed. He left out that the most important targets were ruled off limits. I thought a legitimate question was, if we were attacked by forces from Serbia, would we retaliate against the supply depots, against the bridges, or against the forces that originated the attacks or supported the attacks on the American troops? That is what I asked in the report.

This was a series of discussions on October 5, 1993, before the U.S. planes were shot down.

Senator BROWN. Can you assure me that if our troops are fired on, they will have the right to return fire?

Ambassador Oxman. Yes. The rules of engagement would permit self-defense.

Senator BROWN. We would be able to bomb supply bases of troops that attacked our troops?

Ambassador Oxman. Senator, I think I would not go further than to say there would be rules of engagement which would permit NATO forces to defend themselves and carry out the mission.

Senator BROWN. Let me be specific. In Vietnam, key bridges were put off limits, bridges that carried troops and vital supplies to the North Vietnamese troops. They used those supplies to attack American troops, and yet these key bridges were put off limits, and our planes were not permitted to attack some of the most valuable targets of the enemy. Can you assure me that that will not be the policy if we send troops to Bosnia?

I found it difficult to get an answer, other than "they would have the necessary rules of engagement to defend themselves in order to carry out that agreement."

Mr. President, we have experience in Bosnia already. We detected ground-to-air missiles, SAM missiles. We detected the radar that was following our planes. We knew the locations of Serbian missiles. The U.S. intelligence knew that. We publicly have acknowledged that the Serbs had missiles that were ground-to-air missiles they could use to shoot down our planes. We knew

they were in the locations where our flights were going. We had detected the radar from those units, and we still ordered our planes to fly the missions, and one of our planes was shot down. We are all aware of that.

But perhaps what some Members have forgotten is what we did in retaliation. My concern had been, in the October 1993 hearing, that we would not respond, that we would give a message that Americans are a punching bag and will not punch back. For those Members who have forgotten, let me review what happened.

They shot down our plane, even though we knew the missiles were there and did not cancel the mission. We did not go after the missiles. We did not go after the installation. After the plane was shot down, we did not go after those locations. We did not bomb the bridges that brought those missiles to the front. We did not bomb the supply depots where they came from.

Mr. President, what we did when they shot down our plane was nothing. Now, can you come up with reasons for not doing anything? Of course you can. But what I want to call to mind for the Members is this: What kind of message do you think that sends to people who would attack American forces? Does it encourage them to attack us, thinking we will not fight back? What kind of message does it send to the parents of Americans who might die in combat to know that we do not even care enough about our troops to defend them and retaliate when they are attacked?

Mr. President, I think the administration was remiss in, one, not making sure that we moved against installations that would fire SAM missiles against us and, two, when it happened, not following up and retaliating against those who did. What you have, in my belief, is a callous disregard for those who wear the uniform of the United States. They deserve to be defended and protected and stood by. It is a mistake for us to put them into combat unless we are willing to stand with them, and that is part of the problem of this mission. It is not speculation; it is what happened in Bosnia already by this administration—Americans were fired on, and the plane was shot down, and we turned our back on those who wear our uniform in terms of protecting or defending them.

Mr. President, I want to follow up. First, I want to pay tribute to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have made an effort to get all the information I could about this mission, and they have been, frankly, quite helpful in responding. They have taken a great deal of their time to not only try and respond to the questions, but to be helpful in providing information. I think that is to their credit. I have great respect for all three of them.

I want to share with the Senate, specifically, a question and an answer that I had asked because I think it goes to

the very heart of this issue of when we stand by our troops when they are in the field.

This was submitted to Secretary of State Warren Christopher on October 17. I received the answer today.

Question:

If we receive information that attacks in violation of the peace agreement by Bosnian Serbs have received the full support of the Serbian government in Belgrade, will we retaliate against Belgrade?

I think that is a reasonable question. If we know they have been involved in attacks against our troops, will we retaliate against Belgrade, or put them off limits like they did in Vietnam?

A. Will strikes into Serbia or Croatia, should they violate the terms of the peace agreement, be considered off-limits if the safety of American troops is jeopardized?

B. Will our rules of engagement include the authority to take actions to cut off supply lines from Serbia itself?

C. Will strikes into Serbia or Croatia, if necessary to ensure the protection of American troops, be authorized?

That is pretty specific. If they attack us, will we go after those who attacked us?

The response is:

* * * IFOR will have complete freedom of movement throughout Bosnia.

That is helpful. It does not respond to the question, but I think it is helpful.

But let me share the response to the more specific aspects:

IFOR commanders will operate under procedures and rules of engagement that allow them great flexibility in determining the proper response to a violation of the agreement or a threat to IFOR. This would help ensure that violations are dealt with effectively and further violations deterred.

It goes on in the concluding paragraph, specifically, with regard to my questions as to whether we will go after them if they attack our troops. This is the Secretary of State:

I cannot speculate now on what the U.S. would or would not do against Serbia or Croatia if it were determined that violations of peace accord were supported from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such decisions would be made based on the particulars of the situation.

Mr. President, I want to submit that entire question and response so the record is complete.

I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

QUESTION FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER BY SENATOR HANK BROWN, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Question. 5. If we receive information that attacks in violation of the peace agreement by Bosnian Serbs have received the full support of the Serbian (Yugoslav) government in Belgrade, will we retaliate against Belgrade?

a. Will strikes into Serbia or Croatia, should they violate the terms of the peace agreement, be considered off-limits if the safety of American troops is jeopardized?

b. Will our Rules of Engagement include the authority to take actions to cut off supply lines from Serbia itself?

c. Will strikes into Serbia or Croatia, if necessary to ensure the protection of American troops, be authorized?

Answer: As specified very clearly in the Dayton agreement, IFOR's mission is to implement the military aspects of that agreement: enforcing the cessation of hostilities, withdrawal to agreed lines, and creation of a zone of separation; and overseeing the return of troops and weapons to cantonments. The forces, their training, their equipment, and their Rules of Engagement (ROE) are geared to these missions. IFOR will have complete freedom of movement throughout Bosnia. This mission will be even-handed. It is important to keep in mind that the parties themselves bear primary responsibility for achieving the peace in Bosnia which they themselves sought, initialled in Dayton on November 21, and will sign in Paris on December 14.

IFOR commanders will operate under procedures and rules of engagement that allow them great flexibility in determining the proper response to a violation of the agreement or a threat to IFOR. This would help ensure that violations are dealt with effectively and further violations deterred. IFOR's ROE authorize the use of force, up to and including deadly force, to ensure its own safety and fulfillment of its mission.

Obviously, IFOR's mandate and mission focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina. I cannot speculate now on what the United States would or would not do against Serbia or Croatia if it were determined that violations of the peace accord were supported from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such decisions would be made based on the particulars of the situation.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, the reason I quote that is because I am concerned about it. I am concerned that, once again, this country will send troops into harm's way and then turn their back on them. Mr. President, I submit this response of the Secretary of State as some indication of what may happen. It is not just the experience we had with the shot down pilot where we did not respond when they shot him down, and we did not go after the surface-to-air missile emplacement—even at the start, they were unwilling to give us a commitment that if Serbia attacks our troops we will go after them.

Mr. President, I believe part of this depends on what Serbs think we will do. If they think if they attack our troops we will ignore it, they will be tempted to take a different course of action than if they know we will respond if they attack us. I think this invites attacks. I think the vagueness of our commitment invites attacks on our troops.

Mr. President, I respect the Secretary of State—and I understand how he does not want to be pinned down—but I respectfully suggest, Mr. President, that this is the problem, a willingness to commit troops, and ask them to make the final commitment, in Abraham Lincoln's words "without our willingness to stand beside them."

In my book, if you are going to be true to those troops, if you commit them to combat and somebody goes after them, we have an obligation to defend them and to go after whoever attacked them. There should be no

doubt about it. That is part of what is wrong with this mission, an unwillingness to stand squarely beside young men and women we put in harm's way.

There is one last aspect I want to mention before closing. I heard some very conscientious, intelligent Members who I have enormous respect for come to this floor and say,

We think it is a mistake to send troops to Bosnia but the Commander in Chief has made the decision and it is not our role to prohibit him acting as Commander in Chief in dispatching troops.

They may have said it in a different way, but in its essence it boils down to that—a deference to the President in this regard. The doubt or concern about the decision the President made but a deferring to the President in terms of the matter of deploying the troops into Bosnia.

Mr. President, I most sincerely have a different view of the American Constitution and frankly of the logic of the governmental process. I do not know how any scholar can read the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, can understand the struggle for independence that this Nation went through, can understand the cases that have come down from the Supreme Court, and not come to the conclusion that the essence of the American experience in constitutional government is checks and balances.

The Founders believed in and perfected the system of checks and balances as effectively as anyone has in the history of the world, and there have been a lot of attempts. To look at the American experience and assume the President has unlimited authority to commit our troops to combat situations and Congress' only job is to simply go along is to misunderstand the effect of our Constitution.

I believe it is quite clear that Congress has a role to play. Tomorrow we will play that role as we vote. But none of us should be under the impression that the Constitution allows us to duck our responsibility. The truth is, a declaration of war comes from Congress, and the ability to control the purse strings comes from Congress.

If we turn our back on our responsibilities under the Constitution we will be just as responsible for this unfolding tragedy as the misguided President who brought it about.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BROWN). The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Maine is recognized.

Mr. COHEN. I listened with interest to the presentation of the Senator from Colorado who is now occupying the chair. He delivered it with great passion. That passion stems from his expe-

rience of having been in the fields of Vietnam and having witnessed the kind of policy that we pursued there—in leaving, in many cases, our troops without either the military or moral support that they deserved.

He spoke with great eloquence and passion, and I think his words should be given serious consideration by all of our colleagues as we deliberate and debate this issue tonight, tomorrow, and beyond.

If you watch the evening newscasts, it is very clear our troops are heading into Bosnia as we speak. The anchor-men are there cataloging the various vehicles that are rolling by, the numbers of troops, the feelings and sentiments of the men and women who are being sent, the reaction on the part of the citizens that they are being sent to help defend. And various commentaries being offered by military leaders who have served in the past as part of the U.N. force.

It is interesting to get their different perspectives in terms of both the mission and how long it might be before we complete that mission. So our troops are in Bosnia, and we have to ask the questions: How did they get there? What will they do there? When will they leave? How will we ever measure their success?

I think it is fairly clear that the road to Bosnia has been paved with good intentions and poor judgment. The road has been littered with mistakes. We can point to those in the past. I say that the early recognition on the part of a united Germany of Croatia was one of those initial mistakes. I think the new united Germany at that time was feeling its power, its diplomatic initiative, and that prodded a number of countries to follow suit too quickly in recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The West fell in line to applaud its—the Germans—diplomatic initiative.

When predictable war broke out, the Europeans, who were steeped in Balkan history, said it is a local issue. It is really not our problem. It is a domestic civil war. These tribes as such, these factions, have been making war for centuries. We are not going in.

So the United States was not about to intervene where Europeans feared to tread. If we had any inclination to do so, if the Bush administration had any predisposition to going in to helping solve that particular war, it was discouraged from doing so by domestic politics.

After all, President Bush had come off of a major victory in the Persian Gulf. He was riding very high in the polls at that time but the charges were he was too interested in foreign affairs, he had neglected domestic issues. The Nation was suffering, and therefore he should turn his gaze away from world affairs and concentrate on domestic issues.

So if there were any inclination, and I am not sure there was at the time, but if there were any inclination on President Bush's part to intervene in

any significant way in that war, he was discouraged from doing so.

UNPROFOR, the U.N. peacekeeping force was sent in. I have spoken on this floor on a number of occasions, written articles for the Washington Post and other publications, suggesting—no, not suggesting, but declaiming, that it was an inappropriate mission for U.N. forces to send blue helmets into that region. It was inappropriate to send these brave, heroic people wearing blue helmets and flak jackets and carrying very light weapons into a region that was so mired in conflict at that time. It was an inappropriate mission for them to perform. It was a "Mission Impossible," in many ways, for them to perform. But those soldiers performed that mission as well as they could, given their circumstances. But they were put directly in the midst of an ongoing war and asked to keep the peace.

They were attacked without retaliation. They were taken hostage. They were humiliated by the warring factions who demanded that they pay tribute, that they give up half of their fuel, half of their food, half of their weapons, whatever it was, to gain access to the starving population that they were sent to help feed and clothe. They were tied to weapons storage sites to prevent any kind of attack by the United States or Western allies.

We had the anomalous situation—and the presiding officer, Senator BROWN, touched upon this—we had the anomalous situation of the military leaders on the ground saying, "Please send in the cavalry, send in air support, attack the people who are attacking us." But, of course, the planes did not come and the relief did not come because they received some hot air excuses from U.N. diplomats who held the keys to the weapons. It was a so-called dual-key arrangement, which amounted to dual nonsense to those on the ground.

So, we watched the situation unfold with heroic blue helmeted soldiers carrying out their mission as best they could, as atrocity was piled on atrocity, until we could no longer stand it.

The final blow came when the artillery shell was launched into Sarajevo, killing 69 innocent people and wounding some 200 others. We continued to watch the evil of ethnic cleansing, and all the while the world stood by, praying for peace while the innocents were slaughtered.

There were some in this Chamber, I point specifically to Senator DOLE, the majority leader, who said we should lift the embargo, multilaterally if possible, unilaterally if necessary, and strike, if necessary, in order to prevent the Serbs, at that particular time, from continuing their assault upon safe havens, so-called safe havens. Lift the embargo and strike, or simply lift the embargo and let them fight. And on each occasion he was rejected.

The administration said no, you cannot do this and you should not do this. Our allies have said no. The President

has said no. The United Nations has said no, it would endanger the UNPROFOR forces who are on the ground. By the way, United States, you do not have any forces on the ground so do not be so quick to lift, or to lift and strike. It would endanger the UNPROFOR forces, and it would lead to more slaughter. And if we should act unilaterally, then NATO would dissolve, the U.N. forces who were there would leave, the United States would no longer have any credibility, and we would endanger the other embargoes that exist on Iraq and other countries who have engaged in, certainly, unfriendly behavior.

So, under the threat that we would endanger NATO, that NATO would dissolve, nothing was done. The slaughter continued and the regions were cleansed of their undesirables.

Last spring, President Clinton made a pledge to commit up to 20,000, perhaps as many as 25,000 troops to aid the extraction of U.N. forces, if it became necessary. That really was a shot across the Senate's bow at that time, saying, "If you are going to insist on lifting the embargo over the objection of the President, over the objection of our allies, over the objection of the United Nations, then I am making a commitment as Commander in Chief. I will commit 20,000 American troops, ground forces, to help extricate the U.N. forces from that situation."

That was a pledge he made publicly. I think, perhaps to his surprise, President DOLE—strike that for the moment—Senator DOLE said, "I agree. If we have to get U.N. peacekeepers out of there in order to allow the Bosnian Moslems to defend themselves, that is a decision we will support."

But that was the marker that was laid down. We are going to commit U.S. forces on the ground in order to extricate the peacekeepers in the event the United States unilaterally decided to lift the embargo or our allies decided the United States was no longer interested in pursuing a multilateral approach and therefore said, "We are getting out." We would help get them out.

So, Congress retreated. We retreated on that issue. We waited. We delayed. We debated. We did nothing, until finally we saw one atrocity too many. We would strike, and we did strike, but we would not lift. And we saw an immediate reaction once we decided to apply air power. The President sent off his chief negotiator, Secretary Holbrooke, to then hammer out a truce.

Again, we hesitated. All of us in this Chamber and the other Chamber as well, we hesitated. "Don't interfere with the President. He conducts foreign policy. Don't cut his legs off with a preemptive vote of disapproval. Allow him to conduct this effort." And we backed away. Once again, we deferred.

We deferred because, No. 1, we assumed, or at least thought, perhaps the negotiations will fail on their own

weight. Perhaps the negotiations will be unsuccessful. So why should we take action at this point on a preemptive basis to say, no matter what you arrive at in the way of negotiation, we disapprove your sending American troops to help keep that truce? So we did nothing at that time.

Also, we should be very candid about it, if we had taken so-called preemptive action to assert our constitutional authority, our control over the purse strings, saying, "No funds appropriated under this account may be expended for the deployment of ground forces in Bosnia," and the negotiations then failed, Congress did not want to accept the blame for it. So we backed away and we waited.

Now, I mention this all by way of a preface to the debate over constitutional power. Who has it? Does the President have the undiluted, unilateral power to send troops to Bosnia, or does Congress have the power? That is a debate that cannot be resolved and will not be resolved during the course of this particular discussion.

Who has the power depends upon who lays claim to it, who takes possession of it, who runs with it. I know the Senator from Colorado is an attorney, skilled in tax law and real estate law and may recall from law school days that possession is 90 percent of ownership. Who takes possession of the power and runs with it really determines who has it, ultimately.

The fact is, Congress has yielded its powers to the Executive over the years. "Don't vote to strike. Don't vote to lift. Don't vote to disapprove before the negotiations. Don't vote to disapprove after the negotiations." Much of what we say and do really does not matter at all, does it? Because the President has said, "I really am not too concerned about whether you approve or disapprove, because I am going anyway. The troops are going in anyway." Even if the House and the Senate were to vote overwhelmingly to disapprove the sending of American troops to Bosnia, the President has already indicated they are going in any event. "It is my prerogative. It is my power. I am going to keep the commitment I made to the NATO allies and I don't really"—

He cares, of course; I am oversimplifying. He cares, but not enough to say that he would abide by the decision.

As a matter of fact, during hearings in the Armed Services Committee last week, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Holbrooke, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were there to testify, and they were very candid about it. I specifically asked the question: In the event that Congress should pass a resolution disapproving the sending of American forces into Bosnia, the President does not intend to be bound by that decision, does he?

And the answer was a very clear, "No."

The next question that follows onto that, of course, is, well, what if Con-

gress fashions a resolution that imposes certain conditions, or seeks to define the mission with greater clarity to remove some of the confusion and the ambiguities that exist in the documents that were signed and negotiated in Dayton? Would the President in any way feel constrained by those conditions? And, of course, ultimately the answer is no. Secretary Perry was very clear, very direct. If he felt that any resolution passed by the Congress in any way posed a danger to our troops, he obviously would recommend to the President that he not abide by it. We got into something of a semantic dual with the Administration witnesses saying they will not ignore it, but they certainly will not abide by it.

So this entire debate on what we are going to pass in the way of a resolution has no ultimate, no practical, consequence in terms of preventing the troops from going there. More will be going shortly this week.

So, Mr. President, I raise these issues this evening because it is in stark contrast to what took place back during the debate on the Persian Gulf war. I have a whole sheath of notes. I was going to quote from speeches that were made at that time by my colleagues on the other side. That might seem to be a bit unfair, hitting below the intellectual belt on the eve of a vote. But I sat this afternoon reading through their statements, and I was struck by the passion with which they were delivered, by the intensity of the charges that were made at the time should President Bush ever neglect to come to Congress to get its approval. Some suggested he would be impeached, or should be impeached.

In all candor, President Bush was not eager to come to the Congress. I recall on at least two, possibly three, occasions going to the White House with a group of Senators and Congressmen standing up in the East Room, and urging the President to come to Congress to get our approval. The President's advisers at that time said, "He really does not need your approval. He has approval from the United Nations." I do not know how many of us have sworn allegiance to the U.N.

But we, over a period of time, were able to persuade him that it was important. I think from a constitutional point of view he had the obligation to come to get our approval. But even from a political point of view, it was an imperative that he come and get our approval because you should never send American forces into war, or into the danger of a war zone in which they might be forced into war, without the solid support of the American people. And, if you put our troops in such a dangerous position, if you send them off to war without the broad support of Congress—after all, we reflect the views of our constituents—without that broad consensus, then you can anticipate what will happen.

When people start to die, when they start to be flown back to Dover in their

flag-draped coffins, CNN cameras will be there to capture that. And the hearts that beat so loudly and enthusiastically to do something to intervene in areas where there is not an immediate threat to our vital interests, when those hearts that had beaten so loudly see the coffins, then they switch, and they say: "What are we doing there? Why are our young men and women dying in that region?" And the President at that time needs to have the support of the Congress to say, no, once we commit our troops to a region, we have to stand behind them. And the worst thing you can do to American credibility—once you send them into battle and the casualties start to mount—is to leave, to quit and leave before the mission is completed. That will do more to undermine America's credibility as a world power, as a superpower, as a reliable ally, than anything we could possibly do.

So that is the reason it is important, it is critical, for a President to build the support for the deployment prior to making the decision—not the inverse, not putting the troops there first and then coming back and getting support. You have to build the support, give the reasons, persuade the American people that it is our solemn duty and responsibility to take action. And when people start dying, when sons and daughters start dying, we are still going to carry through on the mission. If he does not do that, then he is going to be naked unto his enemies, because the fact of the matter is, unless you have Congress on record in support of such action, when the public turns Congress will be in full pursuit. And that will not bring credit to this institution. It will not bring credit to the United States.

That is why I urged at that time President Bush to come to the Congress. He did so, and he was able by a very thin margin to persuade the Senate and the House—a larger margin in the House but a very thin margin here in the Senate—that it was in our national security interest to see to it that Saddam Hussein did not remain in Kuwait, and that he did not stand astride the oil fields of the Middle East and threaten to go all the way to Riyadh in Saudi Arabia.

We talked about the implications of a tyrant, a dictator of his magnitude, standing astride the oil fields and what it would mean to international stability. We talked about his having biological weapons, chemical weapons, and, yes, even a nuclear capability and the possibility of developing intercontinental ballistic missiles, ICBM's. And still we were only able to persuade a few Members on the other side that it was important that he be removed from Kuwait by force.

I mention all of that tonight because the mood has changed, and the rhetoric has changed. Suddenly we see a support coming forth for the President of the United States on a bipartisan basis thanks to the leadership of Senator

DOLE, Senator LIEBERMAN, and others—Senator MCCAIN. It was not a bipartisan ship that was shared during the Persian Gulf war even though there was a much greater identifiable national security interest there than there is in Bosnia. This is much closer to a humanitarian interest and a potential national security interest. But it is hardly of the magnitude and the immediacy as posed by the Persian Gulf war.

So what do we do at this point? They are over there. More will be there later this week. What we have to do is to lend our support to the troops. We are not going to undercut them at this point as they are going into a very dangerous mission. We intend to support them but to do so in a way that makes it clear why they are going, what they will do, and when they and we will know that it is time to come home.

So we talk about exit strategies—code word, "exit strategy." Basically it means defining what the mission is; defining the mission so you can measure success, so you can say at the end of their tour of duty that the commitment they made was exactly worth the price they are being asked to pay in order to achieve a certain identifiable goal.

There is some confusion about this. And that is why this debate is important. That is why it is important that we pass a resolution being as definitive as we can, even if the President is going to ignore it. Whatever we say, it is important that we try to define what we believe the application is, and should be.

Secretary Warren Christopher made a statement while in Dayton, and he indicated—at least to me the statement indicated—that the mission was to "assure the continuity of the single state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with effective federal institutions and full respect of its sovereignty by its neighbors." Mr. President, no such state has ever existed. What he was saying is that we are about to build a nation upon the ashes of a failed nation. No such nation ever existed for any period of time. Almost simultaneous with its recognition as a separate state, war broke out. There has been no single separate state with effective federal institutions whose sovereignty is respected by all neighbors on all sides.

So is this going to be our mission? We raise this issue. The answer is no. That is not our mission.

That is nation building, but nation building is not something we are supposed to be sending our troops to do. So there is to be no nation building. That apparently is clear. There will be no resettlement of refugees under the aegis of American Forces. That is not going to be our task. There will be no organization or monitoring of elections. That is not our task.

In fact, there will be no hunt for war criminals. You may recall that President Clinton indicated he thought those who have been charged with com-

mitting atrocities should be brought to justice. In fact, he declared they would be brought to justice—Karadzic, Mladic, to name two. Are we going to hunt them down? Well, not exactly. If they happen to wander into the area of Tuzla or the areas that we will be patrolling, if we happen to stumble across them in that region, then obviously we can grab and apprehend them and bring them to justice. But that is not going to be our mission. We are not going to hunt down war criminals. And so that also has to be excluded as part of the mission of our young men and women.

There are side agreements, annexes, which have caused me some concern and some need to seek clarification. Apparently a part of our effort, contained in Annex 1-B, has to do with something called build-down. We are going to seek an arms build-down in the region.

Now, I have taken issue with this publicly because it is a complete misuse of the term "build-down." Build-down was a phrase that was coined back in 1983 referring to a proposal Senator NUNN and I developed. Beginning with an article I wrote for *The Washington Post* January, 1983, that talked about how we could force reductions in nuclear forces as we modernized them to make them more survivable, more mobile. We needed to have a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union, and therefore we wanted to get rid of these fixed, big targets that they had and we had. And one way to do that was to have more mobility and fewer numbers, and so we formulated a concept saying, for every one new missile we put into our inventory, we take two old ones out. And that is where the phrase "build-down" came from.

Well, we are not really seeking to put new modern weapons into the region and build them down on a 2-for-1 basis. That is the phrase that has been used. We will use it for convenience sake, but it has no relationship to the actual reality of what we are seeking to do. What we are seeking to do is have the parties in the region reduce their arms.

Now, if you or I, Mr. President, were negotiating an arms control treaty with any of the parties involved that directly affected our security, we would never sign this agreement. We would be run out of office on a rail were we to sign such an agreement, because in essence it relies not upon verification, not upon independent assessments but upon the declarations of the parties. We are going to rely upon the Serbs to tell us how many weapons they have and where they are, and the Croats and the Moslems, all to make a good-faith statement of the weapons they have in their inventory, and then we will see if we cannot help to negotiate a relative build-down, arms reduction to equal or semi-equal levels.

We have asked people in the business of making these kinds of judgments—former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, former National Security Council Adviser Brent Scowcroft,

former Defense Under Secretary Paul Wolfowitz—would you trust any of these individuals to declare their inventory, would you rely upon that? Brent Scowcroft said he would not trust any of them. I do not know how many here would trust any of them. The history is not replete with accurate assessments and declarations made by any of the individuals involved, any of the leaders, any of the troops.

Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslavia, in fact, is renowned for having hundreds, if not thousands, of underground caves and caches where thousands of weapons are stored. So now they are going to say, we have them all stored in X, Y and Z and you can go in and take a head count for yourself and we will agree to build down.

Very few people believe that is going to be possible. So the next question is, well, if we cannot really guarantee that there is going to be an arms reduction that will result in some sort of military equilibrium, then we have an obligation to see to it that the Bosnian Moslems are put in a position that, when we leave, they will be capable of defending themselves. Well, that means we are going to arm them in the alternative.

What the resolution of Senator DOLE, Senator MCCAIN, Senator LIEBERMAN, and others says is we really have that wrong. If you are talking about an exit strategy, the best we can hope to do is maintain a truce, a cease-fire for a year—I will talk about the year's timeframe in just a moment. That is the best we can hope to do. And during that time, we have to see to it that the Moslems are going to be in a position to defend themselves when we leave, if war should break out. Otherwise, we cannot declare that we have been successful in our mission.

If I had my druthers on this, I would do it in reverse. I would say, let us put the parties in a relative state of equilibrium now, let us build up the Bosnian forces now and then see if we can get them to agree to reduce to roughly equal levels and then leave. At least you would have a real incentive at that particular point for everybody to negotiate in good faith.

Right now, we know from listening to the administration and to others that the Bosnian Serbs do not want us to arm the Moslems. The Croatians do not want us to arm the Moslems. Our NATO allies do not want us to arm the Moslems. Article after article is now being written: Do not arm the Moslems; they have plenty. And, by the way, you do not want to upset the stability that has been achieved.

That is one of the areas that we have to remove in terms of our policy. Are we going to use fig leaf phrases to hide our naked ambiguities? Is that what we are about? Saying, well, we have this commitment on the side and a lot of opposition to it, so let us put it out there. In the event we do not get the arms reduction, we will see to it they are able to defend themselves.

Well, how and who? Who is going to provide the weapons? Under what circumstances, under whose aegis? Are we really fooling anyone? I quoted from a soul singer recently: Who is zooming who? Who are we zooming when we say we are totally neutral on this mission, that we are evenhanded and neutral and not favoring one side or the other? We ought to be up front about it. I know that causes concern for many, saying if we in fact are going over to help make sure the Bosnian Moslems can defend themselves, when we leave we are putting ourselves in danger.

That may be the case. That may be the case. But I would submit to you, Mr. President, and to my colleagues, leaving this in a state of suspended ambiguity also puts our troops in danger. We have to be very clear of what we are about. And so the resolution that will be offered tomorrow will in fact seek to define that our goal is to make sure that at the end of this period of time, be it 12 months or longer or less, when we leave, the Moslems will be in a position to at least be on a relatively equal playing field.

Now, is it going to be 12 months or not? Our colleague, Senator WARNER, asked a very important question during the hearings last week. He suggested to Secretary Perry that he was troubled by the 12-month timeframe; there seemed to be some political overtones to that.

Let me say here, as I said before during the hearings, not for a moment do I think that President Clinton made the decision to send troops into Bosnia for any political purpose. There is absolutely no political benefit that I can perceive that will come from that decision. There is not much of an up side, as we say in politics, from that kind of decision. A lot of down side to it. And so he is taking a very big risk. He is exercising what he believes to be leadership in the correct direction. We can challenge that or question that, but he is exercising leadership coming from the Oval Office.

And so I do not for a moment question his motivation. I think he is doing it because he thinks it is the right thing to do, which is not to say there will not be political implications and overtones come next September and October. It is an election year.

Hopefully—and we are going to pray on this and hope on this and be prepared for this—but hopefully we will never have a major confrontation between any of the major parties and U.S. troops. It would be an act of folly on their part in terms of the firepower we can bear.

But that is not the kind of conflict we can anticipate. If there are going to be any attacks launched against the NATO forces, U.S. troops in particular—and we assume there will be efforts to try to see how thin or wide our patience is going to be—they will come in the form of terrorist attacks, they will come in the form of landmines, they will come in the form of car

bombs like we saw in Beirut, they will come in the form of a sniper's bullet. Those are the kinds of things that we can anticipate will take place.

Should we start to suffer significant casualties between now and next September or October, then obviously the President will be under pressure to pull the troops out. So I raised the issue with Secretary Perry. And to his credit, he was absolutely direct. He did not try to circumvent and he did not try to hedge and he did not fudge or try to engage in any kind of obfuscation. He simply responded to my question.

I said: Is it unreasonable for me to assume that come next October a tranche of 2,500 troops will be coming home? He said: Not at all. In fact, they intend to start bringing the troops home next October, November, and December.

So, really, it is not a truly 12-month mission, it is going to be, at least partially, a 9-month mission. I raised the 9 months because Secretary Perry said in response to Senator WARNER: "Nine or ten months would have been a time one could have been quite suspicious about. But let me assure you that the question never came to me, it was never raised to me by the President, of lowering this time from 12 down to 9 or 10 months."

So, now at least we understand the troops will be coming home in September or October or certainly by November or December. I say that. It is a reality. It does not question the President's motivation in sending them in. But it raises the issue, if we are really planning on that kind of a strategy of getting them out starting in September or October, then that really does accelerate the timeframe in terms of what we have to do in order to complete the mission.

So we have to be very clear on what we are seeking to do. If you ask any other U.N. commander who has been in that region and say we will be out of there in 12 months, not to mention 9 months, they will shake their head and say, "No, no." The President of France said that we will be there for 20 years. A Canadian commander who has been there as part of the UNPROFOR forces has said that our grandchildren will be there, if we really are serious about carrying out a mission to help build a nation.

But, of course, that is not what we are going to do. We are simply going to maintain a cease-fire to keep the warring parties apart for a period of 9 months-plus.

So, Mr. President, I will not take any longer this evening to discuss this issue. It is getting late. It is not much of an audience that is going to be influenced by whatever I say this evening. But I do think it is important to try to spell out what we believe to be the goal of our forces there, that we make it as clear to the American people as we can, so that if things go awry, if things do not work out as the administration hopes and we pray they work out, that

we will at least have defined what we believe the mission to have been and, hopefully, shape the administration's thought process on this so it does not get expanded.

We are worried about mission creep, that once we get there, once an incident starts to take place, once bullets start flying, once there is an action and reaction, once someone is attacked and we respond, that we do not start engaging in mission creep and start to indulge ourselves with the added burdens that will come about under that kind of pressure.

The Chinese leader Mao said, "Power comes out of the end of a gun barrel." Power in this country does not come at the end of a gun barrel; it comes at the end of Pennsylvania Avenue and Capitol Hill. Power, as I suggested before, belongs to whomever claims it and exercises it.

Congress has chosen not to claim the power of deciding when to deploy American forces when our Nation is not under attack and when our vital national interests are not immediately at stake. So, we are where we are because we were not willing to risk the consequences of action. We have deferred, we have debated, we have waited, we have talked, and we have let the President take us to where we are today.

So our duty, as I see it, is now to define the role that our men and women must now play.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

PROHIBITION ON FUNDS FOR BOSNIA DEPLOYMENT

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Foreign Relations Committee be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 2606, involving the use of funds for troops in Bosnia, and that the Senate now turn to its immediate consideration, with no amendments in order to the bill or motions to commit or recommit.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 2606) to prohibit the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense from being used for the deployment on the ground of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of any peacekeeping operation, or as part of any implementation force, unless funds for such deployment are specifically appropriated by law.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that the bill be advanced to third reading and that final passage occur at 12:30 p.m., on Wednesday, December 13, with paragraph 4 of rule XII being waived.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that at 9 a.m., Wednesday, H.R. 2606 be immediately

laid aside, that the Senate proceed to a Senate concurrent resolution to be submitted by Senators HUTCHISON, INHOFE, and others.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent that there be a period for the transaction of routine morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TRIBUTE TO THE REVEREND DR. RICHARD C. HALVERSON

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I was deeply saddened by the passing of Dr. Richard C. Halverson, our friend and our Chaplain who served the Senate with distinction for 14 years. Dr. Halverson was a shining example for us all—he embodied all that we seek to be in the eyes of our families, our friends, the Americans we serve, and of course, God.

George Bernard Shaw once wrote: "There is only one religion, though there are a hundred versions of it." Mr. President, I would say this is a fitting description of the community Dr. Halverson so gracefully ministered. There are as many different opinions in this Senate as there are Senators. Yet Dr. Halverson, in his kind and gentle manner, was always able to provide the individual counsel and insight that helped us reach decisions on issues both monumental and mundane. Amid the busy hustle and bustle of events here in the Senate, it is not difficult to lose grounding, and it becomes ever more important to remember our place in the universe. Dr. Halverson, through his daily prayers, helped us to keep our perspective.

Of course, Dr. Halverson served all the Senate employees, and those who knew him loved him just as much as he loved them. He was always available to help and guide people in need, people in pain, or people who just needed to talk.

But Dr. Halverson's work extended far beyond the United States Senate and the Capitol dome. He was minister to the Fourth Presbyterian Church in Bethesda, leader of the prayer breakfast movement and World Vision, and deeply involved in several other evangelical organizations. Dr. Halverson reached out to many, and he will be sorely missed.

I want to extend to his family my condolences, and during this difficult time wish for them the hope and strength that Dr. Halverson inspired in all who knew him.

TRIBUTE TO REVEREND DR. RICHARD HALVERSON

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, tomorrow there will be a memorial service for the late Reverend Dr. Richard

Halverson. I want to take this opportunity to express my sorrow and sadness over the passing of this man who served not only as Chaplain of the Senate for 14 years, but also as model of the Christian life.

Dr. Halverson came to the Senate after serving churches in Missouri, California, and Maryland. His leadership of World Vision, the Campus Crusade for Christ, Christian College Consortium, and the prayer breakfast movement, established him as a world-renowned figure.

But I always think of him as the Senate family Chaplain. He did not merely try to give guidance and wisdom to Senators. He served all in the Senate, including the family members of staffers at all levels of the Senate.

In moments of great stress, I know many Senators turned to Dr. Halverson for guidance and counsel. And every day, when Dr. Halverson opened proceedings with the prayer, he gave us strength and perspective in understanding the responsibilities we hold as Senators.

I am proud to have known Dr. Halverson and can truly say that I will miss him. I know that his family can be comforted in knowing that today he is with God.

THE BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, before discussing today's bad news about the Federal debt, how about "another go", as the British put it, with our pop quiz. Remember—one question, one answer.

The question: How many millions of dollars in a trillion? While you are thinking about it, bear in mind that it was the U.S. Congress that ran up the enormous Federal debt that is now about \$12 billion shy of \$5 trillion.

To be exact, as of the close of business yesterday, December 11, the total Federal debt—down to the penny—stood at \$4,988,568,481,765.63. Another depressing figure means that on a per capita basis, every man, woman and child in America owes \$18,936.69.

Mr. President, back to our quiz (how many million in a trillion?): There are a million million in a trillion, which means that the Federal Government will shortly owe five million million dollars.

Now who's in favor of balancing the Federal budget?

ERNIE BOYER—A GIANT IN EDUCATION

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, the death of Ernie Boyer last week has deprived the Nation of one of its greatest leaders in education. Throughout his long and distinguished career, Ernie was unsurpassed as a champion of education, and I am saddened by the loss of a good friend and great colleague.

In the history of modern American education, Ernie Boyer was a constant leader, working to expand and improve