Let me comment on the $6 billion my colleague mentioned. It is simply not the case that people over here say we do not want to spend enough on agriculture. That is not the case. My colleague knows that is not the case. The fact is, we are not debating the baseline for the 7-year period on agriculture. If we were debating that, the debate on the baseline is that the majority party's budget cut far more than twice as much from the baseline than the budget cuts that we had offered. If we are going to debate baselines, that is what we ought to debate. And I would be glad to do that, but I also want to go on to another brief subject.

A WAY TO BALANCE THE BUDGET

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I was very heartened a few minutes ago by the discussion of the Senator from Mississippi, Senator LOTT, in which he talked about something that a number of us had advocated and the President advocated last evening.

In fact, Senator EXON and I were in a press conference about a week or so ago. At that time we said one idea about resolving the budget issue is to package up each side's offer, take the lower spending cut on each of the offers. When you add all that up you reach $711 billion in spending cuts and you reach savings sufficient so you can balance the budget. Why do we not do that?

The President came to the floor of the Chamber of the House last evening and said let us do that. Let us at least do that. We can just take the lower of the two offers from the Republicans and the Democrats. We can take the lower in each spending category of the two offers of saving money in every category. Then you have $711 billion, which is sufficient to balance the budget.

What I heard this morning is that the Speaker of the House suggested that might be a good thing. Senator LOTT indicated that makes a lot of sense. If we are moving in that direction, I am enormously heartened by that. It is a way to move towards a balanced budget, do it with the right priorities and do it in the right way.

If we can do that, we can solve the problems of the CR, the debt limit. We can have a clean appropriations extension, pass a clean debt limit and agree on taking $711 billion of savings. As a result we can balance this Federal budget. Then we will have done something, I think, of substantial good for this country.

So I would just say that I feel heartened by at least the little snippets I have heard today, first on television this morning by the Speaker, and next in a discussion by Senator LOTT. Maybe there is a formula here for breaking this gridlock and actually reaching results with respect to a 7-year balanced budget plan.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition? The distinguished Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. EXON. Mr. President, we are in morning business as I understand it?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Morning business expired at 5:30, but the Senator may request to proceed under morning business.

Mr. EXON. Has time been limited for Senators in morning business when we were in morning business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. We had been under a 5-minute guideline.

Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I ask I may be allowed to proceed under the same rules for 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE FARM BILL

Mr. EXON. Mr. President, there are two things I want to talk about. First, I have heard some of the discussion with regard to farm policy by some of my closest friends and colleagues on both sides of the aisle today. It is a pretty sad situation when I see that the usual farm coalition between Democrats and Republicans is obviously breaking down. I think it is a tragedy of major proportions.

I would simply say, there are those of us who feel we should stay in session for lots of reasons, not the least of which is to pass a farm bill. If we cannot come to some kind of an agreement, I hope the majority leader will simply call up the farm bill for discussion, debate it on the floor of the U.S. Senate, pass something, and send it to the President and see if he will sign it.

The President, I might add, has been very supportive of the position for funding of agriculture that this Senator, as the lead Democrat on the Budget Committee, has been for a long, long time. We have a profarm advocate sitting at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, the President of the United States of America. We should continue to build and work with him.

The various moves that have been made with regard to the Freedom To Farm Act that I do not agree with I will not vote for. I will simply correct something I thought I heard, that all major farm organizations have supported the Freedom To Farm Act. The Farmers Union is a major farm organization in the State of Nebraska. The Farmers Union is not only against the Freedom To Farm Act, it thinks it is folly.

I would say to all of my colleagues, this Senator yesterday had printed in the RECORD some true facts with regard to how far down the welfare road we are going under the Freedom To Farm Act. In summarizing what I put in the RECORD yesterday on page S 321 under Exhibit 1, for a 500-acre farm, 120 bushels to the acre in corn yield, the present cash price is in the vicinity of $3.10. That would be $186,000 gross—not net, gross—that the farmer would receive.

On top of that, under the Freedom To Farm Act, there is a welfare payment that goes to corn farmers. I think, when all the corn farmers found out about this, and especially when the public found out about it, there would be a revolution, and the Freedom To Farm Act would fall by the wayside, because, in the example that I have just given, a farmer would receive a check from the Federal Government for 1996 of $16,200 on top of the $186,000 gross that he got from his crop.

That might not be so bad. You might argue that is still a good thing, at $3.10 a bushel for corn. But most people in and outside the business recognize that $3.10 a bushel for corn is a pretty good price and one we can be satisfied with. The point is, if it were $5 a bushel or $7 a bushel, which I do not think it will ever go to, but whatever the price of corn would be under the Freedom To Farm Act, this typical farmer, and every farmer who is in a similar situation, which is typical, would receive a check from the Government regardless of the price of corn in the marketplace. That is welfare. That is an excessive amount of money.

I am for freedom-to-farm principles, giving them the decisions they can make out there on the farm. I am for simplifying. But I simply say there is a fault here in the Freedom To Farm Act that is a giveaway.

DO NOT RECESS THE SENATE

Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I wanted to make just a few comments, if I might, with regard to what I consider to be a very ill-advised move, and that is the consideration that maybe, after Friday, we are going to recess the U.S. Senate, right in the middle of very important negotiations. I would simply say, Mr. President, we should stay here, work on the farm bill, work on the debt ceiling, work on the budget, and come up with a compromise. Certainly I, too, was pleased with the President's address last night and the acceptance, generally, as I understand it, of Speaker GINGRICH and leading Republicans in the U.S. Senate that says to take this $711 billion and balance the budget in 7 years, with CBO scoring, which we have all been for.

We cannot do those things, we cannot solve the crisis in the debt ceiling, by leaving here and not coming back until 2 or 3 days before we would have default. I hope, and I appeal, for both the House and the Senate to remain in session and do our work, especially at this critical time with regard to the farm bill and the other important matters that we have on our plate.

I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY ON NORTHERN IRELAND

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, last November, the British and Irish Governments acted jointly to create an innovative three-member committee,

called the International Body, to assess an extremely difficult issue that had become a serious obstacle to the peace process in Northern Ireland—how to remove all arms from Irish politics.

Our former colleague, Senator George Mitchell, agreed to serve as chairman of the International Body, and he was joined by two other distinguished international leaders, Gen. John de Chastelain of Canada and former Prime Minister Harri Holkeri of Finland.

The International Body issued its report earlier today, and I welcome it as a reasonable way forward for all sides in Northern Ireland. I hope all sides will make the fair and modest concessions needed to enable the peace process to move ahead.

I commend Senator Mitchell, General de Chastelain, and Prime Minister Holkeri for their sensible approach to the difficult problem of decommissioning weapons. The International Body did its work well. Reasonable people who genuinely want peace have a priceless opportunity now to make the kind of progress needed to end the current impasse. It is time for all-party talks to begin.

I believe that all of us in Congress concerned about Northern Ireland will find this report of great interest, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY, JANUARY 22, 1996

(By George J. Mitchell, Chairman, John de Chastelain, and Harri Holkeri)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 28 November 1995, the British and Irish Governments issued a Communiqué which announced the launching in Northern Ireland of a ''twin track' process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations.''

2. One track was ''to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent.'' This has become known as the political track.

3. The other track concerned the decommissioning of arms and was set forth as follows in the Communiqué:

''5. In parallel, the two Governments have agreed to establish an International Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.

''6. Recognising the widely expressed desire to see all arms removed from Irish politics, the two Governments will ask the International Body to report on the arrangements necessary for the removal from the political equation of arms silenced by virtue of the welcome decisions taken last Summer and Autumn by those organisations that previously supported the use of arms for political purposes.

''7. In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body to:

—identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and

—report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve that.

''8. It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such evidence on its merits.''

4. We are that Body. This is our report. We have no stake in Northern Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end of the conflict and in the ability of its people to live in peace. Our role is to bring an independent perspective to the issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to help. This assessment represents our best and our independent judgement. We are unanimous in our views. There are no differences of opinion among us.

5. To provide us with sufficient information to meet our remit, we held two series of meetings in Belfast, Dublin and London: the first, 15 through 18 December 1995; the second, 11 through 22 January 1996. In addition, we held an organisational meeting in New York on 9 December 1995.

6. In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in writing from dozens of government officials, political leaders, church officials and representatives of other organizations and institutions. We received hundreds of letters and telephone calls from members of the public and met with many others. We thank all for their submissions. Contributions from those who suffered losses during the time of troubles but are strongly committed to the peace process were especially moving. All the submissions have been carefully reviewed and considered.

II. DISCUSSION

7. Our examination of the issues and of the facts, and the perspectives brought to us by those who briefed us or who made written representations to us, convince us that while there is no simple solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland, the factors on which a process for peace must be based are already known. We can indicate the way we believe these factors should be addressed so that decommissioning of arms and all-party negotiations can proceed, but only resolute action by the parties themselves will produce progress.

8. That noted, we are aware of the enormous contribution already made by individuals and groups in advancing the process of peace in Northern Ireland to its current stage. The tireless and courageous efforts of Prime Minister John Major and *Taoiseach* John Bruton (and before him Albert Reynolds) have been essential to the peace process. They have been joined by other political leaders, institutions, organisations and individuals in the promotion of peace.

9. We consider our task in the light of our responsibility to all of the people of Northern Ireland; the need for the people to be reassured that their democratic and moral expectations can be realised; and in the spirit of serious efforts made by the British and Irish Governments to advance the peace process.

10. For nearly a year and a half, the guns have been silent in Northern Ireland. The people want that silence to continue. They want lasting peace in a just society in which paramilitary violence plays no part. That was the dominant theme expressed in the many letters and calls we received from those in the North and South, Unionist and Nationalist, Catholic and Protestant, Loyalist and Republican.

11. Notwithstanding reprehensible ''punishment'' killings and beatings, the sustained observance of the cease-fires should not be devalued. It is a significant factor which must be given due weight in assessing the commitment of the paramilitaries to ''work constructively to achieve'' full and verifiable decommissioning.

12. Since the cease-fires, the political debate has focused largely on the differences that have prevented the commencement of all-party negotiations intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. This circumstance has obscured the widespread agreement that exists—so widespread that it tends to be taken for granted. In fact, members of both traditions may be less far apart on the resolution of their differences than they believe.

13. No one should underestimate the value of the consensus for peace, and the fact that no significant group is actively seeking to end it.

14. In paragraph five of the Communiqué we were asked ''to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.'' It is a serious issue. It is also a symptom of a larger problem; the absence of trust. Common to many of our meetings were arguments, steeped in history, as to why the other side cannot be trusted. As a consequence, even well-intentioned acts are often viewed with suspicion and hostility.

15. But a resolution of the decommissioning issue—or any other issue—will not be found if the parties resort to their vast inventories of historical recrimination. Or, as it was put to us several times, what is really needed is the decommissioning of mind-sets in Northern Ireland.

16. We have asked ourselves how those who have suffered during the many years of internal strife can accept the fact that the establishment of a lasting peace will call for reconciliation with those they hold responsible for their loss and pain. Surely the continued suffering and bereavement of individuals and of families should never be forgotten. But if the focus remains on the past, the past will become the future, and that is something no one can desire.

17. Everyone with whom we spoke agrees in principle with the need to decommission. There are differences on the timing and context—indeed, those differences led to the creation of this Body—but they should not obscure the nearly universal support which exists for the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organizations. That must continue to be a principal objective.

18. However the issue of decommissioning is resolved, that alone will not lead directly to all-party negotiations. Much work remains on the many issues involved in the political track. The parties should address those issues with urgency.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS: PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND NON-VIOLENCE

19. To reach an agreed political settlement and to take the gun out of Irish politics, there must be commitment and adherence to fundamental principles of democracy and non-violence. Participants in all-party negotiations should affirm their commitment to such principles.

20. Accordingly, we recommend that the parties to such negotiations affirm their total and absolute commitment:

a. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues;

b. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations;

c. To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission;

d. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations;

e. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations

and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and

f. To urge that ''punishment'' killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.

21. We join the Governments, religious leaders and many others in condemning ''punishment'' killings and beatings. They contribute to the fear that those who have used violence to pursue political objectives in the past will do so again in the future. Such actions have no place in a lawful society.

22. Those who demand decommissioning prior to all-party negotiations do so out of concern that the paramilitaries will use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome of negotiations with which they disagree. Given the history of Northern Ireland, this is not an unreasonable concern. The principles we recommend address those concerns directly.

23. These commitments, when made and honoured, would remove the threat of force before, during and after all-party negotiations. They would focus all concerned on what is ultimately essential if the gun is to be taken out of Irish politics: an agreed political settlement and the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. That should encourage the belief that the peace process will truly be an exercise in democracy, not one influenced by the threat of violence.

IV. COMMITMENT TO DECOMMISSIONING

24. The second of the specific questions in paragraph seven of the Communiqué asks us ''to report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve'' full and verifiable decommissioning.

25. We have concluded that there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve full and verifiable decommissioning as part of the process of all-party negotiations; but that commitment does not include decommissioning prior to such negotiations.

26. After careful consideration, on the basis of intensive discussions with the Governments, the political parties, religious leaders, the security forces, and many others, we have concluded that the paramilitary organisations will not decommission any arms prior to all-party negotiations. That was the unanimous and emphatically expressed view of the representatives of the political parties close to paramilitary organisations on both sides. It was also the view of the vast majority of the organisations and individuals who made oral and written submissions. It is not that they are all opposed to prior decommissioning. To the contrary, many favour it. But they are convinced that it will not happen. That is the reality with which all concerned must deal.

27. Competing views were advanced on prior decommissioning. One was that decommissioning of arms must occur prior to all-party negotiations. We were told that the clearest demonstration of adherence to democratic principles, and of a permanent end to the use of violence, is the safe removal and disposal of paramilitary arms, and that at this time only a start to decommissioning will provide the confidence necessary for all-party negotiations to commence. In this view, all parties were aware of the need for prior decommissioning before the cease-fires were announced and should not now be able to avoid that requirement.

28. In the competing view we were told that decommissioning of arms prior to all-party negotiations was not requested before the announcement of the cease-fires, and that had it been, there would have been no cease-fires; that those who entered into cease-fires did so in the belief they would lead immediately to all-party negotiations; and that the request for prior decommissioning, seriously pursued for the first time months after the cease-fires were declared, is merely a tactic to delay or deny such negotiations. In this view, the cease-fires having been maintained for nearly a year and a half, all-party negotiations should begin immediately with no further requirements.

29. We believe that each side of this argument reflects a core of reasonable concern which deserves to be understood and addressed by the other side.

30. Those who insist on prior decommissioning need to be reassured that the commitment to peaceful and democratic means by those formerly supportive of politically motivated violence is genuine and irreversible, and that the threat or use of such violence will not be invoked to influence the process of negotiations or to change any agreed settlement.

31. Those who have been persuaded to abandon violence for the peaceful political path need to be reassured that a meaningful and inclusive process of negotiation is genuinely being offered to address the legitimate concerns of their traditions and the need for new political arrangements with which all can identify.

32. Clearly, new approaches must be explored to overcome this impasse. That is the purpose of the six principles we recommend. They invoke a comprehensive commitment to democracy and non-violence that is intended to reassure all parties to the negotiations.

V. DECOMMISSIONING DURING ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS

33. One side has insisted that some decommissioning of arms must take place before all-party negotiations can begin. The other side has insisted that no decommissioning can take place until the end of the process, after an agreed settlement has been reached. This has resulted in the current impasse.

34. The parties should consider an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations, rather than before or after as the parties now urge. Such an approach represents a compromise. If the peace process is to move forward, the current impasse must be overcome. While both sides have been adamant in their positions, both have repeatedly expressed the desire to move forward. This approach provides them that opportunity.

35. In addition, it offers the parties an opportunity to use the process of decommissioning to build confidence one step at a time during negotiations. As progress is made on political issues, even modest mutual steps on decommissioning could help create the atmosphere needed for further steps in a progressive pattern of mounting trust and confidence.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: GUIDELINES ON THE MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING

36. The first of the specific questions in paragraph seven of the Communique asks us ''to identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning.''

37. We recommend the following guidelines on the modalities of decommissioning. These recommendations are realistic in light of the nature and scale of the arsenals in question, estimates of which were provided to us by the Governments and their security forces. We believe these estimates to be accurate.

38. Decommissioning should receive a high priority in all-party negotiations. The details of decommissioning, including supporting confidence-building measures, timing and sequencing, have to be determined by the parties themselves.

The decommissioning process should suggest neither victory nor defeat.

39. The cease-fires and the peace process are products not of surrender but rather of a willingness to address differences through political means. This essential fact should be reflected clearly in the modalities of the decommissioning process, which should not require that any party be seen to surrender.

The decommissioning process should take place to the satisfaction of an independent commission.

40. The decommissioning process should take place to the satisfaction of an independent commission acceptable to all parties. The commission would be appointed by the British and Irish Governments on the basis of consultations with the other parties to the negotiating process.

41. The commission should be able to operate independently in both jurisdictions, and should enjoy appropriate legal status and immunity.

42. In addition to having available to it independent sources of legal and technical advice and adequate field resources to receive and audit armaments and to observe and verify the decommissioning process, the commission should be able to call upon the resources and the relevant technical expertise of the British and Irish Armies, when it is appropriate.

The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of armaments in a manner that contributes to public safety.

43. The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of the armaments. Procedures for destruction would include the cutting up or chipping of small arms and other weapons, the controlled explosion of ammunition and explosives, and other forms of conventional munitions disposal.

44. The decommissioning process could encompass a variety of methods, subject to negotiation, including:

The transfer of armaments to the commission or to the designated representatives of either Government, for subsequent destruction;

The provision of information to the commission or to designated representatives of either Government, leading to the discovery of armaments for subsequent destruction; and,

The depositing of armaments for collection and subsequent destruction, by the commission or by representatives of either Government.

Parties should also have the option of destroying their weapons themselves.

45. Priority should be accorded throughout to ensuring that armaments are safely handled and stored, and are not misappropriated.

The decommissioning process should be fully verifiable.

46. Whatever the options chosen for the destruction of armaments, including the destruction of weapons by the parties themselves, verification must occur to the satisfaction of the commission.

47. The commission would record information required to monitor the process effectively. The commission should have available to it the relevant data of the *Garda Siochana* and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It would report periodically to relevant parties on progress achieved in the decommissioning process.

The decommissioning process should not expose individuals to prosecution.

48. Individuals involved in the decommissioning process should not be prosecuted for

the possession of those armaments; amnesties should be established in law in both jurisdictions. Armaments made available for decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examination, and information obtained as a result of the decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in either jurisdiction.

49. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be free to organise their participation in the decommissioning process as they judge appropriate, e.g. groups may designate particular individuals to deposit armaments on their behalf.

The decommissioning process should be mutual.

50. Decommissioning would take place on the basis of the mutual commitment and participation of the paramilitary organisations. This offers the parties another opportunity to use the process of decommissioning to build confidence one step at a time during negotiations.

VII. FURTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING

51. It is important for all participants to take steps to build confidence throughout the peace process. In the course of our discussions, many urged that certain actions other than decommissioning be taken to build confidence. We make no recommendations on them since they are outside our remit, but we believe it appropriate to comment on some since success in the peace process cannot be achieved solely by reference to the decommissioning of arms.

52. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. The early termination of paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate a commitment to peaceful methods and so build trust among other parties and alleviate the fears and anxieties of the general population. So, too, would the provision of information on the status of missing persons, and the return of those who have been forced to leave their communities under threat.

53. Continued action by the Governments on prisoners would bolster trust. So would early implementation of the proposed review of emergency legislation, consistent with the evolving security situation.

54. Different views were expressed as to the weapons to be decommissioned. In the Communiqué, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held by paramilitary organisations. We accept and share that view. There is no equivalence between such weapons and those held by security forces. However, in the context of building mutual confidence, we welcome the commitment of the Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communiqué, ''to continue to take responsive measures, advised by their respective security authorities, as the threat reduces.''

55. We share the hope, expressed by many on all sides, that policing in Northern Ireland can be normalised as soon as the security situation permits. A review of the situation with respect to legally registered weapons and the use of plastic bullets, and continued progress toward more balanced representation in the police force would contribute to the building of trust.

56. Several oral and written submissions raised the idea of an elected body. We note the reference in paragraph three of the Communiqué to ''whether and how an elected body could play a part.'' Elections held in accordance with democratic principles express and reflect the popular will. If it were broadly acceptable, with an appropriate mandate, and within the three-strand structure, an elective process could contribute to the building of confidence.

57. Finally, the importance of further progress in the social and economic development of Northern Ireland and its communities was emphasised time and again in our meetings, in the context of building confidence and establishing a lasting peace.

VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

58. Last week we stood in Belfast and looked at a thirty foot high wall and at barriers topped with iron and barbed wire. The wall, which has ironically come to be known as the ''peace line,'' is a tangible symbol of the division of the people of Northern Ireland into two hostile communities. To the outsider both are warm and generous. Between themselves they are fearful and antagonistic.

59. Yet, it is now clear beyond doubt that the vast majority of the people of both traditions want to turn away from the bitter past. There is a powerful desire for peace in Northern Ireland. It is that desire which creates the present opportunity.

60. This is critical time in the history of Northern Ireland. The peace process will move forward or this society could slip back to the horror of the past quarter century.

61. Rigid adherence by the parties to their past positions will simply continue the stalemate which has already lasted too long. In a society as deeply divided as Northern Ireland, reaching across the ''peace line'' requires a willingness to take risks for peace.

62. The risk may seem high but the reward is great: a future of peace, equality and prosperity for all the people of Northern Ireland.

CHINA—TAIWAN DEVELOPMENTS

Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to take a moment to read a story in today's New York Times on proposed military actions by the People's Republic of China [PRC] against the Republic of China on Taiwan. I ask unanimous consent that this article appear in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. PRESSLER. According to the story, the People's Republic of China has finished plans for a limited missile attack on Taiwan—an attack that could come following Taiwan's first Presidential election, which is scheduled for March 23.

This revelation is the latest in a series of intimidating tactics that work to threaten Taiwan and destabilize East Asia. Between July 21 and July 26, the PRC conducted a series of ballistic missile test firings 85 miles off the coast of Taiwan. All the missiles were modern, mobile and nuclear capable. No country ever has held this level of field tests for nuclear capable missiles before.

The results of that action were predictable—the stock market and the local currency in Taiwan plunged. These ballistic missile exercises resumed on August 15, and continued through the fall leading up to last December's elections in Taiwan for the 164-seat Legislature.

Now comes word that the PRC has done more than just test its military capability. It has matched its hardware testing with military planning—a plan that calls for one ballistic missile to be launched each day for 30 days.

As was the case with the missile tests, this recent report can be seen as a blatant attempt to influence the outcome of the upcoming Presidential elections in Taiwan. There could be more to this story. I believe this is an attempt to intimidate the Clinton administration and test our Nation's resolve in the Taiwan Straits. The fact that the PRC has advanced a limited but sustained missile attack plan indicates that it believes the Clinton administration may do nothing to strengthen Taiwan's defenses or come to its aid in the event of an attack.

It is not hard to understand why the PRC has come to this conclusion. The Clinton administration's policy with respect to the Taiwan-Mainland China issue is nothing short of confusing. The administration claims to be advancing a policy of deliberate ambiguity. For example, high level administration officials recently have been asked if the United States would come to Taiwan's defense in the event of an attack from the PRC. Their responses were consistently and ominously vague.

The administration seems to believe that this ambiguity will be enough to deter Beijing. Today's report indicates that the exact opposite has occurred. I believe this policy of strategic ambiguity is wrong and has failed. It is not just dangerous for the people of Taiwan, it is potentially destabilizing for the entire East Asia region. It is an approach that clearly advances the PRC's interests and not our own. The administration's ambiguity policy has fueled the belief within the PRC that the United States will look the other way if PRC missiles are launched. Because of our ambiguity, the PRC believes that it can achieve its policy goals at the very least through intimidation and military posturing. Even if the PRC privately has no intention for a direct military confrontation against Taiwan, our ambiguity gives the PRC's military maneuvers greater credibility. It sends a signal of weakness. It fosters a belief that we can be pushed around by the PRC. It is a belief shared by many in Taiwan as well. Indeed, this ambiguity has troubled other Asian democracies in the region, compelling many—from Japan to the Philippines—to increase their defense budgets.

Mr. President, as I said last August, in response to the PRC's first ballistic missile exercise, the United States is faced with three choices: First, we can do nothing, which appears to be the present course. I believe that is not in the national security interest of the United States. We must not allow Asia—a region of many thriving free market, democratic societies—to be dominated by an aggressive, nondemocratic power.

Second, at the other extreme, we could intervene should the moment of conflict become imminent by interposing the United States Pacific fleet in the Taiwan straits. President Truman did so in 1950. This, again, is an extreme course and thus, should only be