

By Ms. SNOWE:

S. 1694. A bill to prohibit insurance providers from denying or canceling health insurance coverage, or varying the premiums, terms, or conditions for health insurance coverage on the basis of genetic information or a request for genetic services, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources.

By Mr. MCCAIN:

S. 1695. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to assess up to \$2 per person visiting the Grand Canyon or other national park to secure bonds for capital improvements to the park, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

By Mr. THURMOND:

S. 1696. A bill to provide antitrust clarification, to reduce frivolous antitrust litigation, to promote equitable resolution of disputes over the location of professional sports franchises, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

SUBMISSION OF CONCURRENT AND SENATE RESOLUTIONS

The following concurrent resolutions and Senate resolutions were read, and referred (or acted upon), as indicated:

By Mr. JEFFORDS (for himself, Mrs. KASSEBAUM, Mr. SIMON, and Mr. FEINGOLD):

S. Con. Res. 53. A concurrent resolution congratulating the people of the Republic of Sierra Leone on the success of their recent democratic multiparty elections; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Ms. SNOWE:

S. 1694. A bill to prohibit insurance providers from denying or canceling health insurance coverage, or varying the premiums, terms, or conditions for health insurance coverage on the basis of genetic information or a request for genetic services, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources.

THE GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE ACT OF 1996

• Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I introduce the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1996. I join Representative LOUISE SLAUGHTER, who introduced this bill in the House, in calling for an end to discrimination on the basis of genetic information in health insurance.

Progress in the field of genetics is accelerating at a breathtaking pace. Who could have predicted 20 years ago that scientists today could accurately identify the genes associated with cystic fibrosis, cancer, Alzheimers' and Huntington's disease? Today, scientists can, and as a result doctors are increasingly able to identify predispositions to certain diseases based on the results of genetic testing, and to successfully treat and manage such diseases. These scientific advances hold tremendous promise for the approximately 15 million people affected by the over 4,000 currently known genetic disorders, and the millions more who are carriers of genetic diseases who may pass them on to their children.

But as our knowledge of genetic predisposition to disease has grown, so has the potential for discrimination in health insurance.

As a legislator who has worked for many years on the issue of breast cancer, and as a woman with a history of breast cancer in her family, I am delighted with the possibilities for further treatment advances based on the recent discoveries of two genes related to breast cancer—BRCA1 and BRCA2. Women who inherit mutated forms of either gene have an 85-percent risk of developing breast cancer in their lifetime. Although there is no known treatment to ensure that women who carry the mutated gene do not develop breast cancer, genetic testing makes it possible for carriers of these mutated genes to take extra precautions—such as mammograms and self-examinations—in order to detect cancer at its earliest stages. This discovery is truly a momentous breakthrough.

However, the tremendous promise of genetic testing is being significantly threatened by insurance companies that use the results of genetic testing to deny or limit coverage to consumers. Unfortunately, this practice is relatively common today. In fact, a recent survey of individuals with a known genetic condition in their family revealed that 22 percent had been denied health insurance coverage because of genetic information.

In addition to the potentially devastating consequences health insurance denials on the basis of genetic information can have on American families, the fear of discrimination has equally harmful consequences for consumers and for scientific research. For example, many women who might take extra precautions if they knew they had the breast cancer gene may not seek testing because they fear losing their health insurance. Patients may be unwilling to disclose information about their genetic status to their physicians out of fear, hindering treatment or preventive efforts. And people may be unwilling to participate in potentially ground-breaking research trials because they do not want to reveal information about their genetic status.

The bill I am introducing today addresses these serious concerns by prohibiting health insurance providers from denying or canceling health insurance coverage or varying the terms, premiums, or conditions for health insurance for individuals or their family members on the basis of genetic information. It also prohibits insurance companies from discriminating against individuals who have requested or received genetic services.

My bill also contains important confidentiality provisions which prohibit insurance companies from disclosing genetic information about an individual without that person's written consent. And it prohibits an insurance provider from requesting someone to undergo, and from disclosing, genetic information about that person.

Finally, the bill allows individuals to sue for monetary damages or injunctive relief if an insurance company violates, or threatens to violate, these nondiscrimination or disclosure provisions.

I urge my colleagues to end the unfair practice of denying health care coverage to individuals on the basis of genetic information by supporting the bill I am introducing today. •

By Mr. MCCAIN:

S. 1695. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to assess up to \$2 per person visiting the Grand Canyon or other national parks to secure bonds for capital improvements to the park, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

THE NATIONAL PARKS CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS ACT

• Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, I introduce legislation to make desperately needed improvements within America's national parks.

The National Parks Capital Improvements Act would allow private fundraising organizations, under agreement with the Secretary of the Interior, to issue taxable capital development bonds to finance park improvement projects. The bonds would be secured by an entrance fee surcharge of up to \$2 per visitor at participating parks.

Our National Park System has enormous capital needs—by last estimate over \$3 billion of high priority projects such as improved transportation systems, trail repairs, visitor facilities, historic preservation, and the list goes on and on. The unfortunate reality is that even under the rosiest budget scenarios our growing park needs far outstrip the resources available.

A good example of this funding gap is at Grand Canyon National Park. The park's newly approved park management plan calls for over \$300 million in capital improvements, including a desperately needed transportation system to reduce congestion. Compare that to the \$12 million the Grand Canyon received last year for operating costs. The gap is as wide as the Grand Canyon itself. Clearly, we must find new means of financing park needs.

Revenue bonding is an integral part of the solution. Based on current visitation rates, a \$2 surcharge at the Grand Canyon would enable us to raise \$100 million dollars from a bond issue amortized over 20 years. That is significant amount of money with which we could accomplish a lot of critical work.

I want to point out that the Grand Canyon would not be the only park eligible for the program. Any park unit with capital needs in excess of \$5 million is eligible to participate. Among eligible park the Secretary will determine which shall take part in the program.

I also want to stress that only projects approved as part of park's General Management Plan can be funded through bond revenue. This proviso eliminates any concern that the revenue could be used for projects of questionable value to the park.

Finally, the bill requires that all professional standards apply and that the issues are subject to the same laws, rules and regulatory enforcement procedures as any other bond issue.

In addition, only organizations under agreement with the Secretary will be authorized to administer the bonding, so the Secretary can establish any rules or policies he deems necessary and appropriate.

Under, no circumstances, however would investors be able to attach liens against Federal property in the very unlikely event of default. The bonds will be secured only by the surcharge revenues.

Will the bond markets support park improvement issues, guaranteed by an entrance surcharge? The answer is yes, emphatically. Americans are eager to invest in our Nation's natural heritage, and with park visitation growing stronger, the risks would appear minimal.

Are visitors willing to pay a little more at the entrance gate if the money is used for park improvement? Again, yes. Time and time again visitors have expressed their support provided the revenue is used where collected and not diverted for some other purpose devised by Congress.

Finally, I want to point out that the bill will not cost the Treasury any money? On the contrary it will result in a net increase in Federal revenue. First, the bonds will be fully taxable, and, second, making disparately needed improvements sooner rather than later will reduce project costs.

America has been blessed with a rich natural heritage. The National Park Organic Act enjoins us to protect our precious natural resources for future generations and to provide for their enjoyment by the American people. The National Parks Capital Improvements Act must pass if we are to successfully fulfill the enduring responsibilities of stewardship with which we have been vested.●

By Mr. THURMOND:

S. 1696. A bill to provide antitrust clarification, to reduce frivolous antitrust litigation, to promote equitable resolution of disputes over the location of professional sports franchises, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

THE PROFESSIONAL SPORTS ANTITRUST
CLARIFICATION ACT OF 1996

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Professional Sports Antitrust Clarification Act of 1996 to address underlying problems which have resulted in recent franchise instability and movement in professional sports, particularly the National Football League. My legislation clarifies that the antitrust laws do not apply to professional sports leagues and their member franchises when they establish rules and make decisions about whether a team may change its home territory. This antitrust protection is obtained, however, only if the

sports league provides notice and a hearing and examines appropriate factors prior to its decision on relocation, and institutes revenue sharing of the public benefits received by its teams, in order to reduce the incentive for teams to move simply to reap large public subsidies. I will clarify the importance of these points in a moment.

Let me initially explain why this issue deserves the attention of the Congress. First, larger and larger amounts of public funds seem to be spent subsidizing professional sports, by building new or improved stadiums, providing rent abatement and special tax treatment, and even making direct cash payments. Cities and States are being pitted against each other by the threat or promise that a team will relocate depending on the subsidy offered, which raises serious questions about the appropriate use of scarce public resources. Baltimore and Cleveland made headlines last winter by competing to be the hometown of the Browns football team, with hundreds of millions of public dollars at stake. The resolution, of course, was for both cities to pour hundreds of millions of dollars into new or improved stadiums so each could secure a football team. Even more remarkable, perhaps, is the report that Cincinnati has been handing over \$3 million in cash to its football team in each of the last several years to stave off relocation.

Second, professional sports are an important part of American life, emotionally as well as financially, and relocation of a popular team can devastate its fans and shake the confidence of its hometown. The Browns' announcement that they intended to move to Baltimore upset the team's fans tremendously both in Cleveland and around the country. The current willingness of so many teams to consider moving frightens fans of all teams, regardless of whether their own team is openly threatening a move.

The current level of sports franchise instability is at its highest since the Congress focused its attention on these issues in the 1980's. In 1982 and 1985, I held several hearings as chairman of the Judiciary Committee on legislation dealing with sports franchise relocation. Since that time, the financial stakes for local and State governments have escalated. The public funds routinely expended to keep a team in place or entice a team to move seem to have risen from tens of millions to hundreds of millions of dollars. At a time when public resources at all levels of government are becoming ever tighter, this transfer of scarce public funds to rich owners and rich players is remarkable. Accordingly, it is time to address these issues.

Two hearings have been held in the Senate Judiciary Committee in recent months on these issues. As chairman of the Antitrust, Business Rights, and Corporation Subcommittee, I chaired a hearing on November 29, 1995, which analyzed sports franchise movement.

Witnesses included a range of elected officials, sports league commissioners, and antitrust and economic experts. Senator HATCH chaired a second hearing of the full Judiciary Committee on January 23, 1996, in order to further examine these issues. This legislation is an outgrowth of those hearings.

Let me turn to the specifics of the legislation I am introducing today. My bill does not grant a special exemption from current antitrust law, but essentially codifies existing judicial interpretations which permit a sports league to determine where its member franchises may operate, provided certain requirements are met. My legislation clarifies and provides certainty in this complex area of the law, where costs of defending claims are always high, and any damages resulting from liability or an incorrect judicial decision are trebled and may amount to hundreds of millions of dollars or more. Antitrust certainty would restore integrity to the decision-making processes of professional sports leagues which have been chilled by the prospect of huge treble damage judgments.

A sports league cannot enjoy this antitrust certainty, however, unless it meets three requirements set forth in the legislation. First, the league must provide notice and a hearing to all interested parties concerning a team's proposed move. Second, the league must protect the public interest by considering specified factors in deciding whether to permit the move. Last, the league must promote comparable economic opportunities for its teams by sharing revenue derived from the public benefits and subsidies the teams receive.

This conditional antitrust protection will help resolve the problems of franchise instability caused by large public subsidies. The antitrust certainty provided by this bill will permit a sports league to take more decisive action to stop teams from moving when the league believes relocation will not serve the public interest. The requirements that the league analyze specific factors and provide notice and a hearing to interested parties before deciding whether a team can relocate will help ensure that proper decisions are made. The third requirement, instituting revenue sharing of public benefits, is crucial to address an underlying cause of sports franchise instability. Unlike the first two requirements, the effectiveness of revenue sharing does not depend on the opinion of the league about a particular move. Let me briefly explain the economic background of this revenue sharing requirement.

As revealed during my Antitrust Subcommittee hearing, the franchise instability we are now experiencing is largely the result of changing economics within major league sports. Now that players are free agents, competition among owners for the best talent has driven player salaries to amazing heights. This, in turn, has increased pressure on owners to increase their

revenues, particularly relative to other owners, in order to compete for the best players. In this competition for talent, the total amount of an owner's revenue matters less than whether that owner has fallen behind the other owners.

Football, hockey, and basketball each share a significant portion of total revenues among the teams in the league. Because owners seek to better their positions compared to other owners, however, they naturally seek to raise revenue in areas where revenue is not shared. As a result, owners aggressively seek new public benefits and subsidies, often through new or improved stadiums with more luxury suites as we have seen in football, because they have not been required to share that revenue. In this effort, owners routinely use threats of relocation to another city as leverage.

Let me emphasize that my legislation would not in any way prohibit public funds from being used to attract or keep a team, if a city or State voluntarily decides to allocate its resources in that way. Instead, my legislation would require the league to promote comparable opportunities for all teams by equalizing the public benefits among them. This would level the playing field, so to speak, so that teams need not move or threaten to move in order to obtain more public funds to keep from falling behind others in the league. Let me illustrate how this is intended to work in practice.

Last Fall, Art Modell, owner of the Cleveland Browns, announced that he planned to move his team from Cleveland to Baltimore. His move reportedly was motivated by financial pressure on the franchise caused by rapidly increasing player salaries, plus promises of large public benefits from Baltimore. If my revenue-sharing provision had been in place, however, Mr. Modell would have faced different options. Under my legislation, the league would have instituted procedures to promote comparable economic opportunities to address disparities in team revenue due to public benefits and subsidies. So in our example, if Mr. Modell was obtaining fewer public benefits in Cleveland than average, he would receive transfers to bring his team up to the league average. On the other hand, if the annual public benefits received for moving to Baltimore pushed Mr. Modell above the average, he would have to share some of the value of the public benefits in order to keep his team at the league average. Faced with these choices and a hometown that loved his team, it is hard to imagine that Mr. Modell would have chosen to move—and endure tremendous criticism—if he would receive the league average either way. Even if Mr. Modell still wished to relocate, however, the league might well have blocked the move, based on the factors established and the antitrust certainty provided by this legislation.

Of course, it is sometimes appropriate and even desirable for a team to

relocate, such as when the fans and local business community do not adequately appreciate and support their team. My revenue-sharing requirement would not stop such moves, but would encourage professional sports to look more to private funding than to public subsidies in such cases.

Nor does this revenue-sharing requirement stop a community from using public funds to construct or improve a stadium or arena if it wishes to do so. The provision would require the team using the facility to share revenue only if the team receives financial benefits as a result of the public expenditures, such as rent abatement or extra luxury suite income, which exceed the league average. In other words, if the city chose to build or renovate a stadium, and used any additional revenues to repay the public expenditures for the construction, those new revenues would not be included in any revenue-sharing arrangement.

As I indicated earlier, the recent problems with franchise instability have occurred largely in the National Football League. It may be no coincidence that since a \$49 million antitrust judgment was levied against the NFL for trying to block the Raiders' move to Los Angeles in the 1980's, football has been more reluctant than basketball and hockey to risk antitrust litigation over the propriety of league actions. It should be noted that my legislation does not require any league to take any action, but simply provides antitrust certainty to those leagues which choose to comply with the bill's requirements. Some leagues may not choose to participate initially.

Certainly this legislation should not be taken as any indication that joint conduct by a league in addressing franchise movement or any other issue would be illegal under the current state of antitrust law. The conduct of a league may very well be found lawful under the antitrust laws when making and enforcing rules governing franchise relocation by its teams, without consideration of this legislation. My bill simply provides certainty to leagues that choose to comply with its terms.

Finally, this bill does not limit its antitrust clarification to the major sports, but defines professional sports league broadly. It should be noted, however, that major league baseball is excluded from the bill as long as baseball's judicially created antitrust exemption concerning franchise relocation remains in place. I would hasten to add that franchise relocation issues are expressly not affected by the separate baseball legislation, S. 627, that I introduced with Senator HATCH and others, to limit baseball's judicially created antitrust exemption. Let me repeat so there is no confusion: neither this legislation I am introducing today, nor our baseball legislation, S. 627, which has passed both the Antitrust Subcommittee and the full Judiciary Committee, would in any way impact baseball's current ability to control

franchise movement. Indeed, this new legislation along with S. 627 would go a long way toward putting all professional sports on an even footing under our Nation's antitrust laws.

Mr. President, the instability of sports franchises caused by large public subsidies of professional sports raises important issues which have a direct and significant impact on the lives and finances of most Americans. The Professional Sports Antitrust Clarification Act will help to resolve these concerns.

I send the bill to the desk and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 1696

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Professional Sports Antitrust Clarification Act of 1996".

SEC. 2. ACTIONS AUTHORIZED.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any provision of the antitrust laws, and subject to section 3 and subsection (b) of this section, a professional sports league or its member franchises may establish and enforce rules and procedures for the purpose of deciding whether a member franchise may change its home territory.

(b) CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to exempt from the antitrust laws any conduct which would be unlawful under any antitrust law if engaged in by a single entity.

SEC. 3. REQUIREMENTS FOR ANTITRUST PROTECTION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—This Act applies to a professional sports league and its member franchises if such league—

(1) establishes applicable rules and procedures to govern whether a member franchise may change its home territory that are available upon request to any interested party;

(2) affords due process, including 180 days notice and an opportunity to be heard, to interested parties prior to deciding whether a member franchise may change its home territory; and

(3) promotes comparable economic opportunities by sharing revenue among member franchises to account for disparities in revenue received or costs saved due to direct or indirect public benefits and subsidies, including publicly financed facilities, rent abatement, special tax treatment, favorable arrangements for parking, concessions, and other amenities, and other public benefits not generally available to businesses as a whole within the jurisdiction.

(b) RULES AND PROCEDURES.—Rules and procedures established under subsection (a)(1) shall require consideration of various factors to protect the public interest, including—

(1) the extent to which fan support for a member franchise has been demonstrated through attendance, ticket sales, and television ratings, during the period in which the member franchise played in its home territory;

(2) the extent to which the member franchise has, directly or indirectly, received public financial support through publicly financed facilities, rent abatement, special tax treatment, favorable arrangements for parking, concessions, and other amenities, and any other public benefits not generally

available to businesses as a whole within the jurisdiction, and the extent to which such support continues;

(3) the effect that relocation would have on contracts, agreements, and understandings between the member franchise and public and private parties;

(4) the extent of any net operating losses experienced by the member franchise in recent years and the extent to which the member franchise bears responsibility for such losses; and

(5) any bona fide offer to purchase the member franchise at fair market value, if such offer includes the continued location of such member franchise in its home territory.

SEC. 4. JUDICIAL REVIEW.

(a) STANDARD OF REVIEW.—The standard of judicial review shall be de novo in any action challenging the establishment and enforcement of rules and procedures for deciding whether a member franchise may change its home territory, except that the reviewing court shall give deference to actions of the professional sports league regarding compliance with paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 3(a).

(b) DECLARATORY ACTIONS.—A professional sports league or any interested party may seek a declaratory judgment with respect to whether paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 3(a) are adequately satisfied by the professional sports league for this Act to apply.

(c) LIMITATION ON MONETARY DAMAGES.—A judicial finding that a professional sports league did not comply with any provision of section 3 shall result only in further proceedings by the professional sports league and shall not result in liability under the antitrust laws or monetary damages, if—

(1) the professional sports league implemented a revenue sharing plan in a good faith attempt to comply with section 3(a)(3) prior to the specific dispute in issue; or

(2) a prior declaratory judgment held that the revenue sharing plan of the professional sports league complied with section 3(a)(3).

(d) VENUE.—In any action challenging the establishment and enforcement of rules and procedures to decide whether a member franchise may change its home territory, venue shall be proper only in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, except that—

(1) venue shall be proper only in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York if the existing or proposed home territory of a member franchise is located within 100 miles of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia; and

(2) venue shall be proper only in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois if—

(A) the existing home territory of a member franchise is located within 100 miles of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or the Southern District of New York; and

(B) the proposed home territory of the member franchise is located within 100 miles of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or the Southern District of New York.

SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.

For purposes of this Act—

(1) the term “antitrust laws”—

(A) has the same meaning as in subsection (a) of the first section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)), except that such term includes section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent that such section relates to unfair methods of competition; and

(B) includes any State law comparable to the laws referred to in subparagraph (A);

(2) the terms “professional sports team”, “team”, “member franchise”, and “franchise”

mean any team of professional athletes that is a member of a professional sports league;

(3) the terms “professional sports league” and “league” mean—

(A) an association of 2 or more professional sports teams that governs the conduct of its members and regulates the contests and exhibitions in which such teams regularly engage;

(B) whose decisions relating to franchise relocation would otherwise be subject to the antitrust laws; and

(C) that has combined franchise revenues of more than \$10,000,000 per year;

(4) the term “interested party” means the member franchise at issue, local and State government officials, owners and operators of playing facilities, concessionaires, and others whose business relations would be directly and significantly affected by the franchise relocation at issue, and representatives of organized civic and fan groups; and

(5) the term “playing facility” means the stadium, arena, or other venue in which professional sports teams regularly conduct their contests and exhibitions.

SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This Act applies to any action occurring on or after the date of enactment of this Act.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS

S. 334

At the request of Mr. McCONNELL, the name of the Senator from Colorado [Mr. CAMPBELL] was added as a cosponsor of S. 334, a bill to amend title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to encourage States to enact a Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights, to provide standards and protection for the conduct of internal police investigations, and for other purposes.

S. 673

At the request of Mrs. KASSEBAUM, the name of the Senator from Alaska [Mr. MURKOWSKI] was added as a cosponsor of S. 673, a bill to establish a youth development grant program, and for other purposes.

S. 773

At the request of Mrs. KASSEBAUM, the name of the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. GRAMS] was added as a cosponsor of S. 773, a bill to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to provide for improvements in the process of approving and using animal drugs, and for other purposes.

S. 837

At the request of Mr. WARNER, the name of the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. INHOFE] was added as a cosponsor of S. 837, a bill to require the Secretary of the Treasury to mint coins in commemoration of the 250th anniversary of the birth of James Madison.

S. 1002

At the request of Mr. CHAFEE, the name of the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. BREAU] was added as a cosponsor of S. 1002, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide a credit against income tax to individuals who rehabilitate historic homes or who are the first purchasers of rehabilitated historic homes for use as a principal residence.

S. 1493

At the request of Mr. LAUTENBERG, the names of the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. AKAKA], the Senator from California [Mrs. BOXER], the Senator from Nevada [Mr. REID], the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. FEINGOLD], the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. KOHL], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KERRY], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. SIMON], the Senator from Maryland [Ms. MIKULSKI], and the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. BRADLEY] were added as cosponsors of S. 1493, a bill to amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit certain interstate conduct relating to exotic animals.

S. 1524

At the request of Mr. LAUTENBERG, the name of the Senator from Washington [Mrs. MURRAY] was added as a cosponsor of S. 1524, a bill to amend title 49, United States Code, to prohibit smoking on any scheduled airline flight segment in intrastate, interstate, or foreign air transportation.

S. 1578

At the request of Mr. FRIST, the names of the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. KEMPTHORNE], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. DOMENICI], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. SIMON], and the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PELL] were added as cosponsors of S. 1578, a bill to amend the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1997 through 2002, and for other purposes.

S. 1612

At the request of Mr. HELMS, the name of the Senator from Alaska [Mr. MURKOWSKI] was added as a cosponsor of S. 1612, a bill to provide for increased mandatory minimum sentences for criminals possessing firearms, and for other purposes.

S. 1628

At the request of Mr. BROWN, the names of the Senator from Colorado [Mr. CAMPBELL], and the Senator from Alaska [Mr. MURKOWSKI] were added as cosponsors of S. 1628, a bill to amend title 17, United States Code, relating to the copyright interests of certain musical performances, and for other purposes.

S. 1660

At the request of Mr. GLENN, the names of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. DEWINE] and the Senator from Illinois [Mr. SIMON] were added as cosponsors of S. 1660, a bill to provide for ballast water management to prevent the introduction and spread of nonindigenous species into the waters of the United States, and for other purposes.

S. 1690

At the request of Mr. CONRAD, the name of the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. KOHL] was added as a cosponsor of S. 1690, a bill to provide a grace period for the prohibition on Consolidated Farm Service Agency lending to delinquent borrowers, and for other purposes.