

persons but also to help people who are homeless, jobless, and difficult-to-employ get jobs, preferably within walking distance, and become self-sufficient. The YMCA staff will work, for example, with people who are recovering from substance abuse by concentrating aggressively on job training and job getting. Success will be measured not just by occupancy rates but, more importantly, by the number who have moved to independent living.

As with the other examples, the virtue of the YMCA initiative lies in its responding not just to today's need but also to tomorrow's challenge. To paraphrase columnist Robert J. Samuelson, the United States struggles through a soul-searching transition from an era of entitlement to an era of responsibility.●

#### MODEL EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS FOR EX-OFFENDERS

● Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, I take this opportunity to recognize the continued outstanding accomplishments of a model employment program for ex-offenders in my home State of Colorado.

The Golden Door program, founded and developed by Bill Coors, president of the Coors Brewing Co., was implemented 28 years ago this month. The goal of Golden Door is to provide ex-offenders with a comprehensive program for reentry into society with a focus on employment. In addition to an employment opportunity targeting people with limited employment skills, the Golden Door program offers an education, training in personal finances, general counseling, and the stability that allows people to successfully maintain a job.

Eighty percent of the participants in the Golden Door program complete it successfully and move on to assume full-time positions within the corporation. While this kind of opportunity is somewhat rare, Colorado has proven that the concept can be effectively duplicated, proving profitable to the sponsoring business, the community and the participants.

Bill Coors' vision for a better community and a second change for people has left the State of Colorado with his legacy of philanthropic efforts and a solid example to which businesses, small and large alike, can aspire. It was in 1994 that I first called the attention of Congress to the Golden Door program, commending its good will and success. I also used that opportunity to express my support for the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit—now the Work Opportunity Tax Credit—initiative, a program designed to assist smaller businesses in employing people of similar target groups.

Since then, a variety of other legislative action has been taken to encourage the successful reentry of ex-offenders into society. Employment training is being institutionalized in prisons, and Congress is working to safeguard the continuation of these programs as we move through the legislative process.

In addition to highlighting the ongoing success of Golden Door and the Na-

tion's concern over reducing the rate of recidivism, I would like to recognize a sister program to Golden Door called Gateway Through the Rockies, a community partnership to reduce criminal recidivism. The El Paso County, CO, Sheriff's Department recently kicked off Gateway to provide inmates nearing release with a comprehensive program of education, counseling, work experience, social skills training and post-release support. Modeled after Golden Door, Gateway offers ex-offenders a second chance at no cost to taxpayers.

Golden Door and Gateway Through the Rockies are shining examples of how communities and businesses can work together toward improving the quality of life for the community, while drastically reducing the cost we now incur by simply shuffling people in and out of the penal system. On July 11 of this year, my colleague, Senator GRAHAM, stated in a Senate floor statement that in Florida, "the recidivism rate among those prisoners who have been through our prison industry program is one-fifth of the recidivism rate of the population as a whole." These figures are impressive. It is my hope that in our effort to practice fiscal responsibility and become a less intrusive and yet more responsive government, we would make practical decisions regarding that segment of our community that has paid its debt and is capable of making a positive contribution. Programs serving as this segue simply makes sense.

Mr. President, I would like to state my commitment to encouraging such programs and exploring potential legislative initiatives to facilitate community partnerships to reduce recidivism. Again, my thanks to all of the individuals, organizations and businesses for their ground-breaking contributions to community-based programs in Colorado and across the country.●

#### CITY CAB CO.

● Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise to honor City Cab Co. on its 68th anniversary. City Cab Co. is the Nation's oldest African-American taxicab association.

On July 17, 1928, a group of ambitious African-American taxi drivers met in Detroit to discuss the possibility of starting a nonprofit corporate association because they were not accepted at the major cab company. Two weeks later, City Cab Co. was founded with nine charter members. City Cab membership has grown over the last 68 years, and as the company has remained in the city since its inception, it has become closely involved with the community. City Cab has transported children with special needs to and from school for over 30 years free of charge. This year, an anniversary gala will benefit these children further with proceeds going to scholarship fund.

City Cab has shown the people of Detroit what it means to be a supportive partner of the community. I know my

Senate colleagues join me in congratulating City Cab Co. on its 68th anniversary.●

#### THE GATHERING STORM

● Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to read an article by Maj. Gen. Edward J. Philbin, which I ask be printed in the RECORD. In the wake of downsizing our national defense apparatus, we will come to rely even more on the capabilities of United States' Reserve Forces. As Members of Congress, we should take it upon ourselves to insure that guard and reserve units are prepared to carry this mission well into the next century.

The article follows:

[From National Guard, June 1996]

#### THE GATHERING STORM

(By Maj. Gen. Edward J. Philbin (ret.))

Recently, I was conducting experiments on the aerodynamic behavior of low-altitude, low-velocity spherical bodies at the Andrews Air Force Base golf course. Like all weather-wary flyers, I kept a suspicious eye on the mutating cloud formations overhead. Across the initially cloudless, blue sky crept wisps of white, which slowly burgeoned into rising silver cloud towers, the pinnacles fattening into great overhanging mushrooms of gold and purple. Progressively, the sky was darkened by a great sea of these forbidding gray thunderstorms. And then, these "duty boomers" unleashed a lightning barrage, which generated peals of thunder, followed by a monsoon-like deluge of water.

With apologies to Winston Churchill for appropriating one of his titles, I was struck by the similarity between this atmospheric spectacle and the acerbic treatment accorded the Army Guard since Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm almost six years ago. At that time an orchestrated public affairs attack on the Army Guard was launched, concentrating on the three round-out brigades federalized on November 30, 1990. The most popular target of abuse was Georgia's 48th Infantry Brigade, roundout to the 24th Infantry Division, because of its alleged post-mobilization ineptitude at the National Training Center (NTC). The fact that the 48th Brigade had, before mobilization, been consistently evaluated as combat ready by the 24th Infantry Division was ignored. Also ignored was the 48th's call-up 3½ months after its parent division was alerted for Gulf deployment. Also never mentioned was the fact that, despite all the obstacles placed in its path at the NTC, the 48th was revalidated as combat ready in 91 calendar days, which was just one day more than scheduled, and on the very day the cease-fire went into effect. During those 91 days, the 48th Infantry Brigade spent only 65 days actually training.

Despite these facts, the 48th has been continually flogged and castigated by the media for "failure" to deploy to the combat area. With relentless determination, the media have published a rash of articles emphasizing fictional failings rather than positive accomplishments of the 48th, concluding that since the 48th "couldn't hack it," then none of the Army Guard "can hack it." This World War II tactic relies on the theory that "if you tell a big enough lie, and tell it often enough, most people will eventually believe it." The audience for which this propaganda is intended is the members of Congress in the hope they will relegate the Army National Guard to a state constabulary.

The Reserve Officers Association (ROA), in its May issue of the ROA National Security

Report, published the written testimony of Richard Davis, General Accounting Office (GAO), which was presented at a hearing before Senator John McCain (R-Arizona). Davis, among other things, claimed that "at least one reserve component has not sufficiently adapted to the new challenges [of regional dangers rather than a global Soviet threat] and therefore may not be prepared to carry out its assigned missions." Guess which one? It's the Army National Guard. Davis went on to state that (1) the "Army National Guard has considerable excess combat forces" while the "big Army" hungers for more combat support units; (2) "the ability of some Army National Guard combat brigades to be ready for early deployment missions \* \* \* is highly uncertain," suggesting that Army National Guard roles and missions should be "modified;" and (3) the Air National Guard force dedicated to continental air defense " \* \* \* is not needed today" and eliminating them would free "considerable funds" for better use. Since this issue will be resolved cooperatively with the United States Air Force and the Congress, no further comment will be made here.

Davis, whose resumé is devoid of any hint of military experience, grounded his opinion upon the alleged military deficiencies of the three Army National Guard brigades, federalized for the Gulf War. However, those three brigades met the Army's deployability criteria, but were never given the mission to deploy and no sealift was ever requested or scheduled for them. I repeat: All three roundout brigades and the three additional Guard battalions (Texas, Alabama and South Carolina) met the readiness deployability criteria established by the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS) on the first day of federalization.

The truth, obscured by the slanderous billingsgate that has been spewed on the Army Guard, is that Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was a significant success for the Army National Guard as well as the "big Army." Army Guard volunteers filled critical positions early in the crisis. It was successful in rapidly deploying 60 COL/LTC level commands to SWA, all of which made a significant contribution to Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield.

Due to years of preparation, Army Guard units were ready for federalization and were successful. All Army Guard units were at their respective mobilization stations within 72 hours of federalization. More than 97 percent of ARNG units met or exceeded deployability criteria when federalized. Sixty-seven percent of all Army Guard units deployed within 45 days of being federalized. The primary obstacle to an even earlier deployment was unavailability of sealift and airlift.

Almost 100 percent of the Army Guard soldiers called-up reported for active duty and more than 94 percent of the units' soldiers were deployable. Of the unit troops, only six percent (3,974 of 62,411) were ineligible for deployment under statutory provisions and DoD guidelines.

Before federalization, the combat readiness of the Army National Guard was at an historic high. The Army Guard demonstrated its ability to alert, federalize and rapidly deploy to the theater of operations (CENTCOM)—reports to the contrary notwithstanding.

Did Mr. Davis (B.S. degree in accounting; M.S. in business administration) consider any of these data in arriving at the apocalyptic conclusions about the Army National Guard's military prowess? If he did, he didn't mention it in his written or oral testimony. But his oral testimony was liberally buttressed with statements such as: "I think," "I believe," "it's my opinion," but no evidence was given.

Our "good friends" in the ROA never mentioned these facts to their readers. Nor did ROA mention that for various reasons a considerable portion of the Army Reserve is not deployable. Probably that is the reason the Army Reserve is energetically blocking the path of Army Reservists who wish to transfer to the Army Guard. ROA claims that the purpose of its National Security Report is to inform Reservists of the facts of readiness issues. Yet, ROA publishes only material that denigrates the Army Guard. The motive may be found in the following excerpt from a commentary printed beside the Davis testimony:

"Anyone reading carefully between the lines of the articles contained in this month's NSR will become aware of the riptides and undercurrents that can impact negatively on the future size and role of the Reserves if we (ROA) are not careful. The problem is that many Reserve officers assigned to units feel they do not have to join ROA in order to take advantage of the benefits of the highly effective legislative work ROA does on their behalf on Capitol Hill."

Sounds more like a membership drive than a crusade for the truth.

ROA followed Mr. Davis' fantasy with two other articles presented as if they were hot-off-the-press news flashes: "21st Century Force: A Federal Army and a Militia" and "The State Militia." In fact, as the Brits say, they were "mutton dressed up as lamb," having been written in 1993 at the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, by COL Charles Heller, who was an Army Reserve advisor.

Heller's first article blames the "inordinate influence" of the AGAUS and NGAUS for the "big Army's" alleged difficulty in structuring a stronger Total Army. Not surprisingly, he paints the Army Reserve and ROA as more responsive to and supportive of the "big Army." Predictably, Heller alleges that the Army Reserve call-up and its service in the Gulf War were exemplary, while Army Guard combat maneuver elements required, "lengthy post-mobilization training and then [did] not deploy to the Gulf." Heller concludes that, "the Total Army should be organized into two components—a federal Army (Active Army and the U.S. Army Reserve) and a militia (the state Army National Guard.)" He stops short, just barely, of advocating equipping the Army Guard with horses, lances and swords.

Heller proposes that the Army Reserve be made responsible for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). That's very interesting, since the ROA leadership, which published Heller's musings, now professes to have utterly no interest in seeking new jobs for the Army Reserve. Yet, they feverishly sought and probably still seek passage of the Laughlin Bill (H.R. 1646), which would have interjected the Army Reserve into the National Guard's constitutional state mission.

Very solicitous of the National Guard's welfare, Heller worries that the Army Guard will have no time to train adequately for both the state and federal mission, alleging without explanation that the Army Guard failed in the Gulf deployment and in the Los Angeles riots. He proposes of that the Army Guard should concentrate on the state mission. He also advocates USAR involvement in the state, as well as the federal, mission in a contradiction in his argument, which in his exuberance to redesign the Army Guard, he ignores.

His opinions and conclusions are heuristic, self-serving, internally contradictory and unsupported by any evidence. All of these allegations are refuted by the actual performance of the Army Guard in the Gulf War. But Heller performs a valuable service by raising an extremely important question: Why have

two Army Reserve components? Why, indeed? Certainly, the constitutional framers recognized, as did George Washington, the need to establish a full-time standing army and accordingly gave Congress the power to raise and support armies—and only standing armies were contemplated by that particular language. The Founding Fathers never intended and the sovereign states *never* granted the federal government the power to organize and maintain a federal militia over which the states would have no control. They recognized the necessity of a well-regulated militia and, in the Militia Clause of the Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 16), they made provisions accordingly. It is under this clause that the militia and its modern counterpart, the National Guard, have developed.

A propaganda storm has been gathering and thickening around the Army National Guard since the Gulf War. These libels are intended to generate thunderous doubt about the capability of the Army Guard to perform its federal mission; to generate lightning bolts of criticism of the Army Guard from the Congress and ultimately to create a legislative deluge in which the Army Guard will sink into oblivion. This storm has been energized by the hunger of the National Guard would-be competitors to co-opt our missions and the share of the federal military budget that supports these missions.

There are two ways to deal with an imminent thunderstorm. One way is to huddle under an umbrella, close your eyes to the lightning, put your fingers in your ears to mute the thunder and hope for survival. The other way is to seed the clouds with a defusing substance like silver iodide, dissipate their destructive energy and make them vanish. The time may be at hand when supporters of the National Guard must resort to the defusing technique, which might very well answer, once and for all, Heller's question. Why have two Army Reserve components?

Why, indeed, when the United States Constitution authorizes only one—the National Guard.

Note: As this article was being written, troops of the 48th Brigade were packing up to once again deploy to the NTC. On April 23, Mr. Davis' GAO Division notified DoD that it was initiating, on its own authority, a review of "Roles, Missions, Functions and Costs of the Army Guard and Army Reserve." Be assured that the NGAUS will be scrutinizing both events for any signs of dissembling. ●

#### LAKE SUPERIOR STATE UNIVERSITY

● Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise today to honor Lake Superior State University on the 50th anniversary of its founding. The University has a long and interesting history.

In 1822, Colonel Hugh Brady established a fort in Sault Ste. Marie along the Saint Mary's River. The fort was later named after Colonel Brady, its first commanding officer. In 1866, Fort Brady was rebuilt to protect the State lock and canal from invasion or destruction. In 1892, Fort Brady was moved to a nearby hill-top because increased commercial shipping raised the value of river-front property.

During World War II, Fort Brady saw a lot of action as over 20,000 troops were stationed there for training. The Army used the winters of the region to condition its snowshoe troops for warfare in northern Europe. At the end of