Nearly 20 years ago, Congress prohibited the importation of junk guns, but allowed their domestic manufacture to soar virtually unchecked. Today, 8 of the 10 firearms most frequently traced at crime scenes are junk guns that cannot be traced. My view is that if a gun represents such a threat to public safety that it should not be imported, its domestic manufacture should also be restricted. A firearm's point of origin should be irrelevant.

Since the introduction of my legislation, a strong grassroots movement has developed to help get these weapons off the streets. Thousands of volunteers have worked to educate local, State, and Federal elected officials about the issues. The emerging coalition against junk guns includes law enforcement officials, physicians, children's advocates, and religious organizations. More than two dozen California police chiefs, in that or those from California's largest cities, have endorsed my legislation.

The movement to get these junk guns off the streets is clearly gaining steam. Many of California's largest cities, from San Francisco to Oakland and San Jose, have enacted local ordinances prohibiting the sale of junk guns. Two weeks ago, the mayors of more than a dozen cities from California's East Bay pledged to push for local junk gun prohibitions in each of their jurisdictions, creating the one of the largest junk-gun-free zones in the country.

I am dedicated to working hard on this issue and will continue to push the yonder. We will get these killer guns off our streets. When Senators return to their States over the August recess, I encourage them to discuss this issue with their constituents. I believe they will find that Californians do not support the current junk gun double standard, allowing poor quality weapons to be produced domestically, but not imported.

**JAPAN CONSTRUCTION PRACTICES**

**Mr. MURKOWSKI.** Mr. President, I rise to speak about an item that is not in the news right now. But that could have significance for United States construction companies and for United States-Japan trade relations. It has come to my attention that the Japanese Government is building a new airport near Nagoya, Japan, called the Chubu Central Airport. This multibillion-dollar project will be that country’s largest public works effort for the next decade. The first flights are planned for the year 2005.

As many of my colleagues are already aware, construction companies must be included in any list of our most competitive international industries. These companies have particular expertise in building large airports, having constructed the international airports in Hong Kong and Seoul, Korea, among others. Curiously, only in Japan have they been unsuccessful.

This is not for lack of trying. American construction, architecture, and design engineering firms have been trying to participate in the Japanese market for over a decade, with limited success. I have taken to the Senate floor many times to complain about how United States companies were blocked from participating in any meaningful way in the construction of the Kansai International Airport, despite numerous promises from the Japanese Government that it would work to level the military playing field between Serbs and Muslims.

I maintained then—I reiterate today—that it is the Congress—the United States Congress—which had to authorize the deployment, after thorough consultation with the Administration. From all reports coming out of Bosnia, we are now paying the piper for moving without the careful deliberation and consideration of pros and cons that a real policy debate would have engendered. If the Administration had truly consulted with the Congress—and not simply presented us with a fait accompli—we might have been able to anticipate many of the problems that we have experienced in the military aspects of the Dayton Accord and its parallel civilian institutions.

I recognize that the issues and problems are complex and I do not mean to suggest that I or the Senate would have arrived at some even of the answers.

But I did pose a number of questions to the Administration during last year’s all-too-brief hearings on the deployment and in the subsequent cursory debate on the Senate floor, in an effort to focus on partici- pant problems. But as you know, the decision had already been made to move forward and the Congress sideline, a sad fact I blamed as much on our timidity as the Administration’s circumvention of constitutional proc-

I recognize, Mr. President, that the Dayton Accord and the IFOR deployment to enforce its provision has not been without some real benefit. We can all agree that the humanitarian effort is no longer dying en masse in Bosnia; U.S. and other IFOR troops are to be applauded for having largely succeeded in enforcing the military aspects of the agreement.

The head of the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA], Lt.Gen. Patrick Hughes, testified earlier this year that he expected that the parties would continue generally to comply with the military aspects of the Dayton Accord, and that he hoped that they will receive positive news on the Chubu project.

**BOSNIA POLICY**

**Mr. FEINGOLD.** Mr. President, the deployment of U.S. and NATO forces under the International Force [IFOR] has passed its midway mark and I would like to re-

view with my colleagues what I believe has been accomplished to date, the many questions yet unanswered by the Administration, as well as the dan-
gerous pitfalls I see on the road ahead.

Mr. President, I was one of those who voted against the deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia, to take part in the NATO-led effort to enforce the military provisions of the Dayton Accord. I was skeptical then, and remain so today, of Administration assertions that U.S. strategic interests in Central Europe will be served by the deployment. I justified this costly investment of troops and resources abroad. I took with a grain of salt Administration promises that U.S. troops would be out of Bosnia in a year’s time and Administration assertions that it would work to level the military playing field between Serbs and Muslims.

Mr. President, I was one of those who viewed with my colleagues what I believe were the dangerous pitfalls I see on the road ahead.

Mr. President, I will be watching the Administration to ensure that the IFOR directives. Hughes “did not ex-

pect” U.S. or allied forces to face orga-
nized military resistance; any “mod-
ed” threat remained limited to mines and sporadic low-level violence, such as ambushes and rocket attacks. The administration recently confirmed that many of the peacekeeping tasks delegated to IFOR have been completed, including over-

seeing the transfer of territory, the de-
mobilization of troops and the storage or disposal of heavy weapons.

But there are disturbing signs, Mr. President, that the progress is transitory and perhaps even an illusion.
Compliance is begetting; “the spirit of Dayton” encouraged at the point of NATO armed forces. In an October 19, 1995 letter to Secretary Perry, I asked just how durable an IFOR-enforced peace would be. Specifically for some of the reasons that the Serbs had abandoned their quest for a “Greater Serbia” and that the territorial integrity of Bosnia would be protected.

The facts on the ground provide the disturbing answer. Secretary Hughes, for one, was troubled by the “fundamentally unchanged strategic political goals of the former warring factions; that is, eventual permanent partition. Upon IFOR’s withdrawal, Hughes forewarned: Bosnian Serbs seeking political confederation with Yugoslavia; Bosnian Croats with Zagreb; resistance by Serbs and Croats to efforts of the Muslim-led government to assert its authority; collapse of the “Federation” of Croats and Muslims, intended as a counterweight to the Serbian entity created by Dayton, under the mutual hostility of Muslim and Croat; and delay or stymie of civil affairs, such as elections.

In short, Mr. President, there is the real possibility that after a nearly $2.8 billion investment just for the deployment of our troops to Bosnia, we will be back at square one: hostile, ethically-divided factions facing off at tenuous borders under unstable military, political, and social conditions.

I am pleased to note President Clinton’s July announcement that the military assistance program for the Bosnian-Muslim federation is finally scheduled to begin. A contingent of Bosnian soldiers—all Muslims—reportedly arrived in Turkey for training and $98.4 million in U.S. arms are scheduled to be shipped to the Bosnian army, including M60 tanks, armored personnel carriers and antitank weapons in the next several weeks. Turkey has reportedly matched the U.S. pledge and U.S. private contractors will assist the Turks in improving command-and-control and other military procedures. I hope that this marks the genesis of a Muslim force capable of defending the Dayton peace agreement—waged by hostile neighbors.

But I wonder, Mr. President, where are our European allies? Even with the U.S. and Turkish pledges, there remains a $600 million shortfall on the amount needed to adequately equip and train the Muslims. The Europeans—especially the French and British—have contributed nothing and their support for Dayton Accord provisions calling for adequate arming and training of the Muslims, are lukewarm, at best. Yet while they continue to view sending Western arms to Bosnia as destabilizing, they do not seem to object to harboring an—otherwise hostile state with which they wish to trade—arm the Muslims.

I had thought that we had received assurances from the Europeans that they would support the arm and train provisions of Dayton. Have we been bamboozled? What is the Administration doing to press the issue?

Yet another question I asked of Secretary Perry last year regarded U.S. taintment of international observers such as General Miladzic and Mr. Karadzic. The issue of dealing with persons today government officials responsible for effecting Dayton’s provisions, but who yesterday were mass murderers, is not an easy one. All the factions in Bosnia harbor such men and each of the ethnic communities—especially the Muslims—suffered grievously at their hands.

Some argue that the process of reconciliation would be better served by putting the past behind us. I disagree wholeheartedly. The international community has made a judgment that those involved in genocide must be brought before a court of justice. Corruption and the investigation and prosecuting these men risk exacerbating old wounds. But I believe the healing process is better served by bringing these crimes out into the light of day and punishing those responsible. Otherwise, the victims families will allow the resentments to fester and the cycle of violence inevitably erupt anew.

I am pleased to note President Clinton’s July announcement that the military assistance program for the Bosnian-Muslim federation is finally scheduled to begin. A contingent of Bosnian soldiers—all Muslims—reportedly arrived in Turkey for training and $98.4 million in U.S. arms are scheduled to be shipped to the Bosnian army, including M60 tanks, armored personnel carriers and antitank weapons in the next several weeks. Turkey has reportedly matched the U.S. pledge and U.S. private contractors will assist the Turks in improving command-and-control and other military procedures. I hope that this marks the genesis of a Muslim force capable of defending the Dayton peace agreement—waged by hostile neighbors.

But I wonder, Mr. President, where are our European allies? Even with the U.S. and Turkish pledges, there remains a $600 million shortfall on the amount needed to adequately equip and train the Muslims. The Europeans—especially the French and British—have contributed nothing and their support for Dayton Accord provisions calling for adequate arming and training of the Muslims, are lukewarm, at best. Yet while they continue to view sending Western arms to Bosnia as destabilizing, they do not seem to object to harboring an—otherwise hostile state with which they wish to trade—arm the Muslims.

I had thought that we had received assurances from the Europeans that they would support the arm and train provisions of Dayton. Have we been bamboozled? What is the Administration doing to press the issue?

Yet another question I asked of Secretary Perry last year regarded U.S. taintment of international observers such as General Miladzic and Mr. Karadzic. The issue of dealing with persons today government officials responsible for effecting Dayton’s provisions, but who yesterday were mass murderers, is not an easy one. All the factions in Bosnia harbor such men and each of the ethnic communities—especially the Muslims—suffered grievously at their hands.

Some argue that the process of reconciliation would be better served by putting the past behind us. I disagree wholeheartedly. The international community has made a judgment that those involved in genocide must be brought before a court of justice. Corruption and the investigation and prosecuting these men risk exacerbating old wounds. But I believe the healing process is better served by bringing these crimes out into the light of day and punishing those responsible. Otherwise, the victims families will allow the resentments to fester and the cycle of violence inevitably erupt anew.

Our political, financial and strategic investment in Dayton and in IFOR requires that we not allow the Muslim entity to wither on the vine. The dividends—stability in Europe, enhanced credibility in the Muslim world, underpinning Iranian inroads, economic opportunities for U.S. business—outweigh the costs.

Which brings me, Mr. President, to the next question I raised in October: what provision had the Administration made for the arming and training of Bosnia’s Muslims? I have argued almost from the moment I first entered the Senate that we should arm and train the Muslims, permitting them to adequately defend themselves. If we had done so three years ago, we would likely not have found ourselves in a position of enforcing a peace that the facts may not want.

In any event, the Pentagon has also apparently modified the President’s promise that our troops would be home by December 20. Now, I understand, exit will begin on or around that date, ensuring that some of our men and women will be in Bosnia well into 1997. The Pentagon has also apparently modified the President’s promise that our troops would be home by December 20. Now, I understand, exit will begin on or around that date, ensuring that some of our men and women will be in Bosnia well into 1997. The Pentagon has also apparently modified the President’s promise that our troops would be home by December 20. Now, I understand, exit will begin on or around that date, ensuring that some of our men and women will be in Bosnia well into 1997. The Pentagon has also apparently modified the President’s promise that our troops would be home by December 20. Now, I understand, exit will begin on or around that date, ensuring that some of our men and women will be in Bosnia well into 1997. The Pentagon has also apparently modified the President’s promise that our troops would be home by December 20. Now, I understand, exit will begin on or around that date, ensuring that some of our men and women will be in Bosnia well into 1997. The Pentagon has also apparently modified the President’s promise that our troops would be home by December 20. Now, I understand, exit will begin on or around that date, ensuring that some of our men and women will be in Bosnia well into 1997. The Pentagon has also apparently modified the President’s promise that our troops would be home by December 20. Now, I understand, exit will begin on or around that date, ensuring that some of our men and women will be in Bosnia well into 1997. The Pentagon has also apparently modified the President’s promise that our troops would be home by December 20. Now, I understand, exit will begin on or around that date, ensuring that some of our men and women will be in Bosnia well into 1997. The Pentagon has also apparently modified the President’s promise that our troops would be home by December 20. Now, I understand, exit will begin on or around that date, ensuring that some of our men and women will be in Bosnia well into 1997. The Pentagon has also apparently modified the President’s promise that our troops would be home by December 20. Now, I understand, exit will begin on or around that date, ensuring that some of our men and women will be in Bosnia well into 1997. The Pentagon has also apparently modified the President’s promise that our troops would be home by December 20. Now, I understand, exit will begin on or around that date, ensuring that some of our men and women will be in Bosnia well into 1997. The Pentagon has also apparently modified the President’s promise that our troops would be home by December 20. Now, I understand, exit will begin on or around that date, ensuring that some of our men and women will be in Bosnia well into 1997.

Let me say now, Mr. President, that I am opposed to the continued deployment of U.S. ground forces in Bosnia after December 1996. I do not think they should be there now and I expect the President to brief us on its plans for a timely exit.

That said, I am not necessarily opposed to a limited U.S. support role. I remain deeply concerned that Dayton produced a Muslim geographic entity essentially DOA. If ethnic partition is inevitable, the Muslim rump state likely to emerge will have no coastline, be an economic basketcase for the foreseeable future, and remain surrounded by hostile neighbors.

Our political, financial and strategic investment in Dayton and in IFOR requires that we not allow the Muslim entity to wither on the vine. The dividends—stability in Europe, enhanced credibility in the Muslim world, underpinning Iranian inroads, economic opportunities for U.S. business—outweigh the costs.

Which brings me, Mr. President, to the next question I raised in October: what provision had the Administration made for the arming and training of Bosnia’s Muslims? I have argued almost from the moment I first entered the Senate that we should arm and train the Muslims, permitting them to adequately defend themselves. If we had done so three years ago, we would likely not have found ourselves in a position of enforcing a peace that the facts may not want.
I understand the view of the IFOR military commanders, who are reluctant to involve themselves and their troops in this sort of distasteful civilian task and in the dangers of “mission creep.” In a cauldron such as Bosnia, the last thing the peace enforcers want is to be seen taking sides. But I believe that the higher moral and practical obligation involved requires that IFOR troops vigorously protect those seeking to uncover evidence of these crimes. The presence of a protective cordon of IFOR troops at Srebrenica, where the first solid evidence of mass murder and atrocities on an appalling scale is now being exhumed, is a welcome development. I note, however, that the two most prominent war criminals, Karadzic and Mladic, continue to flout their disdain for such pronouncements. Karadzic, for example, dismissed the moderate Serbian prime minister, Rajko Kasagic, in mid-May.

That seems to me to be an act of real political power and certainly not in keeping with State Department assessments that the man is being “sidelined.” Karadzic’s June 30 transfer of power to a political flunky was merely another attempt to avoid punishing economic sanctions. And despite Ambassador Holbrooke’s efforts last month to strip Karadzic of political influence, I think we all understand that Karadzic continues to call the shots which are aimed at the underpinnings of Dayton.

There are other problems, of course. Carl Bildt, the High Representative for implementation of Dayton has noted that while the formal structures of civil civilian implementation are in place, the political will to make Dayton work is clearly missing. Conditions are nowhere near settled enough to conduct “free and fair” elections; absent are freedom of movement, freedom of association and media, and the right to vote in secret near one’s home.

Ambassador Frowick, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission head in Bosnia, even went so far as to admit July 29 that, at best, the elections could be expected to be “reasonably democratic,” adding that “free and fair is a stretch.” Frankly, I’m puzzled as to how elections neither free nor fair can ever be reasonably democratic.

Yet another OSCE certified June 25 that such elections can be held by September 14. The chief of staff of the OSCE, William Steubner, resigned in June, reportedly over a disagreement as to whether Bosnia is anywhere near being ready for an election. The continued influence of thugs such as Karadzic, the reports that Serbian goons are preventing Serbs from voting in their former home districts—one Serb official reportedly dismissed objections by stating: “Who cares where they vote, as long as they vote. That’s all that matters”—are the worst of the IFOR troops. If true, how will this affect the Administration’s pledge that the arm and train program will not come up to speed until those forces are gone?

These political problems—which certainly threaten the long term health of Dayton—are compounded by economic difficulties. A question I did not ask in October, but which looms now over the process, is that of paying for the reconstruction of Bosnia? How realistic is the expectation that the international community will contribute the estimated $5.1 billion necessary over three years to put Bosnia back on the road to recovery? In April, in Brussels, World Bank and EU officials requested $1.8 billion in reconstruction aid for 1996. Donors have pledged only one-third of that amount and the World Bank has received only one-half (or $300 million) of that in actual commitments. Is it any wonder that the Sarejevo government may look again to Tehran, which recently offered $50 million in assistance?

Which leads me Mr. President, in a roundabout way back to the first and most important question I put to Secretary Perry back in October, and which I discussed at length during the December floor debate: why would the Administration not seek Congressional approval and support for the deployment to Bosnia? As I said then, it is through the authorization process—a procedure mandated by the Constitution—that a deployment is explained and refined; that questions are answered; fears alleviated; and the American people given an opportunity to air their views on what the mission is worth to them.

This first and last question, Mr. President, has never been answered. The result has been uncertainty and more questions. To date, we have been fortunate that the results have not been tragic, the sad circumstances surrounding Secretary Brown’s mission notwithstanding.

I remain unconvinced that the IFOR-imposed ceasefire masks anything more than an inevitable slide towards permanent partition; if that is the case—and I hope I am wrong—then I and the American people want to know how this costly deployment furthered the national interest. Mr. President, I hope we will have public hearings soon on the status of the deployment and that you will answer the questions I put forward in October, and repeated here today. I acknowledge again the Congress’ own culpability in not forcing the issue and asserting its constitutional authority and responsibility on the deployment. I hope that the lessons learned here will lead to more backbone in the future.

CENTERs FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION: 50TH ANNIVERSARY

Mrs. KASSEbaum. Mr. President, this summer, the eyes of the world are turned toward Atlanta, the host of the centennial Olympic games. But a careful look reveals another anniversary taking place in Atlanta—an anniversary that we should hail. On July 1, 1996, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reached a milestone: The agency turned 50 years old. What began during World War II as a program to stop the spread of malaria among U.S. military personnel has become a world-renowned scientific agency the mission of which is to prevent and control disease, disability, and injury. With time-tested expertise in communicable disease control, the agency has led efforts in developing a strategy to combat the newly emerging infectious diseases of today. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, which I am honored to chair, has held hearings on this major global public health issue and the role which the United States plays in fighting the spread of communicable diseases, and I am personally committed to this battle. Recently, President Clinton, recognizing the threat that infectious diseases present, issued a Presidential Decision Directive on Emerging Infectious Diseases. In recognition of CDC’s golden anniversary, I would like to summarize the problem, along with the prevention strategy that CDC has developed.

ADDRESSING EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE THREATS: A PREVENTION STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES

Two to three decades ago, many scientists believed that infectious diseases could and would be eliminated as a public health problem in their lifetimes. Today, those very same diseases remain the leading cause of death worldwide, and a major cause of illness, death, and escalating medical costs in the United States.

More and more Americans recognize that the threat that emerging or re-emerging infectious diseases pose to domestic and global health. Accordingly, they understand the need to improve surveillance and response capacity inside and outside our borders—infec-tious microbes know no borders and disregard immigration laws.

Several dramatic changes in our behavior and environment have contributed to the resurgence of infectious diseases. Across the globe, explosive population growth has led to unprecedented migration and overcrowding. These population shifts are aggravated by rapidly changing technology and increasing international travel.