use its limited public resources to provide more and better service to the citizens of the national capital region and to the millions of visitors to the Washington area each year. I hope my colleagues will join me in supporting House Joint Resolution 194.

Mr. Speaker, in closing, I would like to thank the Committee on the Judiciary and its Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law for their expeditious handling of this resolution. These amendments are of the utmost importance to the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.

To the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GEKAS] and to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. SCOTT], who has been a long-time supporter of this system in the State legislature, I appreciate their willingness to move this matter along so we can assist the authority in its constant efforts to reduce costs. As Metro reduces its costs, it can use its limited public resources to provide more and better services to the citizens of the Nation's capital and to the region and to the millions of visitors to the Washington area each year. I ask for its support.

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House Joint Resolution 194 which will help the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority [WMATA] conduct its daily business in a more efficient and cost-effective manner. The proposed amendments already have been approved by the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the District of Columbia. The consent of Congress is required in order for the amendments to become effective.

WMATA, more commonly known as Metro, was created in 1967 when Maryland, Virginia, and the District entered into an interstate compact which was approved by Congress. This is the fifth action to amend the WMATA compact since its inception.

The amendments contain several housekeeping measures which are largely clarifications of current practices mainly of interest to the Authority. The most important amendment would modify the Authority's procurement practices to comply with recently enacted Federal procurement reforms. The Authority has been using a sealed bid process to purchase capital items. Metro's procurement process has been called an anachronism by the Federal Transit Administration [FTA] and it's time for a change. House Joint Resolution 194 will allow Metro to engage in competitive negotiations on capital contracts, as an alternative to the sealed bid process. Most importantly, this alternative will allow WMATA to reduce its costs.

In addition, the proposed amendment will allow WMATA to raise the ceiling on simplified purchasing from $10,000 to $100,000 which conforms with Federal procedures. This will allow Metro to cut out several costly steps in the procurement process for small purchases.

I want to praise and thank Congressman TOM DAVIS for his efforts to bring these important amendments to the House floor in a timely manner. It is important to help Metro reduce its costs in order to provide more and even better service to commuters in the Washington metropolitan region and to the thousands of visitors to the Nation's Capitol each year. Americans visiting Washington surely will be impressed by the safe, clean, reliable system they will use to reach the Smithsonian Museums, the White House, and Capitol Hill.

AMENDMENTS TO THE WMATA INTERSTATE COMPACT FACT SHEET

BACKGROUND

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority was created in 1967 by the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, the District of Columbia entering into an Interstate Compact consented to by the U.S. Congress. The Authority was created to plan, finance, construct and operate a comprehensive public transit system for the metropolitan Washington area. The Compact has been amended four times since its inception. The Authority is proposing a fifth set of amendments to the Compact in order to allow the transit agency to perform its functions more efficiently and cost effectively.

The proposed amendments have been enacted by the three signatories (Maryland, Virginia and the District of Columbia) and require the consent of the Congress in order for the amendments to become effective.

PROCUREMENT REFORM

The most important proposed amendment modifies the Authority's procurement practices to conform with recently enacted Federal procurement reforms. Currently, the Authority must use a sealed bid process on capital items. The proposed amendment will enable the Authority to engage in competitive negotiations on capital contracts, as an alternative to the sealed bid process, resulting in a far more flexible and productive contracting system. This amendment will allow the Authority to essentially do more with less, by reducing paperwork and the time involved in the procurement process.

During the Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) review of the WMATA procurement process, the Authority's procurement approach was cited as an ''anachronism''. The FTA's regulations have allowed competitive procurement since enactment of the Federal Competition in Contracting Act in 1984.

The proposed changes will result in the Authority having fewer bid rejections and cancellations of solicitations. WMATA will be better able to define selection criteria and eliminate costly items from bids. If a prospective contractor recommends a way to change the specification to reduce the costs of that procurement, the Authority will be able to take advantage of this cost savings.

The proposed amendment will also allow the Authority to raise the ceiling on simplified purchasing from $10,000 to the federal level. The FTA has published a circular encouraging States and localities to raise the dollar threshold for small purchases to $100,000 to come into conformity with federal procedures. This amendment will enable the Authority to eliminate several costly steps in the procurement process for small purchases, such as printing a voluminous invitation for bid and waiting 30 days for bids. Instead, WMATA will be able to publish a simplified bid specification and accept written or oral price quotations. Given inflation over the past two decades, the proposed simplified purchasing procedures provide a more accurate definition of small purchase.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

The Amendments contain several ''housekeeping'' matters of interest to the Authority. These amendments are largely codifications and clarifications of current practices including:

Designation of Loudoun County as being within the Transit Zone. This codifies an existing agreement between WMATA and Loudoun County to include the county in the WMATA transit service area.

Deletes references to the Commissioners of the District of Columbia.

Clarifies that where a quorum of the WMATA Board is present, a majority of the quorum may take action, if each signatory is represented among the prevailing vote.

Codifying the current understanding that the Superior Court of the District of Columbia has original jurisdiction concerning WMATA cases.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GUNDERSON). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GEKAS] that the House suspend the rules and pass the joint resolution, House Joint Resolution 194, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended, and the joint resolution, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING BOMBING IN DHAHRAN, SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 200) expressing the sense of the Congress regarding the bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, as amended.

The Clerk read as follows:

H. CON. RES. 200

Whereas on June 25, 1996, a terrorist truck bomb outside a military housing compound in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killed 19 members of the Armed Forces and wounded hundreds of others;

Whereas the members of the Armed Forces killed and wounded in the bombing were defending the national security interests of the United States;

Whereas the defense of United States national interests continues to require the forward deployment of members of the Armed Forces to other countries;

Whereas the members of the Armed Forces are called upon to perform duties that place their lives at risk from terrorist elements hostile to the United States;

Whereas global terrorism has demonstrated no respect for the historic rules of war, no reluctance to strike against innocent and defenseless individuals, and a willingness to engage in tactics against which conventional defenses are difficult;

Whereas it is the duty of the President and the military chain of command to take all necessary steps to keep members of the Armed Forces protected and as safe as the nature of their mission permits;

Whereas the people of the United States stand with those who have volunteered to serve their country and grieve at the loss of those who, to quote Lincoln, ''have given their last full measure of devotion'' to the security and well-being of the United States;

Whereas those members of the Armed Forces serving in Saudi Arabia and around the world demonstrate valor and a faith in the American way of life that reflects honorably not only on themselves but upon the country that they represent; and

Whereas the military personnel who lost their lives on June 25, 1996, in the bombing in Dhahran died in the honorable service of their Nation and exemplified all that is best and most virtuous in the American people: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),

That Congress hereby—

(1) recognizes the 19 members of the Armed Forces who died in the terrorist truck bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on June 25, 1996, and honors them for their service and sacrifice;

(2) calls upon the Nation to hold fast the memory of those who died;

(3) extends its sympathies to the families of those who died; and

(4) assures the members of the Armed Forces serving anywhere in the world that their well-being and interests will at all times be given the highest priority.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE] and the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE].

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on the concurrent resolution now under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, on June 25, 1996, a terrorist bomb attack against a government housing compound in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, resulted in the death of 19 American service members and the wounding of 200 others. This attack demonstrated that terrorism directed against Americans is a continuing threat, and that our men and women in uniform are often at great risk because of the nature of their mission.

Today the House has before it House Concurrent Resolution 200, a bill authored by my colleague and valued member of the House Committee on National Security, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SCARBOROUGH], that recognizes and honors the ultimate sacrifice paid by the 19 American service members who died in this cowardly attack. I believe this bill is a fitting tribute for the House to make, and I urge my colleagues to support it.

Mr. Speaker, last week the Committee on National Security held a hearing to review the Saudi terrorist bombing, the conclusions reached by the Department of Defense's own investigation, and the appropriate measures necessary to ensure that United States forces deployed abroad would be better prepared to deal with similar attacks in the future.

The committee heard from Secretary of Defense Perry, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Shalikashvili, and retired Gen. Wayne Downing, who headed the independent task force charged with investigating the bombing. The conclusions of General Downing's study were consistent with the findings of our committee report released last month.

Mr. Speaker, both reports noted the need for greater tactical intelligence to be used on the terrorist threat to United States forces, and the conduct of Operation Southern Watch as a temporary contingency mission, when it is in reality a long-term operation, and both cited numerous institutional and organizational shortcomings that contributed to the tragedy that resulted in the death of 19 brave Americans.

General Downing's report also found fault at all levels of the chain of command, a conclusion accepted by Secretary of Defense Perry during his testimony before our committee.

Mr. Speaker, House Concurrent Resolution 200 properly notes that we have important and legitimate national security interests in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East that justify our continued presence. The bill also notes the danger posed to American national interests and personnel by the threat of global terrorism. I believe it deserves the unanimous support of all House Members.

I once again want to commend the legislation's author, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SCARBOROUGH], for his diligent efforts to bring this legislation to the House floor. Thanks to his commitment, we are here today ensuring that the brave Americans whose lives were lost in the Khobar Towers bombing are never forgotten by this House.

Mr. Speaker, I include for the RECORD a copy of the report from the Committee on National Security.

The report referred to is as follows:

THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING INCIDENT—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The terrorist bombing that killed 19 American military personnel, wounded more than 200 others, and harmed hundreds more Saudi soldiers and civilians in and around the Khobar Towers complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia on June 25, 1996 exposed more than the physical vulnerability of Americans serving abroad. It exposed the shortcomings of a U.S. intelligence apparatus that left Americans unprepared for the threat that confronted them. It exposed significant problems of continuity and cohesion in the units deployed for Operation Southern Watch. And it exposed the risks to U.S. military personnel deployed on contingency operations where political and cultural sensitivities of the host country are significant factors.

The ability to acquire and process accurate and timely intelligence is critical to the successful execution of any military mission. It is equally essential for force protection—especially in a world of increasing terrorist threats. The dearth of reliable intelligence on the terrorist threat, coupled with the inability to extrapolate from the intelligence that was available, even after the Riyadh bombing in November 1995, was one of the primary factors contributing to the Khobar Towers tragedy. Because intelligence regarding terrorist threats is more often than not incomplete and uncertain, both intelligence analysts and military operators must recognize it for both what it is and is not and hedge in developing force protection and operation plans.

In the case of the Khobar Towers bombing, problems resulting from incomplete intelligence on the terrorist threat were exacerbated by numerous operational and organizational shortcomings that limited the ability of Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia to effectively protect against the increased terrorist threat. In particular, short tours of duty, even for senior commanders, compromised the ability of deployed units to properly address the urgent need to make long-term security improvements.

Commanders, their staffs and security personnel also need greater continuity if they are to bring stability to organizations that currently face constant personnel turbulence and to develop effective personal and professional relations with Saudi officials with whom they must work. Because the various sensibilities of the host nation often conflict with or complicate the operations of U.S. forces deployed overseas, American military and political leaders must remain vigilant for potential problems.

Intelligence and organizational shortcomings are a growing hallmark of ''temporary'' or ''contingency'' missions that in reality become long-term commitments. Despite the fact that Operation Southern Watch has been ongoing since 1992 and the probability of Iraqi compliance with UN resolution is low, Saudi and American leaders and the U.S. Air Force observed and perpetuated the illusion of a ''temporary'' operation. The Department of Defense needs to review other ongoing contingency operations to ensure that similar perceptions are not compromising force protection needs or jeopardizing U.S. security interests. The proposed movement of significant numbers of U.S. military personnel to more secure quarters now agreed to by the United States is clearly warranted, if not overdue.

STAFF REPORT—AUGUST 14, 1996

On June 25, 1996, a terrorist's bomb exploded at the Khobar Towers housing compound in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 American service personnel, wounding more than 200 others, killing at least one Saudi civilian and injuring hundreds of other civilians. The force of the explosion was so great it heavily damaged or destroyed six high rise apartment buildings and shattered windows in virtually every other structure in the compound, leaving a crater in the ground 85 feet wide and 35 feet deep. The blast was felt 20 miles away in the Persian Gulf state of Bahrain. It was the worst terrorist attack against Americans in more than a decade.

The Khobar Towers complex is home for the airmen of the 4404th Fighter Wing (Provisional) of the U.S. Air Force, part of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), and coalition forces from the United Kingdom, France, and Saudi Arabia participating in Operation Southern Watch, the United Nations effort to enforce the ''no-fly'' and ''no-drive'' zones in Iraq south of the 32nd parallel. Because the bombing was directed specifically at Americans with such devastating effect, it has led to questions concerning the security of U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia and in other regions of the world.

At the request of Chairman Floyd Spence, a staff delegation of the House National Security Committee traveled to Dhahran and visited the site of the bombing from July 10–13, 1996 as part of the committee's investigation of the incident. The delegation spent several days interviewing field commanders, being briefed by those responsible for security measures, and speaking with the military personnel who played a critical role just

prior to and immediately after the blast. The staff also sought interviews with Saudi officials and FBI agents in theater, but as the staff's visit coincided with the Saudi weekend and Sabbath, the Saudis did not provide anyone to be interviewed. Likewise, the staff delegation was unable to interview Department of Justice officials, who responded that any disclosure of information could compromise the integrity of their ongoing investigation. (A copy of a letter from Attorney General Janet Reno is included as Appendix A. A complete list of individuals who were interviewed is included as Appendix B).

The Khobar Towers bombing tragedy calls into question more than just the safety of American military forces in Saudi Arabia. It also raises issues related to the conduct of the Operation Southern Watch mission, the importance of accurate intelligence on terrorist activities and capabilities, the sufficiency of the operational command structure, and the appropriate balance between the need to protect American personnel stationed abroad and the desire not to challenge the sovereignty or offend the sensibilities of host countries who have granted American forces conditional rights to deploy on their territory. What follows is an unclassified summary of the staff's observations and findings regarding the Dhahran incident.

THE BOMBING INCIDENT

On June 25, 1996, at approximately 2200 hours Dhahran local time, a fuel truck laden with an estimated 3,000–5,000 pounds of explosives approached the northwest end of the Khobar Towers compound from the north and turned east onto 31st Street just outside the perimeter fence separating the compound from a public parking lot. The truck, and a car that it was following, continued to travel along the perimeter fence toward the northeast corner of the compound. Staff Sergeant Alfredo Guerrero, present at an observation site on the roof of Building 131, at the northeast corner, spotted the suspicious car and fuel truck as they continued to travel along the perimeter fence toward their location. When the vehicles reached Building 131, they turned left, pointing away from the building, and stopped. The fuel truck, positioned behind the car, began to back up into the hedges along the perimeter fence directly in front of Building 131. Staff Sergeant Guerrero's suspicion was confirmed when two men emerged from the truck and quickly got into the car, which then sped away. At this point, he radioed the situation to the security desk and began, along with the other two guards on the roof, to evacuate the building.

Emergency evacuation procedures then began for Building 131 as the three security personnel ran door to door, starting from the top floor and working their way down, knocking loudly on each door and yelling for the resident to evacuate. Three to four minutes after the truck had backed up against the perimeter fence, the bomb exploded, ripping off the entire front facade of the eight-story building. Khobar Towers residents and officials of the 4404th Fighter Wing, the provisional U.S. Air Force unit conducting Operation Southern Watch, were unanimous in their belief that quick action on the part of the guards, who had only been able to work their way down several floors of the building, helped saved the lives of a number of residents of Building 131. Many residents of Building 131 were caught in the building's stairwells at the moment of the explosion, which may have been the safest place to be, in the estimation of engineers and security experts on the scene. However, the force of the blast demolished the building and severely damaged five adjacent buildings. Nineteen American service personnel were killed and more than 200 injured. Hundreds of Saudi and third country nationals living in the complex and immediate vicinity were also wounded.

The bomb blast blew out windows throughout the compound and created a crater 85 feet wide and 35 feet deep. The blast was felt as far away as Bahrain, 20 miles to the southeast. Most of the buildings in the ''American sector'' of the Khobar Towers complex suffered some degree of damage. While residents of Khobar Towers, 4404th Fighter Wing leaders, and U.S. intelligence experts conclude that Americans were the target of the terrorists, and the damage was extensive, an even greater number of casualties might have occurred had the driver positioned the truck differently against the fence and had not at least one row of ''Jersey'' barriers of the kind used in construction and on U.S. highways been present to absorb or deflect part of the blast away from the lower level of Building 131. Senior leaders of the wing, after consultation with their engineers and with investigators at the scene, have concluded that this arrangement helped to prevent the collapse of the lower floors of the building. Had the lower floors and thus, the entire building, collapsed, the number of fatalities likely would have been much greater.

THE KHOBAR TOWERS COMPOUND

Khobar Towers is a series of high-rise apartment buildings comprising approximately 14 city blocks. U.S. forces occupy a portion of these buildings on the north end of the complex stretching roughly two and one half blocks. Other buildings house troops from the multinational forces participating in Operation Southern Watch, in particular the British, French, and Saudi militaries, while some buildings are also used for Saudi civilian housing. There is only one main access route into and out of the compound.

The buildings were originally built in the 1970s as shelters for Bedouins, but remained vacant until the time of the Persian Gulf War. During the war and in its aftermath, American military forces operated out of a military airbase located near Dhahran's commercial airport, where the facilities were rudimentary and quarters cramped. During the war, the Saudis offered to house U.S. troops at Khobar Towers. Accommodating the 500,000 U.S. troops who participated in the Gulf War, even on a temporary basis, called for the use of every possible facility. After the war, the Saudis offered continued use of space in the Khobar Towers to coalition forces conducting Operation Southern Watch, and U.S. forces have been housed in Khobar Towers for the past six years.

The complex is located in the midst of an urban environment, laced with residential and commercial areas and mosques. On the north end is the public park and parking lot where the June 25 bombing took place. The urban setting of the complex creates unique security difficulties, and establishing perimeters is particularly challenging. The nearest perimeter fence was along the north end, only about 85 feet from several residential structures in the complex; a long perimeter fence on the east side was slightly further out, but still relatively close to the Khobar Towers buildings. And the perimeter marking the U.S. part of Khobar Towers from the other military and civilian housing runs down the middle of a four-lane street. Prior to the bomb blast, Air Force security officials at the complex had identified the perimeter fence as one of the more serious physical security concerns in conducting antiterrorism vulnerability assessments.

Use of a general alarm system

The Khobar Towers buildings themselves are of sturdy construction, built with a minimum of combustible material and consequently without a fire alarm system. There has been speculation as to whether a central alarm system should have been installed and operational at the time of the blast to reduce reaction and evacuation times. The opinion of Air Force security officials is that a fire alarm would not have made a substantial difference, and might even have added to the confusion and worked against any attempts to inspire sleeping troops with a sense of urgency about the suspected bomb threat. For general alarm purposes, the Air Force uses a loudspeaker system in Khobar Towers called ''Giant Voice.'' However, on the night of June 25, there was insufficient time to activate it. In fact, commanders and security officers at Khobar Towers have concluded that a central alarm system is unlikely to have reduced the number of fatalities or injuries the night of the blast, given that it was only a matter of a few minutes between the time evacuation procedures began and the detonation. A number of people survived the blast by being in the stairwell when it occurred. Had a general alarm been sounded, it is possible that more people would have exited the building and would have been at greater risk from the blast's effects. Although the windows in many of the buildings were blown out, not a single building collapsed from structured damages as a result of the bomb. Even Building 131, outside of which the bomb detonated, remained standing, although the face of the building was completed sheared off.

Vulnerability of the compound

In sum, the Khobar Towers apartment complex, and the American portion within, is an inherently vulnerable location to terrorists threats. The decision recently reached by the United States and Saudi Arabia to move Operation Southern Watch and other American military personnel to a more remote location is a sound decision. Factors cited in press reports as contributing to vulnerabilities of the complex and contributing to casualties—the lack of a fire alarm, delays in activating the Giant Voice, for example—are of marginal importance, at least in the judgment of Khobar Towers residents and security officers in the 4404th Fighter Wing. These security officers and senior wing leaders also said that a more raid evacuation may have done more harm than good, exposing more troops to the effects of the blast. Troops housed in an urban environment, with limited perimeters, are inviting targets for terrorist attack. While no location is entirely immune to terrorism, the vulnerabilities of Khobar Towers made the risks especially high.

THE SECURITY SITUATION PRIOR TO JUNE 25, 1996

Prior to the November 13, 1995 bombing of the Office of the Program Manager of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM–SANG) in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, American intelligence and U.S. military leaders considered the risks to U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia as low. While terrorist threats against the United States are not unusual in the region, until recently terrorist activity in Saudi Arabia has been considered sporadic and rare. In particular, the threat from internal Saudi factions and dissidents was rated low by the U.S. intelligence community. The Saudi ruling family enjoys generally widespread support, based upon its extensive system of state-run social services, its largesse with its oil wealth, and its very conservative interpretation and strong support of Islam. Moreover, the ruling Al-Saud royal family brooks no dissent. The Saudi system of justice is swift and sure: public executions are the norm for serious crimes and beheadings are not uncommon. The Saudi approach to justice has long been seen as a deterrent to

crime and to those who would violate the tenets of Islam.

Second, despite the cultural sensitivities aroused by U.S. leadership of and participation in the Gulf War, Americans have long operated in Saudi Arabia on a routine, albeit restricted, basis. The ARAMCO oil concern employs tens of thousands of U.S. citizens, and other Westerners also work in the Kingdom generally without incident. Internal dissent aimed at the Saudi regime did not, until very recently, begin to make a link between the ruling regime and the U.S. military presence.

The OPM–SANG bombing and its aftermath

Both the Saudi and American belief that Saudi Arabia was an unlikely venue for anti-American terrorist activity was shattered on November 13, 1995, when a car bomb exploded outside the headquarters of the OPM–SANG mission. The building was used by American military forces as a training facility for Saudi military personnel. The car bomb contained approximately 250 pounds of explosives. Five Americans were killed in the OPM–SANG bomb blast and 34 were wounded. Until then, terrorist actions against Americans in the Kingdom had been considered unlikely by the U.S. intelligence community.

As a result of the OPM–SANG bombing, security measures were stepped up at installations where American troops maintained a presence throughout Saudi Arabia. The U.S. intelligence community reviewed its analysis of threats to American military forces and the results of that analysis were factored into the subsequent vulnerability assessment that was conducted for the wing commander by the Air Force's Office of Special Investigations (OSI). As with all Air Force installations, routine vulnerability assessments of Khobar Towers and other facilities in Saudi Arabia were conducted by OSI every six months. The most recent vulnerability assessment prior to the June 25 bombing at Khobar Towers was completed in January 1996 and identified numerous security shortcomings. As a result of the OPM–SANG bombing, the threat condition for American forces in Saudi Arabia was raised from THREATCON ALPHA—the second lowest threat condition—to THREATCON BRAVO, the next highest threat condition. Consistent with this increased threat situation, additional security measures were implemented at the Khobar Towers facility in Khahran. (An explanation of the various Threat Conditions is attached as Appendix C.) Security officials held weekly meetings to discuss and review security procedures, and also conveyed bi-monthly security forums with participation of British and French coalition forces.

Incidents at Khobar Towers

Since November 1995, security forces at Khobar Towers recorded numerous suspicious incidents that could have reflected preparations for a terrorist attack against the complex. Much of the suspicious activity was recorded along the north perimeter of Khobar Towers, which bordered on that portion of the complex used to house Americans. Several incidents involving individuals looking through binoculars at the complex were reported. On one occasion, an individual drove his car into one of the concrete Jersey barriers along the perimeter, moving it slightly, and then drove away. This may have been an effort to determine whether the perimeter could be breached. Other incidents reflected the heightened state of security awareness. For example, a suspicious package, which turned out to be non-threatening, was noticed on May 9, 1996, in the elevator of Building 129 and led to the building's evacuation. (As Colonel Boyle, the 4044th's Support Group commander noted, buildings were evacuated no less than ten times since the November OPM–SANG bombing.)

While a number of incidents could have reflected preparations for an attack on Khobar Towers, there was no specific intelligence to link any of them to a direct threat to the complex. Again, this peculiar position of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia complicated the ability of security officials and intelligence analysts to reach definitive conclusions. Security officials at Khobar Towers remain unsure whether surveillance by outsiders was anything more than an attempt by local Saudis to observe the culturally different Americans in Western attire. In one incident involving shots fired outside the compound, it was determined that teenage boys were firing a new rifle and no threat to the compound was intended. Nevertheless, the number of reported incidents and the heightened state of alert after the OPM-SANG bombing led security officials and wing leaders to reassess the security situation within the complex.

Security enhancements implemented in spring 1996

In response to these local incidents and following the November 1995 OPM-SANG bombing, Brigadier General Terryl Schwalier, commander of the 4404th Fighter Wing (Provisional) initiated a number of security enhancements that included the placement of additional concrete Jersey barriers around the Khobar Towers perimeter, staggered barriers, or ''serpentines,'' along the main entrance to the complex; and the posting of guards on rooftops. Additionally, bomb dogs were employed, Air Force and Saudi security patrols were enhanced, the entry gage to the compound was fortified, and access was restricted. In March 1996, General Schwalier met with Lieutenant Colonel James Traister, the wing's new Security Police Squadron commander, to discuss measures to prevent penetration of the compound. Although the two officers discussed a range of security threats, security efforts focused on preventing a penetration of the complex itself, and in particular, the threat of a car bomb.

In March, Lieutenant Colonel Traister conducted an additional, personal assessment of the compound's vulnerabilities to terrorist action. He subsequently presented his recommendations to General Schwalier, who accepted all of them. In April, Colonel Boyle and Lieutenant Colonel Traister initiated a series of additional counterterrorism measures. These included posting additional guards on the roofs, laying seven miles of concertina wire along the compound perimeter, and trimming vegetation on the compound side of the perimeter fence. Security forces increased their patrols, working 12–14 hour shifts 6 days a week. Staff Sergeant Guerrero noted that security patrols were losing every third break because they were helping to fortify the perimeter. Overall, numerous additional security enhancements were implemented beginning in April. Among the most visible were substantial guard pillboxes built from sandbags mounting machine guns to protect the main entrance. Lieutenant Colonel Traister also initiated monthly security group meetings with representatives of the other coalition forces in Khobar Towers. Several security police said they originally believed Lieutenant Colonel Traister was ''crazy'' because of his obsession with security enhancements at the compound.

Expansion of the security perimeter

Colonel Boyle dealt directly with his Saudi security counterparts regarding the issue of the compound perimeter, which was located less than 100 feet from several housing units along the north end of the compound. On two occasions—in November 1995 and March 1996—Colonel Boyle said he asked Saudi security forces for permission to extend the perimeter. The Saudi security forces responded that doing so would interfere with access to a public parking lot that was adjacent to public park and mosque, stating that the property was owned by Saudi government ministries and that they did not have the authority to approve such a move on their own. While never flatly refusing to extend the perimeter, the Saudis continued to assert that the existing perimeter was sufficient against the baseline threat of a car bomb similar to the Riyadh OPM-SANG bombing, and they did not act to accommodate the U.S. request. Instead, they offered to increase Saudi security patrols both inside and outside the compound, and to run checks of license plates in response to American concern over suspicious vehicles.

Neither Colonel Boyle nor General Schwalier said they considered the issue of perimeter extension to be of sufficient urgency to necessitate the intervention of higher authorities. This belief was based upon at least two factors, they said. First, they did not consider the Saudi reluctance to act on the U.S. request as unusual, given the generally slow pace of Saudi society and previous experiences in achieving expeditious Saudi action. As a result of the perceived need not to offend their Saudi hosts by demanding quick resolution of problems to American satisfaction, the perimeter extension issue remained open. Second, both were consumed by the need to quickly implement the required security improvements within the compound, as well as by their numerous other duties. Both General Schwalier and Colonel Boyle said that their priorities were to accomplish what was needed within Khobar Towers first before turning to additional enhancements that would require long-term negotiation and did not necessarily promise the desired outcome.

Thus, General Schwalier, Colonel Boyle, and Lieutenant Colonel Traister continued to work through the checklist of other measures that could be implemented without the prior approval of the Saudis and that would mitigate some of the vulnerabilities presented by the perimeter fence problem. The aforementioned OSI vulnerability assessment conducted in January 1996 recommended 39 specific security enhancements to the compound. However, extension of the perimeter was not identified as a recommended security fix by either the July 1995 or the January 1996 vulnerability assessment and was, therefore, not pursued with great urgency or elevated up the chain of command for higher-level intervention.

Assessment of actions taken and not taken

After the November 1995 Riyadh bombing, security became a major focus of activity within the 440th Fighter Wing, with more than 130 specific actions taken in response to the vulnerability assessments that were conducted in July 1995 and January 1996. Given command priorities, actions that could be accomplished unilaterally were taken relatively quickly—actions such as trimming the hedges on the U.S. side of the perimeter fence to increase visibility along the compound perimeter. Other actions requiring greater funding were considered as part of a five-year plan for security improvements. This included placing Mylar coating on all windows to reduce the impact of a bomb blast by limiting the shattering and fragmentation of glass windows and doors. In retrospect, had Mylar been available at the time of the blast, it is possible that some casualties might have been avoided. Even had the bomb been within the parameters of

the device used in the November 1995 OPM–SANG attack, untreated windows and sliding glass doors in the Khobar Towers apartments still would have been vulnerable to the blast effects. Likewise, the heavier ''blackout'' curtains that had already been approved for acquisition but not yet installed would likely have lessened casualties resulting from shattered glass.

General Schwalier said he did not consider a relocation of troops from the more exposed locations within the vulnerable buildings to interior quarters further away from the perimeter. While in retrospect such a relocation might have saved lives, prior to the blast relocation was not considered a priority due to the threat perception that discounted the prospect of a bomb the size of the one that ultimately exploded outside Building 131. Relocation also would have resulted in disruptions to the operations—residents were housed by military unit in order to maintain some cohesion and some apartments were used as offices—and a decrease in the quality of life for personnel having to ''double-up'' in living quarters. Given the small size of the American sector of the Khobar Towers complex, consolidating personnel to a degree that would have produced substantial security improvements—such as vacating the entire outer ring of apartment buildings exposed to the perimeter—would have involved measures not perceived as warranted by the threat situation.

Overall, theater military commanders exercised an aggressive and proactive approach to security in the wake of the OPM–SANG bombing in November 1995. Indeed, some residents of Khobar Towers believe it is possible that the bombers struck when they did because they saw a window of opportunity closing. Lieutenant Colonel Traister's security enhancements following the OPM–SANG bombing were visible and extensive—they would not have gone unnoticed by anyone planning to attack the compound.

General Schwalier and other leaders in the 4404th Fighter Wing clearly did not press the Saudis for timely action to resolve specific U.S. security concerns. While the issue of Saudi cultural and political sensibilities is treated more fully below, the decision not to elevate these concerns to a higher level of decision-making must be seen in the context of the overall environment in which U.S. forces found themselves. Wing leaders were impressed by their superiors and in turn impressed upon their troops the need for a cooperative relationship with Saudi officials and Saudi society in general. The command is imbused with a desire not to unnecessarily offend Saudi cultural or political norms.

HOST COUNTRY SENSIBILITIES

As with any U.S. military deployment abroad, there is a need to strike an appropriate balance between the military requirement for force protection and the political and diplomatic requirements to understand and work within the cultural norms of the host country. Under the best of circumstances in Saudi Arabia, this is not an easy balancing act, although in some cases, security needs of U.S. forces are consistent with Saudi preferences. For example, the recent agreement to relocate U.S. forces to a more remote location at Al Khari initially stemmed from a suggestion made by the Saudis.

At Khobar Towers, residents commented about their Saudi hosts and the challenges of working through issues with them. The Saudi approach to resolving issues is informal, indirect and seeks measured consensus rather than quick, clear decisions. As a result, to Americans the Saudi decision-making process seems to lack a sense of urgency. Moreover, many of those interviewed expressed frustration at the seeming lack of Saudi attention to important security details prior to June 25. A common element in the comments was that the Saudis did not take security as seriously as the Americans.

The very presence of American forces in the Kingdom is considered by some Saudis to be sacrilegious and an affront to Islam. Additionally, the strong U.S.-Saudi military relationship has increasingly been exploited by political dissidents in Saudi Arabia, under the ostensible guise of religious observance but often for different reasons. Consequently, the ruling family has sought to keep the American presence as segregated as possible from Saudi society. A visible display of U.S. ''decadence''—particularly women with exposed skin or driving vehicles—is an affront to traditional Saudis, and therefore a political problem for the ruling family. In such an environment, it is difficult to ensure that U.S. military personnel are treated fairly and can do their jobs effectively, without insulting the sensibilities or culture of their hosts, and possibly risking the internal political consensus that sanctions U.S. troop deployments.

These cultural differences can have serious security implications. For example, in the late spring of 1996 U.S. forces requested that the Saudis trim back the vegetation that was growing up along the fence around the perimeter of the Khobar Towers complex. The Saudis refused to do so for cultural reasons. The overriding U.S. concern was security—Americans guards needed an unobstructed view of activity along the outside perimeter of the complex. However, the Saudis desired to keep American activity out of view of the average Saudi citizen. In this case, the Americans trimmed the vegetation on the compound side of the perimeter fence and employed security forces on top of selected building to enhance observation. The Saudis did not trim the vegetation on their side.

Many of the vulnerabilities that were identified by the OSI January 1996 vulnerability assessment required corrective action that could only be taken with the support of the Saudis. For example, stepping up identification checks outside the compound, trimming vegetation outside the perimeter, and running license plate checks on suspicious vehicles required the active cooperation and participation of Saudi security authorities. Some of these measures were accomplished, some were not, and some, such as license plate checks, were only accomplished intermittently.

From the standpoint of domestic politics the Saudis wish to ensure that the American military presence is perceived as temporary rather than permanent. For example, there is no formal ''status of forces'' agreement between the Americans and the Saudis, as is the case in many other nations where American troops are forward deployed, that comprehensively defines the rights and responsibilities of U.S. forces and the host nation. Rather, the U.S. presense in Saudi Arabia is delineated by a series of ''stationing'' agreements covering individual deployments and extending back to 1953. This complex series of arrangements requires certain adjustments in the operational activities of the deployed forces. For example, extraordinary care is taken to ensure that the flight operations of Southern Watch and crafted to minimize the effects on Saudi society, to the point of changing course to avoid flying over Saudi princes' palaces. These arrangements also complicate the force protection mission. For example, the relationship between U.S. security police and their Saudi counterparts has remained intentionally informal and ad hoc.

The political and cultural sensitivities of the Saudis are impressed upon U.S. forces from the day they arrive for duty. For instance, in his ''Commander's Inbriefing,'' presented to all newly arriving troops, General Schwalier outlined the standards of the 4404th Wing. ''General Order Number One'' was presented as ''respecting our hosts.

THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

One of the primary factors contributing to the loss of American life from the bombing at Khobar Towers was the lack of specific intelligence regarding the capabilities of the terrorists who carried out the June 25 attack. Therefore, significant questions have been raised concerning the adequacy of intelligence collection, analysis and the ability to recognize the limits of the intelligence upon which the 4404th Fighter Wing planned its security measures.

The threat baseline

Prior to the Riyadh bombing of October 1995, U.S. threat analyses considered the likelihood of a terrorist incident against Americans in Saudi Arabia very low. In the words of Major General Kurt Anderson, commander of Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia (JTF–SWA), the threat was portrayed as coming from an isolated terrorist incident, ''not by large, organized groups.'' It was also based on what intelligence analysts considered to be a ''demonstrated capability.'' This analysis formed the threat ''baseline'' that was used in the July 1995 OSI vulnerability assessment.

According to General Anderson, the Riyadh bombing ''changed the rules of the game.'' The threat analysis conducted after OPM–SANG incident concluded that there was a much higher likelihood of terrorism targeted at U.S. forces. The size of the Riyadh device—approximately 250 pounds of explosives—also was a surprise. However, the analysis conducted after the OPM–SANG bombing did not allow that terrorist groups were capable of building a device larger than the Riyadh car bomb.

The Riyadh attack put everyone within the theater on high alert, and the frequency of terrorist incidents within the region seemed to increase. A number of these involved small bombs set off in Bahrain that apparently were related to internal problems there and not to the situation in Saudi Arabia. Increased security awareness at Khobar Towers also revealed what looked like a pattern of surveillance of the facility. In November 1995, and in January, March and April 1996, Air Force security police reported a number of incidents, including Saudis taking photographs and circling the parking lot adjacent to the north perimeter, but they were uncertain about their linkage. Also in the spring, a car bumped and moved the Jersey barriers at the Khobar Towers perimeter, which security police interpreted as a possible test of the perimeter's strength.

In retrospect, other incidents also were suggestive. In January, the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh issued a public advisory noting that it had received ''disturbing reports that additional attacks may be planned against institutions identified with the United States and its interests in Saudi Arabia.'' In March there was an unconfirmed intelligence report that a large quantity of explosives was to be smuggled into Saudi Arabia during the Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca which draws huge numbers of Muslims to the Kingdom every year. Also, on March 29, a car was seized at the Saudi-Jordanian border with 85 pounds of explosives. Perhaps more significant than the amount of explosives was the fact that they were very expertly concealed within the car's engine compartment. Throughout the spring a number of other reports involving bomb materials were received by U.S. intelligence. Finally, in May, when the Saudis convicted the four men for the Riyadh bombing and sentenced them to death, the U.S.

Embassy released another advisory reporting threats of ''retaliation against Americans in Saudi Arabia'' if the men were executed.

To General Anderson, these incidents did not represent a ''road map'' leading from the OPM–SANG bombing in Riyadh to the Khobar Towers bombing. However, taken together with other information available to U.S. intelligence and suggesting the possibility of more sophisticated terrorist capabilities, the pattern of incidents suggests there may have been substantial shortcomings in the U.S. ability to process accurately intelligence regarding the terrorist threat to U.S. forces inside Saudi Arabia.

Intelligence collection

While the precise extent of U.S. intelligence gathering operations inside Saudi Arabia cannot be discussed within the context of an unclassified report, commanders in the theater said they lacked adequate insight into internal Saudi society or the terrorist threat and prized highly the few independent intelligence sources they possessed. Further, given the increasing sophistication of the devices and the operations employed by terrorist groups operating in Saudi Arabia, which suggested to intelligence experts that those responsible for the bombings were most likely part of larger, well-connected organizations, the difficulties facing intelligence collection against terrorist organizations in the region generally and in Saudi Arabia specifically are likely to be enduring.

A substantial degree of the intelligence available to the United States on Saudi Arabia comes from the Saudis themselves. However, on politically sensitive topics—such as the level of activity of Saudi dissidents—there is reason to doubt the comprehensiveness of intelligence that is passed to Americans by the Saudis. To American experts, there appears to be no tradition of ''pure intelligence''—intelligence free from political influence—in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the Saudi style of decentralized and diffused bureaucratic power is a complicating factor. It is a common belief among U.S. intelligence and military officials and that information shared by the Saudis is often shaped to serve the ends of competing Saudi bureaucracies—interior and defense ministries, for example—from which it originates.

American intelligence collection efforts regarding terrorist or dissident activities in Saudi Arabia must also obviously compete with other intelligence needs. Given the operational mission of the Air Force in Saudi Arabia, the principal focus of intelligence activity remains the Iraqi threat to U.S. and allied aircraft contributing to Operation Southern Watch. In addition, there have been ample reasons to operate discreetly in the Kingdom and to avoid the risks that would be associated with intelligence activities, particularly human intelligence activities. The Saudis are among our closest allies in the Middle East and the monarchy has been seen as generally stable in a tumultuous region. Developing the kind of human intelligence sources most useful to protecting U.S. forces against terrorist threats would require a long-term and possibly high-risk commitment.

Intelligence analysis

The problems of intelligence collection relative to the terrorist threat against Americans in Saudi Arabia have been accompanied by problems of analysis. While the issue of intelligence analysis requires further investigation, several observations are in order.

Based upon a review of available intelligence information, it is questionable whether the U.S. intelligence community provided theater commanders with sufficient intelligence. At the very least, formal intelligence analyses of the terrorist threat to U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia failed to project an increasing bomb-making capability on the part of terrorist groups. Prior to the Riyadh bombing, there were no incidents involving a bomb of that size (250 pounds) in Saudi Arabia, therefore the intelligence threat analysis concluded that there was not likely to be such a device. Likewise, while the threat level was raised to a 250-pound car bomb after the Riyadh bombing, it was not raised beyond. It appears that threat assessments were more reactive than predictive. While neither military nor civilian intelligence agencies had voluminous detailed intelligence on which to base their projections, officials interviewed said the expertise required to build a larger truck bomb is not substantially beyond that required to build a smaller car bomb such as was used in the November 1995 Riyadh bombing. While intelligence reports received subsequent to the Riyadh bombing were not conclusive, they should have forced analysts to at least reconsider their analyses, although the extent of the appropriate ''hedge'' factor is difficult to quantify.

For the U.S. intelligence community and the military, focusing on the Iraqi threat—a tactical necessity and familiar focus—apparently has been coupled with a certain complacency about developments within Saudi Arabia, and perhaps in other Gulf states as well. The result has been to leave commanders in the theater lacking a good understanding of particular terrorist capabilities and threats against U.S. forces. General Anderson said the Kingdom was ''considered very benign'' with respect to the terrorist threat to U.S. forces in the region, a belief that was open to question even prior to the June 25 bombing. Certainly, events proved General Anderson to be operating under a misapprehension. Saudi Arabia is located in a violent quarter of the world, where anti-American sentiments are strong and where Americans have been frequent targets of terrorism. The Saudi monarchy has made many enemies in the region. Within Saudi Arabia itself, more than 630 people were killed in a series of violent episodes in the city of Mecca between 1979 and 1989. Press reports and scholarly articles about dissidents within the Kingdom have been frequent in recent years.

General Anderson said that he has requested that USCENTCOM assign a counterterrorist intelligence analyst to his staff to fill what he perceived as an unfilled requirement. He said the analyst would have two duties: to give him a better understanding of developments inside Saudi Arabia and to give him a ''sanity check'' on U.S. intelligence products. The lack of in-house intelligence analysis capability likely contributed to an unquestioning acceptance by the command of formal threat assessments provided by the intelligence community.

Recognizing the limits of intelligence

Intelligence support to U.S. forces conducting Operation Southern Watch did not do an adequate job of understanding and accommodating its own shortcomings. Despite collection and analysis problems, few if any in the intelligence or operational chain of command seem to have adopted a skeptical attitude concerning the limits of intelligence assessments of the potential threat to U.S. military forces in Saudi Arabia. The command could not know what it did not know, there was no recognition of limits.

One area requiring further investigation is how the limitations inherent with available threat intelligence were explicitly recognized and presented to the operational consumers as intelligence products worked their way into the theater. For example, one senior U.S. intelligence official interviewed said he would never have been so specific in quantifying terrorist bomb-building capabilities. Yet security officials at Khobar Towers considered a 250-pound bomb, one roughly the size of the OPM–SANG bombing, to be a fixed threat baseline. Based upon staff interviews, it is evident that intelligence assessments that began as broad ranges of possible terrorist threats evolved and were viewed by those responsible for security at Khobar Towers as firm conclusions.

As a result, officers such as General Schwalier or his security subordinates did not have the appropriate understanding and incentive to hedge against a degree of uncertainty in the projected threat. While neither General Schwalier nor his subordinates asserted that this hedging would have made a decisive difference in the measures taken within the time available prior to the bombing, they did say it might have made a difference in the urgency associated with U.S. discussions with the Saudis regarding security. Acknowledgment of the limited nature of intelligence analysis of the terrorist threat against U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia might well have increased the urgency with which recommendations to push out the Khobar Towers perimeter fence into adjacent civilian areas were pursued with the Saudis, or even the decision to move out U.S. forces of Khobar Towers altogether.

CONTINUITY OF COMMAND IN THE 4404TH FIGHTER WING

Intelligence problems were exacerbated by a number of organizational and operational factors which limited the ability of JTF–SWA and its subordinate commands to respond to new security challenges. While none were sufficient to singularly account for the June 25 bombing, there were pervasive deficiencies that in the aggregate resulted in a serious problem. In the race to respond to the increased threat following the Riyadh bombing, the 4404th Fighter Wing was handicapped by these shortcomings.

Organizational handicaps

The 4404th Fighter Wing (Provisional) is a unit facing constant organizational turbulence. Average tour length is 90 days. According to General Schwalier, the command averages between 200 and 300 new personnel every week, or about 10 percent of its total manpower. To keep up with the turnover, General Schwalier conducts an orientation briefing for incoming personnel each week.

This level of personnel turbulence affects the wing leadership as well as the flight line. Prior to General Schwalier's appointment one year ago, the wing commanders also had short tours. As the thirteenth commander of the 4404th Fighter wing in four years, General Schwalier is the first to serve a one-year tour. This concern was raised by General Schwalier's predecessor in his end-of-tour report. That report was provided to General Schwalier, who requested approval of the extension of tour lengths for nine senior members of the wing staff. Since the June 25 bombing, General Schwalier had recommended that another nine positions be approved for extended tours.

In addition, according to General Schwalier, the structure of command is ''a bare bones operation.'' When the wing was designed at the start of Operation Southern Watch, it was intended only to carry out a temporary mission until Iraq complied with UN resolutions and sanctions were lifted. Four years later, and despite the continuing augmentation of the unit following Operation Vigilant Warrior in 1994, the mission is still formally a temporary one. The result is that the command lacks many of the support staff and other resources typical in a permanent wing structure. The wing's skeletal structure oversees the operation of a wide variety of aircraft, including F–15s, several

types of F–16s, A–10s, EF–111s, several types of C–130s, a C21, AWACS planes, KC–10s and KC–135s, U–2 spy aircraft, search and rescue helicopters, and has forward air controllers riding in Army helicopters.

The wing is also widely dispersed geographically. Although the contingent in Dhahran and housed at Khobar Towers is the largest, at a total authorized strength of 2,525, other substantial contingents operate out of Riyadh (1,221), Kuwait (799, in four locations), and other facilities within Saudi Arabia (441, in four locations). General Schwalier admitted that he spent ''much time on the road'' visiting these ''remote sites,'' attempting to build teamwork among elements of the command and provide the requisite command supervision.

The necessity for unit cohesion is important for a variety of reasons. Beyond the constant rotations and dispersed basing, the conduct of no-fly zone missions is an ongoing problem for the Air Force as well as the other services. The missions, despite the fact that they are conducted in ''harm's way,'' are widely considered by those who fly them to be deleterious to pilot training and skills, and a monotonous routine. No-fly zone duty also is a personal hardship requiring frequent family separations, not merely for pilots but for maintenance and other personnel. Yet many in the wing had served a number of rotations on no-fly-zone duty and the resulting need to retrain for basic combat missions imposed a six- to nine-month burden on pilots and units.

The impact of short tours

The overall result of short tours, a widely dispersed command, and personnel turbulence is a command that lacks much if any continuity or cohesion. While the professionalism of individual members of the commend was apparent, the lack of continuity among senior leaders was widely recognized by those interviewed as a shortcoming. General Schwalier remarked that it was a ''consuming'' leadership challenge—a viewpoint that was echoed at every echelon of the command.

General Schwalier identified three primary problems that stemmed from the lack of continuity. The first was an inability to build a better relationship with the Saudis. According to General Schwalier, ''You can't build that in two weeks.'' For example, a common assessment within the wing leadership is that, although security assistance on the part of the Saudis had been improving prior to the June 25 bombing, accomplishing more difficult tasks such as expanding the Khobar Towers security perimeter would take months. The estimate of Colonel James Ward, commander of the Army-run logistics operation designed to accommodate any surge of forces into the theater, was that such a project would require four to six months. Thus, when the initial negotiations about such measures ran into Saudi resistance, General Schwalier's assessment was that these were ''still a possibility'' that he might be able to ''get to,'' but improving security within the compound was a more immediate concern.

A second problem was the difficulty of building organizational and command stability within the wing. In particular, implementing the recommendations of the periodic, six-month vulnerability assessments conducted for the wing appear to have fallen victim to this sort of organizational and command instability. For example, the vulnerability assessment returned from OSI to the wing in September 1995 had been completed the preceding July. Thus, ''by the time the assessment appeared, the people (who had requested it) were gone,'' said General Schwalier. When he discovered the three-month lag, General Schwalier demanded that future vulnerability assessments be completed and returned to the command in a more timely fashion.

Colonel Boyle, the departing wing Support Group commander who had overall responsibility for security measures, said one of his biggest challenges was training his organization to the specific requirements of the mission before personnel rotated to other assignments. ''You never got beyond the elementary'' level, he said. For example, guards manning observation posts or other positions often worked only in single locations or a small number of locations. Short tours and the demands of the mission prevented them from acquiring a broader understanding of the security operation or even manning a substantial variety of posts.

The third problem stemmed from the other effects of working within a 90-day rotation cycle. While the basic building blocks of the wing—the fighter and other squadrons that conducted the flying missions—might be kept relatively intact, arriving and departing as a whole, higher echelon, wing-level support activities were primarily conducted by ad hoc organizations, with personnel arriving and departing individually. Even senior leaders often would have no more than 24 to 36 hours of overlap with their predecessors.

Difficulties of developing institutional knowledge on security matters

The lack of unit and leadership continuity made building and retaining institutional knowledge difficult. After-action reports or other similar documents were not immediately available to all incoming commanders; apparently were not centrally collected, controlled, or disseminated by the wing, the Air Force, or USCENTCOM; and may not even have been required. Available reports did not routinely include ''status-action'' assessments high-lighting problems to be addressed. Nor typically were there pre-rotation familiarization tours for incoming commanders, staff or senior enlisted personnel within the wing. These particular concerns were focused on the support functions of the wing.

The experience of Lieutenant Colonel Traister, the commander of the wing's security squadron at the time of the bombing, is indicative of the challenges senior leaders faced as a result of the lack of continuity. By all accounts, including those of his subordinates, Lieutenant Colonel Traister has been a superb commander, but he was confronted with many problems resulting from organizational instability.

Lieutenant Colonel Traister benefited from the fact that his previous position was as part of the CENTAF staff. By virtue of this position, he was able to determine who had been his predecessors as commanders of the 4404th security squadron, read their after-action reports (although he said the records were incomplete and did not contain ''status-action'' recommendations), and contact a number of them for personal interviews and recommendations. He also was able to determine who would be filling important positions that could affect his own work, such as who his OSI counterpart would be. By contacting his counterpart, Lieutenant Colonel Traister was able to establish the beginning of what he saw as an essential relationship between the two and the building of teamwork with the special investigator with whom he would work closely. However, prior to his arrival at Khobar Towers, he could get access to only the July 1995 vulnerability assessment, not the 1996 assessment done after the Riyadh bombing. Yet even that, he said, was a step that his predecessors typically had been unable to accomplish and was made possible because of his previous assignment responsibilities which permitted his access to the reports and appropriate personnel.

Accordingly, when he arrived at Khobar Towers and received from General Schwalier his security mission, Lieutenant Colonel Traister enjoyed advantages his predecessors has not and was more rapidly able to take measures to improve security. He said that he spent between two and three weeks evaluating the compound and the resources he had at his disposal, a process that he said ''takes three to six months'' under normal circumstances. At the same time, he recognized a human intelligence shortfall, and that he required ''an analyzed (intelligence) product'' that the skeletal wing staff, the JTF–SWA staff, or even USCENTCOM would not be able to give him. He also came to understand that the shortage of Arab linguists in the wing—the entire 4404th has just one—would be a continuing problem for the security squadron. Lieutenant Colonel Traister said that when he was stationed in Japan, where the threat level was lower, the security squadron had retained a linguist of its own and made arrangements to acquire others in times of crisis.

Institutional shortcomings

General Schwalier also faced a number of institutional shortcomings that affected the ability of the command to accomplish longer-term tasks. Although many of these have no direct bearing on security issues, several do. For example, the 4404th operated without an established mid- or long-term budgeting mechanism as is found in other wings. After three or four months in command, General Schwalier began to focus on the need to prepare a five-year budget plan. Despite the fact that the wing had been operating on a temporary mission basis since 1992, this was the first long-term budget plan for the wing. Its expenses had previously been paid out of contingency funds, which were accounted for in yearly, ad hoc procedures with funds reprogrammed from other Department of Defense programs. Under General Schwalier's plan, the first year's budget, covering all aspects of the wing's operations, totaled $27 million, with $3 million for construction. Though these construction funds allowed for some repair of the Khobar Towers facility, which had generally been neglected and was in need of repair, about one-third was intended for security improvements. The largest item was $700,000 for ''black-out'' curtains for every apartment and office. Lower in priority were funds for Mylar covering for the Khobar Towers windows to reduce the possibilities for fragmented glass in the event the windows were shattered. As General Schwalier's plan has not yet made its way through the annual Air Force budgeting program, it is unclear what the likelihood was that these recommended improvements—long-term investments for what then was considered a ''temporary'' mission—would have been realized.

A number of institutional problems at higher echelons of command also bear upon questions of security. The focus of operations and intelligence at JTF–SWA was primarily on conducting the Southern Watch no-fly-zone mission. According to Major General Anderson, the Joint Task Force commander, his intelligence staff was a relatively small, 65–person operation whose focus was on the Iraqi order of battle relevant to each day's air tasking order. General Anderson currently has one officer assigned to force protection issues, but estimates that he needs at least seven or eight personnel to deal with force protection issues, given the current threat level. He also said he lacks adequate intelligence analysis capability for the purposes of providing a

''sanity check'' on intelligence assessments provided by theater and national intelligence organizations, and an analyst is among the personnel he has requested. The need for this analytical capability, or at least access to it, was also expressed by others in the theater.

Also, General Anderson has been given the mission of ''force protection czar'' for the JTF–SWA area of operations, though his authority is only for the purposes of coordination rather than command, which is retained at USCENTCOM. General Anderson did not receive this force protection coordination authority until April 12, nearly six months after the Riyadh bombing. According to Army Colonel Ward, for some time ''no one (in Saudi Arabia) was in charge of force protection after (the) OPM–SANG (bombing).'' And several elements of General Anderson's authority as force protection czar took lower echelons by surprise in that USCENTCOM changed or contradicted recommendations worked out previously.

Contrasting service approaches to command continuity

It is unclear precisely what the proper tour lengths or level of organizational or financial commitment to the mission of the 4404th Fighter Wing should be, but it is clear that the nature of the mission resulted in some organizational requirements going unmet. While matching military forces to missions is more an art than a science, comparing the Air Force's execution of its mission in Saudi Arabia with that of other services provides a useful benchmark. For example, the Army units under Colonel Ward's command have a much higher percentage of long-service positions; roughly 10 percent of the 900 soldiers under his command serve at least a one year tour. When senior commanders and their staff rotate to the theater, they typically undertake two extended familiarization tours, with the first of these tours coming several months prior to deployment. While many of these positions are associated with the longer-term logistics effort for which there is no exact Air Force parallel, others, particularly the Patriot missile units, are more analogous to the no-fly zone mission. The Patriot units—which are deployed with a higher-than-normal manpower level—serve a 120-day tour, and the senior leaders and staff all have at least one substantial familiarization tour prior to deployment. Also, each unit has ready access to the after-action reports of predecessor units. In part because of its logistics mission, the Army has had a traditional long-term budget process in place for its units serving in Saudi Arabia for some time; Colonel Ward's next budget includes $7 million for military construction including a ''couple of million'' for security. Finally, his staff includes two interpreters and his organization includes a counter-intelligence team with an Arab linguist.

While the reasons for shorter tours have a degree of validity in terms of lessening the strains of repeated no-fly-zone tours, family separations, and loss of warfighting skills, at a minimum senior positions within the wing demand a greater degree of continuity than has been the case in past. The fact that General Schwalier was the lone long-term member of the wing—and that, in four years of operation, he was the first commander to serve more than a very short tour—is indicative of the reluctance and unwillingness of political and military leaders to admit that the mission was more than temporary and to bestow upon it the full complement of resources, manpower, and capabilities.

The ''contingency'' nature of Operation Southern Watch

Confronting the fact that Operation Southern Watch is in fact a long-term commitment and not a temporary contingency missions poses a domestic political problem for the Saudis and Americans, and an institutional problem for the Air Force. The Saudis must face the fact that a continued U.S. military presence will be necessary to maintain stability in the region—an admission that raises sensitive domestic political concerns for the Saudi ruling family. The United States must similarly understand the nature of its commitment and aggressively confront the risks such a mission entails, including the continuing threat of terrorism. For the U.S. Air Force, such an admission would call into question the policy of constant personnel rotation, at least at the wing leadership level.

Any belief that Iraq would quickly comply with the UN provisions that resulted in the Southern Watch mission has been misplaced, certainly since late 1994 when Iraqi forces moved south to threaten Kuwait and the United States responded with Operation Vigilant Warrior. And given the statements by U.S. policymakers in the wake of the Riyadh and Khobar Towers bombings about American determination to maintain forces in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. military presence in the Kingdom stands revealed for what it has always been: a long-term commitment to security and stability in the Gulf. The Saudis have also, in effect, made such an admission by agreeing to bear many of the costs of relocating the 4404th to Al Kharj, an airbase in a more remote location.

While the lack of leadership and organizational continuity within the 4404th has had wide-ranging effects, it also played a substantial role in problems confronting the wing's security personnel in its efforts to react to terrorist threats. Neither the wing or JTF–SWA level possessed the intelligence analysis capability to evaluate what proved to be seriously limited intelligence. There were no budgetary procedures or processes for making long-term investments in the Khobar Towers complex, even for security reasons. Only through the efforts of General Schwalier and his senior staff were improved security measures within the compound achieved following the November 1995 Riyadh bombing. Achieving greater security would have required expanding the perimeters of the Khobar Tower complex or, as is now planned, a move out of the facility altogether. These are measures whose quick consideration and implementation transcend the day-to-day influence of the 4404th or JTF–SWA, as the direct involvement of the office of the Secretary of Defense in the recent negotiations indicates.

IMMEDIATE POST-BOMBING REACTION

In the immediate aftermath of the June 25 bombing, the medical and other support systems and personnel of the 440th Fighter Wing appear to have reacted with a high degree of professionalism. Commanders and troops alike recounted stories of individual heroism. Major Steven Goff, a flight surgeon who was badly wounded in the attack, worked methodically in the compound's clinic to treat more than 200 of his compatriots who were seriously injured. Prior to receiving formal medical treatment, many of the wounded were initially treated by the ''buddy care'' system, which also appears to have worked as planned and insured that no one was left alone. After the bombing, according to those interviewed, guards rapidly but methodically went into every building and checked out every room to ensure that no one was trapped or unaccounted for.

The medical system also appears to have performed well, and was blessed with abundant resources. At the clinic, three Air Force physicians were assisted by an Army doctor and additional personnel from coalition forces, including the Saudis. Emergency supplies of blood and other necessary materials were sufficient to treat more than 250 people. Everyone who was brought to the clinic for medical treatment, regardless of the severity of their injuries, lived; the only fatalities on the evening of June 25 were 16 airmen in Building 131 who likely died instantly from the initial explosion, a communications specialist in Building 133 who was killed when the glass door to his balcony shattered from the force of the blast, and two other fatalities in Building 131 who might have survived had they been nearer to the medical facility.

Since the bombing security at the Khobar Towers complex has been increased significantly. An additional 44 security personnel have deployed to Khobar Towers, and 44 more were requested by Lieutenant Colonel Traister and are expected to be deployed in the near future. The perimeter has been extended beyond the public parking lot on the north end of the compound, an additional 1,000 barriers have been erected, and the number of observation posts has been increased. Saudi security patrols have been increased outside the perimeter and agreement with the Saudis to move to a more secure and remote site has been reached. According to statements by Defense Secretary Perry, the relocation will be conducted as quickly as possible.

OBSERVATIONS

The unpreparedness of U.S. forces stationed in Saudi Arabia for the magnitude of the terrorist bomb in Dhahran raises significant questions about the adequacy of intelligence support. While intelligence information was provided, it was not of either the quality nor the quantity necessary to alert commanders to the magnitude of the terrorist threat they faced. The lack of on-the-ground intelligence collection and analysis capabilities deserves priority attention and argues for a greater commitment of resources.

Greater counter-terrorism intelligence analysis effort is needed by U.S. forces stationed in Saudi Arabia. The intelligence staff working for the JTF–SWA commander is small, focused on the Operation Southern Watch mission and lacks adequate resources to function as an independent ''sanity check'' on the quality of intelligence received from USCENTCOM or national intelligence agencies. The JTF commander requires this analysis capability to function in his capacity as the local ''force protection czar.'' Likewise, tactical fighter wings and other significant elements of the JTF should have the capability for timely access to this independent, in-theater analysis.

The uncertainties inherent in intelligence efforts against terrorist groups and in friendly but closed societies such as in Saudi Arabia needs to be adequately conveyed to military commanders so they can assess intelligence information in the proper context and retain an ability for independent judgments about the threat they face. Commanders need to better understand the limits of intelligence they receive and be cognizant of a range of threats rather than fixate on a ''baseline'' or overly specific threat assessment.

Three-month troop rotations place unnecessary and counterproductive strains on unit leaders and staffs. It is difficult to establish leadership and unit continuity in contingency operations, let alone to address issues where it is essential to build relationships of trust with host nations. Newly-deployed commanders, security chiefs, and other force protection specialists should not have to relearn the same lessons learned by their predecessors and work to establish the same kinds of productive relationships with their

Saudi counterparts. While short tours may make sense for those on the flight line, senior leaders, staff and key personnel should be deployed for sufficient period to develop the expertise and experience necessary to ensure the safety of their commands.

Short rotations reflected the pretense of a ''temporary'' mission. Despite the fact that Operation Southern Watch had been ongoing since 1992 and the probability of Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions was low, Saudi and American leaders and the U.S. Air Force planned and operated based on the presumption that Operation Southern Watch was only a temporary mission. An appropriate and earlier recognition by the civilian and military leadership (a recognition certainly warranted by Operation Vigilant Warrier in 1994) that the mission, for all practical purposes, was a ''permanent'' one might have resulted in a higher degree of leadership and unit continuity and minimized a number of organizational and operational shortcomings. The Department of Defense needs to review other ongoing operations to ensure that U.S. force protection needs and U.S. security interests are not being compromised by the limitations inherent in running quasi-permanent operations under the politically-acceptable rubric of ''temporary'' contingencies.

APPENDIX A

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, DC, July 5, 1996.

Hon. WILLIAM J. PERRY,
Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Media reports concerning the bombing of the al-Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, purport to disclose very detailed information pertinent to the ongoing criminal investigation. Some of the reports appear to be based on either public statements or leaks by U.S. Government employees.

The investigation of a terrorist act directed at the United States overseas is, by its nature, very difficult to conduct. Public disclosures of details pertinent to the investigation compound the difficulty and may compromise the prospects for the eventual success of the investigative effort. In the event of a U.S. prosecution, such disclosures present significant litigation problems.

While the public interest in this investigation is understandable, it is imperative that all federal employees refrain from unauthorized public disclosures of information pertinent to the investigation. Disclosures concerning the events leading up to the bombing—including any prior warnings or surveillance of the U.S. facility—as well as the details of the bombing and the results of the investigation should be limited to those made through authorized agency channels. Authorized disclosures should be coordinated with this Department prior to their release by contacting the Department's Terrorism and Violent Crime Section at 202–514–0849.

The al-Khobar bombing investigation involves the dedicated and professional efforts of a large number of federal personnel. It is imperative that the professionalism of this effort not be compromised by unauthorized disclosures.

Sincerely,

JANET RENO.

APPENDIX B

LIST OF INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED BY THE DELEGATION

Major General Kurt B. Anderson, JTF/SWA/CC; Brigidier General Terryl J. Schwalier, 4404WG(P)/CC; Brigidier General Daniel M. Dick, BG Schwalier's Replacement; Colonel James R. Ward, ARCENT; Colonel Gary S. Boyle, 4404 Spt Gp/CC; Lieutenant Colonel James J. Traister, 4404 SPS/CC; Chief Master Sargeant Jimmy D. Allen, 4404 SPS/CCE; Richard M. Reddecliff, Office of Special Investigations; Staff Sargeant Alfredo R. Guerrero, Security Patrol; Senior Airman Corey P. Grice, Security Patrol; Airman First Class Christopher T. Wagar, Security Patrol; Staff Sargeant Douglas W. Tucker, Security Patrol; Lieutenant Colonel John E. Watkins, F–16 pilot; Major James D. Hedges, F–16 pilot; Captain Steven E. Clapp, F–16 pilot; Captain John P. Montgomery, F–16 pilot; Major Steven P. Goff, Flight Surgeon.

APPENDIX C

EXPLANATION OF TERRORIST THREAT CONDITIONS

THREATCON NORMAL—Applies when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists, but warrants only a routine security posture.

THREATCON ALPHA—Applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and facilities, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and circumstances do not justify full implementation of THREATCON BRAVO measures. However, it may be necessary to implement certain measures from higher THREATCONs resulting from intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.

THREATCON BRAVO—Applies when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measure in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability, or aggravating relations with local authorities.

THREATCON CHARLIE—Applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist action against personnel and facilities is imminent. Implementation of this measure for more than a short period probably creates hardship and affects the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.

THREATCON DELTA—Implementation applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely.

Source: Air Force Instruction 31–210, 1 July 1995.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SCARBOROUGH] be permitted to control the remaining time on our side.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for his leadership on the committee, the ranking member for his leadership on the committee, and obviously the families of these brave young men that died over in Saudi Arabia, as well as those in the Eglin community in northwest Florida who saw 11 of the 19 of their bravest men not come back.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SAXTON].

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me. I would commend the gentleman for the leadership role he has brought to bear in bringing this measure to the floor today, because I think it is of very notable importance.

Mr. Speaker, let me say it is entirely appropriate that we should make note of the event that occurred in Dhahran in June of this year. It is, obviously, our intent to speak today to the families of the people who were involved in that very disastrous event, so it is appropriate and fitting that we make these remarks on behalf of the people who were involved and who died on that date.

I think it is also appropriate, Mr. Speaker, that we note that while we remember an event that occurred, and remember the families that were affected by it, it is also important for us to look ahead. It is important for us to understand this event in the context of the future, and what it could mean to servicemen and servicewomen, their families, and other civilians who travel outside the United States, and in some events that could even occur here at home.

Mr. Speaker, those who have the objective of disrupting the American presence around the world have found what many of us believe is a new way to accomplish that. In the past, when people wanted to use force to bring about change of one kind in one part of the world or another, they would use what we refer to today as conventional force.

Since World War II, or the middle of World War II, the United States has been the predominant nation or the predominant force in terms of conventional power and our success at conventional warfare. I think the many nations around the world have understood that today. They have understood that they need to find another way to bring about the changes that they seek. That was learned, I think, in the Middle East by a number of Middle Eastern nations during the history of the State of Israel, during the last 50 years or so, when war after war was won by the Israelis.

□ 1530

Other people who wanted to disrupt Israeli society and perhaps drive Israel out of existence used a form of warfare today known as international terrorism. That international terrorism, of course, still goes on in the Middle East, and this event which occurred in June is evidence of that.

In 1991, we decided that we did not like an event that was occurring or about to occur in the Middle East. It happened to be the invasion by Saddam Hussein of our friendly associate, Kuwait. And so once again we demonstrated our capability to carry out a conventional act which educated in some respects some countries in the Middle East as to our ability to carry out a conventional defense of that country.

It is notable that since 1991, the acts of terror against American personnel, both military and civilian, overseas

has increased. In 1995, there was a bombing in Riyadh where five American servicepeople lost their lives, and, of course, this bombing in Dharan is further evidence of the increase of terror against the United States, against Westerners, and against people who are considered to be, by them, unfriendly to certain countries in the Middle East. And so it is important for us to note several things about these events.

First, we have to note what they are not, or what we believe they are not. They are not just random acts acting out against the West. They are well planned, the perpetrators are well trained, they are well financed, and in some cases, in many cases perhaps—perhaps in most cases—we believe today they are sponsored by certain states in the Middle East.

Countries on the suspect list, of course, are Iran, Sudan, Syria, perhaps in some cases Iraq, some forces out of Turkey, not the Turkish Government necessarily but some forces in Turkey, some forces in Saudi Arabia, some forces in Egypt, and perhaps other countries, Libya in North Africa.

These are well-planned, well-carried-out events which are intended to accomplish a purpose. Usually that purpose is to drive out or disrupt the American presence in certain quarters of the world. I think it is important to understand these things in the context of the Dhahran bombing and for us to take note as an institution as to what it is the Americans face overseas.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I thank the gentleman from New Jersey for his statement on terrorism and helping explain to us a little bit more of why what happened, happened.

My resolution today that I have placed before the House is meant to honor heroes that were obviously victims of this terror. If is a modest gesture to salute the 19 men who in life and who in death made their country proud and, in doing so, gave their country an example of service, dedication, and nobility for which all Americans should strive and which we should not forget.

It was only a matter of months ago, on June 25, that an act of terrorism was perpetrated against the men and women of our armed services in Saudi Arabia. Those men and women had been called by their country to a duty in a faraway place to help defend freedom in a land that has known very little of it.

It was not an easy task to take on. The place our men and women in uniform were defending is in many respects a forbidding place, a place of strange customs, of harsh climate, and sometimes unfriendly and unwelcoming people. Obviously, it was far removed from family, friends, and home that all of them knew.

Yet like the professionals that they are, they did their jobs, and in doing so, they were making sure that we all could enjoy the blessings of liberty. Then in one split second, the 19 brave young men were killed.

Among them were A1c Joshua Woody, who was known to his buddies simply as Woody and was the guy that everybody came to with their problems.

Then there was Capt. Christopher Adams. Captain Adams had barely escaped another fatal terrorist attack 3 years earlier and had told a relative of his that he was very fearful of being deployed in Saudi Arabia. Yet he never hesitated to go when duty called.

Mr. Speaker, Captain Adams was due to be married on October 19. His last words to his uncle, who is a minister, were, ''When I come back from Saudi, I'll be sure to give you a call.'' Sadly, instead of officiating at Mr. Adams' wedding, his uncle presided over his funeral.

Then there was Joseph Rimkus, a brave young man whose aunt is with us today who has been fighting for the memory not only of her nephew but for the other 18 young men who were killed over in Saudi Arabia.

These 3 young men and the 16 others who died with them were in many respects ordinary men. However, these men were doing extraordinary things. They even in death give us a great example of courage, duty, honor, and nobility.

Mr. Speaker, I still remember vividly the television scenes of the military compound, of wounded men and women being removed from the wreckage, and later still I attended memorial services held at Eglin Air Force Base in my district, a base where 11 of these 19 young men came from. I remember the grieving widows and children.

I remember the terrible feeling I felt in the pit of my stomach when the wife of one of these men who died came up to me and said, ''Please don't let my husband be forgotten.'' As she handed me a small picture, she said, ''Please don't let my husband be forgotten.''

As I have stated earlier, I know this is a modest gesture, I know this does not bring those 19 young men back, but it is all we can do today.

I also remember the young 10-year-old boy that had gone down to Panama City to live with his father. And when his father was deployed and did not come back, I remember going up to him that morning in the memorial service and talking to him. And he was talking about things that my 8-year-old boy talks about, the Atlanta Braves, about baseball, about what school was going to be like in the fall, and it had not really hit him at that time that his father was gone and that his father was not coming back and would not be able to go with him to a ball game, would not be able to share with him in a school play this year, would not be able to see him grow up, go to college, and do all the things that I pray to God that I will be able to do.

It was at that moment when I saw him break down at the memorial service that it hit me, I guess more than it has ever hit me before, exactly what type of sacrifice these men gave in Saudi Arabia when they gave their life. It is a terrible price that they had to pay, but it is a price that they were willing to pay.

It has been said that America is the last best hope of man on earth. Ronald Reagan talked about that shining city on a hill. But we see in the bombing both a blessing and the responsibility that such a role entails.

American men and women are serving in the uniform of their country, risking their lives in dangerous places all around the world to see to it that this hope, that this shining city on the hill, never dies. It is, quite literally, a sacred duty and a duty that, at the very least, is worthy of our recognition and our honor.

Mr. Speaker, that is what I wanted to do today in a small way with this resolution. To paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, the brave men who died in Saudi Arabia have consecrated that place far above our poor power to add or to detract. However, if we remember and honor their memories, I believe that we will be able to carry on in some small way the work for which they sacrificed their lives.

And may those who carry on take comfort in the thought that their 19 comrades are now safe in the arms of a loving God and that we have done what I promised that wife we would do, that we have remembered her husband and the other 18 who died tragically on June 25.

Mr. Speaker, in memory of those who have died and also those that go on serving in carrying out the duties of freedom, I ask that my colleagues support this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN].

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise with my full heart in this resolution.

I had been over there to visit with these young men from this great 33d Fighter Wing down in northern Florida. One of their squadrons, the 58th, had accounted for more aerial victories in Desert Storm than any other. They had gotten all the early victories. Because the 1st Fighter Wing out of Virginia was to guard the oil fields, they went deep into Iraq and never lost an aircraft.

The corporate memory problem is what I wanted to address today. I can remember exactly where I was in Phoenix, AZ, when the bomb destroyed our barracks in Beirut; 220 marines, 17 Army, and 4 Navy died in a flash, and we always forget about those that are blinded or lose fingers or an arm or a leg. The wounded toll was terrible.

But before that, in April 1983, a car bomb had gone off in front of the American Embassy in Beirut, almost the exact number killed as this 19-death tragedy at the Khobar Barracks. Eighteen killed. And then months later it happened again. I was in Jean Kirkpatrick's office at the United Nations

when that bomb went off and tore the whole facade off our Embassy in Beirut and killed two marines who were up front, in their position, guarding the security of the Embassy and who comes in the front door, who is barred entrance.

The bombings in London. I have a photograph back in the Cloakroom. I would have brought it out, but it would just look brown to the gallery or to the C–SPAN audience. It is of a car bomb set off in the financial district of London. And that only one human being died is a miracle when you look at this photograph: Skyscrapers and buildings going back 100, 200 years; roofs torn off; every single window for a quarter of a mile on both sides of the street wiped out.

We know about these car bombs. Is it the bureaucracy in the House that has no corporate memory? In the Senate? About 30 percent of us were here when the 1983 bombings took place in Beirut killing so many Americans and so many servicemen.

In the military, though, general officers were around during these bombings. They do not have this rollover problem and this loss of institutional memory.

I do not want to see people pay the price of having their careers destroyed, some of them with combat missions in Southeast Asia or in the gulf region of the Middle East, but we simply cannot forget the past. The past is prolog to the future. Study the past, and implement the security needed.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I have tried to listen diligently to all of the remarks of my distinguished colleagues as they have marched into the well to address themselves to House Concurrent Resolution 200.

First with respect to the general issue of terrorism, yes, Mr. Speaker, it is here, it is real, it is alive, it is expanding, it is evolving, and it will be a threat that America and the world will have to deal with on an increasing basis as we move into the 21st century. That is a matter that we must come to grips with and address in significant terms. It will require the highest and the best in us. It will require our best thinking, our best judgment and our best thoughts.

□ 1545

That is not the moment that we are in at this point. There will also be recriminations about who did what and who was responsible. That also is an integral part of the process. But that is not why we are here today.

We are here today for a very simple, thoughtful, and compassionate reason; not to politicize, not to demagogue, not to point fingers, but simply to pause as human beings and to attempt to put our emotional arms around people who have experienced great tragedy. First, 19 human beings who paid the ultimate and supreme price of dying in a terrorist tragedy, Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia.

Something we have not focused upon is the 200 people, many of whom severely and significantly were injured, who also paid a very heavy price. The families that my distinguished colleague from Florida spoke about, the young child speaking in those kinds of real and powerful human terms, bring the reality of the risk of serving abroad in dangerous places as we carry out the foreign policy and national security policy of this country. It comes to us all too real.

But I just want to rise, along with the distinguished gentleman from Florida, the author of this concurrent resolution, and join with all of my colleagues on the Committee on National Security, for we passed this resolution unanimously, in acknowledging the personal sacrifices the 19 American military personnel to which I alluded earlier gave, killed, and the more than 200 wounded, on June 25 of this year.

I know that I join with the rest of the country when I say to their families and fellow service members that they can be assured that this Nation will long remember their bravery and sacrifices that they have made for their country.

So I am simply saying, Mr. Speaker, all of the other comments notwithstanding what this resolution is about, is to ask this body to pause for a moment, to embrace human life in a compassionate way, to embrace the families of this country that have grieved and paid an incredible price; people dying, and mothers and fathers crying, and children not quite understanding what is going on.

So I urge all of my colleagues to come to the floor at the appropriate point in these proceedings, to join with the gentleman from the State of Florida, this gentleman, and all of my colleagues on the House Committee on National Security, and unanimously pass this resolution as some modest way of saying to people we feel, we understand, we care, and we pay tribute.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman from California for his kind words.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GUNDERSON). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE] that the House suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution, House Concurrent Resolution 200, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended and the concurrent resolution, as amended, was agreed to.

The title of the concurrent resolution was amended so as to read: ''Concurrent resolution honoring the victims of the June 25, 1996, terrorist bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.''

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

MAKING IN ORDER AT ANY TIME CONSIDERATION OF CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 3666, DEPARTMENTS OF VETERANS AFFAIRS AND HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1997

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order at any time to consider a conference report to accompany the bill, H.R. 3666, that all points of order against the conference report and against its consideration be waived, and that the conference report be considered as read when called up. This request has been cleared with the minority.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

ANIMAL DRUG AVAILABILITY ACT OF 1996

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 2508) to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to provide for improvements in the process of approving and using animal drugs, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read as follows:

H.R. 2508

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; REFERENCE.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ''Animal Drug Availability Act of 1996''.

(b) REFERENCE.—Whenever in this Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an amendment to, or repeal of, a section or other provision, the reference shall be considered to be made to a section or other provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321 et seq.).

SEC. 2. EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS.

(a) ORIGINAL APPLICATIONS.—Paragraph (3) of section 512(d) (21 U.S.C. 360b(d)) is amended to read as follows:

''(3) As used in this section, the term 'substantial evidence' means evidence consisting of one or more adequate and well controlled investigations, such as—

''(A) a study in a target species;

''(B) a study in laboratory animals;

''(C) any field investigation that may be required under this section and that meets the requirements of subsection (b)(3) if a presubmission conference is requested by the applicant;

''(D) a bioequivalence study; or

''(E) an in vitro study;

by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and reasonably be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof.''.

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—