[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 46 (Thursday, April 17, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3373-S3379]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SENATE EXECUTIVE RESOLUTION 75--RELATIVE TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION
Mr. HELMS submitted the following executive resolution; which was
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:
S. Exec. Res. 75
Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring
therein),
SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS.
The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention (as defined in section 3 of this
resolution), subject to the conditions in section 2.
SEC. 2. CONDITIONS.
The Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention is subject to the following
conditions, which shall be binding upon the President:
(1) Effect of article XXII.--Upon the deposit of the United
State instrument of ratification, the President shall certify
to the Congress that the United States has informed all other
States Parties to the Convention that the Senate reserves the
right, pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, to
give its advice and consent to ratification of the Convention
subject to reservations, notwithstanding Article XXII of the
Convention.
(2) Financial contributions.--Notwithstanding any provision
of the Convention, no funds may be drawn from the Treasury of
the United States for payments or assistance (including the
transfer of in-kind items) under paragraph 16 of Article IV,
paragraph 19 of Article V, paragraph 7 of Article VIII,
paragraph 23 of Article IX, Article X, or any other provision
of the Convention, without statutory authorization and
appropriation.
(3) Establishment of an internal oversight office.--
(A) Certification.--Not later than 240 days after the
deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the
President shall certify to the Congress that the current
internal audit office of the Preparatory Commission has been
expanded into an independent internal oversight office whose
functions will be transferred to the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons upon the establishment of the
Organization. The independent internal oversight office shall
be obligated to protect confidential information pursuant to
the obligations of the Confidentiality Annex. The independent
internal oversight office shall--
(i) make investigations and reports relating to all
programs of the Organization;
(ii) undertake both management and financial audits,
including--
(I) an annual assessment verifying that classified and
confidential information is stored and handled securely
pursuant to the general obligations set forth in Article VIII
and in accordance with all provisions of the Annex on the
Protection of Confidential Information; and
(II) an annual assessment of laboratories established
pursuant to paragraph 55 of Part II of the Verification Annex
to ensure that the Director General of the Technical
Secretariat is carrying out his functions pursuant to
paragraph 56 of Part II of the Verification Annex;
[[Page S3374]]
(iii) undertake performance evaluations annually to ensure
the Organization has complied to the extent practicable with
the recommendations of the independent internal oversight
office;
(iv) have access to all records relating to the programs
and operations of the Organization;
(v) have direct and prompt access to any official of the
Organization; and
(vi) be required to protect the identity of, and prevent
reprisals against, all complainants.
(B) Compliance with recommendations.--The Organization
shall ensure, to the extent practicable, compliance with
recommendations of the independent internal oversight office,
and shall ensure that annual and other relevant reports by
the independent internal oversight office are made available
to all member states pursuant to the requirements established
in the Confidentiality Annex.
(C) Withholding a portion of contributions.--Until a
certification is made under subparagraph (A), 50 percent of
the amount of United States contributions to the regular
budget of the Organization assessed pursuant to paragraph 7
of Article VIII shall be withheld from disbursement, in
addition to any other amounts required to be withheld from
disbursement by any other provision of law.
(D) Assessment of first year contributions.--
Notwithstanding the requirements of this paragraph, for the
first year of the Organization's operation, ending on April
29, 1998, the United States shall make its full contribution
to the regular budget of the Organization assessed pursuant
to paragraph 7 of Article VIII.
(E) Definition.--For purposes of this paragraph, the term
``internal oversight office'' means the head of an
independent office (or other independent entity) established
by the Organization to conduct and supervise objective
audits, inspections, and investigations relating to the
programs and operations of the Organization.
(4) Cost sharing arrangements.--
(A) Annual reports.--Prior to the deposit of the United
States instrument of ratification, and annually thereafter,
the President shall submit a report to Congress identifying
all cost-sharing arrangements with the Organization.
(B) Cost-sharing arrangement required.--The United States
shall not undertake any new research or development
expenditures for the primary purpose of refining or improving
the Organization's regime for verification of compliance
under the Convention, including the training of inspectors
and the provision of detection equipment and on-site analysis
sampling and analysis techniques, or share the articles,
items, or services resulting from any research and
development undertaken previously, without first having
concluded and submitted to the Congress a cost-sharing
arrangement with the Organization.
(C) Construction.--Nothing in this paragraph may be
construed as limiting or constricting in any way the ability
of the United States to pursue unilaterally any project
undertaken solely to increase the capability of the United
States means for monitoring compliance with the Convention.
(5) Intelligence sharing and safeguards.--
(A) Provision of intelligence information to the
organization.--
(i) In general.--No United States intelligence information
may be provided to the Organization or any organization
affiliated with the Organization, or to any official or
employee thereof, unless the President certifies to the
appropriate committees of Congress that the Director of
Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of Defense, has established and
implemented procedures, and has worked with the Organization
to ensure implementation of procedures, for protecting from
unauthorized disclosure United States intelligence sources
and methods connected to such information. These procedures
shall include the requirement of--
(I) the offer and provision of advice and assistance to the
Organization in establishing and maintaining the necessary
measures to ensure that inspectors and other staff members of
the Technical Secretariat meet the highest standards of
efficiency, competence, and integrity, pursuant to paragraph
1(b) of the Confidentiality Annex, and in establishing and
maintaining a stringent regime governing the handling of
confidential information by the Technical Secretariat,
pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Confidentiality Annex;
(II) a determination that any unauthorized disclosure of
United States intelligence information to be provided to the
Organization or any organization affiliated with the
Organization, or any official or employee thereof, would
result in no more than minimal damage to United States
national security, in light of the risks of the unauthorized
disclosure of such information;
(III) sanitization of intelligence information that is to
be provided to the Organization to remove all information
that could betray intelligence sources and methods; and
(IV) interagency United States intelligence community
approval for any release of intelligence information to the
Organization, no matter how thoroughly it has been sanitized.
(ii) Waiver authority.--
(I) In general.--The Director of Central Intelligence may
waive the application of clause (i) if the Director of
Central Intelligence certifies in writing to the appropriate
committees of Congress that providing such information to the
Organization or an organization affiliated with the
Organization, or to any official or employee thereof, is in
the vital national security interests of the United States
and that all possible measures to protect such information
have been taken, except that such waiver must be made for
each instance such information is provided, or for each such
document provided. In the event that multiple waivers are
issued within a single week, a single certification to the
appropriate committees of Congress may be submitted,
specifying each waiver issued during that week.
(II) Delegation of duties.--The Director of Central
Intelligence may not delegate any duty of the Director under
this paragraph.
(B) Periodic and special reports.--
(i) In general.--The President shall report periodically,
but not less frequently than semiannually, to the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives on the types and volume of intelligence
information provided to the Organization or affiliated
organizations and the purposes for which it was provided
during the period covered by the report.
(ii) Exemption.--For purposes of this subparagraph,
intelligence information provided to the Organization or
affiliated organizations does not cover information that is
provided only to, and only for the use of, appropriately
cleared United States Government personnel serving with the
Organization or an affiliated organization.
(C) Special reports.--
(i) Report on procedures.--Accompanying the certification
provided pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i), the President shall
provide a detailed report to the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives identifying
the procedures established for protecting intelligence
sources and methods when intelligence information is provided
pursuant to this section.
(ii) Reports on unauthorized disclosures.--The President
shall submit a report to the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives within 15 days
after it has become known to the United States Government
regarding any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence
provided by the United States to the Organization.
(D) Delegation of duties.--The President may not delegate
or assign the duties of the President under this section.
(E) Relationship to existing law.--Nothing in this
paragraph may be construed to--
(i) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the
Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to
section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)); or
(ii) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of title
V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et
seq.).
(F) Definitions.--In this section:
(i) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate and the Committee on International Relations and
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives.
(ii) Organization.--The term ``Organization'' means the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
established under the Convention and includes any organ of
that Organization and any board or working group, such as the
Scientific Advisory Board, that may be established by it.
(iii) Organization affiliated with the organization.--The
terms ``organization affiliated with the Organization'' and
``affiliated organizations'' include the Provisional
Technical Secretariat under the Convention and any laboratory
certified by the Director-General of the Technical
Secretariat as designated to perform analytical or other
functions.
(6) Amendments to the convention.--
(A) Voting representation of the united states.--A United
States representative will be present at all Amendment
Conferences and will cast a vote, either affirmative or
negative, on all proposed amendments made at such
conferences.
(B) Submission of amendments as treaties.--The President
shall submit to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the
Constitution of the United States any amendment to the
Convention adopted by an Amendment Conference.
(7) Continuing vitality of the australia group and national
export controls.--
(A) Declaration.--The Senate declares that the collapse of
the informal forum of states known as the ``Australia
Group,'' either through changes in membership or lack of
compliance with common export controls, or the substantial
weakening of common Australia Group export controls and non-
proliferation measures in force on the date of United States
ratification of the Convention, would constitute a
fundamental change in circumstances to United States
ratification of the Convention.
(B) Certification requirement.--Prior to the deposit of the
United States instrument of ratification, the President shall
certify to Congress that--
(i) nothing in the Convention obligates the United States
to accept any modification,
[[Page S3375]]
change in scope, or weakening of its national export
controls;
(ii) the United States understands that the maintenance of
national restrictions on trade in chemicals and chemical
production technology is fully compatible with the provisions
of the Convention, including Article XI(2), and solely within
the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States;
(iii) the Convention preserves the right of State Parties,
unilaterally or collectively, to maintain or impose export
controls on chemicals and related chemical production
technology for foreign policy or national security reasons,
notwithstanding Article XI(2); and
(iv) each Australia Group member, at the highest diplomatic
levels, has officially communicated to the United States
Government its understanding and agreement that export
control and nonproliferation measures which the Australia
Group has undertaken are fully compatible with the provisions
of the Convention, including Article XI(2), and its
commitment to maintain in the future such export controls and
nonproliferation measures against non-Australia Group
members.
(C) Annual certification.--
(i) Effectiveness of australia group.--The President shall
certify to Congress on an annual basis that--
(I) Australia Group members continue to maintain an equally
effective or more comprehensive control over the export of
toxic chemicals and their precursors, dual-use processing
equipment, human, animal and plant pathogens and toxins with
potential biological weapons application, and dual-use
biological equipment, as that afforded by the Australia Group
as of the date of ratification of the Convention by the
United States; and
(II) the Australia Group remains a viable mechanism for
limiting the spread of chemical and biological weapons-
related materials and technology, and that the effectiveness
of the Australia Group has not been undermined by changes in
membership, lack of compliance with common export controls
and nonproliferation measures, or the weakening of common
controls and nonproliferation measures, in force as of the
date of ratification of the Convention by the United States.
(ii) Consultation with senate required.--In the event that
the President is, at any time, unable to make the
certifications described in clause (i), the President shall
consult with the Senate for the purposes of obtaining a
resolution of continued adherence to the Convention,
notwithstanding the fundamental change in circumstance.
(D) Periodic consultation with congressional committees.--
The President shall consult periodically, but not less
frequently than twice a year, with the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives, on Australia Group
export control and nonproliferation measures. If any
Australia Group member adopts a position at variance with the
certifications and understandings provided under subparagraph
(B), or should seek to gain Australia Group acquiescence or
approval for an interpretation that various provisions of the
Convention require it to remove chemical-weapons related
export controls against any State Party to the Convention,
the President shall block any effort by that Australia Group
member to secure Australia Group approval of such a position
or interpretation.
(E) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
(i) Australia group.--The term ``Australia Group'' means
the informal forum of states, chaired by Australia, whose
goal is to discourage and impede chemical and biological
weapons proliferation by harmonizing national export controls
chemical weapons precursor chemicals, biological weapons
pathogens, and dual-use production equipment, and through
other measures.
(ii) Highest diplomatic levels.--The term ``highest
diplomatic levels'' means at the levels of senior officials
with the power to authoritatively represent their
governments, and does not include diplomatic representatives
of those governments to the United States.
(8) Negative security assurances.--
(A) Reevaluation.--In forswearing under the Convention the
possession of a chemical weapons retaliatory capability, the
Senate understands that deterrence of attack by chemical
weapons requires a reevaluation of the negative security
assurances extended to non-nuclear-weapon states.
(B) Classified report.--Accordingly, 180 days after the
deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the
President shall submit to the Congress a classified report
setting forth the findings of a detailed review of United
States policy on negative security assurances, including a
determination of the appropriate responses to the use of
chemical or biological weapons against the Armed Forces of
the United States, United States citizens, allies, and third
parties.
(9) Protection of advanced biotechnology.--Prior to the
deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, and
on January 1 of every year thereafter, the President shall
certify to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives that the legitimate
commercial activities and interests of chemical,
biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms in the United States
are not being significantly harmed by the limitations of the
Convention on access to, and production of, those chemicals
and toxins listed in Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals.
(10) Monitoring and verification of compliance.--
(A) Declaration.--The Senate declares that--
(i) the Convention is in the interests of the United States
only if all State Parties are in strict compliance with the
terms of the Convention as submitted to the Senate for its
advice and consent to ratification, such compliance being
measured by performance and not by efforts, intentions, or
commitments to comply; and
(ii) the Senate expects all State Parties to be in strict
compliance with their obligations under the terms of the
Convention, as submitted to the Senate for its advice and
consent to ratification;
(B) Briefings on compliance.--Given its concern about the
intelligence community's low level of confidence in its
ability to monitor compliance with the Convention, the Senate
expects the executive branch of the Government to offer
regular briefings, not less than four times a year, to the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives on compliance issues related to the
Convention. Such briefings shall include a description of all
United States efforts in bilateral and multilateral
diplomatic channels and forums to resolve compliance issues
and shall include a complete description of--
(i) any compliance issues the United States plans to raise
at meetings of the Organization, in advance of such meetings;
(ii) any compliance issues raised at meetings of the
Organization, within 30 days of such meeting;
(iii) any determination by the President that a State Party
is in noncompliance with or is otherwise acting in a manner
inconsistent with the object or purpose of the Convention,
within 30 days of such a determination.
(C) Annual reports on compliance.--The President shall
submit on January 1 of each year to the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives a full and complete
classified and unclassified report setting forth--
(i) a certification of those countries included in the
Intelligence Community's Monitoring Strategy, as set forth by
the Director of Central Intelligence's Arms Control Staff and
the National Intelligence Council (or any successor document
setting forth intelligence priorities in the field of the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) that are
determined to be in compliance with the Convention, on a
country-by-country basis;
(ii) for those countries not certified pursuant to clause
(i), an identification and assessment of all compliance
issues arising with regard to the adherence of the country to
its obligation under the Convention;
(iii) the steps the United States has taken, either
unilaterally or in conjunction with another State Party--
(I) to initiate challenge inspections of the noncompliant
party with the objective of demonstrating to the
international community the act of noncompliance;
(II) to call attention publicly to the activity in
question; and
(III) to seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest
diplomatic level with the noncompliant party with the
objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;
(iv) a determination of the military significance and
broader security risks arising from any compliance issue
identified pursuant to clause (ii); and
(v) a detailed assessment of the responses of the
noncompliant party in question to action undertaken by the
United States described in clause (iii).
(D) Countries previously included in compliance reports.--
For any country that was previously included in a report
submitted under subparagraph (C), but which subsequently is
not included in the Intelligence Community's Monitoring
Strategy (or successor document), such country shall continue
to be included in the report submitted under subparagraph (C)
unless the country has been certified under subparagraph
(C)(i) for each of the previous two years.
(E) Form of certifications.--For those countries that have
been publicly and officially identified by a representative
of the intelligence community as possessing or seeking to
develop chemical weapons, the certification described in
subparagraph (C)(i) shall in be unclassified form.
(F) Annual reports on intelligence.--On January 1, 1998,
and annually thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence
shall submit to the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed
Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and to the Committees on International Relations,
National Security, and Permanent Select Committee of the
House of Representatives, a full and complete classified and
unclassified report regarding--
(i) the status of chemical weapons development, production,
stockpiling, and use, within the meanings of those terms
under the Convention, on a country-by-country basis;
(ii) any information made available to the United States
Government concerning the development, production,
acquisition, stockpiling, retention, use, or direct or
indirect transfer of novel agents, including any unitary or
binary chemical weapon comprised of chemical components not
identified on the schedules of the Annex on Chemicals, on a
country-by-country basis;
[[Page S3376]]
(iii) the extent of trade in chemicals potentially relevant
to chemical weapons programs, including all Australia Group
chemicals and chemicals identified on the schedules of the
Annex on Chemicals, on a country-by-country basis;
(iv) the monitoring responsibilities, practices, and
strategies of the intelligence community (as defined in
section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947) and a
determination of the level of confidence of the intelligence
community with respect to each specific monitoring task
undertaken, including an assessment by the intelligence
community of the national aggregate data provided by State
Parties to the Organization, on a country-by-country basis;
(v) an identification of how United States national
intelligence means, including national technical means and
human intelligence, is being marshaled together with the
Convention's verification provisions to monitor compliance
with the Convention; and
(vi) the identification of chemical weapons development,
production, stockpiling, or use, within the meanings of those
terms under the Convention, by subnational groups, including
terrorist and paramilitary organizations.
(G) Reports on resources for monitoring.--Each report
required under subparagraph (F) shall include a full and
complete classified annex submitted solely to the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and to the Permanent
Select Committee of the House of Representatives regarding--
(i) a detailed and specific identification of all United
States resources devoted to monitoring the Convention,
including information on all expenditures associated with the
monitoring of the Convention; and
(ii) an identification of the priorities of the executive
branch of Government for the development of new resources
relating to detection and monitoring capabilities with
respect to chemical and biological weapons, including a
description of the steps being taken and resources being
devoted to strengthening United States monitoring
capabilities.
(11) Enhancements to robust chemical and biological
defenses.--
(A) Sense of the senate.--It is the sense of the Senate
that--
(i) chemical and biological threats to deployed United
States Armed Forces will continue to grow in regions of
concern around the world, and pose serious threats to United
States power projection and forward deployment strategies;
(ii) chemical weapons or biological weapons use is a
potential element of future conflicts in regions of concern;
(iii) it is essential for the United States and key
regional allies to preserve and further develop robust
chemical and biological defenses;
(iv) the United States Armed Forces are inadequately
equipped, organized, trained and exercised for chemical and
biological defense against current and expected threats, and
that too much reliance is placed on non-active duty forces,
which receive less training and less modern equipment, for
critical chemical and biological defense capabilities;
(v) the lack of readiness stems from a de-emphasis of
chemical and biological defenses within the executive branch
of Government and the United States Armed Forces;
(vi) the armed forces of key regional allies and likely
coalition partners, as well as civilians necessary to support
United States military operations, are inadequately prepared
and equipped to carry out essential missions in chemically
and biologically contaminated environments;
(vii) congressional direction contained in the Defense
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (title XIV of
Public Law 104-201) should lead to enhanced domestic
preparedness to protect against chemical and biological
weapons threats; and
(viii) the United States Armed Forces should place
increased emphasis on potential threats to forces deployed
abroad and, in particular, make countering chemical and
biological weapons use an organizing principle for United
States defense strategy and development of force structure,
doctrine, planning, training, and exercising policies of the
United States Armed Forces.
(B) Actions to strengthen defense capabilities.--The
Secretary of Defense shall take those actions necessary to
ensure that the United States Armed Forces are capable of
carrying out required military missions in United States
regional contingency plans, despite the threat or use of
chemical or biological weapons. In particular, the Secretary
of Defense shall ensure that the United States Armed Forces
are effectively equipped, organized, trained, and exercised
(including at the large unit and theater level) to conduct
operations in a chemically or biologically contaminated
environment that are critical to the success of the United
States military plans in regional conflicts, including--
(i) deployment, logistics, and reinforcement operations at
key ports and airfields;
(ii) sustained combat aircraft sortie generation at
critical regional airbases; and
(iii) ground force maneuvers of large units and divisions.
(C) Discussions with regional allies and likely coalition
partners.--
(i) In general.--The Secretaries of Defense and State
shall, as a priority matter, initiate discussions with key
regional allies and likely regional coalition partners,
including those countries where the United States currently
deploys forces, where United States forces would likely
operate during regional conflicts, or which would provide
civilians necessary to support United States military
operations, to determine what steps are necessary to ensure
that allied and coalition forces and other critical civilians
are adequately equipped and prepared to operate in chemically
and biologically contaminated environments.
(ii) Reporting requirement.--Not later than one year after
deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the
Secretaries of Defense and State shall submit a report to the
Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House on the result of these
discussions, plans for future discussions, measures agreed to
improve the preparedness of foreign forces and civilians, and
proposals for increased military assistance, including
through the Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military
Financing, and the International Military Education and
Training programs pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961.
(D) United states army chemical school.--The Secretary of
Defense shall take those actions necessary to ensure that the
United States Army Chemical School remains under the
oversight of a general officer of the United States Army.
(E) Sense of the senate.--Given its concerns about the
present state of chemical and biological defense readiness
and training, it is the sense of the Senate that--
(i) in the transfer, consolidation, and reorganization of
the United States Army Chemical School, the Army should not
disrupt or diminish the training and readiness of the United
States Armed Forces to fight in a chemical-biological warfare
environment;
(ii) the Army should continue to operate the Chemical
Defense Training Facility at Fort McClellan until such time
as the replacement training facility at Fort Leonard Wood is
functional.
(F) Annual reports on chemical and biological weapons
defense activities.--On January 1, 1998, and annually
thereafter, the President shall submit a report to the
Committees on Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Armed
Services of the Senate and the Committee on International
Relations, National Security, and Appropriations of the House
of Representatives, and Speaker of the House on previous,
current, and planned chemical and biological weapons defense
activities. The report shall contain for the previous fiscal
year and for the next three fiscal years--
(i) proposed solutions to each of the deficiencies in
chemical and biological warfare defenses identified in the
March 1996 report of the General Accounting Office entitled
``Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains
Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems'', and steps
being taken pursuant to subparagraph (B) to ensure that the
United States Armed Forces are capable of conducting required
military operations to ensure the success of United States
regional contingency plans despite the threat or use of
chemical or biological weapons;
(ii) identification of the priorities of the executive
branch of Government in the development of both active and
passive chemical and biological defenses;
(iii) a detailed summary of all budget activities
associated with the research, development, testing, and
evaluation of chemical and biological defense programs;
(iv) a detailed summary of expenditures on research,
development, testing, and evaluation, and procurement of
chemical and biological defenses by fiscal years defense
programs, department, and agency;
(v) a detailed assessment of current and projected vaccine
production capabilities and vaccine stocks, including
progress in researching and developing a multivalent vaccine;
(vi) a detailed assessment of procedures and capabilities
necessary to protect and decontaminate infrastructure to
reinforce United States power-projection forces, including
progress in developing a nonaqueous chemical decontamination
capability;
(vii) a description of progress made in procuring light-
weight personal protective gear and steps being taken to
ensure that programmed procurement quantities are sufficient
to replace expiring battle-dress overgarments and chemical
protective overgarments to maintain required wartime
inventory levels;
(viii) a description of progress made in developing long-
range standoff detection and identification capabilities and
other battlefield surveillance capabilities for biological
and chemical weapons, including progress on developing a
multi-chemical agent detector, unmanned aerial vehicles, and
unmanned ground sensors;
(ix) a description of progress made in developing and
deploying layered theater missile defenses for deployed
United States Armed Forces which will provide greater
geographic coverage against current and expected ballistic
missile threats and will assist in mitigating chemical and
biological contamination through higher altitude intercepts
and boost-phase intercepts;
(x) an assessment of--
(I) the training and readiness of the United States Armed
Forces to operate in a chemically or biologically
contaminated environment; and
(II) actions taken to sustain training and readiness,
including training and readiness carried out at national
combat training centers;
[[Page S3377]]
(xi) a description of progress made in incorporating
chemical and biological considerations into service and joint
exercises as well as simulations, models, and war games and
the conclusions drawn from these efforts about the United
States capability to carry out required missions, including
missions with coalition partners, in military contingencies;
(xii) a description of progress made in developing and
implementing service and joint doctrine for combat and non-
combat operations involving adversaries armed with chemical
or biological weapons, including efforts to update the range
of service and joint doctrine to better address the wide
range of military activities, including deployment,
reinforcement, and logistics operations in support of combat
operations, and for the conduct of such operations in concert
with coalition forces; and
(xiii) a description of progress made in resolving issues
relating to the protection of United States population
centers from chemical and biological attack, including plans
for inoculation of populations, consequence management, and a
description of progress made in developing and deploying
effective cruise missile defenses and a national ballistic
missile defense.
(12) Primacy of the united states constitution.--Nothing in
the Convention requires or authorizes legislation, or other
action, by the United States prohibited by the Constitution
of the United States, as interpreted by the United States.
(13) Noncompliance.--
(A) In general.--If the President determines that
persuasive information exists that a State Party to the
Convention is maintaining a chemical weapons production or
production mobilization capability, is developing new
chemical agents, or is in violation of the Convention in any
other manner so as to threaten the national security
interests of the United States, then the President shall--
(i) consult with the Senate, and promptly submit to it, a
report detailing the effect of such actions;
(ii) seek on an urgent basis a challenge inspection of the
facilities of the relevant party in accordance with the
provisions of the Convention with the objective of
demonstrating to the international community the act of
noncompliance;
(iii) seek, or encourage, on an urgent basis a meeting at
the highest diplomatic level with the relevant party with the
objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;
(iv) implement prohibitions and sanctions against the
relevant party as required by law;
(v) if noncompliance has been determined, seek on an urgent
basis within the Security Council of the United Nations a
multilateral imposition of sanctions against the noncompliant
party for the purposes of bringing the noncompliant party
into compliance; and
(vi) in the event that the noncompliance continues for a
period of longer than one year after the date of the
determination made pursuant to subparagraph (A), promptly
consult with the Senate for the purposes of obtaining a
resolution of support of continued adherence to the
Convention, notwithstanding the changed circumstances
affecting the object and purpose of the Convention.
(B) Construction.--Nothing in this section may be construed
to impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Director
of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to section
103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-3(c)(5)).
(C) Presidential determinations.--If the President
determines that an action otherwise required under
subparagraph (A) would impair or otherwise affect the
authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure, the President shall report that determination,
together with a detailed written explanation of the basis for
that determination, to the chairmen of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence not later than 15 days after making
such determination.
(14) Financing russian implementation.--The United States
understands that, in order to be assured of the Russian
commitment to a reduction in chemical weapons stockpiles,
Russia must maintain a substantial stake in financing the
implementation of both the 1990 Bilateral Destruction
Agreement and the Convention. The United States shall not
accept any effort by Russia to make deposit of Russia's
instrument of ratification contingent upon the United States
providing financial guarantees to pay for implementation of
commitments by Russia under the 1990 Bilateral Destruction
Agreement or the Convention.
(15) Assistance under article x.--
(A) In general.--Prior to the deposit of the United States
instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to
the Congress that the United States shall not provide
assistance under paragraph 7(a) of Article X.
(B) Countries ineligible for certain assistance under the
foreign assistance act.--Prior to the deposit of the United
States instrument of ratification, the President shall
certify to the Congress that for any State Party the
government of which is not eligible for assistance under
chapter 2 of part II (relating to military assistance) or
chapter 4 of part II (relating to economic support
assistance) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961--
(i) no assistance under paragraph 7(b) of Article X will be
provided to the State Party; and
(ii) no assistance under paragraph 7(c) of Article X other
than medical antidotes and treatment will be provided to the
State Party.
(16) Protection of confidential information.--
(A) Unauthorized disclosure of united states business
information.--Whenever the President determines that
persuasive information is available indicating that--
(i) an officer of employee of the Organization has
willfully published, divulged, disclosed, or made known in
any manner or to any extent not authorized by the Convention
any United States confidential business information coming to
him in the course of his employment or official duties or by
reason of any examination or investigation of any return,
report, or record made to or filed with the Organization, or
any officer or employee thereof, and
(ii) such practice or disclosure has resulted in financial
losses or damages to a United States person,
the President shall, within 30 days after the receipt of such
information by the executive branch of Government, notify the
Congress in writing of such determination.
(B) Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction.--
(i) Certification.--Not later than 270 days after
notification of Congress under subparagraph (A), the
President shall certify to Congress that the immunity from
jurisdiction of such foreign person has been waived by the
Director-General of the Technical Secretariat.
(ii) Withholding of portion of contributions.--If the
President is unable to make the certification described under
clause (i), then 50 percent of the amount of each annual
United States contribution to the regular budget of the
Organization that is assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of
Article VIII shall be withheld from disbursement, in addition
to any other amounts required to be withheld from
disbursement by any other provision of law, until--
(I) the President makes such certification, or
(II) the President certifies to Congress that the situation
has been resolved in a manner satisfactory to the United
States person who has suffered the damages due to the
disclosure of United States confidential business
information.
(C) Breaches of confidentiality.--
(i) Certification.--In the case of any breach of
confidentiality involving both a State Party and the
Organization, including any officer or employee thereof, the
President shall, within 270 days after providing written
notification to Congress pursuant to subparagraph (A),
certify to Congress that the Commission described under
paragraph 23 of the Confidentiality Annex has been
established to consider the breach.
(ii) Withholding of portion of contributions.--If the
President is unable to make the certification described under
clause (i), then 50 percent of the amount of each annual
United States contribution to the regular budget of the
Organization that is assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of
Article VIII shall be withheld from disbursement, in addition
to any other amounts required to be withheld from
disbursement by any other provision of law, until--
(I) the President makes such certification, or
(II) the President certifies to Congress that the situation
has been resolved in a manner satisfactory to the United
States person who has suffered the damages due to the
disclosure of United States confidential business
information.
(D) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
(i) United states confidential business information.--The
term ``United States confidential business information''
means any trade secrets or commercial or financial
information that is privileged and confidential, as described
in section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United States Code, and that
is obtained--
(I) from a United States person; and
(II) through the United States National Authority or the
conduct of an inspection on United States territory under the
Convention.
(ii) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means any natural person or any corporation,
partnership, or other juridical entity organized under the
laws of the United States.
(iii) United states.--The term ``United States'' means the
several States, the District of Columbia, and the
commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United
States.
(17) Constitutional prerogatives.--
(A) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(i) Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States
Constitution states that the President ``shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present
concur''.
(ii) At the turn of the century, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge
took the position that the giving of advice and consent to
treaties constitutes a stage in negotiation on the treaties
and that Senate amendments or reservations to a treaty are
propositions ``offered at a later stage of the negotiation by
[[Page S3378]]
the other part of the American treaty making power in the
only manner in which they could then be offered''.
(iii) The executive branch of Government has begun a
practice of negotiating and submitting to the Senate treaties
which include provisions that have the purported effect of--
(I) inhibiting the Senate from attaching reservations that
the Senate considers necessary in the national interest; or
(II) preventing the Senate from exercising its
constitutional duty to give its advice and consent to treaty
commitments before ratification of the treaties.
(iv) During the 85th Congress, and again during the 102d
Congress, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
made its position on this issue clear when stating that ``the
President's agreement to such a prohibition cannot constrain
the Senate's constitutional right and obligation to give its
advice and consent to a treaty subject to any reservation it
might determine is required by the national interest''.
(B) Sense of the senate.--It is the sense of the Senate
that--
(i) the advice and consent given by the Senate in the past
to ratification of treaties containing provisions which
prohibit amendments or reservations should not be construed
as a precedent for such provisions in future treaties;
(ii) United States negotiators to a treaty should not agree
to any provision that has the effect of inhibiting the Senate
from attaching reservations or offering amendments to the
treaty; and
(iii) the Senate should not consent in the future to any
article or other provision of any treaty that would prohibit
the Senate from giving its advice and consent to ratification
of the treaty subject to amendment or reservation.
(18) Laboratory sample analysis.--Prior to the deposit of
the United States instrument of ratification, the President
shall certify to the Senate that no sample collected in the
United States pursuant to the Convention will be transferred
for analysis to any laboratory outside the territory of the
United States.
(19) Effect on terrorism.--The Senate finds that--
(A) without regard to whether the Convention enters into
force, terrorists will likely view chemical weapons as a
means to gain greater publicity and instill widespread fear;
and
(B) the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack by the Aum Shinrikyo
would not have been prevented by the Convention.
(20) Constitutional separation of powers.--
(A) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(i) Article VIII(8) of the Convention allows a State Party
to vote in the Organization if the State Party is in arrears
in the payment of financial contributions and the
Organization is satisfied that such nonpayment is due to
conditions beyond the control of the State Party.
(ii) Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution
vests in Congress the exclusive authority to ``pay the
Debts'' of the United States.
(iii) Financial contributions to the Organization may be
appropriated only by Congress.
(B) Sense of senate.--It is therefore the sense of the
Senate that--
(i) such contributions thus should be considered, for
purposes of Article VIII(8) of the Convention, beyond the
control of the executive branch of the United States
Government; and
(ii) the United States vote in the Organization should not
be denied in the event that Congress does not appropriate the
full amount of funds assessed for the United States financial
contribution to the Organization.
(21) On-site inspection agency.--It is the sense of the
Senate that the On-Site Inspection Agency of the Department
of Defense should have the authority to provide assistance in
advance of any inspection to any facility in the United
States that is subject to a routine inspection under the
Convention, or to any facility in the United States that is
the object of a challenge inspection conducted pursuant to
Article IX, if the consent of the owner or operator of the
facility has first been obtained.
(22) Limitation on the scale of assessment.--
(A) Limitation on annual assessment.--Notwithstanding any
provision of the Convention, and subject to the requirements
of subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) the United States shall
pay as a total annual assessment of the costs of the
Organization pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article VIII not more
than $25,000,000.
(B) Recalculation of limitation.--On January 1, 2000, and
at each 3-year interval thereafter, the amount specified in
subparagraph (A) is to be recalculated by the Administrator
of General Services, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, to reflect changes in the consumer price index for the
immediately preceding 3-year period.
(C) Additional contributions requiring congressional
approval.--
(i) Authority.--Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the
President may furnish additional contributions which would
otherwise be prohibited under subparagraph (A) if--
(I) the President determines and certifies in writing to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the failure to
provide such contributions would result in the inability of
the Organization to conduct challenge inspections pursuant to
Article IX or would otherwise jeopardize the national
security interests of the United States; and
(II) Congress enacts a joint resolution approving the
certification of the President.
(ii) Statement of reasons.--The President shall transmit
with such certification a detailed statement setting forth
the specific reasons therefor, and the specific uses to which
the additional contributions provided to the Organization
would be applied.
(D) Additional contributions for verification.--
Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), for a period of not more
than ten years, the President may furnish additional
contributions to the Organization for the purposes of meeting
the costs of verification under Articles IV and V.
(23) Additions to the annex on chemicals.--
(A) Presidential notification.--Not later than 10 days
after the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat
communicates information to all States Parties pursuant to
Article XV(5)(a) of a proposal for the addition of a chemical
or biological substance to a schedule of the Annex on
Chemicals, the President shall notify the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate of the proposed addition.
(B) Presidential report.--Not later than 60 days after the
Director-General of the Technical Secretariat communicates
information of such a proposal pursuant to Article XV(5)(a)
or not later than 30 days after a positive recommendation by
the Executive Council pursuant to Article XV(5)(c), whichever
is sooner, the President shall submit to the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate a report, in classified and
unclassified form, detailing the likely impact of the
proposed addition to the Annex on Chemicals. Such report
shall include--
(i) an assessment of the likely impact on United States
industry of the proposed addition of the chemical or
biological substance to a schedule of the Annex on Chemicals;
(ii) a description of the likely costs and benefits, if
any, to United States national security of the proposed
addition of such chemical or biological substance to a
schedule of the Annex on Chemicals; and
(iii) a detailed assessment of the effect of the proposed
addition on United States obligations under the Verification
Annex.
(C) Presidential consultation.--The President shall, after
the submission of the notification required under
subparagraph (A) and prior to any action on the proposal by
the Executive Council under Article XV(5)(c), consult
promptly with the Senate as to whether the United States
should object to the proposed addition of a chemical or
biological substance pursuant to Article XV(5)(c).
(24) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the
applicability to all treaties of the Constitutionally based
principles of treaty interpretation set forth in Condition
(1) of the resolution of ratification with respect to the INF
Treaty. For purposes of this declaration, the term ``INF
Treaty'' refers to the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range
Missiles, together with the related memorandum of
understanding and protocols, approved by the Senate on May
27, 1988.
(25) Further arms reductions obligations.--The Senate
declares its intention to consider for approval international
agreements that would obligate the United States to reduce or
limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a
militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty
power as set forth in Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the
Constitution.
(26) Riot control agents.--
(A) Permitted uses.--Prior the the deposit of the United
States instrument of ratification, the President shall
certify to Congress that the United States is not restricted
by the Convention in its use of riot control agents,
including the use against combatants who are parties to a
conflict, in any of the following cases:
(i) United states not a party.--The conduct of peacetime
muilitary operations within an area of ongoing armed conflict
when the United States is not a party to the conflict (such
as recent use of the United States Armed Forces in Somalia,
Bosnia, and Ruanda).
(ii) Consensual peacekeeping.--Consensual peacekeeping
operations when the use of force is authorized by the
receiving state, including operations pursuant to Chapter VI
of the United Nations Charter.
(iii) Chapter vii peacekeeping.--Peacekeeping operations
when force is authorized by the Securtity Council under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
(B) Implementation.--The President shall take no measure,
and prescribe no rule or regulation, which would alter or
eliminate Executive Order 11850 of April 8, 1975.
(C) Definition.--In this paragraph, the term ``riot control
agent'`` has the meaning given the term in Article II(7) of
the Convention.
(27) Chemical weapons destruction.--Prior to the deposit of
the United States instrument of ratification of the
Convention, the President shall certify to the Congress that
all of the following conditions are satisfied:
[[Page S3379]]
(A) Exploration of alternative technologies.--The President
has agreed to explore alternative technologies for the
destruction of the United States stockpile of chemical
weapons in order to ensure that the United States has the
safest, most effective and environmentally sound plans and
programs for meeting its obligations under the Convention for
the destruction of chemical weapons.
(B) Convention extends destruction deadline.--The
requirement in section 1412 of Public Law 99-145 (50 U.S.C.
1521) for completion of the destruction of the United States
stockpile of chemical weapons by December 31, 2004, will be
superseded upon the date the Convention enters into force
with respect to the United States by the deadline required by
the Convention of April 29, 2007.
(C) Authority to employ a different destruction
technology.--The requirement in Article III(1)(a)(v) of the
Convention for a declaration by each State Party not later
than 30 days after the date the Convention enters into force
with respect to that Party, on general plans of the State
Party for destruction of its chemical weapons does not
preclude in any way the United States from deciding in the
future to employ a technology for the destruction of chemical
weapons different than that declared under that Article.
(D) Procedures for extension of deadline.--The President
will consult with Congress on whether to submit a request to
the Executive Council of the Organization for an extension of
the deadline for the destruction of chemical weapons under
the Convention, as provided under part IV(A) of the Annex on
Implementation and Verification to the Convention, if, as a
result of the program of alternative technologies for the
destruction of chemical munitions carried out under section
8065 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1997
(as contained in Public Law 104-208), the President
determines that alternatives to the incineration of chemical
weapons are available that are safer and more environmentally
sound but whose use would preclude the United States from
meeting the deadlines of the Convention.
(28) Constitutional protection against unreasonable search
and seizure.--
(A) In general.--In order to protect United States citizens
against unreasonable searches and seizures, prior to the
deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the
President shall certify to Congress that--
(i) for any challenge inspection conducted on the territory
of the United States pursuant to Article IX, where consent
has been withheld, the United States National Authority will
first obtain a criminal search warrant based upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and describing with
particularity the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized; and
(ii) for any routine inspection of a declared facility
under the Convention that is conducted on an involuntary
basis on the territory of the United States, the United
States National Authority first will obtain an administrative
search warrant from a United States magistrate judge.
(B) Definition.--For purposes of this resolution, the term
``National Authority'' means the agency or office of the
United States Government designated by the United States
pursuant to Article VII(4) of the Convention.
(29) Russian elimination of chemical weapons.--Prior to the
deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the
President shall certify to the Congress that--
(A) Russia is making reasonable progress in the
implementation of the Agreement between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
Destruction and Nonproduction of Chemical Weapons and on
Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning
Chemical Weapons, signed on June 1, 1990 (in this resolution
referred to as the ``1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement'');
(B) the United States and Russia have resolved, to the
satisfaction of the United States, outstanding compliance
issues under the Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification
Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition on
Chemical Weapons, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on
September 23, 1989, also known as the ``1989 Wyoming
Memorandum of Understanding'', and the 1990 Bilateral
Destruction Agreement;
(C) Russia has deposited the Russian instrument of
ratification for the Convention and is in compliance with its
obligations under the Convention; and
(D) Russia is committed to forgoing any chemical weapons
capability, chemical weapons modernization program,
production mobilization capability, or any other activity
contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention.
(30) Chemical weapons in other states.--
(A) Certification requirement.--Prior to the deposit of the
United States instrument of ratification the President, in
consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall
certify to the Congress that countries which have been
determined to have offensive chemical weapons programs,
including Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, China, and all other countries determined
to be state sponsors of international terrorism, have
ratified or otherwise acceded to the Convention.
(31) Exercise of right to bar certain inspectors.--
(i) In general.--The President shall exercise United States
rights under paragraphs 2 and 4 of Part II of the
Verification Annex to indicate United States non-acceptance
of all inspectors and inspection assistants who are nationals
of countries designated by the Secretary of State as
supporters of international terrorism under section 40(d) of
the Arms Export Control Act, or nationals of countries that
have been determined by the President, in the last five
years, to have violated United States nonproliferation law,
including--
(I) chapters 7, 8, and 10 of the Arms Export Control Act;
(II) sections 821 and 824 of the Nuclear Proliferation
Prevention Act of 1994;
(III) sections 11b and 11c of the Export Administration Act
of 1979;
(IV) the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945; and
(V) sections 1604 and 1605 of the Iran-Iraq
Nonproliferation Act of 1992.
(ii) Other grounds of exclusion.--The President shall also
bar such nationals from entering United States territory for
the purpose of conducting any activity associated with the
Convention, notwithstanding paragraph 7 of Part II of the
Verification Annex.
(32) Stemming the proliferation of chemical weapons.--Prior
to the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, the President shall certify to Congress that--
(A) the State Parties have concluded an agreement amending
the Convention--
(i) by striking Article X; and
(ii) by amending Article XI to strike any provision that
states or implies disapproval of trade restrictions in the
field of chemical activities, including paragraphs 2(b),
2(c), 2(d), and 2(e); and
(B) no provision has been added to the Convention or to any
of its annexes, and no statement, written or oral, has been
issued by the Organization, stating or implying the right or
obligation of States Parties to share or facilitate the
exchange among themselves of chemical weapons defense
technology, chemicals, equipment, or scientific and technical
information.
(33) Effective verification.--
(A) Certification.--Prior to the deposit of the United
States instrument of ratification, the President shall
certify to Congress that compliance with the Convention is
effectively verifiable.
(B) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
(i) Effectively verifiable.--The term ``effectively
verifiable'' means that the Director of Central Intelligence
has certified to the President that the United States
intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the
National Security Act of 1947) has a high degree of
confidence in its ability to detect militarily significant
violations of the Convention, including the production,
possession, or storage of militarily significant quantities
of lethal chemicals, in a timely fashion, and to detect
patterns of marginal violation over time.
(ii) Militarily significant.--The term ``militarily
significant'' means one metric ton or more of chemical
weapons agent.
(iii) Timely fashion.--The term ``timely fashion'' means
detection within one year of the violation having occurred.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
As used in this resolution:
(1) Chemical weapons convention or convention.--The terms
``Chemical Weapons Convention'' and ``Convention'' mean the
Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, Opened for Signature and Signed by the United
States at Paris on January 13, 1993, including the following
protocols and memorandum of understanding, all such documents
being integral parts of and collectively referred to as the
``Chemical Weapons Convention'' or the ``Convention''
(contained in Treaty Document 103-21):
(A) The Annex on Chemicals.
(B) The Annex on Implementation and Verification.
(C) The Annex on the Protection of Confidential
Information.
(D) The Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission
for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
(E) The Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory
Commission.
(2) Organization.--The term ``Organization'' means the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
established under the Convention.
(3) State party.--The term ``State Party'' means any nation
that is a party to the Convention.
(4) United states instrument of ratification.--The term
``United States instrument of ratification'' means the
instrument of ratification of the United States of the
Convention.
____________________