

the Convention subject to reservations, notwithstanding Article XXII of the Convention.

In connection with Condition (7), Continuing Vitality of the Australia Group and National Export Controls: (i) nothing in the Convention obligates the United States to accept any modification, change in scope, or weakening of its national export controls; (ii) the United States understands that the maintenance of national restrictions on trade in chemicals and chemical production technology is fully compatible with the provisions of the Convention, including Article XI(2), and solely within the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States; (iii) the Convention preserves the right of State Parties, unilaterally or collectively, to maintain or impose export controls on chemicals and related chemical production technology for foreign policy or national security reasons, notwithstanding Article XI(2); and (iv) each Australia Group member, at the highest diplomatic levels, has officially communicated to the United States Government its understanding and agreement that export control and nonproliferation measures which the Australia Group has undertaken are fully compatible with the provisions of the Convention, including Article XI(2), and its commitment to maintain in the future such export controls and nonproliferation measures against non-Australia Group members.

In connection with Condition (9), Protection of Advanced Biotechnology, the legitimate commercial activities and interests of chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms in the United States are not being significantly harmed by the limitations of the Convention on access to, and production of, those chemicals and toxins listed in Schedule 1 of the Annex on chemicals.

In connection with Condition (15), Assistance Under Article X, the United States shall not provide assistance under paragraph 7(a) of Article X, and, for any State Party the government of which is not eligible for assistance under chapter 2 of part II (relating to military assistance) or chapter 4 of part II (relating to economic support assistance) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: (i) No assistance under paragraph 7(b) of Article X will be provided to the State Party; and (ii) no assistance under paragraph 7(c) of Article X other than medical antidotes and treatment will be provided to the State Party.

In connection with Condition (18), Laboratory Sample Analysis, no sample collected in the United States pursuant to the Convention will be transferred for analysis to any laboratory outside the territory of the United States.

In connection with Condition (26), Riot Control Agents, the United States is not restricted by the Convention in its use of riot control agents, including the use against combatants who are

parties to a conflict, in any of the following cases: (i) the conduct of peacetime military operations within an area of ongoing armed conflict when the United States is not a party to the conflict (such as recent use of the United States Armed Forces in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda); (ii) consensual peacekeeping operations when the use of force is authorized by the receiving state, including operations pursuant to Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter; and (iii) peacekeeping operations when force is authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

In connection with Condition (27), Chemical Weapons Destruction, all the following conditions are satisfied: (A) I have agreed to explore alternative technologies for the destruction of the United States stockpile of chemical weapons in order to ensure that the United States has the safest, most effective and environmentally sound plans and programs for meeting its obligations under the convention for the destruction of chemical weapons; (B) the requirement in section 1412 of Public Law 99-145 (50 U.S.C. 1521) for completion of the destruction of the United States stockpile of chemical weapons by December 31, 2004, will be superseded upon the date the Convention enters into force with respect to the United States by the deadline required by the Convention of April 29, 2007; (C) the requirement in Article III(1)(a)(v) of the Convention for a declaration by each State party not later than 30 days after the date the Convention enters into force with respect to that Party, on general plans of the State Party for destruction of its chemical weapons does not preclude in any way the United States from deciding in the future to employ a technology for the destruction of chemical weapons different than that declared under that Article; and (D) I will consult with the Congress on whether to submit a request to the Executive Council of the Organization for an extension of the deadline for the destruction of chemical weapons under the Convention, as provided under Part IV(A) of the Annex on Implementation and Verification to the Convention, if, as a result of the program of alternative technologies for the destruction of chemical munitions carried out under section 8065 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1997 (as contained in Public Law 104-208), I determine that alternatives to the incineration of chemical weapons are available that are safer and more environmentally sound but whose use would preclude the United States from meeting the deadlines of the Convention.

In connection with Condition (28), Constitutional Protection Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure: (i) for any challenge inspection conducted on the territory of the United States pursuant to Article IX, where consent has been withheld, the United States National Authority will first obtain a

criminal search warrant based upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and describing with particularity the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized; and (ii) for any routine inspection of a declared facility under the Convention that is conducted on an involuntary basis on the territory of the United States, the United States National Authority first will obtain an administrative search warrant from a United States magistrate judge.

In accordance with Condition (26) on Riot Control Agents, I have certified that the United States is not restricted by the Convention in its use of riot control agents in various peacetime and peacekeeping operations. These are situations in which the United States is not engaged in a use of force of a scope, duration and intensity that would trigger the laws of war with respect to U.S. forces.

In connection with Condition (4)(A), Cost Sharing Arrangements, which calls for a report identifying all cost-sharing arrangements with the Organization, I hereby report that because the Organization is not yet established and will not be until after entry into force of the Convention, as of this date there are no cost-sharing arrangements between the United States and the Organization to identify. However, we will be working with the Organization upon its establishment to develop such arrangements with it and will provide additional information to the Congress in the annual reports contemplated by this Condition.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.
THE WHITE HOUSE, April 25, 1997.

SPECIAL ORDERS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 1997, and under a previous order of the House, the following Members will be recognized for 5 minutes each.

U.S. ARMED FORCES IN BOSNIA PROTECTION ACT OF 1997

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. JONES] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Speaker, when it comes to the issue of Bosnia, America has fulfilled her promise. While many Americans, including myself and my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, were opposed to deploying United States troops to Bosnia, we found some comfort in knowing that they were to come home at the end of one year.

Well, Mr. Speaker, as we know, the President has broken his promise and has extended our military mission in Bosnia until at least June of 1998.

Contrary to what some may say, Bosnia is not a vital United States national interest; it is at best a secondary interest. And contrary to the President's own declaration, Bosnia is not at the heart of Europe, it is a geographic fringe of Europe and devoid of

any strategic assets. It is, in other words, a regional problem for Europe.

So why then are we spending 6.5 billion U.S. dollars, and why are we placing a division-size unit of troops in harm's way if it is Europe's problem to solve? Well, perhaps it is because administration officials have repeatedly warned that, if United States troops withdraw, the Europeans will withdraw and the mission will collapse.

Frankly, I am troubled by the implication that we are hostages to the Europeans' unwillingness to solve their own regional problems.

The fact of the matter is that the United States troops in Bosnia have been forgotten. The old saying, out of sight, out of mind, applies to our men and women in Bosnia. That is why I am an original cosponsor of H.R. 1172, the U.S. Armed Forces in Bosnia Protection Act.

This bill limits the presence of United States ground troops in Bosnia to the end of 1997 and prevents mission creep. It also requires the administration to report on the steps it is taking to prepare our European allies to take over the mission.

Mr. Speaker, it is time for others to shoulder this military burden, as Uncle Sam already has a \$6 trillion national debt problem of his own.

Mr. Speaker, the time has come to bring our troops home. Please join me as a cosponsor of H.R. 1172, the U.S. Armed Forces in Bosnia Protection Act of 1997.

FUTURE OF THE U.S. MILITARY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 1997, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON] is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, today is the first of three speeches I intend to make on the future of the U.S. military. This afternoon I will address the principles that should shape U.S. military strategy in coming years. In the second speech I will discuss whether projected budgets are sufficient to support U.S. strategy. In the final speech, I intend to consider how we are treating our most important resource for protecting national security, our people, the men and women who serve in the Armed Forces and the civilian personnel who support them.

I intend to begin each of these speeches by making a simple point that Congress is responsible for ensuring that U.S. Armed Forces are prepared to preserve and protect the security of the United States. Let me emphasize the key phrase in this statement: Congress is responsible.

Under the Constitution, it is the duty of the Congress, not of the President, let alone of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are not constitutional officers, to determine the size and composition of the Armed Forces. Article I, section 8 of the Con-

stitution, which lists the powers of the Congress, makes this clear. It assigns to Congress the powers to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy and to make rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval forces.

It falls to the Congress, therefore, to ensure that our military strength is adequate to defend our Nation and our national interests. Indeed, there is no more important duty placed upon us as Members of this institution than to provide for the common defense. It is a duty which we owe not only to our fellow citizens today, but to the Americans of tomorrow.

We have a duty, as well, not to squander, through short-sightedness and neglect, the sacrifices which generations before us have made to grant us the peace and security with which we are blessed. We have a duty to future generations of Americans to pass on to them the legacy of peace, prosperity, and freedom which has been bequeathed to us.

It is the Congress, therefore, which is ultimately responsible for approving a strategy to guide U.S. military policy and, above all, for establishing a proper balance between national strategy and the resources available to carry it out.

Historically, Congress has often failed in this responsibility. In the years since the end of the cold war, many commentators have noted how badly the Nation has handled the aftermath of major conflicts in the 20th century. After World War I, after World War II, and after the war in Vietnam, we allowed our military forces to deteriorate to a degree that cost us dearly in the conflicts that inevitably arose later on.

In fact, such a failure is not unique to this century. A few years ago, I discovered a speech made in 1923 by then-Army Maj. George C. Marshall that discerned a similar, though not quite identical, pattern of failure even earlier in our history.

Major Marshall, of course, later became the most distinguished American soldier and statesman of this century, as Chief of Staff in the Army in World War II, Secretary of State in the early years of the cold war, and Secretary of Defense during the war in Korea.

"From the earliest days of this country," said Marshall in 1923, "the Regular Army was materially increased in strength and drastically reduced with somewhat monotonous regularity." It was perhaps understandable, he said, that there should be a reduction in the size of the military following a war. But, in fact, he discovered the pattern was not quite so simple.

Often, following a war, the size of the Regular Army was increased above what it had been before the conflict, but then, within a very few years, or even a few months, in some cases it was reduced below the pre-war level. In struggling to comprehend this inconsistency, Marshall offered the following explanation:

"It appears that when the war was over, every American's thoughts were centered on the tragedies involved in the lessons just learned. So the Congress, strongly backed by public opinion, determined that we should be adequately prepared for the future, and accordingly enacted a law well devised for this express purpose. However, in a few months, the public mind ran away from the tragedies of the war and reasons therefor and became obsessed with the magnitude of the public debt and the problem of its reduction. Forgetting almost immediately the bitter lesson of unpreparedness, they demanded and secured the reduction of the Army, which their representatives had so recently increased for very evident reasons."

It is this pattern of failure that I fear we may now be repeating. For my own part, I have been debating whether the current era resembles more the period of about 1903 or the period of about 1923. At the turn of the century, the Nation had just won a short, popular war against Spain, after which, support for the Army and Navy ran high. But within a few years, funding for the military was reduced, in part because the world seemed to be comfortably at peace, and many believed that war had become impossible.

Just a few years later, all of Europe was in flames, and by 1917, the United States had declared war on Germany, but without any degree of military preparedness.

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Marshall recalled seeing United States soldiers in France at the end of 1917 marching through the ice and snow "without shoes and with their feet wrapped in gunny-sacks." The allies had to continue to hold the line for more than a year before the United States was prepared to participate in the final battles that brought the Great War to a close.

In 1923, the United States had recently participated in what was then the most horrible war in human history. But the public mind, as Marshall lamented, had already forgotten the lessons of that war and the costs of unpreparedness. The majority in Congress could not foresee circumstances in which the United States would again embroil itself in Europe's conflicts, and support for military expenditures had dissolved. Less than 20 years later, we were engaged in an even more destructive global war, for which we were also terribly unprepared.

Today, in the aftermath of a successful conclusion of the cold war with the USSR, we are well on our way to repeating the same mistake of denuding ourselves militarily. The world is no less turbulent or dangerous than it was during the cold war. Regional threats, along with rising terrorism and the possibility of nuclear and chemical weapons proliferation, should cause us to keep up our guard.

Today, a few of my colleagues frequently challenge me with a question