

peace in Europe after World War I. Will it fail a second time? The two cases are disturbingly analogous: Many American political leaders are again obsessed with domestic issues, refusing to recognize their inextricable ties to security affairs and misunderstanding the new forces in Europe.

America withdrew from Europe after World War I, leaving a belt of new democracies, the so-called "successor states," extending from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. France, Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union soon entangled them in competing alliances. Although they all began as democracies, by the mid-1930s all but one were dictatorships. These developments ensured another war.

History does not repeat itself, but structural continuities often prompt similar political developments. That is why the period between the two world wars is so instructive today. The critics insist that NATO can survive without enlargement. In the short term, they are right, but the longer-term dynamics would inevitably fracture the alliance. Maintaining the status quo is a sure formula for bringing about U.S. withdrawal from Europe. Confronted by strong forces of change, NATO will either enlarge to moderate them or be broken by them. And the key to moderating them is Germany, not Russia.

Managing the emergence of German power peacefully has been the major problem in 20th-century Europe. Not only did German leaders fail in 1914, other European leaders share the blame. The resulting Great War produced the Soviet problem, the Nazis and a new war, the bloodiest in history.

After 1945, the United States rectified its earlier mistake, remaining engaged in Europe to resist Soviet expansion. As the rationale for NATO, however, the German problem loomed larger for most Europeans than the Soviet threat, especially for the French. NATO proved surprisingly effective in nurturing a new Germany as well as containing Soviet power, but today the Soviet threat is gone while the German problem is not entirely resolved. German leaders understand this reality well, and that is why they strongly support NATO enlargement. They seek to bind Germany within an integrated Europe as a way to avoid a return to their old predicament.

The European Union's (EU) goal of a "common foreign and defense policy," therefore, is conceived as a lasting solution to the German problem. Its realization, however, remains far from complete as the EU faces the changes caused by the end of the Cold War. In the absence of a multilateral mechanism incorporating Central Europe, competitive policies toward that region will be pursued unilaterally by Germany, France, Britain, Russia and others. (A reappearance of the interwar patterns of diplomacy was evident in the Europeans' reaction to the breakup of Yugoslavia. Finally, NATO forces were required to restore peace in Bosnia.) Thus, Central Europe will again become the scene of some, if not all, of the perverse dynamics of the interwar period unless NATO enlarges to preempt them.

Suppose the United States had followed the advice of the critics and rejected NATO enlargement. Could NATO survive the dynamics of the competition among its key members that would follow? Some argue that the EU could moderate them. But that is unpersuasive in light of the obstacles confronting the EU's adoption of a single currency, not to mention a common defense and foreign policy. Actually, Central Europe presents the EU with a paralyzing dilemma: to "widen" or to "deepen" its integration process? Widening into Central Europe would delay the deepening of existing political and military integration; deepening would leave Central Europe as a zone of diplomatic com-

petition, endangering the EU process itself. Why? Germany.

Britain and France, which were already uncomfortable with a federal Europe that included a strong but divided Germany, are more nervous about a unified Germany bound to be the federation's dominant component. Without a federal Europe, they will be tempted to engage Central Europe against Germany, a game that will invite the most mischievous diplomacy by Moscow. The only viable way out is through NATO enlargement—that is, engaging NATO in the same role in Central Europe that it has long played within Western Europe.

The opponents of enlargement wring their hands about Russia, financial costs and other problems while ignoring the crucially important German problem, no matter that German politicians from all parties warn against leaving Germany on its own to deal with the East.

To be sure, NATO enlargement will cause problems, but its opponents focus mainly on the manageable ones. They usually exaggerate the financial costs. So, too, Russia's probable reaction. The venerable Russia expert George Kennan warns that expansion will destroy Russian democracy. Why would Russia give up democracy to spite NATO? That would harm Russia, not NATO. Actually, Russia has very little "liberal" democracy to destroy. Civil and property rights do not yet enjoy effective protection in Russia. NATO enlargement will undercut those neoimperialist Russian politicians who oppose it and who also misrepresent Russian public attitudes toward it as reflected in polling data. Moreover, proponents of enlargement also urge a continuing and broad Western engagement with Russia, not its isolation.

Other problems, however, are serious, especially the reactions of those countries denied membership in the first round. Their plight demands effective attention—foremost, credible assurance that NATO enlargement is a continuing process, not a one-time affair. An active policy of continuing engagement with each is equally essential.

New members will also cause problems. Some may have embarrassing political scandals involving former Communists and KGB connections. Some may falter in their democratic transitions. NATO, of course, has already coped with such problems in some present member states.

Finally, some critics doubt the administration's competence to carry through NATO enlargement. The president has yet to make the case effectively to the public, and some European leaders believe they are being treated poorly (in French President Jacques Chirac's quaint language, "like crap") in the consultation process. This is worrisome, not just where it concerns Senate ratification but also realities in Europe. When the president told the public that American credibility was at stake if we did not commit troops to the NATO force in Bosnia, he also set an early date for their withdrawal, thereby undermining implementation of the Dayton accord. How can the United States, then, have sufficient credibility in Europe for carrying through on NATO enlargement if it walks away from Bosnia before peace is secure? Success in Bosnia is related to NATO enlargement. Fortunately, the administration evaded the one-year deadline, but the secretary of defense now calls for a pullout next year. Also, President Clinton's occasional remarks on reducing NATO's military essence—for example, after his recent meeting with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia—do not reflect clear thinking about what is required for Partnership for Peace activities. Bosnia and other potential military operations. This is hardly reassuring U.S. leadership.

No great strategic departure is without risks, and enlarging NATO has some, as its opponents abundantly point out. Likewise, there are risks in not going forward, for that, too, is a strategic departure—backward from Europe.

The reunification of Germany within NATO is the greatest strategic realignment in Europe's history without a major war, an achievement no pundit would have conceded beforehand to be possible. But that is only half of the task. Consolidating a community of liberal democracies in Central Europe and beyond is the more difficult half. Failure would eventually affect America's own economy and security adversely, not to mention the negative political and moral consequences. Is America worthy of its liberty and prosperity if it no longer dares to accept such challenges with energy and optimism?

TRIBUTE TO MR. FRED DARIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE SOUTH BRONX COMMUNITY ACTION THEATER

**HON. JOSÉ E. SERRANO**

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, August 1, 1997

Mr. SERRANO. Mr. Speaker, I rise to pay tribute to Mr. Fred Daris. He has been a dear friend and lifelong teacher to me as well as to the youth in the South Bronx community.

On August 4, Mr. Daris turns 70 years old. A man who has given so much of his life to our community, he still holds ambitious dreams for our youth, most of which he has very well accomplished.

Mr. Daris is the founder and executive director of the South Bronx Community Action Theater, established nearly 40 years ago at I.S. 139, in my South Bronx congressional district.

The theater was born from Mr. Daris' desire to provide our youth with quality education and the opportunity to express themselves through the wonderful world of the arts. This performing and creative arts center evolved from the Burger Players, a student theater group which performed in area schools and at special community events.

From the South Bronx Community Action Theater have graduated thousands of students who later became professionals in various fields. Some have joined the center's extended family, such as Mr. Rick Scott, who became the theater's administrator. I was also a product of that dream, as one of the first students to participate in the Burger Players.

Guided by Mr. Daris' determination, knowledge, and wisdom, youngsters who are part of the theater complete their studies with a sense of accomplishment and of a bright future before them.

At the center, students learn dance, drama, singing, the plastic arts, costume design, how to play an instrument, and all other components of an artistic production. They learn to visualize their dreams and to reach out for them.

In addition to Mr. Daris' commitment to the center, the South Bronx Community Action Theater has been in existence in large part through funding provided by title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and with the collaboration of parents and other members of the community.

Mr. Daris has always looked after his community. Before he founded the South Bronx

Community Action Theater, he had already accumulated a wealth of experience as the director of St. Marks Playhouse and of the Royal Playhouse, both in New York; as dramatic arts instructor at Cambridge School of Radio and Television Broadcasting; as the founder of the Stamford Playhouse, in Connecticut; and as assistant director at the Mark Hellinger Theater and Carnegie Hall. He also created a theater group at every Greek church

that could offer plays in English and Greek in Greater New York.

He is the first American citizen to receive a royal scholarship awarded by King Paul and Queen Frederika of Greece, to study at the Royal Theater of Greece. He also completed studies at Irvine School for the Theater, Adelphi College, Long Island University, and Fordham University Theater, where he was a graduate scholarship student.

For the many years that I have known him, Mr. Daris has always shown his great esteem, patience, and dedication to our youth and to betterment of our community.

Mr. Speaker, for all of these reasons, I ask my colleagues to join me in recognizing Mr. Fred Daris, on his 70th birthday and for his life of accomplishments and dedication to our youth. Thank you, Fred. We all love you.