the respect and admiration of men and women in uniform, the Nation and indeed the whole world. His brand of quiet, steady leadership will be greatly missed.

The General Shali story is as unusual as it is remarkable. Born in Warsaw, Poland, on June 27, 1936, John Shalikashvili was just 3 years old when Hitler's tanks rolled into his homeland. Five years later, Stalin's troops invaded Poland from the east. His family fled to Berlin, Germany, after World War II and then later moved to Peoria, IL, when John Shalikashvili was 16 years old. He graduated from Peoria High School in 1954 and received a degree in mechanical engineering from Bradley University 4 years later.

General Shali began his extraordinary military career in an ordinary way—as a draftee in 1958.

He graduated from officer candidate school a year later and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Army. During the next 23 years, General Shalikashvili served in a variety of command and staff positions before becoming a brigadier general in 1982.

In addition to serving on the Army staff, Shali served in Germany as an assistant division commander in the 1st Armored Division. In 1986, he was promoted to major general, and, from 1987 to 1989, he served as Commander of the 9th Infantry Division in Fort Lewis, WA.

In 1989, he was promoted to lieutenant general and returned to Germany to serve as the deputy commander in chief of the Seventh Army. Then, in 1991, he was selected to command Operation Provide Comfort, the relief operation that returned hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees to northern Iraq.

In 1991, he became the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and later served as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and the commander in chief of the U.S. European Command from June 1992 until October 1993.

On October 25, 1993, Gen. John Shalikashvili completed his rise to the top of the military. President Clinton appointed him to serve as the 13th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In that position, he has served as the principal military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. During that tenure as Chairman, Shali was integral to the United States-led efforts to restore democracy in Haiti, enforce sanctions against Iraq, and keep peace in Bosnia.

His guidance, his commitment, and dedication truly made a difference in each of these and more than 40 other missions in which our troops participated over the last 4 years.

In addition to his extraordinary operational successes, the general has also made significant contributions to improving the Department of Defense. He was instrumental in adjusting our military forces to post-cold-war realities and budget levels, always ensuring that the troops received the best equipment and training in the world.

There is not a single soldier in our military today who has not benefited from the concern General Shali has consistently displayed for his or her well-being. His commitment to improving the quality of life for those serving in the Armed Forces has been second to none, and I am sure that they, like the rest of their fellow Americans, salute him.

I think his Commander in Chief best expressed the high regard in which General Shali is held. In his comments at General Shali's farewell ceremony yesterday, President Clinton stated:

> When future students look back upon his time, they will rank John Shali as among the greatest chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff America ever had.

Mr. President, on behalf of the U.S. Senate, the men and women in uniform, and millions of his countrymen, I concur with President Clinton's assessment and thank General Shali for his 39 years of service to his country. I wish him and his wife, Joan, the very best as they begin a new chapter in their lives in the State of Washington.

THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I come before the Senate this afternoon to talk briefly about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty submitted to the Senate by President Clinton last week. This treaty represents another useful and important step toward reducing the spread of nuclear weapons. I stand ready to do all that I can to ensure that the Senate considers the CTBT in a timely manner and votes to allow the United States to join 145 other signatories of this treaty to put an end to nuclear testing.

It was on July 16, 1945, at a site called Trinity in the desert near Alamogordo, NM, that the United States conducted the first test of an atomic bomb. In a fraction of a second, the detonation not only released over the isolated test site an amount of energy equivalent to what we consume in the entire United States in 30 seconds—it also changed the world. The nuclear age had loudly begun. For decades to come, humanity would be forced to grapple with the consequences borne out of what occurred at Trinity.

Much has happened since that first test in the New Mexico desert.

The United States was quickly joined in the nuclear club by Russia and several others. We saw the onset of the cold war and an arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. As each country strove to keep pace with the other, the United States and Russia engaged in a buildup of thousands of nuclear weapons with a destructive power unprecedented in human history.

The United States would go on to conduct more than 1,000 additional nuclear tests; and the Russians more than 700. Several other countries would carry out a total of roughly 300 tests of nuclear weapons.

The Russians would test the largest weapon ever designed by mankind—a monstrous device that, in a split second, produced enough energy to power the entire United States for a whole day. At the height of the cold war, the United States and the Russians had deployed between them roughly 60,000 nuclear weapons.

Taken together, these frightening developments would make a four decade old comment by the preeminent scientist of the 20th century, Albert Einstein, even more poignant. Einstein played a large role in the conceptual development of the atom bomb. Moreover, in 1939, in a letter he sent to President Roosevelt, Einstein urged the President to begin a nuclear weapons program immediately. Later in life, after observing the early stages of the arms buildup and the development of ever more destructive weapons, Einstein commented, ''I made one great mistake in my life, when I signed the letter to President Roosevelt recommending that atom bombs be made.''

Fortunately, the outlook has improved markedly since the darkest days of the cold war. The United States and Russia have cooperated repeatedly during the past several years to reduce the nuclear threat. Each country has ratified the START I Treaty.

Following President Clinton's lead, the Senate ratified the START II Treaty, and we hope the Russians will follow suit by year's end. If START II is implemented, each side will reduce its strategic arsenal down to about 3,500 deployed weapons. In addition, once START II enters into force, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin pledged to immediately begin negotiations on START III. Under the terms of the Helsinki agreement, START III would establish ceilings of as low as 2,000 strategic weapons.

While much has been done to reduce the threat posed by nuclear weapons, much remains to be done. And, President Clinton's submission of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty represents a useful step in the right direction.

The CTBT prohibits any test involving a nuclear explosion, regardless of the test's purpose, size, or location. On behalf of the United States, the President was the first to sign this treaty last September. He would subsequently be joined by representatives from more than 140 other nations.

We will soon hear from the usual critics of arms control, voicing objections to the treaty that are as predictable as they are likely. They will say the CTBT is unverifiable. They will say that it will lead to the inevitable erosion of our nuclear weapons capability. And, they will be wrong on both counts. Although we will have plenty of time to thoroughly address their objections in the days ahead, I will briefly address each of those criticisms.

As to the verifiability of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, this is a

familiar refrain uttered by those who oppose arms control agreements in any form. The treaty's verification regime includes a comprehensive international monitoring system composed of hundreds of seismological, radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasound sensors spread out all over the globe. This network is backed up by the ability of Members to conduct onsite inspections of questionable activities. This combination should be more than sufficient to deter would-be cheaters and, if deterrence fails, catch those who try to violate the treaty's restrictions.

As to the concern that CTBT will erode our nuclear capability, I have 4.5 billion reasons why that will not be the case this year and tens of billions more reasons in subsequent years. Last week, the administration reached an important agreement with our weapons development labs. These labs are staffed by the world's foremost nuclear weapons experts. The labs stated that if they are provided with $4.5 billion this year and similar amounts in each subsequent year, they will be able to conduct a program that will ensure with a high level of confidence the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons in our stockpile. In short, the cessation of nuclear testing need not erode our nuclear capability.

The CTBT is an important step down the path toward a safer world. In simple terms, the United States, the country with one of the largest and certainly the most sophisticated nuclear weapons arsenals in the world, has the most to gain from freezing the competition in place. Countries already possessing nuclear weapons will have a difficult time making qualitative and quantitative improvements to their existing arsenals. And as for countries without nuclear weapons, the CTBT will place an additional hurdle in their path if they seek to develop and deploy such weapons.

I do not believe we can rest with the submission, and, hopefully, ratification of this treaty.

Many more challenges face us if we are to reduce to acceptable levels the threat posed by nuclear weapons. For example, despite the fact that the cold war ended years ago, the United States and Russia still maintain at least 3,000 strategic nuclear warheads poised and ready to launch at a moment's notice. As noted by former Senator Sam Nunn, one of the most distinguished and insightful defense experts to ever serve in this Chamber, while this practice may have been necessary in the cold war, ''today it represents a dangerous anachronism.'' Moreover, tens of tons of nuclear materials and thousands of nuclear weapons remain outside international controls.

Tens of thousands of highly trained employees of the Russian nuclear complex, each armed with the ability to design and build nuclear weapons, go unpaid for months at a time. Future security measures must be designed to speak to these concerns as well.

While I will be doing all I can to ensure smooth ratification of the CTBT in the Senate, I will also be attempting to help design measures that speak to these other security problems. Outside experts such as former Senator Nunn, General Lee Butler, the last Commander in Chief of the now-disbanded Strategic Air Command, and Dr. Bruce Blair, a thoughtful arms control expert at the Brookings Institution, have all raised these same concerns and begun to design solutions. It is an important opportunity for the Senate, the Pentagon, and the country to begin to consider them.

At Helsinki, the administration acknowledged its awareness of these problems and indicated a commitment to resolve them. Unfortunately, the administration appears to have put the detailed discussion of many of these measures on hold until START II enters force and the START III negotiations begin. I hope the administration would begin exploring these steps today. The only real linkage between START and these other measures is that they both can enhance our security. There is no reason why United States action in one arena should be held in abeyance until the Russians act in another.

In summary, Mr. President, I look forward to working with the administration and the other supporters of the CTBT in this body to ensure that the merits of this treaty are fully aired. If that happens, I am confident the CTBT will be ratified, and another step will be taken toward turning back the clock that unfortunately began ticking 52 years ago at a place called Trinity.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. THOMAS. Are we in morning business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, we have spent several days recently and this week talking about campaign finance. I would like to share some of my thoughts. It is one of those issues that have become so complicated and so convoluted that it seems to me it is very difficult for a person to really bring it down to the simple basics, particularly if you haven't listened to all of it.

Proponents of campaign finance reform bills will have you believe this is the top issue and in the interest of Americans, that everyone on Main Street is waiting breathlessly for some significant action that would be more important than tax relief or the balanced budget—no. I think that is not so. When I go back to Wyoming nearly every week, people don't come and talk to me about campaign finance. They want to discuss health care, they want to discuss public lands, they want to discuss taxes.

This is not to say that it is not important, certainly not to say that I am against finance reform, because I think there should be some thoughtful changes in terms of campaign financing. I just don't believe that it is a catastrophic issue. I don't believe it is an issue that is the most important thing on our agenda as it sometimes is termed.

The steam behind the issue, as a matter of fact, is generally that of enforcing the laws that are now on the books. That is what the hearings were about. That is what brought it up. It is not new laws that are needed—enforce the ones that are now there, not merely adding more to be unenforced.

I am in favor of campaign finance reform. I have been very involved in political systems, as a matter of fact, long before I was ever in elective office, because it seemed to me over a period of years that it is pretty clear that politics and campaigns are how we govern ourselves. That is how you and I in our precincts decide the big issues in terms of government. So I just think we need to make it the kind of a process in which people can be involved, the kind of a process in which the first amendment opportunities to speak are there and are extended to everyone—not just limited to the press.

On the other hand, we can't overlook the defects we saw in the last campaign cycle. The answer, however, is not to marshal the powers of the Federal Government and increase governmental intervention. We can reintroduce principle, we can introduce integrity and serious compliance into this important function of governing ourselves by strengthening and enforcing the reporting and disclosure laws, by limiting the influence of soft money on the national level, by requiring that a majority of the funds in a campaign come from the district in which the election takes place, by banning compulsory contributions.

I don't think we ought to pass a bill just because we want to go through the rhetorical process, just because we want to shift the attention from not adhering to the law to writing new laws.

We are talking about being home, and I hear more than anything else in Wyoming, ''Wait a minute, the issue is not new law; the issue is enforcing the laws we have.'' I think disclosure is the most important of the election issues. In that case, voters can determine where the money comes from to go to a candidate and make their own judgment as to whether or not that is reasonable. It is a simple way to bring our system of privately financed campaigns on track by strengthening and enforcing existing disclosure laws.

Privately financed—I think it is a mistake to move more and more to how the taxpayers finance campaigns. It seems to me that has proven not to be useful. Candidates in parties must offer fuller and more timely disclosure of campaign receipts and spending activities. Reports must be prompt and