

responsibility, community involvement, and family.

The city of St. Louis recently celebrated Mark McGwire's decision to sign a long-term contract to remain a Cardinal. McGwire demonstrated his generosity and commitment to the St. Louis community by pledging to donate \$1 million of his salary every year to his foundation for sexually and physically abused children. Mark McGwire's baseball statistics show his excellence on the baseball field but his decision to give \$1 million of his salary demonstrates what makes up his character.

I'm proud to be a St. Louis Cardinals fan—the greatest fans in all of baseball. Mark McGwire is the best home run hitter in the game today and someone in which the entire city can take pride. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to congratulate Mark McGwire on his outstanding baseball achievements and his decision to stay in St. Louis. I join the entire city in welcoming Mark McGwire and I look forward to admiring his work—both on and off the field—in the years to come.

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A BILL TO END THE U.S. TRADE DEFICIT

**HON. PETER A. DeFAZIO**

OF OREGON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Thursday, October 9, 1997*

Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, trade deficits matter. They represent millions of lost jobs—mostly in high wage manufacturing industries. They help keep U.S. interest rates at abnormally high levels, depressing economic growth. And large, persistent trade deficits with low wage nations inevitably depress wages in the United States and contribute to one of America's most vexing problems: the growing disparities in the wealth and incomes of our citizens.

The United States has not had a positive trade balance since 1975. The 1996 total trade deficit—including services—was \$111 billion. The merchandise-only trade deficit was \$192 billion—a new record. It's true that exports create jobs. But when imports—especially imports of goods that were once produced in U.S. factories—exceed exports by nearly \$200 billion a year, the result is a net loss of some of the best jobs our economy has to offer. That's exactly what this Nation's trade policies have delivered to the American people.

Today I am introducing a bill to establish the emergency commission to end the trade deficit. My bill would establish a commission to develop a comprehensive trade policy plan by examining the economic policies, trade, tax, investment laws, and other legal incentives and restrictions that are relevant to reducing the U.S. trade deficit. The commission would be composed of members with expertise in economics, international trade, manufacturing, labor, environment, and business. Senators DORGAN and BYRD have introduced companion legislation in the Senate.

Trade policy developed on a fast track has been disastrous for our people and our economy. It is time to slow down and carefully develop a trade policy whose principle objective is the generation of decent jobs and rising wages for the majority of our people.

TRIBUTE TO DALLAS LIGHTHOUSE FOR THE BLIND

**HON. PETE SESSIONS**

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Thursday, October 9, 1997*

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to commend a great American and a great organization. The Dallas Lighthouse for the Blind has a long history in Dallas of providing blind individuals with work opportunities. The six decades of work improve and enhance the job opportunities for sight-disabled Dallas residents. I am proud to have this modern industrial center in the Fifth Congressional District of Texas.

This year the fifth district has been doubly blessed. One of my constituents, Jeddie Alexander, has been named the Dallas Lighthouse for the Blind's Ronald Pearce Blind Employee of the Year. Jeddie is a machine operator in the molding department of the lighthouse. In addition, he helped produce eyeglass cases and binders. Jeddie is completely blind, but his uncommon ability has allowed him to run a sewing machine.

Jeddie's story vividly shows that we should focus on abilities, not disabilities. In 1985, Jeddie was shot. He lost the use of both eyes and has no light perception. As he recounts, "When I lost my sight, I had the impression that that was the end of myself. I would have to wait on other people to do things for me. After about a month and a half, I realized I didn't have to do that."

I applaud Jeddie's commitment to improving his life and the lives of the people around him. He has truly taken advantage of the opportunities the Lighthouse has given him. As a father of a young Down's syndrome boy, I understand the desperate need for organizations like the Dallas Lighthouse for the Blind. Organizations like this give the greatest gift in all of the world—freedom, independence, and self-reliance to individuals that need an extra boost on the road of life.

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WHY I SUPPORT "FAST TRACK"

**HON. DONALD A. MANZULLO**

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Thursday, October 9, 1997*

Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Speaker, many people have diverse opinions on the issue of fast track and its potential impact in a wide range of areas. I wanted to take this opportunity to define fast track and explain what it is intended to do and what it is not designed to do.

Fast track is simply the process by which Congress provides limited authority to the President to enter into more trade negotiations in order to lower barriers to our U.S. exports. All fast track does is allow the President the ability to negotiate these trade agreements and then present the agreement to Congress for a final "yes" or "no" vote on the entire package without adding or taking away specific words or sections from the agreement. During the negotiations and the drafting of the final agreement, fast track mandates that there is sufficient consultation with Congress so that the President will not present an agreement that does not have the support of a majority in

Congress. That, simply, is fast track, nothing more, nothing less.

Fast track is not a new concept. It has been a common practice for over 60 years, in some form, for every President since Franklin Roosevelt as tariffs became less and less a source of revenue for the U.S. Government and foreign trade policy grew in complexity and importance to the U.S. economy. The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 was the first time Congress delegated to the President the broad authority to set, within specific limits and for a limited time, tariff and other foreign trade policy.

Up until 1945, 32 bilateral tariff-reducing agreements were reached. In 1947, the United States became a founding member of the multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], whose aim is a mutual reduction of barriers to trade among all the free market nations of the world. During this time, Congress extended the 1934 act 11 times to open up more markets to U.S. products by lowering tariffs.

Then, in 1962, Congress gave President Kennedy a 5-year authority to participate in the first major GATT round or negotiation to not just lower tariffs but eliminate duties on specific products. These global trade talks became more commonly known as the Kennedy round, named after his untimely death.

The Kennedy round concluded in 1967 when agreements were reached to reduce not only tariffs but, for the first time, non-tariff or redtape barriers. But more controversial, the executive branch, under President Johnson, also negotiated an international antidumping agreement that was not contained within the authority Congress originally gave President Kennedy. Congress subsequently enacted a law in 1968 nullifying any provision of this antidumping agreement that was not consistent with U.S. law.

Because of this dispute between the executive and legislative branch, a compromise was reached after a 7-year period when there were no significant global trade barrier reduction negotiations. Thus, the fast track procedures were formally adopted for the first time as part of the Trade Act of 1974. This legislation granted then President Ford another 5-year time period to negotiate a further reduction in trade barriers. These talks became more commonly known as the Tokyo round of the GATT. This round eventually produced a package of 14 international trade agreements that eventually became part of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, negotiated by President Carter.

As part of this renewed fast-track authority, the executive branch agreed to more closely consult with Congress, even to the point of accrediting 10 Members of Congress to serve as advisors to trade negotiating teams. But, in return, Congress agreed not to amend or change the final agreement. Countries will not negotiate with the United States until they are assured that the final agreement will not be changed. However, the legislative branch established an informal process with the executive branch, from the beginning of the negotiating process to crafting the implementing legislation, that the final agreement reflects the will of a majority of Congress.

Fast track was further extended again to President Reagan as part of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. Thus, the U.S.-Israel Free