CONGRESSMAN KILDEE HONORS CATHOLIC SOCIAL SERVICES OF OAKLAND COUNTY

HON. DALE E. KILDEE

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, October 23, 1997

Mr. KILDEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise before you today to recognize Catholic Social Services of Oakland County for 50 years of dedicated service to our community. As a Member of Congress I consider it my duty and my privilege to work on behalf of the American family. It is in this spirit that I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting an organization that is on the frontlines everyday working to protect and preserve families.

In 1947, the Archdiocese of Detroit gave Catholic Social Services of Oakland County space above a downtown Pontiac drug store. During the 1950's a new office was established in Pontiac's historical district, with subsequent openings in Farmington, Royal Oak, Southfield, and Waterford. With its 6 offices operating throughout the county and a staff of 140, over 8,000 people every year have benefited from Catholic Social Services' programs, resources, and activities. Many of the group's accomplishments were the result of the selfless dedication of the late Leonard Jagels. Mr. Jagels had been a mainstay since 1949 and served as executive director for many years. His work has left a lasting impression on the organization.

Catholic Social Services has maintained a tradition of providing prompt and effective service to individuals through community outreach, outpatient treatment and in-home programs, and child placement programs. The Families and Schools Together Program, the Foster Grandparent Program, the Retired Senior Volunteer Program, and the Older Adult Day Care Program are just a few of the programs administered by Catholic Social Services. In addition to their services for at-risk children, the group's outpatient and in-home programs are a valuable resource, always on hand for clinical, family, mental health, and substance abuse counseling. Finally, the organization participates in child placement programs, acting as an advocate in matters of special needs adoption, post adoption services, and foster care.

Catholic Social Services is more than just one organization, but rather an integral part of a tremendous service network, one that includes United Way of Oakland County, United Way Community Services, Catholic Charities USA, and the Michigan Federation of Private Child and Family Agencies. Working together to achieve common goals these organizations serve as an inspiration to us all. The dedicated individuals who work with these organizations deserve our gratitude for in my eyes they are true heroes.

Mr. Speaker, without a doubt, our community is a much better place in which to live because of the 50 years of service, love and support from Catholic Social Services of Oakland County. I urge my colleagues in the House of Representatives to join me in congratulating Catholic Social Services on a fulfilling 50 years, and in wishing them even greater success in the years ahead.

INTRODUCTION OF THE SANCTIONS REFORM ACT, H.R. 2708

HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, October 23, 1997

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, today Congressman PHILIP CRANE and I introduced H.R. 2708, the Enhancement of Trade, Security, and Human Rights through Sanctions Reform Act. This bill would reform the process by which both the Congress and the executive branch consider unilateral sanctions proposals. I would like to share with my colleagues the rationale for this bill and describe its key provisions.

The United States needs economic sanctions in its foreign policy toolkit. We need to respond to many international problems. Economic sanctions can be an attractive policy option when military action is not warranted, and diplomacy seems to have failed. In some circumstances, the conduct of a particular country may be sufficiently abhorrent or dangerous that we will feel compelled to respond, regardless of whether other countries join us.

Prior to 1980, several major laws authorized the imposition of economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes. Those laws tended to give the President considerable flexibility to decide when and how to impose sanctions. They also tended to target foreign conduct, rather than specific countries.

During the past two decades, however, and especially since 1990, U.S. sanctions policies have evolved substantially.

First, we impose unilateral sanctions more frequently. In a report prepared earlier this year, the President's Export Council noted that more than 75 countries are now subject to, or threatened by, one of more unilateral U.S. sanctions.

Second, we use a wider variety of unilateral measures to target a wider range of foreign conduct. The Export Council counted 21 specific sanctions covering 27 different target behaviors. We have also given the President less latitude in implementing sanctions.

Third, during the past 2 years we have adopted unilateral sanctions that are extraterritorial in scope. In 1996, we departed from our longstanding policy of opposing secondary boycotts by enacting two laws that penalize foreign firms for activities for activities in Cuba, Iran, and Libya. Meanwhile, roughly 20 States and localities have adopted laws prohibiting government commercial dealings with United States or foreign companies that do business with countries that have poor human rights records.

Fourth, over the past year, several of our colleagues have introduced measures that seek to narrow the presidential waiver or lower the decision threshold in existing sanction statutes. None of these measures has made it to the President's desk. If any do, however, they will raise difficult questions about the roles of Congress and the President in the conduct of foreign policy.

CONCERNS ON UNILATERAL SANCTIONS

I have several concerns about the increasing frequency and scope of unilateral sanctions.

First, unilateral measures often cost U.S. exports. The private Institute for International Economics estimated earlier this year that restrictions imposed for foreign policy purposes are costing $15–19 billion in export sales annually.

An extraordinary example of the cost of unilateral sanctions recently came to my attention. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the five countries currently under total U.S. trade embargoes—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea—will together account for roughly 11 percent of the world's wheat export market this year. This means that 11 percent of the world wheat market is off-limits to U.S. farmers. But it doesn't mean those countries can't get wheat. If they have the cash, there are plenty of other countires willing to do business with them.

My second concern is that our reputation for unilateral sanctions is costing potential export sales and foreign investment opportunities. Many executives I have spoken with over the past couple of years have told me that foreign firms and governments are increasingly steering clear of U.S. companies when making procurement decisions. They are concerned that deals with U.S. firms could be jeopardized by subsequent sanctions. I also understand that some European companies have begun to tell prospective customers that U.S. competitors can't be counted on because of U.S. sanctions policies.

Third, exports lost to unilateral sanctions mean lost jobs. Fifteen to twenty billion dollars in export sales would support tens of thousands of American jobs.

Fourth, third-party unilateral sanction measures like the Helms-Burton and Iran-Libya statutes put us at odds with many of our closest friends. That can undermine both our trade leadership and the effectiveness of our foreign policy.

Fifth, in addition to antagonizing foreign governments, some of our State and local sanctions raise difficult questions concerning the constitutional authority to conduct U.S. trade and foreign policy.

INEFFECTIVENESS OF UNILATERAL SANCTIONS

Unilateral sanctions might be worth their price in exports, jobs, and foreign policy interests if they succeeded in achieving their aims. They rarely do. In fact, they are sometimes counterproductive and harmful to the very people we are trying to help.

A number of studies have concluded that sanctions, both unilateral and multilateral, have worked less than half the time since the early 1970's. One of the most thorough and credible of these studies, from the Institute for International Economics, found that unilateral and multilateral sanctions together have succeeded less than 20 percent of the time since 1990. Unilateral sanctions rarely work because the world economy has become too interdependent. When we deny a country access to our products or our markets, it has plenty of alternatives.

WEAK INFORMATION BASE

One of the most alarming aspects of U.S. sanctions policy, in my view, is the weak information base upon which most unilateral sanction decisions are typically made.

Congress does not usually have before it a detailed assessment of new sanctions bills when it takes them up. We hold hearings and we debate proposals in mark-ups. But our review of sanctions is rarely systematic or comprehensive.

We need to improve our decisionmaking on sanctions. Before they act, Congress and the

President should both have in hand better information on the potential costs and benefits of unilateral sanctions proposals. And they should both proceed in a more deliberative and disciplined manner.

SANCTIONS REFORM ACT

The bill Congressman CRANE and I will introduce is a bill that seeks to accomplish these objectives. H.R. 2708 would reform the process by which both Congress and the executive branch consider unilateral sanctions proposals.

The bill defines a unilateral sanction as any restriction or condition on foreign economic activity that is imposed solely by the United States for reasons of foreign policy or national security.

For both Congress and the executive branch, the bill sets out guidelines for future sanctions proposals and procedures for their consideration and implementation.

The guidelines would be largely similar for both branches. We propose that sanctions bills approved by Congress and sanctions measures imposed by the President:

Contain a 2-year sunset;

Provide waiver authority for the President;

Protect the sanctity of existing contracts;

Be targeted as narrowly as possible on those responsible for sanctionable conduct;

Minimize any interference with humanitarian work performed by nongovernmental organizations; and

Include measures to address any costs incurred by U.S. agricultural interests, which are especially vulnerable to foreign retaliation.

With the exception of this agriculture provision, all of the guidelines would be mandatory for the executive branch. But the President could waive several of them in the event of a national emergency.

The bill's procedural reforms for Congress would require a committee of primary jurisdiction to include in its report on a sanctions bill an analysis by the President of the bill's likely impact on a range of U.S. foreign policy, economic, and humanitarian interests. The committee would also need to explain in its report why it did not adhere to any of the sanctions guidelines.

By invoking the Unfunded Federal Mandates Act of 1995, the bill would also require a report by the Congressional Budget Office on a sanctions bill's likely economic impact on the U.S. private sector. Under the terms of the Unfunded Mandates Act, the bill could not be considered on the House or Senate floor until the CBO analysis was completed and made public.

With respect to the Executive Branch, the bill would require the President to report to Congress prior to implementation on the likely impact of a proposed measure on U.S. foreign policy, economic, and humanitarian interests. The President would also be required to consult with Congress and to provide opportunities for public comment. To provide time for this consultation, public comment, and reporting, a sanction could not be imposed—except in the event of a national emergency—until 60 days after the President has announced his intention to do so.

It is also important to understand what our bill would not do:

The bill would not prevent Congress or the President from imposing unilateral sanctions.

The bill would not impact any sanctions currently in effect. The bill's executive branch guidelines and procedural requirements would apply, however, to future sanctions imposed by the President pursuant to existing laws.

The bill would impose no limitations on the foreign countries or conduct that could be targeted by sanctions.

The bill would have no impact on any of the following kinds of measures—now or in the future:

Sanctions imposed under any multilateral agreement to address a foreign policy or national security matter—including proliferation, human rights, and terrorism.

Restrictions or controls on the export of munitions.

Resolutions disapproving a Presidential decision to maintain MFN trade privileges for China or any other country.

Measures imposed under U.S. laws and regulations implementing trade agreements, combating unfair foreign trade practices, and safeguarding the domestic market.

Import restrictions designed to protect food safety or to prevent disruption of domestic agricultural markets.

Measures to implement international environmental agreements.

Import restrictions designed to protect public health and safety.

This bill is not a red light for sanctions. It is a flashing yellow light. Its message is to take a careful look around and proceed with caution.

I hope that Members who have supported sanctions in the past—as I have—would be able to support this bill. To oppose a measure like this is to say that Congress and the President can't use and shouldn't have better information about sanctions. That is a position neither we nor the President should take. We need not fear information.

This bill would require those who propose sanctions to work harder to justify their proposals. It would ensure that elected officials and the public are better informed about the potential consequences of a proposed measure. Sanctions that receive the kind of careful scrutiny this bill will require are bound to be more effective in achieving their aims and to cause less collateral damage to humanitarian and economic interests. Better-designed sanctions will also be more likely to retain public support.

ANN'S CAMPAIGN FOR A SAFER AMERICA

HON. NORMAN D. DICKS

OF WASHINGTON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, October 23, 1997

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, perhaps one of the greatest nightmares that any family could experience is receiving a call in the middle of the night informing you that your daughter has been killed. Even worse to learn that she has been murdered by a random shooting clear across the country. That is the nightmare faced by Coleman and Jean Harris of Mount Vernon, VA, last spring when their daughter, Ann was murdered while visiting friends in Tacoma, WA. This bright and energetic honor student had a most promising future, having just gained early admission into Purdue University. While riding in a car on March 27, she was struck and killed by a bullet fired senselessly into the car by a joyriding group of young men. All too often these incidents of random violence are happening across America, representative of a society that is becoming more and more numb to the violence occurring on our streets. All of us know that something must be done to develop in our young kids a better sense of values and a more fundamental respect for human life. Getting guns out of the schools is critically important, but we must go further to address the value structure that results in such a cavalier attitude about life among many young people today.

I am proud, Mr. Speaker, of the campaign that has been launched by the Harris family—Ann's Campaign for a Safer America. This effort represents a wonderful attempt by a grieving family to use the tragedy of Ann's death as the impetus for action to stop youth violence. The Harris family is speaking out in schools and in many communities to bring this message of understanding and respect for others to young kids. This is an incremental effort, Mr. Speaker, reaching out in small ways to kids who need this message. If it reaches 50, 100 or 1,000 young people and helps them to care more for their fellow students, it will represent a very significant and meaningful accomplishment. If even one more tragedy such as Ann's senseless murder can be averted through the work of this campaign, it will be a remarkable success and a very important memorial to this very talented and inspiring young woman. Mr. Speaker, I want to commend Coleman and Jean Harris and express my appreciation for their desire to turn Ann's tragedy into a positive and constructive educational effort.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA APPROPRIATIONS, MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM, AND EDUCATION REFORM ACT OF 1998

SPEECH OF

HON. LOUIS STOKES

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, October 9, 1997

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2607) making appropriations for the government of the District of Columbia and other activities chargeable in whole or in part against the revenues of said District for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1998, and for other purposes:

Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Moran substitute to H.R. 2607, the Fiscal Year 1998 District of Columbia appropriations bill. Unamended, H.R. 2607 will provide $7 million for a school voucher program that will enable only 2,000 of the Districts 78,000 students to attend private schools or schools in the suburbs at the cost of $3,200 each.

Vouchers will drain critical financial resources from the D.C. public schools. These schools—as are many schools across the Nation—are already over burdened with financial problems. We need to do all that we can to strengthen the D.C. Public School System, not weaken it. Over 5 years, the proposed voucher program will siphon $45 million away from D.C. public schools while helping only 3 percent of the school population.