

being reported by the Judiciary Committee on September 18, and the California district courts face an urgent need for additional judges on the bench.

I recommended Chris Snyder to the President, in January 1996, for appointment to the central district of California because I believe she is extremely well qualified for the position.

Christina Snyder is a highly respected lawyer in Los Angeles. She has more than 20 years of experience in the courtroom and served as a partner in three respected Los Angeles law firms.

She has focused her legal career on civil proceedings, where approximately 70 percent of her cases have been in the Federal courts.

Her practice has consisted of complex civil litigation, representing mostly defendants, including cases involving the Federal securities laws, civil RICO, antitrust, intellectual property, and the Lanham Act.

Christina's record for integrity and decisiveness has earned the respect of her peers, both Democrats and Republicans alike.

Chris Snyder has the support of professors, judges, and lawyers in the central district and throughout California.

Among her many supporters are such prominent Republican Los Angeles leaders as Mayor Richard Riordan, who noted his very high regard and enthusiastic support for her, and Sheriff Sherman Block.

As a testament to her high regard by her colleagues in the legal profession, Mrs. Snyder was nominated for membership to the prestigious American Law Institute. Membership in the organization is equally divided between lawyers, judges, and legal professors. It is indeed an honor to be elected to the organization and Mrs. Snyder was elected to the institute the very first time she was nominated, a noteworthy accomplishment.

Mrs. Snyder has also lectured on various subjects related to banking law and intellectual property law, and is currently coauthoring a treatise on the local rules of practice of the Federal courts in the State of California.

As an attorney for over 20 years, she has the experience and temperament to excel in this position.

I urge the Senate to confirm her nomination to the central district court.

Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.

Mrs. BOXER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.

Mrs. BOXER. Thank you very much, Mr. President. I want to pick up on a thank you here about the fact that we were able to confirm today an outstanding candidate that Senator FEINSTEIN recommended to the President, Christine Snyder.

NOMINATION OF MARGARET MORROW

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I personally say to Senators LOTT and DASCHLE

an enormous thank you for working out an agreement by which we can vote on another extraordinary woman, Margaret Morrow, and make sure that vote will take place before the February break.

We have had one or two Senators who put anonymous holds on this nomination. I am happy to say they decided to come out and talk about why they don't feel it is a good nomination, because at least we know who is objecting to Margaret Morrow.

Those two Senators and I have spoken. We have written to each other extensively, and they have agreed that it is only fair that there be a vote on Margaret Morrow. She has the support of Senator HATCH. She has the support of many members of the Judiciary Committee on both sides of the aisle. Margaret Morrow will make a great judge. I think it is most unfortunate that she has to wait until February, but I feel that at least we have a commitment for a date certain that we will have a vote, and that will be before the February recess.

Again, I thank very much the majority leader, Senator LOTT, and the Democratic leader, Senator DASCHLE, for working with me to make sure that this happens.

I think as we wind down, I have something to be very happy about, which is that we are going to have a vote on Margaret Morrow. I know when my colleagues see the strong bipartisan support she has in the State of California and in this U.S. Senate that she will win confirmation.

Thank you very much, Mr. President. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may have as much time as I require.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORIGINS OF FAST TRACK

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I have followed the fast-track debate closely, and it is with some disappointment that I note the absence of any discussion of the constitutional and institutional framework that governs our country's approach to foreign trade. A proper understanding of that framework is essential if we are to have a productive, enlightened debate about fast track.

I am also convinced that some of fast track's most ardent admirers might find their ardor dimmed a little if they recognize the sordid truth about fast track.

Accordingly, I wish to speak, not overly long, about the illegitimate

birth and disreputable pedigree of fast track. And I will attempt to unfold a decidedly unflattering but undeniably truthful account of how Presidential machinations and arrogance combined with congressional spinelessness to produce the monstrosity of fast track. They will learn that fast track is not about saving jobs or opening markets or building a bridge to the next century. Fast track, in a very considerable measure, is about *power*—raw, unfettered, Presidential power. And Mr. President, let me point out to any colleagues who doubt my reliability and objectivity in this regard that much of what I have to say is drawn from a recent article in the *George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics*, whose author appears favorably disposed to fast track.

I start by noting that the Constitution assigns Congress a major role in the regulation of foreign affairs. Contrary to popular opinion—and contrary to the beliefs of most Presidents—the executive branch does *not* possess sole authority over foreign affairs. Indeed, beyond the general statement in article II, section 1 that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America,” the Constitution contains only four provisions that grant the executive clear foreign relations authority.

Now, I carry in my shirt pocket a copy of the Constitution of the United States. Alexander the Great greatly admired the Iliad. And he carried with him a copy of the Iliad, a copy that Aristotle had carefully examined and refined somewhat. And it was called the “casket copy.” Aristotle slept with this casket copy of the Iliad under his pillow. And along with the Iliad, there was a sword.

Now, Mr. President, I do not have a copy of the Constitution at night under my pillow, but I try to carry it at all times whether I am in West Virginia or whether I am here. I try to carry a copy of the Constitution in my shirt pocket. It is a copy of the Constitution that I have had for several years. It only cost 15 cents at the time I procured it from the Government Printing Office. Although the price has advanced now to probably about \$1.50, \$1.75, it is still the same Constitution.

We may have added one or two or three amendments to the Constitution since I first procured this copy. I have not stopped to check on that. But the Constitution itself has not changed in that time other than, as I say, some amendments have been added.

Would it surprise Senators to know that the Constitution contains only four provisions that grant the executive clear foreign relations authority? As one scholar has dryly observed, “the support these clauses offer the President is less than overwhelming.” The

clauses, all in article II, are these: the power to appoint ambassadors and to negotiate treaties, (section 2, clause 2), and both of these require the Senate's "Advice and Consent"; also the responsibility to receive ambassadors from foreign governments, (section 3); and the authority to command the Armed Forces in case Congress, through its responsibilities and powers under the Constitution, provides Armed Forces for the President to command, (section 2, clause 1). These narrow provisions provide a rather shaky foundation on which to build a case for the executive's predominance over foreign affairs.

Congress, by contrast, is explicitly given substantial authority under the Constitution and in the Constitution over foreign affairs. While the Constitutional Convention saw a lot of debate about which branch was better qualified to make foreign policy, the document that was signed on September 17, 1787 gives us a clue as to which side won. Fully eleven of the powers granted to Congress in article I, section 8 involve foreign affairs. They include the powers: (1) "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations" (clause 3); (2) "To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises" (clause 1); (3) "To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations" (clause 9); (4) "To declare War . . . and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water" (clause 11); (5) "To raise and support Armies" (clause 12); (6) "To provide and maintain a Navy" (clause 13); and (7) "To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia." (clause 16). When one throws into the mix Congress' power to make the law—section 1, article 1—and its control over spending and appropriations in section 9, one conclusion is inescapable, namely: Congress' authority over foreign affairs is formidable.

Despite the Constitution's clear language, however, the history of this country has seen the executive branch assume control over increasingly large swathes of foreign affairs power, while Congress has occasionally taken back a scrap or two or a crumb or so for itself. It is now almost axiomatic that the President is sole representative of the United States before foreign nations. This is the culmination of a process that began in the earliest days of the Republic, when Congress met infrequently, giving the President effective day-to-day power over foreign affairs; the process has since accelerated with the advent of modern media—particularly television—which provide the President with a singularly powerful forum in which to make his case on matters of foreign policy.

While the executive branch has assumed general authority over foreign affairs, for a long time Congress made sure that its power over foreign *trade* remained on the eastern end—on the eastern end—of Pennsylvania Avenue.

After all, the Constitution is clear on this point: Congress has sole authority over trade. Two of the article I clauses as I just cited deals squarely with that issue, and they are conclusive, namely: Congress must "regulate Commerce," it has the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations" and has the power to "lay and collect . . . Duties, Imposts and Excises."

For much of this Nation's history, there was little tension between the legislative and executive branches over trade regulation, unlike other areas of foreign policy, such as the use of military force.

As I have said on earlier occasions, for the first 150 years or so of its existence, Congress exercised broad control over foreign trade and tariffs. Starting in 1934, however, Congress decided that it no longer wished to unilaterally exercise its power to set tariffs. Accordingly, Congress delegated to the President in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 the authority to negotiate tariff agreements and to proclaim changes in tariff rates, within certain boundaries set by Congress. This so-called "Proclamation Authority" was periodically renewed, typically for brief periods of around three years.

It did not take Congress long to decide that it had given away—that it had delegated—too much trade negotiating authority. The result was the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 which, among other things, created the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations; required that multilateral trade negotiations include designated members of the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee; and prevented the President from negotiating certain tariff reductions designated by the Tariff Commission.

Congress soon discovered that the Trade Expansion Act was not enough to rein in a newly emboldened executive branch, which set about seizing as much control over foreign trade as it could get away with—and then some! The first shoe to fall was the U.S.-Canada Automotive Products Agreement of 1965, which the administration secretly negotiated for over a year without so much as notifying Congress. When President Johnson sent the Agreement to Congress for approval, presenting it as a *fait accompli* which needed only a legislative rubber stamp, a number of my colleagues were disconcerted at what they viewed as his high-handedness. Many resented the President's usurpation of Congress' rightful role in trade matters. And I suspect that many others wish that they had then stood up for congressional prerogatives rather than permitting the executive to accumulate still broader powers over trade. Instead, members adopted a course of conciliation and appeasement; they should have known, as history so often reminds us, that nothing, nothing, whets the appetite for power so much as a tender morsel of the substance.

The other shoe dangled briefly before falling to the floor with a resounding crash a few years later. This time, the issue was the 1964-67 Kennedy Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT. At the time, tariffs were relatively low, which meant that more attention was focused on non-tariff barriers. This posed a problem for congressional oversight. After all, while tariff changes could be restricted within a designated range of percentage rates, it was much more difficult to provide precise limits on the negotiation of *non-tariff* barriers. During the second session of the 89th Congress the Senate therefore adopted a concurrent resolution, S. Con. Res. 100, "urging the President to instruct U.S. negotiators in Geneva to bargain only on provisions authorized in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962."

Now, what was the President's response to this clear, explicit instruction from the Senate? As best I can determine, the President simply cast those directions aside, for he promptly entered into two non-tariff barrier agreements that the 1962 Act had not authorized. One of these agreements was an antidumping code, for which President Johnson claimed "sole executive agreement authority." I was a member of the Senate back then, and let me assure you that we did not look kindly on the President's blatant refusal to follow *our* instructions or those of the Constitution. Our response was to state unequivocally that the President's agreement did not supersede domestic law or limit the Tariff Commission's statutory discretion to implement the antidumping laws. Congress made clear that the President's antidumping agreement would be followed only in cases where it did not conflict with standing law; and Congress reiterated that no President—not even that master arm-twister, Lyndon Baines Johnson!—could encroach upon Congress' power to make the laws.

The second non-tariff agreement that President Johnson entered into without congressional authorization was the repeal of the American Selling Price method of customs valuation. Once again, the President asserted his authority to make—or, in this case, to repeal—the laws. It is just what we are seeing happen in the case of line-item veto. Congress has given the President the authority to repeal laws. Shame, shame on Congress. Once again, and to its everlasting credit, Congress stood firm. We condemned President Johnson's refusal to heed the Senate's instructions and we rejected his outrageous belief that "executive authority" allowed him to make trade agreements that changed U.S. domestic law! Few scholars, today, of course, would agree with the President's position, but the matter was less clearly defined then. And, Mr. President, I for one am relieved that Congress stood fast in defense of its constitutional powers. I wish it would wake up one day and read history and read the Constitution again.

The battle was not over, however. President Nixon continued his predecessor's attempts to usurp Congress' trade authority, though this time by persuasion rather than by intimidation. The different tactics of Presidents Johnson and Nixon towards the same goal may say a lot about their respective personalities and presidencies. President Johnson had launched a frontal attack upon Congress, relying on brute force and his own, ample powers of persuasion to intimidate the legislature into granting him greater trade power. Nixon, however, took a different tack; rather than storming the barricades of Congress, he tried to convince us to open the gates to him.

The President made a powerful pitch for Congress granting him the ability to unilaterally change domestic law. He declared, with a fervor that subsequent fast track supporters have echoed, that the ability of the country to enter into trade agreements hung in the balance. The future of the United States itself was in jeopardy *unless* Congress would delegate to him—you will be hearing the same thing today; the United States was in jeopardy unless Congress would delegate to him—the authority to proclaim all changes to U.S. law necessitated by a trade agreement. Now, how prosperous. I will not dwell on the obvious constitutional infirmities of Nixon's proposal; suffice it to say that giving the President the power to proclaim changes to U.S. law might have raised a few eyebrows at the Constitutional Convention! Don't you think so? It might have raised a few eyebrows up there with that illustrious group of men that included James Madison, Hamilton, Elbridge Gerry, and others. You would have seen some eyebrows going up and down. Our Constitution's framers knew full well that lawmaking by Executive fiat is the very definition of tyranny.

I wish that this story of the executive branch's attempt to seize the powers of the legislative had a happier ending; one of the sad truths known to all historians is that, in real life, the endings are so often confused or disappointing. President Nixon did not, of course, win the authority to proclaim changes to domestic law. However, he did succeed in pressuring Congress to grant him the authority to negotiate certain trade agreements which Congress might neither amend nor debate extensively: what we now simply call "fast track." The President's invocation of the national interest, and the fears he raised that, without fast track—and we are hearing the same siren call today—he would be unable to implement an effective trade policy for the United States, and it won the day. In a moment of weakness—and Congress has had its moments of weakness, as in this instance—Congress allowed itself to be seduced by the President's rhetoric and his appeal to patriotic duty; and a short time later, lo and behold, fast track was born.

Well, today, Mr. President, history appears to be repeating itself. Once

again, the air is filled with the dire, somber predictions about what will happen if fast track is not approved. I read that there are all kinds of trading, all kinds of promises being made, and we are seeing arms twisted out of shape—no bones broken, you understand, but just arms being twisted. Once again, we have a President who appeals to national interest and insists that he will be unable to negotiate trade agreements without fast track. Once again, Members have ears that cannot hear and eyes that cannot see. Once again, we have a Congress that appears overawed by Executive authority and unwilling to assert its rightful role in regulating trade—in fact, a Congress that is quite willing, perhaps happy, as was the Roman senate in that case, to hand off another of its duties to a dictator or to an emperor—in our case, happy to hand off another of its constitutional duties to the Executive.

I am sure that most of the viewing public must wonder why any elected official would willingly give up some of the power of the people, the power that, under the Constitution, is to be exercised by elected representatives of the people. Power, after all, they must imagine, is what politicians crave most.

Oh, that we could review again the story of Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, who in the year 458 B.C. was called upon by a delegation from the Roman senate. And upon inquiring why this delegation had come to him to interrupt his plowing of his small farm of three acres alongside the Tiber River, he was informed that the senate had decided to thrust upon him the power of a dictator so that he could rid Rome of the threat of certain tribes to the east, the Aequians. And being the loyal patriot that he was, Cincinnatus turned to his wife Racilia and said, "We may not have enough food to live on this winter because we won't be able to sow our fields." Nevertheless, he wiped his perspiring forehead, took on the regalia of a dictator, and loyally assumed the responsibilities and duties that the Roman senate had placed upon him. He rid the city of Rome of the threats, and he relieved the Roman legions that were being surrounded by the armies of the tribes to the east. Within 16 days, he had accomplished this mission. And he turned back the powers of dictatorship.

So there was the old-fashioned model of simplicity, the old-fashioned model of one who did not seek power, who did not want power. He did not want the power thrust upon him, but he willingly gave up this power.

So, today, the people of the United States, I am sure, feel that power is what politicians most crave. Isn't it the thirst for power that causes politicians to chase campaign money like a hound on the scent of a fox? Isn't it power that opens doors, rolls out red carpets, and serves up free food and drink? Isn't it really power, more often

than character, that invites the respect of others? So how can the public possibly accept the notion that Congress is actually giving up some of its power—its constitutional power—through fast track?

Now, I am not claiming that the fast track legislation is unconstitutional; I am simply saying that the Congress is willingly giving up much of its power under the Constitution through fast track—not only giving it up, but saying: here it is, take it, relieve me of it.

Perhaps, in this age of television, in which the 30-second sound bite is preferable to a complete and meaningful discussion of issues, some politicians have come to the realization that it is easy, perhaps preferable, to retain the illusion of power, without actually having to be saddled with any of the burdensome responsibility that comes with true power. They would rather not have it because it carries with it responsibilities.

Think about that. If we give up the power of Congress, we no longer have to take the heat for bad decisions, do we? We can just point the finger. We can take those letters from angry constituents and say, "Sorry, not me. It is not my fault. Blame the President. That is his power now. He did that."

How much nicer will our reelection campaigns be? Not having to run for 3 years, it would be much nicer for me, much easier for me, to say, "That wasn't my responsibility." What will our opponents be able to complain about? How can they possibly run negative ads against us when we have given all of our responsibility to somebody else?

I can see the campaign ads now. "Vote for me. I didn't do anything, but I sure looked good not doing it." And our opponents could retort, "Don't vote for him. I cannot attach any blame to him for anything, but he has big ears." So there we have it. If we hand over all of our powers, and thus all of our responsibilities, then we can't be blamed for anything. All we need to do is keep our hair well coiffed, buy fancy suits, have a nip here and a tuck there, keep a list of snappy sound bites in our pocket—that's all it will require to be an invincible political candidate.

Is this what we really want? Is this what the American public out there deserves? Certainly not. We were elected to do a job—to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States. Actually, we took an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. How many of us have read it lately? We certainly are doing a sad job of it when we agree to bind ourselves to fast track and to lie prostrate, waiting for the executive caboose to rumble over us.

I said a few moments ago that history seemed to be repeating itself. And others have said that, and for good reason. Lord Byron said, "History with all its volumes vast hath but one page." Cicero said, "To be ignorant of that

which occurred before you were born is to remain always a child."

So history is repeating itself. I wonder why that is. God created water and other things in the beginning. He created water, H₂O—two parts of hydrogen and one part of oxygen. And it hasn't changed. It is still the same. It is still H₂O. It is still two parts of hydrogen and one part oxygen. Well, human nature hasn't changed either from the beginning. It changed through Abel. Abel's blood cried out from the ground. Human nature hasn't changed. We are still a slave of it.

So history seems to be repeating itself because human nature hasn't changed. Today, I urge my colleagues to study history; Stand firm. Do not give up your constitutional responsibility. Do not rise to the bait offered by those who accuse you of protectionism; the cause of freer and fairer trade is not served by Congress abdicating its power. Do not be fooled into thinking that no country will negotiate with the world's foremost economic power because of concern about how that country's legislative branch conducts its debates; the foolishness of that argument should be self-evident. And don't allow the threats, cajolements, incentives, rewards, punishments or imprecations that the administration may cast your way; don't allow these to sway your decision. I hope that the House will stiffen—stiffen its opposition to fast track. It is time to resist the executive's encroachments on the prerogatives of Congress. It is time, Mr. President, for Congress to throw off its cloak of humility and deference and reverence for the executive and to assert its rightful constitutional role in the regulation of commerce with foreign nations.

Mr. President, recent polls have illustrated how ill-informed most Americans are about their Constitution. Oh, they like it, all right, but few of them can accurately answer or debate the questions about it. Even fewer, I would posit, understand how well and how carefully the Constitution balances the powers given to the three branches of Government—a balance constructed by the Founding Fathers as a defense against the evils of one-man rule. Our Founding Fathers wanted to escape the tyranny that a king can impose over a subservient and subjugated people. And that is why our forefathers fought the American Revolution. That is why lives were risked, and that is why lives were lost. Our Founding Fathers knew that every President would be tempted to amass power to himself, and they hoped that the combined strength of the elected representatives in Congress could check those power grabs.

Of course, there were those at the Convention who were concerned about the thirst of the legislative branch for power and how it might encroach on the powers of the President. But they could not foresee the day when we would have political parties. They could not foresee the day when the

President of the United States would be the titular head of a political party; how he would command hundreds and thousands of patronage positions. They could not foresee the day when television would bring to the American people the news of the second—not the news of the minute, but the news of the second.

Isaiah, a great prophet, was right when he said:

Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make straight in the desert a highway for our God.

Every valley shall be exalted, and every mountain and hill shall be made low; and the crooked shall be made straight, and the rough places plain:

And the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together.

And that is true. Isn't television exalting the valleys and making low the mountains and the hills? Isn't all flesh seeing the glory of the Lord together?

There came a time when the clock struck and we had the underocean cable, the wireless telegraph, the telephone, the diesel motor train, the airplane—all of these things. And by all of these things, radio and television, the printing press—by all of these things, then, the glory of the Lord has been revealed in all of the globe. And Isaiah's prophecy has come true.

So, our Founding Fathers could not possibly have foreseen the time when Americans would have these wonderful inventions. And when the President would have, at the snap of his finger, all of the media in that White House gather around his bully pulpit. They could not foresee these things.

For the most part, this system has worked. And I hope and pray that it will continue to work. Thus, I say to my colleagues in the House and here: Stand firm. Hold fast, and together let us oppose this fast track to nowhere.

Mr. President, I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SENATOR BYRD'S 80TH BIRTHDAY

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, on January 8, 1997, the Senate noted the beginning of Senator Robert C. BYRD's 51st year of public service to the people of West Virginia. On that occasion, I spoke of Senator BYRD's public record, of his service in both houses of the West Virginia State legislature, his service in both houses of the U.S. Congress, of the leadership positions he has held in the Senate, and of the remarkable seven consecutive terms to which he has been elected to represent the people of West Virginia as a U.S. Senator. I spoke of the public man, of the fascinating orator seen edifying Senators and C-SPAN audiences alike with

his grasp of history and his love of the Constitution and of this body.

On November 20, Senator BYRD will mark another, more personal, anniversary. On November 20, Senator BYRD will celebrate the completion of his 80th year of life. To celebrate this event, along with his current and many of his former staff members, I want to share with this body and the world some of our reflections on the personal man, the side of Senator BYRD we see, respect, and honor every day.

If the heart of West Virginia is made of coal—that rich, compressed carbon of long-ago life that breathes fire to warm our homes and light our dark nights—then Senator BYRD is a diamond honed over time to be its purest, clearest core. Years of experience and study have cut many facets in his character, each adding a distinctive sparkle.

ROBERT C. BYRD never forgets the people of West Virginia. He cares, deeply, about living up to the trust and confidence that has been placed in him and about setting the best possible example for others that he can in his own life and behavior. He is a tireless worker. Many of his staff members can tell stories about leaving him in his office late at night, still working, and dragging themselves wearily in the next morning, only to be greeted by his chipper, "Good morning." His energy and drive have not lessened over the years. When added to his own natural bent for self-improvement, this tendency can make him a challenging man to work for, but trying to live up to this challenge has made every member of his staff a better and more committed employee.

Senator BYRD speaks often about the old values—about the importance of hard work, the love of family, respect for authority, loyalty to community and country, and about reverence for the Creator. He does not say these things because he believes they are popular or engaging—he talks about them because he believes in them and because he lives by these values. He keeps a King James Bible on his desk and often refers to its passages, seeking ancient wisdom to guide him through the mire of convoluted political issues and diverse viewpoints.

Senator BYRD does not take anything or anyone for granted. Being a Senator and working in the Capitol building has lost none of its importance and none of its magic for Senator BYRD. Often, when the Sun is setting behind the Washington Monument, he will invite his staff to look out the window and down the Mall, so that moment—that special vantage point and that sunset—would not be taken for granted.

To travel with Senator BYRD in West Virginia is to see up-close the tremendous respect and esteem in which he is held. Yet, his stature as a national statesman has not created a chasm between him and those he serves. On the