

being reported by the Judiciary Committee on September 18, and the California district courts face an urgent need for additional judges on the bench.

I recommended Chris Snyder to the President, in January 1996, for appointment to the central district of California because I believe she is extremely well qualified for the position.

Christina Snyder is a highly respected lawyer in Los Angeles. She has more than 20 years of experience in the courtroom and served as a partner in three respected Los Angeles law firms.

She has focused her legal career on civil proceedings, where approximately 70 percent of her cases have been in the Federal courts.

Her practice has consisted of complex civil litigation, representing mostly defendants, including cases involving the Federal securities laws, civil RICO, antitrust, intellectual property, and the Lanham Act.

Christina's record for integrity and decisiveness has earned the respect of her peers, both Democrats and Republicans alike.

Chris Snyder has the support of professors, judges, and lawyers in the central district and throughout California.

Among her many supporters are such prominent Republican Los Angeles leaders as Mayor Richard Riordan, who noted his very high regard and enthusiastic support for her, and Sheriff Sherman Block.

As a testament to her high regard by her colleagues in the legal profession, Mrs. Snyder was nominated for membership to the prestigious American Law Institute. Membership in the organization is equally divided between lawyers, judges, and legal professors. It is indeed an honor to be elected to the organization and Mrs. Snyder was elected to the institute the very first time she was nominated, a noteworthy accomplishment.

Mrs. Snyder has also lectured on various subjects related to banking law and intellectual property law, and is currently coauthoring a treatise on the local rules of practice of the Federal courts in the State of California.

As an attorney for over 20 years, she has the experience and temperament to excel in this position.

I urge the Senate to confirm her nomination to the central district court.

Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.

Mrs. BOXER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.

Mrs. BOXER. Thank you very much, Mr. President. I want to pick up on a thank you here about the fact that we were able to confirm today an outstanding candidate that Senator FEINSTEIN recommended to the President, Christine Snyder.

NOMINATION OF MARGARET MORROW

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I personally say to Senators LOTT and DASCHLE

an enormous thank you for working out an agreement by which we can vote on another extraordinary woman, Margaret Morrow, and make sure that vote will take place before the February break.

We have had one or two Senators who put anonymous holds on this nomination. I am happy to say they decided to come out and talk about why they don't feel it is a good nomination, because at least we know who is objecting to Margaret Morrow.

Those two Senators and I have spoken. We have written to each other extensively, and they have agreed that it is only fair that there be a vote on Margaret Morrow. She has the support of Senator HATCH. She has the support of many members of the Judiciary Committee on both sides of the aisle. Margaret Morrow will make a great judge. I think it is most unfortunate that she has to wait until February, but I feel that at least we have a commitment for a date certain that we will have a vote, and that will be before the February recess.

Again, I thank very much the majority leader, Senator LOTT, and the Democratic leader, Senator DASCHLE, for working with me to make sure that this happens.

I think as we wind down, I have something to be very happy about, which is that we are going to have a vote on Margaret Morrow. I know when my colleagues see the strong bipartisan support she has in the State of California and in this U.S. Senate that she will win confirmation.

Thank you very much, Mr. President. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may have as much time as I require.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORIGINS OF FAST TRACK

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I have followed the fast-track debate closely, and it is with some disappointment that I note the absence of any discussion of the constitutional and institutional framework that governs our country's approach to foreign trade. A proper understanding of that framework is essential if we are to have a productive, enlightened debate about fast track.

I am also convinced that some of fast track's most ardent admirers might find their ardor dimmed a little if they recognize the sordid truth about fast track.

Accordingly, I wish to speak, not overly long, about the illegitimate

birth and disreputable pedigree of fast track. And I will attempt to unfold a decidedly unflattering but undeniably truthful account of how Presidential machinations and arrogance combined with congressional spinelessness to produce the monstrosity of fast track. They will learn that fast track is not about saving jobs or opening markets or building a bridge to the next century. Fast track, in a very considerable measure, is about *power*—raw, unfettered, Presidential power. And Mr. President, let me point out to any colleagues who doubt my reliability and objectivity in this regard that much of what I have to say is drawn from a recent article in the *George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics*, whose author appears favorably disposed to fast track.

I start by noting that the Constitution assigns Congress a major role in the regulation of foreign affairs. Contrary to popular opinion—and contrary to the beliefs of most Presidents—the executive branch does *not* possess sole authority over foreign affairs. Indeed, beyond the general statement in article II, section 1 that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America,” the Constitution contains only four provisions that grant the executive clear foreign relations authority.

Now, I carry in my shirt pocket a copy of the Constitution of the United States. Alexander the Great greatly admired the Iliad. And he carried with him a copy of the Iliad, a copy that Aristotle had carefully examined and refined somewhat. And it was called the “casket copy.” Aristotle slept with this casket copy of the Iliad under his pillow. And along with the Iliad, there was a sword.

Now, Mr. President, I do not have a copy of the Constitution at night under my pillow, but I try to carry it at all times whether I am in West Virginia or whether I am here. I try to carry a copy of the Constitution in my shirt pocket. It is a copy of the Constitution that I have had for several years. It only cost 15 cents at the time I procured it from the Government Printing Office. Although the price has advanced now to probably about \$1.50, \$1.75, it is still the same Constitution.

We may have added one or two or three amendments to the Constitution since I first procured this copy. I have not stopped to check on that. But the Constitution itself has not changed in that time other than, as I say, some amendments have been added.

Would it surprise Senators to know that the Constitution contains only four provisions that grant the executive clear foreign relations authority? As one scholar has dryly observed, “the support these clauses offer the President is less than overwhelming.” The