The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ROBERTS). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LOTT. I would indicate that that vote will probably not occur until after the recess coming up at the end of this week.

I yield the floor, Mr. President.

RESERVATION OF LEADER TIME

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, leadership time is reserved.

MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be a period for the transaction of morning business not to extend beyond the hour of 12 noon, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 5 minutes each.

Under the previous order, the Senator from Nebraska, Mr. HAGEL, is recognized to speak for up to 20 minutes.

The Senator is recognized.

Mr. HAGEL. I thank the Presiding Officer.

ESTABLISHING A CLEAR OBJECTIVE IN IRAQ

Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, these are very serious times. The administration and America face a complicated and dangerous dilemma in Iraq. This dilemma must be approached from a framework of both our short-term and long-term foreign policy objectives.

As the administration weighs its short-term options, including the possibility of military action with regard to the situation in Iraq, I believe it is very important that we in the Senate keep a steady focus on the objective before we start playing out these other options.

We all know that any military action must have a clear objective. If our Nation decides to risk the lives of young American men and women, we must do so for a clear purpose, with a clear understanding of the possible intended and unintended consequences and a reasonable assurance of success.

Let us remember that the original objective in the Iraqi puzzle was the full compliance by Saddam Hussein with the 1991 resolutions that ended the Gulf war. Most important is Security Council Resolution 687, adopted on April 3, 1991, which clearly spelled out Iraq's obligations under the cease-fire agreement that ended the Gulf war. Those obligations have the force of international law and still stand today.

This has been the U.N.'s primary focus and objective. It was Saddam Hussein who created this current situation when he invaded Kuwait in 1990 and the world united against him. This is not the United States and Great Britain against Iraq. This has been the civilized world united against a pariah intent on developing and using weapons of mass destruction.

We have sympathy for the Iraqi people. The U.N., led by the United States, has provided millions of dollars in humanitarian aid for the Iraqi people. But we must remember that Hussein used chemical weapons against his own people and has starved his own people in his clandestine and relentless pursuit of these weapons.

Time after time he has directly challenged the terms of his surrender under the U.N. resolution. What he is now challenging is the resolve of the world community to stand up to him.

The members of the international coalition that condemned his actions in 1991 and fought against him must remember who is the guilty party here; who is the guilty party. The guilty party is Saddam Hussein.

Just as the world stood united in terms of his surrender, it should stand united and resolved in action against his defiance of those terms. If he refuses to comply with U.N. Resolution 687, he will pay a heavy price. And if Saddam Hussein offers his own people as sacrificial lambs, their blood surely will be on his hands.

Mr. President, there is a growing chorus which suggests that perhaps our short-term objective should be more than Saddam Hussein's full compliance with U.N. Resolution 687, that our immediate short-term objective should be to expel Saddam Hussein from Iraq, to sweep him from the world stage. This kind of talk is very dangerous and inhibits the administration's efforts as it seeks to reconstruct the 1991 coalition united against Saddam Hussein. Let us not be buffeted by the winds of quick fixes, bombing raids and shortsightedness. Saddam Hussein has cleverly framed this world debate as Iraq against the United States. We must not play into his manipulative hands. This is not the equation.

We all would like to eliminate the threat he poses to the civilized world and that should be our long-term goal. That should be our long-term goal. But for the moment we must not forget that from objectives come actions, and from actions come consequences. Every objective carries with it a different set of military options and will have very real consequences. Actions always produce consequences and not always the geopolitical consequences we expect. We must guard against the short-term objective turning into a long-term unexpected problem.

After our lightning success in Desert Storm, I fear that we, as Americans, may have been lulled into a false sense of believing that modern wars can be fought relatively quickly and painlessly, with high-tech weapons and very limited casualties. This is not the case, nor will it ever be the case in warfare.

Those who believe that this greater short-term objective could be accomplished without the use of a massive ground force are underestimating the task.

We need to be aware of the ''law of unintended consequences.'' There are always uncertainties in war. The consequences of any kind of military undertaking are far-reaching. With the current tensions in this region and the grim prospects for peace in the Middle East, this area of the world could erupt like a tinder box. Whatever military action might be taken against Saddam Hussein, it must be surgical, it must be precise, and it must be focused and, above all, well thought out. Other nations would undoubtedly seek to increase their spheres of influence in the Middle East if our immediate objective was to eliminate Saddam Hussein. If we were to escalate the level of our short-term objective, would we create consequences just as, if not more, dangerous to our national interests in the world than the situation we currently face?

As painfully slow as this process seems to be moving, events can unfold very quickly and uncontrollably. We cannot allow Saddam Hussein to stampede us into precipitous actions. Remember how the Six Day War began in 1967. Remember other events of this century that engulfed nations in wider, larger, and more deadly conflicts than anyone could have predicted.

I ask my colleagues in the Senate to keep this in mind when thinking about how to respond to the present situation in Iraq. What chain of events will we unleash with any action we take? Always the question must be asked, what then happens? What happens next? Are we prepared to not only answer this question but deal with the answer? Any short-term action must fit into a long-term foreign policy objective.

Any short-term action that America takes must fit into a long-term foreign policy objective. What is the administration's long-term objective in Iraq? Do we have one? Or are we crafting a long-term policy to justify short-term actions?

In the long term, I believe we need to be more creative in reviewing our options against Saddam Hussein. We must not allow ourselves to get caught up in the trap of doing something—anything—just because we said we would and the world expects us to. Our options should be based on what's right, what's achievable commensurate with the risk we are willing to take with American lives and what will truly have an impact in resolving the problem. And the problem is Saddam Hussein.

Mr. President, I am a little disturbed about reports over the weekend quoting high-ranking administration officials and congressional leaders saying such things as: We may have to face the reality that we will not get U.N. inspection teams back into Iraq; any military action would be to just slow Saddam Hussein down and we would have to keep going back to bomb him again and again every so many months and years; and our allies' support of us in Iraq may be tied to our future commitment to NATO.

These are disconcerting remarks. We owe it to our country and the men and