

For the eight "Presidential Sites", the agreement allows diplomats to accompany the UNSCOM inspectors, and that is acceptable if the inspectors are free to conduct rigorous and professional inspections. All other sites will be open to inspection under the existing UNSCOM procedures. The Secretary General has assured us that UNSCOM Chairman Butler remains in charge of UNSCOM and all weapons inspections. He has also made that abundantly clear to the Iraqis themselves.

Questions have been raised about the Memorandum Of Understanding between Annan and Iraq. There are issues that still need clarification and we want to clarify them, notably with respect to the inspection procedures for the eight "Presidential Sites". The United States has made clear that we expect all aspects of this agreement to reinforce the fundamental requirement that the investigators be permitted to carry out their inspections in a rigorous and professional manner.

We have received important assurances from the Secretary General that clarify aspects of the MOU, notably with regard to the eight "Presidential Sites". UNSCOM and Chairman Butler will preserve their independence. The special team for the "Presidential Sites" will be part of UNSCOM. The team leader will be an UNSCOM Commissioner who is an expert in Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, chosen by the Secretary General and UNSCOM Chairman Butler. The special team leader will report to Chairman Butler. The diplomats will be observers only, with UNSCOM retaining operational control. Procedures for these inspections will be developed by UNSCOM and the Secretary General, not by Iraq. And, as has been the case since 1991, Chairman Butler will continue to report to the Security Council through the Secretary General.

So, the more clarification we get, the better the agreement looks, the clearer the understanding we have about the success of this effort. The bottom line is that we have access in Iraq that we didn't have last week at this time.

So what is next? We support a U.N. Security Council resolution that will

make it clear to Iraq that any violation of its commitments would have the most serious consequences. That would be a useful but not necessary signal from the international community. We also need to test and verify Saddam's intent. In the days and weeks ahead, UNSCOM must robustly test and verify this commitment. It is one thing to have it in language. It is one thing rhetorically to agree. It's another thing to allow it to occur. Failure to allow UNSCOM to get on with its job would have serious consequences. The United States will keep its military forces in the gulf at a high state of preparedness while we see if Iraq lives up to its commitment that it has signed.

The United States remains resolved to secure, by whatever means necessary, Iraq's full compliance with its commitment to destroy its weapons of mass destruction. So again, it will be diplomacy backed up by force. So long as diplomacy works, force will not be necessary. At the very moment diplomacy appears not to be working, force will be employed. So, let there be no mistake. This is not a question of breathing room. This is not a question of simply delaying and somehow, then, obviating the need for the use of force should it be required. It will be there.

Iraq's commitments are an important step forward, but only if matched by its compliance. They have made an important step forward in word. Now they must step forward in deed. As the President has said, "the proof is in the testing."

This agreement can be a win-win. Either Iraq implements the agreement or it does not. If it does, the weapons inspectors will for the first time have unrestricted, unconditional access to all suspect sites in Iraq with no limits on the numbers of visits or deadlines to complete their work. If Iraq does not cooperate and we need to take action, we are in a stronger position internationally than ever. After two crises provoked by Iraq in 4 months, the international community has certainly lost its patience and will not stomach another bout of Iraqi defiance. And there will be no doubt in anyone's mind

about who will be responsible for those consequences.

This agreement is backed up by an immediate test that Saddam Hussein will either clearly pass or clearly fail. Our response will be swift. It will be strong. It will be certain.

So, Mr. President, we have made great progress on paper over the last 72 hours. Again, I give credit to the United Nations Secretary General Annan, to the administration, to all of those responsible for bringing us to this point. I respect the President's decision and believe it was the correct one, to keep our forces there, because, as we say, there is only one option for Saddam Hussein: Comply with his agreement. Allow access. Allow us the opportunity to complete our work.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

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#### ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M. TOMORROW

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate, under the previous order, will stand adjourned until 10 a.m. tomorrow morning, Thursday, February 26, 1998.

Thereupon, the Senate, at 7:58 p.m., adjourned until Thursday, February 26, 1998, at 10 a.m.

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#### NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate February 25, 1998:

##### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUE BAILEY, OF MARYLAND, TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, VICE STEPHEN C. JOSEPH, RESIGNED.

##### DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

WILLIAM C. APGAR, JR., OF MASSACHUSETTS, TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, VICE MICHAEL A. STEGMAN, RESIGNED.

##### DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

MICHAEL J. COPPS, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, VICE RAYMOND E. VICKERY, JR., RESIGNED.

##### POSTAL RATE COMMISSION

RUTH Y. GOLDWAY, OF CALIFORNIA, TO BE A COMMISSIONER OF THE POSTAL RATE COMMISSION FOR A TERM EXPIRING NOVEMBER 22, 2002, VICE H. EDWARD QUICK, JR. TERM EXPIRED.

##### EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

DEIDRE A. LEE, OF OKLAHOMA, TO BE ADMINISTRATOR FOR FEDERAL PROCUREMENT POLICY, VICE STEVEN KELMAN, RESIGNED.