

(5) The Administrator has acknowledged that in drawing boundaries for attainment and nonattainment areas for the July 1997 ozone national air quality standards, Governors would benefit from considering implementation guidance from EPA on drawing area boundaries;

(b) The purposes of this title are—

(1) To ensure that three years of air quality monitoring data regarding fine particle levels are gathered for use in the determination of area attainment or nonattainment designations respecting any PM_{2.5} national ambient air quality standards;

(2) To ensure that the Governors have adequate time to consider implementation guidance from EPA on drawing area boundaries prior to submitting area designations respecting the July 1997 ozone national ambient air quality standards;

(3) To ensure that implementation of the July 1997 revisions of the ambient air quality standards are consistent with the purposes of the President's Implementation Memorandum dated July 16, 1997.

PARTICULATE MATTER MONITORING PROGRAM

SEC. 2. (a) Through grants under section 103 of the Clean Air Act the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency shall use appropriated funds no later than fiscal 2000 to fund one hundred percent of the cost of the establishment, purchase, operation and maintenance of a PM_{2.5} monitoring network necessary to implement the national ambient air quality standards for PM_{2.5} under section 109 of the Clean Air Act. This implementation shall not result in a diversion or reprogramming of funds from other Federal, State or local Clean Air Act activities. Any funds previously diverted or reprogrammed from section 105 Clean Air Act grants for PM_{2.5} monitors must be restored to State or local air programs in fiscal year 1999.

(b) EPA and the States shall ensure that the national network (designated in section 2(a)) which consists of the PM_{2.5} monitors necessary to implement the national ambient air quality standards is established by December 31, 1999.

(c) The Governors shall be required to submit designations for each area following promulgation of the July 1997 PM_{2.5} national ambient air quality standard within one year after receipt of three years of air quality monitoring data performed in accordance with any applicable federal reference methods for the relevant areas. Only data from the monitoring network designated in section 2(a) and other federal reference method monitors shall be considered for such designations. In reviewing the State Implementation Plans the Administrator shall take into account all relevant monitoring data regarding transport of PM_{2.5}.

(d) The Administrator shall promulgate designations of nonattainment areas no later than one year after the initial designations required under paragraph 2(c) are required to be submitted.

(e) The Administrator shall conduct a field study of the ability of the PM_{2.5} Federal Reference Method to differentiate those particles that are larger than 2.5 micrograms in diameter. This study shall be completed and provided to Congress no later than two years from the date of enactment of this legislation.

OZONE DESIGNATION REQUIREMENTS

SEC. 3. (a) The Governors shall be required to submit designations of nonattainment areas within two years following the July 1997 promulgation of the revised ozone national ambient air quality standards.

(b) The Administrator shall promulgate final designations no later than one year after the designation required under paragraph 3(a) are required to be submitted.

ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 4. Nothing in sections 1-3 above shall be construed by the Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency or any court, State, or person to affect any pending litigation.

NOTICE OF HEARING

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I would like to announce that the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry will meet on Tuesday, March 10, 1998, at 9 a.m. in SR-328A. The purpose of this meeting will be to examine the current federal crop insurance program and consider improvements to the system.

AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEES TO MEET

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Armed Services be authorized to meet at 10 a.m. on Tuesday, March 3, 1998, in open session, to receive testimony on the Department of Defense Science and technology programs in review of the Defense authorization request for fiscal year 1999 and the Future Years Defense Program.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, March 3, 1998, to conduct a hearing on S. 1405, the "Financial Regulatory Relief and Economic Efficiency Act (FRREE)."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation be authorized to meet on Tuesday, March 3, 1998, at 9:30 a.m. on tobacco legislation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources be granted permission to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, March 3, for purposes of conducting a full committee hearing which is scheduled to begin at 9:30 a.m. The purpose of this oversight hearing is to consider the President's proposed budget for FY1999 for the U.S. Forest Service.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full Committee

on Environment and Public Works be granted permission to conduct a business meeting to consider amendments to S. 1173, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1997, Tuesday, March 3, 1998, 9:30 a.m., Hearing Room (SD-406).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, March 3, 1998 at 2:15 pm to hold a Business Meeting.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet during the session of the senate on Tuesday, March 3, 1998 at 10:00 a.m. in room 216 of the senate hart office building to hold a hearing on "Market Power and Structural Change in the Software Industry."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Labor and Human Resources Subcommittee on Public Health and Safety, be authorized to meet for a hearing on Global Health: United States Response to Infectious Diseases during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, March 3, 1998, at 9:30 a.m.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Seapower of the Committee on Armed Services be authorized to meet at 2:30 p.m. on Tuesday, March 3, 1998 in closed/open session, to receive testimony on the seapower threat-based force requirement in review of the Defense authorization request for fiscal year 1999 and the future years defense program.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

NATO ENLARGEMENT: A HISTORIC BLUNDER

● Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, in this morning's New York Times, Thomas L. Friedman has written a powerful critique of what he calls "fumbling on NATO expansion." In it he refers to a letter in the spring issue of The National Interest from George F. Kennan who warns that NATO expansion is an historic blunder. Ambassador Kennan's letter came in response to an article by Owen Harries, editor of The National Interest, on "The Dangers of Expansive Realism" in the current, winter issue of The National Interest.

It is surely a rare moment when three respected commentators on foreign affairs, and in Ambassador Kennan's case, a participant of historic standing, each of quite distinctive points of view, come together in such strong agreement. In an article in *The New York Times* of February 5th, 1997, Ambassador Kennan stated that "expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era."

I ask that the column by Thomas L. Friedman, the letter by George F. Kennan, the article by Owen Harries, and the article by Ambassador Kennan in *The New York Times* be printed in the RECORD.

[From the *New York Times*, March 3, 1998]

OHIO STATE II

(By Thomas L. Friedman)

Last week the Senate Foreign Relations Committee put on a shameful performance. Senators Jesse Helms, Joe Biden & Co. rolled over like puppies having their bellies rubbed when Clinton officials explained their plans for NATO expansion by dodging all the hard questions. It's too bad CNN couldn't entice the Clinton team to go out to Ohio State again and hold a town meeting on NATO expansion. If they had, it would sound like this:

Student: "I've got a question for Secretary of Defense Cohen. When you were here before, you had a hard time defining what the endgame would be if we bombed Iraq. What's the endgame of NATO expansion? I mean, if we just admit Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, all we will be doing is redividing Europe slightly to the east. And if we actually do what you advocate, expand NATO to the Baltic States, up to Russia's border, we will be redividing NATO, since the British, French and Germans are not ready to go that far because they know it would be treated by Russia as a strategic threat."

Secretary Cohen: "Son, we've got our endgame on NATO figured out just like we do on Iraq. It's called kick the can down the road and hope it all works out in the end."

Student: "National security adviser Berger, you now say NATO expansion will only cost \$1.5 billion over 10 years, when just last year the Pentagon said it would be \$27 billion over 13 years, and the Congressional Budget Office said it could be \$125 billion over 15 years. How come NATO expansion gets cheaper every day it gets closer to a Senate vote? And how does it get cheaper when France says it won't pay a dime and the Czech Republic doesn't own a single advanced fighter jet, so it will need to buy a whole new air force?"

Mr. Berger: "Our NATO numbers were prepared by the same accountants who said the U.S. budget was balanced. I rest my case."

Student: "Secretary Albright, you say we have to bomb Iraq, because Saddam has all these weapons of mass destruction. But the Russians have 7,500 long-range nuclear missiles, loose warheads falling off trucks and a bunch of Dr. Strangelove scientists looking for work. And we have a Start 2 nuclear reduction treaty that the Russians have signed but not implemented because of resistance in the Russian Parliament to NATO expansion. How could you put a higher priority on bringing Hungary into NATO than working with Russia on proliferation?"

Albright: "Oh, please. You want to blame everything on NATO expansion, like it's El Niño."

Student: "I'm sorry, Madame Secretary, but that's not an answer. You keep dodging

this question. You can say that the Russians can't stop NATO expansion. And you can say that it's worth risking a new cold war to bring these three countries into NATO. But you can't deny that NATO expansion has contributed to Russia's refusal to ratify the Start 2 treaty, which is an enormous loss to U.S. national security."

War veteran: "Secretary Cohen, I thought we fought the cold war to change Russia, not to expand NATO. But now that we've changed Russia and should be consolidating that, you want to expand NATO?"

Secretary Cohen: "NATO expansion is not directed against Russia. It's meant to secure the new democracies in East Europe."

Heckler: "If it's meant to secure democracy in new democracies, isn't the most important new democracy Russia? And why is your P.R. campaign for NATO expansion being funded by U.S. arms sellers, who see NATO expansion as market expansion for their new weapons?"

Student: "I just got the spring issue of *The National Interest* magazine. It contains a letter from George Kennan, the architect of America's cold-war containment of the Soviet Union and one of our nation's greatest statesmen. Kennan says NATO expansion is a historic blunder. What do you all know that he doesn't?"

Mr. Berger: "I have the greatest respect for Mr. Kennan, but our team has its own Russia expert, Strobe Talbott, who speaks Russian, has written books about Russia, and some of his best friends are Russians. He couldn't possibly be anti-Russian, and he's for NATO expansion."

Student: "Excuse me, but didn't Talbott write the first memo to Secretary of State Christopher opposing NATO expansion, because. . ."

Bernard Shaw: "Sorry to interrupt. We've got to close."

[From the *National Interest*—Spring 1998]

THE DANGERS OF EXPANSIVE REALISM

I read your article [Owen Harries, "The Dangers of Expansive Realism", Winter 1997/98] with strong approval. It was in some respects a surprise because certain of your major arguments were ones I myself had made, or had wanted to make, but had not expected to see them so well expressed by the pen of anyone else. I can perhaps make this clear by commenting specifically on certain of your points.

First, your reference to the implicit understanding that the West would not take advantage of the Russian strategic and political withdrawal from Eastern Europe is not only warranted, but could have been strengthened. It is my understanding that Gorbachev on more than one occasion was given to understand, in informal talks with senior American and other Western personalities, that if the USSR would accept a united Germany remaining in NATO, the jurisdiction of that alliance would not be moved further eastward. We did not, I am sure, intend to trick the Russians; but the actual determinants of our later behavior—lack of coordination of political with military policy, and the amateurism of later White House diplomacy—would scarcely have been more creditable on our part than a real intention to deceive.

Secondly, I could not associate myself more strongly with what you write about the realist case that sees Russia as an inherently and incorrigibly expansionist country, and suggest that this tendency marks the present Russian regime no less than it did the Russian regimes of the past. We have seen this view reflected time and again, occasionally in even more violent forms, in efforts to justify the recent expansion of

NATO's boundaries and further possible expansions of that name. So numerous and extensive have the distortions and misunderstandings on which this view is based been that it would be hard even to list them in a letter of this sort. It grossly oversimplifies and misconstrues most of the history of Russian diplomacy of the czarist period. It ignores the whole great complexity of Russia's part in World War II. It allows and encourages one to forget that the Soviet military advances into Western Europe during the last war took place with our enthusiastic approval, and the political ones of the ensuing period at least with our initial consent and support. It usually avoids mention of the Communist period, and attributes to "the Russians" generally all the excesses of the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe in the Cold War period.

Worst of all, it tends to equate, at least by implication, the Russian-Communist dictatorship of recent memory with the present Russian republic—a republic, the product of an amazingly bloodless revolution, which has, for all its many faults, succeeded in carrying on for several years with an elected government, a largely free press and media, without concentration camps or executions, and with a minimum of police brutality. This curious present Russia, we are asked to believe, is obsessed by the same dreams of conquest and oppression of others as were the worst examples, real or imaginative, of its predecessors.

You, I think, were among the first, if not indeed the first, to bring some of the above to the attention of your readers; and this, in my opinion, was an important and valuable service.

GEORGE F. KENNAN,
Princeton, New Jersey.

[From the *National Interest*—Winter 1997/98]

THE DANGERS OF EXPANSIVE REALISM

(By Owen Harries)

. . . it is sometimes necessary to repeat what all know. All mapmakers should place the Mississippi in the same location and avoid originality. It may be boring, but one has to know where it is. We cannot have the Mississippi flowing toward the Rockies, just for a change.

—Saul Bellow, *Mr. Sammler's Planet*

In many ways NATO is a boring organization. It is a thing of acronyms, jargon, organizational charts, arcane strategic doctrines, and tried rhetoric. But there is no gain-saying that it has a Mississippi-like centrality and importance in American foreign policy. When, then, proposals are made to change it radically—to give it new (and very different) members, new purposes, new ways of conducting business, new non-totalitarian enemies (or, conversely, to dispense altogether with the concept of enemies as a rationale)—it is sensible to pay close attention and to scrutinize carefully and repeatedly the arguments that bolster those proposals. Even at the risk of making NATO boring in new ways, it is important to get things right.

Before getting down to particular arguments, the proposed expansion of NATO into Central and Eastern Europe should be placed in the wider context that made it an issue. For nearly half a century the United States and its allies fought the Cold War, not, it was always insisted, against Russia and the Russian people, but against the Soviet regime and the ideology it represented. An implicit Western objective in the Cold War was the conversion of Russia from totalitarianism to a more or less normal state, and, if possible, to democracy.

Between 1989 and 1991, a political miracle occurred. The Soviet regime, steeped in blood and obsessed with total control as it had been throughout most of its history, voluntarily gave up its Warsaw Pact empire,

collapsed the Soviet system upon itself, and then acquiesced in its own demise—all with virtually no violence. This extraordinary sequence of events was by no means inevitable. Had it so chosen, the regime could have resisted the force of change as it had on previous occasions, thus either extending its life, perhaps for decades more, or going down in a welter of blood and destruction. That, indeed, would have been more normal behavior, for as the English scholar Martin Wight once observed, “Great power status is lost, as it is won, by violence. A Great Power does not die in its bed.” What occurred in the case of the Soviet Union was very much the exception.

A necessary condition for its being so was an understanding—explicit according to some, but in any case certainly implicit—that the West would not take strategic and political advantage of what the Soviet Union was allowing to happen to its empire and to itself. Whatever it said now, such a bargain was *assumed by* both sides, for it was evident to all involved that in its absence—if, that is, it had become apparent that the West was intent on exploiting any retreat by Moscow—events would not be allowed to proceed along the liberalizing course that they actually took. Further, there seemed to be basis for the United States objecting to such a bargain. For after all, its avowed objective was not the eastward extension of its own power and influence in Europe, but the restoration of the independence of the countries of the region. In effect, the bargain gave the United States everything it wanted (more, in fact, for the breakup of the Soviet Union had never been a Cold War objective), and in return required it only to refrain from doing what it had never expressed any intention of doing.

Now, and very much at the initiative of the United States, the West is in the process of renegeing on that implicit bargain by extending NATO into countries recently vacated by Moscow. It is an ominous step. Whatever is said, however ingenious and vigorous the attempts to obscure the facts or change the subject, NATO is a military alliance, the most powerful in the history of the world, and the United States is the dominant force in that alliance. And whatever is claimed about spreading democracy, making Europe “whole”, promoting stability, peacekeeping, and righting past injustices—all formulations that serve, either consciously or inadvertently, to divert attention from the political and strategic reality of what is now occurring—cannot succeed in obscuring the truth that the eastward extension of NATO will represent an unprecedented projection of American power into a sensitive region hitherto beyond its reach. It will constitute a veritable geopolitical revolution. It is not necessary to accept in its entirety the resonant but overwrought dictum of Sir Halford Mackinder (“Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; Who rules the World Island commands the World”) to recognize the profound strategic implications of what the U.S. Senate is being asked to endorse.¹

Why is the Clinton administration acting in this way? And—a different question—does it serve American interests that it is doing so, and that its expressed intention is to proceed much further along the same path?

¹When I wrote this, I thought that I was drawing attention to something that was implicit but unacknowledged in the policy of NATO expansion. But in his latest book, Zbigniew Brzezinski directly and honestly links American primacy to “preponderance on the Eurasian continent.” In the same chapter he quotes Mackinder’s dictum. See *The Grand Chessboard* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), chapter 2.

Immediately after the end of the Cold War there was no great enthusiasm either in America or Western Europe for enlarging NATO. In the early days of the Clinton administration, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, and Ambassador-at-Large Strobe Talbott were all opposed to it.

How, then, did it come about that by the beginning of 1994 President Clinton was declaring that “the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but when and how”? It was certainly not by a process of ratiocination, vigorous debate, and the creation of an intellectual consensus concerning interests, purposes, and means. To this day there is no such consensus, and no coherent case for NATO expansion on which all of its principal supporters agree.

HOW ENLARGEMENT HAPPENED

The Clinton administration’s conversion from indifference, or even skepticism, to insistence on NATO expansion was the result of a combination of disparate events and pressures:

The strength of the Polish-American vote, as well as that of other Americans of Central and East European origin.

The enormous vested interests—careers, contracts, consultancies, accumulated expertise—represented by the NATO establishment, which now needed a new reason and purpose to justify the organization’s continued existence.

The “moral” pressure exerted by East European leaders, for whom NATO membership is principally important as a symbol that they are fully European, and as a means of back door entry into the European Union.

Conversely, the growing eagerness of some West European governments to grant these states membership of NATO as an acceptable price for keeping them out of, or at least delaying their entry into, the European Union.

The concern and self-distrust felt by some Germans, and not least by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, at the prospect of their country’s being left on the eastern frontier of NATO, adjacent to an area of political weakness and potential instability.

Growing doubts about democracy’s prospect of success in Russia, and fear of the re-emergence of an assertive nationalism there.

The need of some American conservative intellectuals for a bold foreign policy stroke to “remoralize” their own ranks after some dispiriting domestic defeats, the enthusiasm of others for “a democratic crusade” in Central and Eastern Europe, and the difficulty of yet others to break a lifetime’s habit of regarding Moscow as the enemy.

Formidable as this combination of pressures was, it is doubtful that it would have been capable of converting the Clinton administration on NATO expansion were it not for the addition of one other crucial factor: Bosnia. The war in Bosnia focused American attention on post-Cold War Central Europe, and it did so in a most emotional way. Bosnia also raised in acute form the question of the future of NATO, as the alliance’s feeble response to the crisis cast doubt on its continued viability, and it raised the question specifically in the context of instability in Central and Eastern Europe. The domino theory, forgotten for two decades, was quickly resurrected and applied. “Bosnia” was increasingly understood not as referring to a discrete event but as a metaphor for the chronic, historically ordained instability of a whole region.

RUSSIA IS RUSSIA IS RUSSIA

Taken together, these pressures were politically formidable, especially for an administration as sensitive to pressure as was Clinton’s. But they had very little to do with America’s national interests, and the admin-

istration’s subsequent attempts to make a case for NATO’s eastward expansion in terms of those interests have been perfunctory and shallow. A much more serious attempt has been made outside the administration, mainly by commentators of a realist persuasion. The case they have made, however, is badly flawed.

The realist case is based largely on the conviction that Russia is inherently and incorrigibly expansionist, regardless of how and by whom it is governed. Kissinger has warned of “the fateful rhythm of Russian history.” Zbigniew Brzezinski emphasizes the centrality in Russia’s history of “the imperial impulse” and claims that in post-communist Russia that impulse “remains strong and even appears to be strengthening.” Thus Brzezinski sees an “unfortunate continuity” between the Soviet era and today in defining national interests and formulating foreign policy. Another realist, Peter Rodman, speaks in the same vein, explaining the “lengthening shadow of Russian strength” by asserting that “Russia is a force of nature.”

In arguing in this way, these commentators are being very true to their realist position. But they are also drawing attention to what is one of the most serious intellectual weaknesses of that position—namely, that in its stress on the structure of the international system and on how states are placed within that system, realism attaches little or no importance to what is going on inside particular states: what kind of regimes are in power, what kind of ideologies prevail, what kind of leadership is provided. For these realists, Russia is Russia is Russia, regardless of whether it is under czarist, communist, or nascent democratic rule.

* * * * *

ENDS AND MEANS

Another of the central tenets of realism is that if the end is willed, so should be the means. The two should be kept in balance, preferably, as Walter Lippmann urged, “with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve.” In the case of NATO expansion, this tenet is being ignored. The NATO members are moving to assume very large additional commitments at a time when they have all made substantial cuts to their defense budgets, and when more such cuts are virtually certain. (The French Cabinet, for example, announced in August that the military draft, which dates back two centuries, is to be phased out and that defense procurement expenditure is to be cut by 11 percent.) The irresponsibility of such a course of action raises the question of the seriousness of the new commitments being undertaken. After all, such pledges have been made in the past, only to be broken: Munich, 1938, was the last occasion on which Western powers guaranteed the security of what is today the Czech Republic.

It is not only in terms of power that realists should be concerned with the balancing of ends and means. They should also consider the suitability of the instruments involved—particularly the human instruments—for the tasks at hand. Not to do so is likely to result in the sort of unpleasant surprise that some realist supporters of NATO expansion got as a result of the March 1997 Helsinki summit. At that meeting, so many concessions were made to Moscow by the Clinton administration that we now have an almost lunatic state of affairs: in order to make acceptable the expanding of NATO to contain a potentially dangerous Russia, we are coming close to making Russia an honorary member of NATO, with something approximating veto power.

Some of the initially most ardent supporters of expansion are now deeply dismayed by

these developments. But surely the likelihood of such an outcome was foreseeable. After all, they knew from the start that the policy they were pushing would be negotiated not by a Talleyrand or a Metternich—or an Acheson or a Kissinger—but by Bill Clinton, the man who feels everyone's pain. Kissinger has been clear-eyed enough to label what happened at Helsinki a fiasco.

This image of a Europe "made whole" again after the division of the Cold War is one that the advocates of NATO expansion appeal to frequently. But it is not a convincing appeal. For one thing, coming from some mouths it tends to bring to mind Bismarck's comment: "I have always found the word Europe on the lips of those politicians who wanted something from other Powers which they dared not demand in their own name." For another, it invites the question of when exactly was the last time that Europe was "whole." In the 1930s, when the dictators were on the rampage? In the 1920s, when Germany and Russia were virtual non-actors? In 1910, when Europe was an armed camp and a furious arms race was in progress? In the 1860s, when Prussia was creating an empire with "blood and iron"? When exactly? And then there is the simple and undeniable fact that at every step of the way—and regardless of how many tranches of new members are taken in—the line dividing Europe will not be eliminated but simply moved to a different place. Only if Russia itself were to be included would Europe be "whole." Anyone who doubts this should consult an atlas.

One final note: During the last few months advocates of expansion have been resorting more and more to an argument of last resort—one of process, not of substance. It is that the United States is now so far committed that it is too late to turn back. That argument is not without some merit, for prestige does count, and undoubtedly prestige would be lost by a reversal at this stage. But that granted, prestige is not everything. When the alternative is to persist in serious error it may be necessary to sacrifice some prestige early, rather than much more later. To proceed resolutely down a wrong road—especially one that has a slippery slope—is not statesmanship. After all, the last time the argument that it is too late to turn back prevailed was exactly thirty years ago, as, without clear purpose, we were advancing deeper and deeper into Vietnam.

[From the New York Times, February 5, 1997]
A FATEFUL ERROR—EXPANDING NATO WOULD
BE A REBUFF TO RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY

(By George F. Kennan)

In late 1996, the impression was allowed, or caused, to become prevalent that it had been somehow and somewhere decided to expand NATO up to Russia's borders. This despite the fact that no formal decision can be made before the alliance's next summit meeting in June.

The timing of this revelation—coinciding with the Presidential election and the pursuant changes in responsible personalities in Washington—did not make it easy for the outsider to know how or where to insert a modest word of comment. Nor did the assurance given to the public that the decision, however preliminary, was irrevocable encourage outside opinion.

But something of the highest importance is at stake here. And perhaps it is not too late to advance a view that, I believe, is not only mine alone but is shared by a number of others with extensive and in most instances more recent experience in Russian matters. The view, bluntly stated, is that expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.

Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking. And, last but not least, it might make it much more difficult, if not impossible, to secure the Russian Duma's ratification of the Start II agreement and to achieve further reductions of nuclear weaponry.

It is, of course, unfortunate that Russia should be confronted with such a challenge at a time when its executive power is in a state of high uncertainty and near-paralysis. And it is doubly unfortunate considering the total lack of any necessity for this move. Why, with all the hopeful possibilities engendered by the end of the cold war, should East-West relations become centered on the question of who would be allied with whom and, by implication, against whom in some fanciful, totally unforeseeable and most improbable future military conflict?

I am aware, of course, that NATO is conducting talks with the Russian authorities in hopes of making the idea of expansion tolerable and palatable to Russia. One can, in the existing circumstances, only wish these efforts success. But anyone who gives serious attention to the Russian press cannot fail to note that neither the public nor the Government is waiting for the proposed expansion to occur before reacting to it.

Russians are little impressed with American assurances that it reflects no hostile intentions. They would see their prestige (always uppermost in the Russian mind) and their security interests as adversely affected. They would, of course, have no choice but to accept expansion as a military fait accompli. But they would continue to regard it as a rebuff by the West and would likely look elsewhere for guarantees of a secure and hopeful future for themselves.

It will obviously not be easy to change a decision already made or tacitly accepted by the alliance's 16 member countries. But there are a few intervening months before the decision is to be made final; perhaps this period can be used to alter the proposed expansion in ways that would mitigate the unhappy effects it is already having on Russian opinion and policy.●

PEACE CORPS DAY

● Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I rise today to acknowledge March 3 as Peace Corps Day, celebrating the 37th anniversary this past Sunday of President Kennedy signing the legislation that created the Peace Corps on March 1, 1961. As a former Director of the Peace Corps I want to pay tribute to that organization as an example of Americans at their best.

Since 1961, more than 150,000 Americans from all across the nation have served in the Peace Corps in over 132 countries. Today nearly 6,500 volunteers currently serve in the 84 countries, addressing critical development needs on a person-to-person level, helping communities gain access to clean water; grow more food; prevent the spread of AIDS; teach English, math, and science; help entrepreneurs start new businesses; and work to protect the environment.

Peace Corps volunteers have improved the lives of many people abroad

during their terms of service. They have rightly earned great respect and admiration for the American people and for American values. But they have also brought the benefits of their experience home and continued to contribute to their own communities and to our nation as volunteers and in leadership positions. Returned Peace Corps volunteers find their experience, their knowledge of other cultures, and the self-assurance they gain stand them in good stead in their own careers. But they also share the benefits of their time in the Peace Corps with many others. We call this the "Domestic Dividend."

To commemorate Peace Corps Day, more than 5,000 current and returned volunteers will go back to school today to speak with students about their overseas experiences, some via satellite or phone, but most in person. This is part of the agency's global education program "World Wise Schools." Today more than 350,000 students in all 50 states will learn about life in communities of the developing world by talking the volunteers who have lived there. For example, Peace Corps Volunteer Amy Medley will get to talk to her pen pals from Walden Middle School in Atlanta, Georgia for the first time. She will be calling from Africa, where she is currently serving as a science teacher in Eritrea.

As we celebrate today, interest in the Peace Corps is growing. In 1997 more than 150,000 individuals contacted the Peace Corps to request information on serving as a volunteer, an increase of more than 40 percent since 1994. In view of this interest and the tremendous success and record of the Peace Corps, President Clinton has called for an expansion of the Peace Corps in his 1999 budget, putting the agency on a path to fielding 10,000 volunteers in the year 2000. This is a request and a goal I strongly support.

Mr. President, for 37 years, the Peace Corps has extended a helping hand to the world and Peace Corps volunteers have demonstrated in countless ways the generosity and dedication to service that is so much a part of the American character. So I will take this opportunity to salute all of our Peace Corps volunteers, past and present, and to thank them for their service. We appreciate all they have done and continue to do and I look forward to seeing the Peace Corps continue its outstanding record of service into the 21st Century. ●

COMMEMORATION OF CHIEF A. MARVIN GIBBONS

● Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I had the honor of joining with Mrs. Mary Anne Gibbons, a number of firefighters from the State of Maryland, the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation, the United States Fire Administration, and others in dedicating the National Fallen Firefighters Memorial Chapel in commemoration of Chief A. Marvin Gibbons.