

But we are doing the best we can. That is a major amendment and will take some time. We would certainly like to get to that amendment as soon as we can. The key thing is to dispose of the so-called Chafee amendment as soon as we can.

Mr. BAUCUS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana.

Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I fully concur with the agenda laid out by the distinguished chairman, and hope we accomplish it. Meanwhile, I ask unanimous consent Senator CAROL MOSELEY-BRAUN be added as a cosponsor of the underlying amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CHAFEE. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CHAFEE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. COLLINS). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CHAFEE. Madam President, I am authorized to announce on behalf of the majority leader there will be no more votes this evening. We will announce shortly the schedule for tomorrow, what time we will be coming in, what votes will be coming up and when they will be coming up. We will be ready to announce that very, very shortly.

I ask unanimous consent that Senator DOMENICI be added as a cosponsor to the Chafee amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CHAFEE. Madam President, we are waiting for the final arrangements for the schedule for early tomorrow, and pending that, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CHAFEE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CHAFEE. Madam President, before we start, I once again say to anybody who hasn't yet got the message, I have been authorized by the majority leader to announce that there will be no further rollcall votes this evening.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that at 9 a.m. on Thursday, immediately following the resumption of the highway bill, Senator BINGAMAN be recognized in order to offer an amendment regarding liquor drive-throughs. I further ask unanimous consent that there be 30 minutes for debate, equally divided in the usual form, on that amendment. I further ask consent that immediately following that debate, the amendment be set aside and Senator

DORGAN be recognized to offer an amendment regarding open containers. I ask consent that there be 60 minutes for debate, equally divided in the usual form, on that amendment. Finally, I ask consent that at the expiration of that time, at approximately 10:30 a.m. on Thursday, the Senate proceed to a vote on or in relation, first, to the Dorgan amendment, to be followed by a vote on or in relation to the Bingaman amendment. I also ask unanimous consent that no amendments be in order to the above-mentioned amendments.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. CHAFEE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that there now be a period for morning business, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 5 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### THE BUDGET

Mr. DOMENICI. Madam President, shortly, the Congressional Budget Office—that is the official professional staff that has been in existence for many years that helps the Congress with budgeting—is going to issue—it is already prepared, it is ready for a formal issuance—an analysis of the President's budgetary proposals for the year 1999.

Before I tell the Senate what they are going to conclude, let me hearken back to when the President issued his budget. There were many Senators who asked me, "How can the President have so many new domestic programs when we have an agreed-upon limit for the year 1999 and the year 2000 and the year 2001, all the way to the year 2003, that doesn't permit any growth in the Federal domestic program?" As a matter of fact, to be accurate, it permits .5 percent growth, which the Congressional Budget Office has said, doing the arithmetic, it is even high; you cannot grow that much.

So I was being asked: Where can the President find money for his education initiative—whether you are for it or against it—for his child care proposal—whether you are for it or against it—and a long shopping list of programs? And I believe I said then, and said on the floor of the Senate, I do not believe he can. I believe he has tried to find a way to spend more than the agreement says we can spend, but says he isn't by transferring revenues and receipts to the Appropriations Committee so they can spend the money and take credit for the revenues and receipts and other matters like that.

Well, as a matter of fact, the Congressional Budget Office says that the President is \$68 billion in excess of the agreed-upon amounts we can spend for each of these 5 years—\$68 billion over the budget agreement caps on the do-

mestic discretionary programs, on the domestic program part of the appropriations process.

Now, that is very important, because to the extent that that is correct, then obviously, unless Senators want to go back and restrain and cut and eliminate domestic programs, they are clearly not going to be able to fund very much of the President's new domestic initiative list that was forthcoming and stated in his State of the Union address.

Now, frankly, I did not believe, as one who has worked on this for some time, that the President could exchange matters in that way, and what I said has now been vindicated by the professionals who do the work for the Congress. If you could do it that way, then obviously these agreed-upon caps would be meaningless, for all you would have to do is find revenues and receipts, and the Government could grow and grow in terms of the amount that we spend and still say that we are within the agreed-upon caps because you offset the receipts against the expenditures.

Apparently, the Congressional Budget Office said that is not possible and then found that some of the expenditures are going to spend out more than the President says. Now, that is interesting, because if you wonder where we are on surpluses, you know the President said we had a \$220 billion surplus over 5 years. The Congressional Budget Office, in its report, says the surplus for the 5 years, Mr. President, will be less than half of that, it will be \$108 billion—slightly less than one-half of what he predicted.

In addition to that fact, which should sober us up a bit, this professional evaluation done for us by an independent entity—not the economists who work for the President, and not the President's Office of Management and Budget, but an independent group—they also say that the budget, the way the President is spending it, goes out of kilter and that in the year 2000 we are in deficit again. In other words, we come out, have a little surplus—a little surplus—and then in 2000 we are in deficit again. We come out of it shortly afterwards. But it does put us in a very awkward position, as we speak of the accumulation of surpluses over time, to find that the numbers we are going to be forced to use are going to say there is no surplus in the year 2000.

Now, I wish that the President was right in his \$220 billion surplus over 5 years. I wondered about it, especially with all the new spending. But I was today to some extent—some sober language enters our discussions now, a little sobering-up with reference to where we are. And, I will insert in the RECORD the Congressional Budget Office's analysis in toto for everyone to read.

One last comment. The Congressional Budget Office has modified the annual surpluses also substantially so that there are no significant surpluses in the early years—maybe 4, 5, 6, 7 billion dollars, but nothing significant.

Now, that means that our job around here is a lot more difficult, because whenever anybody thinks it does not matter whether we overspend, we are going to be confronted with the sobering fact that we had better not be looking to the President's budget for guidance or advice because it will just make matters worse.

#### THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Madam President, at the close of business yesterday, Wednesday, March 3, 1998, the federal debt stood at \$5,528,586,832,076.70 (Five trillion, five hundred twenty-eight billion, five hundred eighty-six million, eight hundred thirty-two thousand, seventy-six dollars and seventy cents).

One year ago, March 3, 1997, the federal debt stood at \$5,358,957,000,000 (Five trillion, three hundred fifty-eight billion, nine hundred fifty-seven million).

Five years ago, March 3, 1993, the federal debt stood at \$4,197,838,000,000 (Four trillion, one hundred ninety-seven billion, eight hundred thirty-eight million).

Ten years ago, March 3, 1988, the federal debt stood at \$2,492,076,000,000 (Two trillion, four hundred ninety-two billion, seventy-six million).

Fifteen years ago, March 3, 1983, the federal debt stood at \$1,219,388,000,000 (One trillion, two hundred nineteen billion, three hundred eighty-eight million) which reflects a debt increase of more than \$4 trillion—\$4,309,198,832,076.70 (Four trillion, three hundred nine billion, one hundred ninety-eight million, eight hundred thirty-two thousand, seventy-six dollars and seventy cents) during the past 15 years.

#### MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Williams, one of his secretaries.

##### EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session the Presiding Officer laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of the Senate proceedings.)

#### REPORT CONCERNING NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS WITH RESPECT TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT—PM 105

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, together with an accompanying report; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

*To the Congress of the United States:*

I hereby certify that the continued presence of U.S. armed forces, after

June 30, 1998, in Bosnia and Herzegovina is required in order to meet the national security interests of the United States, and that it is the policy of the United States that U.S. armed forces will not serve as, or be used as, civil police in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This certification is presented pursuant to section 1203 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Public Law 105-85, and section 8132 of the National Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Public Law 105-56. The information required under these sections is in the report that accompanies this certification. The supplemental appropriations request required under these sections is being forwarded under separate cover.

America has major national interests in peace in Bosnia. We have learned from hard experience in this turbulent century that America's security and Europe's stability are intimately linked. The Bosnian war saw the worst fighting—and the most profound humanitarian disaster—on that continent since the end of the Second World War. The conflict could easily have spread through the region, endangering old Allies and new democracies alike. A larger conflict would have cast doubt on the viability of the NATO alliance itself and crippled prospects for our larger goal of a democratic, undivided, and peaceful Europe.

The Dayton framework is the key to changing the conditions that made Bosnia a fuse in a regional powder keg. It is decisively in American interests to see Dayton implemented as rapidly as feasible, so that peace becomes self-sustaining. U.S. leadership is as essential to sustaining progress as it has been to ending the war and laying the foundation for peace.

I expect the size of the overall NATO force in Bosnia and Herzegovina will remain similar to that of the current SFOR. However, the U.S. contribution would decline by about 20 percent, as our Allies and partners continue to shoulder an increasing share of the burden.

Although I do not propose a fixed end-date for this presence, it is by no means open-ended. Instead, the goal of the military presence is to establish the conditions under which Dayton implementation can continue without the support of a major NATO-led military force. To achieve this goal, we have established concrete and achievable benchmarks, such as the reform of police and media, the elimination of illegal pre-Dayton institutions, the conduct of elections according to democratic norms, elimination of cross-entity barriers to commerce, and a framework for the phased and orderly return of refugees. NATO and U.S. forces will be reduced progressively as achievement of these benchmarks improves conditions, enabling the international community to rely largely on traditional diplomacy, international civil personnel, economic incentives

and disincentives, confidence-building measures, and negotiation to continue implementing the Dayton Accords over the longer term.

In fact, great strides already have been made towards fulfilling these aims, especially in the last ten months since the United States re-energized the Dayton process. Since Dayton, a stable military environment has been created; over 300,000 troops returned to civilian life and 6,600 heavy weapons have been destroyed. Public security is improving through the restructuring, retraining, and reintegration of local police. Democratic elections have been held at all levels of government and hard-line nationalists—especially the Republika Srpska—are increasingly marginalized. Independent media and political pluralism are expanding. Over 400,000 refugees and displaced persons have returned home—110,000 in 1997. One third of the publicly-indicted war criminals have been taken into custody.

Progress has been particularly dramatic since the installation of a pro-Dayton, pro-democracy Government in Republika Srpska in December. Already, the capital of Republika Srpska has been moved from Pale to Banja Luka; media are being restructured along democratic lines; civil police are generally cooperating with the reform process; war criminals are surrendering; and Republika Srpska is working directly with counterparts in the Federation to prepare key cities in both entities for major returns of refugees and displaced persons.

At the same time, long-standing obstacles to inter-entity cooperation also are being broken down: a common flag now flies over Bosnian institutions, a common currency is being printed, a common automobile license plate is being manufactured, and mail is being delivered and trains are running across the inter-entity boundary line.

Although progress has been tangible, many of these achievements still are reversible and a robust international military presence still is required at the present time to sustain the progress. I am convinced that the NATO-led force—and U.S. participation in it—can be progressively reduced as conditions continue to improve, until the implementation process is capable of sustaining itself without a major international military presence.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 3, 1998.

#### REPORT ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS PAYMENTS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA FROM U.S. PERSONS—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT—PM 106

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, together with an accompanying report; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

*To the Congress of the United States:*