

NGAWANG CHOEPHEL

• Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, Secretary Albright is planning to travel to China soon to discuss a wide range of important issues with Chinese officials. Her trip is in anticipation of a subsequent visit by President Clinton. On her agenda will be the issue of human rights, and I want to use this opportunity to remind other Senators of the case of Ngawang Choephel, a Tibetan ethnomusicologist and former Middlebury College student. Mr. Choephel came to this country on a Fulbright Scholarship, and in September 1995 he was arrested in Tibet for making a film about traditional Tibetan music and dance. On December 26, 1996, just one month after I spoke to Chinese President Jiang Zemin personally about Mr. Choephel, he was sentenced after a secret trial to 18 years in prison.

This case goes to the heart of our ongoing difficulties with the Chinese Government on human rights. I have repeatedly asked for, and never received, a shred of evidence that Mr. Choephel was engaged in any illegal or political activity. His crime, it appears, was that he was Tibetan and wanted to preserve Tibetan culture.

Mr. President, every country has the right to prosecute individuals who engage in conduct that threatens the safety of others. But no country has the right to violate internationally recognized human rights which are the rights of all people regardless of nationality. As long as a person can be imprisoned for doing nothing more than making a film about Tibetan culture, our relations with China will continue to suffer. By releasing Mr. Choephel, the Chinese Government would risk nothing, but it would represent an important step to those of us who are looking for credible signs that the Chinese Government genuinely wants to improve its human rights record.

An April 21, 1998 editorial in the Rutland Daily Herald notes the release of Chinese dissident Wang Dan, and calls for the release of Ngawang Choephel. I ask that excerpts of the editorial be printed in the RECORD.

DON'T FORGET TIBET

The release of a leading dissident by the Chinese government has shown the Chinese leadership to be willing to make the right political gestures in anticipation of a visit later this spring by President Clinton.

Now is a good time to remind the Chinese that Americans believe Tibet to be an important human rights issue and that future relations with the United States would be improved by better treatment of Tibet. It is a good time, too, to remind the Chinese of a Tibetan with a Vermont connection who has been sentenced to serve 18 years in jail.

Ngawang Choephel had fled Tibet with his mother when he was 2 years old. He eventually found his way to Middlebury College where he was a student of ethnomusicology. He returned to Tibet to record the music and dance of his native land, but he was arrested in the summer of 1995 and sentenced to 18 years.

Releasing one or two well-known dissidents is not enough to establish a record of respect for human rights when other thousands remain behind prison walls for crimes no more offensive than the recording of folk songs.

Ngawang Choephel is just one among thousands who remain behind. As long as he is not forgotten, Clinton and the Chinese may also remember how much more needs to be done before China has established itself as a nation with proper respect for the rights of the individual. •

THE CONTENT OF UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA

• Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, on April 3, 1998 I addressed a conference at Stanford University on the subject of "The Content of U.S. Engagement with China." This conference, on an issue which I believe to be of paramount importance, was convened by The Center for International Security and Arms Control and the Institute for International Studies in conjunction with the Stanford University and Harvard University Preventive Defense Project. I thought my colleagues would find my remarks to be of interest, and I ask that they be printed in the RECORD.

The remarks follow:

ENGAGING CHINA: THE DIRECTION OF THE FUTURE

For the last twenty years I have believed that the single most important undeveloped bilateral relationship in the world is the relationship between China and the United States of America. And I have been puzzled as to why so little attention has been given to its development.

Now, after many years of little presidential interaction between Washington and Beijing, President Clinton's decision to move up his visit to China from November to June I think means that each President is looking at the relationship in a different way. And I believe that this Administration is now ready to fully engage China.

So, what does engagement mean? What should be the content of such a policy? How should it be carried out? And why has it taken so long?

While the debate between engagement and containment with China is by no means dead, this clear and unequivocal effort to engage Beijing now at the highest level marks an historic turning point in U.S.-China relations—and what may well be the most defining bilateral relationship of the coming century.

As we move forward in this new effort at engagement, it is worthwhile to explore the issue of why it has been so difficult to reach this point, and then discuss what "engagement" should look like, and some of the practical steps the United States can take to carry out this effort.

OBSTACLES TO A SUSTAINED POLICY OF ENGAGEMENT

Anyone who has participated in China policy debates in recent years knows first-hand how difficult it has

been to sustain any goal-oriented, consistent policy of engagement. Several reasons come to mind:

First is the events at Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. Just as Tiananmen Square was a much more significant event for China than the Chinese government would like to admit, it also substantially impacted the ability of the U.S. to pursue a policy of engagement.

For many Americans, the events of June 4, 1989 remain their dominant view of modern China—a view shaped by horrifying pictures of tanks advancing on students and workers, and the one white-shirted, slight man, clutching a shopping bag, defiantly facing down an advancing tank. These images are etched indelibly on the minds of virtually everyone who saw the extensive television coverage. It left a mark of unvarnished brutality on the government of China and on the People's Liberation Army. Many in this country came to view China as nothing more than a brutal dictatorship.

From that day on in Washington, China policy became event-driven, lurching from one crisis to the next—every media revelation on human rights, every trade dispute, every diplomatic confrontation over Taiwan, the future of Hong Kong, and the plight of Tibetans. U.S. policy toward China was held hostage daily by whatever "message" we were sending to respond to a particular issue—from the summary and prolonged detention of students involved in Tiananmen Square, to the incarceration of Harry Wu, to the arbitrary imprisonment of scholars and dissidents. Issues like prison labor, and abortion dominate the views of certain members of Congress to this very day.

Secondly, Americans have trouble accepting a non-elected government as a legitimate partner, particularly when that government is Communist. American political instincts are so entrenched when it comes to communism that they often override even our own stated interests. Perhaps this is due to the long Cold War with the Soviet Union. But Americans remain distrustful of a "Red China" despite the fact that China has adopted Western-style market capitalism and is reaching out to the West. Many in Congress see the tight control over political expression and unjust incarceration of dissenters as that which should be the controlling factor of our foreign policy with China.

Thirdly, China's modernization of its military, its increasing nationalism, and the military saber-rattling toward Taiwan in reaction to the Cornell visit of Lee Teng-hui—which culminated in a tense show of force involving missile launches and aircraft carriers—encouraged many here to vilify China as the new Evil Empire and likely military adversary. The book *China Can Say No* introduced a very real element of hostility, and the American corollary, *The Coming Conflict with China*, argued, in response, that conflict is indeed inevitable, that the Beijing government

should be contested and weakened, and that the U.S. policy demeanor should be one of "cold encounters."

Lost in all of this, largely because of the ignorance of so many Americans about the history and culture of China, has been the progress made in China toward a dramatically improved standard of living and freer lifestyle for so many tens of millions of people. One has but to consider the China of the Cultural Revolution, with the enormous loss of life and freedom suffered during the period of the "Gang of Four," to understand that the gains and changes that have been made in China are more profound than those that have occurred in virtually any large country anywhere else in the world in such a short twenty year period of time.

One point driven home to me is that most Americans have remarkably little knowledge of China's 5,000-year history, its culture, and its governance. When I was studying history here at Stanford, taking a course in modern China, the professor said to me, "Beware, Dianne, Americans do not understand China." That is absolutely correct. It does not register on most Americans that China, throughout its history, has been governed by one man—usually a despotic emperor, and then revolutionary war heroes. As Jiang Zemin said to me a couple of years ago in Beijing: "The U.S. cannot expect a country ruled by man for 5,000 years to make the transition to a rule of law overnight."

China's humiliation at the hands of European powers during the Opium Wars, its subsequent isolation from the West for over 100 years, and then its suffering at the hands of the Nationalists, the Communist Revolution, and the Cultural Revolution, and the ramifications of all of these events on its people, are largely unknown to Americans.

I was amazed to learn that a poll conducted during the transition of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty showed that only 12 percent of Americans knew that Hong Kong was, prior to the transition, governed by Great Britain. Most thought Hong Kong to be an independent entity being returned to China. This lack of knowledge makes it difficult for many Americans to understand why development of this relationship is so complex and important to our national interest.

Additionally, the fact that our own government is divided with one party charting foreign policy from the White House and the other trying to dictate it from Congress does not make a consistent policy easy to achieve. That division does, however, facilitate the opportunity for individuals and interest groups to weigh in heavily with the Congress with whatever agenda they may have to criticize the Administration. The easiest path, of course, is to do little in the face of this criticism and lack of understanding. To some extent, this same ambivalence is mir-

rored on the Chinese side. Since the visit of Lee Teng-hui to the United States, we have seen the impact of rising Chinese nationalism, not just as a leadership issue, but as a deeply felt conviction throughout the countryside.

It is my deep belief that China today is America's most important undeveloped bilateral relationship, and that our own national interests suggest that whoever is President must be committed to engage this rising giant on an ongoing and consistent basis, regardless of other pressing domestic and international issues. China policy cannot afford a sense of drift, long periods of inaction, or even a fear of spelling out the importance of engagement and all of its ramifications and pluses to the American people.

DEFINING ENGAGEMENT: A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

So what should a policy of engagement be? First of all, it should be a policy that is clear, consistent, and goal-oriented. It should be aimed at developing the trust, mutual respect, and—most importantly—the dialogue and diplomacy necessary to accomplish two things: 1) minimize the likelihood of conflict between the United States and China, and 2) encourage China's development as an open, responsible, and stable world leader capable of helping maintain a safe and secure Asia. If there is going to be appreciable progress toward this goal in the next 10-15 years, it will come about through the development of a strategic partnership between the United States and China.

This strategic partnership must be based, first and foremost, on a recognition of shared security interests, including: a stable and secure Western Pacific, in which all countries have secure borders and are at peace; eliminating the spread of weapons of mass destruction; stable economic conditions in the Asian-Pacific region; and the free flow of commerce and people through Asian and global sea lanes.

This strategic partnership must also be based on mutual trust, developed over time, through repeated contact and constant communication. Mutual trust requires the development of a common understanding that the interests of one side do not threaten the other; an understanding by the United States that China's rising strength need not necessarily pose a threat to the U.S.; and an understanding by China that the U.S. role in Asia is not aimed at containing China or preventing it from playing its rightful role in the region.

Finally, this strategic partnership must be based on a set of mutual understandings about issues of importance to each side, especially the issue of Taiwan, non-proliferation, and agreed-upon rules of trade.

Taiwan: The most critical area of shared understanding must be Taiwan. The new Chinese Ambassador in Washington, Li Zhaoxing, recently met with me in my office and reiterated un-

equivocally that the key issue remains Taiwan. Beyond that, all issues are negotiable. So, the United States' adherence to the "One China" policy, and the principles set forth in the three Sino-American Joint Communiqués, remain the bedrock of any American policy of engagement.

Specifically, the U.S. should make sure China understands that the United States is committed first and foremost to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, brought about through talks between the Chinese and the Taiwanese. In this regard, we can take encouragement from the fact that Cross-Straits discussions are expected to resume in Beijing later this month for the first time since mid-1995.

As a matter of American policy, we need to be vigilant in ensuring that the United States will do nothing to support Taiwanese independence, and will consistently encourage Taiwan to pursue a course of moderation and avoid provocative acts. At the same time we must make clear that we will not countenance any military action against Taiwan, and that any aggressive action is clearly adverse to U.S. national interests.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: China's need for constant reassuring regarding U.S. intentions toward Taiwan mirrors American concerns about Chinese efforts at stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. and China have achieved some equilibrium on the issue of Taiwan, and have moved much closer to a common understanding on the issue of non-proliferation.

China today has signed or is now supporting virtually every multinational treaty and agreement on nuclear non-proliferation, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, most recently by joining the Zangger Committee to control and monitor exports of nuclear technology. And, at the summit in October, China committed not to engage in any new nuclear cooperation projects with Iran, fulfilling a longtime U.S. policy goal.

There are still questions about whether or not China has fully turned the corner in its approach to nuclear non-proliferation, but the signs are encouraging. China has been supportive of U.S. efforts to halt nuclear proliferation in North Korea and is participating in the four-party talks and supportive of the Agreed Framework. China has also agreed to cease assistance to any unsafeguarded nuclear facility, which is especially critical in the case of Pakistan. Today, both India and Pakistan are capable of launching nuclear devices in a matter of days, and hopefully China now understands that it makes little sense to have a group of states with major nuclear weapons capacity just over its borders.

Now is the time for the United States, when President Clinton goes to China in June, to propose a cooperative approach to nonproliferation as a major initiative with President Jiang

Zemin. The United States can build on the successes already achieved by seeking to encourage China to become a full member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which will require China to abide, not just by the regime's guidelines, but by the technology transfer restrictions contained in its annexes. This is key to a non-proliferation agreement.

Trade: Special attention should be paid to the dynamics of the U.S.-China trade relationship, because the trading relationship, with its domestic ramifications, is such that it can undermine other aspects of a strategic partnership. Hence, there is a real need for a shared understanding and agreement on the rules of trade between the two parties. It is clear that a major United States interest is to have China—which will soon be the world's third-largest economy and growing at unprecedented rates of GDP—abide by the same rules of trade as the rest of the international community.

To that end, a major goal of our policy of engagement should be to encourage China's participation in international economic regimes, and, most notably, the World Trade Organization. As Nicholas Lardy of the Brookings Institution has written, the United States goal of China's accession into the WTO on "commercially viable terms" must dovetail with a realistic assessment of how fast China can achieve the standards necessary for full membership.

A phase-in period is no doubt appropriate given the enormous changes the Chinese economy will have to endure, especially if China continues to show good faith and is moving in the right direction—as the new Premier Zhu Rongji seems inclined to do.

As a further encouragement for China to make the necessary adjustments in its trade practices, Congress might end the application of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to China, thereby making China's MFN status permanent. I intend to cosponsor legislation later this year with the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator WILLIAM ROTH of Delaware, and others, which would guarantee that upon China's accession to the WTO under terms agreed to by the United States, China's MFN status would be made permanent. If necessary, the legislation could be structured so that Jackson-Vanik could be reinstated if China failed to meet its commitments under the WTO. But the important thing is to end the unnecessary and disruptive practice of subjecting the entire U.S.-China relationship to an annual review.

There are other steps the United States can take to ensure a further deepening our strategic partnership with China in the trade area. Each year, the leaders of the world's great industrialized democracies meet in what has been known as the G-7 and, now that Russia is a participant, the Summit of the Eight. These leading na-

tions meet to discuss their common interests and agendas in world economics, trade, and security.

While China is not yet a democracy, it is a rising power in Asia and the world, and, as such, should interact with this summit. As with Russia, full membership is not necessary at the outset. But China's potential role in shaping global peace and economic stability should be recognized and encouraged. It would serve the interests of the United States and our allies at this summit to be able to discuss with Chinese leaders how China and the Western powers can interface and work together.

Most observers agree that China has played a helpful role in responding to the financial crises gripping much of Asia, and there is good reason to be very seriously concerned. Despite a decline in foreign investment and Chinese exports, China has held the line against pressure to devalue its currency, and has pledged to offer financial assistance to its troubled neighbors. China also has pledged to continue and accelerate its reform of state-owned enterprises and the restructuring of its government, with full knowledge that it will have to deal with probable social disruption as a result. This responsible international economic behavior, which has been praised by Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin, bodes well for the strategic partnership we are trying to build.

When I first went to China twenty years ago, virtually all businesses were owned by the state. Today, about 25 percent is owned privately, 25 percent is cooperative, and about 50 percent is still owned by the central government.

These highly subsidized state-owned enterprises are hugely inefficient, but they employ tens of millions of people. Zhu Rongji is determined to shut down these white elephants. As he closes them, unemployment is sure to increase. Already in China there is a huge unemployed migrant population in the millions, moving from city to city, with little hope and little opportunity. As these reforms are carried out and inefficient companies are shut down, the situation that the Chinese have the most concern about, instability, is a real possibility. Also, there is growing unrest in minority areas. These events together will test China's commitment to reform, but the early indications are that the commitment of the new Prime Minister is strong.

STEPS TOWARD MUTUAL TRUST

The strategic partnership we are trying to build requires the development of a sense of mutual trust. I do not believe this can be accomplished at secondary levels, but rather must be developed over time, leader to leader, with a lot of listening needed on the U.S. side—something we are not very accomplished at doing. This takes time and persistence. There will be setbacks. But I do not believe that second-level delegations sweeping into Beijing for a

day or two, giving ultimatums, can accomplish much. To this end, the United States and Chinese leaders need to develop methods of ongoing communication. It is amazing to me to know that, from the resumption of diplomatic relations with China in 1978 until the present day, there has been no red telephone—no ability for the two leaders to talk, exchange information, or discuss points of concern. Hard to believe, but true.

I will never forget visiting Jiang Zemin at Zhongnanhai in August of 1995 and having him tell me that he did not know of the U.S. decision to grant a visa to Lee Teng-hui to visit Cornell University until he read about it in the newspaper—and I saw it written all over his face, the loss of face. The Chinese believed that they had been reassured in May of that year—just weeks before—that such a visit would not take place. When it did, the relationship was shaken to its foundation, culminating in Chinese missile exercises aimed at intimidating Taiwan and U.S. aircraft carriers being sent to the Taiwan Strait.

I am also of the view that it is possible, perhaps even probable, that the ministries of China often act independently of Beijing, such as in the case of the sale of \$75,000 worth of ring magnets to Pakistan. I know that in the case of the intellectual property debate, information was given by the government of Guangdong Province to Beijing indicating that all pirate CD factories in the province had been closed, when they had not.

These cases are small examples of when conversations, and a sharing of key information at critical times, between the leaders of each country—outside of the foreign ministries—can prevent all kinds of difficulties. That is why I am so pleased that a telephone link between the two leaders is set to become operational in May of this year. Other forms of direct contact are important as well. The exchange of visits between the two presidents we are now seeing should be made an annual occurrence. In addition, regular, ongoing high-level visits from both sides at the Secretary of State/Foreign Minister level, as well as cabinet-level visits in other important areas of mutual interests, are vital to developing understanding and trust.

These senior-level talks must also be supplemented by working-level committees that meet at least twice yearly in each other's capitals to discuss non-proliferation, transnational threats such as narcotics trafficking and terrorism, economic cooperation, trade issues, science and technology cooperation, and human rights. Many of our trade disputes with China—over phytosanitary standards, or the calculation of the trade imbalance and what can be done to improve the imbalance, for instance—will never be settled unless there is continuing, ongoing dialogue at both the senior and working levels.

A lack of communication can assert itself in big and small ways. In January of 1996, Sam Nunn, JOHN GLENN, and I met with the Chinese Defense Minister, Chi Haotian, in Beijing. After discussing the tensions in the Taiwan Strait, I asked him if there were any other direct problems between our countries. He said, "Yes, there was one—the problem of U.S. military overflights of Chinese territorial waters." He indicated that some American fighter planes were flying too close to the Chinese coast and may have violated Chinese airspace. From Beijing, I then called Secretary of Defense William Perry. He indicated that he would look into it right away and take care of it, which he did. The U.S. and the Chinese side were able to reach an understanding on these flights fairly easily.

But this incident really showed me the danger inherent in the absence of ongoing communication. Secretary Perry also recognized this gap, and he began a very important process of building an expanded military-to-military dialogue, a process which I strongly support and believe should be continued. In the last two years, there has been an exchange of visits by the Defense Ministers, occasional meetings between officers of the two sides, and a handful of port visits. All are healthy.

The October summit helped to advance this process with an agreement on regular high-level and mid-level exchanges, between both officers and specialists in each country's war colleges. An agreement was also reached on a communication system to avoid accidental encounters between U.S. and Chinese naval forces at sea. This military-to-military dialogue is important. In order to broaden and deepen these exchanges, the United States might conduct some joint exercises with the Chinese military—perhaps initially just search-and-rescue, or disaster relief cooperation—a priority.

Another aspect of a strategic partnership is to combat the transnational criminal threats—such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and alien smuggling—that disrupt each of our societies, and the Chinese have been very cooperative in these efforts. Hopefully, the two presidents will build on this cooperation in June by reaching agreement to allow the U.S. to station DEA agents in China, and perhaps an FBI placement.

This cooperation could be combined with law enforcement-related exchanges in modern investigative techniques, forensics, case-building, and proper training in crowd control techniques. It should be remembered that, until recently, the Chinese had no local police and relied on the army in many domestic situations, including Tianamen Square in 1989.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENGAGEMENT

One cannot talk about what should be contained in a policy of engagement of China without discussing how human rights policies should interact with other aspects of U.S.-China pol-

icy. The truth is that the human rights situation in China remains deeply disturbing. Fundamental freedoms—expression, political activity, assembly, and religion—remain sharply restricted no matter what the Chinese say. Dissidents continue to languish in prison. Arbitrary arrest, torture, and the imprisonment of political prisoners continue.

The situation is even worse in Tibet, which remains a troublesome and unfathomable issue. There is no question but that the Chinese have continued to harden their policies against the Tibetan people. This has taken the form of a crackdown on dissent (merely to have a picture of the Dalai Lama in a home is a cause for arrest), and brutalizing those who do not conform. Han Chinese continue to build a major Chinese presence in the capital of Lhasa, which is rapidly looking more Chinese than Tibetan. Most discouraging, the Chinese maintain their refusal to meet with the Dalai Lama, despite his repeated assurances that he has discarded Tibetan independence as a point of contention.

This issue has been a very personal one for me. I was initially brought into the Tibet issue by my husband, Richard Blum, who has been a longstanding friend of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and first introduced me to him in 1978. In 1979, when I became Mayor of San Francisco, I was the first American official to receive His Holiness. So the issue has become a very personal one for me. Nine years ago, Richard and I began a small quest. That was to arrange a meeting between the Chinese leadership and His Holiness. In 1991, we first carried letters to the Chinese leadership from the Dalai Lama. These discussions have continued for several years.

Then, last September, I thought there was going to be a breakthrough. I was asked by Beijing to come to China to deliver a written message and proposal from the Dalai Lama, which I had been holding since June. We flew to Beijing on a weekend and presented the letter to President Jiang Zemin. The meeting did not go well, and I was very disappointed after it. But before I left Beijing, I received word that the door was not closed to the Dalai Lama's offer. And I have held out hope that there is still an opportunity to capitalize on this offer.

Then, very recently, I saw an article distributed by Xinhua, which falsely depicts the position of the Dalai Lama. The article cites a recent issue of the journal *China's Tibet*. The article says: "The Dalai Lama has never sought genuine talks with the Central government of China in the last ten years." The article goes on to repeat accusations that the Dalai Lama is working to split Tibet from China and is seeking Tibetan independence.

Simply put, these charges are not true. The Dalai Lama has repeatedly made statements, publicly and privately, that should have long since sat-

isfied Chinese concerns. And I, personally, have delivered two of them—one in 1991, and one last September.

Until recently, I have been unable to say anything about this, because these contacts have been basically private. But on March 10 of this year, the Dalai Lama released a statement, which goes to the heart of this subject. The Dalai Lama's statement, while acknowledging some progress in human rights in China, says:

In stark contrast to these positive aspects of development in China proper, the situation in Tibet has sadly worsened in recent years. Of late, it has become apparent that Beijing is carrying out what amounts to a deliberate policy of cultural genocide in Tibet. The infamous "strike hard" campaign against Tibetan religion and nationalism has intensified with each passing year.

Further on in the statement, the Dalai Lama makes clear what he is seeking from the Chinese leadership:

With regard to a mutually acceptable solution to the issue of Tibet, my position is very straightforward. I am not seeking independence. As I have said many times before, what I am seeking is for the Tibetan people to be given the opportunity to have a genuine self-rule in order to preserve their civilization and for the unique Tibetan culture, religion, language, and way of life to grow and thrive. My main concern is to ensure the survival of the Tibetan people with their own unique Buddhist cultural heritage. For this, it is essential, as the past decades have shown clearly, that the Tibetans be able to handle all their domestic affairs and to freely determine their social, economic, and cultural development.

In light of this background, I propose three directions for U.S. policy on human rights in China:

First, the Tibet issue should be elevated to the highest priority of the U.S. human rights agenda. Just a few months ago, the Secretary of State appointed Gregory Craig to be the State Department's Special Coordinator for Tibet. The United States should launch a major initiative, as part of President Clinton's visit, to convince the President of China that he should take the Dalai Lama at his word, and sit down and meet with him. After all, the Dalai Lama is the spiritual leader of some six million Tibetans, and as such, his view and proposals deserve to be heard by the government of his people.

Secondly, the United States must also actively promote and help China develop the rule of law, which is the most important guarantor of individual freedoms. A truly independent judiciary, which it is not now, due process of law, and modern civil, criminal, and commercial codes are all vital to this effort. The Administration has already proposed a new \$5 million program, which I strongly support, to be administered under the auspices of the Asia Foundation for this purpose. This program can be the single most important thing we can do to make major changes possible in the area of human rights.

Finally, the United States should continue to press for the release of political dissidents, for reform of the prison system, the abolition of child

labor and prison labor, and increased religious tolerance. There has been some progress, first with Wei Jingsheng's release, and more recently with Wang Dan's.

WHAT KIND OF CHINA?

The key question that a policy of engagement attempts to address is: What kind of China do we hope to be dealing with in 2015? As most of our deepest partnerships around the world are with democratic nations, the ideal answer of course is that we would see a fully democratic China. But the history of transitions to democracy suggests to us that China may not have made that entire transition in another decade or two. Yet if the current trends toward openness and individual freedoms in Chinese society continue, I believe it will happen, probably along the Taiwan model.

Specifically, we should be looking for the following:

an increasingly open country and society, with sharply reduced barriers to interaction with the West;

a China in which the people have a voice in their governance, at the local, provincial, and even national level—which is now beginning with the widespread village elections initiative;

a China in which the rule of law, due process, an independent judiciary, and modern civil, criminal, and commercial codes, and the protection of individual rights have been firmly established as the basis of human endeavor; and,

a responsible leadership, which allows itself to be held accountable for its decisions and actions, both at home and abroad, and is willing and able to ensure its own peace and stability, and play a role in establishing peace and security all along the Pacific Rim.

I deeply believe in engaging China fully. And as China changes—and it will—engagement will become both easier to practice and easier to build support for at home. All those who are pursuing this effort have the United States best interests at heart. •

CONGRATULATING U.S. ARMY RESERVE ON ITS 90TH ANNIVERSARY AND RECOGNIZING CONTRIBUTIONS OF STROM THURMOND, PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Senate Resolution 213 submitted earlier today by Senator HELMS.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 213) congratulating the United States Army Reserve on its 90th anniversary and recognizing the important contributions of STROM THURMOND, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, who served with distinction in the United States Army Reserve for 36 years.

The Senate proceeded to consider the resolution.

• Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the resolution that I am offering today, along with 28 other Senators, is intended to commemorate the 90th Anniversary of the United States Army Reserve and to honor the soldiers who have served in the USAR, including our good friend and Senate President pro tempore, Senator STROM THURMOND, who served with distinction as an Army Reservist for 36 years.

Winston Churchill once remarked that "the reservist is twice the citizen." Indeed, the accolade "twice the citizen" serves as the title of the definitive history of the U.S. Army Reserve that was written by the late Colonel Richard B. Crossland and Colonel James T. Currie, whose assistance was invaluable in drafting this resolution. The concept that reservists fulfill multiple roles as citizens in their community while simultaneously training for war and other military operations was never more true than today.

Today's Army Reserve of almost 487,000 Ready Reserve and Standby Reserve soldiers and 600,000 Retired Reserve soldiers is a far cry from its predecessor, the Medical Reserve Corps, which was authorized by statute on April 23, 1908. On that date, President Theodore Roosevelt signed an act "to Increase the Efficiency of the Medical Department of the United States Army." The act provided for the commissioning of a few hundred Reserve medical doctors, in order to avert future shortages of officers, such as the one that had occurred during the Spanish-American War.

Mr. President, since that modest beginning, the USAR has grown to become a community-based force with over 1200 facilities across the United States and more than 2000 units in the United States and its territories.

While comprising only about 20 percent of the Army's organized units and receiving only about 5 percent of the Army's budget, today's Army Reserve includes 46 percent of the Army's combat service support (CSS) assets and more than a quarter of the Army's combat support (CS) assets. These assets include medical, engineer, transportation, civil affairs, legal, military police, and psychological operations units which are essential to any military operation.

From World War I when the USAR contributed more than 160,000 soldiers to the United States Army, through World War II, Korea, Vietnam and Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the soldiers of the USAR have been ready when the President called upon them.

Even today, as we spend more and more of our limited defense resources on so-called "contingency operations" and "operations other than war," the soldiers of the USAR and their families are making the sacrifices necessary to serve their country.

Each year, the Army Reserve deploys approximately 20,000 soldiers to 50 countries worldwide on a variety of missions. In Bosnia alone, the Army

Reserve has contributed almost 15,000 citizen-soldiers, representing more than 70% of the Army's reserve component mobilization.

Mr. President, I recently received a letter from Colonel Herbert N. Harmon (USMCR), National President of the Reserve Officers Association, who suggested that I introduce this resolution. I am honored to do so.

Mr. President, it is appropriate that Senator THURMOND and the citizen-soldiers of the USAR be honored on the occasion of the Army Reserves 90th Anniversary on April 23, 1998. For, in many ways, Senator THURMOND's service as a reservist is the story of the consummate citizen-soldier.

His remarkable record of service as a reservist began in 1924 when he received a commission as a Second Lieutenant in the Infantry. By the time he transferred to the Retired Reserve in 1965, Senator THURMOND had risen to the rank of Major General, the highest rank available to a Reserve Officer.

Then First Lieutenant Thurmond volunteered the day war was declared against Germany even though his position as a South Carolina Circuit Judge exempted him from service in World War II. He received a commission in the active Army, became a member of the First U.S. Army and was attached to the 82nd Airborne Division for the Normandy invasion. It was during that action that he sustained an injury for which he was awarded a Purple Heart.

While serving in Europe, Senator THURMOND served in all battles of the First Army, which fought through France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia, and Germany. In addition to the Purple Heart, he received numerous other awards and commendations for his heroism and valor, including the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal with V device and the Army Commendation Ribbon just to cite a few.

Mr. President, it would be difficult to overstate Senator THURMOND's contribution to the security of our country and our gratitude for his exceptional service. Suffice it to say that he is, perhaps, the single most qualified person ever to serve as the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and that I am honored to have had the privilege of serving with him for these past 25 years.

I am also grateful for the service and the sacrifices of the soldiers who willingly serve in, and the families who support, the Army Reserve. Their dedication, commitment, and accomplishments are properly noted on this occasion.

Mr. President, I urge Senators to support this resolution and to join me in honoring Senator THURMOND and the soldiers of the United States Army Reserve. It's the right thing to do and I am confident that Senators will agree.

I ask that the letter from Col. Herbert N. Harmon be printed in the RECORD.

The letter follows: