

and other normal types of expenditures that most land grant university systems enjoy from the endowment that is generated from the landholdings that they have. But that is not the case with Alaska, and that is why we feel it is so important to rectify this situation.

I conclude by indicating that some of America's environmental groups are in opposition to this. They are fearful that the university will make Federal land selections and develop that land. My answer to that is, what is wrong with responsible development? It provides jobs, it provides a tax base, and it would provide a regular source of funding for the university. To suggest that we cannot develop certain areas within strict accordance with environmental considerations I think is really selling Alaska and America's can-do technology short. We can responsibly develop these areas if given the opportunity.

In the interest of equity and fairness, I encourage my colleagues to reflect on the merits of treating Alaska in the same manner in which other States were treated when they came into the Union by adequately funding their land-grant holdings so that they can meet the needs of the higher education system; namely, the University of Alaska.

Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SMITH of Oregon). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

The Senate continued with consideration of the treaty.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I know we have a pending amendment. I would like to speak on the whole issue of NATO enlargement at this time because I was not able to make my opening statement yesterday at the appointed time because we had the other amendment of which I was cosponsor with Senator SMITH.

I believe this Senate will not vote on a more important matter than the one before the Senate this week. The advocates of unfettered enlargement of NATO argue that we are expanding the frontiers of freedom in Europe. It is true that freedom won the cold war. But the spirit of that freedom was the American commitment to defend Europe against the Soviet Union.

Therefore, at the heart of this debate is a simple question: Is the United States prepared to add countries to the list of those that we pledge to defend as

we would our own shores? In answering that question, the Senate should look to the future. Instead, many supporters of the resolution have been talking about the past.

They have argued, not without merit, that expanding NATO is necessary to correct the map of Europe that was drawn incorrectly at the end of World War II. And many argue that it is right and just that these three countries before us today become part of the West, since the West turned its back on them at Yalta more than half a century ago.

I think the Senate should be looking to the future to decide if this idea is the right one at this time. What are the future threats to Transatlantic security? Is expanding the alliance the best means of addressing those threats? Must the United States continue to be the glue that holds Europe together, as was necessary during the cold war?

This is an interesting time to consider expanding our military obligations. Today, the President has said the United States will have an open-ended commitment of thousands of U.S. troops in Bosnia. This mission has already cost the United States \$8 billion. That is in addition to our NATO requirement, our commitment, our allotment. It appears likely that a major conflict will break out in the Serb province of Kosovo, raising the question whether U.S. troops will be drawn deeper into the morass.

We have also learned just this week that the chief U.N. weapons inspector has declared that Iraq's Saddam Hussein has not complied with U.N. resolutions to destroy his biological and chemical weapons, so the allies may have to take military action to force him to comply. Again, that will mean a disproportionate burden for the United States.

While we are adding new commitments, our military readiness is in decline. Last year, the military had its worst recruiting year since 1979. The Army failed to meet its objective to recruit infantry soldiers, the single most important specialty of the Army. At the National Training Center, where our troops go for advanced training, units rotating in typically come with a 60-percent shortage in mechanics and a 50-percent shortage in infantry. These are often due to the fact that these personnel are deployed abroad for missions such as Bosnia, so advance training is suffering.

This year, more than 350 Air Force pilots have turned down the \$60,000 bonuses they would have received to remain in the cockpit another 5 years. A 29-percent acceptance rate for the bonus compares with 59 percent last year and 81 percent in 1995.

Recently, a lack of critical parts for F-16 aircraft forced two fighter squadrons in Italy to cannibalize grounded aircraft to ensure they can continue to conduct the NATO peace enforcement mission over Bosnia.

Mr. President, these are just some of the indicators that show our military

is being stretched too thin. The fact is, these defense cuts that we have made over the last few years of almost 50 percent have put our security at risk. This has been made worse by the diversion of U.S. resources and readiness in Bosnia and elsewhere.

In the midst of all this, the President presents the Senate with a proposal to expand NATO to include three new countries without first answering such questions as what is the mission of a post-cold war NATO? The Senate has been put in a dilemma. On one side, we have colleagues who strongly support the resolution of ratification and oppose conditions and reservations that any of us may wish to add.

Throughout this debate, I have heard supporters say that the proposal to add these new members is moral and just and needs no further thought. We have been told that the United States owes these countries membership in NATO, and it has been implied that to question this assumption is to question the very merits of the cold war and NATO's role in winning that role.

Many of us who have reservations about this proposal are the strongest supporters of NATO—I certainly am—and our American leadership in the alliance is also very important. I think NATO is the best defense alliance that has ever been put together in the history of the world. I want to make sure we preserve it, which is why I am questioning some of the assumptions about enlargement that are not based on any facts that we have seen and which have been brought up at the North Atlantic Council or in the U.S. Senate.

There are many other places in the world where only the United States can and will lead. I cherish the role that NATO played in winning the cold war, and it is because of that commitment to support NATO that I take the ramifications of enlargement so seriously.

Many of us with reservations want to see the United States take its fair place in the world and assume its fair share of the responsibility. But we do not think we should be involved in every regional conflict, dissipating our strength and endangering our role as a superpower, a superpower capable of responding where no one else can or will. This doctrine was set in this country as far back as John Quincy Adams, who said to the American people that we will be tempted to go out and right every wrong, but if we do, we will dissipate our strength and we will no longer be effective.

On the other side of the dilemma is the failure of the President to negotiate conditions that address U.S. costs and the heavy burden for European security that we already bear. He promised the three countries under consideration—all of whom are worthy countries—that their admission into the alliance was a fait accompli.

But too many issues remain open, and it has been left to the full Senate the responsibility, a responsibility unsuited to a legislative body, I might

add, to address the mission of NATO and what the criteria for new membership should be. I, for one, believe it may even be premature for the Senate to be considering the question. While the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has held a number of hearings on NATO enlargement during this Congress, several matters have not been yet thoroughly aired. For example, we still await a strategic rationale for an expanded NATO from the President. What will NATO's future mission be? What will be the role in executing that mission?

The resolution before the Senate requires the President to report on these matters within 6 months of our approval of NATO enlargement. I can think of no better example of putting the cart before the horse. If we approve that sequence, the Senate is, in effect, saying it agrees with the President that we need to expand NATO, but we haven't decided why. It seems to me the Foreign Relations Committee, the Armed Services Committee, and even the Intelligence Committee, should have the rationale from the administration now, not in 6 months.

There are other issues that need further discussion. On January 16 of this year, the Clinton administration signed a security charter with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia that raises important questions: What are we committed to do in this charter? Have we given these countries a security guarantee? Why have no other NATO members signed the Baltic charter? I just think we need to discuss this in the context of where we are going with NATO over the long-term.

The Senator from Virginia has introduced an amendment to take a 3-year time-out after this first phase of enlargement so that we can begin to consider these important issues without the pressure of additional countries that would be waiting on the doorstep with admission promised to them. This would permit us to discuss additional membership on the merits, rather than because of personalities.

A new development since the last Foreign Relations Committee on NATO enlargement is the violence in the southern province of Kosovo. It is very important that we consider the impact this could have on the U.S. and her allies. I think these issues need to be addressed if we are going to look at what NATO is and what everyone in NATO will agree it should be.

There are other issues. How much will it cost? I will speak in greater detail later, because there will be an amendment on cost. But no one knows how much it is going to cost. Estimates that vary from a few million to \$125 billion are not credible. It is impossible to say that we know what the cost to the United States will be. A range of a few million to \$125 billion cannot be taken seriously.

I am also concerned about the chances we have of importing into the alliance ethnic, border, and religious

disputes that have riven Europe for centuries. I will have an amendment in that regard.

After looking at the underlying resolution and the Kyl amendment that was passed yesterday, which could be interpreted—I hope it isn't—as drawing us into one of those ethnic conflicts, my amendment will say that we want NATO to determine a border and ethnic dispute resolution process before we have to make a decision on what our role will be, so that there will be no question of what process will be followed to make peace, and so that it will not rise to the level of common defense necessities for the United States.

The American people cannot believe that this U.S. Senate would act on a resolution that would draw U.S. troops into harm's way for an ethnic conflict that has been boiling in Europe for a hundred years if there is not a U.S. security interest involved.

Opponents of my proposal will say that that will weaken U.S. influence in NATO, but I don't understand that concern. We should certainly be confident enough in our leadership that we would be able to discuss candidly with our allies the limits of our involvement in a parochial dispute.

Mr. President, the resolution before us is far from a finished project. Many of us who do not serve on the Foreign Relations Committee, and would like to support the resolution, particularly as it applies to the three countries, good countries, that are doing the right thing toward democracy and a free market. But we do believe too much has been left out. It is not right to say that this resolution cannot be improved. There are several good proposals that will be introduced in the Senate, which we will have a chance to debate and vote on, which would make this resolution one that all of us can support in good conscience.

I urge my colleagues to consider each amendment on its merits and not based on a preconceived notion that this resolution needs no refinement and that any change would somehow be a bad change. The Senate has a constitutional responsibility to express its will on international treaties. That is a double responsibility when we are talking about the potential of U.S. troops going into a conflict in which they could lose their lives.

The Senate's responsibility in the Constitution is to advise and consent, not just consent. Mr. President, our responsibility in the Constitution is every bit as important and clear as is the President's responsibility. The signers of our Declaration of Independence and the writers of our Constitution came from a historical point in which they had a king who declared war and also executed that war. They specifically rejected the idea of one person having all the power. They dispersed the power because they wanted it to be a well-debated and difficult decision to send U.S. troops into harm's way.

Mr. President, our founders were right. It is the Senate's responsibility to meet their test of advice and consent when our troops and our American security is at stake. I hope we can make this resolution one that all of us can proudly support, one that has conditions that are responsible in the stewardship of the security of the United States. That is our responsibility under the Constitution, and that is what we must do.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. ABRAHAM addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to be allowed to speak as in morning business for up to 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

INS REFORM

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I will discuss today the Senate Immigration Subcommittee's plans for a series of hearings on reform of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

At the beginning of this Congress, I outlined my agenda as the incoming chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration. During that discussion, I noted that the time had perhaps come to consider fundamental reform of the INS. In particular, I raised the question as to whether an agency charged with both policing our borders and providing services to those seeking to come here legally and become citizens could perform either mission well.

Nothing I have observed since that time has persuaded me that these concerns were misplaced. To the contrary, the problems I have observed with the Service's functioning leave me persuaded that the current structure simply does not work. I also remain of the view that splitting responsibility for INS's different missions is an important part of the solution.

In my view, Mr. President, we must take a hard look at all aspects of the current INS structure. Right now, for example, the distribution of policymaking authority between headquarters and field offices seems haphazard, at best. There also seems to be almost no mechanism for implementing priorities and holding workers responsible for failing to do so. INS's bureaucratic culture appears to tolerate and almost expect failure on too many occasions.

I want to spend a few minutes setting forth some examples of these rather serious problems.

Most people are, by now, familiar with the story of "Citizenship U.S.A.," how what began as a laudable effort to reduce the backlog of legal immigrants waiting to become Americans ended up sacrificing the integrity of the naturalization process, leaving a bitter aftertaste to what should have been the joyous experience of becoming a citizen of this great country. In the