the prayer, the routine requests through the morning hour be granted and the Senate then resume consideration of the Craig amendment numbered 2316 to the NATO enlargement treatment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I further ask that the time following the prayer until 12 noon be equally divided for debate on the Craig amendment; further, that at 12 noon the Craig amendment be temporarily set aside and the votes on or in relation to the amendment follow the two stacked rollcall votes previously ordered to occur at approximately 3 p.m.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROGRAM

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, tomorrow morning at 11 a.m. the Senate will resume consideration of the Craig amendment numbered 2316 to the NATO enlargement treaty.

Under the previous order, at noon Senator MOYNIHAN will be recognized to offer an amendment under a 1-hour time agreement.

Following the debate on the Moynihan amendment, Senator WARNER will be recognized to offer an amendment under a 2-hour time agreement.

Following the debate on the Warner amendment, at approximately 3 p.m., at the conclusion of that debate, the Senate will proceed to three stacked rollcall votes.

The first vote will be on or in relation to the Moynihan amendment, followed by a vote on or in relation to the Warner amendment, followed then by a vote on or in relation to the Craig amendment.

As a reminder, a unanimous consent agreement was reached which limits the amendments to the NATO treaty. It is hoped that any Senator still intending to offer an amendment under the consent agreement will do so early tomorrow to allow the Senate to complete action on this important document by early tomorrow evening.

Also, if available, the Senate may consider the conference report to accompany the supplemental appropriations bill.

Therefore, Senators should expect rollcall votes throughout the Thursday session of the Senate.

Mr. President, that is an ambitious schedule. Senators are urged to be timely. Senators are urged, those who may have additional amendments to the NATO enlargement treaty, to make those amendments known to leadership, and hopefully reasonable time requests can be entered into. A number of Senators are making very important official business commitments for the weekend, and the more definite the plans can be about the schedule tomorrow, the more expeditiously those commitments can be undertaken.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask that the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order, following the remarks of Senator CONRAD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. CONRAD. I thank the Chair. I thank my colleague from Indiana as well.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

The Senate continued with the consideration of the treaty.

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the resolution of ratification for NATO enlargement.

In my view, there are four questions that must be answered in the affirmative in order to support NATO expansion.

No. 1, are the risks to relations with Russia and arms control acceptable?

No. 2, are we sure what NATO expansion will cost and who will pay for it?

No. 3, has a compelling argument been made as to why expansion is necessary?

No. 4, are we certain that enlargement will not have perverse consequences, fostering instability in Eastern Europe and perpetuating the danger from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal?

I am convinced, after thorough review, that the answers to these questions are all no.

I start with the observation of Mr. George Kennan, perhaps the foremost observer of U.S.-Russian relations. Mr. Kennan, who was, after all, the architect of the containment policy that proved so effective, said in a Newsday editorial on March 15 that, ''Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-world war era.''

Mr. President and colleagues, let me repeat. George Kennan, the architect of containment, said as recently as March 15 that, ''Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-world war era.''

That is a pretty serious statement by someone who has great credibility based on his record. He is not alone in that assessment. Former Senator Nunn, who enjoyed enormous respect on both sides of the aisle in this Chamber, has discussed a dangerous contradiction at the center of the argument for expansion, saying that while enlargement is intended to protect former Soviet satellites, nothing else is as likely to remilitarize Russia and endanger those very countries as NATO enlargement.

Senator Nunn is not alone. We are hearing from leaders in Russia their warnings to us not to proceed. I recently met—with a group of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives—with Alexi Arbatov, who is deputy chairman of the Duma's defense committee. He told us, ''If you proceed with NATO enlargement, you are handing a powerful issue to the radicals in Russia. You are energizing the extreme nationalists in Russia, and you are weakening the forces for democracy.''

Mr. President, we should not lightly dismiss the warnings of committed democrats in Russia like Alexi Arbatov and others who have given us similar warnings. I think it says a great deal that the primary architects of American strategy during the cold war, George Kennan and Paul Nitze, have cautioned the Senate against ratification and NATO expansion.

Nearly 50 years ago, as successive heads of the State Department's policy planning staff during the Truman Administration, Kennan and Nitze understood that containment of the Soviet Union was critically important to the free world. Today, they have told us that NATO expansion is a mistake.

I believe the stakes are very high. Remilitarization in Russia is a serious threat. Avoiding this outcome should be our priority, not enlarging NATO.

The first casualty of our expansion of NATO may very well be progress on arms control. I know that many of my colleagues do not like to be in a position where it seems the Senate's decisions about foreign policy are dependent on reaction in Russia. It smacks of blackmail. The problem with this thinking is that it assumes that something we need is being held hostage.

As I have discussed, there simply is no compelling argument for why we must expand NATO. Therefore, to risk relations with Russia and arms control are not acceptable. The Duma's expeditious ratification of START II should be our priority. In pursuing our national interest we are in no way giving in to Russian blackmail.

I might add it is not just a question of START II ratification, but it is also clearly in our national interest to make a priority of reducing the threat from the tactical nuclear weapons that are in the Russian arsenal.

By rejecting NATO enlargement, we would simply be choosing not to embark on a dangerous and unjustified course of enlarging NATO and would avoid making a terrible mistake in the course of U.S.-Russian relations.

The second point I think needs to be made is that NATO enlargement brings unknown costs. The case for enlargement becomes increasingly suspect when we look at questions related to the costs and who will bear them.

I direct the attention of my colleagues to a chart on the various estimates that have been issued with respect to the cost of NATO enlargement. The Congressional Budget Office issued an estimate of $21 billion to $125 billion. The Rand Corporation said the