and I are trustees of separate trusts established for the benefit of each son under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. Also, I am neither an officer nor a director of any corporation organized under the laws of the State of Wisconsin or of any other state or foreign country.

INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST NO SURPRISE

HON. DAN BURTON

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 12, 1998

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, although our intelligence community was apparently surprised by India's recent nuclear test, it was no surprise to anyone who has been following the situation there.

On February 13, 1994, CBS' ''60 Minutes'' produced an exposé of India's nuclear program. Reporter Steve Kroft reported that to India, ''nothing seems as important as its membership in the nuclear club.'' He interviewed a retired university professor named Direndra Sharma who said, the ''Nuclear power program is to feed our nuclear-weapons program. I have no doubt about it. Nuclear power and nuclear weapons—two are Siamese twins. They cannot be separated.''

This report makes it clear that even then, India's nuclear program was working to develop the weapons that India exploded Monday. It is a very distressing report.

I would like to place the transcript of this disturbing report in the RECORD in the wake of this destabilizing test, and I strongly urge my colleagues to read it carefully.

ANOTHER CHERNOBYL?

STEVE KROFT: Nothing frightens the world like a nuclear bomb falling into the wrong hands or a nuclear accident like the one that occurred at Chernobyl, which is why the international community has paid a lot of attention to countries like North Korea, Iran and Iraq, and to the aging, decrepit nuclear reactors of the former Soviet Union. But one country has largely escaped scrutiny—India—where nothing seems as important as its membership in the nuclear club. Over the years, it has steadfastly kept international safety inspectors out of its facilities, while pursuing one of the most ambitious, secret and potentially dangerous nuclear programs in the world.

(Footage of Indian rain forest; of Indian people in common settings)

KROFT: (Voiceover) Deep in the heart of the Indian rain forest, the Indian government is building two brand-new nuclear power plants of outmoded design, surrounded by the kind of secrecy and security that you'd expect to find at a military installation. The Indian government says the reactors are needed to help lift more than 800 million people out of poverty and into the 20th century—that nuclear power is vital to India's future prosperity.

(Footage of meeting)

Unidentified Man #1: Mr. Sharma from India.

Dr. DHIRENDRA SHARMA (Indian Activist): Thank you.

KROFT: (Voiceover) But Dr. Dhirendra Sharma, a retired university professor and one of the few people in India willing to take on the government-controlled nuclear establishment, says there's a reason why the country's nuclear power plants are treated like military installations.

Dr. SHARMA: Nuclear power program is to feed our nuclear-weapons program. I have no doubt about it. Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons—the two are Siamese twins. They cannot be separated.

(Footage of weapons plant; of Indira Gandhi; of Indian nuclear power plants)

KROFT: (Voiceover) They can't be separated, Dr. Sharma says, because the spent fuel from those nuclear power plants is needed to make nuclear bombs for the Indian military.

When the government of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi exploded a nuclear device 20 years ago, the United States and Canada stopped helping India build reactors. And to this day, the sale to India of nuclear fuel, vital spare parts and critical safety systems for its nuclear plants is forbidden by most Western governments. But that hasn't stopped India from making more nuclear bombs and building more nuclear plants, even though Sharma says India probably can't maintain the safety standards that the high-risk technology demands.

Today, the Indian nuclear program is a dangerous failure. Its power plants are all operating at less than 50 percent of capacity, and some are even suspected of using more electricity than they generate. There's little oversight, no independent regulation, and for the most part, Indian reactors are off-limits to international inspectors.

(Footage of nuclear plant control room)

KROFT: (Voiceover) The most recent trouble was in March at Narora, a nuclear power plant built in an earthquake zone, barely 155 miles from the capital of New Delhi. A major fire broke out at the plant, knocking out all of the power in the control room.

How serious was it?

Dr. SHARMA: I would say that it was touch and go.

(Footage of regulatory report)

KROFT: (Voiceover) And he isn't the only one who says so. A US Nuclear Regulatory Commission report called the incident a ''close call.'' Just how close may never be known, Sharma says, because Indian law gives the government the power to operate in almost total secrecy when it comes to nuclear matters.

Dr. SHARMA: It is forbidden to talk, plan, write, investigate about past, present or future nuclear power programs. All this is under the law as forbidden.

KROFT: Aside from the emergency at Narora, the Indian government has admitted to 146 other nuclear mishaps—and that's just last year. Five of them ended up killing people. There was an explosion at the country's main fuel fabrication plant; a jet fire at a heavy water facility that sent flames shooting 130 feet into the air; and an underground leak of radioactive water at a research facility.

(Footage of government building)

KROFT: (Voiceover) That information, but very few details, was provided by India's Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, the government-controlled watchdog group that's responsible for nuclear safety. It's chairman, Dr. A. Gopalakrishnann, makes no apologies for the fact that India is one of the only nuclear power-producing countries in the world to resist safety reviews by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.

Why don't you allow safety inspectors from the . . .

Dr. A. GOPALAKRISHNANN: (Chairman, Indian Atomic Energy Regulatory Board): Why should we—why—why . . . .

KROFT: . . . international agency to come in and in—and inspect?

Dr. A. GOPALAKRISHNANN: Why should we do it? What is the need for it?

KROFT: Almost every other country in the world does.

Dr. A. GOPALAKRISHNANN: I don't know. What—for—they're coming to look whether the reactors are safe? Or coming to see what—what they are doing there?

(Footage of Rawatbhala facility)

KROFT: (Voiceover) Whatever they're doing here at the Rawatbhala nuclear facility in the state of Rajasthan, they're not doing it very well. The plant has one of the worst operating records in the country. Unit number one was shut down for three years because of a crack in the reactor's endshield.

Dr. A. GOPALAKRISHNANN: Yes, there was a crack in the reactor endshield. That doesn't mean . . .

KROFT: And you shut the plant down for three years.

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999

SPEECH OF

HON. JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 7, 1998

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 3694) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1999 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes:

Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. Mr. Chairman, I rise to express my support for H.R. 3694, the Intelligence Authorization for FY 1999. However, my support is not without serious reservations, for I remain deeply concerned about allegations that have been raised regarding CIA involvement in drug trafficking in South Central Los Angeles and elsewhere. While I applaud Chairman PORTER GOSS, Ranking Member NORM DICKS, and the rest of the House Permanent Select Committee for convening a public hearing following release of Volume One of the Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General's report in response to the *San Jose Mercury News'* series ''Dark Alliance'', I have made my views about the shortcomings in this report known to the Committee and to the Agency. I am aware that Volume Two of the Inspector General's report, which deals with the more substantive issues regarding the extent of the relationship between the intelligence community and the Nicaraguan *Contra* resistance, has been provided to the Select Committee in classified form. I understand that it is being reviewed by the Central Intelligence Agency to determine whether any or all of it may be declassified. And, we are still awaiting release of Inspector General Michael Bromwich's report on the allegations of wrong doing that may have occurred within branches of the U.S. Department of Justice.

However, I would like to take this opportunity to strongly urge C.I.A. Director George Tenet and Chairman GOSS to do everything possible to declassify as much information in the report as possible as its subject matter goes to the heart of the issues raised by my constituents in the public meetings I convened following publication of the *San Jose Mercury News* series. I also urge Attorney General Janet Reno to release the I.G.'s report at the earliest possible opportunity. Failure to make

this information public feeds the skepticism of the hundreds of consitutents in my District and throughout the nation who still want answers and who are encouraged by the Committee's expressed commitment to make public as much information as possible.

Furthermore, to fully appreciate our government's efforts to fight the scourge of narcotics, the public must understand its intricacies, including the role of interdiction and intelligence. Public release of the reports, followed by public hearings, and ultimately the conduct by the Committee of its own inquiry, will assist my constituents to evaluate the role the Central Intelligence Agency played in balancing competing nations priorities. Such a process will also give Members of Congress, as policy makers, the information necessary to make informed decisions about handling such issues in the future.

Consequently, I and my constituents continue to eagerly await the public release of the reports by the Inspectors General of Justice and CIA. I reiterate my hope that the Select Committee will give their content, methodologies and findings the scrutiny they deserve and in a similar spirit of openness, make themselves available to my constituents to respond to any questions these reports generate. I believe such openness is critical to restoration of the credibility and public trust necessary to allow intelligence gathering activities, which by their nature are secretive, to coexist with democracy