

Assabet, and Concord Rivers as a component of the National Wild And Scenic Rivers System; S. 1016, a bill to authorize appropriations for the Coastal Heritage Trail Route in New Jersey, and for other purposes; S. 1665, a bill to reauthorize the Delaware and Lehigh Navigation Canal National Heritage Corridor Act, and for other purposes; S. 2039, a bill to amend the National Trails System Act to designate El Camino Real de Tierra Adentro as a National Historic Trail; and, H.R. 2186, a bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to provide assistance to the National Historic Trails Interpretive Center in Casper, Wyoming.

Because of the limited time available for the hearing, witnesses may testify by invitation only. However, those wishing to submit written testimony for the hearing record should send two copies of their testimony to the Subcommittee on National Parks, Historic Preservation and Recreation, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, 364 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC 20510-6150.

For further information, please contact Darlene Koontz of the Subcommittee staff at (202) 224-7555 or Shawn Taylor at (202) 224-6969.

AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEES TO MEET

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Armed Services be authorized to meet at 10 a.m. on Thursday, June 4, 1998, in open/closed session, to receive testimony on the future threats to the Department of Defense information systems, including the year 2000 problems and the sale of the frequency spectrum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Armed Services be authorized to meet at 2 p.m. on Thursday, June 4, 1998, in open session, to receive testimony on U.S. forces participating in NATO operations in Bosnia and progress in achieving benchmarks in the civil implementation of the Dayton Agreement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES

Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources be granted permission to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, June 4, for purposes of conducting a full committee hearing which is scheduled to begin at 9:30 a.m. The purpose of this oversight hearing is to receive GAO's preliminary comments on its review of the Administration's Climate Change Proposal and to hear the Ad-

ministration's response to GAO's comments.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS

Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Small Business be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate for a hearing entitled "Oversight of the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program." The hearing will begin at 10 a.m. on Thursday, June 4, 1998, in room 428A Russell Senate Office Building.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Select Committee on Intelligence be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, June 4, 1998 at 10 a.m. to hold a closed hearing on Intelligence matters.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Aviation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation be authorized to meet on Thursday, June 4, 1998, at 2:15 p.m. on Airline Alliances.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATIONS

Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Communications Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation be authorized to meet on Thursday, June 4, 1998, at 9:30 a.m. on Oversight of the Cable Services Bureau.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FORESTS AND PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT

Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Forests and Public Land Management of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources be granted permission to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, June 4, for purposes of conducting a subcommittee hearing which is scheduled to begin at 2 p.m. The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony on S.1253, the Public Land Management Act of 1997.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING OPPORTUNITY AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Housing Opportunity and Community Development of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs be authorized to meet during the sessions of the Senate on Thursday, June 4, 1998, to conduct an oversight hearing on the Programs and Operations of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, RESTRUCTURING, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent on behalf of the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring, and the District of Columbia to meet on Thursday, June 4, 1998, at 10 a.m. for a hearing on "Competition for Commercial Activities in the Federal Government".

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

IMPORTANCE OF SENATE ACTION ON THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

● Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, like many of my colleagues I am deeply concerned about the recent nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan. The leaders of these two nations acted with disregard and both countries must be shown that such actions are unacceptable. No nation should think that it can conduct secret nuclear tests and not be held accountable. The United States and the international community will continue to impose sanctions on both countries, causing further economic hardship for these impoverished populations. However, I believe we can do much more to prevent further testing.

India and Pakistan are two of the three nations who were suspected of having nuclear capability which had not joined the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Now, both countries should be pressured to sign the treaty immediately. In Tuesday's New York Times, Stanford Professor Sidney Drell stated a compelling argument for United States ratification of the CTBT, and I ask that the attached article be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks. I agree with Drell's sentiment that, rather than pointing to India's and Pakistan's tests as reason for inaction, the Senate should immediately take up and approve the treaty. I feel strongly that Senate ratification would make our efforts to dissuade India and Pakistan from an arms race much more credible, and would send a message to any other nations considering tests of their own. Of course, the US and the international community should concentrate on facilitating the dialog necessary between Indian and Pakistan to diffuse the points of contention currently driving this arms race, and ratification of the CTBT will help to shift that focus.

Additionally, the best way for India and Pakistan to address the sanctions resulting from their irresponsible nuclear tests is to sign the CTBT, without conditions. Instead of spending scarce resources on a nuclear arms race, we must convince the leadership

of both countries to rebuild their economies and improve the standard of living for the people, something that obviously has not been the case for either India or Pakistan. Urging them to sign the treaty would be one step in the right direction. Treaty ratification is also a necessary step for restricting the flow of nuclear technology, from these emerging nuclear powers and nations worldwide.

I urge Senator LOTT to take up consideration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and I urge all of my Senate colleagues to vote for a ban on nuclear testing by the United States. The United States must lead by example. We did not do enough to prevent the nuclear tests by India or Pakistan, and now we must do more to ensure that further testing is halted in South Asia and throughout the world. President Clinton is scheduled to travel to China and South Asia later this year. I believe such a diplomatic mission is extremely timely and must include visits to China, India and Pakistan for the distinct purpose of discussing global security in light of the round of nuclear capacity testing in the region. I encourage my Senate colleagues to support the President in this endeavor.

The article follows:

[From the New York Times, June 2, 1998]

REASONS TO RATIFY, NOT TO STALL

(By Sidney D. Drell)

STANFORD, Calif.—The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan have led some in the United States Senate to seek further delay on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which has already been awaiting ratification for more than a year and a half. Senator Trent Lott of Mississippi, the majority leader, said on Friday that “the nuclear spiral in Asia demonstrates that irrelevance of U.S. action” on the treaty, calling the pact “unverifiable and ineffectual.”

To the contrary, the treaty’s international monitoring system, when used in combination with our own intelligence resources, provides the means to verify the test ban effectively. Moreover, a quick vote in the Senate approving the treaty is an essential response to the South Asian nuclear gambit.

While it is true that American intelligence failed to provide imminent warning of India’s first three nuclear tests on May 11, we were well aware that the technical preparations had been made for testing. Furthermore, the global network of seismic sensors that will form the core of the treaty’s verification system did detect, locate and identify the main nuclear blast that day.

It is evident that the system also proved effective in detecting Pakistan’s tests, both on Thursday and on Saturday. And the treaty calls for the monitoring system to be beefed up. Also, the treaty would allow us to request a short-notice, on-site suggesting that a nuclear weapons test might have occurred.

India has claimed that its last two announced tests, on May 13, had very low yields, in the subkiloton range. Whether or not we succeed in corroborating possible tests of such relatively small magnitude, we need to remember that very low yield tests are of questionable value in designing new nuclear weapons or confirming that a new design will work as intended. Any failure by the monitors to detect such tests is not the proper benchmark for determining the system’s—or the treaty’s—effectiveness.

I know from my own work for the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, that the existing monitoring system did the job last summer, detecting a “seismic event” off Novaya Zemlya in Russia and eventually helping to determine that it was not from a nuclear test. Our intelligence services are rightly assigned the task of monitoring for nuclear explosions, with or without the treaty. But with the treaty, additional sensors would be deployed in a global network that would complement our own intelligence. Some of these additional sensors would be “aimed” at the subcontinent. And with the treaty, we could request onsite inspection of suspicious activities.

The test ban treaty—which has already been signed by 149 nations and ratified by our nuclear allies, Britain and France—provides the legal framework for a long-term solution to the problem of nuclear testing in India and Pakistan. The best way for these two nations to begin addressing the international condemnation and sanctions that have resulted from their tests is for them to sign the treaty, without condition. Senate ratification would strengthen our hand in pushing India and Pakistan toward a responsible course, and it would help dissuade other states from going down the dangerous road of developing nuclear weapons.

Senator Lott also expressed concern that the treaty “will not enter into force unless 44 countries, including India and Pakistan, ratify it.” Precisely for this reason, Article 14 of the treaty calls for a review conference in September 1999 to look for ways to put the treaty into effect if it has not been approved by all 44 nuclear-capable nations (i.e., those with nuclear weapons or with nuclear reactors for research or power).

Only those nations that have ratified will have a seat at that conference. Thus the United States must ratify the treaty this year if we are to be a leader, as we must be, in an effort to put the treaty into force.

Previous Senates have shown that they can act quickly and courageously on such matters. When President John F. Kennedy submitted the Limited Test Ban Treaty to the Senate in 1963, the Foreign Relations Committee held its first hearing four days later, and the treaty was approved by the full Senate in less than two months.

Yet in the wake of the Indian and Pakistani tests, it would appear that the Senate will not act even to bring the treaty to a vote. Inaction will not help to deter further nuclear tests or reduce nuclear dangers. Rather than pointing to India’s and Pakistan’s tests as an excuse for inaction, the Senate should be approving the treaty without delay.

Four decades ago President Dwight D. Eisenhower said that not achieving a nuclear test ban “would have to be classed as the greatest disappointment of any administration—of any decade—of any time and of any party.” It would be tragic if once more we fail to seize this opportunity. •

CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA

• Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, the newspapers are full of Kosovo and Serbia, of India and Pakistan and of course, Indonesia. These threatening events have captured most of the headlines and have attracted the attention of the Administration in greater or lesser degrees. These are not trivial issues, and we cannot afford to ignore their importance for challenging US interests.

But another conflict rages that, while small, challenges US interests in

ways that few other conflicts can: I am speaking of the conflict in the Republic of Georgia in the distant but strategically critical region of Abkazia.

And yet the stability in independent Georgia is one of the principal US interests in the former USSR and should be one of our overriding strategic goals. This is not just sentiment for one of the earliest Christian civilizations in a part of the world where Christian civilizations do not thrive: rather it is a clear statement of our own strategic interest and objectives.

Georgia is a NATO borderland and an entry point to the emerging new Silk Road. It is a key ally of our partner Turkey and is important in many ways: strategically, militarily, commercially. If Georgia were to become unstable, the entire region would be put in jeopardy.

Against overwhelming odds, Georgia has achieved strong positive economic growth in the last few years. It is one of the most stable of the post-Soviet states, with world-class leadership in President Eduard Shevardnadze. It is America’s natural ally in a neighborhood that features Iran and Iraq.

Georgia is central to the successful development of what the new Silk Road from Central Europe to China. This ambitious project will eventually encompass pipelines, roads and railroads, airports and communications networks that stretch from Central Europe to China. This corridor will completely alter the economics and the politics of Eurasia in ways that we cannot now foresee, but which are certain to intersect US strategic interests in Eurasia in many places. The states of the Caucasus—Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia—lie at the very center of this new Silk Road. For the corridor to function, stability in these states is essential.

Not surprisingly, some people wish ardently to jeopardize America’s interests in this region by threatening Georgia’s stability, and they have fastened on a perverse way of doing so, the small, break-away region of Abkazia has been Russia’s best available instrument to diminish Georgia’s accomplishments and to imperil its remarkable gains. Russia is the only power to benefit from such activity. Let us not be timid in naming the problem: Russia is the problem, the aggressor and the single-most threat to stability in Georgia and the entire Caucasus.

Since the early 1990s, Russia, acting through Abkazia, has attempted to bring down Georgia. This is no secret. Virtually every expert to travel to the region reports the same thing: Russia is responsible for arming, training and sustaining Abkazia’s so-called freedom fighters. Russia’s support for the pro-Russian Abkazian leadership is barely disguised: Russia has funneled arms and support for more than six years into the Abkaz region of Georgia for one specific task: to destabilize the government of Eduard Shevardnadze so that Georgia will be unable to realize