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COMMUNITY SERVICES BLOCK
GRANT LEGISLATION

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I would like to thank you for this opportunity to thank Senator COATS, the Chairman of the Labor Committee's Subcommittee on Children and Families, for the excellent work he has done in drafting legislation to authorize the Community Services Block Grant, which recently passed in the Senate. The CSBG program is intended to fight poverty and alleviate its effects on people and their communities through block grants, federal money is given to the states and local communities to create programs that help low-income people secure employment, get an adequate education, make better use of their available income, obtain and maintain adequate housing, and ultimately achieve self-sufficiency. These block grants free states and local communities of federal red tape and give them the flexibility they need to meet the needs of people who need help. As a former governor, I learned that state and local governments are far more effective in serving local communities than Washington's bureaucracy. Furthermore, Community Services Block Grants provide opportunities for the government to partner with the non-governmental sector to provide a variety of services to the poor. I am grateful that Senator COATS has led a bipartisan effort in this reauthorization bill language that can expand the opportunities for charitable and faith-based organizations to serve their communities with CSBG funds. The provisions included will help faith-based organizations to maintain their religious character and integrity when providing social services with government funds.

For years, America's charities and churches have been transforming shattered lives by meeting the needs of people—by instilling hope and values which help change behavior and attitudes. As a matter of sound public policy, we in Congress need to find ways to allow these successful organizations to unleash the cultural remedy that our society so desperately needs. Senator COATS' legislation reauthorizing the Community Services Block Grant will help to further this goal. The language in this bill regarding charitable choice providers is similar to my Charitable Choice provision contained in the welfare reform law which we passed two years ago, but it does contain some differences. For non-governmental organizations wishing to participate in both the Community Service Block Grant and the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families programs, the differences between the two provisions may cause some confusion and lead to additional administrative burdens.

This situation demonstrates the need to pass legislation that applies the same Charitable Choice language to all federally funded social service programs in which the government is authorized to use nongovernmental organizations to provide services to beneficiaries. Under my Charitable Choice Expansion Act, which I introduced in May of this year, uniform protections and guidelines would apply to faith-based entities using federal dollars to provide housing, substance abuse prevention and treatment, juvenile services, seniors services, abstinence education, and child welfare services, as well as services under the Community Development Block Grant, the Social Services Block Grant, and of course, the Community Services Block Grant. One uniform Charitable Choice provision will certainly make it easier for both the government and faith-based organizations to work together more efficiently to help our nation's needy.

Again, I thank Senator COATS and all the members of the Labor Committee, as well as their staff, for their hard work. I commend them for their decision to include provisions that invite the greater participation of charitable and faith-based providers in the Community Services Block Grant program. I hope that the Senate will continue working together to pursue legislative proposals that encourage successful non-governmental organizations to expand their life-transforming programs to serve our nation's poor and needy.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
AND SENATE RATIFICATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR
TEST-BAN TREATY

Mr. BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. President.

It is a truism that despite the end of the Cold War, we live in a dangerous world. The ultimate danger we face, I believe, is that nuclear weapons will be obtained—or even used—by unstable countries or terrorist groups.

We must undertake a range of activities to reduce that danger. There is no magic bullet. No single initiative will rid the world of the threat of nuclear cataclysm at the hands of a new or unstable nuclear power.

Rather, we need a coherent strategy with many elements—a strategy designed to reduce both the supply of nuclear weapons technology to would-be nuclear powers and the regional tensions that fuel their demand for those weapons.

I would like to spend a few minutes today talking about one piece of that strategy that this body can implement: We can and should give our advice and consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. And we should do that promptly.

In her speech on the 35th anniversary of John F. Kennedy's American University speech, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called for U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Noting the recent Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, she said that ratification was needed "now, more than ever."
Senator SPECTER and I have also called for ratification now, both in floor statements and by drafting a resolution calling for expeditious Senate consideration of the Test-Ban Treaty.

Why is the Test-Ban so crucial? Because it is related to a global bargain that is the heart of the global nonproliferation regime. Other countries will give up their ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, but only if the declared nuclear powers honestly seek to end their nuclear advantage. We have to keep up our side of the bargain—and that means ratifying and adhering to the comprehensive test ban—or the non-nuclear weapons states will not feel bound to theirs.

One lesson of this decade’s nuclear developments in India, Pakistan, Iraq and North Korea is that very basic nuclear weapon design information is no longer a tightly held secret. The technology required to produce nuclear weapons remains expensive and complex, but is within the reach of literally scores of countries.

To keep countries from producing what scores of them could produce, you need more than pressure or sanctions. You must constantly maintain their consent to remain non-nuclear weapons states.

Ideally, we would maintain that consent by removing the security concerns that propel countries to seek nuclear weapons. But that is terribly difficult, as it is in Kashmir or the Middle East, in the Balkans or the Korean Peninsula or the Taiwan Straits.

In the world of today and of the foreseeable future, peace does not reign. Nuclear non-proliferation will not prevail in this world either, unless we convince states that nuclear weapons are not the key to survival, to status or to power.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is not merely emblematic of the nuclear commitment to the non-nuclear weapons states. It also will put a cap on the development of new classes of nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers.

The test-ban treaty will also limit the ability of any non-nuclear weapons state to develop sophisticated nuclear weapons or to gain confidence in more primitive nuclear weapons if it were to illegally acquire or produce them. If you can’t test your weapon, you are very unlikely to rely upon it as an instrument of war.

These are important reassurances to the non-nuclear nations of the world. They are why those countries agreed to wear all nuclear tests and to accept intrusive on-site inspection if a suspicion arose that they might have tested a nuclear device.

Will the Test-Ban Treaty also gradually reduce a country’s confidence in the reliability of its nuclear weapons over 30 years, as some of its opponents assert? If so, that is actually reassuring to the non-nuclear weapons states, for it gives them hope of the eventual realization of that “cessation of the nuclear arms race” encouraged by Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. So even the cloud that most frightens test-ban opponents has a silver lining: it helps keep the rest of the world on board the non-proliferation bandwagon.

Now it is true, Mr. President, that some countries have never accepted the world non-proliferation bargain. The so-called “threshold states” of India, Pakistan and Israel all viewed nuclear weapons as essential to their national security. They rejected the Non-Proliferation Treaty because it did not require immediate nuclear disarmament.

Still other countries, like Iran, Iraq and North Korea, signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty but maintained covert nuclear weapons programs.

But the vast majority of the world’s states, including many prospective nuclear powers, have gone along with this bargain. And it is vital to our national security that we maintain their adherence to the world non-proliferation regime. They must not become “threshold states,” let alone actually test nuclear weapons.

So, how will we maintain the adherence of the world’s non-nuclear weapons states to the nuclear proliferation regime? The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests are a direct challenge to that regime. The regime—and the countries who support it—can only meet that challenge if the United States leads the way.

On one level, we are already doing that. We have imposed severe sanctions on both India and Pakistan, and both of their economies are at risk. We have adjusted our sanctions to limit their effect upon innocent populations, and we are working to give the President the flexibility to lift them in return for serious steps by India and Pakistan toward capping their arms race and addressing other concerns.

On the world-wide level, however, our record is mixed. Some countries have joined us in imposing sanctions on India and Pakistan. We have also been joined in strong statements by countries ranging from Japan to Russia and China.

Statements and resolutions by the G-8, the Organization of American States, the Conference on Disarmament, and the United Nations Security Council have strongly condemned India and Pakistan’s nuclear tests and called upon them to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to refrain from actual deployment of their weapons, to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and to move toward a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

But the world is acutely aware of our failure to persuade more countries to impose sanctions, and also of our own failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. Until we ratify this Treaty, the nuclear hardliners in India and Pakistan will be able to cite U.S. hypocrisy as one more reason to reject the nuclear non-proliferation regime. And until we ratify the Treaty, the rest of the world will find it easier to reject U.S. calls for diplomatic and economic measures to pressure India and Pakistan.

So how do we keep the nuclear non-proliferation bargain, if we are to maintain U.S. leadership on non-proliferation, keep the rest of the world on board, and influence India and Pakistan? The truth is that we have little choice.

If we fail to keep faith with the non-nuclear states because we cannot even ratify the Test-Ban Treaty, then we will also fail to keep them from developing nuclear weapons of their own. And in that case, Mr. President, we might as well prepare for a world of at least 15 or 20 nuclear weapons states, rather than the 5 or 7 or 8 we have today. That is the stark reality we face.

THE FATE OF THE TEST-BAN TREATY

But we need not fail, Mr. President. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is a very sensible treaty that is clearly in our national interest. It is in the rest of the world’s interest to refrain from nuclear testing. As such, we should not bring this treaty to the floor for a vote before we have bound our own government for the last 6 years.

The Test-Ban Treaty forces us to rely upon so-called “stockpile stewardship” to maintain the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons, but we are in a better position economically and scientifically to do that than is any other country in the world.

Treaty verification will require our attention and our resources, but those are resources that we would have to spend anyway in order to monitor world-wide nuclear weapons programs.

Indeed, the International Monitoring System under the Treaty may save us money, as we will pay only a quarter of those costs for monitoring resources that otherwise we might well have to finance in full.

But we do have a problem. We have been unable to hold hearings on this treaty in the Foreign Relations Committee, even though committees with lesser roles have held them. And the Majority Leader has said that he will not bring this treaty to the floor. Why is that, Mr. President? I know that my good friends the chairman and the majority leader have raised arguments against the Treaty, but they seem curiously unwilling to make the arguments in the context of a proper committee or floor debate on a resolution of ratification.

Could they be afraid of losing? Could they be afraid that, once the pros and cons are laid out with a resolution of ratification before us, the rest of this body will support ratification? Perhaps; I know that I think the Treaty can readily get that support.

For the arguments in favor of ratification, we have a pretty strong record if all the conditions that the President has asked us to attach to a resolution of ratification will assure that we maintain our weapons and the ability to test them, and
that he will consider every year whether we must withdraw from the Treaty and resume testing to maintain nuclear deterrence.

I also know, Mr. President, that the American people overwhelmingly support the ratification of the Test-Ban Treaty. A nation-wide poll in mid-May, after the Indian tests, found 73 percent in favor of ratification and only 16 percent against it. Later polls in 5 states—with 7 Republican senators—found support for the Treaty ranging from 79 percent to 86 percent.

The May poll also found that the American people knew there was a risk that other countries would try to cheat, so the public is not supporting ratification because they wear rose-colored glasses. The people are pretty level-headed on this issue, as on so many others. They know that no treaty is perfect. They also know that this Treaty, on balance, is good for America.

So perhaps those who block the Senate from fulfilling its Constitutional duty regarding this Treaty are doing that because they know the people overwhelmingly support this Treaty, and they know that ratification would pass.

Perhaps they just don't like arms control treaties. Perhaps they would rather rely only upon American military might, including nuclear weapons tests. Perhaps they want a nation-wide ballistic missile defense and figure that then it won't matter how many countries have nuclear weapons. Perhaps they figure our weapons will keep us safe, even if we let the rest of the world fall into the abyss of nuclear war.

I don't share that view, Mr. President. I believe we can keep non-proliferation on track. I believe that we can maintain nuclear deterrence without engaging in nuclear testing, and that the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty is crucial for keeping the non-nuclear states with us on an issue where the fate of the world is truly at stake.

I cannot force a resolution of ratification on this Treaty through the Foreign Relations Committee and onto the floor of this body.

But the American people want us to ratify this Treaty. They are absolutely right to want that. I will remind my colleagues—however often I must—of their historic defense and figure that then it won't matter how many countries have nuclear weapons. Perhaps they figure our weapons will keep us safe, even if we let the rest of the world fall into the abyss of nuclear war.

So our factories and businesses are operating efficiently, our workers are earning more, and our sound government finances are helping to keep interest rates down. What could go wrong?

Well, what if the markets for this new, more productive economy were not there? What if international investors pull their money out of some of our major trading partners? What if those countries stop buying our products and services? What if they can't pay back their loans, and American investments there lose money instead of sending profits back home?

Mr. President, you have enjoyed this excellent economic performance because we have got our own house in order—we have gone through a painful period of restructuring that has made our economy more efficient, and we have taken the tough steps to balance our federal budget.

But just last week, the House pulled its version of the Foreign Ops bill from further consideration because of their internal squabbling over funding for the IMF. And we find that those squabbles may mask an even more cynical motive—to hold the IMF, and by extension global financial stability, hostage to increase their bargaining leverage on unrelated issues at the end of the legislative session this fall.

Mr. President, I want to stress what is at stake while the majority in the House dithers. The financial crisis that began a year ago in Asia has not gone away—it continues to fester, and the plans to stamp it out have failed. Indeed, the resources of the IMF already stretched thin, we may be entering the most critical phase of this threat to the global economy.

If the worst case happens, Mr. President, we will have no place to hide, no matter how well things have been going for us lately. Just look at the risks.

Japan is the keystone of the Asian economy—it could push that already fragile region into a real depression if current trends are not quickly and dramatically reversed. That's why the recent elections there were so important, and why international investors are watching closely to see if Japan has the political muscle to overhaul its financial system and restore growth at the same time. That is a lot to ask, and much hangs on the outcome, including the health of important markets for American exports throughout Asia.

Mr. President, in May our trade deficit soared to $15.8 billion, as exports to Asia dropped by 21 percent compared to a year ago. Still, our friends in the House suggest that we wait until the fall to see if things get worse.

Russia presents an additional threat to our economic and security interests. Despite the announcement of a new IMF package, the Moscow stock market index has dropped 24 percent. An economically foundering Russia, facing political collapse, means that Putin's box of issues for stability in Europe and around the world.

On top of all this, other countries, including South Africa, Ukraine, and Malaysia, are lined up in the IMF's waiting room.

But because of the severity of the Asian crisis, the IMF's resources are so low that international investors must now have real fear that it will not be able to provide further support to its current clients, or support additional countries now on the brink. This will add uncertainty to an already shaky situation, and can only make further panic more likely.