My colleague mentioned the gag rule, how under current law if the HMO decides that they do not want the physicians that are part of their network to tell patients about procedures that are not covered by the HMO, they essentially put in place a gag rule so that their own doctor, in this great democracy that we have, cannot tell them about the type of services that are available because the insurance company will not cover them.

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That is a terrible thing to me, because I think most people when they go to a doctor, they think the doctor is going to educate them and tell them what kind of care they need. That is common sense. Yet they cannot. The doctors in many cases cannot. They are under this so-called gag rule. I think most people are shocked to find out that that is the case and that their doctor actually cannot tell them the truth essentially. That is really what we are all about. We are just trying to put in place what as you mentioned and I mentioned are just commonsense proposals.

Before we conclude tonight, I just wanted to reiterate again so that everyone understands that you and I realize that this is not going to happen because the Republican leadership in the Senate will not even bring it up. But the fact of the matter is that we have a week left. You and I know that when the Republicans decided to bring up their bad bill in August, it only took them a day to do it. They did it in one day. They basically noticed it, they had the debate and they passed what was a very bad bill. So there is no question that if the Senate wanted to take it up, even with a week left, they could do it.

Mr. GREEN. And the Senate could take up the bill number that we passed over there and put real reforms in that bill. What we did is wrong because it is a step backwards. But the Senate could change it and pass real patient protections and send it back to us and hopefully we would just concur in the Senate amendments to the bill and it would make it stronger, include an antigag rule, emergency room care and an outside appeals process.

Mr. PALLONE. The bottom line is that we know that the Republican leadership is not going to do that. They not only do not want to bring up the bad bill, they do not want to bring up anything at all because they do not want to address it. So effectively the issue is dead for now.

But I am worried about the individuals who are negatively impacted in the time before we get a chance to bring this up again. I know that it will come up again because the public as you said is just totally in favor of the kind of patient protections that we have put in our Democratic proposal. I may be unfair also in saying that it is just a Democratic proposal because the patients' bill of rights has Republican support as well but the Republican leadership refuses to bring it up.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. SHIMKUS). Members are reminded to refrain from characterizing Senate action or inaction.

INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT—WHY WE NEED TO STAY THE COURSE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 1997, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) is recognized for the balance of the minority leader's time, approximately 30 minutes.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, it has been almost 10 years since the fall of 1988 when the Communist government of Poland agreed, under great popular pressure, to permit free elections, elections which ultimately led to the ''velvet revolution'' throughout eastern Europe. It has been 9 years since the historic fall of 1989, when the border between Hungary and western Europe opened and thousands of east Europeans first swept aside the Iron Curtain and then brought it crashing down. It has been 8 years since the two Germanys agreed to reunification and 7 years since the Soviet Union disintegrated.

For the United States, the events of a decade ago were the beginning of the end of a long struggle, a struggle that was characterized by terrible sacrifices in Korea and Vietnam; by periods of great national confidence and occasional episodes of uncertainty; by debates in the halls of Congress that were sometimes historic and solemn and sometimes partisan and shrill; and above all by a widely shared sense of national purpose that endured despite occasionally bitter internal divisions.

The constancy with which the United States carried out its global responsibilities over the long course of the Cold War is great testimony to the character of the American people and to the quality of the leaders who guided the Nation through those often trying times. In spite of the costs, in the face of great uncertainties and despite grave distractions, our Nation showed the ability to persevere. In doing so, we answered the great question about America that Winston Churchill once famously posed. ''Will you stay the course?'' he asked? ''Will you stay the course?'' The answer is, we did.

Today we need to raise a similar question once again, but this time for ourselves and in a somewhat different form. Churchill's question ''Will you stay the course?'' implied that there might some day be an end to the struggle, as there was to the Cold War, though no one foresaw when and how it would come. Today the key question is perhaps more challenging because it is more open-ended. It is, ''Will we stay engaged?''

The term ''engagement'' has not yet captured as broad a range of support among political leaders and the public as those who coined it, early in the Clinton administration, evidently hoped it would. But neither did the notion of containment capture broad support until several years after it was articulated during the Truman administration. Some political leaders who later championed containment as the linchpin of our security initially criticized the notion as too passive and even timid.

Engagement, while not yet widely embraced as a characterization of our basic global posture, seems to me to express quite well what we need to be about in the post-Cold War era, that we need to be engaged in the world, and that we need to be engaged with other nations in building and maintaining a stable international security system.

Engagement will not be easy to sustain. It has become clear in recent years it will be as challenging to the United States to fully remain engaged in the post-Cold War era as it was to stay the course during the Cold War. We now know much more about the shape of the post-Cold War era than we did 8 or 4 or even 2 years ago. We know that we have not reached the end of history. We know that we face challenges to our security that in some ways are more daunting than those we faced during the Cold War. We know that it will often be difficult to reach domestic agreement on foreign affairs because legitimate, deeply held values will often be hard to reconcile. We know that we will have to risk grave dangers and pay a price to carry out our responsibilities, and because of the costs, it will sometimes be tempting to think that we would be more secure if we were more insulated from turmoil abroad. We know that we will have to struggle mightily not to allow domestic travails to divert us from the tasks that we must consistently pursue. We also know that our political system, which encourages open debate and which constantly challenges leaders to rise to the demands of the times, gives us the opportunity, if we are thoughtful and serious about our responsibilities, to see where our interests lie and to pursue our values effectively.

Mr. Speaker, today I want to say a few things about engagement in the world, why it may sometimes be difficult to sustain, why it is nonetheless necessary, and, finally, how it has succeeded in bolstering our security.

First, why engagement may be difficult to sustain. Just in the past few months, we have had a series of object lessons in the difficulties of international engagement. Last month our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were attacked by terrorists who have vowed to wage war against the United States as long as we are engaged in the Middle East. As President Clinton aptly put it, ''America is and will remain a target of terrorists precisely because we are leaders; because

we act to advance peace, democracy and basic human values, because we're the most open society on earth; and because, as we have shown yet again, we take an uncompromising stand against terrorism.''

Mr. Speaker, both the President and the Secretary of State warned that the terrorist attacks in Africa and the U.S. retaliation will not be the end of our struggle. In an age of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction, the United States faces particularly grave dangers in its conflict with these forces. So engagement is difficult, first of all, because it entails costs and carries risks. To quail in the face of these risks would be far more damaging to our security than to confront them. But we should not underestimate the dangers we face.

Engagement is also difficult because it requires us to make policy choices in which values we hold dear are troubling to reconcile. The recent debates in this Chamber over policy toward China illustrate this point forcefully. Many of my colleagues were critical of President Clinton's decision to go to China in the first place, and especially critical of the fact that the President would set foot in Tiananmen Square. All of us find China's human rights abuses, forced abortions, forced sterilization, religious and political repression and exploitation of prison labor to be abhorrent. For my part, I believe that U.S. security interests are well-served when we stand up for human rights. Tyranny has crumbled all over the globe in large part because of our active commitment to human rights and because we hold out an example of freedom that millions all over the world hope to emulate. Those who have criticized U.S. policy toward China do so out of deeply held convictions that are entirely legitimate.

It is also true that we cannot sustain a policy of isolating China, and that such a policy would be self-defeating. As former Senator Sam Nunn pointed out in a speech last November, the United States and China have far more interests in common than not. The U.S. presence in Asia bolsters stability that is in China's interest. The U.S. defense of Middle East oil protects China's largest source of energy. We need China to play a constructive role in preventing war in Korea. We need China to be more cooperative in halting weapons proliferation. Both we and China will benefit if we can cooperate in building a framework for stability in former Soviet central Asia. As China develops, the entire world has an interest in encouraging China to pursue energy systems that are environmentally sound and to prevent the spread of communicable diseases.

Constructive engagement with China, therefore, is essential, but it also challenges us to remain true to our fundamental beliefs in human rights. We need to emphasize our common interests with China, but because of our commitment to human freedom, we should not sell short the leverage we may have in encouraging greater liberty inside China. So engagement is difficult because we cannot easily reconcile our deeply held convictions about what is right and necessary in relations with other nations.

Other recent events show that engagement with long-standing allies may also be turbulent at times. Many if not most of our allies have not, for example, wholeheartedly supported our efforts to enforce sanctions on nations that we believe guilty of sponsoring international terrorism or that we see as threats to the peace. The Clinton administration's decision to pursue a new tack in policy toward Iraq reflects in part the fact that some of our allies apparently do not place as high a priority as we do on halting weapons proliferation. In effect, we could not count on them to back us up in carrying out the U.N. enforcement regime as vigorously as we had been doing and as forcefully as many Members of Congress, including myself, would like.

This is especially frustrating, because our allies rely much more on oil from the Persian Gulf than we do. For that matter, they have suffered from terrorism over the years more than we have. So here is a case in which we are doing the heavy lifting, and in the process deepening the enmity of anti-Western elements throughout the region, without being able to rely on the wholehearted support of allies who ultimately benefit most from our stabilizing efforts in the region.

Engagement is difficult, therefore, because leadership itself is difficult, because allies do not always meet our expectations, because burdens are not fairly shared, because other nations seek to enjoy the fruits of our labor while shirking the cost, because foreign leaders do not always see things through the same lens as we do and sometimes may not have as much backbone as we would like. It is tempting in such cases to conclude that we should do less and let the consequences unfold as they will. But that would ultimately, Mr. Speaker, be self-defeating.

The related difficulty of engagement is what might be called the paradox of burdensharing. In some cases our leadership role may require that we commit our resources, including our military forces, even in cases where our allies have more at stake than we do, because others cannot act decisively without us.

The obvious example is Bosnia, in which our allies had forces on the ground for some years, but without being able to forge a peace agreement until we committed our own ground troops.

A forceful, coordinated, diplomatic effort, backed up by military power, required our involvement. Here is the paradox: We generally think that burden sharing, that is getting the allies to do more, will reduce the weight we must bear. In fact, getting the allies to do more often requires that we do more as well. Engagement is difficult, therefore, because it means that we will sometimes become embroiled in undertakings overseas that, on the face of it, cost us more than our immediate interests appear to justify.

The reason we must be engaged is that our overarching interest in building effective security cooperation with our allies requires us to do one thing, and that is exercise leadership.

Engagement is also difficult for domestic political reasons. To be blunt, neither the President nor the Members of Congress get elected by promising to devote a great deal of time and attention to foreign affairs. Moreover, it is easy for those out of power to criticize allies, deplore China and Russia, deprecate the United Nations, condemn actions for being too costly, and denounce inaction for being too timid. Meanwhile those in positions of responsibility must make compromises, choose between alternatives that are often bad and less bad, take risks to get things done, and bear the criticism when initiatives fail.

The world cannot be molded to our liking. It is politically difficult to persist, nonetheless, in the essential task of trying to shape it.

Finally, engagement is difficult because it is financially expensive. In recent years it has been difficult to find the resources to meet obvious needs in defense and foreign affairs because of pressures to reduce the budget deficit. Now that the deficit has been brought under control, a part of the discussion of budget priorities ought to be how to restore a reasonable level of investment in meeting our international security requirements.

Mr. Speaker, despite these difficulties, there is no alternative to continued, active U.S. engagement in the world. To me, the fundamental reason for engagement in the world is moral. I say this with a full appreciation of the fact that the very idea of laying out a moral basis for U.S. foreign policy makes some thoughtful people cringe. It will strike some here at home as a call for a degree of international activism that we cannot sustain, and it will strike many abroad as just another example of American arrogance.

In fact, U.S. foreign policy must always have a moral basis to it, or it cannot be sustained. We persevered in the Cold War precisely because we felt it our responsibility as a nation to defend against tyranny. In the name of that moral mission, and it was a moral mission, we may sometimes have asked too much of ourselves, and particularly of our young sons and daughters in the military, but it was nonetheless a goal worthy of our people.

Now we have a very different moral responsibility before us, which may be somewhat more difficult to express, but which I think is equally important. Our responsibility now is to use our unchallenged position of global leadership

in a fashion that will make the universal hope for peace, prosperity and freedom as much as possible into the norm of international behavior.

Let me be clear about one thing, the world will never be completely at peace, but it is possible that the coming century will be at least spared the global horrors that scourged the first half of the 20th century, perhaps the bloodiest period in human history.

Today, the United States is the bulwark of a relatively secure international order in which small conflicts, though endemic and inevitable, will not decisively erode global stability.

As such, our global engagement is also a means of preventing the growth of new powers that could, in time, constitute a threat to peace and evolve into the enemy that we do not now foresee.

If the United States were not to try, at least, to use our current position of strength to help construct an era of relative peace and stability, it would be a moral failure of historic magnitude. More than that, to fail to exercise our strength in a fashion that builds global cooperation would also, in the long run, leave us weaker and more vulnerable to dangers from abroad.

Indeed, perhaps the most striking feature of the U.S. position in the world right now is that it is an extraordinarily complex mixture both of strength and vulnerability.

We are strong, obviously, because no single nation remotely matches our military power and economic vitality.

We are strong, more importantly, because in almost all parts of the globe, other nations recognize that our leadership is essential to build and maintain a stable, peaceful and regional security environment.

We are vulnerable, similarly, in some profoundly important ways. We live in a truly global society in which our prosperity and our security are affected by events in every part of the world, however seemingly remote. Our security depends on cooperation from other nations, including long-standing allies, long-time neutrals, and especially former enemies, in coping with global challenges ranging from weapons proliferation, to terrorism, to narcotics and international crime, to rogue states that threaten international order, to environmental degradation.

We are vulnerable, paradoxically, because our leadership, which is our greatest strength, makes us a target for those who want to destroy regional order.

The need for engagement follows both from our strength and from our vulnerability.

We need to be engaged because only the United States can provide the leadership necessary to respond to global and regional challenges to stability and only the United States can foster the growth of regional security structures that will prevent future challenges from arising.

We need to be engaged because our continued presence gives other nations confidence in our power and in our reliability and makes us the ally of choice if and when conflicts arise.

We need to be engaged because only by actively shaping effective regional security systems can we create an environment in which nations that might otherwise challenge stability will instead perceive the community of interests with the United States and with our regional allies.

We need to be engaged because only by recognizing and responding to the security concerns of other nations can we expect them to support our security interests and concerns.

We need to be engaged because cooperation of other nations is essential to deter and defeat enemies who want to undermine global order.

Mr. Speaker, since the end of the Cold War, we have learned many things. We have learned that the end of the Cold War did not mark the end of history. The fundamentally ideological struggle between Soviet-style communism and Western-style capitalism may have been resolved but the battle for human freedom continues against a host of other challenges.

We have learned that we face quite different and much more varied threats than those we first imagined. In the wake of the Persian Gulf War, Iraq and Korea were regarded as the major, archetypal threats to regional and world security. Though they remain threats, the gravest danger they pose now appears to be through development of weapons of mass destruction, and a host of other, equally serious threats that have become apparent.

Sophisticated terrorists with global capabilities directly threaten the U.S. homeland. Bitter ethnic conflicts have led to horrible bloodshed and may yet threaten regional stability in strategically important parts of the world. India and Pakistan have stepped onto the threshold of a nuclear arms race. Just over two years ago, China was trying to intimidate Taiwan with a show of military strength. Ballistic missile proliferation has accelerated. Stable economies in the East have crashed. The Russian economy has collapsed.

In view of these largely unpredictable international developments, it is striking to me that debates we have had in the Congress about security issues in recent months do not seem to have evolved very much from the debates we had 4 or 5 years ago. We still seem to be mired in disputes over issues that we should have resolved long ago. Some traditional champions of a strong national defense still complain that the demands of engagement appear to divert attention away from our real national security interests. Engagement seems too multilateralist. It embroils us in regional conflicts that seem remote. It appears to put too much emphasis on peacekeeping or humanitarian missions that are costly and that are not obviously directly related to our vital security interests.

It appears to emphasize arms control measures that impose constraints on our own defenses, while being difficult to enforce on others. Engagement requires building constructive relationships with former enemies, when no one can quite be sure that we are thereby strengthening a future regional or even global competitor.

For others, who believe the world ought to be more peaceful and less militarized in the post-Cold War era, engagement has seemed to require too much U.S. military involvement in distant parts of the globe. It appears to justify military and other ties with regimes that are distasteful or worse. It seems to emphasize security matters at the expense of other interests, such as human rights, fair trade practices or environmental protection. It appears to some even to be a questionable rationale for continued high military spending in a world with no direct, obvious threats.

Some of these concerns are entirely legitimate, I believe; some less so. Certainly they reflect some aspects of engagement that are difficult for many to embrace. But those who see themselves as proponents of a strong national defense and as advocates of assertive American power, should, I think, reconsider their position in view of the compelling evidence that engagement is essential to our military security.

Similarly, those who see themselves as advocates of ''soft power,'' of preventing conflicts from arising by promoting multilateral cooperation, should understand that military engagement abroad is essential to build and enforce a more peaceful, cooperative world in which our other interests and values can flourish.

Mr. Speaker, now that we are almost a decade into the post-Cold War era, we should try to draw some lessons from our experience. We should all try to review the events of recent years and reconsider our expectations about the nature of the world order, or disorder, it appears, that would arise. We should also then try to think through what we believe is needed to carry out our responsibilities as a nation.

The fact that we have been engaged in many smaller scale military operations in recent years should lead us to rethink our attitudes toward such missions. As I just noted, some proponents of a strong defense have tended to regard certain missions at least as a diversion of resources away from our real national security needs. There has been, in some quarters, a tendency to denigrate peacekeeping or humanitarian missions, in particular, as somehow unworthy of our efforts. As one writer generally opposed to such operations put it a couple of years ago, superpowers do not do windows.

In this quite widely shared view, the overriding responsibility of U.S. military forces is to prepare for major conflicts, other, lesser demands to divert our efforts away from this task and should be avoided. One conclusion is

that the United States should seek to establish a division of responsibility with the allies, in which they engage in smaller-scale stability operations, while the United States remains the bulwark of global defense against larger threats.

A variation on this theme is that the United States needs to focus much more on defense of the homeland in the face of new challenges to security.

Though there is something of value to these views, and there is, I also think that they have become increasingly untenable over the past few years. The valuable points are two. First, it is in fact the case that smaller-scale operations demand more resources than military planners had assumed. The answer is not to forswear such operations, which I don't believe we can do, but rather to acknowledge the resource demands and meet those requirements.

Second, it is important to be selective in making commitments and in using the military. Above all, we need to ensure a balance between the interests we have at stake and the commitments we are making.

The problem with this criticism of smaller-scale operations is that our security increasingly depends on maintaining stability in key regions of the globe. The United States cannot, for good or ill, leave to others the responsibility to enforce stability. For one thing, as Bosnia shows, even our major allies cannot act effectively without our leadership. Moreover, we have a direct interest in maintaining stability even in distant parts of the globe because major regional threats to our security are likely to grow out of smaller regional conflicts if we do not prevent them from getting out of control.

For that matter, if we expect to gain access to distant regions in the event of a major regional threat, then we have to be engaged with allies in the region in responding to lesser threats to their security.

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We could not have expected Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states to rely on the United States to respond to Iraq's aggression in 1990 if we had not maintained close security ties with those nations for many, many years.

Finally, in this era of global trade and communications, direct threats to the U.S. homeland will arise out of local conflicts that we might, in an earlier age, have dismissed as remote battles between exotic and unfamiliar peoples. Today, neither distance nor indifference can insulate us from such conflicts. Only our engagement in ream natural stability abroad can limit the threats we face.

For those who still believe that the United States should further reduce its military capabilities, who think that military threats in the post-Cold War era are less demanding than the two major theater wars that we originally prepared for, and who believe that nonmilitary instruments of influence should be emphasized. I agree with that part of it. We should devote more resources to the nonmilitary aspects of engagement abroad. For the rest, all I can say is where have you been for the last 5 years?

What we have discovered is that effective international engagement requires much more active and extensive U.S. military involvement abroad than many expected. In the wake of the Cold War, we decided to maintain a permanent military presence of about 100,000 troops both in Europe and in Asia.

These deployments, in retrospect, hardly appear excessive. On the contrary, our forces in Europe, if anything, have been badly overworked. They have been involved in countless joint exercises with old and new allies and with former enemies that have been critically important in building a new, cooperative security order in Europe.

They have been deployed repeatedly to hot spots throughout Europe and Africa. They have provided the bulk of U.S. forces in Bosnia, which has strained our resources in the region to the limit.

In Asia, our continued strong presence has proven critically important. We have continued to deter conflict in Korea. In the spring of 1996, U.S. naval forces responded forcefully to Chinese threats against Taiwan. China's response was not to escalate the confrontation, but soberly and realistically, to seek a more cooperative relationship with United States, entirely, because of our demonstrated strength and resolve.

Last year, the United States and Japan announced a new cooperative security agreement that reflects Japan's confidence that the U.S. commitment, and that will be a pillar of regional security in the future.

While we anticipated keeping these forces in Europe in Asia, engagement has required much more. It has also entailed a constant, rotational presence in the Persian Gulf, a commitment which we now should recognize is on par with the commitments we have maintained in Europe and the Far East. It has involved military intervention in Haiti, an ongoing peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, and literally dozens of smaller-scale military operations, ranging from the humanitarian mission in Rwanda, to several noncombatant situation missions, to our recent strikes against terrorists in Afghanistan and Sudan.

In Congress, we have debated these various commitments of military operations extensively. Some, perhaps most of us, have favored some activities and opposed others. But whatever position we take on particular instances of military involvement abroad, we should by now all be clear about one thing: as long as we are actively engaged abroad, the pace of military operations is likely to be much more demanding than any of us had imagined a few years ago.

This, in turn, should lead us to reconsider the military posture that we adopted in the wake of the Cold War. To its credit, the Defense Department began to do that last year in the Quadrennial Defense Review or QDR.

The QDR articulated a much broader statement of strategy than the earlier Bottom-Up Review of 1993 had been expressed, a vision that aptly reflected our subsequent experience in the post-Cold War era. The QDR had one failing, however. It did not adequately reassess projected resource requirements in view of the more demanding strategy that laid it out.

Now, it appears, the leadership of the Defense Department has reconsidered budget needs, and I am confident that the President and the Congress will give full consideration to the requirements that have been identified.

Mr. Speaker, the final point I want to make—and perhaps the most important thing we need to keep in mind—is that the U.S. policy of engagement, as practiced by Administrations of both parties since the end of the Cold War, has been a success. Yes, we have suffered some failures. No, we have not accomplished everything we might have hoped. Yes, we have made some mistakes. But failures, shortcomings, and mistakes are inevitable in international affairs—there has never been a government in history that has not run into such difficulties. The key tests are, first, whether we, as a country, have learned from our mistakes and, second, whether we remain resolved to persist despite the difficulties.

The successes of engagement are many, though we don't often focus on them. Cooperation with Russia and constructive engagement with China may or may not succeed in the long run in avoiding a return to global competition in the future. For the present, Russia is struggling through an economic and political crisis that, unfortunately, we can do little to mitigate and that might, in the fairly near future, lead to some dangerous developments. Even so, in the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, our policy has helped to prevent the widespread proliferation of Soviet nuclear weapons and other arms to rogue nations and terrorists. Russia has also cooperated with us, with some ups and downs, on regional security issues in Bosnia and the Persian Gulf. It is, in any case, far better to have Russia as a cooperative partner than the Soviet Union as a bitter enemy.

Engagement with China has had its ups and downs, the nadir coming with the confrontation over Taiwan in 1996. Since then, however, China has endeavored, as we have, to improve relations. Time will tell how cooperative china will be in the future in preventing weapons proliferation and in continuing to keep North Korea in check. Engagement with China on security matters clearly holds out the best hope of building a long-term relationship that emphasizes shared interests, even as we still assert our concerns about human rights, more open trade, and peaceful resolution of disputes.

We have not succeeded in halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction and other military technology—but it would be unrealistic to expect a halt to proliferation. We have slowed down proliferation, and we may be able to constrain it further in the future. Iraq is still in a position to pursue dangerous weapons technologies rapidly in the future unless

allies join with us in enforcing U.N. resolutions vigorously. This is a battle we will likely have to fight for a long time. Iran is also making advances. Our sanctions on Iran have not, however, been wholly fruitless—the current government of Iran appears to be aware of the economic and other sacrifices the country has suffered because of the effectiveness of U.S.-sponsored sanctions. India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons—but both have felt under enough international pressure as a result of their policies that they are now talking, at least, about joining international non-proliferation agreements, including the Comprehensive Test Ban. So even though we may focus on breakdowns of multilateral constraints on technology transfers, the policy has still forced proliferators to pay a price.

Our efforts to build effective structures of regional security have made real progress, though much remains to be done. In Europe, NATO has enlarged to include new members, and across much of the continent, military forces are engaged in extensive military-to-military contacts that bolster mutual confidence and security. Instability in the Balkans remains threatening, but allies are working together to address it. In Asia, the U.S.-Japan security relationship has grown stronger, China appears increasingly interested in security cooperation rather than confrontation, and most of the smaller nations in the region, while shaken by economic crises, see the United States as the ally of choice. In Latin America, though several nations are under assault from narco-terrorism, democracy remains ascendant, and U.S. military-to-military contacts have played an overwhelmingly positive role. In Africa, the United States has supported the first small steps toward development of regional security structures, though tragic conflicts continue. The Middle East and the Persian Gulf remain dangerously unstable, and only our presence can deter conflict.

Engagement, in sum, is as centrally important to our security—and to the prospects for peace in the world—as containment was during the Cold War. Perhaps above all, the key issue is whether we will persist despite the fact that the struggle to maintain relative international peace will never be concluded. This is not a struggle we can see through to the end—it is, nonetheless, an effort that we as a nation must continue to make.

ISSUES FACING THE WEST

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 1997, the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. MCINNIS) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

Mr. MCINNIS. Mr. Speaker, last week, I spoke about character and so on. Tonight's speech I think will be a little less exciting. I do not intend to address the issues that are going down at the White House. I do not intend to address some of the comments I heard earlier on HMOs, although I think certainly that would be fertile ground for debate.

What I am going to address is the West. For some of my colleagues today, it may be a little boring; but for those of my colleagues who look at the heritage of this country and understand the geography of this country and the people of this country, I think they will find some of the comments I am about to make of some interest.

I was inspired to do this speech in the last couple of weeks. About 2 or 3 weeks ago, I went to the club called the Knife and Fork in Grand Junction, Colorado, run by a fellow named Reeford Theibold. My wife Lori is on that board. What they do is there is a group of people in Grand Junction, Colorado; and once a month or once every 6 weeks, they have a speaker that comes in and speaks to the audience.

The speaker this time was a fellow named Dennis Weaver, a name that all of my colleagues know. Dennis Weaver, of course, is a movie star. We have all seen him on our TV. He has dedicated this portion of his life to different aspects of the environment. He lives in Ridgway, Colorado. I am going to tell my colleagues a little bit about the district that I represent, but Ridgway, Colorado is contained within that district.

The other person that I talked to was a fellow by the name of Phil Burgess. Most of my colleagues do not know who Mr. Burgess is, but I can tell them that he is kind of a think-tank kind of fellow. He is out in the West. He also has a place out here near the Chesapeake Bay.

I had an opportunity the other day to spend several hours with him, and we talked about the West and the country and how the West was settled and how it has evolved throughout this time and the evolvement that we now face in the future.

Mr. Burgess has a think-tank operation, I think it is the largest think-tank probably out of Washington, D.C. It is called the center, appropriately named, the Center for the New West. I thought I would go through a few of his ideas as we evolve or go through this speech.

The other thing that inspired me is I got up Saturday morning to run, got up about 6:30 or so, I guess, got ready to run at 7:00, and I turned on the TV, and there was James Arness. Remember James Arness, Gunsmoke, great guy. It is on every Saturday morning about 7 o'clock in the morning. Unfortunately, the show had started, and I did not get the name of the show, but I think it was How The West Was Won or something, but I turned it on Saturday morning. You watch that and you get a real feeling, a good feeling about what the West was like, the beautiful ranges and the mountains.

So with a combination of those three things, I thought it would be important to come down today, talk about a few issues that face the West.

We have things like transportation problems out there, obviously. I want to talk a little about the water issue we have out there. The West is very unique in its water issues. I will talk a little bit about multiple use of Federal lands.

But I thought I would begin first of all by describing the Third Congressional District. That is the district that I am privileged to represent back here in the United States Congress.

The Third Congressional District is one of the largest congressional districts in the United States. Most of my colleagues here today have been in the Third Congressional District of the State of Colorado. It is well known. Why? Here is the State of Colorado over here to my left. The Third District, roughly the eastern border goes north to south and like this. This is Denver, Colorado right here. So it goes about this size, goes all along the border with New Mexico, comes back up along the Utah border and the Wyoming border.

This district contains more ski areas than any other district in the country. This district is the highest in altitude of any other district in the country. So many of my colleagues have probably skied or certainly have heard of areas like Aspen, Colorado, Durango, Colorado, Steamboat, Glenwood Springs, Breckenridge, any number of these areas.

Many of my colleagues have hunted out in this country. We have the largest herds of elk in North America. Our ranges, we have 54 mountain peaks, 54 mountain peaks over 14,000 feet. Pikes Peak, just outside of the District, Pikes Peak out in this area, Pikes Peak goes just around this area.

This district has lots of Federal ownership. In fact, there are 22 million acres, 22 million acres contained just in that area that is owned by the Federal Government.

The Third Congressional District geographically is larger than the State of Florida. It has got a lot of other unique aspects about it. We have lots of wealth contained within that district. For example, Beaver Creek, Vale, Telluride, Aspen, Steamboat, Durango, lots of wealth, a lot of second homes.

But also in this district out in the southern end of the district where I have got the pointer down in this area, we have the poorest area of the State of Colorado down in San Luis and Costilla and Canal and some areas like that.

We also have huge agricultural interests, some of the largest, I think the largest potato warehouse in the world is in this part of the district. Up here, we have large orchards, and of course we have lots of cattle ranching in this area. Up in this area, we have sheep ranching.

As I mentioned earlier, recreation, hunting areas like that all are in that economy out there for the Third Congressional District.

Let me talk a little about one of the things that is unique to the western part of the country. Here in the eastern part of the country, when you deal with water, primarily your problem with water is how to get rid of it. You have too much water. You get floods and things like that.

Out in the West, it is an arid region. I saw with interest the other day the