

the university will have a larger pool of eligible students, and that might lead to more minority students being accepted at UCI, he said.

The new policy, which would take effect for students who will be freshmen in fall of 2001, would make no change in the rules for determining which campuses a student qualifies for, and therefore would have little, if any, effect on who gets into the most selective campuses—Berkeley, UCLA and San Diego. Test scores will remain a key criterion in that decision.

Davis campaigned on the 4% plan as a way to shore up minority admissions that have slipped since the end of affirmative action. But UC officials released new information showing that of the newly eligible students, whites would make up 56%, Latinos 20%, Asian Americans 11% and African Americans 5%. Now, Latinos are 12% of UC freshmen and blacks 3%.

Yet Davis stressed the importance of sending a welcoming hand to high school students who do not think attending the university is possible.

"This admissions program says, 'Keep dreaming big dreams. Keep working hard. If you really excel, you will get a place at one of the eight UC campuses.'" Davis said. "And it completely consistent with the will of the voters" who passed Proposition 209's ban on racial preferences.

Such a change in policy probably would not have passed a year ago, when Republican Pete Wilson was governor. When the faculty brought the idea before the regents last year, it was roundly trounced by Wilson's appointees. They feared that it not only would violate Proposition 209, but would bring in unqualified students and set them up for failure.

Longtime Regent Meredith J. Khachigian cast the lone vote in opposition to the plan, saying that it would raise "false hopes" among students ill-prepared for a rigorous university education. She also said that it sent the wrong message to schools that do not have college-prep programs that adequately prepare students to compete statewide for the 46,000 freshmen slots at the campuses.

But state Supt. of Schools Delaine Eastin joined the governor in arguing that the plan would inspire a culture of academic excellence and competition in those schools that historically send few, if any students, to the prestigious public universities.

Here is how the new admissions process would work:

At the end of the high school junior year, UC officials will help public schools compile grade-point averages for students taking college-prep courses and then rank the students accordingly.

Those in the top 4% of each of California's 863 public high schools—about 10,000 students—will be sent letters informing them that they are eligible for UC admission, provided they send in an application, complete all required college-prep courses and take the SAT and SAT II tests. The university will extend the program to interested private schools.

Poor test scores will not make a student ineligible for admission. But good scores are one of the main criteria for who gets into the most competitive campuses, especially UCLA, UC Berkeley and UC San Diego.

Of the 10,000 students in the top 4%, about 6,400 would be eligible for UC admission without the policy change. Of the 3,600 who would not have been eligible before, officials expect that about half will enroll.

Davis emphasized Thursday that this approach opens the door to a new pool of stu-

dents without displacing anyone who would otherwise get in.

Davis agreed that the change in policy will not alter the racial balance of the university, which has seen steep drops in black and Latino students admitted in the post-affirmative action era.

But, the governor pointed out, referring to the newly eligible students, that "about 800 or 900 of them will be people of color. There is no denying that 800 people of color will have a chance to come to the university that otherwise they would not have had."

The issue of who gets admitted to UC has been a particularly hot topic since 1995, when the regents, led by then-Gov Wilson, voted to ban affirmative action. The ban on racial preferences was extended statewide with the 1996 passage of Proposition 209.

Adopting a companion proposal, the regents decided to require all UC-bound students to take music, dance or other performing arts classes. The goal is to bring UC requirement in alignment with those of the California State University system.

But the regents, following Davis' lead, shunned a faculty proposal to halve the extra grade points awarded to high school students who take Advanced Placement and honors course.

The governor said he did not want to do anything that would diminish the incentives for high school students to challenge themselves by taking the tougher courses.

Under a program set up by UC officials more than a decade ago, students can now earn up to five points for an A in Advanced Placement on honors courses, resulting in grade-point averages that exceed 4.0.

IN MEMORIAM OF ABE GOOTMAN

HON. ROBERT A. BORSKI

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 11, 1999

Mr. BORSKI. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in memory of a dear friend, Mr. Abe Gootman. Much to the loss of local politics, Abe Gootman passed away today.

For as long as I can remember, Abe had been on the front line of politics in Philadelphia. He was with me on my first campaign for Congress in 1982, and was a stalwart supporter throughout the rest of my career. Abe was always there to champion the causes that I believed in and defend my actions as a Member of Congress. As a committee person from the 54th Democratic ward, his voice could always be heard. You could consistently count on Abe to get the message out, whether it was in a neighborhood meeting or a letter to the editor, and people invariably listened.

Abe worked for the U.S. Postal Service for 45 years and retired in April, 1968. He started his career as a letter carrier, then drove a mail truck and became a tour supervisor of all mail at 30th Street Station, working the 4–12 shift, before retiring. As a member of the National Association of Letter Carriers and the National Association of Retired Federal Employees, Abe was a staunch advocate for federal retirees and their need to be treated as equal as beneficiaries of the Social Security system. He worked tirelessly in his effort to see that retired federal employees got what they deserved.

Mr. Speaker, Abe Gootman was a kind and generous man who firmly believed in the sanctity of the government and the political process. As a World War II Veteran, he was a true patriot and believer in democracy by the people, for the people. It is a sad day for Philadelphia, and a sad day particularly for me. I will truly miss Mr. Gootman, he has been an anchor and a guide throughout my career. My deepest sympathies to his family.

HONORING AMERICA'S TEACHERS

HON. GENE GREEN

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 11, 1999

Mr. GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, last week we celebrated National Teacher Appreciation Week and paid tribute to the dedicated men and women who serve as teachers. Our teachers are hardworking professionals who are on the front lines of our struggle to provide a quality education for every child in America. They work hard so that our children can succeed in life. While it is important to recognize and acknowledge their hard work and commitment to educate our children, we must also provide them with the necessary tools they need to give our children a quality education.

It is imperative that Congress pass legislation to provide the money to fulfill our commitment to IDEA so that learning disabled children don't lag behind nondisabled children. It is also important that we continue to fund afterschool programs, and class size reduction programs that will put 100,000 new teachers in our classrooms.

Presently, Congress is considering the Teacher Technology Training Act, which would provide money to local school districts to train teachers in classroom-related computer skills, and the School Construction Act, which would help our teachers by renovating and modernizing the classrooms and facilities. In addition, the President's budget proposal provides for at least an overall 15-percent increase in education programs. These proposals will provide teachers the tools to raise test scores, student achievement, and graduation rates.

However, most important for this Congress and vital for our students and teachers, is the reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. The programs in ESEA are critical to the most disadvantaged students in our educational system. They include monies for safe and drug-free schools, technology education, infrastructure improvement, and bilingual education.

In this week that we have set aside to honor our Nation's teachers, Congress needs to get its priorities in line and act on the legislation that would say more about our dedication to teachers and the education of our children. Our children and teachers need schools that are safe, modern, with small classes, and access to the Internet. The tragedy in Littleton, CO, showed the need for parents, teachers, administrators, and elected officials to work together and set as a national priority, our children.

CRISIS IN KOSOVO (ITEM NO. 2)—
REMARKS BY PROFESSOR MI-
CHAEL KLARE

HON. DENNIS J. KUCINICH

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 11, 1999

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, on April 29, 1999, I joined with Representative CYNTHIA A MCKINNEY and Representative MICHAEL E. CAPUANO to host the second in a series of Congressional Teach-In sessions on the Crisis in Kosovo. If a peaceful resolution to this conflict is to be found in the coming weeks, it is essential that we cultivate a consciousness of peace and actively search for creative solutions. We must construct a foundation for peace through negotiation, mediation, and diplomacy.

Part of the dynamic of peace is a willingness to engage in meaningful dialogue, to listen to one another openly and to share our views in a constructive manner. I hope that these Teach-In sessions will contribute to this process by providing a forum for Members of Congress and the public to explore alternatives to the bombing and options for a peaceful resolution. We will hear from a variety of speakers on different sides of the Kosovo situation. I will be introducing into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD transcripts of their remarks and essays that shed light on the many dimensions of the crisis.

This presentation is by Michael Klare, a professor of world security studies at Hampshire College. A noted expert on foreign policy, Professor Klare discusses the content of the Rambouillet plan, and speculated that the decision to bomb Serbia was closely related to the inauguration of a "new strategic blueprint" by NATO. He also presents a 5-point plan for peace in the Balkans. Following his presentation is his opinion piece from *Newsday*, April 4, 1999, entitled "Kosovo Failures Show Path to Real Peace." I commend these well-reasoned documents to my colleagues.

PRESENTATION BY PROFESSOR MICHAEL KLARE
TO CONGRESSIONAL TEACH-IN ON KOSOVO

First, I want to thank Representatives Kucinich, McKinney, and Capuano for affording me this opportunity to address the issues raised by the current conflict in the Balkans. I believe that public discussion of these issues is essential if Congress and the American people are to make informed decisions about vital national security matters.

As for my own views, I want to make it clear from the start that I am very troubled by the strategy adopted by the United States and NATO to deal with the crisis in Kosovo. Now, I agree that we all share an obligation to resist genocide and ethnic cleansing whenever such hideous behavior occurs. And I think that we all agree that Serbian military and police authorities have engaged in such behavior in Kosovo. The killings and other atrocities that have occurred there represent an assault on the human community as a whole, and must be vigorously opposed.

But this does not mean that we cannot be critical of the means adopted by the United States and NATO to counter this behavior, if we find them lacking. Indeed, our very concern for the lives of the Albanian Kosovars requires that we agonize over every strategic decision and reject any move that could conceivably jeopardize the safety of the people most at risk.

Unfortunately, I do not believe that U.S. and NATO leaders adequately subjected their proposed strategies to this demanding standard. In saying this, I do not mean to question the sincerity of their concern for the people of Kosovo. But I do believe that they rushed to adopt a strategy that was not optimally designed to protect the lives of those at risk.

The haste of which I speak was most evident at the so-called peace negotiations at Rambouillet in France. I say "so-called," because it is now apparent that the United States and NATO did not really engage in the give and take of true negotiations, but rather presented the Serbian leadership with an ultimatum that they were almost certain to reject. This ultimatum called for the virtual separation of Kosovo from Serbia (if not right away, then in three years' time), the occupation of Kosovo by an armed NATO force, and the use of Serbian territory as a staging area for NATO forces in Kosovo—a drastic infringement on Serbian sovereignty that no Serbian leader could agree to, and still expect to remain in office.

Moreover, NATO representatives in Rambouillet evidently did not consider any other scenarios for settlement of the crisis, for example a compromise solution that might have averted the tragedy of the past few weeks. Such a compromise would have entailed a high degree of autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia (as was the case during the Tito period), with U.N. rather than NATO forces providing the necessary security for returning Albanian Kosovars.

Perhaps such a compromise was not really possible at Rambouillet, but we will never know, because NATO representatives gave Milosevic a take-it-or-leave-it package, and he predictably said no. As soon as the OSCE observers were pulled out of Kosovo, the Serbians began their attacks on the Albanian Kosovars. And the NATO air war, when it began a few days later, has proved to have little practical effect on the situation on the ground.

Now, some analysts may argue that haste was necessary at that point, to forestall the actions long planned by the Milosevic regime. But this does not make sense. If Milosevic had initiated full-scale ethnic cleansing while negotiations were under way in Rambouillet and the OSCE observers were still in Kosovo, he would have been exposed to the world as a vicious tyrant and could not have prevented a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force against him under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. It is very unlikely that he would have chosen this outcome, as it probably would have forced Russia to side with NATO against him. As it happened, NATO began the air war without a supporting U.N. resolution, and Milosevic was able to conceal the atrocities in Kosovo from international observation.

Why, then, did NATO rush to begin military operations against Serbia? I believe that the decision to terminate the negotiations at Rambouillet and commence the air war was driven in part by extraneous factors that were not directly connected to developments in Kosovo proper. In particular, I believe that President Clinton was influenced in part by the timing of NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit meeting in Washington. As we know, the crisis in Kosovo was reaching the boiling point only two months before the NATO Summit, which of course was scheduled for April 23-25. The White House had been planning since 1998 to use this occasion to unveil a new strategic blueprint for NATO—one that called for Alliance to transform itself from a collective defense organization into a regional police force with jurisdiction extending far beyond the organization's traditional defense lines. Under this

new strategy, NATO would be primed to engage in "crisis response" operations whenever stability was threatened on the periphery of NATO territory. (Such operations are also referred to in NATO documents as "non-Article 5 operations," meaning military actions not prompted by an attack on one of NATO's members, such as those envisioned in the collective defense provisions of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty.)

I believe that Mr. Clinton must have concluded that a failure to take vigorous action against Milosevic in March would have cast doubt on the credibility of the new NATO strategy (on which the air campaign against Serbia is based), while a quick success would no doubt have helped build support for its ratification. In arriving at this conclusion, Mr. Clinton was also influenced (according to a report in *The New York Times* of April 18, 1999) by intelligence reports suggesting that Milosevic would give in to NATO demands after a relatively short period of bombing.

And so the United States and NATO rushed into an air campaign against Serbia before it had exhausted all of the potential for a negotiated settlement with Belgrade. And I would argue that this very haste has damaged the effectiveness of NATO action. For one thing, it did not allow NATO officials sufficient time to prepare for the refugee crisis provoked by Serbian action in Kosovo, resulting in the massive chaos witnessed at border regions in Albania and Macedonia. In addition, precipitous NATO action has allowed Milosevic to conceal the atrocities in Kosovo from his own people, and to blame the suffering there on NATO bombs rather than Serbian violence. As well, such haste gives the appearance that NATO is acting without proper U.N. Security Council authorization, and thus is in violation of international law. Finally, it has alienated Russia, which sees the air war as a one-sided attack on a friendly Slavic state.

NATO itself has also suffered from this haste, in that the parliaments and publics of the NATO member states were not given an adequate opportunity to debate the merits of the air war and the new strategic blueprint upon which it is based. Given the fact that NATO is an alliance of democracies, in which key decisions are supposedly arrived at only after full consultation with the people and their elected representatives, this lack of consultation runs the risk of discrediting NATO over the long run. Given the magnitude and significance of the strategic transportation now under way, entailing the possible initiation of NATO military operations in areas outside of NATO's traditional defense lines, it is essential that the U.S. Congress and the parliaments of the NATO member states now open up debate on the new strategy, as articulated in paragraphs 31, 41, 48, and 49 of the Alliance's "New Strategic Concept," adopted on April 24, 1999.

This having been said, it is necessary to return to the problem at hand: the evident failure of the existing NATO strategy to halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and to force Milosevic into submission to NATO's demands. As indicated, I believe that this strategy was adopted in haste, and that the consequences of haste was an imperfect strategy. It is now time to reconsider NATO's strategy, and devise a more realistic and effective alternative. Our goal must be to convince Serbian authorities to accept a less harsh version of the Rambouillet proposal—one that gives Albanian Kosovars local self-government and effective protection against Serbian aggression (guaranteed by an armed international presence), but without separating Kosovo from Serbia altogether. To get to this point, I propose a five-point strategy composed of the following: