only temporary; at the onslaught of the great Depression, the festering humiliation from the early 1920's resurged without restraint (Goodspeed 287).

The German elections of 1930 revealed increasing Nazi support. Party membership grew from 400,000 to 900,000, and Nazis claimed over a third of the seats in the Reichstag (Goodspeed 295). Nazi leaders such as Hitler used the humiliation and hardship caused by the Treaty of Versailles as a flash point for inciting German supremacy and desire for revenge among the German people (Goodspeed 273). The Nazi Secret Service offered employment to the nearly 6 million unemployed Germans who were turning to Nazism as a more secure alternative to the status quo (Goodspeed 295). Finally, the Enabling Act of 1933 passed in the Reichstag, giving Hitler absolute power for four years. With the entire nation under his whim, the Fuhrer could enact his dreams of a master race and German expansionism (Goodspeed 297).

While vengeance motivated the Treaty, moral concerns prevented the absolute destruction of Germany. Incidentally, it may have been this compromise that allowed Germany to reemerge as a global threat. As Machiavelli explains to Lorenzo De' Medici in *The Prince*, ''Whoever becomes the master of a city accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it may expect to be destroyed himself . . . In republics there is more life, more hatred, a greater desire for revenge; the memory of their ancient liberty does not and cannot let them rest . . .'' (48–49; ch. VI). The Treaty was enough to spark indignation in Germany, but not strong enough to prevent revenge. While annihilation of an enemy may be key to retaining power, reducing the humiliation of the enemy through reconstruction is morally superior and can ensure lasting peace.

After World War II, the Third Reich was disbanded, leaving the German in the hands of the Allies for the remainder of the year (Shirer 1139–40). The situation resembled the period following WWI, with the addition of threats of Communist aggression from the newly empowered Soviet Union. Reconstruction was necessary, but U.S. funds were scattered among the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Export-Import Bank and the United Nations. Two years and $9 billion later, exports were still down 41 percent from 1938 levels (Hogan 29–30).

In 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall introduced a plan ''directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos . . .'' (Marshall 23). In his speech, Marshall explained that lasting peace required a cohesive aid program to solve the economic roots of conflict (Marshall 23–24). The Marshall Plan was intended to avoid another German nationalist backlash and to create a stable democratic Europe to deter Soviet expansion (Hogan 27). Both objectives were well-founded in history. First, as a proven by the reduction of militarism in Germany after the Dawes Plan, economic stability checks the threat of militant nationalism. Also, just as German aggression in WWII occurred while Europe suffered from depression, economically weak nations are more likely to be attacked. Finally, Marshall aid would create confidence in capitalism, countering Soviet influence (Mee 248). With the intentions of Marshall Plan logically devised, economic success was all that was needed for the prevention of conflict.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 began U.S. action on Marshall's recommendations (Hogan 89). The Economic Endorsement Act made an international economic infrastructure a prerequisite for American aid; so the Committee for European Economic Cooperation was formed to develop a plan for European self-sufficiency (Hogan 124). Discussion in the 16-nation panel included the agriculture, mining, energy and transportation sectors of the economy, as well as recommendations for a more permenant regulatory body (Hogan 60–61). The resulting Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) included all Western European nations except Germany and directed the use of U.S. aid (Hogan 125–126).

Under OEEC, the United States poured aid dollars into Europe while increasing international trade through most-favored-nation agreements. The U.S. spent over $13 billion on aid—1.2 percent of the U.S. GNP (Mee 258, Wexler 249). Efficient use of funds made economic improvements drastic and swift. Between 1947 and 1951, Western Europe's GNP increased by nearly $40 billion, a 32 percent increase, and industrial production grew 40 percent above 1938 levels (Wexler 250–51). With Western Europe fortified, aid could safely be extended to Germany (Mee 239).

In addition to combating nationalism, German reconstruction created a buffer to communist East Germany and added industrial resources to the European economy. Still scarred from past invasions, France refused to allow Germany to sign the OEEC protocol in April 1948. Later, with U.S. pressure, Germany has included in trade and was given funds, making German reintegration a common goal (Hogan 129–130). By the fall of 1948, many issue shad been resolved and the Allies began to draft a framework for an independent, democratic West Germany. By 1964, Marshall aid increased foreign trade by 100 percent, boosted industrial production by 600% and reduced unemployment to a mere 0.4%. In Germany, the Marshall Plan had become more than just an aid package; it had jump-started production, preventing the conditions that spawned the Third Reich after W.W.I (Mee 256–57).

Today, American preventive action largely consists of sanctions to debilitate enemies or diluted aid policies that rely on handouts alone. The current situations of America's Cold War adversaries demonstrate the inadequacies of both policies. Like the Treaty of Versailles, America's continuing vendetta against Fidel Castro has produced decades of embargoes and hardship, but no signs of capitalist reform (Leeden 24). In the economically unstable Russia, current policies of IMF aid may seem similar to the Marshall Plan, but missing components will allow the ruble to continually devalue. Increased trade and regulatory body could permanently stimulate production, but dumping aid into a faulty infrastructure is temporary and wasteful (''Other Marshall Plan'' 29).

While the iron first of the Treaty of Versailles dragged the world into a second World War, the Marshall Plan broke the cycle of German aggression. Additionally, the reconstructed nations created a power balance that helped keep the Cold War from igniting a full-blown conflict. While they may intimidate some countries, harsh economic measures punish innocent civilians and will always pose the risk of a backlash. Nourishing free-trade policies address the root causes of many conflicts, promoting more permanent peace. History demonstrates the need to remove vengeance from preventative diplomacy and address the world's problems with a more wholistic, stabilizing approach.

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PERSONAL EXPLANATION

HON. ROBERT W. NEY

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 1, 1999

Mr. NEY. Mr. Speaker, on June 8, 1999, the House voted on the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies FY 2000 Appropriations Act. More specifically, when the vote on the Chabot amendment (rollcall No. 174) took place, I was unavoidably detained. The Chabot amendment would have sought to prohibit funding for Market Access Program allocations. If I was present, I would have voted ''no.''

SUMTER, SOUTH CAROLINA ROTARY CLUB DEVELOPS ''CART'' FUND

HON. JOHN M. SPRATT, JR.

OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 1, 1999

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, every day Alzheimer's disease claims more victims. Over four million Americans suffer from this dread disease, and scientists predict that unless cures are found, the number of victims will grow to fourteen million within the next twenty-five years. More people are also experiencing the tragedy second-hand as family members or friends of someone afflicted with Alzheimer's. They too feel helpless in the face of this awful illness. Options for treatment are limited, and care for the victim can be difficult and demanding. Family and friends become frustrated, not knowing what they can do.

The members of the Rotary Club in Sumter, South Carolina have found that there is something we can do. They have devised a technique to raise money for research, a technique so successful that I would like to share it with Congress and call attention to it, because what Rotarians have started in Sumter deserves to be copied across America.